WELLINGTON’S BATTLES AGAINST POLITICAL AMBIGUITY

By

Jefferson W. Seddon, Wing Commander, BEng (Hons), CEng, MIMechE, RAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Professor Kenneth G. Johnson

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

December 2012
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

Abstract

It is an unfortunate fact that history is replete with examples of disconnects between a government’s desires and the realms of military possibility. This has led to military stagnation and, at worst, disaster. However, militaries continually fail to appreciate that astute political acumen and an ability to deal with government strategic ambiguity can be just as important to a military commander as operational brilliance. Therefore, it is important for commanders to draw lessons and inspiration from history. Being direct and forthright with politicians would help the military. Politicians who are prepared to listen to such advice can help the country. A fantastic example of this in action is how the great commander, Wellington, dealt with the UK government who faced Napoleonic France threatening to destroy the UK’s national survival between 1809 and 1815.

For Wellington, as an unknown commander, to be able to step into a government strategic vacuum and sell a winning strategy was remarkable. Even more extraordinary was that he was able to execute the strategy despite continuous conflicting strategic direction from his government while operating within a chain of command that was so inefficient it debilitated unity of effort. Readers will draw many parallels to recent operations.
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

Having been at war with France almost continuously from 1793 to 1809, the United Kingdom (UK) had struggled to develop a strategy that could end hostilities on favorable terms. The UK sought to secure its global interests by removing any threat posed by France, particularly under the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. The primary strategy had been to fund the armies of Napoleon’s enemies, but this effort had repeatedly failed as Napoleon shattered the antiquated armies of the other continental powers. Although the Royal Navy’s (RN) blockade of France and her allies restricted Napoleon’s freedom of maneuver and ability to trade, naval power alone could not defeat him. To make matters worse, in 1809 an impending recession in the UK was suffocating available financial resources. A new strategy needed to be defined and successfully executed but there was no obvious solution.

Fortunately for the UK, the remarkable commander, Wellington, came to the fore. He would not only help his country define a winning strategy, he would also conduct a successful campaign against the most powerful army the world had ever seen. Moreover, he had to fight his campaign while receiving unclear and conflicting strategic direction from his government. In overcoming these challenges, Wellington demonstrated that astute political acumen and an ability to deal with government strategic ambiguity can be just as important to a military commander as operational brilliance. His strategic expertise was demonstrated when he helped to shape the government’s strategy on where to prosecute the UK’s land war against Napoleon. Then, after the campaign started, he was able to operate successfully despite continuing unclear strategic direction from above due to his strategic aptitude and politically adept nature. Finally, he was able to succeed despite an inefficient strategic chain of command that detracted from unity of effort and could have sapped the energy from lesser commanders.
Clear strategic direction is very important to help guarantee a successful campaign and it needs to be more than just a grandiose statement of the obvious dressed up as strategy. Current US Joint Doctrine provides an excellent example of what strategy should contain. It states that “strategic guidance should provide long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It should define what constitutes “victory” or success (ends) and allocate adequate forces and resources (means) to achieve strategic objectives.” It is illuminating that this definition recognizes the importance of providing intermediate objectives as part of an overall strategy as that is exactly what the UK Government failed to provide Wellington. He knew the ultimate end state needed to be the defeat of Napoleonic France but he did not have the means to do that and there was conflicting direction on what the intermediate steps should be. In the absence of such guidance or if the guidance becomes inconsistent, any commander would find it difficult to formulate his own operational end states and objectives. History is replete with examples of commanders who have had to operate with unclear strategic direction which has led to disastrous consequences. Such ambiguity still happens today and that is why it is useful to examine the scale of the political ambiguity Wellington faced in order to draw lessons from how he was able to deal with it so successfully.

One of the ways Wellington was able to influence strategy was by using his political nature. No stranger to the political arena, his past experience undoubtedly helped him as a military commander. He gained valuable political, diplomatic and administrative experience when serving as a governor in India and advisor to the Governor General. India can be considered the place where Wellington served his political apprenticeship because although he was learning his military craft, he was also closely involved in the political processes that led to wars and ended them. Subsequently, his political expertise was enhanced by serving as a
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

politician. In April 1806, he was elected to the House of Commons and a year later the Prime Minister appointed him to be the Chief Secretary for Ireland. Wellington learned numerous invaluable lessons for political generalship during his time in India and in Government which would serve him well. He saw that a general was only as good as his last success and that victory in battle, great or small, could influence government policy. He started to understand how to translate obscure and contradictory political objectives into clear sighted military priorities. He forged an ability to garner government support for his ideas. Most notably however, he learned the importance of having influential friends in high places which was a lesson he would exploit from the outset of his campaign.

In 1809, the UK faced a complex strategic dilemma on how to take the war to Napoleon. There was a growing realization that naval force alone would not be sufficient. Additionally, the British Army had suffered humiliating defeats on the Continent, not least when its main force was ejected from Portugal following the retreat to Corunna and the death of its commander, Sir John Moore. Following Corunna, the UK now faced the difficult question of where to focus its limited land forces on the Continent. In particular, there were three main options suggested by various factions. First, there were arguments to employ a significant British force in Spain. Secondly, there was intense pressure from Austria for a diversion in the Low Countries of Northern Europe to support their next move. Finally, the UK was cognizant of a longstanding treaty of alliance with Portugal dating back to 1373 and the fact that they already had a small force in Lisbon.

Each of these options presented their own difficulties or disadvantages. The Spanish option was complicated by growing mistrust between both countries, highlighted by a British lack of respect for the effectiveness of the Spanish Army and a recent British political backlash
caused by Spain’s refusal to allow British Forces to land at Cadiz when offering their support.\textsuperscript{15} The Low Countries option was favored by the Royal Navy because it could secure the port of Antwerp and deny its use to the enemy. However, the relatively small size of the British Army meant that it had to operate in conjunction with allies but if it went to the Low Countries there was a chance it would need to operate independently. This would be dangerous and recent British operations in that area had failed between 1793-5. Notwithstanding this, the Low Countries option would appease Austria which was important because the Government could not afford the financial costs being requested by Austria for its latest war plans.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, this option represented a credible alternative show of support that did not involve subsidies. Additionally, Viscount Castlereagh, the Secretary for War and Colonies, felt that conducting war with British troops in the Low Countries would be significantly less expensive than in the Peninsula due to favorable exchange rates and the fact that Spanish and Portuguese merchants were reluctant to deal in bills.\textsuperscript{17} Considering the third option of Portugal, Sir John Moore who had commanded forces there declared it to be indefensible.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, the Portuguese army was close to being ineffective. Based on the information available at this stage, Spain appeared to be the most favorable option due to the fortress nature of Cadiz and its close proximity to the British stronghold of Gibraltar.

If the strategic situation was not difficult enough, to make matters worse the Government was distracted by political infighting and a national scandal. The Secretary of War, Viscount Castlereagh, and the Foreign Secretary, George Canning, could not get along and their differences would ultimately lead to an armed duel in September 1809.\textsuperscript{19} The fact that their relationship would lead to a duel shows the loathing they had for each other and the strain they were under. Furthermore, the Cabinet was dealing with the political fallout from allegations that
the Duke of York’s mistress had been selling army officer promotions to the highest bidder.\textsuperscript{20} This was the extremely complex political and strategic context that Wellington faced when advancing his arguments on which strategy the UK should employ.

The complexity of the strategic situation and the fact that Wellington could see the right path the country ought to take, despite other respected opinion stating the contrary, demonstrated his exceptional strategic expertise. Wellington had been proposing the Portugal strategy as early as August 1808, but had only won over Canning.\textsuperscript{21} Crucially, Canning had been unable to garner the support of Castlereagh so the Cabinet was divided. On 7 March 1809, Wellington made a contribution that proved to be decisive. He submitted a convincing memorandum to the Government outlining his strategy on how to defend Portugal and transform her into a powerful ally that could assist the UK on the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{22} The strategic foresight shown was remarkable as Wellington predicted exactly how the war would run. While he believed that the Spanish would be defeated whenever they offered battle, he also foresaw that the French would never be able to hold down all of Spain. Furthermore, he calculated that 30,000 men could successfully defend Portugal against any larger force collected against them.\textsuperscript{23} Wellington was making a very bold assertion as the obvious choice to base the British Army from a military perspective was not Portugal but Cadiz in Spain.\textsuperscript{24} Lisbon did not offer natural defenses like Cadiz, nor was it close to the Spanish resistance.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, the respected Sir Henry Moore had already assessed Portugal to be indefensible.\textsuperscript{26} However, Wellington argued that Portugal’s weakness and total dependence on the UK could be turned to an advantage.\textsuperscript{27} Portugal’s weakness would compel her to acquiesce to British demands including the training of their troops to be an effective part of Wellington’s army serving under British officers.\textsuperscript{28} This could lead to the British being less reliant on the Spanish Government, Spanish forces and guerillas who were all viewed as being
unreliable and uncooperative. In his argument, Wellington was astute in ensuring that he addressed the politically important considerations of finance and the politics of Portugal. He stressed how much cheaper an operation in Portugal would be compared with anywhere else. He also included the need to ensure there was increased British political aid and influence in Portugal to include a British commissariat.\(^{29}\) The eminent Peninsular War historian Charles Oman described Wellington’s memorandum as “a marvel of prophetic genius. No more prescient document was ever written.”\(^{30}\)

On 26 March, Castlereagh finally acted on the recommendation and persuaded the King to appoint Wellington as the commander of the army in Portugal. Unfortunately, the UK Government attempted two of the three options. In addition to sending 30,000 troops to Portugal, almost 40,000 were sent to the Low Countries later in 1809. Just as Wellington had predicted, not only did the expedition to the Low Countries end in complete failure, it also diverted troops he could have used on the Peninsula.\(^{31}\) In sum, the UK Government had no clear strategy on how best to prosecute the land war in 1809; however, it was fortunate that Wellington possessed the strategic vision to propose a course of action that would ultimately lead to success.

Having seen how Wellington masterfully influenced strategic direction prior to the campaign, it is interesting to examine his strategic aptitude during it. In the autumn of 1809, Wellington had a stroke of good political fortune which he fully capitalized on. He already had a longstanding relationship with Castlereagh, the Secretary of War, but his influential relationships were about to take a significant upturn. His brother, Richard Wellesley, was to be appointed Foreign Secretary after serving as an ambassador in Cadiz. Wellington was eager to discuss strategy and the two met in Cadiz on the eve of Richard’s departure to take up his new position in London. It is certain that he told Richard that he could defend Portugal and could even begin
the process to liberate Spain. Armed with this information, Richard Wellesley called for substantial increases for the British military and increased support for the Portuguese and Spanish. Unfortunately, the Wellesley brothers did not have immediate success in gaining all the support they needed but they were able to keep the Peninsula strategy alive which was crucial for success. Full political support would only come with victories on the battlefield. In the interim, Wellington had to fight battles of a different nature against unclear strategic direction from the Government.

Wellington had to deal with strategic ambiguity from his political masters right from the outset of the campaign. Initially, the Secretary of War, Castlereagh, told Wellington that the defense of Portugal was his priority and that he had operational flexibility to decide when and where he could link up with the Spanish to achieve the aim. Soon after, this order was contradicted and Wellington was no longer authorized to maneuver in Spain without permission and he should expect to defend Cadiz should the need arise. Fortunately, Wellington knew that his small force could not defend Portugal and Cadiz and he chose to ignore the conflicting direction for the time being. However, when pressed again on similar matters by Foreign Secretary Canning he responded formally. In another prophetic memorandum dated 5 September 1809 he argued that it would be hopeless to try to defend both Portugal and Southern Spain even if his Army was increased to 40,000 men. Wellington was helping his government formulate policy ‘on the fly’ and his frustrations would only grow when the Earl of Liverpool replaced Castlereagh in October 1809.

It is hard to imagine a more ambiguous set of strategic mixed-messages than those that Wellington received from Liverpool in his tenure as Secretary of War. In light of this, it is testament to Wellington’s strategic aptitude that he was able to devise and pursue a successful
strategy. In just over a year Wellington was told: to defend Portugal; to mount numerous expeditions to various locations around Spain with no additional manpower; to not place his army in any risk; to be prepared to evacuate Portugal at the first sign of trouble; and to bring the war to a quick conclusion.\textsuperscript{37} Wellington sought clarification especially with regard to who should decide the level of risk that would necessitate an evacuation of Portugal.\textsuperscript{38} It was no help to Wellington when Liverpool responded that it should be Wellington’s decision as he was the one on the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{39} Based on all the contradictory guidance Wellington had received, it is hard to see how any commander could have calculated what was an acceptable level of risk and what was not. Liverpool went on to declare that “almost everyone in England had little faith in the defensibility of Portugal against a French Army” and inferred that it would be Wellington who would be taking the blame if anything went wrong.\textsuperscript{40} When faced with such poor direction and leadership, it would be understandable if a commander resigned. However, Wellington was not one to concede defeat so easily and attacked the problem.

When faced with such poor strategic guidance, it is testament to Wellington’s abilities that he was able to convince his political masters of a winning strategy that they could own. In addressing Liverpool’s wavering, he attacked the problem with a hint of sarcasm. In response to Liverpool quoting that many in England doubted Wellington’s ability to defend Portugal, Wellington stated, “If the Government takes the opinions of others upon the situation of affairs here, and entertains doubts upon the measures which I propose to adopt, then let them give me their instructions in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution. I may venture, however, to assure you….that there is no man in the army who has taken half the pains upon the subject that I have.”\textsuperscript{41} Wellington’s choice to directly attack the criticism worked on this occasion. Liverpool responded to Wellington’s attack saying that Wellington now had his fullest
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

confidence.\textsuperscript{42} In February 1811, Liverpool complained that the cost of the war had risen dramatically. However, Wellington was able to point out that the cost of transports and supplies had been included in the most expensive year but not the others.\textsuperscript{43} Not content with leaving the discussion there, Wellington added with typical scorn that the cost would be the same to keep the Army at home as on the Peninsula and ominously stated, “I have no doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the peninsula, and the French government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in His Majesty’s dominions. Then His Majesty’s subjects would discover what are the miseries of war…God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor on the scene.”\textsuperscript{44} The very direct language worked again for Wellington. A few weeks after reading Wellington’s forthright view, Liverpool praised Wellington to Parliament and declared the Peninsular War to be the “cheapest and easiest mode of defending our own country.”\textsuperscript{45} Wellington could clearly sense what his embattled ministers needed to hear and he was certainly unrestrained in providing the necessarily robust language.

Fortunately for the UK, Wellington was able to use his strategic prescience to cut through the ambiguity early in the campaign to devise an acceptable strategy. He recognized the strategically decisive terrain of Torres Vedras and reasoned that whatever path the war took, if that terrain was lost then strategic defeat would be inevitable.\textsuperscript{46} He identified that fortifying the location would prevent his only Army from being destroyed and this was one of the priorities of the Government even though the priority seemed to change on occasion. Secondly, it was a way of defending Portugal by securing its capital and a main port. Finally, it was a way of defeating an attacking French army through defensive annihilation when Wellington only had limited troops. A combination of strong defense and a scorched earth policy would starve the French into
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

submission. Inflicting loss on the enemy was important because although it was essential to keep the war alive, ultimately the enemy had to be defeated when more favorable circumstances allowed. It is very telling that Wellington viewed the Lines of Torres Vedras to be so strategically important that he chose to keep them secret from his own ministers. Perhaps Wellington sensed that his indecisive ministers would have conspired to scupper his plans. Based on the fact the Lines were indeed needed in October 1810, it seems very fortuitous for the UK that Wellington decided to prevent ministers from knowing his secret strategy. He had identified that certain politicians could not be trusted with military secrets. Certainly, the Whigs in opposition had a tendency to leak military matters to a Press that was unsympathetic to the military; it was also a fact that Napoleon read British newspapers and would have seen any leaks.

As the war progressed, Wellington had to fight another significantly flawed strategy that came down from above. It was fortunately for his country that he dealt with it with typical competence. The UK Government had a predilection for supporting expeditions all over the world despite the fact that the British Army was so relatively small. Wellington had got his way on each occasion to prevent his troops being diverted thereby keeping his cautious strategy on the Peninsula alive. However, in 1813, just as Wellington was finally in a position to inflict a decisive defeat on the French, the Government again considered moving the Army from Spain. This time the destination on the table was Italy. General Bentinck had convinced the Undersecretary for War, Henry Bunbury, that Italy was the best place to prosecute the war against France rather than in the heart of France itself. It seems absurd with hindsight that the Government would contemplate this proposal at this juncture but they did. Wellington was determined to convince the Government that it would be folly to pursue such a course of action just at the point of a decision in Spain. Therefore, he was shrewd in how he framed his
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

argument to what was now his third Secretary of War, the Earl of Bathurst. Knowing the Government would listen to arguments of a financial nature, Wellington focused on the cost of such an undertaking: “If the British did not agree to supporting the operation on the full scale it required…the plan would fail, and our troops would be forced to embark with loss and disgrace.” Wellington was playing to the inevitable Government fears on how expensive it would be to raise and equip Italian troops. Just in case his argument failed, Wellington launched his army against the French. He reasoned that once the army was committed, the Government would find it impossible to redeploy it. This latest assault ended with his famous victory over French forces at Vitoria. Once again, Wellington had demonstrated his political acumen. He certainly knew how to make the Government listen to an argument. Moreover, he had remembered a significant lesson from his days as a politician in Government: victory in battle could influence government policy. From this point forward, government policy would fully support Wellington and his endeavors; he had not only won against the French in the Peninsula, he had won a battle of politics with his own government.

Wellington’s achievements are all the more remarkable when one considers the inefficient strategic chain of command he had to work within that detracted from unity of effort. Current US doctrine states, “Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.” The command structure imposed on Wellington meant that unity of command and unity of effort were almost impossible. For example, of the eight principal officers on Wellington’s staff, seven did not work for him but instead answered to different departments in London. The bureaucratic burden was further confounded by the fact that Wellington had to seek approval
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

from at least five government offices just to conduct routine tactical and administrative operations. A simple request for reinforcements would need the approval of six members of the cabinet.\(^{54}\)

The inefficient chain of command inevitably led to tensions and frustrations that Wellington had to deal with through his political contacts. One example of many was Wellington’s continual battle to gain sufficient funds to feed and clothe his army in order to prevent it from plundering the populace that denuded their much-needed support.\(^{55}\) The commissariat that was responsible for providing funds did not work for Wellington, they reported to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, William Huskisson. Wellington had numerous superiors including the Secretary of War in the War Office, the Commander in Chief of the Army in Horse Guards and the Foreign Secretary who was responsible for strategy. Such a command chain meant that the influence that Wellington could bring to bear on the Chancellor of the Exchequer was minimal. This did not stop Wellington writing to him and then the Secretary of War Castlereagh pleading his case, “The operations of the army would be cramped for want of money.”\(^{56}\) In the end, Wellington created a diplomatic incident which provided money in the short term and helped to force the issue for a longer term solution. He forced the wine merchants of Oporto to loan him money while telling them that they should be grateful to him for giving them the freedom to trade because he had made them free of the French. Their protests inevitably caught the attention of both the Portuguese Regency and the British Government. The Government provided funds to pay Wellington’s debts in the nick of time.\(^{57}\) Again, Wellington had needed to be influential in civil affairs to ensure military success.

Modern day commanders will know that it is a fact of life that they often have to deal in the realm of political ambiguity. Having to convert obscure political objectives into clearly
defined military strategy will be familiar to many. However, what sets Wellington apart is the sheer scale of the challenge he faced. In 1809, the United Kingdom was out of ideas on how to defeat Napoleon; everything it tried had failed, its Army was no match against France and the money was now running out too. For Wellington, as a relatively unknown military commander, to be able to step into this strategic vacuum and devise and sell a winning strategy to his government is nothing short of remarkable. Perhaps even more extraordinary is that he was able to execute the strategy despite continuous conflicting direction from his government while operating within a chain of command that was so inefficient it debilitated unity of effort. Furthermore, he overcame all this when fighting the most powerful army the world had ever seen. In six years he orchestrated the defense of Portugal, the liberation of Spain and the defeat of France. In overcoming these challenges, Wellington demonstrated that astute political acumen and an ability to deal with government strategic ambiguity can be just as important to a military commander as operational brilliance. It is recognized that not everyone can be fortunate enough to have a brother who happens to be the Foreign Secretary when you are a commander in chief. Additionally, using caustic language to politicians is certainly far less acceptable today than it was for Wellington. However, this should not detract from how politically adept Wellington was as a general or how his political generalship contributed to his success. In modern times, forthright language to politicians has often been needed but has often been lacking; Wellington provides a valuable lesson to the military in this respect. In sum, Wellington demonstrated that astute political acumen is as an essential, albeit unglamorous, component of command ability. The type of challenges Wellington faced may be familiar to some modern-day commanders. However, the sheer scale of the strategic and political problems he conquered should provide inspiration to anyone in that seemingly insurmountable political ambiguity can be overcome.
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

Notes

1 There was a brief peace between the UK and France from 1801-2.
2 Great Britain became the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801 so the correct term of United Kingdom, as opposed to Great Britain, will be used throughout this paper. Citizens and institutions of the UK are correctly referred to as British.
3 For reasons of clarity Arthur Wellesley has been referred to as Wellington throughout the paper despite the fact that he was not ennobled until September, 1809, or made a Duke until 1814.
5 Andrew Uffindell, Wellington’s Armies (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 2003), 12.
7 Andrew Uffindell, Wellington’s Armies (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 2003), 12.
10 Ibid, xii.
16 Ibid, 82.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid, 86.
22 Ibid, 86-87.
25 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
30 Charles Oman, Wellington’s Army, 1809-1814 (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), 50.
Wellington’s Battles Against Political Ambiguity

33 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
51 Ibid, 161.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid, 162.
56 Ibid, 9.
Bibliography


