EFFECTIVE AIR FORCE LAW ENFORCEMENT,
ANTITERRORISM, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE,
AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

As the United States government experiences deep budget and manpower reductions, it is imperative to evaluate organizational efficacy to ensure homeland security does not falter. The current Air Force Security Forces organizational structure is evaluated for compatibility with other agencies in executing the homeland security mission. The law enforcement, antiterrorism, counterintelligence, intelligence, and emergency management constructs are of primary interest as they are keys to preventing catastrophes and in responding to incidents that do occur. The following are examined: 1) organizational background and event responses; 2) organizational structures needed for proper integration with other agencies; (3) comparison with other law enforcement and counterintelligence constructs for more effective and efficient ways of organizing; and (4) recommendations for an improved Air Force construct incorporating the greatest effectiveness, followed by efficiency. Through this analysis, it is shown that reorganizing the Air Force law enforcement and antiterrorism organizational structures can improve interagency operations and liaison.
Introduction

As the following examination of the current organizational structures shows, the United States Air Force (USAF) needs to reorganize its law enforcement and antiterrorism constructs in order to provide the most effective support of and integration with law enforcement, intelligence, counterintelligence, and emergency management agencies, to include the other Services, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DoJ). In order to increase understanding of this issue, the following will be examined: 1) organizational background and event responses; 2) what structures need to exist for proper integration with other response agencies involved in the mission of homeland security; (3) comparison with other law enforcement and counterintelligence constructs for more effective and efficient ways of organizing; and (4) the recommendations for an improved Air Force construct incorporating the greatest effectiveness, followed by efficiency. This analysis is conducted with a focus on bases located in the 50 United States. Although international constructs may be helpful for widening the scope of tested organizational arrangements, the vastly differing relationships and organization of other nations’ federal agencies complicates the issue beyond the scope of this paper; however, it may prove a useful subject of future research.

As the United States stands at the brink of further budget and manpower reductions, it is imperative to evaluate organizational efficacy to ensure lessons are not learned the hard way - at the expense of lives and/or resources. In the current fiscal environment, the United States government is constrained in its ability to provide all of the services necessary to run a city, the analogy often used to describe how military bases operate. There has been a steady decrease in military personnel in the post-Cold War era, which has driven the Department of Defense (DoD) to civilianize and contract out a wide variety of functions. The USAF has also reduced its
military manpower, most frequently civilianizing and contracting out base support functions. The USAF has also reduced the number of base services altogether, relying on support agreements with other military installations, Federal agencies, and local agencies. This reduces operating costs for the military by not funding maintenance of rarely used capabilities, for example capabilities that are only necessary in the event of a natural disaster or other catastrophic emergency. The probability of these exigencies occurring regularly is very slim, but maintaining the personnel, their training, and the necessary equipment are a large annual cost, whose pay out may not provide benefits for several years, if ever. If a capability exists only within DoD (cannot be shared with the civilian sector), then the entire organization benefits financially from reducing the maintenance costs by sharing the function across a geographical area, instead of maintaining full capabilities at each base. By relying on other agencies that already bear these maintenance costs, the USAF can avoid the burden of continual maintenance, and only pay for the service and associated supplies when it is needed or used. For example, in the 23 years since 1990, Emergency Services Teams (analogous to civilian SWAT) have only been involved twice in deadly force scenarios and were not the forces that caused termination of the events.\(^1\) Despite this, the teams and their equipment have been maintained to some level at most installations during this period.

All of the cost savings are highly beneficial in today’s environment, but multiple functions that are only occasionally used are often the most critical to saving lives and property when a large-scale emergency occurs. It is during these times that the agency responsible for providing a service by agreement must work with the affected populace and leadership (in this discussion that of an Air Force base) to accomplish the mission. Without a mutual understanding and interoperability, crises may be exacerbated instead of mitigated. In this event, leadership
may reconsider the cost savings over years, if the loss of life and property will be extreme. This can be avoided if the service provider(s) properly integrate with the existing base agencies and leadership. With proper integration, the agencies can operate effectively to provide their service, while not needing to work with the base on a daily basis, which would probably negate the anticipated cost savings.

For proper integration, it is necessary to have a base point of contact to help guide the non-organic organization in the performance of its service mission. If the agency does not know who to contact for assistance, then a delay in providing their service is likely, which could prolong the emergency’s effects and allow for greater consequences. Additionally, if the base contact does not understand how the agency operates, then their guidance may incorrectly assume capabilities the agency does not have, or fail to engage capabilities the agency does have. The base contact must also be familiar with the mission the agency performs to ensure relevant information sharing. Absent, or extraneous, information will reduce the efficiency of the agency’s response and may even result in mission failure. Interaction between an agency’s personnel and the base point of contact prior to incident response is important to developing understanding and liaison.

The DoD is also often a contributor to the activities of homeland security. Homeland security is defined by Sauter and Carafano as a “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” The DoD contributes to the missions of keeping the United States, its land, its businesses, and its people safe and able to continue their normal activities. Other Departments, such as Homeland Security, Justice, and State, are
significant contributors to this mission as well. By working together, agencies can streamline processes for prevention of and response to issues of homeland security.

The specific realm of law enforcement, antiterrorism, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations highlight the criticality of well-established liaison. Law enforcement responses are necessary during all manner of incidents, from crimes to attacks to natural disasters, and frequently the speed and quality of response affects the number of casualties and amount of property damage. Antiterrorism is an ongoing effort that requires proactivity and information sharing in order to be effective. Intelligence and counterintelligence are often essential to proper law enforcement and antiterrorism response, especially in the event of an attack. From operations on scene to the command, control, and support behind the scenes, it is important for the base and service providers to integrate rapidly and seamlessly. For this reason, it is important that the base units are organized in such a way that provides a clear liaison for the missions that may occur, with base contacts having sufficient professional experience and interaction to aid in the corresponding agencies’ missions. As they are currently organized, USAF law enforcement, antiterrorism, intelligence, and counterintelligence personnel are not organized as those of off-base agencies. Where organizational structures do align, it is often for a limited piece of a mission, or only at locations where an alternative organization has been adopted, outside of the USAF standard.

Organizational Background

Today’s Air Force Security Forces were born of the United States Army’s Air Provost Marshal when the USAF was created as an independent service in 1947. Designated as Air
Police in 1948, this entity was placed under the Air Force Inspector General. In 1960, the Air Provost Marshal was re-titled as the Director of Security and Law Enforcement and in 1967, the Air Police were re-designated Security Police. In 1975, the Director was re-titled the Chief of Security Police and the function was removed from under the Air Force Inspector General to report directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff as its own function. Three years later, in 1978, the Security Police were moved back under the Air Force Inspector General’s purview as the Air Force Office of Security Police. In 1991, during an Air Staff reorganization, the Chief of Security Police was again returned to reporting directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff. In 1997, the Security Police career field merged the security and law enforcement specialties, along with Combat Arms Training and Maintenance, and was re-designated as Security Forces. The Chief of Security Police was re-titled the Director of Security Forces. In 2006, the Director of Security Forces was again realigned, this time under the Director for Installations and Mission Support, where it continues to reside today.

Along with the changes in title and reporting chain, Security Forces has experienced mission changes over the years. Originally responsible for law enforcement, corrections, and aircraft security as the field separated from the US Army, the conflict in Vietnam saw the emergence of the need to provide air base defense. As times changed more, the Director of Security Forces became responsible for Combat Arms, then Antiterrorism and Force Protection. Also in 2009, the functions of Personnel Security, Industrial Security, and Information Security were removed from the responsibilities of the Director of Security Forces.

Security Forces today provide force protection and air base defense through installation entry control, layered defenses, patrolling, combat arms, and the use of military working dogs. Resource protection and aircraft security are also provided through specific security protocols,
with specialized entry control, sentries, and response forces, as required by resource type.

Security Forces also performs several law enforcement functions such as traffic enforcement, incident response, community engagement/crime prevention, misdemeanor-type investigations, and corrections. The Director of Security Forces is also responsible for Antiterrorism at the MAJCOM and higher levels; however, at the base level it does not work within the Security Forces squadrons, but rather at the base level on the base staff. Security Forces is manned by personnel in ranks from Airman Basic to Brigadier General, with the greatest concentration of personnel in junior ranks performing security, force protection, and law enforcement duties. Security Forces’ core missions and manpower are not likely to change significantly over the next decade; however, there are periodically discussions of returning some departed missions to the Security Forces purview (e.g. Antiterrorism at the squadron level).

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) was created in 1948, reporting to the Air Force Inspector General as it still does. This office conducts felony-type investigations, including cases of drug use and distribution, sexual assault, aggravated assault, cyberspace crimes, and deaths. It also provides extensive forensics analysis capabilities. Counterintelligence awareness training and investigations, offensive counterintelligence operations, threat assessments, and vulnerability assessments are also provided by AFOSI, often in coordination with agencies such as the United States Attorney’s Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Central Intelligence Agency, the US Marshal Service, the US Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. A recently centralized portion of AFOSI now concentrates solely on fraud and corruption investigations, particularly procurement fraud. AFOSI is manned by personnel in the ranks of Staff Sergeant through Brigadier General, with the majority of personnel in the mid-level ranks, although
agents’ ranks are not generally revealed or observable to outside personnel. The counterintelligence function performed by AFOSI is critical to the law enforcement and force protection missions of Security Forces, and investigations often pass between the organizations as developments affect the level of the investigations.

Air Force Intelligence is reports directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff. It is responsible for providing intelligence information for all aspects of Air Force operations. Intelligence is manned by personnel in the ranks of Airman Basic to Lieutenant General, although the majority of these personnel are dedicated to providing information on threats to air operations. Minimal training of intelligence personnel focuses on the ground threat, particularly within the United States. Additionally, Intelligence must be careful not to violate Intelligence Oversight Rules within the United States. Intelligence maintains close liaison with the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence agencies within allied nations’ militaries.

Air Force Emergency Management works for the Air Force Civil Engineer, who, like the Director of Security Forces, is aligned under the Director of Installations and Mission Support. Much of this function has been civilianized over the previous few years for continuity purposes and budget constraints. Additionally, many Air Force bases have reduced the organic capability of this office, substituting instead support agreements with other military installations, other Federal agencies, and other local agencies.

Currently, Security Forces, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Emergency Management, and Intelligence have different chains of command, with widely differing manpower and mission emphasis (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). Security Forces, AFOSI, and Intelligence all have missions that are focused on preventing catastrophes; however, if they do
not interface properly, actionable information may not make it to the unit needing to take action. Counterintelligence is one such arena, with important information to prevent catastrophes - the ideal mission of homeland security.

These organizations are also limited differently in their contributions to the homeland security mission. Understanding the limitations is important to the liaison with agencies as events cross the boundaries of military installations. Security Forces personnel are limited in their off-base law enforcement capacity by the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1835). While permitted full law enforcement authorities in exclusive and concurrent federal jurisdictions, there are some constraints on law enforcement activities within proprietary jurisdiction and great constraints on those off an installation. Notably, due to AFOSI agent status as federal agents, they encounter the least restriction on their activities off base; however, they still may not enforce local or state laws, and military agents may not arrest civilians outside of federal jurisdictions. Air Force Intelligence is governed by Executive Order 12333, and corresponding DoD 5240.1-R, allowing necessary activities while ensuring protection of US persons’ rights. All DoD assets are somewhat limited in their ability to support civil authorities through the Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). As Gen Jacoby, USNORTHCOM Commander, stated in his report to Congress, “Our civil support actions range from support to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) on our borders, to mitigating the effects of man-made incidents or natural disasters. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, our assistance in this role is always in support of the lead federal agency.” This is the avenue through which Security Forces and Emergency Management operate with non-DoD agencies in the greater homeland security environment.
In summary, the existing Air Force responsibilities for incident response are varied and have differing chains of command. Figure 1 shows the Air Force-level functions as they correspond to functions possessed by the USAF. In blue is the higher leadership, while red denotes the agencies owning the functions of interest.

**Figure 1. Air Force-level Organization.**

![Air Force-level Organization Diagram]

Figure 2 shows the MAJCOM-level functions as they correspond to functions possessed by the USAF. In blue is the higher leadership, while red denotes the agencies owning the functions of interest.
Figure 2. MAJCOM-level Organization.

Figure 3 shows the base-level functions as they correspond to functions possessed by the USAF. In blue is the higher leadership, while red denotes the agencies owning the functions and yellow describes the particular functions of interest.

Figure 3. Base-level Organization and Functions.
Historical Event Responses

Throughout recent history, non-military agencies have been involved in interagency responses on military installations. This has been occurring more frequently as the military’s organic capacity to deal with incidents has been reduced. In this section, three events that occurred on military installations are examined, as they required multiple non-DoD agencies’ assistance for expeditious and effective recovery. These three examples are from different services in different states a few years apart. Although the comparisons are not perfect as the incidents are varying and in vastly different environments, they do show similar deficiencies, and areas which were improved DoD-wide over time. For all three incidents the methods and effectiveness of interagency response are discussed.

Response #1: Fort Hood, Texas

On 5 November 2009, a gunman began shooting at the Fort Hood Soldier Readiness Center. In addition to medical responders, Military Police, CID, and the FBI also responded to perform force protection and investigative functions. In the wake of the event, DoD assembled an Independent Review team, whose analysis was conducted to improve force protection programs against the threat posed by members of the base populous. Although force protection programs may be valuable in preventing a recurrence, not much has changed to improve the actual responses of the law enforcement, investigative, and intelligence functions. Memoranda of understanding and agreement were successfully executed; however, these documents needed rewriting, as identified by the base leadership. The DoD Independent Review also identified information sharing as an area of weakness leading up to the incident. Specifically, the Review noted, “the time has passed when bureaucratic concerns by specific entities over protecting
‘their’ information can be allowed to prevent relevant threat information and indicators from reaching those who need it - the commanders.”\textsuperscript{12} As a result, they specified immediate action items including “[working] with the FBI to enhance the operation of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces” and to “increase Service representation on the Joint Terrorism Task Forces,”\textsuperscript{13} as well as “establish[ing] a functional body to concentrate in one place the effort to gather, analyze, and interpret data useful in identifying indicators of potential for violent action.”\textsuperscript{14}

Another significant issue faced during the Ft Hood incident was who was in charge. The Review observed, “an effective protection system requires robust information sharing and command and control structures that facilitate active information sharing… Our command and control systems must have the right architecture, connectivity, portability, and flexibility to enable commanders to cope with near-simultaneous incidents at multiple locations… Gaps in our ability to provide proper command and control and support to subordinate commands should be explored in a variety of ways.”\textsuperscript{15}

Finally, the actual response needs to be improved. Although initial response was within 3 minutes and on-scene leadership was effective, the Review commented, “the [DoD] must continue to refine its abilities to provide emergency response in concert with other agencies and jurisdictions.”\textsuperscript{16} This was reinforced by John Kress, USNORTHCOM’s deputy chief of Force Protection & Mission Assurance stating in the aftermath, “We must always look to improve our ability to share information,” said Kress. “USNORTHCOM never operates in a vacuum – our homeland defense mission and the protection of our forces cannot be accomplished without close coordination and cooperation between ourselves and key partners like the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, service Military Criminal Investigation Organizations and the Department of Homeland Security.”\textsuperscript{17} The Review sums up as one of its conclusions, “the lack of a single
functional management structure increases the likelihood of confusion on the part of the FBI when it deals with DoD representatives who operate under different functional guidance.”

Although steps have been taken since to integrate all of the Services’ investigative and counterintelligence organizations into the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces, it is this concern with all of the non-DoD agencies that must be corrected.

Response #2: Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado

On 21 November 2011 at Schriever Air Force Base, an armed suspect barricaded himself in a base building and held off first responders for 10 hours, threatening suicide with his weapon. By the time the suspect turned himself over to authorities, several agencies outside DoD had responded to provide valuable assistance required by the Air Force. In addition to Schriever’s Security Forces, responders included Schriever’s AFOSI, Peterson AFB Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel, the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office SWAT, El Paso County Sheriff’s Office negotiators, and the FBI SWAT, to whom the suspect finally surrendered. In the after-action report it was noted that the FBI was “never requested, but arrived nonetheless;” however, all went smoothly on-scene.

Resource duplication was a noted issue during the response. EOD support was requested of a nearby base to provide robotic surveillance support; however, this was a capability possessed by the FBI SWAT and the duplicate capability was not used. Additionally, ballistic shields were obtained from Peterson AFB, but better ones were already possessed by the FBI SWAT. This demonstrated the need for prior coordination and understanding of agencies’ capabilities. These two examples of inefficiency in allocating resources serve to highlight the need for more streamlined liaison with other federal agencies. In this case there was only one
incident in a closely controlled, small area. Should future incidents involve multiple locations or a vast area, inefficient use of resources may be detrimental to the timely termination of and recovery from an incident, or worse, cause personnel to be put at unnecessary risk.

Response #3: Washington Naval Yard, District of Columbia

On 16 September 2013, a building on the Washington Naval Yard was attacked by an active shooter, a disgruntled former contract employee. A variety of first responders were on-scene in mere minutes to stop the shootings and attend to casualties.23 In addition to Naval District Washington police personnel and NCIS, the FBI, DC Metropolitan Police, US Capitol Police, and US Park Police provided valuable response assistance.24,25 Additionally, military helicopter support was brought to bear for casualty evacuation,26 and a team from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives was on hand.27

From available accounts, the response was well-integrated, especially as several agencies had personnel assigned to offices within the targeted building; however this incident had the second-highest casualties of an incident on a DoD installation, the highest number of casualties belonging to the Ft Hood incident. Although Navy Yard personnel distributed radios to coordinate building evacuation efforts,28 there was no indication of coordination among all of the responding agencies.29 From footage of the response, due to the tight urban area, response forces were somewhat disorganized and blocked routes surrounding the base.30 To achieve incident termination, however, tactical teams were assembled and secured the building.31

(Note: An independent review was also assembled for this incident; however, the results of the review were not scheduled to be published until 20 December 2013.)32
Response Summary

In all responses, incomplete understanding of support capabilities and limited liaison between the base agencies and other responders was demonstrated. Additionally, all three incidents carried with them the underlying issues of behavioral warnings being present in the subjects, as well as the subjects’ abilities to bring unauthorized weapons onto the installations for use in the incidents. Although these two common issues lie at the heart of the incidents, this is a possible avenue for future research as the bases' organizational structures did not directly contribute to either problem.

Structures Required for Integration

The other Federal Departments and liaison organizations, such as local first responders, are the forces with whom bases maintain support agreements and from whom bases request outside assistance. The ability to align similar organizational structures on scene is very valuable in a dynamic environment, as parallel chains of command allow simple matches between the lowest and highest levels. It is most simple for on-scene responders to work together when their leadership is functionally paired and a linear chain of command links their priorities and missions. In the wake of the Fort Hood incident the DoD has migrated to the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to assist in this endeavor.

In order to successfully integrate forces on an incident scene, responding organizations need to have clearly identified one or more of the following capabilities: law enforcement for traffic control and investigation, counterintelligence and intelligence in an attack scenario, and emergency management components to contain and recover from the incident. It is also
advisable to integrate antiterrorism and counterterrorism functional specialists at incidents which may have a nexus to terrorism, may spark terrorist reactions, or may demonstrate a new tactic that could be employed by terrorists. Given these specialty requirements, it is valuable to compare the organizational structures of non-DoD agencies that may respond to a serious incident, as they share in the homeland security mission.

The DHS bears the greatest burden for incident response and recovery. It is a conglomeration of 22 agencies brought together in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Within the Department, the following agencies perform the subjects analyzed: ICE and CBP perform homeland defense-type activities; the US Secret Service and US Coast Guard perform law enforcement activities; the Transportation Security Agency concerns itself with aircraft security; FEMA is responsible for all emergency management and coordination of efforts; and the Intelligence and Analysis agency performs intelligence functions needed by the other 21 agencies. Figure 4 shows the functions belonging to DHS as they correspond to functions possessed by the USAF. In blue is the higher leadership, while red denotes the agencies owning the functions and yellow describes the particular functions of interest.

**Figure 4. DHS Organization and Functions.**

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![Figure 4. DHS Organization and Functions.](image-url)
It is easily recognized that the DHS does not have counterintelligence or counterterrorism agencies. These are provided to the federal construct by the DoJ. Within the DoJ, the FBI has the lead for both functions, as well as major federal investigative responsibilities, so serves as a single focal point for the government. The splitting of incident responsibilities complicates the chain of command during an emergency response, as outside of DoD, a homeland security response is likely to include elements of DHS and DoJ. Figure 5 shows the functions belonging to DoJ as they correspond to functions possessed by the USAF. In blue is the higher leadership, while red denotes the agency owning the functions and yellow describes the particular functions of interest.

**Figure 5. DoJ Organization and Functions.**

The final group with which USAF personnel must interface is the local law enforcement. Depending on the state in which the base is located, there are a variety of possible constructs - most frequently involving a State Police entity, a county Sheriff’s Office, and a city or town Police Department. These police entities frequently do not exist within a unified chain of command, but do have strong liaisons with each other and have established areas of jurisdiction in which they operate. Where jurisdictions overlap, the entities have understandings of responsibilities, and during incidents often will provide each other with direct support.
Within the Air Force, there are currently a few functional gaps and redundancies. First, the USAF does not have a defined office of responsibility for counterterrorism. AFOSI and Antiterrorism offices share the associated tasks, with identification of bad actors lying primarily with members’ chains of command. Second, there is currently an overlap between the investigative responsibilities of Security Forces and AFOSI. Although matrices exist and are agreed upon by both functions’ leadership, determining the actual level and subjects of an investigation that may be uncovered is difficult to do before initiating the investigation. Once the investigation proceeds, it may be transferred between functions, sometimes multiple times. This may result in difficulties with chains of evidence, and minor details may be lost or overlooked for lack of continuity of investigators. The ultimate result can be as serious as unsolved cases or cases that do not survive in a court of law due to disconnects. Finally, the Antiterrorism function on bases is understaffed, relying on significant assistance from Security Forces and AFOSI to meet the program requirements. In addition, Antiterrorism offices often lack the contacts with off base agencies that are formed through liaison by Security Forces and AFOSI while performing their other functions.

**Other Existing Law Enforcement Constructs**

Other organizations’ constructs were examined for more effective and efficient ways of organizing. In this section, the organizations of other military Services’ law enforcement, antiterrorism, and counterintelligence functions are examined. All of the functions have prescribed responsibilities by joint doctrine (some of which is classified).
The United States Army has the Military Police Branch which performs law enforcement, force protection, and security missions similar to Security Forces and is led by the Provost Marshal, who reports to the Army Chief of Staff. The Army also has the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), which reports to the Provost Marshal. CID performs some of the felony-type investigations as AFOSI does; however, the counterintelligence mission within the Army falls under the Military Intelligence Branch. With CID and the Military Police sharing a chain of command, their operations are better integrated and overlaps in mission are more easily resolved than in the Air Force; however, they are not always well-integrated at the base level, leaving room for streamlining. The Army’s emergency management is provided by the Corps of Engineers.

The United States Navy has Masters-of-Arms who perform their basic law enforcement, both at sea and at port. In the 50 United States the Navy’s law enforcement and antiterrorism functions are grouped within Operating Forces Support, and report to the Navy Installation Command. The Navy Installations Command is also responsible for emergency management, under Base Support. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service is entirely civilianized and performs felony-type investigations, similar to AFOSI. NCIS also is responsible for the Navy’s counterintelligence functions. The Navy also has its own Intelligence personnel, tasked with that function.

In the United States Marine Corps, law enforcement, security, and investigations are performed by Military Police. Counterintelligence activities, along with antiterrorism functions, are performed by Counterintelligence/HUMINT personnel. Emergency management is provided by Force Service Support personnel. As with the other Services, the Marine Corps has dedicated Intelligence personnel performing this function.
At a glance, it is apparent that no two military services have the same structure for the functions of interest. They all have differing structures and different groupings of functions within them. At the time of this writing, there is no joint doctrine or publications prescribing a certain organizational template for placement of these functions.

**Recommendations**

From the preceding sections, one gets a clear picture of the ways in which law enforcement, counterintelligence, antiterrorism, intelligence, and emergency management are organized within the Services and the civilian federal system. Furthermore, these functions were brought to bear during incidents occurring on bases operated by each of the military Departments, with varying degrees of success. After comparison and analysis of the structures and their utility during actual events, there are a few notable areas for improvement within the Air Force’s organizations responsible for law enforcement and antiterrorism.

First, it is important to note that the emergency management and intelligence functions as they are within the Air Force match other federal agencies. They both have unique capability and legal requirements that make it wise to keep them separated from the other functions examined. For example, placing the intelligence function in the same organization as the counterintelligence function may blur the activities and cause difficulties with adhering to regulatory requirements, such as Intelligence Oversight Rules. At the same time, the emergency management function often relies on the other capabilities of engineers, thus making it most effective for it to remain organized with its supporting functions. Furthermore, all of the other Services have independent intelligence branches and have grouped emergency management with other engineering
responsibilities. Having no demonstrated difficulties with cooperative operations alongside federal agencies, intelligence and emergency management should remain in their existing organizational positions.

As none of the other Services have matching counterintelligence, law enforcement, or antiterrorism organizations, it is not necessary to match a particular construct to facilitate operating in the joint environment. Counterintelligence requires specialized training and advanced investigative skills, which are already incorporated into AFOSI’s technical training. It may be said that the counterintelligence function belongs under the same umbrella as law enforcement, since it contributes directly to proactive law enforcement; however, this function serves more than just law enforcement, contributing directly to the intelligence function and acquisitions, so keeping it separate prevents parochialism.

The Air Force’s law enforcement structure could benefit from reorganization. The investigation of misdemeanor-type crimes should be organizationally co-located with felony-type investigations. This is necessary for effectiveness, as transferring cases between organizations ultimately results in lengthy, incomplete, and/or improperly documented cases. Continuity of investigators is critical to this function’s performance. Levels of investigation are not split between organizations in the federal system, nor is this done within other law enforcement agencies below the federal level. If a case belongs to a certain jurisdiction it is started and seen through by the agency holding jurisdiction. For example, the FBI arrives and maintains control of terrorist activity investigations, regardless of where within the US the crime occurs. It does not pass between the local level and the FBI, regardless of the severity of the crime. If an incident has criminal elements in multiple jurisdictions, then multiple cases may be
opened, but they are not passed between organizations. At most, coordination and information is transferred between agencies.

Resolving the question of combining investigative responsibilities into one organization may not be difficult, but where to put these responsibilities is more complicated. Placing all investigations within Security Forces has the benefits of matching the structures of the local police departments, with whom these units work closely. This would provide one point of contact for both federal and local law enforcement, with no distinction between levels of incidents. The most notable drawback, however, is that under the current construct AFOSI provides the invaluable service of impartial investigations. The military organization deviates from that of civilians in the greater opportunity for command influence. With AFOSI located separately from the base chain of command, the chain can have relatively little influence, which benefits the Air Force greatly as they look into claims of impropriety. Upon conclusion of an investigation, there is little room for accusations that the chain of command influenced the direction or findings of AFOSI cases. With Security Forces deeply embedded under multiple layers of base leadership, such a claim may seem far more plausible, especially to outsiders and media. The counter-argument of moving Security Forces out of the base chain of command and into the Inspector General’s organization would severely limit the support for the other Security Forces functions, which would be detrimental to the integrated defense concept involving the entire base in security and force protection. Therefore, all investigative functions should be assigned to AFOSI, within the Inspector General’s purview.

A possible argument against moving all forms of investigations under AFOSI purview takes the form of concern with the daily law enforcement being conducted by one unit, while another will investigate incidents further. This concern can be swiftly allayed by the fact that
currently daily law enforcement activities discover prospective cases and are turning them over to another piece of the unit, thus there would be no greater break in continuity at the outset of an investigation than already exists. Furthermore, moving all levels of investigation into one unit will provide the investigators varying levels of difficulty in cases. This will benefit the Air Force, as new personnel could be sent to the shorter (and less expensive) Military Police Investigators course, then assigned to the easier investigations to test their capabilities. If they do well with investigative responsibilities, then it would make fiscal sense to send them to the more extensive (and more expensive) Federal Law Enforcement Training Course. As the system currently stands, all new AFOSI personnel are sent to the more extensive training first, and afterwards it is sometimes discovered that they do not have the faculties or drive for investigative work. This construct would benefit Security Forces and AFOSI alike, eliminating passing investigations between investigators, while giving the Air Force a cost-effective method of testing prospective special investigators.

The final function that would benefit from reorganization is antiterrorism. Its placement within AFOSI would improve function effectiveness and align it with partners. The FBI performs this function in the federal system, so this grouping would enhance interagency coordination, streamlining the FBI’s base contacts. The USMC also places it in coexistence with counterintelligence, as the two functions feed into each other. Combining these functions increases effectiveness, as AFOSI’s counterintelligence activities and participation in the Joint Terrorism Task Force would significantly increase the relevance of antiterrorism efforts. AFOSI is also the office responsible for threat information, which is absolutely essential to performance of antiterrorism duties, including the conduct of all assessments based on threat. Instead of having to wait for AFOSI personnel to be available to share the information, antiterrorism
officers would have first-hand access and knowledge of critical information as part of the AFOSI organization. Although the current location of the antiterrorism function within the Air Force ensures base-level attention to the programs, it is likely to continue to get that attention and funding through the Inspector General’s organization. For example, wing commanders pay plenty of attention to the base Inspector General office’s needs and put significant emphasis on the program.

The difference between effectiveness and efficiency was also considered. While manpower efficiencies are gained in the existing construct, the confusion caused by spreading functions through multiple units may not be worth the efficiencies when information flow and flawless response are needed to save lives and property. For example, Security Forces moves manpower fluidly between law enforcement, investigations, and base security missions. One of the most notable drawbacks from this practice is a lack of specific skills for any one function. This has had the effect of well-intentioned personnel having poor law enforcement responses, while strict security measure adherence migrates towards an unacceptable level of subjectivity. Although the manpower efficiencies will need to be considered before moving functions, mission effectiveness should not be compromised.

In summary, Figure 6 shows the recommended changes to the Air Force functional responsibilities discussed. The Air Force should maintain intelligence, counterintelligence, and emergency management in their current organizational locations. All investigative and antiterrorism functions should be the responsibility of AFOSI, as it currently exists under the Inspector General’s purview.
These changes will streamline interagency coordination on a daily basis, thus smoothing incident response, as well as ensuring dependent functions have access to the support they need to be most effective.

Conclusion

In this time of limited resources and dynamic threat environment, Air Force Security Forces needs to have the most effective and efficient structure for conducting law enforcement operations that are interoperable with other organizations involved in securing the homeland. These include the other Services as well as federal agencies, upon whom the Air Force is relying
more heavily for support and incident response in the hopes of realizing cost savings. As the examination above shows, reorganizing its law enforcement and antiterrorism constructs will provide the greatest effectiveness and facilitate integration with key agencies, as well as consolidating base points of contact for simplicity. To make this judgment, organizational histories and event responses were compared with the structures needed to integrate with other response agencies. Comparison with other agencies assisted in identifying effective organizations that could also increase efficiency. Although focused on bases in the United States, this analysis may be useful at overseas locations where off-base agencies mirror those of the US.
Endnotes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate bibliography entry.)

1. Goepner, Walsh, and Hajovsky, Two to the Chest, 29 & 32.
2. Sauter and Carafano, Homeland security, 211.
5. AFPD 71-1, Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence, 4-7.
8. Ibid., 13.
11. Ibid., 5.
12. Ibid., 3.
13. Ibid., 7.
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18. Ibid., 28.
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22. Ibid., 7.
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36. MCRP 5-12D, Organization of Marine Corps Forces, 5-14.
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