The Benefits of Mission Command: Balance of Philosophy and System

A Monograph

by

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The Benefits of Mission Command: Balance of Philosophy and System

On October 31, 2014, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command published The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World (AOC). The purpose of the document is to establish the azimuth for the future US Army as the war in Iraq ended with the closure of Operation New Dawn and the withdrawal of US forces continues in Afghanistan. Being best prepared for the next first battle is a challenge that has faced militaries throughout history. The soldiers in the US Civil War used the analogy of "seeing the elephant" to describe the difficulty in visualizing battle; one cannot fully understand battle until one is involved in battle. However, it is the duty of the military to attempt to "see the elephant" as clearly as possible ahead of time. An essential capability is Mission Command. The central idea of the AOC further develops the priority of Mission Command when it directed, "Forces tailored rapidly to the mission exercise mission command and integrate joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities." The philosophy and system of mission command, when exercised in balance, provides US Army leaders the agility and adaptability to "see the elephant" sooner when the next first battle arrives.

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Abstract

On October 31, 2014, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command published The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World (AOC). The purpose of the document is to establish the azimuth for the future US Army as the war in Iraq ended with the closure of Operation New Dawn and the withdrawal of US forces continues in Afghanistan. Being best prepared for the next first battle is a challenge that has faced militaries throughout history. The soldiers in the US Civil War used the analogy of ‘seeing the elephant’ to describe the difficulty in visualizing battle; one cannot fully understand battle until one is involved in battle. However, it is the duty of the military to attempt to ‘see the elephant’ as clearly as possible ahead of time. An essential capability is Mission Command. The central idea of the AOC further develops the priority of Mission Command when it directed, “Forces tailored rapidly to the mission exercise mission command and integrate joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities.” The philosophy and system of mission command, when exercised in balance, provides US Army leaders the agility and adaptability to ‘see the elephant’ sooner when the next first battle arrives.
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# Acronyms

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<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>Army Doctrine Reference Publication</td>
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<td>AOC</td>
<td>Army Operating Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWFC</td>
<td>Army Warfighting Challenge</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Mission Command</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>SF</td>
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<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
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**Introduction**

On October 31, 2014, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command published *The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (Army Operating Concept). The purpose of the document is to establish the azimuth for the future US Army as the war in Iraq ended with the closure of Operation New Dawn and withdrawal of US forces continues in Afghanistan. Being best prepared for the next first battle is a challenge that has faced militaries throughout history. The soldiers in the US Civil War used the analogy of ‘seeing the elephant’ to describe the difficulty in visualizing battle; one cannot fully understand battle until one is involved in battle.\(^1\) However, it is the duty of the military to attempt to ‘see the elephant’ as clearly as possible ahead of time. In the AOC foreword, General Raymond Odierno describes how it provides that azimuth when he stated, “The AOC guides future force development by identifying first order capabilities that the Army needs to support US policy objectives.”\(^2\) An essential capability is Mission Command. The central idea of the AOC further develops the priority of Mission Command when it directed, “Forces tailored rapidly to the mission exercise mission command and integrate joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities.”\(^3\) The philosophy and system of mission command, when exercised in balance, provides US Army leaders the agility and adaptability to ‘see the elephant’ sooner when the next first battle arrives.

The study of readiness for the next first battle is not unique. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft’s, historians at the US Army’s Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, compilation *America’s First Battles: 1776-1965* provides ten case studies that demonstrate the difficulties that the US Army has faced, throughout its history, in preparing for the next first battle through the lens of contemporary perspective. The concluding chapter of the book, written by John Shy, decorated American

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3 Ibid, 17.
history professor at the University of Michigan, summarized the emergent problems of the ten first battles. Shy deduced that four common problems plagued the US Army in its performance during the next first battle: weakness of command and control, pre-war doctrine and preconceptions that the last war informed, the political environment surrounding the battle, and force preparedness. Of these problems, US Army leaders only have complete control over the doctrine and preconceptions that the force brings with it to the next first battle. The concept of mission command as a first order capability, is a lens to influence doctrine and preconception of the force. The author intends that this monograph use additional historical case study, through the lens of the philosophy and system of mission command, to expand on Heller and Stofft’s compilation and provide current US Army leaders lessons learned to enable the US Army to be the most agile when it ‘sees the elephant’ in the next first battle.

Analysis of US Army’s preparation, both the actions the US Army took and the resource constraints that the US Government placed on the US Army, during interwar periods is essential to the study of its performance in the next first battle. In the introduction to their book, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, Williamson Murray and Allan Millett describe the importance of the interwar period:

> The emerging strategic environment in which our military institutions will have to operate suggests a number of similarities to the period between the great world wars of the first half of this century [20th Century]. During this timeframe, military institutions had to come to grips with enormous technological and tactical innovation during a period of minimal funding and low resource support.5

Despite Murray and Millett’s publication in 1998 and slant towards the importance of technological and tactical innovation in their book, the concepts of an emerging strategic environment and period of minimal funding and low resource support face the US Army today. The US Army should use the philosophy of mission command to synthesize its doctrine, train its leaders, and organize its force to face

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the complexity of today’s strategic environment where material solutions cannot keep pace with technology.

This monograph begins with an examination of how the US Army’s performance in the next first battle provides emergent trends of problems. Next, the author will analyze how the US Army is currently addressing problems through the Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) framework. The Battle of Osan, Korean War 1950, case study will bridge from Heller and Stofft’s compilation and facilitate analysis of the Battle of Wadi al Batin, Gulf War, 1991, and the Battle of Tora Bora, Afghan War, 2001. These case studies illustrate the importance of balancing the philosophy (art) and system (science) of mission command. Finally, the analysis reinforces and provides substance to recommended solutions to the US Army’s AWFC, “Exercise Mission Command.”

**Literary Review/Methodology/Definitions**

Charles E. Heller’s and William A. Stofft’s work, *America’s First Battles, 1776-1965*, provides a consolidation of analyses of the US Army’s performance in ten initial battles of major wars from the American Revolution to the Vietnam War. The book, published in 1986, is a compilation of separate articles written by military historians at the direction of the Combat Studies Institute and the History Department at the US Army’s Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for the purpose of providing the US Army’s Officer Corps a means to use history to prepare for the war that could begin any day while understanding the future nature of war. In hindsight, the book’s authors wrote and published during a key interwar period, between the proxy and limited wars amongst nation states of the Cold War and the transition to the Global War on Terrorism, when they realized the criticality of winning the next first battle as a key tenant of the US Army’s AirLand Battle construct. As the United States again faces a significant interwar period, withdrawal from Iraq and planned withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2016, coupled with the emergence of new threat, Islamic jihadists in Syria, and resurgence of existing threats, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, the author hopes to expand on the

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work done in *America’s First Battles* through the lens of current United States doctrine and more recent US Army first battles. Using the lens of the US Army’s philosophy of mission command within the framework of the doctrine, organization, and training of the US Army during the interwar periods before the Korean, Gulf, and Afghan Wars, the author hopes to provide the current US Army a means to apply lessons learned to prepare for the next first battle.

The author will examine the Battles of Osan, Wadi al Batin, and Tora Bora as case studies to analyze the US Army’s execution of the first battle through the lens of mission command and the frames of its doctrine, training, and organization prior to the battle. The Battle of Osan is the bridge between Heller and Stofft’s book and this analysis. The Battle of Wadi al Batin provides an example of a conventional war between nation states. The Battle of Tora Bora provides an example of an unconventional war between a nation state and a non-state actor. Each of these cases follow key interwar periods (World War II, the Cold War, and following stability operations in Europe, respectively) in which the US Army’s doctrine was written, its organization was set, and its training was focused on lessons learned from the last war. However, its execution in each of these first battles provides lessons learned that the current US Army should understand as it prepares for the next first battle in the current interwar period.

Dr. John Shy’s article, “First Battles in Retrospect,” is the summary and conclusions chapter for the Heller and Stofft book. He summarized the emergent theme of each of the ten analyses when he stated, “More glaring than poorly trained troops as a first-battle problem is the weakness of command and control.”7 The author will expand on his conclusion in the parlance of the current US Army’s definition of command and control, mission command. Current US Army doctrine defined mission command as both a philosophy and a warfighting function, philosophy and system or art and science, the difference being explained later in this section. Additionally, the US Army uses DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) to frame problems and to manage

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7 Shy, 329.
change by assessing the current state of each against future requirements. It has varying degrees of control within each aspect of DOTMLPF. For example, budgetary constraints significantly influence the materiel, personnel, and facilities aspects, and the US Army can grow leaders and adjust education, but requires a significant investment in time. However, the US Army can exert the most direct impact to doctrine, organization, and training with the relatively least amount of external influence or impact of time. If command and control (mission command) is the primary weakness in the US Army’s performance in first battles, then, logically, the US Army should address that problem during the interwar periods to prepare for the next first battle within the constructs over which it has the most control, its doctrine, its organization, and its training.

The US Army is a growing and learning organization. It defines first order problems, Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC), to frame key issues and address those issues in terms of ends, ways, and means. AWFC #19, Exercise Mission Command, is one of those first order problems and this section will further define that problem in terms of the importance of understanding how theory and history inform doctrine. The US Army uses the term mission command to define both its philosophy of leadership as well as its system that enables commanders and staffs to distribute guidance and direction to subordinates. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Furthermore, mission command is an element of combat power, is inherent in two of eight other elements of combat power, and is the bedrock warfighting function for the other five

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warfighting functions. Understanding the dichotomy of the definition, the theory and history that informed this definition, the current US Army principles of mission command, and how AWFC #19 seeks to frame and provide guidance to improving understanding and execution of mission command is essential to incorporating the past to determine lessons learned for improved future readiness.

In order to understand the dichotomy inherent in the US Army’s definition of mission command as both a philosophy (art) and warfighting function (science), it is important to understand how the US Army visualizes the relationships between its primary tools and elements of combat power, to execute its primary task, which is combat (see figure 1). The figure displays how the commander uses the element of information to make decisions and applies those decisions through the element of leadership using mission command to influence the remaining five warfighting functions/elements (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection). Mission command is not only the lens or function by which the commander influences the warfighting functions, but also a philosophy that frames the commander’s receipt of information and execution of leadership. A brief examination of the history of the definition of military leadership, supported by examples, will help to explain the divide in US Army doctrine between mission command as a philosophy and mission command as a warfighting function.

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11 Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 3-1. Elements of combat power are broad groupings of tasks inherent to the US Army, what the US Army provides to military engagement. The Warfighting functions are the systems that coordinate and synchronize those tasks.
The US Army defines military leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. As an element of combat power, leadership unifies the other elements of power. Confident, competent, and informed leadership intensifies the other elements of combat power.”

Again, US Army doctrine reinforces duality in leadership as both a process executed through mission command and an element of combat power, philosophy, in and of itself. Further, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, demonstrated that history has informed the basis for the US Army’s definition of leadership as well as the influence of loyalty to the United States and its Constitution. The historical military theorist, General Carl von Clausewitz and practitioner, General Helmuth von Moltke, influenced the US Army’s dichotomy in the definitions of mission command as both a philosophy of leadership and a system to execute leadership.

General von Clausewitz’s theory on military genius, informed by the Napoleonic Wars of 1803-1815, influenced the current US Army definition of the philosophy of mission command. General von Clausewitz was a Prussian and Russian general during Napoleon’s conquests of Europe. He sought to

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provide a theory of war, based on his understanding of the change from limited war to Napoleon’s more absolute war, in order to provide future military leaders ways to learn about war. Specifically, the scope and scale of Napoleon’s wars bore additional requirements for the commander and only certain commanders, such as Napoleon, had the innate attributes to lead effectively in absolute war, but through study and experience, other military leaders could be successful in war. General von Clausewitz referred to these attributes as military genius, “two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to the truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.” ¹⁴ For the purpose of this monograph, the author asserts that inherent in these attributes are preparation and the capacity to execute based on that preparation. Following, the author argues that this is the foundation of the US Army’s current philosophy of mission command; a leader prepares both himself and his subordinates (intellect), establishes a shared understanding of the final objective (glimmerings), and motivates his subordinates to strive to achieve the objective (courage). Although the context within General von Clausewitz’ definition of the attributes is that only certain leaders have the innate capacity for these aptitudes, others must work for it, it is clear that these attributes informed the guiding principles of the mission command philosophy.

General von Moltke was the Prussian Chief of the General Staff during the Prussian defeat of the Austrian Army and its German allies at the Battle of Königgratz in 1866. His General Staff stood on the cusp of the transition from the administration of dynastic style warfare to modern warfare and was able to combine the advantages of the old while mitigating its weaknesses and executing large-scale warfare efficiently enabling creativity in implementation. ¹⁵ General von Moltke stressed the importance of providing broad guidance and direction in such a way to subordinate commanders that the subordinate

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¹⁵ Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 147. Technology, scope, and scale prevent the massing and movement of military forces toward the singular, decisive battle in modern warfare. Instead, modern warfare is about outmaneuvering the enemy in order to limit his options and his freedom of maneuver. The Prussian General Staff demonstrated the beginnings of this change in 1866.
commanders maintained their freedom to operate and lead independently towards overall mission accomplishment, which is termed Auftragstaktik.\textsuperscript{16} The process of executing leadership, mission command, unified subordinates towards a common goal and provided subordinates the independence of action to achieve that goal through clear commander’s intent.\textsuperscript{17} Key to the process of mission command is the ability of the commanders to develop goals and objectives that subordinate commanders can understand, trust that their subordinate commanders are aware and capable to strive toward that objective, and visualize how the subordinate commands arrange actions that coalesce to achieve the ultimate goal. This is the system of mission command, it is the venue by which the commander exercises the philosophy of mission command and ensures that his or her subordinate commanders can operate independently toward the overall objective.

Both Generals von Clausewitz and von Moltke influenced the US Army’s current, doctrinal dichotomy of mission command as a philosophy and a process. The guiding principles of mission command (build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk) merge the philosophy (art) and process (science, system) of mission command into a concept that leaders and staffs can use.\textsuperscript{18} These principles also can serve as tools of evaluation to analyze past success or failure in the hopes of capturing lessons learned to prepare for future conflict with respect to mission command. As the bedrock to the leadership element of combat power and the lens through which leadership influences the remaining warfighting functions, it is imperative that a thorough understanding of mission command drives the definition of the problem in AWFC #19.

\textsuperscript{16} Robert M. Citino, \textit{The German Way of War} (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 344n48.

\textsuperscript{17} Daniel J. Hughes, \textit{Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings} (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 214-224.

\textsuperscript{18} ADP 6-0, iv.
The US Army defines the problem of AWFC #19, Exercise Mission Command as “How to understand, visualize, describe, and direct operations consistent with the philosophy of Mission Command to seize the initiative over the enemy and accomplish the mission across the range of military operations.” This problem question accounts for the dichotomy of mission command as a philosophy (understand and visualize) as well as a process (describe and direct) in accordance with current US Army doctrinal definition of mission command as theory and history informed the definition. The problem question explains the utility of the question in using this element of combat power to enable the US Army to execute its primary task of combat through seizing the initiative and accomplishing the mission. As a result, the definition of the problem in AWFC #19 reinforces the utility of using the guiding principles of mission command as a framework to evaluate the US Army’s past successes and failures in order to determine lessons learned that the US Army can now be applied to prepare for the future fight. The US Army’s current interim solution strategy identifies the importance of balancing the philosophy and system of mission command through a variety of doctrine, training, and material-based proposed solutions. If the US Army focused on solutions to improve the application of the art (philosophy) of mission command in doctrine, organization, and training, it would follow that the US Army could build and grow agile and adaptive leaders and staffs. The agile and adaptive leaders and staffs could use technology and material solutions (system) as tools, regardless of the specific piece of technology, and better prepare for the next fight under the condition of the next technological leap.

The term mission command first entered the US Army vocabulary in Field Manual (FM) 6-0 in August 2003 under “the premise that commanders exercise C2 (command and control) over forces to accomplish missions. It emphasizes fundamentals and concepts rather than specific equipment or systems…” Yet, AWFC #19 focuses on processes and material solutions to improve the exercise of


mission command in the present day US Army. Historically-informed theory, prior to the advent of any current material solution, stressed the importance of the basis of the US Army’s current definition of mission command as the bedrock to the leadership element of combat power and the lens through which leadership impacts the five remaining warfighting functions (also elements of combat power). It should follow that the US Army would seek to improve the capability of commanders and staffs to understand the philosophy of mission command rather than focus on the tools to apply mission command. If a commander and staff understand and can apply the philosophy, they can overcome any material shortfall or best take advantage of available material. Examination of the US Army’s past success in the Battle of Wadi al Batin and failures in the Battles of Osan in the Korean War and Tora Bora in the Afghan War with respect to doctrine, training, and organization of its commanders and staffs provides a lens to capture lessons learned that the US Army could apply today as it prepares for the first battle of the next war. The processes and material solutions for each of these battles were different, yet it was still commanders, their staffs, and their execution of the philosophy of mission command that contributed to either success or failure.

Case Studies

The Battle of Osan, Task Force Smith

The Battle of Osan and, specifically, the fate of Task Force (TF) Smith echo in military history as how a lack of focus and unpreparedness of combat forces can lead to disaster in the first battle of the next war. Many historians have dissected the causes of the failure of TF Smith while others have touted the individual and collective bravery of those soldiers despite the lack of guidance and direction from higher headquarters. The author’s intent is not to rehash the various points of view that led to the failure of TF Smith, but to accept that the task force was defeated and forced to withdraw due to a variety of external and internal reasons. Instead, the author will examine how investigation into the circumstances that led to the Battle of Osan through the lens of the current US Army’s philosophy of mission command in the frames of doctrine, training, and organization can provide lessons learned to today’s US Army leaders.
In 1972, the Eighth Army staff historian summarized the actions of TF Smith at the Battle of Osan, July 5, 1950, “Near Osan, on the rainy morning of 5 July, the infantry and artillery contingents of Task Force Smith engaged thirty-three Soviet-made T34 tanks and a regiment of North Korean infantry in a bloody six-hour battle. Though hopelessly outnumbered, they acquitted themselves nobly and, before withdrawing to Taejon inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.”\textsuperscript{21} TF Smith, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Charles B. Smith, was a battalion-sized element of 540 soldiers comprised, ad hoc, of infantry, artillery, and support soldiers that deployed to Korea from Japan on July 1, 1950 upon North Korea’s invasion into South Korea.\textsuperscript{22} TF Smith was an ad hoc formation in terms of the haste in which it was formed and deployed. The regimental combat team formations, relationship between infantry, armor, and field artillery formations, following WWII were not ad hoc; however, the specific elements of TF Smith were assembled immediately prior to its deployment. Its ill-fated mission was to serve as a blocking force north of Pusan against advancing North Korean forces and to demonstrate the effectiveness of military action against North Korean forces to the struggling South Korean forces. Upon notification of the rapid deployment on the evening of June 30, 1950, LTC Smith began movement to the airbase at Itazuke, Japan and received his initial mission from his division commander, Major General (MG) William F. Dean, Commander, 24th Infantry Division:

When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon. We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible. Contact General (Brigadier General [BG]) Church (General Headquarters Advance Command and Liaison Group). If you can’t locate him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can. Sorry I can’t give you more information. That’s all I’ve got. Good luck to you, and God bless you and your men.\textsuperscript{23}

Upon arrival to Taejon on the morning of July 1, 1950, LTC Smith found BG Church and received the following additional guidance for his mission. While pointing on a map, BG Church directed LTC Smith,


\textsuperscript{22} Eighth Army Report, ix.

“We have a little action up here. All we need is some men up there who won’t run when they see tanks. We’re going to move you up to support the ROKs (Republic of Korea soldiers) and give them moral support.”

Following reconnaissance of potential defensive positions approximately three miles north of Osan along the main road between Suwon and Osan, LTC Smith and his staff selected their position, mustered and prepared his task force, and deployed to the position to defend.

On the morning of July 5, 1950, the North Korean columns moved south into TF Smith’s position. The armament of the advancing armor columns was impervious to TF Smith’s artillery and recoilless rifle fire and moved through the position continuing south. Following the tanks, North Korean infantry reacted to TF Smith’s mortar, artillery, and machine gun fire by occupying key terrain, thus forcing TF Smith to break contact and withdraw. At the battle’s conclusion, TF Smith suffered one hundred and fifty casualties and the North Korean forces continued their advance south toward Pusan.

Although a seemingly minor engagement in the overall Korean War, the Battle of Osan was the first engagement of ground troops in Korea and was a failure. Many historians have written on the failure of TF Smith with the focus on lack of proper weapons at the battle, poor training of the soldiers prior to the battle, mismanagement of the forces by higher headquarters, lack of support from the government for the endeavor, etc. In sum, accounts generally laud LTC Smith and his task force for performing heroically in the face of overwhelming odds. Most lessons learned focus on providing more information, better equipment, and a more supportive higher headquarters prior to the battle. What lessons can the current US Army learn when examining TF Smith through the lens of the current US Army philosophy of mission command against the frames of doctrine, organization, and training prior to the battle?

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25 Collins, 50-53.

26 Eighth Army Report, ix.

Prior to the Korean War and following World War II (WWII), the capstone US Army doctrinal document was Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, 1949. The FM 100-5 series began prior to World War II as the US Army made a concerted effort to consolidate and formalize its doctrinal basis with the conversion of the variety of field service regulations to field manuals. The US Army published the first FM 100-5, *Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations* in 1939. By 1949, the US Army was on its seventh revision of the original capstone document. FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1949 was the base doctrinal document that addressed leadership and command and control and accounted for the philosophy and system of mission command in today’s US Army parlance, for the Eighth Army, 24th Infantry Division, and TF Smith as the US Army entered the Korean War on July 5, 1950 at the Battle of Osan.

The underpinnings of the current system and philosophy of mission command are evident in chapters 2 and 3 of FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1949. Chapter 3, Section II, FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1949 defines the post WWII doctrinal basis that informed the present day system-principles of mission command, adherence to the mission command principles of ‘create shared understanding,’ ‘provide a clear commander’s intent,’ and ‘use mission orders.’ Chapter 3, Section II, paragraph 112 emphasized the importance of shared understanding and commander’s intent by stating, “Personal conferences between the higher commander and his subordinates who are to execute his orders are advisable so that subordinates may arrive at a correct understanding of the plans and intentions of their superior.” Chapter 3, Section II, paragraph 127 emphasized the importance of mission orders, and subsequently the importance of clarity in the overall intent of the mission, “The commander’s decision for his unit as a whole, and the missions to subordinate units, are communicated to subordinates by clear, concise, and timely orders.” The doctrine did inform LTC Smith and his commanders of the importance of the

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30 Ibid, 27.
system and philosophy-based principles of present day mission command, but did not call for a balance
between the two.

LTC Smith’s higher headquarters, both 24th Infantry Division and, initially, the Advance
Command in Korea, afforded him personal conferences to provide him an understanding of his mission
and the higher headquarters intent of his actions. However, neither provided LTC Smith a clear, concise,
and timely order that could have provided him relevant details concerning enemy strength, potential
resources, or support available to his task force. The author attributes the lack of a detailed order, the gap
in the doctrinal expectation of the system of command, to the haste required of the mission.
Complementing the system of mission command, the philosophy of mission command provides
commanders means to mitigate gaps in the system. FM 100-5, Operations, 1949 addressed the
complementary nature of the system and philosophy of mission command. Despite the lack of a written,
detailed order, all levels of command did apply the concepts of contemporary doctrine in the deployment
and mission for TF Smith.

Chapters 2 and 3, FM 100-5, Operations, 1949, defined the post WWII doctrinal basis of the
present day philosophy of mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust and exercise
disciplined initiative.31 However, FM 100-5, Operations, 1949 does not directly link to the current
mission command philosophy-principle of accepting prudent risk. Chapter 3, paragraph 82 emphasizes
the importance of building teams and exercising initiative, “In the training of the individual soldier, the
essential considerations are to integrate individuals into a group and to establish for that group a high
standard of military conduct and performance of duty without destroying the initiative of the
individual.”32 Paragraph 84 further explains the importance of initiative, “Every individual must be
trained to exploit a situation with energy and boldness and must be imbued with the idea that success will
depend upon his initiative and action.”33 Chapter 4, Section II, paragraph 110 warns against lack of

31 ADRP 6-0, 1-3.
32 FM 100-5, 1949, 17.
initiative, “Nevertheless, a commander of a subordinate unit cannot plead absence of orders as an excuse
for inaction.” 34 At all levels, the commanders demonstrated an understanding of the importance of the
principle of initiative, but did not fully apply the principle of building cohesive teams through mutual
trust. Major Donald L. Barnett explained the difficulty of combined arms training to achieve trust through
prewar training, despite the contemporary regimental combat team task organization, for the US Army
units on occupation duty in Japan in his article, “Breech Blocks Painted Bright Red: Task Force Smith in
Korea”:

A shortage of units, equipment, and personnel was typical of Army units in Japan. Scotty’s [then
First Lieutenant (1LT) Dwain L. Scott, Commander, A Battery, 52d Field Artillery Battery] battery equipment, conditions and training standards were poor because no one could foresee a war that would require ground troops. 35


34 Ibid, 23.

Generals Dean and Church relied upon LTC Smith’s initiative and application of prudent risk in assigning TF Smith its mission prior to deploying TF Smith from its occupation duty in Japan to face the invading North Korean Army. Despite the vague orders that Generals Dean and Church issued LTC Smith, he showed disciplined initiative in his execution of a reconnaissance to establish a sound strongpoint defensive position.\(^{38}\) Influenced by General MacArthur’s assessment of the state of the ROK Army following the fall of Seoul, it appeared that Generals Dean and Church applied the acceptance of prudent risk in ordering TF Smith to defend the route into Osan, “The general (General MacArthur) noted that the Koreans had kept their weapons and ammunition, saluted officers, and smiled and laughed, which he interpreted as good morale, not a bad case of nerves.”\(^{39}\) Based on this assessment, BG Church’s initial

\(^{36}\) ADRP 6-0, 1-3.

\(^{37}\) FM 100-5, 17-20.

\(^{38}\) Flint, Heller and Stofft, 277.
direction to LTC Smith appears feasible, which was the deployment of a small, initial US force to provide a strongpoint defense to augment the ROK Army in order to provide the opportunity to gain time for the deployment of follow on forces. Despite application of the leadership and command and control tenets of pre-Korean War doctrine that aligns with five of six present day principles of mission command, Task Force Smith and its higher headquarters did not build a cohesive team through mutual trust prior to its deployment.

FM 100-5, Operations, 1949 described the importance of training individuals and teams to accomplish the mission, which supports the present day mission command philosophical tenet of building cohesive teams through mutual trust. TF Smith was a composite, ad hoc organization that rarely, collectively trained together and, as a result, could not achieve collective trust within its organization or within Advance Command in Korea prior to execution of its mission. MG Dean acknowledged the ad hoc nature of the task force when he stated that, “No commander likes to commit troops piecemeal, and I’m no exception, but Smith was definitely the man for the job if it had to be done.” 40 The WWII combat experience of many of the senior officers and non-commissioned officers, coupled with the individual and crew training status mitigated MG Dean’s decision to commit TF Smith piecemeal. LTC Perry, 52d Field Artillery Battalion Commander, for TF Smith explained, “We had limited training areas for battalion-size exercises, but the battalion had recently passed its Army Training Test, and the Soldiers were qualified with their weapons. Most of my senior officers and noncoms had combat experience from WWII. 41 TF Smith deployed as two understrength infantry companies (B and C Companies, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry), rocket launcher and machine gun teams (from Battery A, 52nd Field Artillery), some headquarters personnel from 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, and mortar teams from 21st Infantry

39 Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951, They Came from the North (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS, 2010), 131


Regiment Heavy Mortar Company. LTC Smith only commanded the infantry companies and headquarters personnel prior to deployment. Furthermore, the limitations on training areas and focus of the 24th Infantry Division during its occupation duty in Japan made it difficult for 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment to conduct battalion level collective training as a combat team with its prescribed field artillery battery, as per contemporary task organization, which could have mitigated the piecemeal nature of the task force through an established team that had trained together and would fight together at the Battle of Osan. First Lieutenant (1LT) Scott highlighted the limited nature of combat team training in his interview when he said, “We took training trips to Mori [a Japanese weapons firing area] and trained with the 21st Infantry. We probably trained as a combat team twice.”

Dr. Leo J. Daugherty, Command Historian, US Army Cadet Command & Fort Knox, summarized the training deficiencies of the post WWII US Army when he stated, “In short the problem [lack of training readiness] was not due to a failure of basic or advanced individual training, but in the training program instituted by Far Eastern Command or those in Germany to maintain these skills once a Soldier was in theater.”

Following World War II, the Eighth Army was the United States’ occupation army in Japan. It consisted of the 24th, 25th, and 7th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division. Its higher headquarters was the Far East Command, commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. As an occupation army that experienced peace-dividend budget cuts, an American public with little stomach for war, and a massive reduction in force, many criticisms of the Eighth Army argue that it was not focused on training or preparing for the next war. One opinion of the state of readiness of the occupation army follows:

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43 Ibid, 18.


Many of the men were more familiar with beer halls and brothels of the Japanese cities than with the basics of soldiering as one critic later complained, it was a ‘cream puff’ army…if these guys had spent more time on the firing range and less time in the PX snack bar…they might be alive today.46

A private first class of a sister unit in the 24th Infantry Division further explained the training conducted while on occupation duty, “Occupation duty was heaven. I was the troop information and education NCO (non-commissioned officer) at Sagamo Prison, where Japanese war criminals were held. My unit did very little military training.”47 However, this anecdote is misleading as to the state of readiness for all units of the 24th Infantry Division and, specifically, 21st Infantry Regiment.48 Despite these poor reflections on Eighth Army’s, 24th Infantry Division’s, and 21st Infantry Regiment’s training status prior to deployment, not all reports are negative with respect to military training of the occupation army, “Interviews with soldiers stationed in Japan from 1945 to the Korean War started all state that they were training continually. They talk about live fires, road marches, tactical exercises, and evaluated events.”49 Despite this controversy, it is evident that the piecemeal formation, just prior to deployment, of TF Smith did not allow LTC Smith to build a cohesive team through mutual trust that he could have achieved through collective training prior to deployment. The organization of the task force did not account for the philosophy of mission command in the principle of building the cohesive team through training.

In sum, the doctrine that informed TF Smith prior to deployment, FM 100-5, Operations, 1949, did demonstrate the current, system-focused, principles of mission command. However, neither TF Smith nor its higher headquarters accounted for one of the philosophy-focused principles of mission command, the principle of building cohesive teams through mutual trust, in the training or organization of TF Smith prior to deployment. The author does not intend to express that Task Force Smith would have been able to

47 Knox, 8.
49 Ibid.
defeat a North Korean tank column and infantry regiment had it trained together prior to its deployment. Instead, the failure of TF Smith to account for all six principles of present-day mission command philosophy provides a lesson learned for today’s Army leaders. Today’s principles of mission command enlighten both the philosophy and the system to execute. Proper execution of mission command requires a balance in understanding its philosophy and in execution of its systems. Concerning TF Smith, the focus on the systems of mission command outweighed the philosophy of mission command. Application of the principles of mission command in today’s parlance, rooted in FM 100-5, Operations, 1949, was out of balance. The doctrine may inform, but it is incumbent on leaders at all levels to apply and balance application. Colonel William J. Davies, in his examination of the failure of Task Force Smith, summarizes the lesson learned from Task Force Smith, “Thus the basic tenet of train how you will fight was violated.”

The Battle of Wadi al Batin, Task Force 1-5 CAV

In contrast to the failure of the Battle of Osan at the start of the American involvement in the Korean War, the Battle of Wadi al Batin was a great success to start the ground offensive in the Gulf War, 1991. Similar in intent, although not scope or scale, to Operation Fortitude in World War II (WWII), VII Corps Commander Lieutenant General (LTG) Frederick Franks ordered his 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) to conduct an elaborate deception plan along the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait border near Wadi al Batin to deceive the Iraqi Republican Guard as to the true axis of advance for coalition forces. From February 15-20, 1991, 1CD’s execution was a “textbook example of deception” that enabled the success of the start of the ground war. An examination of the circumstances and planning of the deception operation through the

50 Davies, 16.


52 Ibid, 142.
lens of the current principles of mission command and the frames of doctrine, organization, and training demonstrate that commanders at all levels balanced the system and philosophical principles of mission command prior to the battle. This balance can provide lessons learned to present day US Army leaders.

Through a series of synchronized operations, Berm Buster, Red Storm, and Knight Strike, elements of 1CD successfully caused the Iraqi Army to allocate forces against the deception, reveal defense plans, and show the capabilities of Iraqi forces. Operation Berm Buster was a coordinated artillery effort to break paths through the Iraqi Army’s protective berms on the border. Operation Red Storm was a series of coordinated artillery and rotary-wing fires to interdict Iraqi Army defenses. Operation Knight Strike was a reconnaissance-in-force mission across the Iraqi border.\(^{53}\) 1CD’s history sums up the success of the execution, “The enemy responded. Iraqi Divisions focused forces toward the coalition threat in the Wadi, and the First Team froze them. Hussein’s flanks were left thinned, allowing the other Allied Forces to attack virtually unopposed. The deception had worked.”\(^{54}\) 1CD was one of three parts for the overall deception operation that began Operation Desert Storm. The other two parts included a similar series of raids conducted by the I Marine Expeditionary Force and an amphibious assault rehearsal by the US Marine Corps’ amphibious task force.\(^{55}\)

The 1CD deployed to Saudi Arabia as a security force during Operation Desert Shield and was subsequently attached to VII Corps in January 1991 to support Operation Desert Storm. LTG Franks, VII Corps Commander, ordered Major General (MG) John Tilelli, 1CD Commander, “Fix the attention of the Iraqis on them and the Wadi al Batin approach and cover the VII Corps’ movement to its attack positions…Find the enemy and determine his composition, his disposition, and his intent.”\(^{56}\) Individual


\(^{54}\) _____, “The 1st Cavalry Division” (Fort Hood, TX), 8-10, accessed October 11, 2015, http://www.hood.army.mil/1stcavdiv/Documents/1CD_history.pdf.


\(^{56}\) Bourque, 141-143.
accounts from junior leaders demonstrate that the mission was clear, coordinated, and synchronized among all echelons of command from VII Corps to each battalion-sized task force within 1CD. Similar to TF Smith, VII Corps and its subordinate elements were task organized into combined arms task forces (infantry, armor, and field artillery) prior to and during operations in the Gulf War, 1991.

Captains Andy Hoskinson, then a battery commander for C Battery, 3-82 Field Artillery (3-82 FA), and Alan Dover, then a rifle platoon leader for Task Force 1-5 Cavalry (TF 1-5 CAV), in their personal accounts of the actions of 1CD, show the understanding and clarity of the mission at the lowest tactical level. Captain Hoskinson recounted:

Our mission was to conduct an aggressive program of raids, reconnaissance in force, deceptions, and feints one and a half weeks prior to G-day to make the Iraqis think that we were prepping the Wadi Al Batin for the main attack. The desired effect was that the Iraqis would think that the main coalition ground attack would come up the Wadi Al Batin, a natural invasion route, and they would therefore beef up their forces there, at the expense of the Western flank, where VII Corps would conduct the main attack.57

Captain Dover explained, “The Task Force moved to a position north of Hafar Al-Batin to screen the movement of the U.S. Army VII Corps move to the west in preparation for the ground war.”58 Operation Knight Strike I was the culmination of the deception plan as TF 1-5 CAV crossed the border into Iraq, encountered a deliberate defense, fought a high intensity battle for five hours, and withdrew to its original positions in Saudi Arabia with three soldiers killed in action and nine wounded in action. Despite the tactical defeat, the task force had accomplished its mission and “The short battle demonstrated that the Iraqi Army still had plenty of fight and could punish any ill-conceived or poorly executed VII Corps attack.”59 What lessons can the current US Army learn when examining TF 1-5 CAV’s support to 1CD’s

57 Hoskinson, 835-839. G-day was the nomenclature to describe the actual day when the ground war would begin. Until that day was determined, it was referred to as G-day.

58 Alan J. Dover, Operation Knight Strike I, Student Monograph (Department of the Army: Fort Benning, GA, February 20, 1992), 2.

59 Bourque, 146.
deception through the lens of the current US Army philosophy of mission command against the frames of doctrine, organization, and training prior to the battle?

Prior to the Gulf War and following the limited, regional conflicts that marked the Cold War, such as the Vietnam War, the US Army capstone doctrine was Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1986. Although one in a long series of FM 100-5s, the 1986 version was the culmination of the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. In contrast to FM 100-5, Operations, 1949, the 1986 version did not provide the US Army’s fundamentals for leadership in line with the present day concept of mission command. Instead, FM 100-5, Operations, 1986 focused on a descriptive execution of combat in terms of sustainment, offensive, and defensive operations. The US Army’s foundation for leadership in doctrine was FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 1990 prior to the beginning of the Gulf War. Although not the cornerstone document of pre-Gulf War US Army doctrine, as FM 100-5, Operations, was for TF Smith, the fundamental principles of mission command as found in FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 1990 were evident in 1CD’s deception.

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 1990 was a dedicated work to the US Army’s concept of military leadership vice two chapters in the previous discussion of FM 100-5, Operations, 1949. It allows for a direct comparison of the 1990 version of the principles of leadership to the 2012 version of the principles of mission command.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles of Mission Command (2012)(^{60})</th>
<th>Principles of Leadership (1990)(^{61})</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
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| Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust (philosophy) | • Set the Example  
• Know Your Soldiers and Look Out for Their Well-Being  
• Develop a Sense of Responsibility in Your Subordinate  
• Build the Team | FM 22-100 provides ways and the desired end. ADRP 6-0 provides the desired end.                                                          |
| Create a Shared Understanding (system)        | • Keep your Subordinates Informed                                                                               | Both documents provide the desired end.                                                                                                     |
| Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent (system)   | • Ensure the Task is Understood, Supervised, and Accomplished                                                   | FM 22-100 provides the desired end. ADRP 6-0 provides the ways.                                                                             |
| Exercise Disciplined Initiative (philosophy)  | • Seek Responsibility and Take Responsibility for Your Actions                                                 | The loosest correlation, but both documents describe the importance of proactive leadership                                               |
| Use Mission Orders (system)                   | • Employ Your Unit Accordance with its Capabilities                                                              | Both documents require the use of the science of command.                                                                                    |
| Accept Prudent Risk (philosophy)              | • Make Sound and Timely Decisions                                                                               | Both documents require an understanding of the leader in making decisions                                                                   |
|                                              | • Know Yourself and Seek Self Improvement  
• Be Technically and Tactically Proficient                                                                          | No direct correlation to ADRP 6-0’s principles of mission command.                                                                         |

**Figure 3.** Leadership principles compared between 2012 and 1990.


In sum, this comparison shows that the doctrine that informed the US Army that fought the Gulf War in 1991 balanced the science and philosophy of the current principles of mission command. Although terminology is different, the intent of each of the tenets of FM 22-100, 1990, informed the principles of ADRP 6-0, 2012, and show a distinct requirement for leaders to practice the art of team building, initiative, and risk determination through the system of providing understanding and clear intent in an order to their subordinate leaders. An examination of the organization and training of TF 1-5 CAV, ICD, and VII Corps immediately prior to the execution of the deception plan exhibited a balance in the execution of the science and philosophy of the current principles of mission command.

\(^{60}\) ADRP 6-0, 1-3.

The 1CD employed TF 1-5 CAV with the required information, an understanding of the mission, and the capabilities required to complete the mission in keeping with the system principles of leadership as outlined in FM 22-100, Leadership, 1990. Both Captains Hoskinson and Dover explained an understanding of the ends that their execution would accomplish, the ways that they would achieve their mission, and the means at their disposal to execute the ways in their recounts of the deception. FM 22-100, Leadership, 1990 defined the principle of keeping soldiers informed as “American soldiers do best when they know why they are doing something.”62 Both Captains Hoskinson and Dover recounted that their mission was to enable a larger ground offensive for the VII Corps by deceiving the Iraqi Army as to the true axis of advance. Furthermore, FM 22-100, Leadership, 1990 defined the principle of ‘ensure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished’ as “Your Soldiers must understand what you expect from them.”63 Captain Hoskinson summarized his understanding of what was expected of his battery and the other elements of the brigade, “With its feints, raids, and deceptions, the First Cavalry Division (especially the 2nd Blackjack Brigade) kept four Iraqi Divisions tied up in the Wadi Al Batin, and kept the Republican Guard divisions' focus on the Wadi as the main attack route.”64 Finally, FM 22-100, Leadership, 1990 defined the principle of ‘employ one’s unit in accordance with its capabilities’ as “Your soldiers will gain satisfaction from performing tasks that are reasonable and challenging but will be frustrated if tasks are too easy, unrealistic, or unattainable.”65 Captain Dover expressed his satisfaction with his unit’s preparation and performance of its tasks, “In combat, we performed exactly as we trained to do.”66 The organization of 2nd Brigade, 1CD, specifically TF 1-5 CAV, was a capability-based, organized team of armor, infantry, and field artillery that was informed of its mission and understood its

62 FM 22-100, 7.

63 Ibid.

64 Hoskinson, 969-970.

65 FM 22-100, 7.

66 Dover, 5.
task in accordance with the leadership principles of FM 22-100, *Leadership*, 1990. These principles align with the science-focused principles of present day mission command and enabled the success of the deception plan in the Gulf War. In addition, TF 1-5 CAV’s pre-execution training supported the philosophically based, current principles of mission command as expressed in the leadership principles of ‘build the team,’ ‘seek responsibility,’ and ‘make sound and timely decisions.’

The 1CD conducted significant training prior to the execution of the deception plan that enabled VII Corps’ ground offensive in the Gulf War. Upon notification of deployment in August 1990, the training ramp up for the division was comprehensive and focused on individual and collective proficiency that extended into training while defending the of Saudi Arabian border during Operation Desert Shield.67 This training enabled the philosophy-based principles of present day mission command to balance the science-based principles and enable overall success of the mission of TF 1-5 CAV. Examples from the tactical unit level illustrate how leaders ‘built the team,’ ‘confidently sought responsibility,’ and then ‘made sound and timely decisions.’ Captain Dover recounts, “Captain Kirkton’s (commander of A company, 1-5 CAV) pre-deployment training program…ensured that all key leaders knew their SOPs (standard operating procedures)/drills from the beginning and understood exactly what they meant.”68 Captain Hoskinson explained the training conducted at the battalion level while deployed, “We practiced three artillery raids, this time at the battalion level. These were full-scale rehearsals. All three were conducted at night, of course. We learned many valuable lessons.”69 In sum, the mission-oriented training conducted pre-deployment and prior to execution of the deception enabled the leaders to build their teams, inspire confident leaders who actively sought responsibility, and could then make sound decisions in the midst of combat.

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67 “The 1st Cavalry Division,” 8.

68 Dover, 3.

69 Hoskinson, 825-826.
Colonel (COL) Randolph House, commander, 2nd Brigade, 1CD, understood his mission, and despite the tactical failure of TF 1-5 CAV’s raid, was confident in ordering the withdrawal because he understood the operational success of the mission. The ground offensive in the Gulf War began with a deception plan that included TF 1-5 CAV’s raid into the Wadi al-Batin. In contrast to the tactical and operational failure of TF Smith to begin the Korean War, TF 1-5 CAV’s raid, despite tactical failure and subsequent withdrawal back in to Saudi Arabia, was operationally successful and enabled the ground offensive of VII Corps. Its success was facilitated by a balance of employing the science and philosophy-based principles of present day mission command through the frames of pre-execution doctrine, organization, and training.

The leadership doctrine that informed the US Army that fought the Gulf War, although not located in the capstone doctrinal document, FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1986, demonstrated a comprehensive approach to the importance of the science and philosophy of present day mission command. Actions of leaders from the platoon to corps level, in the execution of the deception plan, showed an understanding and application of the principles of leadership from FM 22-100, *Leadership*, 1990. Furthermore, the pre-Gulf War US Army operating concept of AirLand Battle synthesized doctrine that further informed the US Army’s organization and training foundations, which led to TF 1-5 CAV’s operational success in the deception plan. The author does not intend to explain the success of the deception plan as a direct or foundational result of the balance of science and philosophy-based principles of leadership through the frames of doctrine, organization, and training through the lens of present day mission command. However, this balance can provide lessons learned as the present day US Army prepares for the next first battle.

Unlike the unbalanced application of the science- and philosophy-based principles of mission command by the US Army prior to the employment of TF Smith, the US Army employed TF 1-5 CAV

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70 Ibid., 953-954.

(and all echelons in the Gulf War) armed with a doctrine, an organization, and training centered on the concept of AirLand Battle. The Center for Military History’s account of the Gulf War, *The Whirlwind War*, provides a summation of how the balance led to success:

From the Army Staff in the Pentagon to the individual Soldiers in the rifle companies, many strands came together to make up the defense of the Army of Desert Storm. Overall the soldiers preparing for deployment to Saudi Arabia in the late summer of 1990 shared a pervasive confidence in their units, their weapons, and their own capabilities. Their leaders were equally sure that, in the doctrine they had so thoroughly rehearsed, they held the keys to battlefield success.72

The Battle of Tora Bora, CIA Jawbreaker Team and US Special Forces Delta Team

In late 2001, the United States began a war unlike any of its kind since World War II. On September 11, 2001, terrorists used commercial airliners as bombs to attack the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon, and a target unknown as brave American citizens forced the crash of a fourth airliner in a farm field in Pennsylvania. The United States’ response, beginning on October 7, 2001, signaled the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as a direct response to an attack on the United States homeland just as the United States entered World War II (WWII) as a response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In both the Battles of Osan and Wadi al Batin, US military action was a response to aggression against an ally. However, the Battle of Tora Bora was a response to aggression against the United States itself. John Kerry’s report as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee stressed, “The war had been conceived as a swift campaign with a single objective: defeat the Taliban and destroy al Qaeda by capturing or killing [Osama] bin Laden and other key leaders.”73 The war began with the use of air power, graduated to US Special Operations Forces coaching and mentoring existing resistance, the Northern Alliance, in Afghanistan, and culminated in the first battle with US ground forces in the Battle of Tora Bora, December 3-22, 2001. US air power and the Northern Alliance forces achieved tactical success by forcing the Taliban to retreat from Kabul, but the United States

72 Schubert and Kraus, 45.

required ground forces to destroy al Qaeda’s center of gravity, then defined as al Qaeda leadership, in the Tora Bora mountains near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in the effort to achieve the second part of the single objective.  

An examination of the circumstances and planning of the Battle of Tora Bora though the lens of the current principles of mission command and frames of doctrine, organization, and training demonstrate that commanders at all levels did not balance the system and philosophy-based principles of mission command prior to the battle. This imbalance can provide lessons learned for present day US Army leaders.

By November 13, 2001 the Taliban had retreated from Kabul following more than a month of US air strikes and Northern Alliance offensives. The fall of Kabul “cracked open the shield of secrecy that had, up to then, proved the best protection for the al Qaeda chief (Bin Laden).”

Gary Berntsen, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) team code-named Jawbreaker, led the United States’ initial effort to exploit intelligence and hunt al Qaeda leaders, especially bin Laden, to complete the United States’ objective. The resulting intelligence drove the dispatch of various special forces elements throughout Afghanistan to follow up on leads for continued intelligence gathering and directed strikes against al Qaeda leaders. Credible intelligence caused Berntsen to enlist the aid of 5th Special Forces Group Commander, Colonel (COL) John Mulholland. Berntsen explained the request when he said, “‘John,’ I said, ‘I have intel that bin Laden and his men have fled to Jalalabad and plan to give pursuit…I’d like one of your SF [special forces] teams paired with mine to provide extra security because Nangarhar province

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76 Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzulo, *Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander* (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2005), 164-201. The US government was concerned that the international community would perceive US actions following the attacks of 9/11 as a war against Islam or Afghanistan rather than the terrorists that resided in Afghanistan. Therefore, it sought to minimize US troops’ presence in Afghanistan by capitalizing on indigenous forces that would be coached, mentored, and supported by US Special Forces and CIA Operatives.
is in a state of flux.”77 This request and COL Mulholland’s acquiescence initiated the execution of the Battle of Tora Bora. For the remainder of this monograph, Jawbreaker will refer to both the CIA team and the US Special Forces Delta Team.

Berntsen’s objective at the Battle of Tora Bora was to capitalize on speed, take advantage of fresh intelligence, and use available SF and Afghan forces to capitalize on the terrain and initiative to kill or capture bin Laden. He deployed a team of four Americans, called Jawbreaker Team Juliet, to establish an observation point in Tora Bora guided by local Afghans, which came to be known as the Eastern Alliance resistance fighters. Following, COL Mulholland would deploy a US Special Forces Delta Team to coordinate with Eastern Alliance resistance fighters to direct US airstrikes from the north and cover the eastern and western flanks of the mountain range in order to push the al Qaeda forces, and bin Laden, to evacuate south or stay and fight in the mountains. Key to the success of the operation was the deployment of 800 US Army Rangers to seal the southern flank of the mountains so as to deny al Qaeda escape into Pakistan.78

However, the Rangers were never deployed to seal the southern flank of the mountain range and, despite the efforts of US airstrikes and cave-to-cave fighting with the Eastern Alliance resistance forces, many al Qaeda fighters and, presumably, bin Laden escaped. Senator Kerry’s report summarizes the impact of bin Laden’s escape and how it, potentially, led to the violence and continuation of war for the next decade.79 The failure that Senator Kerry defined was not tactical failure; Jawbreaker succeeded in tactically defeating al Qaeda at Tora Bora. In contrast to the tactical failures of TF Smith and TF 1-5 CAV, Jawbreaker and the Eastern Alliance resistance fighters did defeat the al Qaeda fighters. Instead, the failure that Senator Kerry defined was operational and strategic failure. In contrast to 1CD’s operational and strategic success in the deception of the Gulf War, Jawbreaker and the Eastern Alliance

77 Berntsen and Pezzulo, 213.
78 Barzilai, 89-90.
79 Kerry, 1.
resistance fighters did not complete the second part of the United States’ singular objective in Afghanistan, to kill or capture bin Laden. What lessons can the current US Army learn when examining the Battle of Tora Bora through the lens of the current US Army philosophy of mission command against the frames of doctrine, organization, and training prior to the battle?

During the 1990s, as the international community adjusted to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the hegemony of the United States. The US Army, as the world’s leading military, reflected on its doctrine and adjusted its focus from perpetual readiness to face the Soviet threat to preparedness “across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict.” The US Army’s capstone doctrinal document was FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2001, which was published in June 2001. It reflected a new nomenclature/numbering system, but extended the FM 100-5 series in concept. Also, it retained the FM 100-5 series’ focus on a descriptive execution of warfighting with some examination of basic fundamentals of leadership and a reference to the US Army’s primary doctrine for leadership, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, August 1999. Although not the cornerstone document of pre-Afghan War US Army doctrine, the fundamental principles of FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, 1999 provides points to examine Jawbreaker’s execution at the Battle of Tora Bora.

FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, 1999 was the direct descendent of FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, 1990 and introduced the “Be, Know, Do” slogan/principles of the US Army leadership of the 1990s and early 2000s. Similarly to its 1990 version, it allows for comparison to the 2012 version of the principles of mission command.

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<tr>
<th>Principles of Mission Command (2012)(^{82})</th>
<th>Principles of Leadership (1999)(^{83})</th>
<th>Principles of Leadership (1990)(^{84})</th>
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| Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust (philosophy) | • Know (Interpersonal)  
• Do (Improving) | • Set the Example  
• Know Your Soldiers and Look Out for Their Well-Being  
• Develop a Sense of Responsibility in Your Subordinate  
• Build the Team |
| Create a Shared Understanding (system) | • Know (Technical)  
• Know (Tactical)  
• Do (Influencing) | • Keep your Subordinates Informed |
| Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent (system) | • Know (Technical)  
• Know (Tactical)  
• Do (Communicating) | • Ensure the Task is Understood, Supervised, and Accomplished |
| Exercise Disciplined Initiative (philosophy) | • Be (Personal Courage)  
• Know (Conceptual)  
• Do (Influencing) | • Seek Responsibility and Take Responsibility for Your Actions |
| Use Mission Orders (system) | • Be (Duty)  
• Know (Technical)  
• Know (Tactical)  
• Do (Operating) | • Employ Your Unit Accordance with its Capabilities |
| Accept Prudent Risk (philosophy) | • Be (Personal Courage)  
• Be (Selfless Service)  
• Know (Conceptual)  
• Do (Influencing)  
• Do (Operating) | • Make Sound and Timely Decisions  
• Know Yourself and Seek Self Improvement  
• Be Technically and Tactically Proficient |

Figure 4. Leadership principles compared between 2012, 1999, and 1990.

Source: Data adapted from ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 2014; FM 22-100, Army Leadership, 1999; and FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 1990.

Despite the author’s attempt to categorize the principles of “Be, Know, Do” into the framework of the principles of mission command, the categorization is loose and does not neatly align with categorization of the philosophy and system of mission command. In sum, this comparison shows that the doctrine that informed the US Army that fought the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 did provide principles, but not the requirement to balance between the science and philosophy of the current

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\(^{82}\) ADRP 6-0, 1-3.

\(^{83}\) FM 22-100, 1999, 2-2 to 2-28.

\(^{84}\) FM 22-100, 1990, 5.
principles of mission command. Following, an examination of the organization and training of the US forces prior to the Battle of Tora Bora showed an imbalance in the application of the science and philosophy of the current principles of mission command.

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was formed on January 1, 1983 with the geographic responsibility for Afghanistan, among other countries. Commanded by General Tommy Franks, it was the highest level of military command for the OEF theater above the Jawbreaker team that executed the Battle of Tora Bora. The command and commander were located at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida during the preparation and execution of the battle. Furthermore, it was the decision-making authority for strategic, operational, and even some tactical level decisions during the battle. However, the chain of command for decision-making at the Battle of Tora Bora was convoluted. Hank Crumpton, Bernten’s supervisor at the CIA recalls speaking to Bernten daily and to the specific request for additional troops to seal the mountains. In his article, “The Account of How We Nearly Caught Osama bin Laden in 2001,” Peter Bergen explained how General Franks influenced tactical and operational level decisions for the battle when he stated,

Yet when Crumpton called General Tommy Franks to as for more troops, Franks pushed back. The general, who had overall control of the Tora Bora operation, pointed out that the light-footprint approach—U.S. reliance on local proxies—had already succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban, and he argued it would take time to get more U.S. troops to Tora Bora.

The organization of the forces that executed the Battle of Tora Bora highlighted the inability to balance the science and philosophy of the current principles of mission command. Bernten’s request for additional troops to seal the southern end of the Tora Bora mountains to prevent Bin Laden’s escape provides an example of the imbalance. The operating concept that drove execution at Tora Bora was to


86 Kerry, 8.

minimize the presence of US troops, maximize the impact of air power, and enable local fighters for the majority of the ground fighting under US SF and CIA operatives’ direction. Senator Kerry’s report summarized the issue:

The decision not to deploy American forces to go after bin Laden or block his escape was made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, the architects of the unconventional Afghan battle plan known as Operation Enduring Freedom. Rumsfeld said at the time that he was concerned that too many U.S. troops in Afghanistan would create an anti-American backlash and fuel a widespread insurgency. Reversing the recent American military orthodoxy known as the Powell Doctrine, the Afghan model emphasized minimizing the U.S. presence by relying on small, highly mobile teams of special operations troops and CIA paramilitary operatives working with the Afghan opposition. Even when his own commanders and senior intelligence officials in Afghanistan and Washington argued for dispatching more U.S. troops, Franks refused to deviate from the plan.88

First, when decision-making authority on how to apply available force is withheld by levels that are not physically present in the theater, the commander on the ground is not able to ‘operate’ in accordance with FM 22-100, 1999 or ‘exercise disciplined initiative’ in accordance with the current principles of mission command. In addition, the potentially disparate execution of small teams of special operations troops and CIA paramilitary operatives does not facilitate ‘improving’ in accordance with FM 22-100, 1999 version or ‘build cohesive teams through mutual trust’ in accordance with the current principles of mission command. The organization of the forces that executed the Battle of Tora Bora was proficient in the science of leadership at the technical and tactical levels. However, it did not balance that expertise with the philosophical principles of leadership present in the ‘Be, Know, Do” principles of US Army Leadership nor its correlation to current principles of mission command. As a result, the pre-execution training of the forces demonstrated an imbalance in the science and philosophy of mission command and, despite tactical success, did not result in operational success.

Dalton Fury, pseudonym of the US Army SF team commander that led the tactical execution of the ground troops at the Battle of Tora Bora, explained the level of training and preparedness of his element in his recount of the actions of his team on the morning of September 11, 2001 just prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center:

88 Kerry, 2.
We awoke inside a large white and yellow striped circus tent on September 11, 2001, our Delta squadron having been deployed to a foreign country to sharpen our joint war-fighting skills. It would be another day of prepping our equipment for the upcoming mission, scrubbing vehicle and helicopter loads, reviewing contingency plans and scouting and studying intelligence reports and recent satellite photos. A few discreet operators, trained in the delicate skill of close urban reconnaissance, were already in place near the target area. To help us refine the assault plan they would send back to us via small satellite radios digital photos of key breach points—roofs, doors, and windows. In different corners of the tent, the staff sergeants and sergeants first class were talking about the type of explosive charges needed for this door or that window. That practice mission remains classified, but the real mission might certainly happen within the next few years. Typically, once these training exercises are complete, they are put “on the shelf,” filed away but ready to roll in an emergency. Should some terrorist organization or criminal gang execute their end of the action at that site, Delta would trigger a response that had already been planned down to the last detail.89

For the US Army SF operators, these types of missions were planned, coordinated, and rehearsed to the finite detail. In contrast, the pre-deployment training of the CIA Jawbreaker team, although equal in technical expertise and competence, was more ad hoc. Gary Berntsen, initially the deputy commander and then commander of the team that led the operational execution of the Battle of Tora Bora, was notified of the deployment to Afghanistan on the day of the flight, met his team at the terminal while awaiting the flight, and learned the specifics of the operating environment while on a seven hour drive into Afghanistan.90 General Franks briefed the plan to achieve the objectives of actions in Afghanistan on September 20, 2001 to the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, and General Richard Myers, incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs of Staff. Jawbreaker was already forward deployed, which did not leave time for combined training or shared understanding. Despite each element being individually, tactically, and technically proficient, the combined Jawbreaker team was neither able to build cohesion through mutual trust nor create a shared understanding; the combined team was not able to achieve the “do” in the contemporary leadership doctrine.

90 Berntsen, 44-47.
The ground war in OEF began with the Battle of Tora Bora that pitted a CIA paramilitary operative team, a special operations team, and Afghan allies against al Qaeda forces in the mountain range that separated Afghanistan from Pakistan. The small units’ missions were to kill or capture al Qaeda leadership. The combined force was able to clear the mountains of al Qaeda fighters, but did not kill or capture bin Laden. It had tactical, but not operational or strategic, success. The disparity between the tactical success and operational and strategic failure highlighted the imbalance of the science and philosophy of mission command through the frames of contemporary doctrine, organization of the forces, and pre-execution training.

The leadership doctrine that informed the US Army that fought the Battle of Tora Bora, although not located in the capstone document, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2001, did provide an approach that accounted for the science and philosophy of mission command through the “Be, Know, Do” construct. However, despite doctrinal description, USCENTCOM leadership did not balance the science and philosophy in the organization and training of the forces prior to execution. The team, consisting of US Army special operators and CIA paramilitary operatives did not build a comprehensive team through shared trust prior to execution, never achieved shared understanding, and were not afforded the opportunity to exercise disciplined initiative. Similar to the imbalanced application of the science and philosophy-based principles of mission command by the US Army prior to the employment of TF Smith, and in contrast to the balanced application prior to the employment of TF 1-5 CAV, the US Army employed special operations forces and CIA paramilitary operatives at the Battle of Tora Bora out of balance with respect to the current principles of mission command. Senator Kerry’s report showed how, despite tactical success, the battle was an operational and strategic failure that led to years and years of war when it stated, “The failure to finish the job represents a lost opportunity that forever altered the course of the conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism, leaving the American people more
vulnerable to terrorism, laying the foundation for today’s protracted Afghan insurgency and inflaming the internal strife now endangering Pakistan.”

Analysis

The 2013 Army Mission Command Strategy explained the importance of mission command and the means and ways to achieve the ends of the strategy by stating, “The path to successful unified land operations in support of the joint force is Army-wide understanding and effective practice of the Mission Command philosophy executed through the Mission Command warfighting function.” The author asserts that the previous examination and analysis of three first battles provides current US Army leaders lessons learned in support of this strategy. The path to effective mission command is more than practice of philosophy through the warfighting function and must include a balance of the commanders’ practice of the philosophy and the commanders’ and staffs’ execution of the warfighting function (system). The US Army has indicated the importance of this balance in one of the recommendations to address problem #3 of Army Warfighting Challenge #19: “Doctrine and Training Change. Include MC [mission command] implications in all DOTMLPF [doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities] considerations to ensure a meaningful balance between the art [philosophy] and science [system] of MC.” The examination of the Battles of Osan (TF Smith), Wadi al Batin (TF 1-5 CAV), and Tora Bora (Jawbreaker team) through the frames of doctrine, organization, and training against the lens of the philosophy and system of mission command provides tangible support to the importance of balance in the US Army’s current understanding and application of mission command.

Whether the contemporary US Army doctrine attempts to capture the lessons learned from a previous world war, account for an existential threat, or maintain US military dominance, the principles of

91 Kerry, 1.


leadership, although different in terminology through iterations of doctrine, demonstrated certain consistencies from the Korean War to the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. The consistencies are that the principles of leadership from 1949 to 1999 aligned against a dichotomy in the art (philosophy) and science (system) framework that placed the onus of the art on the leader and provided the science for the leader to ensure his or her subordinate leaders are able to understand their role in mission completion.

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<td>Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust (philosophy)</td>
<td>• Know (Interpersonal)</td>
<td>• Set the Example</td>
<td>• Integrate Individuals into a Group</td>
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<td>• Do (Improving)</td>
<td>• Know Your Soldiers and Look Out for Their Well-Being</td>
<td>• Unit Cohesion</td>
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<td>• Develop a Sense of Responsibility in Your Subordinate</td>
<td>• Mutual Confidence</td>
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<td>• Build the Team</td>
<td>• Unselfish Cooperation</td>
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<td>Create a Shared Understanding (system)</td>
<td>• Know (Technical/Tactical)</td>
<td>• Keep your Subordinates Informed</td>
<td>• Independence from assigned mission must conform to general plan</td>
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<td>• Do (Influencing)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent (system)</td>
<td>• Know (Technical/Tactical)</td>
<td>• Ensure the Task is Understood, Supervised, and Accomplished</td>
<td>• Influence and Direct People to an Assigned Goal</td>
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<td>• Do (Communicating)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exercise Disciplined Initiative (philosophy)</td>
<td>• Be (Personal Courage)</td>
<td>• Seek Responsibility and Take Responsibility for Your Actions</td>
<td>• Be Trained to Exploit a Situation</td>
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<td>• Know (Conceptual)</td>
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<td>• Self-Reliant in Decision Making</td>
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<td>• Do (Influencing)</td>
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<td>• Bold and Determined</td>
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<td>• Will to Fight</td>
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<td>Use Mission Orders (system)</td>
<td>• Be (Duty)</td>
<td>• Employ Your Unit Accordance with its Capabilities</td>
<td>• Receive and disseminate orders</td>
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<td>• Know (Technical/Tactical)</td>
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<td>• Do (Operating)</td>
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<td>Accept Prudent Risk (philosophy)</td>
<td>• Be (Personal Courage/Selfless Service)</td>
<td>• Make Sound and Timely Decisions</td>
<td>• Avoid Subjecting Troops to Useless Hardship and Danger</td>
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<td>• Know (Conceptual)</td>
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<td>• Do (Influencing/Operating)</td>
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<td>• Know Yourself and Seek Self Improvement</td>
<td>• Be Physically Qualified</td>
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<td>• Be Technically and Tactically Proficient</td>
<td>• Prompt Recognition for Services Well Done</td>
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<td>• Training and Discipline</td>
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Figure 5. Leadership principles compared between 2012, 1999, 1990, and 1949.

Source: Data adapted from ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 2012; FM 22-100, Army Leadership, 1999; and FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 1990; FM 100-5, Operations, 1949.

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94 ADRP 6-0, 1-3.
95 FM 22-100, 1999, 2-2 to 2-28.
96 FM 22-100, 1990), 5.
97 FM 100-5, 17-20.
FM 100-5, *Operations*, 1949, the capstone doctrinal document prior to the Korean War, informed all echelons involved in the Battle of Osan of the philosophy and system of present day mission command. FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, 1990, although not the capstone doctrinal document, informed all echelons involved in the Battle of Wadi al Batin of the philosophy and system of present day mission command. FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, 1999, again not the capstone doctrinal document, informed all echelons involved in the Battle of Tora Bora of the philosophy and system of present day mission command. However, none of this doctrine specified, outlined, or described the importance of balance between the individual principles to include ADP or ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*. Problem #3 of AWFC #19 correctly identifies the requirement to balance the philosophy (art) and system (science) of mission command.\(^98\) Despite being doctrinally informed, the units involved in the Battles of Osan, Wadi al Batin, and Tora Bora executed different balances of the philosophy and system of current mission command as demonstrated in their organization and training.

Each of the three first battles were a response to the aggression of an enemy rather than an unprovoked action by the United States. TF Smith was the initial tactical unit to respond to the aggression of the North Koreans against the South Koreans. TF 1-5 CAV was the initial tactical unit to respond to the aggression of the Iraqi Army against Kuwait. The Jawbreaker team was the initial tactical unit to respond to the aggression of al Qaeda in its attacks on the United States. Despite the similarity, the organization of the elements differed when viewed through the lens of the philosophy and system of mission command. TF Smith was an ad hoc, combined arms (infantry and field artillery) organization that was task-organized upon receipt of the mission to deploy to Korea just days prior to the battle and consisted of occupational troops that were “ill-suited for battle.”\(^99\) TF 1-5 CAV, similarly, was a combined arms (mechanized infantry, armor, and field artillery) organization, but enjoyed months of individual and collective training prior to deployment that continued upon arrival into theater prior to the

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\(^{98}\) Army Warfighting Challenges, November 2015.

The Jawbreaker team consisted of elite individuals and teams, but again, was an ad hoc organization that was task organized in theater just prior to the battle. As doctrine informed each element in accordance with the current principles of mission command, and each unit was task organized ad hoc as a response to an aggressor, the training of each unit prior to its battle resulted in the balance or imbalance of the philosophy and system of current mission command.

Problem #3 of AWFC #19 is “Develop, integrate, and evaluate mission training and education solutions for use across the institutional, operational, and self-development domains.” Following, there are five recommended solutions and one of which is a doctrine and training change to “include mission command implications in all DOTMLPF considerations to ensure a meaningful balance between the art and science of mission command.” The case studies in this analysis provide two examples of imbalance, one example of balance, and the resulting failures or success of each of the first battles of the wars. There are many other factors and conditions for each first battle that other authors have examined for their failure or success, and this author does not intend this work to claim that balancing the philosophy and system of mission command would have changed history. The history and balance, however, does provide lessons learned to current US Army leaders as it prepares for the next first battle.

Of the three case studies, the US Army demonstrated the most balance between the philosophy and system of mission command prior to the Battle of Wadi al Batin. Leaders at all levels applied the leadership principles of 1990 US Army doctrine that further the foundation of the current philosophy-based principles of mission command. From the battalion to corps level, the commanders built cohesive teams through mutual trust in mission-focused individual and collective training prior to deployment and upon arrival to theater. Commanders demonstrated disciplined initiative through decision-making at all levels.

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100 Hoskinson, 206.

101 Berntsen and Pezzulo, 47-44.

102 Army Warfighting Challenges, November 2015.

103 Ibid.
levels. Commanders applied prudent risk in the arrangement of actions in time, space, and purpose from
the development of the “left hook” maneuver to the application of raid forces against an entrenched,
defending enemy. 105 Similarly, leaders at all levels applied the leadership principles of 1990 US Army
document that advance the foundation for the current system-based principles of mission command. The
US Army used mission orders to express clear commander’s intent and create shared understanding from
corps to platoon level. 106 Ultimately, the tactical actions of TF 1-5 CAV failed as they were not able to
defeat the entrenched Iraqi Force, but the deception enabled the operational and strategic success of US
Forces in the Gulf War, 1991. In contrast, TF Smith and the Jawbreaker team did not balance the current
principles of mission command.

Critics of this assessment could point to the impact of the amount of preparation time for each of
the units involved in each of these first three battles. TF Smith deployed just two days prior to the Battle
of Osan, which was intended to be an immediate response to an existential threat to the Republic of
Korea. TF 1-5 CAV trained together five months prior to deployment and in the weeks prior to the battle
while in theater as the Iraqi forces completed their invasion of Kuwait and had settled into an established
defensive posture. The Jawbreaker team coalesced at the commencement of the Battle of Tora Bora,
which was executed in haste to prevent the escape of al Qaeda leaders to include bin Laden. Although the
time afforded to TF 1-5 CAV, no doubt, enabled its leadership to balance the philosophy and system of
present day mission command, this author asserts that the time to prepare is now before an existential
threat attacks an ally or the United States. The team should be built, the leaders should be trained, and the
systems should be in place to enable leaders to demonstrate initiative and ensure shared understanding so
that the US Army demonstrates agility and adaptability regardless of the conditions of the next first battle.

104 Bourque, 103-113.
105 Hoskinson, 953-954.
106 Ibid., 969-970.
The framework is present in current doctrine and current leadership. Focus is required to prepare today’s leaders.

Current US Army leaders, in the absence of omniscience concerning the details of the next first battle, can “buy time” to enhance the capacity of its force with respect to the balance of mission command by applying its tenets during this current interwar period. The current doctrine calls for the balance and proposed solutions acknowledge the requirement to balance. Now, the US Army needs to train and organize to achieve the balance. Leaders must grant their subordinate leaders the opportunity to build cohesive teams, exercise disciplined initiative, and accept prudent risk in all garrison activities. Leaders must provide their subordinate leaders mission orders that establish clear intent and increase shared understanding. US Army actions in garrison should not resort to tasking memoranda, canned qualification ranges, and ‘checking the block’ task lists. Instead, a leader should enforce the principles of mission command in every activity he or she requires of his or her subordinate leaders. These behaviors will translate to the performance of the force in the next first battle and enable that force to perform better under any conditions.

At the Battle of Osan, TF Smith was soundly defeated by an advancing North Korean armored column, which set the conditions for a protracted war that to this date has not officially ended. At the Battle of Tora Bora, the Jawbreaker team failed to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden, which set the conditions for another protracted war that also has not ended. The elements of command and control or mission command (in today’s parlance) examined in this monograph, although doctrinally informed, did not balance the philosophy and system of mission command. TF Smith was not able to build cohesive teams internally or externally, did have shared understanding, albeit uncertain, from its higher headquarters, and did not receive a mission order prior to the battle. The Jawbreaker team did not build a cohesive team prior to the battle (especially with the Alliance forces), was not able to exercise prudent risk in the use of the US Army Ranger element to seal the southern end of the mountains, and never fully shared understanding of the willingness of USCENTCOM leaders to apply force at Tora Bora. It is too much to profess that a balance of the current mission command principles would have changed the
outcomes of either of these battles, but the US Army that fought the Battle of Wadi al Batin did balance the philosophy and system of present day mission command and this provides a lesson learned to current US Army leaders.

The current estimate of AWFC #19 explains the need for balance that was not present just months ago. The author began this examination with a desire to support the US Army’s ongoing discourse in addressing the challenges the current US Army faces as the War in Iraq has closed, the War in Afghanistan is coming to a close, and the United States faces threats across the spectrum from conventional to hybrid to terrorist. The initial intent was to enhance development of the mission command challenge in a time when information technology far exceeds systems and material solutions available to the US Army. The lessons learned emerge from improved doctrinal, organizational, and training agility in the current US Army as opposed to the relative rigidity of material, leadership, personnel, and facilities change. In July 2105, the estimate of AWFC #19 included just six defined challenges while five of seven recommendations were material based. Since beginning this monograph, the estimate of AWFC #19 now includes the importance of doctrine and training changes to balance the art and science of mission command in execution. It has expanded to fifteen total problems with thirteen recommended solutions being material based, while twenty-one recommended solutions are a mixture of doctrinal, training, policy, leadership, and organization based. This monograph now supports this expansion using historical case study to demonstrate how an imbalanced application of the current principles of mission command prior to the first battle of the next war will, most likely, not lead to success in that next, first battle. While material solutions facilitate the system of mission command, US Army leaders require doctrine that informs, organization that enables, and training that prepares US Forces to demonstrate agility through the balance of the philosophy and system of mission command, regardless of the material available, to succeed in the next first battle.

107 Army Warfighting Challenges, November 2015.
Conclusion

In the final chapter of Heller and Stofft’s *America’s First Battles: 1776-1965*, John Shy concludes the book by identifying that first battles are peculiar and there are four groupings of problems that emerge in examination of the first battles of the United States’ ten major wars: weakness of command and control, doctrine and preconceptions, politics, and preparedness (readiness) of the force.\(^\text{108}\) In his monograph, *The Challenges of Adopting a Culture of Mission Command in the US Army*, LTC James W. Wright explored the challenges of adopting mission command in the present-day US Army. His central conclusion was that cultural barriers within the US Army prohibit acceptance and adoption of the principles of mission command within the current US Army.\(^\text{109}\) However, this author believes that the principles of mission command have been present in doctrine since, at least, 1949 and have been executed in the first battles examined in this case study. This monograph does not explain the US Army’s failure or success in the case studies as a result of the balance of current mission command’s philosophy and system principles alone, nor extoll the virtues or embodiment of mission command in the present-day US Army. The author accepts that, in General Martin Dempsey’s words, “Our need to pursue, instill, and foster mission command is critical to our future success in defending our nation in an increasingly complex and uncertain operating environment.”\(^\text{110}\) Further, the author accepts that there are a myriad of factors and conditions that lead to success of failure in any military engagement. Since mission command is ‘critical’ and first battles are ‘peculiar,’ the author prescribes that exploration and the development of mission command in US Army doctrine, organization, and training of US forces now, prior to the next first battle, will enable success in that next first battle.\(^\text{111}\) Examination of the Battles of Osan, Wadi al Batin, and Tora

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\(^{108}\) Shy, 329-342.


Bora demonstrated that when the US Army effectively balanced the philosophical and systemic principles of present day mission command, such as during the Battle of Wadi al Batin, the result of the battle supported operational and/or strategic success for US forces regardless of tactical success or failure.

The US Army understands the importance of this balance. In AWFC #19, problem #3, a recommended solution includes doctrine and training change to “ensure a meaningful balance between the art and science of MC [mission command].”\(^\text{112}\) However, this recommended solution is a relatively recent addition. When the author began this analysis, the recommended solutions to AWFC #19 were primarily material changes that focused on the system principles of present-day mission command.\(^\text{113}\) Material solutions are difficult to implement in peacetime due to the peace-dividend that reduces resources and funding available to the military, see Figure 6. Since withdrawal from Iraq, the inclusion of doctrinal and training changes to address the required balance of the philosophy and system of mission command is essential and will lead to organization changes to support the balance. The three case studies help to support this assertion. The ill-fated TF Smith was an ad hoc organization that, despite then-contemporary leadership doctrine which underscored the foundations of mission command, failed to balance the philosophy and system of mission command in its training and organization prior to the Battle of Osan. Despite tactical failure, TF 1-5 CAV, effectively balanced the philosophy and system of mission command at the Battle of Wadi al Batin and supported the United States success in the Gulf War’s overall deception plan. Although tactically successful at the Battle of Tora Bora, the Jawbreaker team showed an imbalance in the philosophy and system of mission command and allowed Osama bin Laden to escape, thus leading to operational and strategic failure of the battle.

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\(^{111}\) The author intentionally mirrors the descriptive words, critical and prescriptive, used by GEN Dempsey and John Shy in their descriptions of mission command and first battles, respectively.

\(^{112}\) Army Warfighting Challenges, November 2015.

\(^{113}\) Army Warfighting Challenges, August 2015.
LTC Wright argued, “despite a pervasive communications program and significant emphasis by senior leadership, legitimate questions remain about whether or not the basic premises of mission command are embedding into the institutional culture of the US Army.”114 This author demonstrated that the foundations of present-day mission command were present in doctrine at least as early as FM 100-5, Operations, 1949, informed the pre-battle organization and training of TF Smith, TF 1-5 CAV, and the Jawbreaker team, and have evolved to incorporate the unique culture of the US Army. The current principles of mission command are descendant from the German concept of Aufragstatik, but with a distinctly American interpretation that has been present in US Army doctrine for decades and evolved over time, see Figure 7.115 Following, the pre-battle doctrine of each case study in this monograph provided each of the US Forces the doctrinal basis to balance the philosophy and system of present day

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114 Wright, 1.

115 Wright, 2. LTC Wright explained that the German concept of Aufragstatik emerged because of the distinct culture of the German people and that the US Army has not quite institutionalized this concept due to “internal organizational tensions” and “challenging and unique environmental pressures.”
mission command in pre-battle organization and training. The lack of balance prior to the battle provides current US Army leaders lessons learned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles of Mission Command (2012)</th>
<th>Principles of Auftragstaktik (German AR 100/100)</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust (philosophy)</td>
<td>• Mutual Trust • Soldiers’ Unwavering Commitment</td>
<td>Near direct linkage between the two philosophies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a Shared Understanding (system)</td>
<td>• Informs What His Intentions Are</td>
<td>ADRP 6-0 takes the next step to not just informing, but ensuring the information is shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent (system)</td>
<td>• Informs What His Intentions Are • Sets Clear Objectives</td>
<td>Near direct linkage between the two philosophies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Disciplined Initiative (philosophy)</td>
<td>• Gives Latitude to Subordinate Leaders</td>
<td>ADRP 6-0 places the onus on the leader, Auftragstaktik places the onus on the leader to enable the initiative of subordinate leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use Mission Orders (system)</td>
<td>• Provides Details Only When Measures Have Been Harmonized</td>
<td>ADRP 6-0 is more prescriptive and defines what a mission order is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept Prudent Risk (philosophy)</td>
<td>• Provides Required Forces and Resources</td>
<td>Auftragstaktik provides the means, ADRP 6-0 provides the ends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Comparison of Principles of Mission Command and Auftragstaktik

Source: Data adapted from ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 2014 and LTC Wright’s Monograph.

The current US Army continues to face the same problems that Shy summarized and remain out of the US Army’s control. Of the four emergent problems that Shy identified, the US Army can only control its doctrine and preconceptions. Shy explained, “Virtually every case study emphasizes the lack of realistic large scale operational exercises before the first battle, exercises that might have taught commanders and staffs the hard practical side of their wartime business as even the most basic training introduces to the soldier at the small-unit level.”118 The author does not assert that large-scale exercises are not beneficial to unit command and control capabilities, but the next first battle will likely not allow for the time to conduct these large exercise due to the immediacy of response, initiative of the future enemy, or type of battle in the current, complex operating environment. Although prior to the Battle of Wadi al Batin the US Army did enjoy time for training, this was because of the posture of the Iraqi forces. Future first battles may not provide this time. In addition, the US Army cannot predict or account for the

116 ADRP 6-0, 1-3.

117 FM 100-5, 17-20.

118 Shy, 329.
politics surrounding the next first battle. For example, in the ongoing fight against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the United States could not have predicted the complexity of international relations and politics following Russian air strikes in retaliation for an ISIL attack against a Russian civilian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula. Finally, current US Army leaders, although they provide input to civilian leaders for funding and resources and monitor readiness status, must fight the next first battle with the force available regardless of readiness and preparedness. Current US congressional budgeting drives resources that influence maintenance levels, training opportunities, and personnel readiness for the US Army, see Figure 6. US Army leaders must be prepared to fight with what they have. However, the US Army does control its doctrine and can directly influence the preconceptions of the force.

The emergent problem that Shy extrapolated from the analysis of the ten first battles is that “doctrine is so often in flux or dispute that we must accept the condition as normal. When doctrine lacks clarity or credibility, soldiers at every level will fall back on other notions of warfare, whatever their source—prior experience, film images, even childish fantasies.”119 As this author has demonstrated, only for Operation Desert Storm did the doctrine that informed the forces provide the model for the execution of the first battle. Mission command can fill the gaps and seams between evolving doctrine and the preconceptions of soldiers if US Army leaders organize and train, as recommended in AWFC #19, to seek a balance between the philosophy and art of mission command. Although current US Army leaders cannot predict the time, location, or enemy of the next first battle, cannot predict the political environment of the next fight, cannot ensure optimal readiness or preparedness, and cannot provide large scale combat training events to all of its commanders and staffs, current US Army leaders can instill the importance of balancing the philosophy and system—art and science—of mission command in its leaders. US Army leaders must arrive to the next first battle with cohesive teams, built through mutual trust that are led by leaders who have the confidence to exercise disciplined initiative, and informed by an understanding of prudent risk. US Army leaders must focus, now with the time available, to improve training,

119 Shy, 332.
understanding, and application of the system-principles of mission command to increase the shared understanding of the team of teams in the next fight that will operate from mission orders and clear commander’s intent.
Bibliography


