(U) Army National Guard Companies Have Not Developed Effective Training Programs to Attain or Sustain Mission Essential Task Proficiency
MISSION ★ EFFICIENCY ★ ACCOUNTABILITY ★ EXCELLENCE

Mission
Our mission is to provide independent, relevant, and timely oversight of the Department of Defense that supports the warfighter; promotes accountability, integrity, and efficiency; advises the Secretary of Defense and Congress; and informs the public.

Vision
Our vision is to be a model oversight organization in the Federal Government by leading change, speaking truth, and promoting excellence—a diverse organization, working together as one professional team, recognized as leaders in our field.

Fraud, Waste, & Abuse HOTLINE
Department of Defense
dodg.mil/hotline 800.424.9098

For more information about whistleblower protection, please see the inside back cover.
Results in Brief

(U) Army National Guard Companies Have Not Developed Effective Training Programs to Attain or Sustain Mission Essential Task Proficiency

(U) December 5, 2016

(U) Objective

(U) The announced audit objective was to determine whether military units had the ability to perform their mission essential tasks (METs). Specifically, the objective was to evaluate the Army National Guard’s training proficiency at the company and cavalry troop level.

(U) Finding

(U) Commanders of units did not develop effective training programs to ensure their units attained or sustained MET proficiency. Specifically, the commanders did not:

- (U) properly develop METs, training priorities, and plans;
- (U) manage personnel resources for sustaining training proficiency;
- (U) effectively implement training plans and events; and
- (U) continually or adequately assess MET proficiency.

(U) The Army and National Guard Bureau did not provide clear, consistent guidance for managing unit training. In addition, commanders did not implement effective inspection programs to provide oversight of collective training and ensure that units complied with training management policies.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, require units to implement standardized METs at the company level, establish suspense dates for implementation, and monitor unit progress toward completion.

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, in coordination with the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Director, Army National Guard, standardize requirements across unit training management guidance to ensure compliance. At a minimum, the guidance should be updated to:

- (U) clarify requirements for developing unit training priorities and plans,
- (U) provide consistent methodologies for evaluating training events and assessing MET proficiency.

(U) We recommend that the Director, Army National Guard, in coordination with the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, establish training and manning priorities.

(U) We recommend that the Director, Army National Guard, in coordination with the Army Inspector General, develop and implement a standardized National Guard Inspection Program template for Army National Guard MET training programs to include minimum inspection standards.
(U) Management Comments

(U) The Secretary of the Army, responding for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army and the Director, Army National Guard, addressed the recommendations to standardize training requirements, establish training and manning priorities, and develop and implement a standardized inspection template for training. The Army stated that it had developed standard mission essential task lists and provided clarifying guidance through a republication of Field Manual 7-0, “Train to Win in a Complex World,” in October 2016 and a revision of Army Regulation 350-1, “Army Training and Leader Development.” The Army National Guard also stated that it will publish refined guidance to reduce personnel turnover, increase training management proficiency, and renew focus of organizational inspection programs on unit-level training management. Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page.
### (U) Recommendations Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Recommendations Requiring Comment</th>
<th>No Additional Comments Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Army National Guard</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3, 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(U) MEMORANDUM FOR AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

(U) SUBJECT: Army National Guard Companies Have Not Developed Effective Training Programs to Attain or Sustain Mission Essential Task Proficiency
(Report No. DODIG-2017-029)

(U) We are providing this report for your information and use. This is the first in a series of internally generated audits addressing military unit readiness. The companies we assessed did not develop effective training programs to ensure they could attain or sustain MET proficiency.

(U) We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. Comments from the Secretary of the Army, responding for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, and the Director, Army National Guard, conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional comments. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 699-7331 (DSN 499-7331).

Carol N. Gorman
Assistant Inspector General
Readiness and Cyber Operations
(U) Contents

(U) Introduction ................................................................................... 1
(U) Objective .................................................................................................. 1
(U) Background ................................................................................................. 1
(U) Review of Internal Controls ......................................................................... 6
(U) Finding ........................................................................................................ 7
(U) National Guard Units Did Not Develop Effective Training Programs .......... 7
(U) National Guard Units Did Not Effectively Implement the
    Four Phases of the Operations Process ...................................................... 7
(U) Army Training Guidance is Not Clear ..................................................... 14
(U) Command Inspection Programs Did Not Provide Effective
    Oversight of Training Management ......................................................... 20
(U) Units at Risk ............................................................................................... 20
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response .............. 21
(U) Appendix A ............................................................................................... 25
(U) Scope and Methodology ............................................................................. 25
(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data .............................................................. 27
(U) Prior Coverage ........................................................................................... 27
(U) Appendix B ............................................................................................... 30
(U) Notice of Concern ...................................................................................... 30
(U) Appendix C ............................................................................................... 35
(U) Director, Army National Guard’s Response to Notice of Concern .............. 35
(U) Commander, .......................................................................................... 36
    Response to Notice of Concern ................................................................. 36
(U) Appendix D ............................................................................................... 38
(U) Classified Information Used in the Preparation of This Report for Record ...... 38
(U) Management Comments ........................................................................... 39
(U) Secretary of The Army ............................................................................. 39
(U) Director, Army National Guard ................................................................. 42
(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................... 44
(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The announced audit objective was to determine whether military units had the ability to perform their mission essential tasks (METs).\(^1\) Specifically, the objective was to evaluate the Army National Guard’s training proficiency at the company and cavalry troop level. \(^2\) We focused the audit on determining whether training programs were sufficient to ensure units could attain and sustain MET proficiency. \(^3\) See Appendix A for our scope and methodology.

(U) Background

(U) Brigade Combat Teams

(U) Brigade Combat Teams serve as the Army’s primary close combat forces and contain the units and warfighting capabilities needed to function across the spectrum of conflict. Brigade Combat Teams use fire\(^4\) and movement to destroy or capture enemy forces, to repel enemy attacks, to engage in close combat, and to counterattack. There are currently three types of Brigade Combat Teams in the Army: Armored, Infantry, and Stryker.\(^5\) While Infantry and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are combined arms forces organized around mounted and dismounted infantry units, ABCTs primary maneuver forces combine infantry with armored units. ABCTs are designed to conduct large-scale actions, can fight without additional combat power, but can also be task-organized to meet specific mission needs.

---

1. (U) METs refer to tasks that a unit can perform based on their design, equipment, manning, and organization.
2. (U) Fire is a military term that describes the use of weapon systems or other actions to create lethal or nonlethal effects on a target.
3. (U) This audit focused on only the ABCTs.
(U) At the time the audit began, ABCTs consisted of two combined arms battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, a brigade support battalion, and a brigade special troops battalion. Combined arms battalions are the primary maneuver force for the ABCT, conduct sustained land operations, and deter armed conflict. The cavalry squadrons conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and security operations. Combined arms battalions and reconnaissance squadrons consist of companies or troops (units) equipped with vehicles such as tanks and cavalry fighting vehicles. The fires, support, and special troops battalions support ABCT operations through responsive and accurate fire support; forward logistics and medical support; and command and control for the ABCT's headquarters, engineering, intelligence, signal, and police units. Please see Appendix A for additional information on unit location and selection.

(U) Army National Guard

(U) Army National Guard units have a dual reporting structure. When activated for Federal missions, National Guard units report to the President through the Secretary of Defense. Otherwise, while under State authority, National Guard units report to their State’s Governor through the state’s Adjutant General. Unless exempted by the Secretary of the Army, National Guard units must assemble for training for at least 39 days per year. Training days are divided between:

- (U) Inactive Duty Training: 24 days made up of 48 periods of 4-hours that generally occur one weekend each month.
- (U) Annual Training: At least 15 days of training each year.

---

5 (U) According to the October 2015 version of Field Manual 3-96, “Brigade Combat Team,” Armored Brigade Combat Teams now have three combined arms battalions. Cavalry, field artillery, engineer, intelligence, signal, and sustainment are all organic to the ABCT.

6 (U) Section 502, title 32, United States Code states that unless excused by the Secretary of the Army, units within the National Guard shall assemble for drill and instructions at least 48 times each year (the Army refers to these periods as inactive duty training) and participate in training at encampments, maneuvers, outdoor target practice, or other exercise, at least 15 days each year (the Army refers to these periods as annual training).
(U) Army Force Generation Process

(U) Army Regulation 525-29 establishes the Army Force Generation process to provide trained forces on a sustainable and rotational basis. The force generation cycle encompasses a 3- to 5-year period, depending on the type of unit. For Army National Guard ABCTs, the force generation cycle spans 5 years:

- (U) 1-year reset period in which personnel have time to reintegrate with families, new equipment is fielded, and personnel are rotated.
- (U) 3-year train/ready period in which personnel begin training on individual tasks progressing to collective task training.
- (U) 1-year available period in which units can be used for deployments. After the available period, units cycle back to the reset period.

(U) The Army National Guard allocates money for training and determines the expected level of training proficiency for each unit based on where the unit is in their force generation cycle. According to Army Regulation 525-29, during the 3-year train/ready period, National Guard units should conduct training to progress from individual, crew, and squad proficiency in the first year to platoon proficiency in the second year and reach company-level proficiency by the end of the third training year. At the end of the train/ready period, collective training occurs at the brigade level during a culminating training event. Units sustain proficiency by maintaining unit cohesion, minimizing turnover, and performing regular collective training.

---

8 (U) Individual task training refers to training that may be done at an individual soldier level, such as weapon qualifications, and collective task training refers to training that requires multiple soldiers to train together, such as a platoon or company-level maneuver training.
(U) **Mission Essential Task Focused Training**

(U) Army guidance states that throughout the train/ready period, commanders must focus collective training to support their MET lists. The MET lists are directly supported by collective tasks. From those tasks, commanders identify Key Collective Tasks (KCTs) that are the specific tasks the unit needs to focus on to accomplish their METs and their mission and survive on the battlefield. Units should continuously apply the Army’s Operations Process to training as described in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0. This process requires the units to plan, prepare, execute, and assess training that supports unit proficiency in performing METs.

(U) ADRP 7-0 also requires that units focus training plans on their METs and provide opportunities to demonstrate proficiency. Further, ADRP 7-0 states that commanders must prepare for planned training events by creating a realistic training environment to include sufficient equipment and personnel. According to the Leader’s Guide to Unit Training Management (Leader’s Guide), the unit commander leads the collective training exercises and should plan time for multiple iterations and any retraining necessary for the unit to conduct the tasks to standard. The Leader’s Guide requires commanders to continually assess and report the overall training proficiency of each of the unit’s METs and the KCTs that support them.

---

9 (U) A MET list refers to a listing of all the units approved METs that are critical for the unit to successfully accomplish its mission. For units within a Combined Arms Battalion, “Conduct an Attack,” “Conduct a Movement to Contact,” and “Conduct an Area Defense” are common examples of METs, which would appear on the comprehensive MET list.

10 (U) ADRP 7-0, “Training Units and Developing Leaders,” August 23, 2012.

(U) Introduction

(U) Organizational Inspection Program

(U) Army Regulation 1-201 establishes the policies for Army Organizational Inspection Programs (OIP), which strive to ensure that inspections complement and support MET training efforts. The Regulation requires battalions and higher level commands to inspect subordinate units in areas that immediately impact readiness. The Regulation further states that the OIP is a critical tool to maintain combat readiness by establishing a single, cohesive inspection program focused on command objectives such as training, discipline, readiness, and welfare of the command.

(U) According to Army Regulation 1-201, all inspections have one purpose—to provide feedback to commanders and stakeholders so they can make informed decisions. Inspections must focus on measuring compliance against established standards to ensure the Army, as a whole, can function effectively in its combat role. Command and staff inspections help verify that units comply with regulations and policies and assist commanders in holding leaders at all levels accountable for that compliance. Army Regulation 1-201 requires battalion inspections of subordinate units to focus on areas that immediately impact readiness and reinforce goals and standards.

(U) Figure 1. An Abrams M1A1 Tank and Crewmember During a Collective Training Exercise

(U) Source: DoD OIG.

(U) Review of Internal Controls

(U) DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified internal control weaknesses related to training guidance and oversight. Specifically, the Army and National Guard Bureau did not provide clear, consistent guidance for unit training management. Also, commanders did not implement effective OIPs to provide oversight of collective training and ensure accountability for compliance with unit training management policies. We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the Department of the Army and National Guard Bureau.

(U) Finding

(U) National Guard Units Did Not Develop Effective Training Programs

(U) Commanders of the units we audited did not develop effective training programs to ensure their units could attain or sustain MET proficiency. Specifically, the unit commanders did not:

- (U) properly develop METs, training priorities, and training plans;
- (U) properly manage personnel resources to sustain training proficiency;
- (U) effectively implement training plans and events; and
- (U) continuously or adequately assess MET proficiency.

(U) The training programs were not effective because the Army and National Guard Bureau did not provide clear, consistent guidance for managing unit training. In addition, commanders did not implement effective OIPs to provide oversight of collective training and ensure units complied with unit training management policies.

(U) National Guard Units Did Not Effectively Implement the Four Phases of the Operations Process

(U) Commanders of the units we audited did not develop effective training programs to ensure their units could attain or sustain MET proficiency. Specifically, leaders at multiple levels were not effectively implementing the four phases of the operations process as outlined in ADRP 7-0.

(U) Plan: Properly Develop METs, Training Priorities, and Plans

(U) Commanders did not properly define their unit’s MET lists and training priorities nor did they develop training plans to address their METs during FY 2016. According to ADRP 7-0, as part of the plan phase, commanders should identify the collective tasks on
(U) which to train; identify and sequence training events; identify resources required; and provide the guidance necessary to achieve mission readiness during planning. However, the commanders did not consistently:

- (U) define MET lists in accordance with guidance,
- (U) focus training priorities on their METs,
- (U) develop yearly training plans, and
- (U) develop inactive duty training plans.

(U) Units Did Not Consistently Define MET Lists

(U) Although the should have had MET lists for FY 2016, only one unit defined its MET list in accordance with ADRP 7-0. ADRP 7-0 requires company-level commanders to develop MET lists that align with and support the MET list at the next higher level unit. It also states that the MET list must be approved by the higher level commander. Further, the MET list should be used to determine which collective tasks the unit will focus its training on during the year.

(U) MET lists for did not comply with one or more of the requirements in ADRP 7-0. Specifically, did not fully align their METs lists with their higher level units. Additionally, did not properly approve their MET list by their higher level command. Of these:

- (U) did not have a MET list approved by higher command;
- (U) higher level commander stated that the unit’s MET list was approved but officials could not provide the approved document;¹⁴ and
- (U) did not have an approved MET list until after the planning for FY 2016 training events had been completed.

(U) In June 2016, the Army adopted a “Standard Decisive Action Mission Essential Task List” that establish a standardized MET list for company-level units to enable commanders to “more accurately and objectively build and assess training readiness.”¹⁵

¹⁴ (U) In the absence of the approved document, the training officer could only provide an undated, unsigned document with the unit’s METs; therefore, we could not determine whether it was prepared before training was planned or approved by higher command.

(U) Units were allowed to begin using the standard MET list to focus training immediately, and standard MET lists were initially incorporated into unit readiness reporting in June 2016 and will continue through March 2017 with the initial implementation of the objective training readiness effort.

(U) Units Did Not Focus Training Priorities

(U) Only [redacted] focused their training priorities in accordance with Army training doctrine. According to Army Doctrine Publication 7-0, since units do not have the time or resources to train on all tasks that support their METs, commanders must identify the KCTs that are most essential to mission accomplishment and then prioritize training on these KCTs to attain or sustain MET proficiency. The [redacted], which properly focused their training priorities, selected KCTs that aligned with the company’s MET list, mission, and higher level guidance. However, [redacted] did not identify KCTs to support their METs, and their stated training priorities focused on crew-level gunnery tasks rather than collective MET training. Furthermore, ADRP 7-0 states that commanders should select a few KCTs; however, commanders had selected so many KCTs (18 and 20) they could not focus on each of them. Finally, [redacted] did not develop its MET list and KCTs until after they had already conducted planned training.

(U) Units Did Not Develop Yearly Training Plans

(U) Only [redacted] developed FY 2016 training plans that complied with National Guard Bureau and Army guidance. National Guard Regulation 350-1 requires that unit commanders develop a comprehensive training plan for the fiscal year to build MET proficiency. The Regulation also states that the training plan should include annual training, inactive duty training, and other training as applicable. According to Army Doctrine Publication 7-0, commanders communicate the training plan to the unit through an operations order that uses a “crawl-walk-run” approach to progressively and systematically build on successful task performance before progressing to more difficult tasks. Commanders of [redacted] did not issue their own FY 2016 training plans, and the commander for one unit stated that although he prepared a plan, he could not locate the document.

---

17 (U) “Crew-level” refers to the teams which operate each individual vehicle within a company-level unit. There are four personnel in each of the 14 tank crews within an armored unit; three to four personnel in each of the 14 Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews within a mechanized infantry unit; and three personnel within each of the seven Cavalry Fighting Vehicle crews within a reconnaissance unit.
(U) Units Did Not Consistently Develop Inactive Duty Training Plans

(U) The units, which conducted collective MET training, properly developed training plans for inactive duty training periods (drill periods). For example, according to the Leader's Guide, commanders should plan each training event in detail and issue an operations order identifying the tasks to be trained and the desired level of proficiency to be reached by the end of the training. The units, which developed training plans, prepared operation orders for inactive duty training events that included all necessary guidance and aligned with their battalion operation orders. Some unit commanders which did not prepare inactive duty training plans stated that training calendars and schedules were adequate planning for drill periods. However, according to the Leader's Guide, training event plans should be issued in the form of a five-part operations order that provides the situation, mission, execution, sustainment, and command and signal requirements for the event. Training calendars and schedules do not include all the elements from the Leader's Guide.

(U) Figure 2. A Convoy of Bradley Fighting Vehicles During a Collective Training Exercise

(U) Source: DoD OIG.

---

(U) Inactive duty training operation orders should include at a minimum: mission statement, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to train, and end state.
(U) Prepare: Properly Manage Personnel Resources to Sustain Training Proficiency

(U//FOUO) For the [Redacted] that conducted collective training during our audit, commanders generally ensured proper personnel and equipment were present at training. According to ADRP 7-0, commanders are required to prepare the training environment to be as realistic and effective as possible by ensuring personnel and equipment are present at collective training events to demonstrate success in performing METs and supporting tasks. Commanders of [Redacted] ensured personnel attendance including key leaders [Redacted] met National Guard Bureau standards and that their unit had adequate equipment to conduct planned collective MET training. For example, we observed attendance of at least 85% of assigned personnel at collective training events we attended. We also observed that units had the necessary equipment to perform their collective training events as planned.

(U) Personnel who should attend collective training events includes those in key leadership roles (for example, unit commanders, platoon leaders, squadron/section leaders, gunners, and tank commanders) and soldiers.

(U) A [Redacted]. Senior Army and Army National Guard planning and sourcing officials stated that substantial turnover, especially in key leader positions, degrades proficiency because these positions are “critical to training proficiency.” [Redacted] experienced substantial personnel turnover within key leadership roles [Redacted]. For example, [Redacted] changed both their commanders and executive officers. Additionally, [Redacted] experienced key leader turnover in positions such as tank commanders, section leaders, or squad leaders. According to National Guard Regulation 350-1, all commanders and leaders are required to minimize the impact of personnel and unit turbulence (such as...
key leader turnover). Commanders of these units did not execute company-level collective training events to minimize the impact of the turnover and provide new leaders the opportunity to become proficient in executing their new roles. (See “Units Did Not Sustain MET Proficiency” below)

(U) **Execute: Effectively Execute Training Plans and Evaluate Training Events**

(U) Commanders did not effectively implement unit training plans. Specifically, commanders did not:

- (U) execute MET training to sustain proficiency, and
- (U) use Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs)

**Units Did Not Sustain MET Proficiency**

The, which had experienced substantial personnel turnover, had also not executed collective training to sustain MET proficiency. Instead of conducting collective MET training, units focused on administrative tasks, mandatory training briefings, and gunnery practice up to the crew and squad levels. One commander stated that he received direction from his higher headquarters that was a “relaxed year” and, therefore, did not train his unit on its METs.

---

22 (U) T&EOs are the source for understanding performance measures and steps for all individual and collective tasks. The outlines help leaders evaluate task execution and assess a unit’s ability to perform tasks.

23 (U) Army Regulation 525-29 states units train to sustain proficiency during their available year. ADRP 7-0 states that collective training develops and sustains an organization’s readiness by achieving and sustaining proficiency in METs.
(U) Units Did Not Use Standards Based Training Evaluations

(U) commanders stated that they did not use T&EOs to evaluate the execution of collective training events. Army Regulation 350-1 defines a proficient unit as one that has “demonstrated success in performing the organization’s MET list and appropriate supporting tasks to standard.” The Leader’s Guide states that T&EOs are the source of Army standards for collective training and serve as a primary means to measure training proficiency. The Guide also states that training event planners should publish the relevant T&EOs so that commanders, planners, and leaders at every level can reference training standards and evaluate tasks during training events. Commanders stated they either chose not to use T&EOs during execution to evaluate training or used alternative evaluation methods, such as reviewing field manuals and conducting after action reviews. However, Field Manuals and After Action Reviews are not comprehensive or standards-based evaluations and should not be used as task evaluation tools. If unit leaders do not use T&EOs during the evaluation of collective training, they may not be able to determine whether their soldiers have achieved the Army’s standards for collective MET training.

(U) Assess: Continuously or Adequately Assess MET Proficiency

(S) According to Army Regulation 350-1, all commanders must deliberately and continually assess unit training as part of their overall training programs. Commanders use assessments to identify training deficiencies, improve their training programs, and determine their unit training proficiency. In addition, according to Army National Guard officials, battalion commander assessments are key factors in selecting units for deployment.24 ADRP 7-0 states that only commanders can assess unit MET readiness and requires that commanders record the assessment results in the Digital Training Management System.25 Commanders assess METs as either untrained, needs practice, or trained...

24 (U) According to Headquarters, Department of the Army officials, a battalion assessment reflects the ability of the battalion and its subordinate units to perform their METs.

25 (U) The Digital Training Management System is the only authorized system for unit commanders to manage training.
based on their units’ ability to perform their METs and accomplish their mission. Army guidance identifies a variety of factors that commanders may consider such as past training evaluations, personal observations, and instincts when assessing their units.

From October 2015 through April 2016, commanders of did not assess their units’ MET training proficiency. Specifically, of these commanders:

- did not assess METs because the units had not trained on their METs;
- only assessed METs at the end of the training year;
- did not perform assessments unless directed by the battalion; and
- did not know of the requirement to perform assessments.

The ability of company-level units to perform METs should also be reflected in battalion-level assessments. battalion-level commanders made unrealistic assessments about their units’ overall MET training proficiency. Specifically, concluded their battalions were trained on most of their METs despite the fact that their subordinate units underwent substantial personnel turnover in key leadership roles and had not conducted collective training.

Army Training Guidance is Not Clear

Although the Army and National Guard Bureau have developed guidance for managing unit training, the guidance is not clear and often contains conflicting or inconsistent information. Specifically, the guidance does not clearly address MET-focused training priorities, training plan development, training evaluation, and training proficiency assessment. Where the criteria conflicted or was unclear, we consulted with the proponents of the guidance to determine their intent.

(U) **MET-Focused Training Priorities Were Not Clear**

(U) Army and National Guard guidance did not clearly describe how company-level commanders should develop KCTs. Specifically, management criteria for unit training provide differing methodologies or sources that commanders should use when selecting their units’ KCTs. Army Doctrine Publication 7-0 and National Guard Regulation 350-1 state that the KCTs should support the unit's MET lists, while the Leader’s Guide simply states the KCTs should be derived from higher commander's training mission and guidance. Army Regulation 350-1 states KCTs should be derived from both MET lists and guidance from the higher commander.

(U) **Training Plan Development Guidance Was Not Clear**

(U) The Army and National Guard Bureau do not have clear guidance for unit training plans. The requirements for yearly training plans and training event plans are contained in at least five different Army and National Guard publications and regulations, which sometimes conflict. For example, the publications and regulations provide conflicting guidance on who is responsible for developing company-level unit training plans. Army and National Guard regulations emphasize the commander’s responsibility at battalion level for planning training for subordinate units and describe a supporting role for company-level commanders. The regulations require battalion-level commanders to develop unit training plans, and company-level commanders should assist them in developing those plans. In contrast, Army doctrine describes a much more active planning role for company-level commanders. However, according to Army doctrine and an Army Training and Doctrine Command official, company-level commanders should use troop leading procedures\(^{27}\) to develop unit training plans.

(U) **Requirements Were Not Clearly Communicated**

(U//FOUO) Although senior Army and National Guard officials emphasized the importance of minimizing turnover, the unit

\(^{27}\) (U) Troop Leading Procedures are the Army’s operational and training process for developing plans at the company and platoon level.
(U) Finding

(U//FOUO) training guidance for the Army and National Guard does not emphasize the importance of minimizing turnover and unit “turbulence” (instability). Further, the training guidance provides conflicting information on what units’ training programs should focus on.

(U) According to senior Army and Army National Guard planning and sourcing officials, substantial turnover degrades training proficiency and battalion- and company-level leadership should work to minimize turnover. Specifically, the officials stated that unit leadership should minimize turnover of key leaders because they are “critical to training proficiency” and substantial turnover in these positions present a “huge risk” to the unit’s MET proficiency. However, the criteria governing unit training management did not adequately reflect the statements of senior Army and National Guard officials. For example, reducing and controlling turnover is addressed in a training circular related to weapon system qualifications but is not addressed in key unit training management guidance such as the Army and National Guard regulations and doctrine publications. National Guard Regulation 350-1 states that commanders and key leaders should be stabilized before collective training.

(U) Planning and sourcing officials for the Army and Army National Guard also stated that units should maintain their training proficiency levels. Specifically, all units should continue to conduct collective training to prevent a degradation of their capabilities over time. While Army guidance generally emphasizes the importance of sustaining proficiency, for example, Army Regulation 350-1 states that should continue to take advantage of professional military education opportunities. National Guard Regulation 350-1 states that soldiers may attend the courses instead of attending inactive duty training and annual training events. Therefore, sending leaders to these educational opportunities could effectively restrict them from leading and participating in the collective training necessary to sustain proficiency.

(S) The Reported Readiness Did Not Reflect Key Leader Turnover

(S) During the audit, we issued a Notice of Concern (see Appendix B) to address the key leader turnover and lack of collective training we observed for [REDACTED]. As discussed in the Notice of Concern, the [REDACTED] did not properly report “Training” ratings in Commander’s Unit Status Reports after undergoing substantial personnel turnover (See “Prepare: Properly Manage Personnel Resources to Sustain Training Proficiency,” and “Units Did Not Sustain MET Proficiency”). We suggested that the Commander, [REDACTED], in coordination with the Director, Army National Guard, and the:

- (U) direct subordinate units to immediately reassess training proficiency for their METs and issue Commander’s Unit Status Reports to reflect the current assessments, and
- (U) issue a Commander’s Unit Status Report for the [REDACTED] based on the information from subordinate Commanders’ Unit Status Reports.

(S) In response to the Notice of Concern, the Commander, [REDACTED], agreed that the battalion-level commanders subjectively assessed their training proficiency in a manner inconsistent with Army guidance. The Commander directed [REDACTED] battalion-level commanders to reassess their training proficiency for battalion METs. Battalion-level commanders completed the reassessments [REDACTED]. Additionally, the Director, Army National Guard, stated that the Army National Guard will initiate a process to establish manning guidance. According to Army National Guard plans, the guidance will apply to ABCTs for FY 2017 to 2019. Army National Guard officials anticipate reaching a course of action decision by September 20, 2016 regarding how to proceed with manning guidance.
Guidance Regarding Conducting Training Evaluations Is Unclear

(U) Army and National Guard training guidance states that commanders must evaluate training but is unclear on whether commanders must use T&EOs to conduct evaluations. According to the Leader's Guide, commanders evaluate task performance against training standards established in T&EOs. However, Army Regulation 350-1 states that evaluations should be based on standards derived from multiple sources such as Combined Arms Training Strategies, drills, soldier manuals, or other sources. In addition, officials from Army Training and Doctrine Command stated that T&EOs should be used to evaluate training as a best practice, but they were uncertain whether the Army requires units to use T&EOs to evaluate training.

Guidance Does Not Provide a Clear Method To Assess MET Proficiency

(U) Army regulations and publications provide inconsistent or vague guidance on what sources commanders should use to assess training. Army Regulation 350-1 states that assessments should be based on evaluations of performance, while Army Doctrine Publication 7-0 states that commanders should also use personal observations and judgment. Further, the Leader's Guide states that commanders should assess METs using a variety of factors including instinct.

(U) Additionally, to assess training for each MET, commanders assign one of three ratings: Trained (T), Needs Practice (P), or Untrained (U). Although the Leader's Guide defines each term, it does not provide a clear method to assign these ratings based on the various assessment sources. Instead, the Leader's Guide states that leaders should use multiple inputs,\(^\text{29}\) to judge task performance. Without a clear methodology, commanders used different methodologies and sources to assess MET proficiency.

\(^{29}\) According to the Leader's Guide, these inputs may include, but are not limited to, after action reports, lessons learned, weapons qualification, T&EOs, personal experience, personal observations, staff visits, and top-down feedback.
(U) For example, one commander stated that he would assess training by talking to leadership at the company and platoon level. Another commander stated that he assessed training based on his personal experience and instinct, as well as feedback from subordinates.

(U) If commanders of similar units (such as ABCTs) do not consistently assess and report training proficiency, decision makers will not have assurance they are properly allocating funding and selecting the most prepared units for mobilization. Finally, assessment criteria do not provide guidance on how long an assessment of MET proficiency is valid or what factors would cause MET proficiency to degrade such as high unit turnover or length of time since a unit last trained a task.

(U) In February 2016, the Army announced that it will establish a common readiness baseline for similar units that includes objective factors to evaluate task proficiency. Further, the Army will modify its existing policies to incorporate the new training assessment, methodologies, and standards.

(U) Figure 3. A Concealed Soldier During a Collective Training Exercise

(U) Source: DoD OIG.
(U) Command Inspection Programs Did Not Provide Effective Oversight of Training Management

(U) Commanders did not implement effective OIPs of collective training and ensure units complied with training management policies. Specifically, battalion-level inspections of subordinate units did not provide effective feedback on the unit’s strengths and weaknesses and reinforce goals and standards for METs as required by Army Regulation 1-201. The Regulation also states that commanders must ensure that inspections complement and support MET training efforts.

(U) Training sections of inspections generally addressed some aspects of unit training management but did not fully address the management of MET training. Army Regulation 1-201 specifically states that OIPs “must strive to ensure that inspections complement and support mission-essential task list training efforts.” However, none of the inspections adequately addressed whether units planned, prepared, executed, and assessed MET training. In addition, inspectors did not always properly execute the training inspections. For example, one inspector stated that a company-level unit was “in compliance” on preparing training plans even though the unit commander stated that he did not prepare company-level plans. Another inspector filled out only two of the three OIP sections related to training. Therefore, the inspections did not provide effective feedback on the unit’s strengths and weaknesses and reinforce goals and standards for METs.

(U) Ineffective command and staff inspections are a missed opportunity for commanders to gain valuable feedback on the training readiness of soldiers.

(U) Units at Risk

The purpose of Army unit training is to build and maintain ready units to conduct unified land operations. Units train to attain mastery of individual and collective tasks under the demanding conditions of the anticipated operational environment. Ensuring quality training gives soldiers, leaders, and units confidence in their abilities to consistently accomplish the mission under stressful conditions and to survive in battle. Additionally, adequate assessment of
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army ensure that units implement standardized METs at the company level, establish suspense dates for implementation, and monitor unit progress toward completion.

(U) Secretary of the Army Comments

(U) The Secretary of the Army, responding for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the Army has completed development of standard mission essential task lists for 95 percent of operating force units down through the company level. Standard mission essential task lists are now available to units through the Army Training Network website.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Secretary addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, in coordination with the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Director, Army National Guard standardize requirements across unit training management guidance to ensure compliance and provide consistent guidance across their respective criteria. At a minimum, the guidance should be updated to:

   a. (U) Clarify requirements for developing unit training priorities and plans.
   b. (U) Provide consistent methodologies for evaluating training events and assessing MET proficiency.
Secretary of the Army Comments

The Secretary of the Army, responding for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the Army provided clarifying guidance with the October 2016 publication of Field Manual 7-0, “Train to Win in a Complex World,” describing the role of standard mission essential task lists. He added that the second quarter FY 2017 revision of Army Regulation 350-1, “Army Training and Leader Development,” will further reinforce guidance focusing training on standard mission essential task lists. Finally, the Secretary stated that the Army will continue to integrate standard evaluation criteria into all training and evaluation outlines published in the web-based Combined Arms Training Strategy with an expected completion by the fourth quarter FY 2017.

Our Response

Comments from the Secretary addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Recommendation 3

We recommend that the Director, Army National Guard, in coordination with the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command establish training and manning priorities for units.

Secretary of the Army Comments

The Secretary of the Army, responding for the Director, Army National Guard, agreed with the recommendation and stated that in early 2016 the Army National Guard began to revise the Army National Guard training and manning guidance. The Secretary stated that the Army National Guard will publish refined guidance to reduce personnel turnover and increase training management proficiency so units can build required levels of collective training readiness. The new guidance will be coordinated with Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army Forces Command, and other applicable Army stakeholders.

Our Response

Comments from the Secretary addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.
**Recommendation 4**

We recommend that the Director, Army National Guard, in coordination with the Army Inspector General develop and implement a standardized National Guard Organizational Inspection Program template for Army National Guard MET training programs to include minimum inspection standards.

**Secretary of the Army Comments**

The Secretary of the Army, responding for the Director, Army National Guard, agreed with the recommendation and stated that the Army National Guard is fully committed to the use of organizational inspections as internal mechanisms to identify, prevent, and eliminate problem areas impacting readiness. The Secretary stated that state adjutants general will renew unit-level focus on organizational inspection programs to improve Army National Guard training management, and the Department of the Army Inspector General will conduct staff assistance visits and review Army National Guard products. The Secretary further added that the Army National Guard Commanders will take direct ownership of unit-level organizational inspection programs and will use Appendix I of the recently revised Field Manual 7-0 and Army Regulation 1-201, “Army Inspection Policy,” to inform the renewed effort. Finally, the Army will publish a message to all Army activities re-emphasizing responsibilities in Army Regulation 1-201 for commanders, program managers, directors, and state adjutant generals to manage organization inspection programs.

**Our Response**

Comments from the Secretary addressed all specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

**Additional Secretary Of the Army Comments**

In addition to the comments addressing our recommendations, the Secretary of the Army stated that the Army is proceeding with Army Directive 2016-05, “Building Training Readiness,” in a concerted effort to:

- identify readiness posture required of units to meet Defense Planning Guidance;
- communicate readiness objectives to units;
- provide units with the resources to achieve readiness objectives;
- establish objective criteria for evaluating task/MET list proficiency;
(U) Finding

- (U) update training and evaluation outlines with standard criteria for use by leaders during task performance evaluations;
- (U) establish objective measures of unit training readiness; and
- (U) apply the objective measures in training and readiness reporting.

(U) Our Response

(U) Additional actions stated in the Secretary of the Army’s comments will supplement the corrective actions identified in each of the recommendations.

(U) Comments from the Director, Army National Guard

(U) The Director, Army National Guard, also provided comments to our recommendations that supported the Army’s official position provided by the Secretary of the Army.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments provided by the Director, Army National Guard align with the official Army position.
(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from August 2015 through September 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) We reviewed training records; interviewed brigade, battalion, and company-level personnel to include commanders, training officers, and readiness officers; and observed training exercises. We also reviewed DoD, Army, and National Guard Bureau guidance on MET training. We determined whether units planned, prepared, executed, and assessed MET training in accordance with reviewed guidance.

(U) ABCTs generally consisted of two combined arms battalions, a reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, a brigade support battalion, and a brigade special troops battalion.
Combined arms battalions generally consist of at least five company-level units: headquarters, two rifle, and two armored units.

Reconnaissance squadrons generally consist of at least four company-level units: headquarters and three reconnaissance units.
(U) We conducted site visits, to observe training and interview personnel from the

We also reviewed battalion-level OIPs to determine whether commanders’ inspections provided adequate oversight of MET training.

(U) We interviewed officials responsible for training policy and oversight at the following locations.

- (U) Headquarters, Department of the Army
  o (U) Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans (G-3/5/7)
- (U) Army Training and Doctrine Command
- (U) National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Headquarters
  o (U) Training Division
  o (U) Mobilization and Readiness Division
- (U) Joint Force Headquarters for National Guards

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We obtained and used computer-processed data to perform this audit. Specifically, we used assessments from the Digital Training Management System and Defense Readiness Reporting System–Army to determine whether units properly assessed and reported training proficiency. We used Human Resources Authorization Reports (formerly unit manning reports) from the client to determine whether units had sufficient personnel resources. We verified the accuracy of the data through interviews of unit personnel and review of alternate training records. The data in conjunction with the alternate evidence were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this audit.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last five years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), and U.S. Army Audit Agency have issued five reports on Army processes and training proficiency for METs. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at www.gao.gov. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. Unrestricted Army Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil and gao.gov domains at www.aaa.army.mil/.
(U) **GAO**


(U) The GAO report found that although deploying Army and Marine Corps units conduct extensive pre-deployment training, factors such as limited training time between deployments and the current focus on counterinsurgency operation training prevented units from completing all desired training prior to the culminating training event. GAO recommended that the services develop results-oriented performance metrics that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of their training management initiatives and support any adjustments that the services may need to make to these initiatives.

(____) **DoD IG**

(U) DODIG-2016-050, “Chemical and Biological Training for Army and Marine Corps Units in the Republic of Korea Needs Improvement,” February 24, 2016

(U) The Department of Defense Inspector General report found that some Army and Marine Corps units in the Republic of Korea were not conducting collective chemical and biological training. The Inspector General recommendations included the Commander, Eighth Army ensuring that collective chemical and biological training be integrated into exercises and that subordinate commands conduct annual inspections of collective training.

(____) **U.S. Army Audit Agency**


(U) The U.S. Army Audit Agency follow-up report found that the Army National Guard took alternative action that met the intent of one recommendation and fully implemented another related to increasing skilled personnel rates. Command also fully implemented a recommendation to decrease excess equipment rates. The agency made no additional recommendations.
(U) The U.S. Army Audit Agency report found that Army did not fully implement three recommendations for managing no-shows and cancellations. The agency recommended that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 issue guidance regarding use of the Army Training Requirements and Resources System Training Tracker to manage and schedule Soldiers’ training. The agency also recommended that the Commander, U.S. Forces Command capture and report quarterly no-shows and cancellation by unit and require brigade commanders to use the information to reduce the number of no-shows and cancellations.

(U) The U.S. Army Audit Agency report found that the Digital Training Management System was sufficiently configured but not sufficiently maintained or used by units. The agency recommended that the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 define requirements for the systems interface, establish performance measures to continually monitor use of the system, and provide performance measure results. The agency also recommended establishing a process to ensure functions of the Army Career Tracker and the proposed system interface do not duplicate each other.
(U) MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

April 27, 2016

(U) Background
(U) Please respond to these suggested actions or provide actions taken by May 11, 2016. My point of contact for your response is [Redacted]. This memorandum and management’s comments to the suggested actions will be included in the final report.

Donald A. Bloomer  
Program Director  
Readiness and Cyber Operations
(U) Appendix C

MEMORANDUM THRU Inspector General, National Guard Bureau, 111 South George Mason Drive, Arlington, VA 22204-1373

FOR Inspector General, Department of Defense, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense, Inspector General Audit on Armored Brigade Combat Team Readiness, ARNG (Project No. D2015-D000RF-0242.000)

1. Upon receiving your Memorandum for Record, Notice of Concern dated 27 April 2016, I directed my staff to contact [REDACTED] to review your concerns. Leaders conducted an analysis of the Commanders Unit Status Reports (CUSRs) and reviewed this information with the staff of the [REDACTED].

2. After a review of the Mission Essential Task List (METL), training planned, and training conducted, the commanders reassessed their METL. The commanders submitted change CUSRs that reflect the updated METL assessments.

3. In returning to Defilce Action focused training, I recognize a need for commanders to appropriately manage leaders, key personnel, and crews throughout the higher-level collective training events. I have directed my staff to analyze the personnel impacts of unit stationing and position stabilization. It is paramount that, in our efforts to sustain unit readiness, we stabilize key leaders and crews and maximize training proficiency.

4. My point of contact [REDACTED]

TIMOTHY J. KADASY
Lieutenant General, GS
Director, Army National Guard

MAY 31 2016
MEMORANDUM THRU

(U) SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense, Inspector General Audit on Armored Brigade Combat Team Readiness, ARNG (Project No. D2015-D000RF-0242.000)

(U) 3. This Headquarters is cognizant of the anticipated change from a subjective evaluation of Mission Essential Task ability and the related Training (T) rating to an objective (Objective – T) evaluation. We acknowledge that it will greatly enhance the collective understanding and proper rating of units. We fully support this change and
SUBJECT: Response to Department of Defense, Inspector General Audit on Armored Brigade Combat Team Readiness, ARNG (Project No. D2015-D000RF-0242.000).

are making significant efforts to implement the tenants of the objective evaluation to better reflect the training readiness of our subordinate units.
(U) Appendix D

(U) Classified Information Used in the Preparation of This Report for Record

(U) Source 1: Commander's Unit Status Reports (Documents Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: 20400715
Date of Source: 15 July 2015

(U) Source 2: Commander's Unit Status Reports (Documents Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: 20401015
Date of Source: 15 October 2015

(U) Source 3: Commander's Unit Status Reports (Documents Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: 20410415
Date of Source: 15 April 2016

(U) Source 4: Commander's Unit Status Reports (Documents Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: 20410515
Date of Source: 15 May 2016

(U) Source 5: Commander, Response to Notice of Concern (Document Classified SECRET)
Declassify on: 20260726
Date of Source: 10 May 2016

(U) Source 6: Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies (Document Unclassified)
Type: Security Classification Guidance
Issued by: Chief of Staff, U.S. States Army
Issued: 5 May 2010
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General

SUBJECT: Army Position on Recommendations in Department of Defense Inspector General Project No. D2015-D000RF-0242.000 (U)

1. (U) Reference Department of Defense Inspector General Project No. D2015-D000RF-0242.000 (Army National Guard Companies Have Not Developed Effective Training Programs to Attain or Sustain Mission Essential Task Proficiency), September 30, 2016 (U).

2. (U) This memorandum provides the Army position regarding recommendations in subject report (reference 1).

3. (U) Recommendation 1.

   a. (U) The report recommends that Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 ensure that units implement standardized Mission Essential Tasks (METs) at the company level, establish suspense dates for implementation, and monitor unit progress toward completion.

   b. (U) Army position. Concur. In Fall 2016, the Army completed development of standard Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) for 95 percent of operating force units (regardless of component) down through company level and expects to complete METL for all units in the next few months. Standard METL is now available to units for training purposes via the Army Training Network website.

4. (U) Recommendation 2.

   a. (U) The report recommends that the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, in conjunction with the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command; the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; and Director, Army National Guard, standardize requirements across unit training management guidance to ensure compliance. At a minimum, the guidance should be updated to:

      (1) (U) Clarify requirements for developing unit training priorities and plans and

      (2) (U) Provide consistent methodologies for evaluating training events and assessing MET proficiency.
b. (U) Army position. Concur. The Army provided clarifying guidance with the 5 October 2016 publication of Field Manual (FM) 7-0 (Train to Win in a Complex World), describing for leaders in all operating forces (regardless of component) the role of standard METL. The FM also describes the role of commander’s training guidance in developing unit training priorities and plans. The second quarter fiscal year 2017 revision of Army training policy, Army Regulation (AR) 350-1 (Army Training and Leader Development), will further reinforce guidance focusing training on standard METL, with the only exception being units with an assigned mission. The Army continues integrating standard evaluation criteria into all training and evaluation outlines published in the web based Combined Arms Training Strategy, with an expected completion by fourth quarter fiscal year 2017.

5. (U) Recommendation 3.

a. (U) The report recommends that the Director, Army National Guard, in conjunction with the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, establish training and manning priorities for units [redacted].

b. (U) Army position. Concur. In early 2016, the Army National Guard began a concerted effort to improve readiness for combat. This renewed commitment requires a revision of Army National Guard training and manning guidance. In the coming months, the Army National Guard will publish refined guidance aimed at reducing personnel turbulence and increasing training management proficiency so units can build required levels of collective training readiness. The new guidance will be coordinated with Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, and other applicable Army stakeholders.


a. (U) The report recommends that the Director, Army National Guard, in conjunction with the Army Inspector General, develop and implement a standardized National Guard Organizational Inspection Program template for Army National Guard MET training programs to include minimum inspection standards.

b. (U) Army position. Concur with comment. The Army National Guard is fully committed to the use of organizational inspections as internal mechanisms to identify, prevent, and eliminate problem areas impacting readiness. State adjutants general will renew unit-level focus on Organizational Inspection Programs to improve Army National Guard training management. The Department of the Army Inspector General will conduct staff assistance visits and review Army National Guard products. Furthermore, Army National Guard commanders will take direct ownership of unit-level organizational...
 SUBJECT: Army Position on Recommendations in Department of Defense Inspector General Project No. D2015-D000RF-0242.000 (U)

inspection programs. Army National Guard commanders will use appendix I of the recently revised FM 7-0 and AR 1-201 (Army Inspection Policy) to inform this renewed effort. Finally, HQDA will publish a message to all Army activities re-emphasizing responsibilities in AR 1-201 for commanders, program managers, directors, and State adjutant generals to manage organization inspection programs.

7. (U) In addition to all actions listed in paragraphs 3 through 6 in this memorandum, the Army proceeded with Army Directive 2016-05 (Building Training Readiness), beginning a concerted effort to:

   a. (U) Identify readiness posture required of units to meet Defense Planning Guidance,

   b. (U) Communicate readiness objectives to units,

   c. (U) Provide units with the resources to achieve readiness objectives,

   d. (U) Establish objective criteria for evaluating task/METL proficiency,

   e. (U) Update training and evaluation outlines with standard criteria for use by leaders during task performance evaluations,

   f. (U) Establish objective measures of unit training readiness, and

   g. (U) Apply the objective measures in training and readiness reporting.

8. (U) Point of contact is

   [Signature]

   Eric K. Fanning

---

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

---
(U) Director, Army National Guard

Mr. Donald A. Bloomer  
Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense  
4800 Mark Center Drive  
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Dear Mr. Bloomer:

Thank you for the recent Inspector General draft report on Army National Guard Readiness. The report’s findings highlight the importance of training management, which is the foundation of any effective training program. As Director of the Army National Guard, I am committed to reinvigorating unit training management across the Army National Guard. To this end, I wish to provide further insight on the actions already taken or planned actions that address the report’s findings and recommendations.

In 2016 Headquarters, Department of the Army established standardized Mission Essential Task Lists for all company and higher units. Standardization creates an Army baseline for training and ensures training programs are founded on properly developed Mission Essential Tasks.

We are partnered with Headquarters, Department of the Army on several initiatives aimed at improving readiness and training management understanding. The intent is to improve training management, enhance a commander’s ability to prioritize unit training requirements, assess Mission Essential Task proficiency, and report more accurate training readiness. For example, in early 2017, the Army will begin measuring and reporting training readiness against Objective-T standards. Objective-T places increased rigor on how commanders assess training levels and is designed to better measure a unit’s training by establishing a common readiness baseline.

In early 2016 the Army National Guard began a concerted effort to improve readiness for combat. This renewed commitment requires a revision of Army National Guard training and manning guidance. In the coming months, the Army National Guard will publish refined guidance aimed at reducing personnel turbulence and increasing training management proficiency so units can build required levels of collective training readiness. The new guidance will be coordinated with Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army Forces Command, and other applicable Army stakeholders.
The Army National Guard is fully committed to the use of organizational inspections as internal mechanisms to identify, prevent, and eliminate problem areas that impact readiness. State Adjutants General will renew unit-level focus on Organizational Inspection Programs to improve Army National Guard training management processes. Furthermore, Army National Guard Commanders, in coordination with the Inspector General, will take direct ownership of unit-level inspection programs. The intent is to employ a mix of command and Inspector General inspections across the force, without detracting from Mission Essential Task training.

Today’s Army National Guard is the best America has ever seen. Rest assured, Army National Guard leaders remain vigilant, understand the risks involved, and are fully committed to improving unit readiness and training management. As America’s Combat Reserve of the Army, the Army National Guard is preparing for the future by building a better force for the future.

Sincerely,

Timothy J. Kadev
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Director, Army National Guard

cc:
Program Director, Forensic Audits and Applied Technology
## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCT</td>
<td>Armored Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCT</td>
<td>Key Collective Task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIP</td>
<td>Organizational Inspection Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;EO</td>
<td>Training and Evaluation Outline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whistleblower Protection
U.S. Department of Defense

The Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman’s role is to educate agency employees about prohibitions on retaliation and employees’ rights and remedies available for reprisal. The DoD Hotline Director is the designated ombudsman. For more information, please visit the Whistleblower webpage at www.dodig.mil/programs/whistleblower.

For more information about DoD IG reports or activities, please contact us:

Congressional Liaison
congressional@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

Media Contact
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

For Report Notifications
http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/email_update.cfm

Twitter
twitter.com/DoD_IG

DoD Hotline
dodig.mil/hotline