INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN SMALL WARS:
A COMPARISON OF THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY AND VIETNAM WAR

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INTRODUCTION

For over the past 10 years the United States (US) has been continuously involved in large scale counter-insurgency operations. Military strategists have frequently struggled to determine what conditions lead to the success or failure during counter-insurgency operations. Military history focuses a significant amount of effort on military tactics and weaponry used to achieve the results in warfare, but intelligence operations are sometimes only given cursory consideration. In reality, intelligence operations can be key contributors to success or failure of counter-insurgency operations as was the case in both the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War. Both the British and US intelligence operations were not successful at the beginning of the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War respectively but, weaknesses in operations were identified by leadership and rectified to enable defeat of the guerrilla forces encountered. However, the British were successful at achieving unity of effort in their intelligence operations whereas the US operated using several discrete intelligence efforts which were less efficient.

Several factors contributed to the success of the British and US intelligence organizations in their counter-insurgency campaigns. First, the countries modified their human intelligence (HUMINT) collection methodology which normally was a slow analysis process into a more efficient targeting process. Second, the senior political leaders instituted social policies that encouraged cooperation by the civilian population and made HUMINT collection feasible. Third, the British achieved unity of effort within and between the ground forces intelligence operations and psychological operations organizations making operations more efficient than those used by US. Unfortunately, some of the early failings of the US hampered the strategic success in the Vietnam War and contributed to loss of credibility with the American public.
MALAYAN EMERGENCY BACKGROUND

After World War II, the British government returned to Malaya, but they were not prepared for the monumental task that they faced in rebuilding their authority on the Malayan peninsula.¹ The Japanese occupation left the economy in disarray with scarce public and private investment.² The British government set the primary Malayan commodities of tin and rubber low resulting in low wage earnings, but extremely high cost of living.³ Furthermore, there were significant rice shortages which led to an anti-government sentiment by the entire population.⁴

The British government also made several unpopular political decisions leading up to the Malayan Emergency. First, the government attempted to impose a federal government construct with subordinate states known as the Malayan Union and broadly grant citizenship to non-Malays.⁵ This policy was extremely unpopular with the Malays because they perceived the state sultans were stripped of sovereignty and minimal input was gained by Malayan leadership.⁶ Ultimately, compromises were made with the Malays leading to a Malayan Federation, but the new citizenship policies were very restrictive for minorities, especially Chinese.⁷ Additionally, the economic policies and attempted development of the Malayan Union resulted in extreme distrust by all ethnic groups.⁸

The grievances of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and communist supporters manifested itself in terrorist attacks, kidnapping and other violent acts undertaken by the MCP’s military arm known as the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). The MRLA which changed names several times since the beginning of WWII were originally trained by British special operations forces to fight the Japanese occupation.⁹ During the Malayan Emergency the
MRLA was supported with recruits, intelligence, and supplies by a sympathetic Chinese civilian group living called the “Min Yuen” living on the jungle fringes.\(^\text{10}\)

The communist violent acts culminated in the declaration of a state of emergency in June 1948.\(^\text{11}\) The Malayan government immediately adopted an enemy centric approach emphasizing coercion of civilians to provide intelligence about the guerilla threat.\(^\text{12}\) Many of the Chinese that were merely accused of providing support to the guerrillas had their homes burned, were deported or killed.\(^\text{13}\) These very brutal police and military tactics which were highly publicized using a robust communist propaganda strategy increased support for the guerrillas in the first two years of the emergency.\(^\text{14}\)

In February 1952 General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed the High Commissioner of Malaya after his predecessor was killed in an ambush.\(^\text{15}\) Unlike his predecessor, Templer adopted a population centric strategy and travelled the country and met with all major communities to help address grievances in the country’s policies.\(^\text{16}\) Initially Templer put the weight of his effort on improving the conditions for the Chinese population that were relocated from the jungle fringes to fortified “New Villages” under the Briggs Plan in 1951.\(^\text{17}\) This population provided the most support to the guerrillas because it was the most vulnerable to attacks and was largely neglected lacking proper security, water and sanitation.\(^\text{18}\) Aided by the economic boom due to the increased demand for tin and rubber during the Korean War, Templer provided improved health care, education, community centers and improved security by augmenting police with a protection force called the “Home Guard.”\(^\text{19}\) Food ration policies were also implemented which ensured that food provided in the “New Villages” had a limited shelf life and personnel searches prevented workers from taking food outside controlled areas.\(^\text{20}\) The full implementation of the social programs and food policies took three years but as
implementation spread support waned for the guerrillas leaving them vulnerable to capture by security forces. Ultimately, Malaya had their first federal election in 1955 and gained full independence in 1957.

MALAYAN EMERGENCY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

In September 1945, the Malayan Security Service (MSS) was re-established as part of the British Military Administration responsible for collecting information on subversive organizations in both Malaya and Singapore. The MSS was plagued by personnel shortages due to significant losses during World War II and was only manned at 50% of the authorized level. Furthermore, the MSS had the daunting and time consuming task of re-building secret agent and informer networks that existed pre-war while the country was in a politically and physically unsettled state. From April to June 1948 there was increased lawlessness and a series of terrorist attacks, but the MSS provide no early warning about the outbreak of violence and minimal information regarding MCP’s strength and plans. Therefore, the colonial office disbanded the MSS and distributed the personnel and functions to the Singapore and Malaya Special Branches Criminal Investigation Departments (CID).

The Malaya Special Branches were charged with not only providing political and security intelligence, but were now also responsible for all operational intelligence collection to create efficiencies during the counter-insurgency. Aerial photographic and visual reconnaissance was used in the Malayan Emergency for both strategic and tactical purposes. Photographic reconnaissance was primarily used to provide greater resolution maps. Similarly, tactical photographic mosaics could show ground forces barriers to their objective and save ground forces hours of marching. Additionally, Auster aircraft were used for visual reconnaissance
where pilots looked for unusual activities in the jungle such as smoke from cooking fires.\textsuperscript{31} Unfortunately, most operations were in dense jungles so photography and visual reconnaissance was significantly limited by the dense canopy and primarily relied on openings in the foliage.\textsuperscript{32}

Due to the limitations of airborne reconnaissance in Malaya the primary emphasis was on HUMINT. Unfortunately, most of the British personnel used in Malaya before WWII were either killed or out of the service so significant experience was lost as well as human intelligence sources due to the five year absence. From 1948-1950, the Special Branch built a good order of battle for the MRLA using primarily HUMINT from surrendered or captured guerrillas. During interrogations these personnel provided names of key leaders, locations for camps, ambush sites and where letters were left for couriers as well as primary jungle paths which enabled the Special Branch to develop detailed dossiers, gain an understanding of operations and map the guerrilla networks. Furthermore, there were some clandestine HUMINT operations where high value targets were targeted and interrogated at a location known as the “Holding Center.” Agents associated with the “Holding Center” used some technical means such as telephone tapping or modifying radios with transmission devices that were made available cheaply in Chinese sundry shops which could assist in tracking the guerrillas once the radio was activated. Many of the captured personnel that were deemed to be trustworthy were used to translate tactical documents to overcome the shortage of Chinese linguists.\textsuperscript{33}

**VIETNAM WAR BACKGROUND**

In 1954 after the French withdrew from Vietnam, President Eisenhower began providing economic, military and administrative support to President Diem to help preserve an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam. At first President Diem was an effective, but soon
became isolated and repressive, but President Kennedy continued to increase support. By spring 1963, Vietnamese Buddhists led a widely based opposition to Diem that ultimately led to a coup attempt and the death of Diem and his brother in November 1963.³⁴

Diem’s death exacerbated the political instability in South Vietnam which the North Vietnamese and the southern communist insurgency known as the Viet Cong exploited. In August 1964, President Johnson increased involvement in Vietnam when he ordered air strikes on facilities in southern North Vietnam after a US destroyer was attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin. Additionally, congress authorized military action in Vietnam when it passing the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. In spring 1965, President Johnson began escalating retaliation air campaign primarily on the North Vietnamese transportation infrastructure known as Operation ROLLING THUNDER. Furthermore, he committed 125,000 ground forces in July 1965.³⁵

In 1967 as the number of drafted US troops and casualties increased the public grew frustrated with the progress. Therefore, President Johnson and General Westmoreland launched a public relations campaign that assessed that the US had reached the point in the war where the number of enemy eliminated was greater than the number of recruits known as the “crossover point.”³⁶ The public was led to believe that reaching the “crossover point” would enable an expeditious end to the conflict.³⁷ However, in January 1968 the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong launched surprise attacks on approximately 100 cities and towns with approximately 84,000 forces.³⁸ The South Vietnamese and US forces were able to repel the attacks and killed approximately 45,000 enemy forces which was a serious, but not debilitated loss for the Viet Cong.³⁹ However, the Johnson administration and senior military leadership lost enormous credibility with the US public because they were led to believe that the enemy strength was already significantly depleted, but the Viet Cong were able to launch a significant offensive.⁴⁰
The Tet Offensive and increasing anti-war sentiment in the US led President Nixon to immediately look for a way to end the country’s involvement in Vietnam. In 1969, President Nixon started withdrawing American forces in a process known as “Vietnamization” where South Vietnamese forces were equipped and trained to take over more of the combat responsibility. However, in April 1970, President Nixon briefly widened the conflict to including bombing and ground invasions of Cambodia to protect US troop withdrawals and increase time for the Vietnamization process. In 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a spring offensive into South Vietnam and President Nixon responded with an aggressive bombing campaign of North Vietnam called Operation Linebacker. In Paris a peace agreement was eventually signed in 1973 concluding the US involvement in Vietnam.41

VIETNAM WAR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The US deployed a very robust intelligence capability in support of the Vietnam War that included signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and HUMINT capabilities. In 1961, the Army Security Agency deployed a 78 person operational element for collection of communications intelligence (COMINT) and 15 person team to train the South Vietnamese COMINT specialists.42 Initially, all the SIGINT capabilities were ground based, but due to the terrain and radios used by the Viet Cong the US direction finding equipment was unable geo-locate the targets transmitting from locations over 15 miles away.43 In order to resolve the technical issues the direction finding equipment was mounted on U-6 aircraft which enabled efficient collection and strikes on the enemy.44 Unfortunately, the training of the South Vietnamese was not as successful and only 70 personnel were trained during two classes.45 The South Vietnamese had difficulty identifying personnel eligible for security clearances and lacked support from their military leadership.46
As the US expanded their involvement in Vietnam the SIGINT mission was also expanded rising to almost 6,000 personnel by 1968. COMINT trained personnel were attached to US battalions as well as the higher Army echelons. Furthermore, the airborne signals collection expanded to over 100 aircraft and 10 variants whose collection was centrally managed at a coordination center under the control of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Director of Intelligence (J2).

Before mid-1965 when the US committed ground forces, aerial reconnaissance was primarily used to locating suitable targets for air strikes. Like the SIGINT platforms the IMINT platforms were also controlled by at the MACV level. Both photographic and electronic sensors such as RADAR and infrared were used. Both types of sensors had some limitations which included bad weather preventing the aircraft from reaching target areas and the photographic sensor could only be used in certain parts of the country due to the jungle canopy as well as cloud cover. Once combat forces were committed to Vietnam, aerial reconnaissance was also used to develop photomaps which were used for military operations planning. These products were in great demand because they were accurate enough for artillery targeting which was not always possible with topographic map coverage. Visual surveillance was also used for real time detection of enemy forces which could subsequently direct artillery, naval gunfire or airstrikes. Despite some of the terrain and weather limitations photographic and visual collection was deemed to be an important collection capability.

HUMINT collection was also an important part of contributing to both strategic and operational objectives in Vietnam. The Central Intelligence Agency was responsible primarily for strategic clandestine HUMINT collection. They were responsible for targeting and recruiting sources that could provide insight on the senior leadership in North Vietnam and Viet Cong.
However, security within these organizations was very tight and infiltrating these organizations proved very difficult and was rarely successful and occasionally resulted in misinformation being passed to the CIA. Furthermore, the CIA also targeted the South Vietnamese government which was more successful. The CIA played an important role in advising Washington officials regarding diplomatic engagements with the South Vietnamese government.

MACV also conducted HUMINT collection which included both a clandestine and overt efforts. The majority of the clandestine collection was performed by MACV Studies and Observations Group (SOG) in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The operations in North Vietnam were primarily conducted by air dropping agents by air where the personnel gathered information on military forces and installations as well as political and economic information. Additionally, SOG maritime forces conducted reconnaissance operations against coastal targets and intercepted logistical vessels whose personnel were interrogated to gain operational intelligence information. All agents used for collection against North Vietnamese targets were native personnel recruited by the South Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) due to strict rules of engagement preventing US personnel from operating in North Vietnam. Unfortunately the STD lacked experience in recruiting personnel well suited to the missions and many recruits were motivated by money rather than political conviction. SOG also operated in Cambodia and Laos where South Vietnamese personnel accompanied by US special operations advisors conducted reconnaissance against the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The Army’s overt HUMINT efforts ranged from interrogations of captured combatants to conversations with local villagers. The most successful collection occurred through developing relationships with the local population. Most of the divisions had to teach themselves the art of HUMINT collection including asset vetting and handling because they received minimal support
from upper echelons. In addition to lack of training and experience on the intricacies of developing and vetting HUMINT sources which are skills that take years to master, MACV also had difficulty maintaining sources because of constant rotation of units since HUMINT sources are built on trust between individuals over long periods of time.56

**COMPARISON OF MALAYAN EMERGENCY AND VIETNAM WAR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

There were some significant fundamental differences in the methodologies used for collecting intelligence in the Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency and the emphasis placed on the information during analysis. From the very beginning of the Vietnam War the US used sophisticated sensors for collecting intelligence information, especially SIGINT. This technology was useful in collecting information on the North Vietnamese Army. For example, sensors were deployed along the Ho Chi Minh trail which would pick up movement by trucks was relayed via orbiting aircraft to computers plotting the information. The suspected convoys could be targeted sometimes as quickly as 30 minutes. Furthermore, signals from enemy radios also provided a significant amount of intelligence, but one of the major limitations for relying on this type of intelligence was that many of the guerrilla forces did not use radios.57

HUMINT was also collected by the US by both MACV and CIA, but it was not favored by the MACV J2 or staff. First, the reporting of the collection was much slower than for technical intelligence. It frequently took days or even weeks for interrogation reports, defector debriefs and captured documents to be forwarded to the analysts for consideration.58 All intelligence collected was not considered credible unless it was verified by another collection method because of concerns with truthfulness and translation.59 This practice of verifying the
intelligence from another source was not a problem for intelligence collected by technical means, but the HUMINT collected on the guerrillas was typically difficult to verify because they did not communicate using radios.60

The CIA had similar concerns to MACV regarding the timeliness and credibility of the HUMINT, but they developed new operational techniques to maximize the effectiveness of HUMINT collection. First, the CIA used polygraphs on agents, informants and surrendering VC to determine the validity of the information provided which was not a capability accessible to the MACV HUMINT collectors.61 Furthermore, the CIA attempted to verify information with other HUMINT sources to ensure validity which was not a favored technique by MACV.62 Intelligence deemed to be credible was quickly passed to combat units to achieve tactical effects. Using these techniques the CIA was able to have a significant operational impact on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) which was a shadow government responsible for directing VC operations as well as gathering intelligence, recruiting and collecting taxes.63 By 1964, the VCI built a formidable military force which was able to destroy South Vietnamese militias or force them into urban areas.64 The Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) which were clandestine units composed of South Vietnamese elite paramilitary forces advised by a CIA agent were the most successful combat forces at both collecting intelligence and neutralizing VCI. These units were some of the few that were able to operate in VC controlled areas at night.65 Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) estimated that the PRUs neutralized over 1,000 VCI per month in 1969 and made a significant contribution to making them combat ineffective by 1972.66

By contrast, the British emphasized primarily HUMINT collection during the Malayan Emergency. They experienced some of the same challenges as the US in the first part of the
emergency, but developed techniques to make the HUMINT collection more operationally effective. First, during the first two years of the emergency the intelligence was not timely because there was a lack of Chinese linguists and the way the information was disseminated was inefficient due to military procedures. In order to overcome these challenges, the Special Branch used hired local Chinese, Chinese speaking missionaries and used loyal captured MRLA for translating documents. Furthermore, the Federal Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee was formed under the Briggs Plan. The committee was responsible for ensuring that intelligence was disseminated quickly to the correct geographic region and was written so that it could be acted upon immediately and not overcome by events.

Second, the Special Branch graded all of their intelligence based upon a scale that graded the information based upon a six point scale for source reliability and information accuracy rather than using the US approach of verifying through two different collection methods. For example, the information was provided a letter grade based upon the reliability of the source from their past performance. Additionally, a number score was designated that rated the information along a spectrum from improbable to confirmed based upon other available evidence. Using these methods the British were able to gain efficiencies in their HUMINT collection and capture more guerrillas than was possible during the first few years of the emergency.

One of the influential factors on the collection, reporting and analysis of intelligence in both Malaya and Vietnam was politics and the political atmosphere surrounding the operations. Politics had a significant negative impact on intelligence operations in Vietnam, especially for the Army. Washington DC was pre-occupied with anything that could be counted or measured because they viewed it as the most accurate way to depict the success of the attrition strategy.
General Westmoreland was convinced that once the enemy strength peaked and started declining that the Vietnam War would end quickly. Therefore, the intelligence analysts were spending a great deal of effort counting the enemy strength and weapon systems. The intelligence analysts were significantly influenced by the senior leadership sight picture and were losing focus on the overall intelligence picture which should have included the enemy’s motivation and resolve. In November 1967, the “crossover point” was reached and General Westmoreland conducted the public relations campaign stating the enemy is “bankrupt” and assessed the US would depart Vietnam within two years. However in January 1968, the Tet Offensive was launched which should have not been possible according to the claims made by General Westmoreland. Even though the “crossover point” was reached the military strategy was flawed because it did not account for the will of the insurgents. Although the US won tactically during the Tet Offensive the event had a negative strategic impact because the Johnson administration, General Westmoreland and the intelligence community lost total credibility with the US public for the remainder of the Vietnam War. The strategic consequences of this intelligence failure were so significant that President Johnson attempted to immediately attempt to end the Vietnam War abandoning the US primary objectives for entering the war as well as deciding not to run for re-election. Additionally, General Westmoreland was immediately replaced by General Abrams.

The political environment during the Malayan Emergency also had a significant impact on the Special Branch’s collection effort. From 1948-1950, the British had a coercion policy in place where the Chinese were essentially interrogated for information regarding the insurgents. If the personnel accused of assisting the insurgents then they could be physically attacked, deported to China or incarceranted in a detention facility. However, the Chinese civilians were more fearful of the MRLA than the Malayan police so they were unwilling to assist with
intelligence information and many were even joining the efforts of the MRLA to protect themselves from abuse. In 1951, the British realized that their coercion policies were not effective and instituted new programs, including voluntarily relocating the Chinese civilians to “New Villages.” At first, the citizens were still unwilling to provide intelligence information to the Special Branch because due to the speed to the relocations the “New Villages” did not adequately provide for humanitarian needs such as water and sewage and MRLA attacks continued. However, in 1952 when General Templer was appointed High Commissioner the government finally met with the Chinese civilians and leaders to gain an understanding of the cultural and humanitarian grievances. Once the needs of the personnel were met through the “Home Guard,” adequate living conditions and addressing citizenship eligibility concerns the Chinese were very cooperative of providing intelligence to more effectively fight the MRLA.79

Like the British, the US did not have adequate cultural knowledge of the operating environment which negatively impacted their intelligence operations. In particular the lack of cultural knowledge during Vietnam War caused the US to under estimate the strength of the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong was a complex organization with an administrative force that was responsible for recruitment, indoctrination and training.80 Recruits started with local area operations, progressed to district operations and eventually country wide operations.81 The forces operating at the district level and above were well understood forces that resembled conventional army organizations (ie division, battalion) and were accounted for in the order of battle.82 The guerrilla and self-defense forces that operated at the local level were more difficult to track because their tactics and equipment were primitive so HUMINT was the only source of intelligence for these forces.83 The MACV J2 opted to drop the self-defense elements of the local operating forces because this element was assessed to be militarily insignificant since it
primarily consists of women and senior citizens. While the permanent members of the self-defense force were not as physically able to conduct regional warfare this organization was also a starting place for those being indoctrinated into the Viet Cong. Furthermore, these forces were setting up booby traps and mines near their villages which accounted for a third of the US casualties. Since the self-defense forces played a role in shaping the battle space through training and setting explosive devices they should have a minimum been footnoted in the intelligence estimates rather than dropped from consideration altogether. Additionally, the US viewed the self-defense from the US cultural perspective rather than the enemy’s perspective which further contributed to the unanticipated strength of the Tet Offensive.

While the Tet Offensive had a detrimental strategic impact on the Vietnam War that the US never recovered from politically in the view of the US public, once the US increased cultural motivations of the population political policies were shaped appropriately which aided HUMINT collection and ultimately resulted in rendering the VC combat ineffective. At the beginning of the Vietnam War, the US assumed that the population was joining the VC effort either by fighting to providing intelligence because they believed in the ideological cause. However, the South Vietnamese people above every other influence were interested in the welfare of their family. The civilians were supporting the VC because they provided their family security and economic gains such as farmland which was a unique opportunity not previously available. After the Tet Offensive, General Abrams reenergized the allied pacification efforts implementing new policies that garnered the crucial support from the civilian population. First, the US improved the effectiveness of the Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) by providing new weapons and training. These forces were militias that provided security to their local regions and villages by conducting patrols, night ambushes and bridge security. In October 1968, there
were only 1,250 forces by the early 1970s that had increased in strength to 500,000 personnel. Furthermore, the US and South Vietnamese also implemented effective economic policies providing more popular support to the government. The South Vietnamese government instituted an economic program called “Land to the Tiller” which provided land to peasants which provided them a more prosperous future. Additionally, the US introduced “miracle rice” which enabled three growing seasons per year increasing the rice production by 1.1 million metric tons over pre-war production. The new economic growth and security provided by the RF/PF encouraged the local population to provide HUMINT to the coalition forces without fear of reprisal which assisted the US in eliminated the remaining VC elements as well as reducing recruitment influences.

One of the significant security and intelligence collection challenges that impacted both the COIN operations in Malaya and Vietnam was insurgents seeking sanctuary and obtaining supplies though neighboring countries not directly involved in the conflict. At the beginning of the Malayan Emergency the Special Branch was continually receiving intelligence through the police in the frontier areas that the MRLA was crossing into Southern Thailand for training and re-cooperation. The area contained extremely rugged terrain which did not have any major Thai army or police installations so the area was not well patrolled creating a very porous border for the insurgents to exploit. The MRLA were frequently crossing the border and extorting the civilians for “taxes” and those who did not cooperate were murdered. Since the security situation was quickly deteriorating the British Prime minister met in Bangkok in December 1949 facilitate a security agreement. The two governments only agreed to aerial photography which was of limited use due to the terrain, intelligence sharing and coordination on anti-smuggling measures. Initially, the measures only had minimal effects, but in September 1949 the
agreement was expanded so the Malayan forces could pursue insurgents across the border up to 20 miles if they were in “hot pursuit.” Additionally, joint Thai-Malay patrols were conducted in Southern Thailand and a Special Branch intelligence liaison was added to the British consulate staff in Songkhla. The border region progressively became more secure with increased security presence and HUMINT provided by the local population that eventually forced the senior MCP leadership, including Chin Peng, to retreat from Thailand into China.

During the Vietnam War, the US and South Vietnam coalition had challenges with personnel and supplies entering South Vietnam from North Vietnam though Laos and Cambodia. Furthermore, China and Russia were proving military logistical support, especially ammunition, using the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. From 1966 to 1968, 14,000 tons of ordnance were delivered to Sihanoukville with only 800 tons used for the Cambodian armed forces. Agents and surrendered enemy personnel verified that the remainder was provided to North Vietnamese forces. While the US engaged Laos and Cambodia diplomatically, US forces were not authorized to operate in those countries willingly so the US used SOG with airpower to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail. However, due to the politically sensitive environment there were numerous operating restrictions. For example, US ambassadors placed strict restrictions on how the forces were inserted (ie foot or helicopter), operation areas and length of missions were typically only authorized for a few days. All missions were not only approved by the US ambassadors, but also the Pentagon and president. Since most of the Ho Chi Minh trail could not be seen from the air, SOG visually identified targets for air strikes as well as planted electronic surveillance devices that were monitored from Thailand. Furthermore, SOG captured NVA soldiers travelling along the trail which were a valuable source of current intelligence regarding specific tactical units conducting operations. From 1966-1967, the SOG operations were very
successful at disrupting the major logistical operations taking place in Laos and Cambodia which placed a strain on the North Vietnamese effort. However, after the Tet Offensive the North Vietnamese devoted more effort to force protection. The North Vietnamese were able to counter the SOG operations through strategically placed observers and espionage at the highest levels of the South Vietnamese military so by the end of the war the operations were not having the strategic impact that senior leaders envisioned.  

The organizational structure of the intelligence organizations participating in the Malayan Emergency directly impacted their effectiveness by contributing to efficient unity of effort. The Special Branch was directing both police and military intelligence collection efforts so there was no unintended duplication of effort. Furthermore, under the Briggs Plan state and district war executive committees were developed. These organizations brought together army, police and civil administrators to coordinate all operations within their areas of responsibility. The entities met in joint operations intelligence rooms where the intelligence analysts maintained accurate order of battle data and briefed police and military forces before each counterinsurgency operation. Additionally, the Special Branch also debriefed the patrols on their return and reported any relevant intelligence to higher headquarters.

Unlike the British in the Malayan Emergency, the US had many separate intelligence organizations that operated in Vietnam under different command chains. Unfortunately, while each entity had success individually there was frequently duplication of effort. For example, CIA, ASA and MACV all collected and maintained separate order of battle information. Unfortunately, most of the tactical units received little information from the upper echelons and relied on small organic HUMINT collection to assist with combat operations. In addition, the South Vietnamese and US intelligence organizations were not combined as they were in Malaya,
but there were coordination cells such as the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) for supporting conventional operations. Even with the centers there were cultural barriers which prevented effective intelligence sharing. The US valued the South Vietnamese ability to add to the American analysis efforts. However, the only independent South Vietnamese intelligence capability was HUMINT, but since low technology intelligence collection was viewed not as reliable by MACV and there were significant concerns about espionage the South Vietnamese HUMINT was largely disregarded. This bias was unfortunate because Vietnam is a relatively closed society which was more transparent to the South Vietnamese intelligence collectors than the Americans.¹⁰⁹

The CIA was less resistant to intelligence sharing with the South Vietnamese and stood up Phoenix Centers which were intended to fuse HUMINT from all collection agencies. The South Vietnamese also embraced the concept and set up a parallel organization called Phung Hoang which was intended to collaborate with the Phoenix Centers. The intention was that these centers would fuse the intelligence and provide credible intelligence to ground forces such as the PRUs to act upon which was a similar construct to the intelligence centers used in the Malayan Emergency. Unfortunately, many of the HUMINT collectors found that the Phoenix Centers were too slow at processing the information to make it actionable by the ground forces. Furthermore, some of the collectors were resistant to sharing their data for fear of losing their source to another HUMINT team or compromise through espionage.¹¹⁰

One of the areas that became a significant concern for the US during the Vietnam War, but was not of as significant of a problem for the British in Malaya was defensive intelligence operations, such as counterintelligence. The US efforts in defensive operations exhibited mixed results. The CIA was able to identify and capture several North Vietnamese spies working in the
South Vietnamese government, such as an aide for President Thieu. However, there were many others that went unidentified such as Pham Xuan An who was posing as a western reporter as well as South Vietnamese officers. The North Vietnamese were far more successful at infiltrating the north than vice versa. CIA analysts in 1970 estimated that Hanoi had as many as 30,000 agents in the Saigon government and army whereas the US and South Vietnamese were only able to imbed several hundred. Even when the US believed that they were using strict operational security protocols missions were sometimes being compromised. For example, SOG missions in Laos and Cambodia were only briefed by the SOG commander to the chairmen of South Vietnam’s General Staff who was only authorized to brief the president. However, unbeknown to the US he was also briefing the prime minister so that he would not be surprised by an operation who had his senior “trusted colonel” present. Unfortunately, in the 1980s it was revealed that the “trusted colonel” was actually working for the NVA and reporting details of the SOG operations before they took place so NVA could ambush SOG when their helicopter departed.

Communications security also complicated the US operational efforts in Vietnam. While the SIGINT capability of the North Vietnamese was not as advanced as the US, they did have significant success at intercepting US communications. In 1969, US ground forces secured an enemy intercept unit and SIGINT analysts discovered that they had a wealth of information on Army operations including locations, order of battle, morale and intentions. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese were able to gain indications of impending bombing mission, especially for operations such as large B-52 raids that required support from tankers. The ASA was monitoring communications security and reporting infractions to command, but there were too many devices to be adequately monitored. In order to remedy the communications security
issues the ASA did implement training and wider deployment of encryption devices, but these programs were not fully implemented by the end of the Vietnam War.  

The intelligence threat to the British during the Malayan Emergency was not as significant as it was to the US during the Vietnam War. Since Malaya was a British colony during the emergency, the British were able to more closely vet and monitor the personnel in the government agencies, including the police force. Additionally, the MRLA was not as technologically advanced as the North Vietnamese Army so they were not capable of intercepting radio transmissions nor did they have an ally that was providing that information. The primary intelligence threat to the British was the Min Yuen, but the information they garnered would have been what their network heard or observed rather than a significant amount of insider information about detailed operations or intentions. The Special Branch did put a significant effort into infiltrating the Min Yuen because of their link to both the MCP and MRLA, but were largely unsuccessful during the first couple of years due to security precautions. However, once most of the Chinese moved to the “New Villages” the Special Branch was able to discredit the Min Yuen by providing misinformation to them which was passed to the MRLA.

In addition to the important role that intelligence played to shape the ground forces strategy and scheme of maneuver, intelligence operations also enhanced the effectiveness of the psychological campaign. The relationship between intelligence and psychological operations in many cases was reciprocal since the psychological operations often influenced the population to provide information about the enemy as well as enemy combatants to surrender. During the Malayan Emergency as part of the Briggs Plan the Emergency Information Service was developed and responsible for information operations and countering communist propaganda.
which was largely ignored until this point.\textsuperscript{121} The MRLA had very unsophisticated psychological operations capabilities which included leaflets and face to face communication emphasizing Chinese support for the MRLA to encouraged the local populace to provide recruits and intelligence.\textsuperscript{122} These efforts were very effective because of the brutal tactics used by British at the beginning of the emergency and it was essentially the only point of view heard by the Chinese civilians. Therefore, the EIS psychological operations campaign focused on winning the loyalties of the uncommitted populace as well as attempting to induce surrenders and break morale within the MRLA.\textsuperscript{123} Robust dissemination means were used including newspapers, posters, leaflet drops, touring loudspeaker vans, radio broadcasts, films and voice broadcasts from loudspeaker equipped aircraft.\textsuperscript{124} The aerial broadcasts were deemed particularly effective where “by 1955 70 percent of all surrendered terrorist who had heard one of the aerial broadcasts stated that it had influenced their decision and in many cases it was the major factor involved.”\textsuperscript{125}

One of the key integral aspects of the psychological operations was the close cooperative relationship with the special branch because HUMINT was used to efficiently target groups of concern or people residing is a specific geographic region.\textsuperscript{126} Senior communist leaders were also used to develop technical propaganda as well as leaflets to encourage cooperation of the by the Chinese civilians and surrenders of the MRLA.\textsuperscript{127} Furthermore, since the EIS used both British and local citizens the psychological operations were able to take advantage of face to face information operations campaigns which were very influential. In particular, high ranking surrendered enemy personnel who no longer supported the communist party actions frequently returned to their MRLA units and convinced dozens of their former subordinates to surrender.\textsuperscript{128}
Psychological Operations were also an important part of the US strategy in Vietnam, but it was not as well integrated with intelligence operations as the Malayan Emergency. The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) which was made up of both civilians from the US Information Agency and military from the Department of Defense and was responsible for policy and supervision of all agencies conducting psychological operations in Vietnam.\(^{129}\)

Furthermore, there were information operations elements in the MACV J3 as well as teams at each of the corps.\(^{130}\) Unfortunately, the South Vietnamese opted not to conduct combined operations with the Americans likely for fear of being dominated which lead to a less cohesive effort than would have been possible under a combined organization.\(^{131}\) The US also hired 600 local personnel to assist with translating the propaganda materials.\(^{132}\) Starting in 1967 quality control mechanisms were introduced where psychological themes presented to the national audience were also tested local population panels before dissemination to overcome cultural barriers, but this policy was not implemented at field units until 1971.\(^{133}\) The US relied primarily on both technical and non-technical means to disseminate protects such as radio, films, TV, leaflets and periodic publications.\(^{134}\) One of the types of communication that the US was unable to take advantage of was face to face communications and the South Vietnamese only rarely used this method which the Viet Cong used very effectively.\(^{135}\)

In order to take advantage of intelligence information in the information operations campaign the US assigned psychological operations liaison officers with intelligence community.\(^{136}\) However, typically intelligence analysts were too focused on conventional tactical operations to give detailed consideration to psychological operations support.\(^{137}\) Therefore, most of the psychological themes disseminated were geared toward a general audience and only 12% in South Vietnam and 4% in North Vietnam took advantage of tactical
HUMINT enabling the messages to be tailored to a specific audience. Most of the field units relied on psychological themes suggested by JUSPAO. However, one of the national level psychological campaigns that provided significant intelligence information was associated with the Chieu Hoi program which provided amnesty and re-location to VC and NVA. Many different themes were used including that their families miss the combatant to appeal to family values, how to surrender and fair treatment once they surrender. Between 1965-1967, many of the VC were skeptical about the promises for amnesty. However, in 1969 the number of personnel that used the Chieu Hoi program more than doubled and two-thirds of the personnel testified that the leaflets had a major influence on their decision. Furthermore, some defectors noted they were able to confirm the good treatment through word of mouth which provided more credibility to the program and influenced their decision too. While the number of defectors totaling 183,000 by 1971 was deemed a success, most of the people were low level VC. Only 171 high echelon VC (ie division commanders, district party chiefs), 1,055 middle echelon VC (ie deputy commanders) and 870 NVA defected since these personnel were ideologically invested. Even though most of the defectors were low level they provided valuable insight into the VC operations and frequently were able to provide information to led to the capture of personnel in their unit or VCI.

Intelligence operations shaped the clandestine psychological operations conducted by SOG more than overt psychological operations. Intelligence was a key contributor to the psychological operations that targeted the government and the overall military strategy. First, the CIA and SOG collected information on mid-level and senior government and military officials, including private and official mailing addresses. The CIA would assist SOG in forging letters to the targeted individual that would look like the official was corresponding with
Vietnamese national living abroad. The letters would allude to correspondence sent by the official raising concerns about the conduct of the war or the government such as treatment of American POWs. These psychological operations were intended to manipulate the security conscious regime and create distrust with the targeted official when the letter is discovered in the security sweeps. Furthermore, SOG intelligence analysts were aware that many of the agents inserted into North Vietnam had been compromised because they were receiving radio traffic from their agents in locations they where they were not supposed to be located such as military facilities in Hanoi. However, SOG intercepted several correspondences between security agencies and the National Assembly and noted that North Vietnamese counter-intelligence investigations were on the rise. Several of the correspondences sounded very alarmist regarding the threat of “spy commandos” and the North Vietnamese believed there were much larger numbers of agents present than were actually inserted.

Therefore, SOG initiated a psychological campaign that exploited the North Vietnamese paranoia. SOG developed a fake resistance called Sacred Sword of the Patriots League which was selected because of the historical context of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in the 15th century. SOG used sophisticated psychological operations methods supported by more traditional methods such as radio broadcasts and printed propaganda to give the impression there was a resistance movement. The most sophisticated methodology used was kidnapping North Vietnamese and taking them to a South Vietnamese island, known as Paradise Island, that contained a mock rural North Vietnamese village where SSPL indoctrination took place. These personnel were released back to North Vietnam to propagate the information about the fake resistance movement so the North Vietnamese government would expend more security resources on internal resources instead of on operations in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, these clandestine
psychological operations did not have the desired strategic effect that the Pentagon and White House desired and were primarily deemed just a nuisance to North Vietnamese. These clandestine operations were primarily “smoke and mirrors” that was not followed up with tangible action. Furthermore, the senior MACV leadership did not value their contribution so SOG efforts were essentially independent and not incorporated into the overall military strategy for the Vietnam War. In an interview General Westmoreland in reference to SOG operations that “it was a sideshow as far as the military was concerned…The contribution was a kind of pinprick.”

The North Vietnamese also possessed a sophisticated psychological operations campaign to counter the efforts of the US and South Vietnam. In addition to targeting their own population to encourage continued support of the government throughout the Vietnam War and US service members, the North Vietnamese also successfully targeted the US center of gravity, the American public. North Vietnamese senior leaders acknowledged in interviews that they knew they had to win the Vietnam War in the US not on the battlefield. The North Vietnamese invited journalists, humanitarian workers and antiwar activists to report on the conditions of the war while strictly managing the visits only to convey messages beneficial to the communists. NVA colonel Bui Tin when describing the North Vietnamese exploitation of the US anti-war movement stated:

“It was essential to our strategy. Every day our leadership would listen to world news over the radio at 9 a.m. to follow the growth of the American anti-war movement. Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us confidence that we should hold on in the battlefield reverses. We were elated when Jane Fonda, wearing a red Vietnamese dress said at a press conference that she was ashamed of American actions in the war and that she would struggle along with us.”
Unfortunately, the US failed to effectively counter the North Vietnamese psychological campaign against the US public by noting through strategic communication recent successes of the US military including economic growth for the rural population, atrocities also committed by the North Vietnamese and highlighting issues of long term welfare to the South Vietnamese.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE SMALL WARS

Several of the strengths and weaknesses noted in the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War can be applied to improve current and future small war intelligence operations. Recommended areas of improvement is in the efficiency of collecting HUMINT, fusing intelligence information for use by ground force commanders and ISR. In Vietnam, many of the tactical units were responsible for a large portion of their intelligence collection and analysis to drive their operations. Unfortunately, due to technical limitations most of the SIGINT and IMINT was not easily transferred between units and HUMINT from upper echelons was not timely. Since 2005, there has been a significant improvement in the amount of intelligence data made available to intelligence units at the tactical units. For example, in 2007 NSA deployed the Real Time Regional Gateway (RT-GT) which gave intelligence analysts access to SIGINT information about their area of responsibility even if their firebase was isolated from a major installation. According to the Pentagon, “thanks to RT-GT analysis that used to take 16 hours or more now can be done in less than 1 minute.” Similar access has provided for airborne and satellite imagery. However, one area that still requires emphasis is HUMINT intelligence. One battalion commander when taking over an infantry Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in June 2009 in Afghanistan noted that he “had the vaguest notion of which villages were friendly, unfriendly, or sitting on the fence” because his intelligence analysts were passed little information about the operating environment from the battalion they were relieving. He wondered “how was I
expected to win their heart and minds if I know nothing about them?" Since the local population is a key contributor to providing information regarding enemy operations, it is important to make understanding their views and influences in the village a priority. While most of the ground forces are trained in collecting intelligence information, sometimes it is not stored in a long term usable format for long-term analysis. Intelligence databases should be maintained that provide information about major landowners or village chiefs with any tribal or political affiliation. The databases should be robust enough that they can be view not only locally, but also at upper echelons for operational planning, by other ground forces so that movement can be noted between areas of operations. Understanding what motivates the personnel in the villages will also help shape psychological campaigns and help prevent them from assisting the enemy.

In addition to the overt HUMINT collection conducted by the conventional ground forces, US clandestine HUMINT programs are also being re-emphasized by intelligence agencies. During the 1990’s the CIA HUMINT capacity was reduced to fewer than 2,500 agents. Therefore, they were unprepared for the increased HUMINT effort required in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the US had very little success at infiltrating the Taliban because once conflict started the Taliban used strict measures to prevent infiltration so relationships with the Taliban would have needed to be developed before September 11, 2001. By 2009, their level of agents rebounded to 5,000 but, building HUMINT capacity takes the most time of any intelligence discipline because it requires building HUMINT networks through report with sources. Similarly, the Department of Defense is refocusing and increasing HUMINT capacity as well through the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) administered by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Additionally, the US Air Force has also increased their overt HUMINT capability by developing a new detachment in 2007 that will eventually be turned into
a squadron. All of these efforts to improve HUMINT collection will be of significant assistance to the US in future contingencies as they are able to increase the network for reliable sources that can be fostered over the next several years.

One of the most successful aspects of the intelligence operations in Malaya was the ability of the Malay and British coalition to quickly fuse intelligence from multiple agencies (ie police and military) and distribute the information for immediate use in tactical operations. By contrast in Vietnam, there were also fusion centers, but they did not use the inter-agency and coalition approach as successfully which resulted in duplication of effort. Similarly, in current US operations there are fusion centers dedicated to synthesizing intelligence information to enhance decisions of commanders and shape combat operations. Unfortunately at times there are so many fusion centers with differing chains of command that there is a significant duplication of effort. For example, during OEF there were four fusion centers in Kabul alone which included one for ISAF, US-only, CIA and special operations fusion centers. In Kabul there were also eight additional fusion centers with a specific mission focus which included two for SIGINT, three for counter IED intelligence and three for counter narcotics intelligence. Part of the reason that so many fusion centers are available is because intelligence organization are collecting so much data from airborne and space intelligence platforms, that only a percentage of the intelligence gathered is exploited and normally there is only sufficient time for first phase exploitation. However, in Iraq General McChrystal set up an inter-agency intelligence fusion cell that incorporated representatives from all collection agencies (ie CIA, National Security Agency, military). The interagency intelligence cell was credited with fusing intelligence that located hundreds of high value targets. Therefore, all source fusion is needed to develop trends and emerging threats which may become apparent by combining
intelligence from multiple sources. However, combining some of the fusion centers and ensuring a unified effort as was demonstrated in Iraq provides commanders and units with more actionable intelligence for the limited analytic resources available. Therefore, it is advisable to develop inter-agency fusion centers as the standard construct for future small wars.

At the beginning of both the Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency, intelligence analysts did not effectively develop actionable intelligence for executing operations using a population centric approach accounting not only for military tactics, but also culture. Similarly, in Afghanistan, while the fusion centers are in an important aspect of making transforming intelligence from basic analysis conducted by near real time exploitation units into actionable intelligence that can develop trends, some enhancements are to make the fusion more effective for population centric intelligence operations in small wars. Currently the methodologies used are efficient for major combat operations with state on state actors, but they are not as appropriate for complex small wars with guerrilla warfare and insurgents hiding among the population. Most fusion centers will divide the battlefield into distinct groups which encompass enemy forces, the host nation government and forces which are deemed to be friendly to the US and the civilian population which are deemed neutral and must be protected from hostile action. This model is very easy for the analysts to conceptualize, but is not very flexible and does not easily lend itself to some changes in status from enemy to neutral or vice versa. Unfortunately, in many cases military intelligence is predisposed to focusing on the enemy because that was the emphasis of their intelligence training and other factors such as economic and political are given little weight of analysis since they are viewed as another agencies responsibility. However, an enemy centric analytic approach frequently is not well suited for small war. An alternate approach would be to approach the analysis from a more holistic
approach where the all entities are viewed based upon a behavioral spectrum from hostile to supportive.\textsuperscript{163} For example, corruption not intended to impede the US objectives may be in the middle of the spectrum and may provide commanders indicators of actions that need to be taken. Positive actions may include voting, good governance by officials and legal economic activities.\textsuperscript{164} Viewing the battle space using a behavioral spectrum will provide commanders with a better understanding of the entire environment rather than hearing about hostile actions form intelligence analysts and economic factors from other entities.\textsuperscript{165} Furthermore, this type of behavioral analysis will also enable the commander to shape psychological operations based upon weaknesses highlighted by the intelligence personnel. However, this type of analytic approach would be a significant paradigm shift for most military analysts so it will require significant adjustments in basic intelligence training. The current methodologies should not be abandoned because they are effective for major combat operations involving two state actors, but training should involve resources available for incorporating environmental factors such as economics, politics and culture into the intelligence picture.

During the Vietnam War most of the intelligence disciplines were stove piped and many of the tactical units did not have airborne collection platforms accessible to them because there were so few in theater. While the intelligence is now much more accessible, the integration of this capability can be improved to make the most efficient use of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Typically, ground units do not possess extensive knowledge of the capabilities of USAF airborne ISR platforms or exploitation capabilities so at the beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM the ISR platforms were not integrated effectively into the US military strategy. Therefore, the USAF decided to place ISR liaison officers, but only had sufficient personnel to embed a few at the division level.\textsuperscript{166} Army senior
leaders noted that the liaison officers made key contributions to more effectively employing ISR. Lt Gen Odierno who served as Multi-National Corp- Iraq commander noted “providing these Air Force subject matter experts as advisors to division staff sections and as key members of the intelligence-operations team has been a combat multiplier. It would be extremely helpful to have these experts at the BCT level to provide the CAOC (combat air operations center) and related organizations with insight into the operations they support.” The only organizations that have incorporated ISR experts at lower levels as Lt Gen Odierno suggests are special operations forces, but valuable lessons can be applied across a wider context for application in small wars. The special operations forces have placed normally Air Force ISR experts known as ISR Tactical Controllers (ITCs) in their tactical operations centers. The ITCs provide expertise on ISR similar to the expertise that Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) provide for planning and controlling close air support. ITCs work for the ground force commander and are responsible for directing the sensor location of full motion video (FMV), providing guidance on orbit placement, and directing the types of specialized exploitation products required. In the current conventional construct normally Army units are directing only what targets they would like look and when they would like a still image. However, due to lack of training they are unfamiliar with all the capabilities of both the platforms and exploitation units the USAF enterprise is not being used to its fullest extent. Furthermore, the ISR used for supporting conventional forces provides a few hours of ISR to several units whereas special operations forces mass the ISR on their top priorities. Normally the special operations forces use SIGINT or HUMINT to cue the FMV which is capable of persistently tracking a target 24 hours a day but only has a narrow view of the battle space. Using this methodology special operations forces have been able to either capture numerous high value targets to continue the intelligence cycle or kill them. For
example, 600 hours of ISR was used on Zarqawi’s network which was able to reveal a detailed pattern of life assessment which eventually led to Zarqawi himself. Part of this success of eliminating numerous high value targets from the battlefield can be attributed to the ITCs which were integral members of the ground force team which provided need airborne ISR expertise for both directing the sensors as well as directing the development of specialized intelligence products that could be fused to provide a pattern of life assessment. Depending upon the operation, the concept of ITCs may be appropriate to focus ISR collection of behalf of the ground force commander. However, currently training is localized at a few squadrons that primarily tasked to provide 24 hours a day FMV support to special operations forces. In order to make ITCs a viable construct, training would need to be more standardized and adopted by the larger USAF.

CONCLUSION

Counter-insurgency operations tend to be extremely complex military campaigns which warrant detailed study. Sometimes intelligence operations are overlooked as compelling enablers to counter-insurgency operations, but they can have significant positive or negative strategic effects so detailed study is warranted. The thorough evaluation of the intelligence operations in Malaya and Vietnam demonstrate some of the key factors that should be taken into account. First, there needs to be a detailed study of the operating environment before the contingency begins so that collection methodology can be developed. Using technical intelligence collection methods in dense canopy against insurgents with no radios would be less effective than HUMINT. During both the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam it took approximately four years to develop effective HUMINT networks so HUMINT needs to be a constant emphasis by the intelligence community to prepare for future contingencies and
enhance US national security. Additionally, a thorough understanding of the prevalent cultures in the areas of operation is also a fundamental element to success. Second, the structure for the operations is equally as important. A combined hierarchical structure as demonstrated in Malaya is the most efficient, but may not be possible due to political considerations. Therefore, an alternative option would be a coordination cell. Finally, it is important that the intelligence collected not only contributes to the tactical operations, but also the information operations since some targets may be neutralized via non-kinetic means. Lack of coordination with all the element of information operations can also have strategic impacts to the overall campaign objectives.

2 Ibid, 16-17.
3 Ibid, 18-19.
5 Ibid, 23.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid, 27.
8 Ibid.
11 Ibid, 13.
13 Ibid, 74-75.
14 Ibid, 67 and 91.
15 Ibid, 136 and 143.
16 Ibid, 149.
19 Ibid, 162, 174-176.
21 Ibid, 258.
22 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid, 36-37, 39 and 42.
27 Ibid, 43.
28 Ibid, 64.
30 Ibid, 125-126.
31 Ibid, 129.
32 Ibid.
33 Comber, Malaya’s Secret Police 1945–60; 82, 85-86.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
43 Ibid, 5.
44 Ibid, 8-9.
47 Ibid, 111.
48 Ibid, 33.
49 Ibid, 36-38.
52 Ibid, 183.
53 Ibid, 195.
54 Ibid, 104-105.
55 Ibid, 214.
57 Blood, The Tet Effect, 141-142.

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Ibid, 11-14.

Ibid, 9-10.

Ibid, 164-165.

Ibid, 171, 390.


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Ibid, 80.


Ibid, 246-247.

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Ibid, 251.

Ibid, 253-254.

101 Ibid.

102 Shultz, *The Secret War Against Hanoi*, 214.


104 Ibid.


108 Ibid, 626.


112 Ibid.


114 Shultz, *The Secret War Against Hanoi*, 243-244.


116 Ibid.

117 Ibid, 624.


119 Comber, *Malaya’s Secret Police 1945–60*, 149

120 Ibid, 160-161.


122 Ibid, 155.


126 Ibid, 154.

127 Ibid, 159.


130 Ibid, 5,11.

131 Ibid, 6.

132 Ibid, 46-47.


135 Ibid, 50.

136 Ibid, 16.

137 Ibid.


139 Ibid, 40.

140 Ibid, 92-93.

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