COORDINATION WITHIN PEACEBUILDING INSTITUTIONS: THREE CASE STUDIES FROM RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN BRČKO, BOSNIA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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COORDINATION WITHIN PEACEBUILDING INSTITUTIONS: THREE CASE STUDIES FROM RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN BRČKO, BOSNIA

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The status of the Bosnian municipality of Brčko was the “toughest of all issues at Dayton.” Now seen as an unqualified success of American peacebuilding efforts in the Balkans, is the U.S. Brčko experience a model for inter-organizational coordination during future peacebuilding efforts? Most literature addressing the organization of peacebuilding institutions focus on the approach to stability and reconstruction. This study is unique in applying the emerging literature on interagency cooperation to peacebuilding. A theory emerges that there exists a coordination balance which allows for greatest efficiency and increased likelihood of reaching desired outcomes, whereas limited coordination increases the potential for unintended outcomes and excessive coordination constrains agencies and leads to rivalries among partners. This theory is tested through a comparative analysis of three case studies from early reconstruction efforts in Brčko. Given recent attention focused on the perceived failures of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the peacebuilding experience in Brčko presents a better model for the organization of future peacebuilding endeavors.

Peacebuilding, interagency, coordination, Bosnia, post-conflict, reconstruction, stability operations, IAD framework, Department of State, civ-mil

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
The status of the Bosnian municipality of Brčko was the “toughest of all issues at Dayton.” Now seen as an unqualified success of American peacebuilding efforts in the Balkans, is the U.S. Brčko experience a model for inter-organizational coordination during future peacebuilding efforts? Most literature addressing the organization of peacebuilding institutions focus on the approach to stability and reconstruction. This study is unique in applying the emerging literature on interagency cooperation to peacebuilding. A theory emerges that there exists a coordination balance which allows for greatest efficiency and increased likelihood of reaching desired outcomes, whereas limited coordination increases the potential for unintended outcomes and excessive coordination constrains agencies and leads to rivalries among partners. This theory is tested through a comparative analysis of three case studies from early reconstruction efforts in Brčko. Given recent attention focused on the perceived failures of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the peacebuilding experience in Brčko presents a better model for the organization of future peacebuilding endeavors.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The status of the Bosnian municipality of Brčko was the “toughest of all issues at Dayton,” threatening to derail the entire peace process up until the last moment (Holbrooke 1999, 296). The solution was to make the municipality a uniquely American rebuilding and reconciliation project. Now seen as an unqualified success of American peacebuilding efforts in the Balkans, is the Brčko experience a model for inter-organizational cooperation during future stabilization efforts? While most studies of peacebuilding institutions focus on the approach of those organizations, the object of this research is to examine the way the peacebuilding community organized itself to bring security and stability to one of Bosnia’s hardest hit municipalities.

A theory on inter-organizational coordination is built from a review of current literature of interagency coordination and peacebuilding institutions and personal experience supporting reconstruction efforts. This theory suggests that there exists a coordination balance that peacebuilding organizations should strive to achieve. Too little coordination increases the likelihood of unintended outcomes, while excessive coordination is inefficient. The plausibility of the theory is tested through the comparative analysis of three case studies from the Brčko experience which illustrate how peacebuilding organizations altered their approach to solve the same problem.

The success of peacebuilding operations is traditionally attributed to a combination of the following factors: the development of local political institutions; the continued prevalence of wartime legacies; the sequencing of the reform agenda; and the organizational approach of the peacebuilding community (Moore 2013, 17-32). While no
peacebuilding or stabilization effort can succeed without the compliance of the target population (Sullivan 2007), how the intervening actor organizes itself determines the ability of that third party to take advantage of favorable conditions to effectively implement a policy (O’Toole and Montjoy 1984), in this case secure the peace and strengthen domestic institutions.

This thesis differs from prior peacebuilding studies in its analysis of peacebuilding institutions. Prior studies on peacebuilding institutions focus on the approach taken by those institutions. That approach is normally considered to be “top-down” or “bottom-up” (Autesserre 2010; Moore 2013). Inter-organization coordination between peacebuilding agencies is rarely addressed. This paper will examine the way American and international intervening agencies organized themselves to implement the Dayton Accords in the first five years after the agreement. This period of the stabilization and reconstruction effort can be divided into two distinct periods: the deployment of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in the year and a half after the Dayton Accords; Brčko under the administration of the American Supervisor, from the First Award in 1997 until the creation of the Brčko District in 2000.

From this early stage of peacebuilding in Brčko, three case studies were selected to test the theory of inter-organizational coordination. Most studies of peacebuilding efforts usually conduct a comparative analysis of cases within the same country or from different peacebuilding efforts. This study is unique in that each case study stems from the same peacebuilding effort.

By setting the physical environment as the independent variable, it is possible to examine the differences in which the peacebuilding community organized itself to solve
the same problem. The location, actors, and underlying causes of conflict remain constant between each case study. However, each case study represents a different method of self-organization among intervening agencies. The first case shows what happens when agencies operate independently with limited coordination with other organizations. The final case demonstrates excessive coordination when organizations become rivals. Here, peacebuilding becomes secondary and coordination and process becomes an acceptable outcome. In between, peacebuilding organizations reached an appropriate level of coordination that this paper will refer to as the coordination balance. In this case study, organizations operated with a “functional interdependence” (Marcella 2008, 25) in which coordination increased individual capacity of each agency without hampering effectiveness. Coordination balance increases the likelihood of achieved desired outcomes, and minimizes the risk of unintended outcomes, referred to as uncertainty reduction (Bardach 1998).

Each case study from the intervention in Brčko will be examined through the application of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Polski and Ostrom 1999; Hess and Ostrom 2005; Gibson et al. 2005). Through the use of the framework, it is possible to further understand the local dynamics at play and how the interactions of the actors affected the outcome. An important adaptation to the framework has been developed for the use of this study. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the inter-organizational coordination in each case study, six evaluation criteria will be used: agency performance; unity of effort; efficiency; the attainment of desired outcomes; and uncertainty reduction.
The three case studies were selected based on the historical significance and the variance in coordination inherent in each case. The timeframe of each case is also important. The longest duration for these cases is six months, ensuring that the inter-organizational coordination approach did not change during the case. The first case revolves around IFOR’s establishment of the Arizona market to spur economic growth in a secure environment for all ethnicities. The second case looks at the government formation process that took place in the later months of 1997 under the direction of the newly arrived international Supervisor. The final case returns to the Arizona market, examining the initial attempt in 1999-2000 to regulate the market to increase revenue for the municipal government and curb extremist finance and trafficking.

Since its inception, the Arizona market has developed into a significant economic asset for the region and represents a benchmark achievement for IFOR initiative and leadership. However, the unilateral nature of the initiative led to administrative and security problems over the next four years. The case study shows that greater coordination with civilian agencies could have alleviated some of these issues from the beginning. This type of coordination was limited at that early time of Dayton implementation due to perceptions of the highly unstable post-conflict environment and lack of security limiting the presence of civilian agencies and civil society organizations. As an example of limited coordination, this case study demonstrates the increased probability of undesired outcomes through an inability to reduce uncertainty (Farrand 2011, 222-234; Parish 2010, 129-130; Moore 2013, 142-144).

Brčko’s government formation process took place in a much different organizational environment, demonstrating what is possible when coordination balance is
achieved. While the actors within the peacebuilding community remained constant, their organization and the rules that governed their actions had changed. IFOR had transitioned to SFOR (Stabilization Force). And most significantly the tribunal set up to deal with the Brčko issue after the signing of the Dayton Accords had made its first ruling in the future of the municipality. Brčko would remain independent of the new Serb and Muslim/Croat Entities. The First Award also called for the establishment of an international Supervisor to administer over the region until a final decision on Brčko’s future could be reached. The coordination balance in this case study allowed for the optimal performance of each agency, while providing a systematic process to voice concerns that mitigated the potential for unintended outcomes (Farrand 2011, 145-161).

The formation of a viable local government partner to aid in the reconstruction effort was the first—and perhaps most important—task of the new Supervisor. This process used voter registration, municipal elections, and a Supervisory Order mandating the multiethnic composition of the government to mitigate the effects of ethnic cleansing and the forced migration of people. Without the Supervisor’s intervention the raw election results would have consolidated Serb gains in the strategically important municipality and allow outside actors to continue to pursue their wartime objectives through political means (Moore 2013, 102-115; Leroux-Martin 2014, 198-219).

The final case examines the failed process to regulate the Arizona market in 1999 and early 2000. Again, the peacebuilding effort in Brčko had reorganized. The Office of the High Representative sought to exercise greater control over the Brčko office and increased coordination to accomplish this objective (Farrand 2011, 222; Parish 2010, 135). The desire to regulate the market was rooted in terms of the peacebuilding effort.
Since its inception, the market had become a center for black market goods, a source of finance to extremist political parties elsewhere in Bosnia and a hub for organized crime and trafficking. Bringing the market under municipal government control would increase government revenue and provide police security over the market (Farrand 2011, 222-25). Excessive coordination slowed the regulation process to a near standstill, eventually preventing resolution of the issue. The emphasis within each agency became focused on the actions of the other organizations instead of the task at hand. The threshold for coordination balance had been exceeded.

Examining these three episodes of the American intervention in Brčko will help to identify and analyze the effectiveness of peacebuilding institutions’ coordination mechanisms in Brčko. Several key patterns emerge. First, that while unity of effort is only achievable through coordination, there is a coordination threshold beyond which these efforts become inefficient. Secondly, an essential element to maintaining the coordination balance critical to ensuring effective operations is trust, which limits competition between intergovernmental actors and prevents encroachment upon the areas of responsibility of other agencies. Trust in the capabilities and an understanding of each actor’s motivations is necessary to mitigating the effects of the perverse incentives influencing the decision-making process of each actor.

The Supervisory regime was able to strike the appropriate coordination balance with SFOR and other U.S. government and international agencies. Finding the appropriate level of coordination was essential to each agency’s performance. The mechanisms that facilitated this coordination were strong but discreet, giving each agency the space to operate according to their specified tasks. In addition, the strong performance
of each agency formed the basis of the mutual respect and trust across the interagency spectrum. The Army’s ability to keep the peace and take initiative like the development of the Arizona market helped build trust in IFOR/SFOR capability, while the government formation process firmly established the Supervisor as the center of the peacebuilding effort. The result was an inter-organizational effort that efficiently prosecuted its mission to rebuild one of Bosnia’s most war ravaged regions (Parish 2010, 135-136).

The coordination balance had eroded, however, by the time the Brčko Supervisor turned his attention towards regulating the Arizona market in 1999. The coordination mechanisms originally designed to facilitate the free flow of information had become a constraint on efficient performance, rather than an aid to maximize each agency’s capabilities. Partner peacebuilding institutions had become rivals, and each sought to stake out turf as opposed to supporting a unified effort. In short, the mission to bring stability to Brčko had been replaced by a focus on coordination itself. The best outcome achievable in this circumstance is that the intervening institutions could somehow muddle through (Farrand 2011, 231-233).

Since 2003, the importance of coordination has gained attention from both scholars and practitioners alike in the wake of perceived peacebuilding failures in reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Friedman, Sapolsky, and Preble 2008). In both instances, breakdowns in the interagency process have blurred the lines of the responsibilities and capabilities of each agency. Within the American interagency process, the military is increasingly called upon to perform traditional State Department or USAID tasks, and the civilian agencies are becoming more expeditionary. The reaction has been to call for greater coordination. The Brčko experience illustrates, however, that
a better approach would be to seek out the appropriate level of coordination. More coordination does not necessarily lead to greater unity of effort, but perhaps can itself become paralyzing. In this context, a reexamination of the American led peacebuilding experience in Brčko would present a better model for future peacebuilding endeavors.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This study will rely on sources within three disciplines: peacebuilding; interagency coordination; and resources specific to the post-Dayton Brčko, Bosnia experience. Peacebuilding literature informs this research on the dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The interagency coordination literature draws from the application of management, public administration and organizational theory to the intergovernmental coordination and the policy process. The foundation of this study is the application of basic principles emerging from the interagency literature to the organizational dynamics of peacebuilding institutions. As this study will conduct a plausibility probe to test a theory on the limitations of coordination between peacebuilding institutions, the literature on the Brčko experience will provide the basis of the case studies from which this analysis is conducted.

Confusing the literature on peacebuilding is the variation in terminology ascribed to the practice of post-conflict reconstruction. Depending on the source discipline, peacebuilding literature can also be labeled as peacekeeping, stability operations or statebuilding. For the purpose of this study, the terms are interchangeable with the exception of peacebuilding and peacekeeping. This distinction arises from the focus on security (peacekeeping) (Fortna and Howard 2008) and the effort to address underlying causes of conflict, often through the building of domestic institutions (peacebuilding) (Barnett et al. 2007). According to Michael Barnett, peacebuilding is defined as “external interventions intended to reduce the risk that a state will erupt into or return to war”
Peacekeeping is often a prerequisite for peacebuilding; however, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive and can be pursued simultaneously.

Collectively, peacebuilding literature has sought to define the success or failure of peacebuilding efforts through analysis of four identified factors that contribute to the success of post-conflict interventions: the building or strengthening of local political institutions; the long term effects of wartime legacies; the sequencing of reconstruction tasks; and the best practices and organizational approach of the intervening actors (Moore 2013, 4, 18-32). This literature focusing on the act of peacebuilding interventions can be supplemented by the work of Virginia Fortna and Patricia Sullivan to better understand the local dynamics at play during reconstruction efforts. Fortna addresses the question of why combatants often return to war after a negotiated settlement and the role of the outside peace “broker” to guide the process (Fortna and Howard 1999). As peacebuilding can be described as an application of coercive power in which an intervening power must seek the compliance of the target population to achieve its political objective, Sullivan’s theory on why strong states often lose to “weaker” states (Sullivan 2007) helps illustrate the local dynamics affecting peacebuilding operations.

Peacebuilding literature reflects the modern international trend of post-conflict reconstruction, characterized by Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk as experimental (Paris and Sisk 2009). Peacebuilding consists of a complex weave of interrelated objectives which includes the social transition from conflict to peace, a political transition from non-existent or weak governance to effective governance and an economic transition from violent competition to a more equitable and transparent distribution of wealth (Paris and Sisk 2009, 1-4). To approach these challenges in a more systematic way, the
peacebuilding community has largely agreed upon four categories of activities that must be pursued to address the underlying causes of conflict and bring lasting stability. Those categories are: security and military; social, economic and humanitarian; political and diplomatic; and justice and reconciliation (Barnett et al. 2007, 46).

These categories of peacebuilding activities are pervasive enough that they form the basis of U.S. Army doctrine with regards to stability operations. Adapted from the State Department (Department of the Army 2012, 2-33), these “lines of effort” equate to security, rule of law, essential services (humanitarian assistance and social well-being), governance, and sustainable economic development (Department of the Army 2012, 2-6, 7, 8). While the State Department is the lead for stability operations (Marcella 2008; ADRP 3-07, 2-6), the assignment of specific tasks within that framework is the result of the interagency process (Marcella 2008). This aspect of the interagency is well represented in the interagency coordination literature emerging from the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (notably Friedman, Sapolsky, and Preble 2008). While that literature examines both the policy process and operational coordination within the interagency, what is still needed is the application of these principles across the spectrum of peacebuilding institutions.

The area of peacebuilding literature most applicable to understanding the organizational aspects of post-conflict reconstruction efforts is focused on the lessons learned from previous endeavors and organizational approach. However, the focus of these studies tend to revolve around a current debate on the overall operational approach of peacebuilding efforts—not on how intervening actors can better organize themselves to maximize their capabilities. The debate to date has shown the fallacies of traditional top-
down or bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding and has instead proposed an integrated approach (Autesserre 2010; Moore 2013, 29-32).

Only a small number of works seek to address coordination among peacebuilding institutions. Anna Herrhausen writes in 2007 on the need for a “concerted effort” to address coordination issues within the United Nations. Herrhausen claims that the UN’s previous methods of organization did not lead to a more coherent presence and proposed that an application of network theory could help address coordination issues. Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk would apply organizational theory to the complexities of coordination in “The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations” (2009). Combined with the literature on interagency coordination, the work of Paris and Sisk and Herrhausen help form the basis of a new theory on the pitfalls of excessive coordination within peacebuilding institutions.

The literature addressing interagency coordination is on the rise in the wake of perceived policy failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. The literature is a combination of scholarly works, prescriptions based on the experience of practitioners, or the critics of pundits (Lira 2010). Additionally, works focusing on interagency coordination draw extensively from the fields of public administration (organizational theory), political science (community dynamics), and management (social tendencies such as culture and leadership). Interagency coordination literature typically examines two primary facets of coordination—the need for coordination and recommendations on how to do it better. These two aspects of coordination are examined in the context of either the policy process or coordination between agencies at the operational level (Lira 2010).
The most common reference to the interagency process applies to the decision making process at the National Security Council (NSC) designed to formulate policy. The NSC is the designated arbitrator of interagency conflicts at the strategic level, with the power to task the agencies involved and propose new policies to the President. Despite endemic tensions between the NSC and executive agencies, owing in part to the NSC’s role as the policy maker of the administration and the agencies’ role as the implementers of that policy (Marcella 2008, 15-16; Whittaker 2008; Stuart 2008), the NSC remains an effective facilitator of the interagency process (Lira 2010). Criticisms of the interagency process, therefore, often address the failure of an administration’s policy as opposed to the bureaucratic process of the NSC. The exception is when the organizational culture and funding priorities are cited as causes of dysfunction within the interagency (Miles 2013). These differences can lead to competition and rivalries between agencies, complicating the role of the NSC (Rast 2004; Olson 2008).

The other arena addressed by the literature on interagency coordination focus on coordination at the operational level. This literature generally makes one of two cases. The first is the basic need for interagency coordination—why must various agencies coordinate with each other in the first place? The second case is a call for improved coordination to meet the need identified by the first category of literature. This segment of literature on the interagency examines the challenges inhibiting coordination. This research is unique both in its application of coordination literature to peacebuilding, but also in proposing a theory suggesting that excessive coordination does not improve performance.
The need for interagency coordination arises when the government seeks to address complex and interrelated problems. Executive agencies possess specific policy implementation roles based on their capabilities and limitations. Citing Bernardo Kliksberg and Arturo Israel, Rodrigo Serrano views interagency coordination as an “essential condition” supporting an “improved institutional framework” for dealing with complex problems (Serrano and Brakarz 2003, 2). Hindrances to coordination arise based on institutional culture (Miles 2013), protection of perceived turf (Olson 2008), information flow (Fukuyama and Shulsky 1997), the impact of interpersonal relationships (McKeown 2001), and agency capacity (Lira 2010). Whereas the NSC possesses the power to create policy, the collective government agencies still do not have an established system to coordinate on the implementation of policy (Lira 2010). Serrano also suggests that too many actors and too many assigned tasks can lead to a breakdown in the interagency process (Serrano and Brakarz 2003, 12), hinting at a key finding of this paper—that excessive coordination can be just as harmful to the unity of effort as no coordination. To sum up the challenges facing the interagency, Leonard Lira lists: (1) Rules; (2) Structures; (3) Authorities; and (4) Politics (2007, 47).

These challenges to effective interagency coordination are factors that hinder good coordination. This situation leads to what William Olsen terms the coordination fallacy, that despite the consensus opinion that coordination is necessary, individual agencies do not wish to coordinate. Although Olsen stresses the need for coordination and suggests that turf wars and agency rivalries restrain coordination, Olsen’s perspective is useful to this study in its view of coordination as a bona fide goal of the interagency. Olsen’s coordination fallacy is a planning consideration that must be accounted for in the
interagency, though he stops short of addressing the limits or potential harmful effects of excessive coordination (Olsen 2008, 225-226).

Proposed solutions to the interagency approach to national security issues include the interagency equivalent of the Goldwater-Nichols act that mandated the current joint nature of American military operations (Roche 2013); and the creation of a new federal government level agency specifically tasked with contingency operations (Sarkar 2012). Sarkar looked at the effectiveness of the U.S. initiative to create Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq and Afghanistan and advocates for the proposed solution that came from SIGIR—a new crisis oriented nation-building entity within the U.S. government (Sarkar 2012). Meanwhile, Olson argues that what is needed now is a “National Security Reorganization Act” which would re-examine the incentive structure for agencies to participate more cordially in the interagency process (2008).

In “Understanding the Interagency Process: the Challenge of Adaption,” Gabriel Marcella (2008) argues in favor of improved interagency coordination citing the “imperative of strategic integration.” Marcella believes that “no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone” (2008, 25). To achieve a cohesive government effort, Marcella argues for what he terms “functional interdependence.” Functional interdependence is the means by which the individual stakeholders in an issue are related, taking into account each agency’s resources, personnel and expertise. Importantly, Marcella notes the importance of each stakeholder limiting its activities to its own “jurisdiction” (2008, 25-28). For the purpose of this study, functional interdependence is a defining characteristic of an interagency or inter-organizational effort that has achieved coordination balance.
Writing in the late 1990s, the works of Eugene Bardach and Arturo Israel are significant in their application of organizational theory to the issue of coordination. Israel suggested that there is a correlation between institutional capacity and coordination, arguing that coordination is impossible when institutions are weak. In this case, Israel shows that convergence and integration are preferable to coordination, leading to institutional relationships that are more consultative than collaborative. Israel characterized this consultative relationship by the use of minimum coordination mechanisms (Israel 1997, 26).

Meanwhile, Bardach advocated for a more results oriented management approach to coordination, viewing coordination as a necessary tool. To Bardach, a defining characteristic of effective coordination is the potential to mitigate unintended outcomes. For organizations exercising proper coordination, risk and the unknown are viewed as opportunities. Bardach terms this characteristic “uncertainty reduction” (Bardach 1998).

The final major component of the literature review relevant to this study focuses on the peacebuilding efforts in Brčko, Bosnia. As the longest current peacebuilding effort today (Paris and Sisk 2009), much has been written regarding the international community’s efforts to bring peace and stability to Bosnia. Less is known about efforts in Brčko municipality, despite the significance of the region.

Not all literature detailing reconstruction efforts in Bosnia are applicable to the Brčko experience. Brčko is similar to the rest of the country only in the root causes that lead to the outbreak of violence during the war and the effect of wartime legacies on reconciliation efforts. For this reason, it is important to this study to carefully select
Brčko specific sources or broader Bosnia related sources that have a direct relevance to Brčko.

Among studies focusing on peacebuilding efforts, this study is unique in that all three case studies come from the same physical location with the same actors. To provide context and attributes of the physical environment of Brčko municipality, this study makes use of the local reporting of international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Brčko at that time. These reports take the form of project reports, financial reports, and regular reports from the various entities and international organizations working in Bosnia at the time. These institutions include, but are not limited to, OSCE, USAID, Office of the High Representative (OHR), Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia, International Organization for Migration, International Crisis Group (ICG), and the European Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM). These accounts help provide an in depth accounting of conditions in Brčko following the war in Bosnia and the outcome of peacebuilding efforts.

Peacebuilding efforts throughout Bosnia were guided by the Dayton Peace Accord. The accords were detailed in their roadmap for bringing peace to Bosnia and address the perceived root causes of the conflict. Implementation of the Dayton Accord was the first and foremost objective of peacebuilding institutions in Brčko, despite the fact that Brčko’s status was left unresolved by the agreement. Later rules by the arbitration court mandated by Dayton to rule on its status formed the basis of the rules-in-use that established and set the parameters for the primary peacebuilding institution in Brčko—the Supervisory administration (OHR 1997).
A combination of personal accounts and scholarly works are useful in the identification of primary actors and their patterns of interaction. Several firsthand accounts exist by prominent figures of the peacebuilding effort. Most useful of these personal accounts were written by Brčko’s first Supervisor, Ambassador William Farrand, LTC Anthony Cuculo, and Colonel Gregory Fontenot. Both Cuculo and Fontenot were U.S. Army officers who commanded IFOR units in Brčko immediately after the Dayton Accords. For the most part, these works represent personal narratives that focus on those individuals’ specific role. As works by highly experienced practitioners, these accounts provide valuable insight into the conditions each person found in Brčko and their own actions to implement the Dayton Accords (Cuculo 1998; Fontenot 2007; Farrand 2011). Finally, former legal officer at OHR’s Brčko office, Mathew Parish, provides the most comprehensive account of reconstruction efforts in Brčko (Parish 2010).

As 3-5 Task Force commander, then-LTC Anthony Cuculo was one of the first to arrive in Brčko as part of the IFOR contingent tasked with stabilization operations in the area just after the Dayton Accords. Cuculo’s account was written in 1998 as part of an Army War College Strategy Research Project, and focused strictly on the military’s role as a third party to peacebuilding efforts (Cuculo 1998). Similarly, the article published in *Military Review* in 2006 by Cuculo’s commanding officer—Col. Gregory Fontenot—focused on the U.S. Army’s deployment as part of the NATO led IFOR (Fontenot 2007). Throughout Bosnia, IFOR was focused on forcing what Moore calls a “negative peace,” or rather, the absence of fighting (Moore 2013, 13). The IFOR experience in Brčko differed, however, causing Cuculo and Fontenot to look beyond their mission parameters.
and seek to improve security through rudimentary reconciliation steps. As part of this effort, Cuculo and Fontenot were the officers responsible for the creation of the Arizona market, which forms the first case study in this paper.

On the civilian side, the most prominent personal account is the recent book of the first Supervisor, Ambassador Robert W. Farrand. Similar to the way that Cuculo and Fontenot’s account focused primarily on efforts within their areas of responsibility, Farrand’s account is limited mostly to the civilian effort in Brčko (2011). Though limited, Farrand does offer a glimpse into the coordination efforts between the military and the civilian implementation unit and how these efforts aided in the success of their mission. Farrand does go into great depth regarding coordination between his office, the OHR main office in Sarajevo, the State Department and local officials.

Ambassador Farrand was posted to Brčko in 1997 shortly after the first ruling of the arbitration court. He stayed in the position for 36 months until the establishment of the Brčko District in accordance with the Final Award. Farrand’s book only covers the three years he was in Bosnia, and gives little insight into the peacebuilding efforts that preceded his arrival. By the time Farrand arrived in Brčko, IFOR had given way to SFOR and the rulings of the Brčko arbitral tribunal had forged a new set of rules for reconstruction efforts in the municipality.

The account of the reconstruction effort in Brčko written by Matthew Parish in 2010 attempts to bridge the gap between personal narrative and scholarly analysis. Parish was a lawyer working with OHR in Bosnia from 2005 to 2007, and his work attempts to tell the story of Brčko over the previous decade and place it in context of historical interventions. Parish’s book helps shape the image of the successes achieved by the
civilian implementation unit, specifically with regards to reviving the economy and encouraging the return of displaced persons and refugees (Parish 2010, 118-134). A review of Parish’s book by Robert Hayden notes that the book focuses mostly on the international legal complications of peacebuilding efforts, and that Parish’s “nostalgia for past empires provides an odd perspective on state building, to say nothing of reconstructing a divided society” (Hayden 2011).

The primary scholarly work touching on the Brčko question is Adam Moore’s “Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns” (2013). Moore provides an overview of peacebuilding literature, and seeks to understand the causes in variation of success in reconstruction efforts in Brčko and Bosnia’s other divided city—Mostar. Moore analyzes the approach of the intervention, and the effectiveness of the peacebuilding community to build strong domestic institutions (Moore 2013). Moore concludes that a number of localized factors contributed to the success or failure of peacebuilding in Brčko and Mostar, most notably the decision in Brčko to delay municipal elections until strong domestic institutions could take root as opposed to Mostar where elections validated wartime gains (Moore 2013, 4-11).

By examining the combined literature in the areas of peacebuilding and interagency cooperation a potential theory arises regarding the pitfalls of excessive coordination. To further examine the validity of this theory on the coordination balance, three case studies have been chosen from the Brčko reconstruction experience for further examination.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this paper is to explore the interagency coordination process during reconstruction efforts in Brčko, Bosnia, in order to test the plausibility of a new theory on coordination between peacebuilding institutions. The research will build the coordination balance theory then conduct a plausibility probe through a comparative analysis of three case studies. The analysis of each case study will employ the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which will assist in breaking out the separate components, actors, structures and incentive factors that characterized the type of coordination present. Finally, each case study will be evaluated based on six criteria: agency performance; unity of effort; efficiency; the likelihood of reaching desired outcomes; and the capacity for uncertainty reduction.

The coordination balance theory is built from a series of logical steps that combines the scholarly literature pertaining to peacebuilding and interagency coordination and my own experience as a practitioner supporting peacebuilding efforts in several countries. The resultant coordination balance theory suggests that there exist an appropriate level of coordination that improves efficiency, promotes unity of effort, increases the likelihood of reaching stated desired outcomes, and mitigates the potential for harmful second and third order effects. This appropriate level of coordination represents a coordination balance, where with limited coordination increases uncertainty by restraining information flow between partners and excessive coordination creates an atmosphere of competition wherein coordination supplants the stated objective.
Research focused on the success or failure of peacebuilding efforts typically conducts comparative analysis of case studies in two ways: interstate or cross-country (Moore 2013, 11). Interstate comparative analysis focus on separate case studies from within the same country and conflict. Cross-country comparative analysis compare case studies derived from different conflicts in different countries. This study is unique in that all three case studies are taken from not just the same country and conflict, but the same location. This allows for a better understanding of the institutional dynamics at play in the peacebuilding community by setting the physical environment of Brčko as the independent variable.

The conflict in Bosnia was driven by structural, institutional, ideational and psychological causal stories. In addition, the implosion of the Yugoslav state removed that element of control that stabilized certain master and local cleavages (notably between Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Bosnian Muslims). These causal claims continue to drive the political process in Bosnia to this day, and consistently hinder efforts to implement the Dayton Accords (Leroux-Martin 2014, 119). This study focuses strictly on an institutional causal claim related to the effect of the rules governing the actions of intervening agencies on the outcome of peacebuilding outcomes.

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1 For a discussion of these four causal logics, see Craig Parson’s *How to Map Arguments in Political Science*, 2007.

2 Stathis Kalyvas laid out his theory of causes of local violence during civil wars in *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*, 2006. Kalyvas’ theory revolves around the existence of master and local cleavages which are kept in check by an element of control from higher authorities, asserting that localized violence during conflicts is a rational phenomenon.
Through each case study, the elements within the environment that impacted the reconstruction effort remained constant. Those factors include the municipality of Brčko, local actors, the demographics of the local population, lingering wartime legacies of the population, and the participating peacebuilding institutions. What changed significantly between each case study is the organizational approach of the peacebuilding community. This plausibility probe therefore compares three separate approaches to addressing the same problem, allowing for the isolation of the institutional causal logics that contributed to the success of peacebuilding efforts in Brčko.

The Brčko reconstruction effort is unique in a number of ways, namely the distinctly American nature of the intervention (Parish 2010, 58, 135, 176), the separation between peacebuilding at the municipal and national levels (Moore 2013, 30), and the unqualified success achieved in the area (ICG 2003). The political objectives of the international community after the Dayton Accords required the use of coercive power to promote reconciliation and alleviate the underlying causes of the war. Therefore, ultimate success or failure of intervening forces depended primarily on the compliance of the local population to adhere to the international community’s concept of peace and stability in the region. The willingness of the local population to comply is an underlying factor that presents the opportunity for the success of the peacebuilding operation. The effect of these local dynamics on peacebuilding efforts throughout Bosnia are well represented in the literature (Moore 2013; Bieber 2006; Pickering 2007). The comparative analysis of

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3The theory of what type of force is needed to accomplish political objectives was developed by Patricia Sullivan in her article “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful State Lose Limited Wars,” 2007, wherein Sullivan argues that nations intervening to achieve political objective that need the compliance of the local population to be successful require the application of coercive force.
these case studies from the Brčko experience is specifically designed to demonstrate how the organizational approach contributed to the intervening actors’ ability to take advantage of the opportunities presented by local compliance to promote stability.

The international intervention in Brčko—and Bosnia in general—began within days of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995. Peacebuilding efforts continue in some capacity until today. Regarding Brčko, reconstruction efforts can be divided into three primary periods: IFOR’s peacekeeping mission, 1995-1997; the Supervisory regime after the First Award, 1997-2000; the current period since establishment of the Brčko District in accordance with the Final Award, 2000-present. For the purpose of this study, I will focus solely on the first two periods, or rather, the first five years of reconstruction efforts in Brčko.

The reason for focusing on the initial five year timeframe is that these are the years when American agencies exercised the highest level of control over peacebuilding efforts in Brčko. Until the establishment of the District, local governance was non-existent or weak and the local dynamics within the municipality remained largely unchanged. Local partners were few and limited in their capacity. In addition, although initially the security situation prevented other international organizations from conducting normal operations within the region, the peacebuilding actors and their stated responsibilities were constant. Lastly, the broader international effort—which revolved around OHR—was focused at the larger issues throughout Bosnia during this timeframe, despite the universal recognition of the volatility of the region and the likelihood that Brčko’s unresolved status might ignite renewed conflict.
The other reason for focusing on solely the first five years of intervention in Brčko is the potential of the effort to be replicated elsewhere. Here, a distinction is made between the broader international effort in Bosnia and the American-led effort in Brčko. On the strategic level, the Peace Implementation Council that came together to implement the Dayton Accords consisted of 55 countries and oversaw an organization in OHR that was developed specific to Bosnia. The High Representative wields extreme authoritarian powers, up to and including the ability to fire elected officials—even the President or Prime Minister. The possession of these powers and the international backing behind them presents a system of intervention that is highly unlikely to ever been repeated. The international approach to Bosnia is neither sustainable nor replicable, whereas on the operational level the American approach to Brčko might be more relevant to policymakers in the wake of peacebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The three cast studies that form the basis of this plausibility probe were selected to illustrate the nature of the peacebuilding approach to the intervention. In addition, the following criteria were followed in the selection of these cases:

1. The historical significance of the event within the context of Brčko’s post-conflict development;
2. The availability of data within existing literature to complete the study;
3. The degree of variance in the type of coordination present from one case to the other, in order to show how the evolving rules shaping interagency coordination affected the outcome; and
4. The duration of each episode, which was short enough that the organizational approach to each case remained constant throughout the case.
To each of these case studies, I will apply the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to further examine the elements and factors at play in the environment, the actors and their motivations, their patterns of interactions, and finally, the outcomes from each decision-making process. Each of these action arenas represents a different organizational approach to reconstruction efforts in Brčko. The development of the Arizona market in 1996 is characterized as an example of limited coordination, while the regulation of the market in 1999 illustrates the effects of excessive coordination. The government formation process in 1997 is an example of when institutions achieve coordination balance.

This review of interagency coordination from the time that IFOR entered Brčko through the full transition of authority to the first international Supervisor and finally to the creation of the Brčko District—will reveal whether the subsequent success of Brčko’s recovery can be linked directly to the efforts of the U.S. Army, Department of State, and their peacebuilding partner institutions. If so, then Brčko may very well present a viable reference example for the future conduct of interagency peacebuilding efforts and stability operations.

Application of the IAD Framework

The peacebuilding effort in Brčko required the input of numerous stakeholders. As such the IAD framework is an important tool to examine how these actors approached the problems in Brčko and analyze the rules put in place to address those problems. Through the use of this framework, this study will identify and analyze the way that the peacebuilding institutions in Brčko organized themselves within the broader international
context to successfully intervene to bring peace, stability and later prosperity to one of
Bosnia’s most hard-hit communities.

The IAD framework, developed over the past forty years by Elinor Ostrom, is the
ideal instrument for this study as the framework is specifically designed to reveal all the
factors and elements at play within an environment that contribute to an outcome within a
given action arena. The framework is particularly useful when a study is attempting to
find out why one system works in one action situation but not in another (Hess and
Ostrom 2005, 37).

There are three ways to conduct a study using the IAD framework, beginning with
either the action arena, the outcome, or the underlying factors that influenced the process
(Hess and Ostrom 2005, 7). With regards to interagency cooperation in Brčko, the
outcomes and underlying factors are largely known. The way the actors interacted within
the action arena to arrive at those outcomes is not. Therefore, the IAD framework in this
study will help link interagency coordination with known outcomes. To this framework,
the above evaluation criteria will be applied to further analysis the effectiveness of the
coordination present within each case study. This will help determine to what extent the
organization of intervening agencies contributed to successes or failures within the Brčko
reconstruction effort.

Although the IAD framework was initially developed in the 1970’s, it has evolved
over time. For the purposes of this study, I have referred to the version of the IAD
framework that appears in Clark Gibson’s “The Samaritan’s Dilemma” (Gibson et al.
2005), supplemented by the workshop paper Ostrom co-wrote with Margaret Polski
methodology is outlined on how best to apply the framework to achieve research objectives. The questions used in this study of the intervention agencies in Brčko were adapted from the definition of terms and suggested questions outlined in that paper (see Appendix 1).

Applying the IAD framework to examine the patterns of interaction that lead to the three events this study will help gauge the efficiency of those processes. However, given that this study focuses specifically on interagency cooperation at the local level, it is important to contextualize the patterns of interaction within the broader international intervention in Bosnia. This context will help to identify the various perverse incentives at play within each agency (and often within each practitioner inside those agencies), and how those influences created path dependencies affecting their actions. Here, Gibson’s “The Samaritan’s Dilemma” is helpful once again.

Gibson utilizes Ostrom’s concept of rules-in-use to provide a basic framework for examining the levels of interaction that occur within an operating environment. These levels are the constitutional, collective-choice, and operational (Gibson et al. 2005, 138). The constitutional level equates to the macro level, and refers to the laws and policies that define the basic purpose and parameters of the intervention. In the Brčko case, this most often refers back to the Dayton Peace Accords and the broader alignment of interested countries in the form of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). The collective-choice level relates to the institutional rules-in-use that define the procedures and regulations that guide how agencies conduct themselves at the lower levels. In Brčko, the rules in place that characterize the collective-choice level are the rulings of the arbitration court on Brčko’s status and the rules of engagement determined by NATO that guided IFOR
and SFOR. Finally, on the operational, or local, level—represents the rules that define how the agents of intervening organizations apply the higher policy to specific activities (Gibson et al. 2005, 138-140; Hess and Ostrom 2005, 9, 15).

In sum, the IAD framework provides a comprehensive way of looking at the context, the action arena, the patterns of interaction and the outcomes (see Appendix 2). Within the context, the framework examines the physical environment, attributes of the community, and the rules-in-use by the institutions present. The action arena looks more closely at the actors present and their motivations, alongside the action situations that cause these actors to interact. Through the actors’ perceived incentives, their patterns of interaction will result in specific outcomes which then feed back into the context by altering the environment in some way. Into this framework I have added the shock—or trigger—that precipitated the event or decision-making cycle. The framework was applied individually to each action situation that comprised the three case studies examined in Chapter 4: the development of the Arizona market, the government formation process, and the regulation of the Arizona market.

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4William Connolly in The Fragility of Things, 2013, suggests that events are an accumulation of interacting open systems, their clash representing a shock to the overall system that precipitates a change in the environment or new events.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Coordination Balance Theory

This chapter will test the plausibility of a new theory on coordination balance and the inefficiency of excessive coordination. This theory was developed through an inductive process of logical steps. This process begins with Elinor Ostrom’s theory of collective-action situations and combined with the CATO institute’s suggestion that there may be limits to coordination and my personal experience as a practitioner supporting peacebuilding efforts in several countries. Laurence O’Toole’s application of organizational theory to policy implementation is another essential building block of the coordination balance theory.

Ostrom and Clark Gibson describe collective-action situations and collective-action problems in “The Samaritan’s Dilemma.” Collective-action situations are defined as any situation where a “desired joint outcome requires the input of several individuals” (Gibson et al. 2005, 15). This concept based on the need for stakeholders to take joint action to achieve outcomes is in line with O’Toole’s application of organizational theory to coordination (O’Toole and Montjoy 1984). Both sources posit that nearly all forms of relationships require some degree of collective-action in order to be productive.

Any hindrance to achieving desired outcomes in a collective-action situation becomes a collective-action problem. These problems arise when stakeholders within the collective-action situation pursue interests or choose to take actions that are less advantageous than other options available to them (Gibson et al. 2005, 15). Coordination is often prescribed as a solution to collective-action problems, although coordination
itself can also be problematic as actors seek to divert collective returns to themselves or act in accordance with built-in perverse incentives (Gibson et al. 2005, 15). Collective-action problems are exacerbated by a preponderance of stakeholders, whereas the probability of reaching desired outcomes is “expected to decrease as the number of [actors] increases” (O’Toole and Montjoy 1984). Collective-action situations are inherently complex and dynamic, and as such collective-action problems often result in diminishing returns as perverse incentives tend to be “self-reinforcing” (Gibson et al. 2005, 15).

When examining the lessons the US government should take from Iraq reconstruction efforts, the CATO Institute suggested that coordination has its limits. CATO believes that the stakeholders that comprise the interagency possess different capabilities, objectives and interests for a reason. CATO views the interagency as the “arena where society’s competing ends contend,” and that only through the divergent preferences of the interagency can effective policy be developed. In the end, the problem that plagued Iraq peacebuilding efforts was “not too little unity [of effort] but too much” (Friedman, Sapolsky, and Preble 2008).

My own experience as a practitioner supporting US government peacebuilding efforts supports the view that there is a limit to coordination. Self-reinforcing perverse incentives are pervasive and inherent in collective-action situations (Gibson et al. 2005, 15-16). To achieve greater unity of effort, coordination is necessary. In instances when unity of effort persists as a collective-action problem, the conclusion inherently is often a call for greater coordination. Soon, effective coordination supplanted mission objectives
as the inter-organizational goal. The drive for greater efficiency compounded joint efforts resulting in inefficiency.

The resultant coordination balance theory is that excessive coordination can be just as harmful as a lack of coordination in collective-action situations. In order to increase the probability of achieving desired outcomes, coordination between peacebuilding institutions must be balanced. Balanced coordination should provide an appropriate level of coordination that improves individual agencies’ performance and maximizes the benefits of coordination while maintaining focus on desired outcomes (see figure below).

Figure 1. Coordination Balance Theory

Source: Created by author.
Brčko Overview

The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995 and the subsequent entrance of the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) into Bosnia marked a period of political uncertainty for one of Bosnia’s most war-ravaged regions. One of the final “red button” issues that threatened to derail the negotiations, the strategically positioned Brčko municipality was considered too contentious to be settled during peace talks and threatened to derail the process until the very last moments (Daalder 2000, 127). The solution was to effectively remove the issue from the equation by deferring Brčko’s status to an arbitration court that would revisit the question at a later date (Holbrooke 1999, 308,358).

The issue was complicated by Brčko’s strategic location linking the two halves of the Serbian Entity Republika Srpska, the municipality’s physical linking of two noncontiguous parts of the Muslim and Croat Federation Entity, and the continued nearby presence of large communities from each of Bosnia’s warring ethnicities (Farrand 2011, 2). Whereas during the war large numbers of displaced Croats went to Mostar and Muslims went to Sarajevo, many Serbs went to Brčko (ICG 2003; Farrand 2011, 2; Parish 2010, 42). The dispute over Brčko became intractable, as each major ethnic group came to see the municipality as essential to its survival (Holbrooke 1999, 296, 303-305).

As per the Dayton Accords, the arbitration tribunal would decide the fate of the Brčko municipality one year after the signing of the general accord (OHR). The tribunal would consist of one international member and a representative from each entity. The objective of the tribunal was to weigh the circumstances on the ground and the political disputes surrounding Brčko, and to rule on the status of the municipality. The court ruling
would “award” Brčko to one of the two entities. But while the tribunal’s mandate gave it the authority to rule as it saw fit, the volatile nature of dispute meant that any award of Brčko to either entity could potentially restart the conflict (Parish 2010, 43, 54). Holbrooke had bet that the security situation in Brčko would ease enough during the intervening year to allow space for resolution of the issue—it had not. As a result, the arbitration process “did not run smoothly” at all (Farrand 2011, 5-8).

When the tribunal finally offered its initial ruling on Brčko’s status in February 1997, the First Arbitration Award did exactly what the Dayton Accord had done—postponed a final decision on the issue. During the proceedings, both entity representatives had sought to argue their claim to the municipality. Serbs pointed to facts on the ground while Bosniaks and Croats argued that to award Brčko to the Serbs would be “unconscionable,” validating the ethnic cleansing of the city (Farrand 2011, 6). The tribunal declared that it was “unable” to resolve the issue at that time and that “any ‘simple’ solution must be rejected in favor of an approach that is consistent with the law and equity” (OHR 1997a).

Instead of resolving the issue, the First Award (also referred to as the Rome Award) established international Supervision of Brčko. The Supervisor would operate under the auspices of the international community, and similar to the High Representative in Sarajevo, would hold administrative authority over the municipality. According to the ruling, the creation of the Supervisor was in line with its ruling that any approach to the Brčko issue must be “designed [to] gradually relieve the underlying tensions and lead to a stable . . . solution” (OHR 1997a).
The tribunal would eventually rule twice more. The second, or Supplemental Award would be made in March 1998, cited the failure of the Republika Srpska and Federation entities to comply with the provisions of the Dayton Accord. The Supplemental Award therefore set the conditions for a continuation of the Supervisory regime, noting significant progress in establishing freedom of movement, the return of refugees and displaced, economic revitalization and the formation of a multiethnic municipal government (Farrand 2011, 8-12; OHR 1998). Issued exactly one year later, the court proposed a final status for Brčko and an end to the arbitral process.

The Final Award established Brčko as a district separate from the two Bosnian entities created by the Dayton Accords (OHR 1999a). The tribunal noted the continued failure of Serb authorities to move the Dayton implementation forward, and took into consideration the willingness of all parties to keep the Supervisory regime in place. However the tribunal believed that a definitive ruling on the political status of Brčko was needed to continue to move reconciliation efforts forward (OHR 1999a). The Brčko District would officially be established on March 8, 2000.

According to the final ruling, the District would be neither its own entity, nor belong to either the Republika Srpska or Federation. Brčko would be “subject to the powers of the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” but that the entities would delegate all other powers of governance to the District (OHR 1999a). The Final Award also set the official boundaries of the District (OHR 1999a; Parish 2010, 116-117). The final ruling remains controversial until today, as scholars and practitioners alike continue to debate the effect of the Final Award on the relationship between the
District, the entities, and the federal government (Moore 2013, 137-139; Parish 2010, 105-109).

Immediately after the Dayton Accords while the arbitration process was still getting underway, the U.S. would focus primarily on stabilization operations. Eventually, American support would expand to provide civilian administration of the municipality beginning with the First Award and the establishment of the international Supervisor for Brčko. Despite IFOR’s international flavor due to its NATO affiliation, the force sent to Brčko was distinctly American (Fontenot 2007; Cuculo 1998). The arbitration tribunal set up to resolve the question of Brčko’s eventual status was headed by an American. And after the First Award called for an international Supervisor to govern the municipality, that person would be an American as well. The dominance of American officials in the handling of the Brčko issue—from Dayton and continuing through the arbitration process—has lead to the perception that Brčko had become an “experimental American neo-colonial mini-project” (Parish 2010, 58).

Officially established under the umbrella of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the U.S. government appointed an American diplomat to fill the role of Supervisor. The Supervisor therefore answered to two masters—to Washington as an American Foreign Service Officer, and to Sarajevo as one of the Deputy High Representatives. The awards also outlined the parameters for the international administration of Brčko by giving the future Supervisor extraordinary powers. The Supervisor would be empowered to issue binding orders that superseded local laws, and would be the ultimate authority to de-conflict existing laws and government decisions. Brčko’s Supervisor would eventually carry final executive and legislative powers in the
municipality. American supervision of Brčko would continue until 2012, although the role of the Supervisor would be continually redefined after the creation of the Brčko District and the strengthening of the District’s democratic institutions (ICG). This informal redefining of the Supervisor’s authority ceded greater authority to the municipal government as its capacity increased over time.

The U.S. Army’s 3rd Battalion, 5th Calvary Task Force (TF 3-5) arrived in Brčko within days of the signing of the Dayton Accord in December 1995. What confronted the military commanders of the TF 3-5 was a peacebuilding challenge that included a wide range of tasks far beyond the stating mission of keeping the peace. Brčko required extensive physical and economic reconstruction, reconciliation, coordination of humanitarian aid, and support to Internal Displaced Persons and refugees. Separating warring parties was the objective, but maintaining the peace would necessitate dealing with these underlying causes of the conflict. With Supervision not even a concept at that point in time, and the lack of security preventing most civilian agencies and organizations from establishing footholds in the city, TF 3-5 was largely on its own in the initial days of its deployment (Fontenot 2007; Cuculo 1998).

Similar to the arbitration process, the international community slowly realized that implementing the Dayton Accords would require continued intervention. At the conclusion of the IFOR mandate, it was deemed necessary to transition to a stabilization force (SFOR) to prevent a return to violence and create the space for the political process to address the underlying causes of the conflict (Sharp 1997). The transition to SFOR coincided with an increase in civilian-led efforts in Brčko, aided in large part to the improved security situation achieved by the TF 3-5 of IFOR. With this transition came a
period of increased need for interagency cooperation, to coordinate efforts and ensure unity of effort.

Post-September 11, 2001, the interagency effort required to take on the type of peacebuilding and reconstruction required in Brčko has become commonplace, and has since been written into both defense and diplomatic ‘doctrine.’ However, Brčko’s reputation today as an unqualified successful “American project” may make it a positive example for how the U.S. military, State Department and USAID can work together (in conjunction with civil society, international organizations and multi-national forces) to bring stability, reconciliation and prosperity to a war-torn region.

**Physical Environment of Brčko**

The strategic importance of the Brčko municipality stems from both its geographic location and its demographics. The municipality of Brčko consists of a medium sized town in a largely rural region of northern Bosnia and Herzegovina. Brčko is an agricultural and transportation center, situated on the Sava River in an area known as the Posavina Corridor. Bosnian Muslims (often referred to as Bosniaks) were predominate in Brčko according to the 1991 census; however each of Bosnia’s three warring ethnicities had significant communities in the municipality. Campaigns of ethnic cleaning and the migration of displaced people severely altered the demographic makeup of the municipality. In addition, the final position of the fighting front–later to become the inter-entity borders–heightened Brčko’s geographic value.

In 1991, Bosniaks consisted of 44 percent of the municipality’s population (56 percent of Brčko town), while Serbs represented 21 percent and Croats 25 percent. Brčko also had a large population of other minorities—including Roma—representing
approximately 10 percent (Farrand 2011, 2). Brčko’s prewar population numbered just over 87,000, with slightly less than half resident within Brčko town. While Brčko town was a multi-ethnic mixture of Muslims, Serbs and Croats, the outlying villages were largely homogenous.

Bosnia’s Serb population is traditionally concentrated in two separate parts of the country. Serb population centers are found in the west in the area surrounding the town of Banja Luka and in the East in Bosnia’s Serbia/Montenegro border region. Due to the geographic separation of the two Serb regions, the Serbs identified the need to bridge the two regions early on in the war. Unfortunately for the inhabitants of Brčko, the municipality is situated in the corridor exactly between the two Serb regions. The Serb war plan therefore came to include the ethnic cleansing of all non-Serbs from Brčko.

Similar to the Serbian need for a land bridge between Serb population centers, Brčko was also the only possible connection between Bosnian Croat region south of Brčko and the eastern Slavonia region of Croatia. Upon the creation of the Muslim and Croat Federation entity by the Dayton Accords, possession of Brčko was the only means to make the Federation contiguous in the north. Additionally, Bosniaks placed a priority on protecting the Muslim community in Brčko and sought to maintain land access to Brčko’s port—the Bosniak-Croat Federation’s only access to the shipping lanes of the Sava River (Moore 2013, 44-49).

East-west north-south, the crosshairs were drawn on Brčko. The Dayton Accords renamed the front lines at the end of the war as the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). To further complicate the geographic importance of Brčko, the IEBL ran directly through the municipality, effectively cutting it in half. Serbs forces held the city, while Croat and
Muslim forces held the surrounding land. All major roads leading in and out of the municipality crossed the IEBL, making freedom of movement impossible (Fontenot 2007; Farrand 2011, 59-61).

Upon his arrival to Brčko in 1997, American Ambassador Farrand estimated that over ten thousand Muslim and Croat homes had been destroyed in the municipality by units of the Yugoslav People’s Army supported by Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces (2011, 59). The International Crisis Group estimates that over 75 percent of Brčko’s population was displaced by the war, replaced by Serbs displaced from Sarajevo, Croatia and elsewhere in Bosnia (2003). IFOR estimated in 1996 that approximately 39,000 Bosniaks and 11,000 Croats had fled the municipality (ICG 2003). By 1996, ICG believed that 97 percent of Brčko town’s population was now ethnically Serb (2003).

As post-war reconstruction efforts progressed in Brčko, however, it is important to note that the demographics within the municipality remained relatively constant. Those Serbs who took up residence in Brčko town largely decided to remain there. And despite the movement of IDPs throughout the peacebuilding period as people returned to their pre-war homes, the overall demographic makeup of the municipality remained relatively stable for the period covering each of the three case studies.

The Bosniak-Croat population displaced in Brčko were unusual for Bosnia in that those persons settled in an area relatively close to their original homes, as opposed to fleeing to Sarajevo or abroad. The proximity of displaced to Brčko formed the basis of the Federation government “moral case” for maintaining their claim on Brčko, and Bosniaks and Croats continued to threaten a return to arms should the arbitration process “go the ‘wrong’ way” (ICG 2003).
American Prominence in Brčko Reconstruction Efforts

The dominance of American officials in the stability, arbitration, and administration aspects of the Brčko intervention led to the perception—real or imagined—that the municipality’s reconstruction was an “American project.” The prevalence of U.S. influence was evident on both the military and civilian aspect of the intervention. American involvement in Brčko is essential to understanding the nature of peacebuilding efforts in the municipality, given the emphasis on the international nature of the intervention throughout the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the Dayton Accords. Despite the dual civil-military nature of the intervention in Bosnia, however, there was no political-military plan ever developed to guide this effort (Wentz 1997).

On the military side, IFOR and later SFOR were NATO-led efforts. Country wide–IFOR averaged about 54,000 troops from 32 different countries, including 18 non-NATO countries (significantly, Russia) (Wentz 1997). The Multi-National Division–North that covered the region which included Brčko was comprised of three primary groups: two U.S. brigades, a Russian brigade, and a Nordic-Polish brigade (with elements from nine countries). The U.S. 1st Armored Division, 1st Brigade was responsible for the north-west American sector, in which Brčko was located. After the transition from IFOR to SFOR, foreign military personnel in Bosnia were roughly half that of IFOR–maxing out at 31,000 troops (Fontenot 2007; Wentz 1997).

IFOR’s one year mandate was simple and straightforward: enforce peace. Despite its name, IFOR was not deployed to Bosnia to implement the Dayton Accords. Rather, IFOR’s primary mission was to separate warring parties and prevent further violence (DOS 1995; Fontenot 2007). Generally successful, IFOR’s replacement was given a
broader range of authorities and responsibilities. IFOR largely accomplished the mission outlined for it in Dayton. However, the lack of progress on several key issues warranted the creation of SFOR to support the implementation effort. Primarily, those issues revolved around refugee returns, municipal elections, the disposition of war criminals, and Brčko’s yet unresolved status (Wentz 1997).

SFOR, although leaner, would concentrate on implementation of the accords by further stabilizing the secure environment achieved by IFOR. Specifically, SFOR’s mission was to support civilian agencies to ensure local compliance with the agreement. SFOR would also be given the task of aiding in the search for war criminals still at large. SFOR’s reduced size, however, meant that it had to prioritize efforts and increase coordination with civilian agencies. Originally, NATO planned on an 18 month mandate for SFOR; however some form of SFOR exists until today (Wentz).

On the civilian side, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was formed to oversee all aspects of Dayton implementation, born out of the effort to assemble an international front to implement the Accord. The PIC is comprised of 55 member states and agencies with a significant role in the peace process, ranging from financial assistance to military support. As a collective entity, the PIC provides political guidance to OHR. This existence of the PIC and the “ad hoc” OHR is significant in that they and not the UN were not the lead civilian entity in the reconstruction effort in Bosnia (Moore 2013, 53). The Americans in Brčko therefore answered to two entities: the U.S. government and the PIC (usually through OHR). Though the Dayton Accords provided clear language as the limits of OHR’s responsibilities and authorities while drawing a distinct line of separation between civilian and military operations, subsequent High
Representatives have increasingly become more activist and sought to expand their influence throughout the peacebuilding community (Moore 2013, 52-56; Farrand 2011, 43, 45). This would have compounding ramifications in Brčko as OHR Sarajevo gradually took exception to the American nature of efforts in the municipality. OHR Sarajevo used excessive coordination in attempts to reign in OHR North beginning in 1998-1999.

At the height of peacebuilding operations in Brčko in 1999, about 500 civilian personnel and 900 military personnel were present in the municipality (Parish 2010, 128). The military personnel were strictly U.S. military and were based in Camp McGovern, which straddled the IEBL just south of Brčko town. The civilian personnel were a mixed bag of numerous international organizations. OHR was the primary instrument for effecting implementation of the Dayton Accords. While the Deputy High Representative/Supervisor was always an American diplomat, the OHR-North office staff represented the multi-national flavor of the PIC (the two deputies for Ambassador Farrand, the first Supervisor, were Russian and a U.K. citizen) (Farrand 2011, 15; Parish 2010, 75).

The Dayton Accords also expressly stipulated specific roles for a number of other international organizations. OSCE would continue to assist with elections support and monitor human rights issues. UNHCR was tasked with overseeing refugee and IDP issues. Meanwhile, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) would focus on police reform, rule of law issues, and human rights issues. The primary instrument for the UNMIBH to conduct this mission was the International Police Task Force (IPTF). In addition, the World Bank, IMF, USAID and the EU Customs and
Financial Assistance Office (CAFAO) were tasked with specific roles in the peacebuilding effort (Moore 2013, 52).

Upon the arrival in April, 1997, of the international Supervisor for Brčko–American Ambassador Robert W. Farrand–Brčko was still seen as one of the most likely flashpoints for renewed conflict in Bosnia (ICG 2003). The Supervisor’s tasks were vast. Farrand immediately set out to ensure freedom of movement through the municipality, establish multiethnic institutions, reform entity laws and draft the district’s statute as a basis for the adherence to rule of law. Economic reform was also vital to return Brčko to its pre-war status as one of Bosnia’s most prosperous regions, and to encourage the return of the municipality’s displaced persons scattered throughout the country. Farrand also oversaw the appointment of an interim government, after municipal elections in September 1997 (ICG 2003; Farrand 2011, 111-112, 131-157).

**U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Brčko**

The U.S. intervention in Bosnia was the first major peacebuilding and reconstruction effort undertaken by the United States in the wake of the Cold War. Today, scholarship and practitioners’ “best practices” focusing on interagency cooperation are expanding after the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 1995, the State Department took the lead in the Bosnian peacebuilding effort, ostensibly because of the agency’s role in negotiating the Dayton Peace Accords (Wentz 1997). However, there was no established plan or rule-book providing guidance to the political-military effort. Coordination was largely ad hoc. The only prevailing belief guiding coordination was that the military and civilian aspects of the reconstruction needed to appear as distinct and separate lines of operations (Farrand 2011, 24-26).
State Department officials operating in Bosnia at the time drew from their previous experience working within other countries with which the United States enjoys “normal relations.” As Brčko’s first Supervisor points out, the skill set required of an administrator tasked with building good governance and leading reconciliation efforts is much different in contrast to the Foreign Service Officer’s usual daily routine of top-down focused fostering of strong bilateral relationships between governments. Bosnia was still a sovereign country with which the U.S. maintained formal relations, but the country’s civilian apparatus and domestic institutions were ravaged during the war. The first arrivals in Brčko, for example, were greeted by several men from each ethnic group claiming to be the mayor of the town, with no way to verify any of their claims (Fontenot 2007).

The military, on the other hand, had its mission handed to them. The Dayton Accords specifically outlined the nature and duration of the IFOR mission. NATO provided guidance in the development of rules of engagement. The IFOR contingent in Brčko became the model for successful crisis management, working within its mandate to limit the spread of riots, actively preventing civil disturbances and using its civil affairs and intelligence assets to help prepare the local population for the looming decision of the arbitration tribunal (Wentz 1997). Due to the non-permissive security environment that prevented civilian representatives from gaining a foothold in Brčko, IFOR operated in virtual impunity. As the security situation improved, however, NGOs and civilian agencies began to flow into Brčko increasing the need for coordination. This influx of civilian authorities skyrocketed upward after the First Award, at a time when the military presence was growing leaner under SFOR.
Throughout his tenure as Supervisor, Ambassador Farrand maintained regular contact with military leaders at all echelons in Bosnia, and met frequently with Multi-National Division–North (MND-North) commander Major General Montgomery Meigs and later Major General David Grange. The Supervisor and SFOR’s requirements were divergent, however, and in an initial meeting with Allied Land Forces Central Europe Commander General William Crouch, Farrand sensed that prior relations between SFOR and the civilian leadership were strained (Farrand 2011, 24-26). A primary driver of divergence was time, as the SFOR mandate was set to expire in June 1998—one year after Farrand’s arrival in Bosnia. SFOR was therefore motivated to show significant improvement in the situation on the ground before redeployment (Farrand 2011, 24).

Farrand also commented that his less than enthusiastic initial reception to a wave of SFOR offers of help and advice may have contributed to a growing feeling within SFOR that the Brčko experiment might be in jeopardy (Farrand 2011, 24).

Farrand’s cold receipt of offers of assistance in the early days of the Supervisory regime stemmed from his desire to ensure that the public face of the civilian authority was not overwhelmed by an overt association with the military (Farrand 2011, 24-26). Farrand believed that allowing the civilian implementation unit to be “transformed into an organization with large military overtones . . . would not serve either SFOR’s or our interests . . . since SFOR would not be able . . . to follow through on initiatives mandated in the First Award for civilians to implement” (Farrand 2011, 25). However, Farrand recognized the importance of the SFOR role in keeping the peace, noting that the civilian operation in Brčko “depended fundamentally” on SFOR’s ability to provide a secure environment for the civilian authorities to complete their mission (Farrand 2011, 26).
Farrand would later credit his weekly meetings with the MND-North commander for building the necessary trust between their respective entities and enabled them to work more closely together.

Farrand’s trust in SFOR’s ability to accomplish its mission was rooted in a newfound knowledge of the military’s discipline, professional behavior and rules of engagement and local code of conduct. As such, Farrand frequently—and without reservation—publicly defended SFOR against allegations of misconduct. Even in instances where Farrand differed with SFOR actions or decisions, Farrand tailored the public message so as not to allow the perception that there were any policy discrepancies between the two (Farrand 2010, 24-26, 32-36).

In addition to Farrand’s monthly meetings with MND-North commander, Farrand maintained regular contact with the SFOR battalion liaison officer which worked directly on the supervisor’s staff, and also met weekly with the battalion commander. Two civil affairs officers were seconded onto Farrand’s staff. However, Farrand insisted that these officers wear civilian clothes to shape the public image of his civilian unit. Farrand also used the civil affairs officers quite differently than originally intended, as Farrand discovered that the civilian careers of these reservists were far more useful to the Brčko reconstruction effort than their Army-stated purpose. Notably, one individual was a hospital administrator in his civilian life and Farrand put him to work bringing Brčko’s hospital up to operating status. Another was a city manager and was tasked with advising Brčko’s mayor. Farrand stated that an underlying cause for success of the mission was the emphasis on keeping the lines of communication with the military open at all levels. Farrand also stressed resolved issues as they arose in person, and believed this aspect of
personal interaction was the most critical aspect of coordination with the military (Farrand 2011, 24-26).

Application of IAD Framework to Three Case Studies

The following represents a comparative analysis of three case studies taken from that characterized the different organizational approaches of the peacebuilding community during Brčko’s early history of international intervention. The three case studies are centered on the creation of the Arizona market by IFOR in 1996, the formation of the municipal government in 1997, and the first attempt to regulate the Arizona market in 1999. All three of these experimental actions have come to be viewed as successes, though only after rather painful lessons were learned and new rules instituted to mitigate the harmful unintended effects of each event.

The creation of the Arizona market, its later regulation, and the establishment of the first municipal government were three events that typified the way the U.S. government intervened in Brčko between the Dayton Accords and the formation of the Brčko District in 2000. American efforts can be divided into two distinct periods: the IFOR-driven security presence immediately following the signing of the Accords; the Supervisory regime that administered the municipality between the first ruling of the arbitral tribunal and the creation of the District in 2000. That said, regardless of their physical presence on the ground in Brčko, the peacebuilding actors remained largely the same as stipulated in the Dayton Accords.

In 1996, IFOR was the primary instrument of the international community on the ground in Brčko. The American Embassy in Sarajevo was focused on the overall implementation of the Dayton Accords throughout Bosnia and coordinating with the
massive international buildup that was occurring across the country. The security situation within the municipality was still too perilous for NGOs or other civil society organizations to take root. IFOR worked with civilian authorities when possible, but without a dedicated civilian team to oversee stabilization efforts, the soldiers in Brčko were largely on their own.

The creation of the Arizona market was a unilateral action to distract local citizens from their grievances and provide an outlet for basic needs. The location of the market was determined based on an assessment of the security situation; the lot chosen was within the Separation Zone along the main north-south road leading out of Brčko, codenamed by American forces as ‘Route Arizona;’ the market was located within close proximity of IFOR troops based at Camp McGovern. For the first five years of its existence, the market grew considerably but amounted to little more than a bazaar with merchants selling black-market goods under tents or from the back of lorries. The land was designated largely without consideration for property ownership (the land owners mostly displaced to other parts of the country).

Once established in the municipality, the Supervisory regime exercised no control over the market as the physical location of the Arizona market landed outside the Supervisor’s jurisdiction. However Sarajevo authorities initially had no interest in instituting regulations upon the market until a popular theory among the international community suggested that the profits from the market were funding hard-line Croat elements in Mostar (Farrand 2011, 229; Moore 2013, 87). Farrand had previously attempted to exert control over the Arizona market for the sake of empowering the Brčko government through the market’s tax revenues. However the security issue of extremists
finance (later proven by OHR-North as minimal) helped form the initial basis of the decision to allow the Supervisor to begin to regulate the market. Today, the market has grown to resemble a western style mall complex although the original resolution of questions of land-use remains controversial. At the time of the first attempt at regulation in 1999, the Arizona market consisted of over 1,500 stalls with fifteen to twenty thousand costumers visiting the market every weekend (Farrand 2010, 229).

Whereas the Arizona market was created by IFOR’s own initiative with no local partners and minimal consultation with the other interagency or international partners, the establishment of Brčko’s first municipal government since the war was a coordinated effort led by the international Supervisor. The creation of the municipal government in late 1997 became a test of the new Supervisor’s authority, as representatives from each ethnic group vied for position at the behest of their minders in the Entity governments. The government formation process in all took about nine months, marked by municipal elections in September 1997, the establishment of the Brčko Assembly in November, and the peaceful transfer of power to a Bosnian Muslim president in December. In January 1998 Ambassador Farrand reported to the PIC Steering Committee that Brčko was the first Bosnian municipality in the Serb-dominated region to have a Muslim president of its legislature (Farrand 2010, 145).

The municipal elections of September 1997 did not provide a ready-made solution to the government formation problem in Brčko. The last census was conducted in 1991 before hostilities, and the demographics of the area had been severely altered by the conflict. Muslims and Croats were driven out in large numbers, and replaced by Serb displaced persons from elsewhere in the country (mostly Sarajevo). Taking the election
results at face value would have essentially given Brčko to the Serbs. Shortly after OSCE certified the election results in October, Ambassador Farrand issued a Supervisory Order mandating the multi-ethnic administration of the municipality. The Supervisor would use the election results—in the absence of a formal census—as the basis for forming a new government. Farrand refers to this policy as “democratic governance and multiethnic administration” (Farrand 2010, 109-10). The Supervisor’s use of the election results were controversial, however, with some characterizing the move as illegally annulling the results of the election (Chandler 1999, 86).

The landscape of the international presence in Brčko had changed dramatically since the First Award. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) had set up office in Brčko in the form of the international Supervisor. IFOR had transitioned to the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). The presence of the Supervisor—an American Foreign Service Officer—automatically increased the connections between the OHR Deputy and Washington, both directly and through Embassy Sarajevo. The implementation of the new administrative regime also created space for civil society and other international organizations to take root in Brčko.

In the end, the Supervisor’s need to impose a governance solution in Brčko illustrates the fallacy of the West’s elections fetish.⁵ Farrand recognized that a directly elected Assembly and Executive Council would have signaled a severe setback to a host of primary objectives of the international community in Brčko. Freedom of movement, IDP returns, economic growth, and the resolution of land disputes—all would have been

³Severine Autesserre suggested that the international community has an election fetish in her book The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, 2010.
jeopardized by a Serb-dominated government that clearly took its orders from Pale and sought to consolidate war gains by seizing political control of the strategic municipality (Farrand 2010, 65, 70, 90, 191).

The Supervisor’s actions took under consideration the local complexity, but forged a new path based on policy objectives imposed by the international community and the Dayton Accords. The resultant new government in Brčko became a viable –if still imperfect–partner for reconstruction efforts and laid the groundwork for the success of the international community’s ambitious agenda for Brčko over the next few years. Not until after the creation of the Brčko District and the strengthening of Brčko’s domestic institutions, did Brčko get an election that directly resulted in a representative government in 2004. The advantages of not giving into the elections fetish were clear: the Supervisor had a strong and viable partner to push reforms, and the public increasingly saw the election as an opportunity to address issues rather than advance ethnic rivalries (ICG 2003).

IFOR Development of the Arizona Market

Physical Environment

The IFOR contingent responsible for the Brčko municipality, the Task Force 3-5, entered Bosnia unsure of their reception by the locals and were prepared to “compel peace” if resisted (Fontenot 2007). At that time, IFOR viewed the IEBL as an active front line, although fighting had ceased and did not resume in Brčko. The IFOR forces quickly began erasing the front by confiscating weapons and bulldozing trenches. IFOR established a new Zone of Separation (ZOS) around the area of the original front to discourage violence along the lines.
To further separate the warring factions, TF 3-5 would build its headquarters just south of Brčko town along the IEBL. Camp McGovern was built on the site of an abandoned collective farm that was placed along the main approach to Brčko, where some of the fiercest fighting in the entire region had taken place. The camp’s location was in a marshy area and was heavily mined. From a military point of view, Camp McGovern was not ideally situated. However the location of the Camp was chosen strictly in accordance with NATO guidelines and would help facilitate keeping the peace (Fontenot 2007).

Despite a lack of fighting, the security situation remained perilous. Locals did not enjoy freedom of movement throughout the municipality, and none would venture across the IEBL. Additionally, negative perceptions of the security situation had hindered most civilian agencies tasked with peacebuilding roles by the Dayton Accords from taking up residence in Brčko. For the most part, these organizations operated from their main headquarters in Sarajevo or their home offices abroad. This included the State Department and USAID, which operated primarily out of the US Embassy in Sarajevo. The most significant exception was OSCE, which maintained a physical presence in Brčko from the very beginning.

Attributes of the Community

The effect of the perception of the security situation and the peacebuilding community’s preference of working in Brčko from afar was that IFOR was the de facto international authority in the municipality. Although IFOR itself was a heterogeneous organization comprised of troops originating from the range of NATO nations plus a few other stakeholders, the 3-5 TF responsible for Brčko was a homogenous American unit.
Operating in the American area of responsibility in north-eastern Bosnia, TF 3-5 also enjoyed clear lines of communication, command and control with its parent unit, the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division that comprised the Multi-National Division-North (MND-North) based in Tuzla.

The local Bosnian community was divided along ethnic lines, with all three communities well represented within the municipality. Bosnian Muslims had been ethnically cleansed or driven out from Brčko town, however, and in their place were Serbs displaced from other parts of the country, namely Sarajevo. Croats displaced from Brčko town had taken up residence in either in the vicinity of Brčko Ravne village in the southern part of the municipality or had fled to Croatia. Importantly, whereas in other parts of Bosnia IDPs fled to locations far away from their original homes (Muslims to Sarajevo and Croats to Mostar, for example), Brčko’s displaced remained largely within the same municipality from which they originated (ICG 2003).

Civil society did not exist in Brčko at the time of IFOR’s arrival. Civil structure was completely broken down. No less than three people approached the TF 3-5 claiming to be the mayor of Brčko town. This left IFOR with little choice but to look within the military structure of the warring factions for local partners (Cuculo 1998). Among the local population, each community maintained strong ideational ties to their original land, despite attempts to ethnically cleanse the area.

**Rules-in-Use**

During the early stages of Dayton implementation, the peacebuilding institutions tasked with bringing stability to Bosnia were largely focused on national level problems. In Brčko, this left IFOR as the face of the international intervention. As an institution,

The Dayton Peace Accords had laid out three areas for ending the war and peacebuilding, specifying the responsible actor for each aspect: IFOR was responsible for the military role; the High Representative to oversee the civilian aspects of reconstruction; and a series of donors conferences to keep tabs on and push reconstruction efforts. Shortly after the signing of the agreement, a UN mandate authorized NATO to implement the military aspects of the accords. The military annex of the Accords laid out in clear terms IFOR’s mission (DOS 1995). IFOR’s mission in Bosnia consisted of the following five tasks: (1) ensure compliance with the cease-fire; (2) establish the zone of separation along the IEBL; (3) collect heavy weapons from combatants and oversee the demobilization of forces; (4) relieve remaining UNPROFOR forces; and (5) continue to control Bosnian airspace (Wentz 1997, 26).

The NATO operation to put IFOR troops on the ground in Bosnia represented many significant firsts for the alliance. The operation was NATO’s largest to date, and the first ever ground force operation. Additionally, the IFOR mission was NATO’s first such operation conducted jointly with Partnership for Peace partner countries and other countries outside of NATO—most notably Russia (Wentz 1997, 3). The use of NATO to implement the Dayton Accords also demonstrated the alliance’s ability to go behind its charter in support of UN Security Council resolutions to achieve political objectives. While civil-military cooperation was becoming standard within the U.S. government, this type of coordination was a new concept for NATO (Wentz 1997, 6). NATO’s rules of
engagement allowed for the “robust use of force” to carry out its mission and to defend itself. IFOR was also held to the standards of proportionality and required to take action to minimize collateral damage (Wentz 1997, 27).

At the brigade and battalion level, the IFOR troops on the ground were governed by command and control structures and standing operating procedures for the conduct of stability operations. MND-North commander Colonel Gregory Fontenot noted that the duration of the deployment, dispersion of forces, and decentralized command structure required that lower level commanders needed to “think differently about time” and learn to “link tactical operations differently” than they normally would during conventional operations. Additionally, Fontenot provides a definition of what is now been coined by Army doctrine as mission command: “a commander’s task is to accept, interpret, and decide, creatively, how to implement the intent of the division [or higher] in order to accomplish the outcomes they intend when they assign missions” (Fontenot 2007).

Finally, the prior norms that stipulated defined roles for peacebuilding institutions created limitations upon IFOR. Informal traditional wisdom at that time said that military units were to remain separated from the civilian aspects of peacebuilding. This distinction was drawn from the belief that this type of action was outside of a soldier’s training and warfighting skills (Cuculo 1998, 10).

For the local population, local institutions in Brčko were nonexistent outside of the war apparatus. Politically, however, each ethnic community answered to the powers-that-be in their respective power centers. Serbs took their orders from the seat of Bosnian Serb power in Pale, the Serb wartime capitol. Croats acted in accordance with guidance from Mostar and Zagreb. Sarajevo set the set agenda for Brčko’s Muslims. In this way,
the local population had very little control over the political aspects of their daily lives or governance, as the larger ethnic powers continued to fight over control over the strategically vital municipality.

**Action Arena**

Given IFOR’s primary mission to bring a halt to fighting through the implementation of the ceasefire, the objective of MND-North’s decision to support the development of the Arizona market was driven by the desire to increase security. The MND-North and TF 3-5 commanders were betting that economic opportunity would be a unifying factor that would promote reconciliation, job growth, and improved security (Fontenot 2007).

**Actors**

At the time of inception of the Arizona market, the list of task for the peacebuilding community was lengthy and difficult. MND-North was subsumed by a myriad of challenges which ranged from clearing mines, supporting the early development of a police force, and providing security for national elections (Fontenot 2007). Given that IFOR’s other partners were equally overwhelmed and located off site (OSCE was the exception, though they were focused exclusively on elections), IFOR was the prime actor in this scenario. No other peacebuilding actor took part in the decision.

**Shock**

While trying to strictly prosecute their mission to keep the peace and enforce the ceasefire, MND-North found it increasingly difficult to keep the peace without addressing at least some of the civil problems facing the municipality. Principally, these
issues were essential services and economic growth. An alternative solution needed to be found if TF 3-5 were to continue to maintain the ceasefire.

Patterns of Interaction

With very little coordination with their international peacebuilding partners, the commanders of IFOR represented the primary authority in Brčko. Realizing the need to do more than separate belligerents to bring peace, IFOR sought to stabilize the security situation by building political capital with the local factions (Fontenot 2007). The solution was to provide security and allocate land to a burgeoning black market along the main road leading southwest from the town of Brčko (Parish 2010, 86). Although the primary action taken by IFOR was within its security mandate—the setting up of a checkpoint and the staging of an M1 tank near the market—the decision-making process was ad hoc and “spontaneous” with limited coordination with other agencies (Fontenot 2007).

At the time of the development of the Arizona market, coordination among the peacebuilding institutions was limited at best. Recognizing the need for increased collaboration with local civil authorities, 3-5 TF had taken the lead in working with the local population. LTC Cuculo regularly met with local political and military leaders from each ethnic group (Fontenot 2007; Cuculo 1998), one of the few battalion commanders throughout Bosnia to embrace the need to build local support (Bauman, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 101). Recognizing the need to pull other peacebuilding partners into the Brčko decision-making process, IFOR initiated a coordination mechanism between military and civilian organizations called the Posavina Working Group.
The Posavina Working Group was a nascent inter-organizational coordination mechanism at the time of the Arizona market’s development. At that point, the World Bank and USAID possessed neither the resources nor the staff on the ground in Brčko to initiate or oversee development projects. This led IFOR to call the first official meeting of the working group in August of 1996. Held at a Joint Military Commission (JMC) site on Route Arizona, the meeting was attended by the UN, UNHCR, USAID, OSCE, World Bank, EU Customs Monitors, and International Police Training Force (IPTF). OHR was represented at the highest level, with the High Representative Carl Bildt attending. The working group agreed to focus its combined efforts on a peacebuilding agenda that included continued efforts to implement the military annex of the Dayton Accords, provide “impartial support” for reconstruction, begin work on securing refugee and IDP return, and economic recovery (Fontenot 2007).

The Posavina Working Group would later serve as the basis of civilian-military coordination in the Brčko municipality. By the end of IFOR’s mandate, the group had achieved significant results by supporting national elections and overseeing the safe return of over 300 families to their homes. The group also supported the early cooperation between local police forces and the first small American-funded aid programs. However, coordination remained limited, due to Brčko’s unresolved status and the lack of civilian agencies presence on the ground (Fontenot 2007).
Table 1. Institutional patterns of interaction at the macro to local level–IFOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of interaction</th>
<th>Rules affecting the action arena</th>
<th>Examples of instruments</th>
<th>Main actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutional</strong></td>
<td>Dayton Peace Accords; military annex</td>
<td>IFOR’s five mission tasks</td>
<td>PIC NATO US government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective-choice (policy)</strong></td>
<td>NATO charter UNSCR 1031 US foreign policy Political objectives of Bosnian factions</td>
<td>IFOR rules of engagement 1st brigade 1st armored division training and task organization</td>
<td>NATO MND-North OHR-Sarajevo Bosnian entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational</strong></td>
<td>U.S. military doctrine Traditional norms regarding military role in peacebuilding</td>
<td>Command and control Decentralized command; dispersed forces “Mission command” Posavina Working Group</td>
<td>MND-North 3-5 TF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author. Adapted from Gibson et al., The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 138.

Outcomes and Evaluation Criteria

The creation of the Arizona market would have a significant economic impact on the Brčko municipality that continues through today. The market would soon become the economic engine for the entire northeastern part of Bosnia (Moore 2013, 87), and would employ thousands of people. The market would become a meeting place for families separated in the war (Parish 2010, 60) and also serve as a vehicle for reconciliation by
providing a haven where people from all ethnic groups “interacted with each other as though there had never been a war” (Cuculo 1998; Bauman, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 101). However the market also became a medium for smuggling across the front (Parish 2010, 60) and would eventually become a means to fund extremist political elements elsewhere in Bosnia, particularly the hardline Croat HDZ party (Moore 2013, 87; Farrand 2011, 222-225). The physical location of the market was close to the watchful eye of TF 3-5 at Camp McGovern to aid in maintaining security. But would later lay outside of the Brčko Supervisor’s initial control. This allowed the market to grow unrestrained, both as an economic hub and a crossroads of illicit activity (Farrand 2011, 222). Until the Supplemental Award in 1998 expanded the territorial mandate for the Supervisor, the market remained outside of any institution’s or entity’s jurisdiction for regulation, being physically located within Brčko municipality (therefore out of the reach of the Republika Srpska and the Federation) and outside of the Supervisor’s authority (Farrand 2011, 223).

With limited partners on site with which to coordinate, IFOR’s decision-making process in development of the Arizona market was swift and impulsive. With the market later upheld as a model for economic initiative in Bosnia’s reconstruction (ICG 1998a; ICG 2003), it is an example of how quickly an idea can move from inception to implementation when coordination is minimal. However, the lack of coordination allowed IFOR to act in an arena that impacted areas outside of its mandate (economic development), showing how a lack of coordination can empower independent actors to act regardless of higher policy. In addition, the lack of information flow within the peacebuilding community restricted IFOR’s ability to consider potential unintended
outcomes that might result from creation of the market. Better coordination at the
inception of the market could have hedged against future illicit activity and provided
means to regulate the market at the onset. The risks inherent with supporting the market
were therefore unknown and unaccounted for, and monitoring and evaluation of the
market’s development were non-existent.

OHR-North Led Government Formation Process

Physical Environment

At the end of 1996, IFOR completed its mandate and transitioned to the smaller
SFOR presence. In Brčko, IFOR also handed the reins of reconstruction efforts to OHR
after the first ruling of the arbitration court established the civilian Supervisor to direct
peacebuilding efforts as an extension of the High Representative’s authority (OHR
1997a). Unlike IFOR, the new Supervisor established the new headquarters of the civilian
administration in the heart of Brčko town, across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL)
from Camp McGovern.

The establishment of the civilian administrator and the move of OHR into Brčko
town coincided with an influx of other civilian peacebuilding institutions into the area.
Within a year the civilian presence in Brčko would grow to over 500 professionals
(Parish 2010, 128). The increased civilian presence and the insistence of the new
Supervisor on locating OHR-Brčko’s headquarters within the town would have a
significant impact on peacebuilding efforts (Farrand 2011, 18).

As evidenced by occasional riots fueled by the political agendas of authorities in
Pale and Sarajevo, the security situation remained tenuous. The IEBL remained a front
line that separated Serbs in Brčko town and Muslim and Croat populations to the south.
However, fighting in the area had not resumed since the signing of the Dayton Accords. The perception of a stabilizing security situation promoted the increased presence of international organizations and for the Supervisor to take on the most pressing issue of the post-war reconstruction: restoring civilian freedom of movement across the IEBL.

Attributes of the Community

The new OHR-Brčko office under the control of the new Supervisor was a heterogeneous organization comprised of a multinational staff representing numerous countries with a stake in Bosnia’s reconstruction. Despite the fact that Brčko was viewed largely as an “American project” due to the U.S. Army units in SFOR, the American head of the Brčko tribunal and the Foreign Service Officer named as Supervisor (Parish 2010, 118-119), OHR-North’s staff did not reflect this perception. The Supervisor had two deputies, one from the U.K. and the other Russian (Farrand 2011, 15).

The peacebuilding community was driven by an informal cultural norm centered around an election fetish. This fetish led to the misconception that elections represented a positive indicator for reconstruction efforts and were the only way to develop legitimate local partners (Moore 2013, 5, 102-103). In Bosnia, the international community had pushed for holding national elections in 1996 and municipal elections in 1997. OSCE was the principal stakeholder to ensure the smooth running of elections (OSCE).

The local community continued to be plagued by wartime legacies of ethnic cleansing and brutal fighting. Initial IFOR efforts to ease tensions over property rights still left endless disputes that hindered IDP and refugee returns. The international community still had no way of assessing the demographics of the area, and any effort to
take a count (including voter registration in the lead up to 1997 municipal elections) was viewed as a way of validating war gains (Farrand 2011, 114-120; ICG 2003).

**Rules-in-Use**

For the international community working to bring stability to Brčko, the Dayton Peace Accords remained the primary mandate for that mission. Every peacebuilding effort continued to be applied under the auspices of implementing the agreement. The First Award of the Brčko arbitration tribunal had led to the establishment of a new mode of organization for the international intervention. The Supervisor would hold unprecedented powers and would be the highest civil authority in the municipality, even superseding all local authorities.

Though he represented the highest authority in Brčko, new Supervisor was subject to the norms of two bureaucracies. First, as Deputy High Representative, the Supervisor was an important part of the overall international presence in Bosnia though he also possessed some independent authority. In theory, the Supervisor answered directly to the High Representative in Sarajevo. However, as a career diplomat and active Foreign Service Officer, the Supervisor was also a part of the U.S. policy approach to Bosnia and answerable to the Secretary of State. This situation of being answerable to two bureaucracies was systematic and was the case for both of the Supervisor’s deputies as well (Farrand 2011, 19).

In order to mitigate the effects of OHR-North’s dual masters, the Supervisor instituted a series of operating procedures. These procedures helped form the culture of OHR-North and were designed to portray a unified front to their interlocutors. Farrand went everywhere with both deputies, which had the additional effect of minimizing the
need to increase internal coordination and allowed for the free flow of information within
the organization (Farrand 2011, 19-24).

NATO forces’ transition from an implementation force to a stabilization force
meant a new set of rules for American troops on the ground in Brčko. IFOR had largely
accomplished its peacekeeping mission and had achieved a level of security to allow for
the civilian aspects of Dayton implementation to move forward. However, the
international community deemed that the security situation remained perilous enough to
warrant a continued military presence in Bosnia. SFOR’s mission would be much
different from IFOR’s, with the express mission of supporting the civilian peacebuilding
effort (Wentz 1997; Bauman, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004).

Action Arena

Nearly two years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, legitimate civil
authorities still did not exist in Brčko. Municipal elections scheduled nationwide for
September 1997 aimed to correct the situation and establish the basis for basic civilian
governance at the municipal level. Without local institutions, the international community
had limited local partners, hindering the delivery of essential services to the population.
Brčko critically needed a civilian government.

Actors

The municipal government formation process in Brčko was lead by the new
Supervisor and OHR-North. OSCE was the lead international organization to ensure the
running of smooth elections, and were the sole authority to validate the voting results.
Both the State Department and OHR-Sarajevo provided policy guidance to the
Supervisor, and gave the final approval for the Supervisor’s utilization of election results and the principles of the Dayton Accords to assist in the formation of Brčko’s first post-war government.

**Shock**

The municipal elections threatened to undermine all peacebuilding efforts in Brčko. Wartime efforts to ethnically cleanse the area, the influx of Serbs into Brčko city and the displacement of Muslims and Croats into the country side had disrupted the traditional ethnic balance of the region. Given Brčko’s strategic importance to each warring faction, each group sought to manipulate the election results to further pursue its wartime aims through political means. Allowing the election to move forward in Brčko as planned threatened to validate the results of ethnic cleansing and forced migrations in the area.

**Patterns of Interaction**

Coordination between the peacebuilding institutions tasked with Brčko’s reconstruction increased as each organization’s footprint increased. SFOR’s influence was lessened as OHR-North became the final authority within the municipality. OHR-North operated within the OHR bureaucracy with a great degree of autonomy due to the high level of trust between the High Representative and the Brčko Supervisor and the Supervisor’s exercise of his separate authorities. Additionally, the chain of command between OHR-North and OHR-Sarajevo was simple and streamlined. OHR-North staff answered directly to the Supervisor while maintaining ties to their home institutions.
OHR-North operational culture was based on preventing redundancy and competition. Peacebuilding partner institutions worked independently according to their capabilities and mandate. For example, the Supervisor did not intervene with OSCE’s conduct of the election or certification of the results. OHR-North made a point of allowing each agency to work independently within their line of effort and coordinating where areas of responsibility overlapped.

The SFOR military contingent in Brčko was a fraction of the size of the TF 3-5. As local law enforcement capacity grew, SFOR was able to shift focus away from IFOR’s peacekeeping role and more into their civilian support role. Throughout the first year of the Supervisory regime in Brčko, SFOR was a willing and capable partner in providing military support to the Supervisor’s agenda. SFOR support to OHR-North included security protection to Bosnian federal government delegation’s visit to Brčko and quelling riots over property rights and voter registration. SFOR’s coordinated backing of the OHR-North helped establish the Supervisor’s authority.

The creation of the Arizona market and OHR-North’s initial efforts to improve freedom of movement across the IEBL helped increase positive interactions between local factions. Fighting had not renewed, but tensions between ethnic groups remained high. Each group was heavily influenced by the ethnic centers of power outside of Brčko, which sought to manipulate the situation for political gain.
Table 2. Institutional patterns of interaction at the macro to local level–OHR-North I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of interaction</th>
<th>Rules affecting the action arena</th>
<th>Examples of instruments</th>
<th>Main actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutional</strong></td>
<td>Dayton Peace Accords</td>
<td>SFOR mission Mandated nationwide municipal elections</td>
<td>PIC NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Award</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective-choice</strong></td>
<td>First Award</td>
<td>Policy to adhere to mandated elections MND-North level LNO</td>
<td>OHR-Sarajevo SFOR Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(policy)</td>
<td>SFOR mandate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational</strong></td>
<td>OHR-North cultural norms and standards</td>
<td>Validation of results Supervisory Orders Battalion level LNO</td>
<td>OHR-North SFOR OSCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author. Adapted from Gibson et al., The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 138.*

Outcomes and Evaluation Criteria

In January 1998, Brčko Supervisor William Farrand reported to the PIC that Brčko had established Bosnia’s first multi-ethnic government (Farrand 2010, 145). Although the decision to exercise the Supervisor’s special authority to mandate representative government remains controversial, Adam Moore credits OHR-North’s postponement of direct elections and focus on first building domestic institutions as key to the success of peacebuilding in Brčko (2013, 5). This series of decisions would have only been possible under a collaborative atmosphere that relied on the functional interdependence of each partner. The Supervisor emerged from the government formation process as the unquestioned authority in Brčko, which positioned OHR-North
to progressively mitigate the influence of Pale, Sarajevo and Mostar upon each ethnic community. The new Brčko government would remain intact until municipal elections in 2004, after the building of domestic institutions strong enough to work more equitably for all Brčko District residents regardless of ethnicity (Moore 2013, 26-29).

Every peacebuilding partner institution in Brčko enjoyed the benefits of functional interdependence. Each organization worked according to their mandated area of responsibility, coordinating only when necessary on overlapping issues. Coordinating mechanisms assisted in maximizing the performance of each organization. Actions of each institution were in line with and supported overall policy objectives.

Most importantly, the unity of effort achieved by the international community allowed the Supervisor to turn a potential set back into an opportunity to drive forward in implementing a key policy objective. Elsewhere in Bosnia, the municipal elections of 1997 were a catalyst for increased animosity and were a means for ethno-political entities to pursue their wartime objectives through the election (Bieber 2005). The diversity of perspectives expressed through the coordinating mechanisms presented planning considerations that helped reduce uncertainty inherent in the reconciliation and government formation agenda.

OHR-North and OHR-Sarajevo Attempted Regulation of the Arizona Market

Physical Environment

With the Brčko municipal government becoming an increasingly stronger partner to peacebuilding efforts, OHR-North sought the means to increase local capacity and extend the government’s reach throughout the municipality. Four years after the Dayton
Peace Accords, foreign aid was thinly spread throughout the country. An ideal place for OHR-North and the Brčko government to turn to increase revenue to fund critical social reforms and infrastructure improvements was the Arizona market.

The tribunal’s Final Award brought the question of Brčko’s status to resolution. Brčko would remain semi-independent of both Bosnian entities. Importantly, the growing strength of Brčko’s domestic institutions had insulated the municipality from the influence of the ethnic power centers. In addition, the Final Award set the municipality’s borders and extended the Supervisor’s authority to the entire territory.

The security situation in Brčko continued to steadily improve, as SFOR and IPTF efforts allowed local police to consolidate security gains. The international presence in Brčko was at its height, and OHR-North’s size was at its most bloated. Over 500 civilians worked under the OHR umbrella in Brčko, and most peacebuilding institutions maintained a significant physical presence (Parish 2010, 128).

Attributes of the Community

OHR-North continued to expand its personnel and scope of operations. One significant addition to the Supervisor’s office was a growing legal section which assisted

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6A common perception is that the success of peacebuilding efforts in Brčko were a direct result of substantially greater funding to the area based on a U.S. government desire to ensure the success of its “American project.” Adam Moore explores the fallacy of this argument by comparing funding levels of Brčko and other regions of Bosnia. The reality is that Brčko received a disproportionally lower level of international funding (Moore 2013, 5). Parish also notes that international funding to Brčko was disproportionately less than elsewhere in Bosnia, with Brčko receiving a mere $70 million of the $16 billion spent nationwide (Parish 2010, 136). Two primary sources of income for Brčko stemmed from collection of customs fees on the Sava River bridge and taxation of the Arizona market, both of which did not take effect until late 2003 after the establishment of the Brčko District (Parish 2010, 133, 136).
in the writing of Supervisory Orders and had a direct hand in the writing of the Final Award (Parish 2010, 104). However, OHR-Sarajevo’s office was growing at a similar rate, and with increasing capacity and interest to pay more attention to the semi-autonomous Brčko office. This situation lead to a greater demand for information from the field, approval for every action by Sarajevo and an emphasis on coordination from the working level and higher (Farrand 2011, 43,48, 50, 252).

Another catalyst for the change in the relationship between OHR-Sarajevo and OHR-North was the changeover of the High Representative. The Supervisor enjoyed a high degree of trust and a good working relationship with the first High Representative, who was more sympathetic to OHR-North’s approach to the Brčko issue than his successors. Subsequent High Representatives were less comfortable with the American nature of the Brčko reconstruction effort, and sought to supplant the State Department’s influence with their own (Farrand 2011, 252). One tool employed by OHR-Sarajevo to reign in the Brčko office was an emphasis on coordination.

OHR-North staff gradually came to understand that they worked for three masters. Whereas before OHR-North staff was responsible to the Supervisor and their home agencies, they now found themselves also having to report directly to their Sarajevo counterparts. So the new legal office of in the OHR Brčko office answered not just to the Supervisor, but took direct direction from the legal office in OHR-Sarajevo as well (ICG 2003). As a result, an “internecine struggle emerged” between the two legal departments as debate grew about whether OHR-North’s legal team worked for the Supervisor or Sarajevo’s legal advisor (Parish 2010, 136).
Locally, refugee and IDP returns continued to surge throughout the municipality. Increased effectiveness of the Brčko government also meant lessened influence by the ethnic power centers in Pale, Sarajevo and Mostar, although differences between the ethnic groups meant that the Supervisor still needed to apply a heavy hand at times to build consensus (Bieber 2006). Brčko’s law enforcement capacity was also increasing, due to SFOR and IPTF successes in training and integration. The lack of government revenue was hindering further progress, however. The unregulated Arizona market—now the single largest economic entity in northern Bosnia—was a ready-made solution (Farrand 2011, 208).

Increasing the Brčko government’s reach into the Arizona market was problematic, however. The market had become a center for smuggling and black market goods, and was well known as a means of financing the hardline Croatian HDZ party in Mostar. At the beginning of the regulation process, very little was known about the market, including the number of stalls, numbers and origin of customers, or the type of goods offered there. OHR-Sarajevo assumed that the unregulated Arizona market was therefore a cesspool of other types of illicit activity as well, fearing drug and arms sales and trafficking of women (Farrand 2011, 229).

Rules-in-Use

The two most significant changes in how the international community organized itself with regards to the Brčko issue were the jurisdiction of the Supervisor and the desire of OHR-Sarajevo to turn OHR-North into a true constituent post. The Supervisor had not previously addressed the Arizona market issue simply because it lay outside of his jurisdiction, despite its physical location within the boundaries of the municipality.
This situation was a direct result of the limited coordination at the market’s inception. However the expansion of the Supervisor’s authority by the Supplemental and Final Awards allowed OHR-North to finally turn its attention to the market, which it saw as a potential revenue stream for the budding Brčko government (OHR 1999b; Parish 2010, 73).

OHR-Sarajevo’s attempts to exert influence over the Brčko office led to new coordination mechanisms between the two offices. These mechanisms were designed to increase information flow and oversight. This situation severely altered the working atmosphere within OHR-North, as staff began to align themselves with one office or the other.

The bureaucratic structure of OHR-Sarajevo and OHR-North had not changed, however. The Supervisor’s office was always answerable to OHR-Sarajevo in accordance with its establishment under the umbrella of the international community’s peacebuilding instrument of the High Representative. The primary change in the relationship was a renewed emphasis on process over progress, stemming from the attitudes of the individuals within the organization, particularly in Sarajevo. Meanwhile, OHR-Sarajevo was able to exert its influence with impunity, as the State Department had become refocused on more pressing issues within the region—namely Kosovo (Parish 2010, 135; Farrand 2011, 52).

Action Arena

The effort to regulate the Arizona market stemmed from the need to boost Brčko’s government capacity by tapping into a previously untouched revenue source. The lack of government influence over the market represented a loss of millions of dollars
worth of tax income. By regulating the market, the government would also be in a better position to stamp out illicit activity in the market. Lastly, market regulation would help keep the profits of the market from flowing out of the municipality and into the hands of Croat powerbrokers in Mostar, which would increase the economic impact of the market on the local area (Parish 2010, 130, 131).

**Actors**

The fledgling Brčko government would ordinarily be the primary actor, along with the local police force in enforcing new regulations upon the market and extracting tax revenue. However, the reality was that the market regulation process was decided between the OHR office in Sarajevo and Brčko. OHR-Sarajevo and OHR-North could no longer be viewed as single entities, however, as the internal departments and individual members of each office became independent actors. Lastly, the two main political parties of the Croats (HDZ) and Muslims (SDA) attempted to exert influence over the regulation process. HDZ naturally wanted to complicate regulation process as the Arizona market was a significant source of income. Similarly, the SDA desired to promote regulation to cut off funding to a fierce rival.

**Shock**

The Arizona market was allowed to grow unregulated for three years due to a gap in entity or municipal government jurisdiction. The Final Award set the official boundaries of the municipal territory and extended the Supervisor’s authority throughout the municipality. Further, the annex to the Final Award, issued five months after the ruling, gave the Supervisor specific authority to bring the Arizona market “into full
compliance with relevant tax laws” (OHR 1999b; Farrand 2011, 225). This change in OHR-North’s organization and authorities, combined with the strengthening of Brčko’s police force and government coincided with the need for increased revenue (Farrand 2011, 225-228). Additionally, the unchecked growth of the market had exasperated property disputes between vendors and the land’s prewar owners (Farrand 2011, 224).

**Patterns of Interaction**

Coordination between stakeholders in the regulation of the Arizona market was complicated by a resurgent OHR-Sarajevo. OHR-North’s status as the final authority on Brčko reconstruction issues was eroded by increased influence of the Sarajevo office. Working level sections within each organization increased contact as Sarajevo pressed its need to provide guidance on and approve every step of the process. Whereas previously OHR-North would present a final proposal to OHR-Sarajevo for concurrence, OHR-Sarajevo now injected itself into the formulation process.

The initial OHR-North proposal to regulate the market was summarily rejected by OHR-Sarajevo in November of 1999. Two of the principals in attendance at the Supervisor’s presentation of the proposal were “openly skeptical.” However, neither the UN’s Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) nor the senior OSCE representative had a direct role in regulating the market. The opposition to the plan centered on the illicit activity within the market, which incidentally was a primary impetus for regulating the market in the first place. The SRSG and OSCE positions would later be taken up by the High Representative (Farrand 2011, 228).

OHR-North’s reaction was to “cast a broader net” of local implementing partners. The new “Arizona Market Working Group,” or AMWG would eventually grow to
include representatives of SFOR, IPTF, the EU’s Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO), and the UN in addition to OHR staff. SFOR civil affairs officers conducted field research at the market to better understand the dynamics of the market’s vendors and criminal elements.

A new process of coordination emerged between the peacebuilding institutions on the ground in Brčko and Sarajevo. The push and pull between OHR-North and OHR-Sarajevo served to lengthen the process well into the next year, and increased the likelihood that no agreement on a way forward would be reached before the formal creation of the Brčko District. Finally, after the submission of additional reports on the economic impact of the market and security issues to OHR-Sarajevo, the AMWG submitted its final proposal to regulate the market to Sarajevo on January 31, 2000. However, despite the increased coordination that led to agreement on the final plan, the opposition of the SRSG and OSCE remained adamant. The plan was not approved, and regulation of the market would not be broached again until October 2000, costing the Brčko government revenue from the market in the meantime.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of interaction</th>
<th>Rules affecting the action arena</th>
<th>Examples of instruments</th>
<th>Main actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional</td>
<td>Dayton Peace Accords</td>
<td>OHR’s civilian implementation tasks</td>
<td>PIC, NATO, US Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective-choice (policy)</td>
<td>First Award; Supplemental Award; Final Award</td>
<td>Principals meeting</td>
<td>State Department High Representative Supervisor SFOR, Bosnian Entities OSCE, SRSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>OHR-Sarajevo culture and procedures OHR-North culture and procedures</td>
<td>Arizona market working group (AMWG)</td>
<td>OHR-Sarajevo legal department OHR-North legal department Brčko government SFOR, IPTF, CAFAO, UNMIBH, Local Police, Local farmers HDZ, SDA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcomes and Evaluation Criteria

The Arizona market would eventually be regulated in October 2000, after the establishment of the Brčko District and under a different Supervisory regime. The net result was a missed opportunity to increase municipal government capacity through an increase in its tax revenue it would have gained through regulation of the market. Additionally, the illicit and unregulated black market activity associated with the market was allowed to continue unchecked for another year. When the new Supervisory regime did institute reform for the market, the changes were not nearly as wide-ranging in their impact as the original proposal would have allowed.

While the coordination mechanisms were designed to increase information flow between the two offices, the actual result was that the principals often found themselves in a meeting where their interlocutor knew more about their operation than themselves. The cohesive atmosphere of OHR-North eroded, and there was no longer a unity of effort. OHR-North and OHR-Sarajevo became rivals in pursuit of opposing objectives, with competition replacing a singular policy goal.

The answer to the problems created within OHR-North due to the imposition of greater coordination with OHR-Sarajevo was more coordination. OHR-North instinctively answered excessive coordination with even more coordination and analysis. The emphasis on greater coordination in turn resulted in more coordination, with a compounding effect. The coordination mechanisms became an instrument of control and a constraint upon individual organizations.

In the end, the perverse incentives that fueled the agenda setting at OHR-Sarajevo brought the process to regulate the market to a complete standstill. Yet ironically, despite
moving the process forward the staffs of OHR-North and OHR-Sarajevo expended considerable time and resources to the issue that could have been focused on other pressing issues. Performance of every institution involved suffered as a result, as coordination itself gradually replaced peacebuilding in Brčko as the primary objective. The potential for uncertainty on the ground in Brčko only increased, as the risks inherent in letting the market continue to grow unregulated were ignored.

Conclusion

Taken together, these three case studies from the Brčko peacebuilding effort demonstrate the characteristics of coordination balance help identify the effects of limited and excessive coordination. The following table represents a summary of the effects of the different levels of coordination upon the peacebuilding institutions working in Brčko. Within the table, IFOR’s development of the Arizona market represents an example of limited coordination, the OHR-North led government formation process represents coordination balance, and the failed attempt to regulate the Arizona market represents the effects of excessive coordination.
Table 4. Inter-organizational Coordination of Peacebuilding Efforts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Coordination (Structure)</th>
<th>Agency Performance</th>
<th>Unity of Effort</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>(likelihood of..) Positive Outcomes</th>
<th>Uncertainty Reduction (Potential to mitigate unintended outcomes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limited</strong> (simple)</td>
<td>Focus on agency *Unrestrained</td>
<td>Independent operators divorced from policy</td>
<td>Information deficit</td>
<td>Performance focus</td>
<td>Uncertainty = Risk (unknown) Monitoring and evaluation lacking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balanced</strong> (functional interdependence)</td>
<td>Agency + Coordination (Capacity?)</td>
<td>Policy + Capacity</td>
<td>Capacity maximized Trust</td>
<td>Policy + Performance</td>
<td>Uncertainty = Opportunity Diversity of perspectives for planning considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excessive</strong> (complex)</td>
<td>Focus on coordinating mechanisms *Constraints</td>
<td>Rivals Increased competition</td>
<td>Information overload Mission creep due to lack of trust</td>
<td>Coordination = Revised outcome Muddle through</td>
<td>Uncertainty = Risk (ignored)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The peacebuilding effort in Brčko, Bosnia from 1995 to 2000 represents an ideal medium to examine the effects of limited and excessive inter-organizational coordination and demonstrate the potential for institutions which have achieved coordination balance. By taking three case studies from the same post-war environment, this study was able to isolate the organizational structure of the peacebuilding institutions as the primary independent variable.

The results show that while limited coordination might allow for greater ingenuity and rapid response to problems, the lack of diversity of perspectives and capabilities increases the potential for unintended outcomes later. However, the prescription cannot simply be greater coordination, as excessive coordination is equally disadvantageous. Excessive coordination can lead to a situation whereby the coordination mechanisms themselves become a desired outcome, supplanting the original objectives. This situation is also susceptible to competition and the development of rivalries among collaborating partners, erasing any concept of unity of effort. If limited coordination cannot recognize potential risks, excessive coordination creates an atmosphere where risks are sidelined or ignored.

Between limited and excessive coordination, peacebuilding institutions can achieve a coordination balance that maximizes each agency’s capacity through the positive effects of coordination while maintaining a unified effort to tackle the mission. Each institution is empowered by the flow of information necessary to the completion of their specified tasks, thereby increasing performance. When peacebuilding institutions
achieve coordination balance, uncertainty and risks become opportunities to push forward on the reform agenda. The diversity of perspectives and varied capabilities of the partner institutions increases the chances of achieved desired outcomes by mitigating the possibility of unintended outcomes. In the end, how peacebuilding institutions organize themselves matter, and can help or prevent the intervention from achieving its stated objectives.

Areas for Further Research

International peacebuilding interventions are on the rise (Paris and Sisk 2009). International efforts to bring stability to Bosnia continue. As does peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Congo and South Sudan, among others. The multiple iterations of peacebuilding efforts in each of these locations provide an opportunity to replicate this study, but isolating the evolving organizational approach to specific geographic areas or issues within these interventions.

One ideal context to replicate this study are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) set up by the U.S. government to support peacebuilding endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The PRT program spanned five years in Iraq and is winding down in Afghanistan. PRTs were based mostly in provincial capitals, and consisted of both civilian and military personnel. Most PRT leaders rotated out every year, so the organization approach to the problems they faced was altered over every rotation. USIP made publically available extensive reports and oral histories from the PRT program in both countries, which would provide the data to conduct a similar organizational study to test the coordination balance theory.
One aspect of peacebuilding that arises from the examination of the Brčko example is the dynamics of these types of interventions on the local level. Peacebuilding at the sub-national level appears problematic and ill-advised. While the Brčko example can present a model for how best an intervening government can organize to put itself in the best position for success, Brčko’s success compared to the lack of progress in the rest of the country demonstrates the perils of focusing efforts in a single area or region.

Since the creation of the Brčko District in 2000, Brčko has steadily outgrown its international Supervisors. However, while Brčko was moving forward, the rest of Bosnia was still mired in a political struggle to continue to press its war aims. The reasons Brčko was such a contentious issue in 1995 largely still exists today. The difference is that today Brčko has been transformed from a bombed out shell to an economic engine.

The incentives for the Entities to fight over control of the District have never been more intense. Had the Supervisory authority continued, its role surely would have shifted from rebuilding Brčko to protecting it from the Entities. Yet justifying such a large international presence when the District clearly possessed the capacity to administer itself is impossible—both from a resource allocation and a moral perspective. The international community was then in a precarious position—continue a presence unjustifiably, or turn it loose to fend for itself against the wolves. As the rules in use governing international peacebuilding efforts goes, there really was no option A. Brčko remains to this day a beacon for economic prosperity and reconciliation in Bosnia. But each day that passes that the rest of the country lags behind, the achievements of the District are slowly eroded.
Another aspect of the Brčko reconstruction that emerges is the need for professional peacebuilding community within the U.S. government. Ambassador Farrand concluded by summing up the differences of traditional diplomacy and peacebuilding. Farrand points out the obvious: diplomats are not trained to lead such efforts, and their roles during peacebuilding efforts differ greatly from their usual daily skill sets. Despite this, the State Department is clearly the lead agency (by law and by doctrine) in stability and reconstruction efforts, as these types of interventions fall under non-war international relations.

As Farrand suggests, the State Department and USAID needs to institute a formal training center dedicated to this pursuit. The need for dedicated diplomats and development agents skilled in the art of peacebuilding and reconstruction is paramount at a time when the number, frequency, and intensity of these types of operations are increasing around the globe. Similarly, the military needs to take a serious look at developing an officer corps who look beyond basic target acquisition and can grasp the deeper complexity of an environment and understand the broader implications of the use of force in post-conflict arenas. Until this type of officer corps has been developed—both civilian and military—the broader institutional solutions to the problems related to conducting of peacebuilding operations will still be dependent largely on the personalities of the individuals involved.
APPENDIX A
MODIFIED IAD FRAMEWORK QUESTIONS

Policy analysis objective and the analytic approach:

What is happening in the policy arena?

How do observed outcomes compare to policy objectives?

Which outcomes are satisfactory? Which are not?

Which outcomes are most important?

When/Where are these outcomes occurring?

Who is involved?

Physical and Material Conditions:

Focusing on the good or service produced in the policy situation, what is the economic nature of the activity?

How is the good or service provided?

How is this good or service produced?

What physical or human resources are required to provide and produce this good or service?

What technologies and process are required?

Community Attributes:

What knowledge and information do participants have about the relationship among policy-oriented strategies, actions, and outcomes?

What are the participants’ values and preferences with respect to strategies for achieving
outcomes, as well as outcomes themselves?

What are participants’ beliefs about the relationship among policy-oriented strategies, actions and outcomes?

What are the participants’ beliefs about other participants’ strategy preferences and outcomes?

**Rules-in-Use:**

*Position* (specify set of positions/roles that participants assume; sets number and type of participants)

*Boundary* (exit/entry rules; how participants enter and leave positions)

*Authority* (specifies which actions participants may take)

*Aggregation* (determine how decisions are made in an action situation)

*Scope* (jurisdiction of outcomes; determines whether outcomes are final or not)

*Information* (affect amount and type of information available to participants)

*Payoff* (determine how costs and benefits are meted-out)

*Nested rules* (multi-level rules in use)

**Action Situation:**

What are the positions or roles that actors play in this situation?

Who are the participants?

What actions can participants take, and how are actions linked to outcomes?

What is the level of control that each participant has over action in this situation?

What outcomes are possible in this situation?
What information about the action situation is available to participants?

What costs and benefits do participants incur when they take action in this situation?

**Actors:**

*Resources*

*Valuations*

*Information Processing*

*Selection Processes*

**Shock:**

*What events precipitated a need for interaction between the actors?*

*Was there a change in the environment that set new patterns in motion?*

*What were the causal logics involved?*

**Patterns of Interaction:**

*Structure of economic and political participation*

*Information flows*

**Outcomes:**

*Efficiency*

*Distributional Equity*

*Accountability*

*Conformance to general morality*
Sustainability and Adaptability

Evaluation Criteria

Agency Performance

Unity of Effort

Efficiency

Desired Outcomes

Uncertainty Reduction
APPENDIX B
IAD ANALYSIS OF COOPERATION IN BRČKO

The following table represents the IAD analysis of all three case studies of inter-organizational coordination between peacebuilding institutions in Brčko, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Arizona Market Development; Government Formation; Arizona Market Regulation.

Figure 2. Modified IAD Framework

Table 5. IAD Analysis of Inter-organizational Cooperation in Brčko

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IAD Domain</th>
<th>IFOR</th>
<th>OHR-North I</th>
<th>OHR-North II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical World</strong></td>
<td>Brčko municipality; unknown boundaries</td>
<td>Brčko municipality; ambiguous boundaries</td>
<td>Brčko municipality; defined boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ–Camp</td>
<td>HQ–Brčko town</td>
<td>HQ–Brčko town</td>
<td>HQ–Brčko town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGovern</td>
<td>Freedom of movement across IEBL</td>
<td>Freedom of movement across IEBL restored</td>
<td>Security situation improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IEBL = active front</td>
<td>IEBL = dormant front</td>
<td>Civil Society and International Organizations present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security situation perilous</td>
<td>Security situation tenuous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zone of Separation established</td>
<td>Civil society and international</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE only active civilian international</td>
<td>organizations present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attributes of the</strong></td>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>OHR-North</td>
<td>OHR–Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td>Homogenous</td>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brigade task</td>
<td>International staff</td>
<td>International staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organized from 1st Armored Division</td>
<td>New Supervisor, untested</td>
<td>Recent turnover of High Rep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Locals</td>
<td>International Community Elections fetish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Divided along ethnic lines</td>
<td>International Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serb population in Brčko includes</td>
<td>Elections fetish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>displaced from Sarajevo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim/Croat population displaced from Brčko town to rural areas</td>
<td>Post-War Demographics Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil structure broken down</td>
<td>Disputes over property hindering Refugee/IDP returns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belief in Right to Land/Brčko</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules-in-Use</td>
<td>Dayton Accords—mission objectives</td>
<td>Dayton Accords—political objectives</td>
<td>Dayton Accords—political objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO—rules of engagement</td>
<td>Brčko Tribunal—First Award</td>
<td>Brčko Tribunal—First Award; Supplemental Award</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army Doctrine and Culture Mission Command</td>
<td>State Department bureaucracy and culture</td>
<td>State Department bureaucracy and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5 TF Chain of Command to MND-North</td>
<td>OHR bureaucracy</td>
<td>OHR bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals</td>
<td>Answerable to outside entities</td>
<td>Persistent Influence of outside entities</td>
<td>Locals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase in municipal government capacity</td>
<td>Decreased influence of outside entities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Action Arena | Economic Growth | Governance | Economic Growth; Governance |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>IFOR - lead</th>
<th>OHR-North - lead</th>
<th>OHR-North</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local military leaders</td>
<td>SFOR OSCE State Department OHR-Sarajevo (lesser extent) International community Local community leaders Electorate</td>
<td>OHR-North Sarajevo (dual lead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>OHR-North Sarajevo</td>
<td>State Department SFOR OSCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns of Interaction</th>
<th>IFOR primary authority in Brčko Ad hoc Little to No Coordination outside military Spontaneous decision-making Posavina Working Group</th>
<th>OHR-North final authority in Brčko OHR-North largely autonomous from OHR-Sarajevo SFOR reduced in size; movement OHR-North staff answerable to Supervisor and home agencies</th>
<th>Brčko Government gaining in authority OHR-North advisory/supervisory role OHR-North more subsidiary to OHR-Sarajevo OHR-North staff answerable to Supervisor, OHR-Sarajevo and home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OHR-North Sarajevo (dual lead)</td>
<td>State Department SFOR OSCE</td>
<td>Brčko municipal government International organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals - Little to No interaction between ethnic groups</td>
<td>Locals - Increased interaction between ethnic groups Decline of violence; still prevalent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals - Increased interaction between ethnic groups Interactions free of violence Disputes handled through local government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Arizona Market Economic outlet Security Reconciliation Unregulated Market Suspected Extremist Finance Increased potential for trafficking</th>
<th>Government Formation Multi-ethnic municipal government Strong Supervisor Influence of outside entities mitigated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona Market Regulation Failure</td>
<td>Stalled economic growth Loss of tax revenue; registration Security situation unchanged; extremist finance unmitigated Lost opportunity to increase in municipal government capacity by increased revenue for municipal government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCE LIST


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