Trust and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team

A Monograph

by

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2016

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This monograph is a case analysis of the current US Army leadership doctrine for building and maintaining trust, using the 442nd Regimental Combat Team means of evaluation. The 442nd Regimental Combat Team was a segregated organization comprised of Japanese-Americans from Hawaii and internment camps across the mid-west during World War II. The 442nd Regimental Combat Team provides a unique opportunity to explore trust-building measures in a situation where the United States, as a whole, destroyed trust between the United States and Japanese-Americans. The monograph assesses four key leaders who were responsible for executing internment and commanding Japanese-American forces. By building trust at the tactical and direct leadership level, key 442nd Regimental Combat Team leaders helped Japanese-Americans soldiers overcome larger societal and military lapses in trust and become an effective organization. The monograph closes by discussing emergent themes from the analysis that future leaders should consider when applying or evaluating the abilities of others to the build trust.
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Abstract

Trust and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, by MAJ Shigenobu T. Morinaga, 47 pages.

This monograph is a case analysis of the current US Army leadership doctrine for building and maintaining trust, using the 442nd Regimental Combat Team as the means of evaluation. The 442nd Regimental Combat Team was a segregated organization comprised of Japanese-Americans from Hawaii and internment camps across the mid-west during World War II. The 442nd Regimental Combat Team provides a unique opportunity to explore trust-building measures in a situation where the United States, as a whole, destroyed trust between the United States and Japanese-Americans. The monograph assesses four key leaders who were responsible for executing internment and commanding Japanese-American forces. By building trust at the tactical and direct leadership level, key 442nd Regimental Combat Team leaders helped Japanese-Americans soldiers overcome larger societal and military lapses in trust and become an effective organization. The monograph closes by discussing emergent themes from the analysis that future leaders should consider when applying or evaluating the abilities of others to the build trust.
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Introduction

...Leadership is the acceptance of responsibility for an outcome...I think trust is probably the most—the single most important quality to develop...it’s one of those words, that as you unpack it, it begins to have more meaning...if you ever decide that you’ve got the definition about right, then you’re wrong because it’s something that requires constant study and constant work.

— General Martin E. Dempsey, Pentagon Channel Interview on Leadership

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, the United States took reactive measures to prevent another attack. One of the many concerns for policy makers and military leaders was a substantial concentration of Japanese immigrants (Issei) and American born descendants in Hawaii and the western United States. However, US policy makers and military leaders disagreed on how to determine Nikkei (Japanese diaspora, which includes Japanese immigrants and Japanese-American citizens) loyalty. However, determining who was loyal, or if it was even possible, became a problem for political and military leaders. Rushed into a decision before fully understanding the problem, US political and military leaders decided that full-scale relocation and internment of Nikkei was the best of the worst options available. The US military tore Nikkei along the US west coast and Hawaii from their homes, stripped them of their property, placed them into internment camps, and classified them as 4C, enemy aliens. Many Nikkei remained in internment camps spread across the American mid-west until the end of World War II.

By May of 1946, the War Relocation Authority, the organization responsible for

1 Due to the period of major Japanese immigration to the United States, post Meiji Restoration (1868) to the Gentlemen’s Agreement (1907), most Japanese-American citizens were Nisei (second generation), with a significantly smaller population as Sansei (third generation) and Yonsei (fourth generation).
administrative control of the internment, closed the last internment camp.\(^2\) That same year, the Department of the Interior released a series of reports assessing the War Relocation Authority and the decision to intern immigrants and American citizens. To their credit, the Department of Interior made clear that the United States had made a mistake:

> But perhaps the most disturbing results are the least tangible ones - the pattern we have established for undemocratic behavior, the stain on our national record in the eyes of freedom loving peoples throughout the world, and the physical discomfort and mental anguish we have brought upon thousands of sincere, well disciplined, and patriotic people. If we had learned to judge people by their individual worth instead of by the pigmentation of their skin and the slant of their eyes, these things would not have happened and we would be a prouder, more widely respected nation today.\(^3\)

Yet from the disenfranchised Japanese-American population grew one the most decorated units in American military history, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.\(^4\) Despite the harsh treatment, forced relocation to camps, and denial of inherent constitutional rights, many Japanese-Americans answered the call to serve their nation.\(^5\) Composed primarily of Nisei, first generation Americans, from Hawaii and internment camps, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team fought valiantly in Italy and France, participating in seven major campaigns; earning seven Presidential Unit Citations, 18,143 individual decorations, at the cost of 9,486 casualties and a 300% increase in population.

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\(^3\) United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: A Story of Human Conservation, 190.

\(^4\) The 442nd Regimental Combat Team contained the 442nd Infantry Regiment (100th, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Battalions), 522nd Field Artillery Battalion, and 232nd Engineer Combat Company.

\(^5\) Robert Asahina, Just Americans: How Japanese Americans Won a War at Home and Abroad : The Story of the 100th Battalion 442d Regimental Combat Team in World War II (New York, NY: Gotham, 2006), 6. Approximately 22,500 Japanese-Americans served in the US Army. 18,000 in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 100th Infantry Battalion, and 1399th Construction Battalion in Hawaii. The remainder served in the Military Intelligence Service or regular army services, including Army Air Corps.
replacement rate.\textsuperscript{6}

Demonstrating courage and loyalty, the men of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team returned home as heroes and used their exploits to shift social tension and rebuild the trust between the Japanese-American community and the United States.\textsuperscript{7} The Department of the Interior noted the significant impact Japanese-Americans veterans had fighting negative social perceptions:

Although the American people of Japanese descent did reach a low point during 1943, when they were more widely reviled and distrusted than ever before, the War Relocation Authority firmly believes that in the following two years of 1944 and 1945, they not only regained their prewar status, but actually achieved a higher level of popular acceptance that they have known since the first regular Japanese immigrants arrive at San Francisco in the early 1880's. This is truly astounding reversal is due primarily to two developments: (1) the spectacular and highly publicized record of the Japanese American soldier, and (2) the much quieter, much less obvious process of reintegration throughout the country.\textsuperscript{8}

Although a mix of cultural norms, the need to prove to the United States wrong, and a desire to fulfill a nationalist drive to serve greatly contributed to the success of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, those are not the only factors. How the unit overcame a significant lack of trust is also important. Anyone who examines the situation from the Nisei's perspective may be amazed that the Nisei even formed a cohesive team or became a team that division, corps, and army commanders wanted in their command.

Therefore, the question becomes not only how Japanese-Americans in the 442nd

\textsuperscript{6} Asahina, 5. June 21, 2000 President William Clinton overturned previous decisions and awarded twenty Medal of Honors, mostly posthumously, to Japanese-Americans serving in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.


Regimental Combat Team regained trust for the US military, but who helped rebuild lost trust? More importantly, what methods did they use and how can future military leaders learn from that experience? The answer is key military leaders who stood up the 442nd Regimental Combat Team and demonstrated the current US Army leadership competency of building trust for Japanese-Americans.

By building trust at the tactical and direct leadership level, key 442nd Regimental Combat Team leaders helped Nisei soldiers overcome larger societal and military lapses in trust and become an effective organization. This not only implies that tactical level leadership can have more influence than higher levels of leadership, but that the current doctrinal understanding of how to build trust is relevant and accurate. For future leaders, this means even if society or higher military leaders destroy the trust from a specific population, subsequent tactical leaders can overcome those shortcomings through their own personal actions and influence the success of the organization.

Although there is a significant amount of literature that focuses on trust or the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, none assesses trust-building actions by initial 442nd Regimental Combat Team leadership. Instead, literature regarding trust in the military or trust theory tends to focus on examinations of unit cohesion, organizational leadership, historical case studies, and the evolution of military doctrine. Conversely, literature pertaining to the 442nd Regimental Combat Team tends to commonly falls into three categories. The first set of literature focuses on rising ethnic tensions prior to and during World War II and the subsequent battle for equal rights during the post war civil rights movement. The second set of literature focuses on the isolation, relocation, and internment of Japanese and American citizens. The third set of literature focuses

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9 Because of their proximity, experience, and language strengths over Issei, Nisei who served in the US Army or resided in the internment camps dominate the literature field.
on men and tactical actions of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 100th Infantry Battalion, and Japanese-Americans in the Military Intelligence Service.

However, there is no literature examining how the leaders of and within the 442nd Regimental Combat Team built and maintained trust. With Nisei trust for the United States decimated by forced relocation and internment, the actions of 442nd Regimental Combat Team leaders can provide a unique assessment of the US Army’s conception of trust. An assessment of leader actions not only adds to the robust 442nd Regimental Combat Team's literature, but also provides a means to discover new considerations for trust in leadership doctrine for future leaders.

To do so, this monograph will divide an assessment of trust and leaders into four parts. First, the monograph will define trust and outline how the US Army conceptualizes trust in leadership doctrine. This section will result in three sub-components the US Army sees as necessary to building trust as a leader. Next, the monograph will discuss the environment and background leading up to the internment and subsequent emergence of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Within this context, the monograph will assess the actions of two key military leaders who influenced the decision for internment against the US Army's conception of trust. Next, the monograph will provide a background for the formation and employment of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Within this background, the monograph will assess the actions of two key military commanders of and within the 442nd Regimental Combat Team who successfully built and maintained Japanese-American trust for the US military during the unit's inception. Lastly, the monograph will conclude with key lessons and considerations for future leaders when applying the trust component of the lead competency.

**Trust and Leadership**

This section will begin by defining trust, and then examine how the US Army integrates trust into leadership doctrine. The section will end by identifying the three sub-components of
building trust: (sets personal example of trust, takes direct actions to build trust, and sustains a climate of trust). These three sub-components will become categories for leader action assessment in the subsequent two sections.

Although leadership doctrine does not explicitly define trust, leadership doctrine describes trust in the reference to military leadership. Field Manual 6-22: Leader Development defines trust as the expectation that someone will act in the interests of someone else or the group over their own interests.10 Army Doctrine Publication 6-22: Army Leadership articulates that, "trust characterizes positive relationships. Army leaders build trust by being honest and dependable. Without trust, there will be no relationship, no commitment, and no effective communication among parties."11 This categorizes trust as a foundational building block in organizational leadership and inherently necessary to accomplish both peace and war time missions.12

The US Army conception contains a multitude of variables, considerations, attributes, and competencies to set the conditions for mission success. Figure 1 depicts the “Underlying logic of Army Leadership.”


12 Field Manual 6-22, viii.
The US Army sees building trust as "an important competency to establish conditions of effective influence and for creating a positive environment." To influence “people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization,” the US Army places the leadership requirements model at the core of its underlying logic. The Leadership Requirements Model establishes what leaders need to be, know and do. A core set of requirements informs leaders about expectations.

13 Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, 7. The Leadership Requirements Model does not include “build trust” until June 2015. However, the US Army still discussed trust throughout previous leadership doctrinal publications. The absence of building trust in the Leadership Requirements Model is a function of saving space in a depiction rather than total ignorance.

14 Ibid., 1.
leadership requirements model outlines an interdependent and interactive set of expectations the US Army has of its leaders.

There are two sets of requirements. The first three attributes are character, presence, and intellect. These attributes highlight the expected internal identity of a leader, how others should see a leader, and desired abilities and knowledge a leader should possess. The second set of requirements are the three leader competencies; lead, develop, and achieve. The leader competencies highlight the expected external actions of a leader. Similar to the leader attributes, the US Army expects its leaders to demonstrate all of these competencies regardless of echelon of responsibility.

Within the lead competency are five subordinate competencies; leads others, extends influence beyond the chain of command, builds trust, leads by example, and communicates. Field Manual 6-22 further describes the builds trust competency into three sub-components: sets a personal example for trust, takes direct actions to build trust, and sustains a climate of trust. Sets a personal example of trust, focuses on the ability of leaders to inspire those around them by modeling consistent Army values and leadership attribute behaviors. Takes direct action to build trust, focuses on the ability of leaders to mentor leaders, empower others, address discrimination and communicate honestly. Sustains a climate of trust, focuses on the ability of leaders to sustain an open, risk-tolerant and high morale organization through consistent value support behavior. Field Manual 6-22 further delineates the aspects of the build trust competency by providing detailed tables on strength indicators, need indicators, underlying causes, feedback, study, and

\[15\] Ibid., 7.

\[16\] Field Manual 6-22, 7-10.
practice. These tables "provide ways to understand leader actions and confirm aspects of each leader behavior as strength or a developmental need."17

In terms of application, the intended audience for Field Manual 6-22 are leaders at the operational and tactical level. This means, these attributes and competencies applies to all leaders who interpret strategic guidance and below. The US Army also believes that the leader competencies are something leaders acquire at the direct leadership level.18 The levels the US Army is referring to are the three Army leadership levels. These levels are how the US Army differentiates roles and responsibilities using varying spans of control, headquarters level, power, and autonomy.19 Understanding the levels of leadership is important because it establishes a link between leaders at different levels that expands beyond hieratical authority. Since leadership doctrine differentiates each level of leadership in scope, purpose, and planning horizon, it shows that the leadership doctrine nests leader values and attributes as well.

Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-22: Army Leadership expands the Army leadership level model, as shown in Figure 2, to elaborate the Army leadership levels model.

17 Ibid., 7-1.

18 Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, 7.

Here the leadership levels are broken up into three categories: strategic, organizational, and direct. US Army doctrine divides leadership skills and actions into three population based levels. Note that they are similar to the military’s strategic, operational, and tactical framework, but are more fluid. Although there are three separate levels, leaders are likely to operate in all three levels simultaneously. As outlined in Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-22, strategic leadership is at the Department of Defense level where leaders are responsible for hundreds of thousands of people and address enduring missions. Strategic leaders work in uncertain environments in broad organizations dealing with continuing missions. Organizational leadership generally includes leaders at the battalion to corps level with two to ten year planning horizons. Organizational leaders will manage multiple policies, priorities, and resources to establish a climate that will support subordinate leaders. Organizational leaders can influence their organizations indirectly in policymaking and system integration, but will also use face-to-face contact to verify perceptions and progress.\textsuperscript{20} Direct leadership is face-to-face contact to exert

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 2-5.
Direct influence. Direct leadership tends to occur at the team, squad, section, platoon, or company levels where direct influence is limited between a few to dozens of people. Although there is a great deal of face-to-face interaction, direct leaders can facilitate indirect leadership through their subordinates.

The three levels of leadership are important for this analysis because they outline different approaches and focuses for leaders at various levels. The leadership levels model also denotes that the US Army underpins the leadership levels with values and leadership attributes. That means all leaders, regardless of the leadership level they focus on, are responsible for adhering to the US Army values and leadership attributes. The case study analysis includes two leaders who focused primarily at the organizational leadership level and two leaders who focused on the direct leadership level.

**The Seeds of Mistrust and Internment**

This section of the monograph will begin by setting the background for the internment decision and then assess the actions of two key leaders, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the commander of the Western Defense Command, and Lieutenant General Delos Emmons, the Chief of the Army's Hawaii Department and the military governor of Hawaii. Although there are many military leaders who played a vital role during this period, DeWitt and Emmons provide the most pronounced influence on trust and serve as a means to assess the build trust competency at the organizational leader level.

The buildup of tension by the United States for Japanese-Americans did not happen solely because of the attack on Pearl Harbor. While the attack marked as significant increase in tension, it alone was not sole cause for Japanese-American internment. Environmental factors from the international, federal, state, and local levels formed an interdependent web of reinforcing

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21 Ibid., 2-4.
influences. The decision to inter Japanese-Americans was also not the decision of a single person. Although President Roosevelt published Executive Order 9066, the order most commonly associated with the start of internment, the President left it to military leaders to translate the strategic guidance into tactical actions.\(^{22}\) Additionally, those interpretations required approval or support by cabinet officials, budgeting and support for legislative bodies, and continual popular support.\(^{23}\)

Internationally, American and Japanese international relations improved from the late 1850's to World War I, then grew worse until the end of World War II. Following Commodore Perry's gunboat diplomacy and the opening of Japan in 1854, both the United States and Japan, gained influence in the Pacific at the expense of surrounding nations in the years that followed.\(^{24}\) A positive perception of the Japanese continued to grow during World War I as Japan enacted the Meiji Restoration, joined Allied powers, seized German colonial holdings in the Pacific, and provided residual western Pacific security for Anglo-powers through naval activity.\(^{25}\) The United States and Japan also enjoyed mutually beneficial trade with each other until the 1920s.

However, after World War I, international relations between the United States and Japan deteriorated as Japan fought to achieve regional hegemony in the Pacific. Opposed to losing its

\(^{22}\) Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 9066, "Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas," *Federal Register* 7, no. 1407 (February 25, 1942), 1.


influence in the Pacific, the United States enacted diplomatic agreements to control Japan's growing influence. International relations between the United States and Japan continued to decline as Japan expanded its Empire in the Pacific.26 With warnings and sanctions from the United States, diplomatic friction between the two nations continued to increase until the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Domestic relations between US citizens and Japanese immigrants followed a similar trajectory as the United States-Japanese international relationship. Between the start of Japanese immigration to the United States in the late 1890s to World War I, Japanese immigrants enjoyed positive support from local communities. The perceptions of US citizens tended to side with Japan during the Russo-Japanese war from 1904-1905, which positively influenced local treatment of Japanese immigrants.27 However, by the 1910's to early 1920's, domestic and Nikkei relations deteriorated as Japanese expansion encroached on US interests and stories of Japanese atrocities in Korea spread.28 Although Japanese immigrants were not directly responsible, actions such as remittance payments, influenced the local American populace to infer Japanese immigrant support for the Empire of Japan. 29 Additionally, Japanese and American propaganda created friction points between Caucasians and the Nikkei.30

As relations fractured along ethnic lines, there was an increase in federal legislative and judicial actions against the Nikkei. The US government enacted specific actions to limit Nikkei prosperity and growth in the United States. *Takai Ozawa v United States* prohibited naturalization

27 Lynch, 48.
28 Ibid., 49.
29 La Violette, 523.
30 Ibid.
to free white persons or persons of African nativity or person of African descent, meaning there
was no way for the Issei to become American citizens.\textsuperscript{31} The Immigration Act of 1924, or
Johnson-Reed Act, prevented further Japanese immigration, in addition to other non-north
western European ethnicities.\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Hidemitsu Toyota v. United States} denied Japanese World War I
veterans US citizenship, despite their service.\textsuperscript{33} Although these decisions targeted Japanese
immigrants, they had indirect influences on the Nisei. For example, \textit{Takai Ozawa v United States}
meant that the Issei, even those assimilated into American culture, could never become citizens,
placing their national loyalties in question against their American children.

Domestic tensions rose to their highest in California, where international friction
reinforced rising social and economic tensions. These tensions spawned from the growing Nikkei
population and their growing prosperity in California. As a result, the Californian government
took additional legislative and judicial action. California passed the California Land Act of 1913,
which prohibited Japanese immigrants, and later all Nikkei, from owning land.\textsuperscript{34} Rather than
finding ways to integrate the Nikkei, Californian politicians often used subversive actions against
the Nikkei to gain popular support. Some politicians wanted to go so far as to amend the
constitution to deny Nisei their citizenship.\textsuperscript{35}

In San Francisco and Sacramento, the negative perception of increasing Japanese

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} \textit{Takao Pzawa v. United States}, 260 US 178 (1922), 1.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Office of the Historian, US Department of State. "The Immigration Act of 1924 (The
Johnson-Reed Act)," accessed August 30, 2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-
1936/immigration-act.
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Hidemitsu Toyota v. United States}, 268 US 402, 406 (1925), 2.
\item \textsuperscript{34} "California Alien Land Act of 1913," Online Archive of California, accessed August
\item \textsuperscript{35} Roger Daniels and Harry H. L. Kitano, \textit{American Racism: Exploration of the Nature of
\end{itemize}
economic prosperity from labor class to owner class became a point of friction for other white minority immigrant groups, such as Irish migrants, who saw the Nikkei as economic competition and an ally of the British since Japan and Britain had signed a treaty together.\textsuperscript{36} Japanese immigrants often became the target of pro-Anglo groups, such as the Native Sons of the Golden West, a California based fraternity that sought to remove non-white influence in California.\textsuperscript{37} As a result, Japanese immigrants tended to isolate themselves into their own communities. However, the Nikkei isolation only increased negative perceptions of the Japanese. Many Californians believed that the Japanese stayed in isolated communities to raise their children as Japanese citizens.\textsuperscript{38} Many Californians also believed that the Nikkei lacked a willingness to integrate into American culture.\textsuperscript{39} Falsely equating Chinese and Japanese immigrants, Californians' expected to see Japanese immigrants integrate into American society as Chinese immigrants had. However, Chinese immigrants were able to change Californian perceptions from hatred to respect over time by assuming roles as servants and laborers.\textsuperscript{40} Conversely, Japanese immigrants tended to be industrious, organized, capable of rising above the labor class, and unwilling to accept discrimination.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, Japanese immigrants were unable to replicate the same shift in American perceptions as Chinese immigrants.

Other states followed the same polices and attitudes as California, but to a lesser degree the farther the state was from the west coast. However, this general trend did not apply to Hawaii.

\textsuperscript{36} McWilliams, 20.


\textsuperscript{38} Lynch, 48.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 50.
Although under the same international relations influences as California, Hawaii saw a much more positive relationship with their Nikkei population. As a US territory and a natural geographic mid-point between Japan and the United States, Hawaii experienced a significant influx of Japanese immigrants starting in the 1880's as Japanese immigrants sprawled to Hawaii in search of agricultural employment opportunities.\(^{42}\) So much so, that by the 1920's Japanese immigrant workers made up the majority of Hawaii's population.\(^{43}\) As the majority population in Hawaii, the Nikkei experienced the normal quality of life that Anglos enjoyed on the mainland. This naturally influenced a greater level of communal integration than in California. Japanese-Americans also enjoyed the ability to join Hawaii's Territorial Guard, which increased the sense of belonging within the community. Although animosity and ethnic tensions still existed in Hawaii, it never achieved the same level of dysfunction as in California.

In summary, there was a decline in the respect and acceptance of the Nikkei in California and surrounding states, but a much higher level of respect and acceptance in Hawaii. This is important because the differing environments created sub-cultures within the Japanese immigrant population. Although many political and military leaders considered both groups as Japanese-Americans, they were starkly different. While Hawaiian Japanese-Americans experienced a strong sense of equality, fairness, and belonging, mainland Japanese-American experienced inequality, prejudice, and exclusion. In addition to influencing two different types of Japanese-Americans, the environment also influenced the decisions of leaders. With two different treatments and perceptions of the Nikkei, military leaders assigned to deal with the Nikkei after Pearl Harbor developed different solutions.


\(^{43}\) Ibid.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States experienced a moment of Japanese hysteria. There were concerns about Italian and German citizens; however, the American public associated the evil actions of Nazi Germany to men and the evil actions of Tojo's Japan to a nationality. Many feared that Japan would conduct another attack using the resident Japanese population in the United States for disruption, reconnaissance, or other fifth column activities. Concerned with the friction for the Nikkei population and apprehension from state political leaders on the west coast, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. The order authorized,

Secretary of War, and the military commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate military commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander may impose in his discretion.

Note that the order did not direct the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to relocate Nikkei directly. Executive Order 9066 prescribed authorities from the President to the Secretary of War, and those he appoints, to use to protect the United States and the population if necessary or desirable. Executive Order 9066 redistributed judicial power to military commanders. Executive Order 9066 gave military commanders the ability to determine who was a threat to the security of the nation and the population and the ability to prescribe exclusionary measures. However, it is important to note that five days before President Roosevelt signed Executive Order

44 Daniels and Kitano, 58.

45 Hanley, 3. Fifth Column is a pre-World War II colloquial term used to describe subversive activities by a resident portion of the population in support of a larger overt offensive to seize a population center. The term emerged following the 1936 Siege of Madrid and grew in common use as a descriptor of Japanese potential actions.

46 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 9066, "Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas," Federal Register 7, no. 1407 (February 25, 1942), 1.
9066, DeWitt sent a memorandum to Stimson that recommend "the evacuation of Japanese and other subversive persons from the west coast area."\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, while Executive Order 9066 explicitly leaves the interpretation of focus to commanders, in reality President Roosevelt understood the military would use Executive Order 9066 against the Nikkei.

One of the areas of immediate concern for Executive Order 9066 application was Hawaii. Emmons assumed command of the Hawaiian Department ten days after the attack on Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{48} Based in Hawaii, Emmons was in a different position than DeWitt in California. On initial assessment of his situation, one would assume Emmons would lean towards the internment of Nikkei in Hawaii. Not only did Japan attack Hawaii, it was also closer to Japan, had a significantly larger Japanese population by proportion, and had greater authorities since Hawaii was a territory rather than a state.

However, Emmons limited forced relocation to areas near military installations and internment to the surrounding islands and mainland, to a small portion of the Nikkei population. Note the Hawaii Islands number on Figure 3 that indicates the relocation of 1,118 people to various locations.

\textsuperscript{47} United States Department of the Interior, viii.

The significant difference between Emmons and DeWitt is that Emmons believed it was possible to determine the loyalty of the Nikkei population. Rather than interning all Nikkei, Emmons integrated the support of Nikkei on the island. This does not mean Emmons did not make any poor decisions. Rather in comparison to DeWitt, Emmons' decisions were more respectful of the Nikkei population. Emmons continued censorship of mail, curfews, prohibition on speech against the government, the closure of Japanese schools, and the shutdown of Japanese newspapers.

The first sub-component of build trust is, *sets personal example for trust*. By choosing to send a select portion of the Nikkei to internment camps, Emmons partially demonstrated the strength indicator of showing respect and remaining firm and fair. Although a better build trust action might have been not sending any Nikkei to internment camps, Emmons had security

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considerations he had to balance.

The second sub component of build trust is, *takes direct actions to build trust*. One of the strength indicators Emmons demonstrated is identifying areas of commonality and building on shared experiences. Emmons understood many Nikkei were victims during the attack on Pearl Harbor and, as a community, felt the attack was against them as Americans. Emmons also understood and acknowledged that the Japanese community responded with a sense of nationalist pride after the attack and assisted with medical, repair, and security operations during and after the attack. Rather than treat the Nikkei as the enemy, he tended to treat them as Americans.

Emmons also strongly supported the 1399th Engineer Battalion, a construction unit comprised of Japanese-Americans who supported island defense projects. Rather than lose potential manpower, Emmons used support from the Nikkei community for the greater good.50

Another strength indicator in the second sub component of build trust is *demonstrating an unwillingness to tolerate discrimination*. Unlike DeWitt, Emmons did not succumb to the anti-Japanese sentiment of senior policy makers. Emmons continued to promote the Nikkei and correct false assumptions about the Nikkei. In one instance, he wrote a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, discounting poor views of the Japanese in Hawaii and the ill intentions of certain staff members on the war staff in regards to the Nikkei.51

Emmons also communicated honestly and openly with others. Emmons accepted the advice of his Federal Bureau of Investigation counter-part, Robert Shivers. Robert Shivers believed that the Nikkei represented no future threat to the United States or took part in any

50 Asahina, 38.

51 Delos Emmons, Memorandum to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, April 29, 1942 (Fort Shafter, Hawaii), 1. General Emmons wrote to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy after reading a report from representatives in the US Justice Department that mentions false information about the Japanese community in Hawaii.
sabotage against the United States. Emmons also maintained open dialogue with his peers and counterparts who supported a similar positive view of the Nikkei in Hawaii.

The third sub component of build trust is, *sustains a climate of trust.* Emmons did this by continuing to talk to policy makers and fellow military leaders in Washington and Hawaii about the potential the Nisei represent. Emmons testified that the Nisei contributed greatly to the security of Hawaii. One of the groups he referenced was the Triple V: Varsity Victory Volunteers, a group of Nisei Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets discharged after the attack on Pearl Harbor that volunteered in security and construction efforts. Additionally, by continuing to promote the actions of Nisei, Emmons was able to influence the idea of a Japanese-American unit as a method to counter Japanese propaganda. Soon after visiting Hawaii and speaking with Emmons, Stimson noted that, "it is the inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in the nation's battles."54

Another of the area of immediate concern for Executive Order 9066 application was the American west coast. As the commander responsible for the American west coast, DeWitt decided to force relocate and intern all Nikkei on the west coast. DeWitt believed that ethnicity determined loyalty, regardless of citizenship. During his testimony to the Naval Affairs subcommittee, DeWitt said, "A Jap is a Jap. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen; theoretically he

52 Asahina, 20.


is still a Japanese, and you can't change him. You can't change him by giving him a piece of
paper."56 He also believed that the Nikkei were "inscrutably oriental," meaning the Japanese were
so different than Americans, in thought and behavior, that it was impossible to distinguish the
loyal from disloyal. 57 As a result, DeWitt categorized all ethnic Japanese people as
indistinguishable and disloyalty.58

The first sub-component of build trust is, *sets personal example for trust*. For DeWitt, he
set neither an example for his subordinates or the Californians he sought to appease. DeWitt held
an extremely negative view of Japanese and was not shy about sharing his views publicly in
testimonies and interactions with policymakers. His views of the Japanese were often so
prejudicial that historians could identify his comments in unlabeled conversations. 59

Another strength indicator DeWitt failed to demonstrate was admitting mistakes.
Opposition for DeWitt's perspective increased over time and from many different sources. Some
opposition existed prior to DeWitt's internment actions, for example Attorney General Francis
Biddle. Some developed over time, for example Secretary McCloy. Once the military had
completed relocation and internment, fissures between DeWitt and policymakers began to grow.

56 Jacobus TenBroek, Edward Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, *Prejudice, War, and the
Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World
War II* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1954), 351. Note that there is a difference
between newspaper reporters and hearing records with regards to what DeWitt said.
Congressional Records indicate DeWitt said "The danger of the Japanese, was, and is now-if they
are permitted to come back-espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he is an
American citizen. He is still a Japanese. American citizenship does not necessarily determine
loyalty." However, media reports reflect a much more prejudicial dialogue. There is also a mix of
conversations in the congressional minutes as DeWitt answers questions about the Japanese and
while answering questions about dimly lit taverns.

57 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, *Personal Justice
Denied*, 213.

58 Ibid., 222.

59 Ibid., 215.
Key political leaders began to voice their own interpretations of Executive Order 9066 and the intent behind internment; most did not think determining loyalty was impossible or due to ethnicity. However, despite senior political and military urging him to rethink his approach, DeWitt remained committed his line of logic.

The second sub-component of build trust is, *takes direct actions to build trust*. With prejudicial views of Japanese-Americans, the probability of DeWitt demonstrating care for others or was unwillingness to tolerate discrimination was low. To identify threats to the United States, DeWitt began by using the ABC lists. The ABC lists were a collaborative effort between the War Relocation Authority and the Justice Department to identify three groups of people; A: immediately dangerous, B: potentially dangerous, C: possible Japanese sympathizer. Rather than categorize Japanese immigrants and Japanese citizens into categories in terms of potential threat, DeWitt's interpretation of the ABC categorization placed all Japanese immigrants and Japanese-Americans into one threat category, overlooking the opportunity to protect Nikkei who supported the United States.

DeWitt also failed to communicate honestly and openly with others. DeWitt ignored strong evidence and reports from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, that there were no indications of Japanese espionage, sabotage, or subversion. DeWitt also discounted military advice. In February of 1942, General Mark Clark, then on the Army General Staff and later commander over the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, noted that the cost in resources and time to house, feed, and guard 110,000 internees over an indefinite amount of

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60 Ibid.  
61 Robinson, 47.  
62 Asahina, 20.
time would present too high of an opportunity cost in resources needed to fight the war. DeWitt also ignored concerns from Attorney General Francis Biddle regarding relocation and violations of constitutional rights. Unlike Emmons, DeWitt did not maintain open dialogue with his peers and counterparts, but rather became defensive as opposition grew. Because DeWitt did not take steps to build trust with Japanese-Americans, there was no way for Dewitt to demonstrate the third sub-component, sustain a climate of trust.

Assessing Emmons and DeWitt’s Executive Order 9066 actions, there are several key takeaways. First adherence to the build trust competency creates more potential for increasing a unity of effort in the future. For Emmons, building trust with Japanese-Americans afforded him the ability to use the Nikkei community in Hawaii. Communicating with others honestly, Emmons understood the Nikkei did not represent a threat, and if they did, relocating a majority of the Hawaiian population would be logistically difficult and economically unviable.

Second, Emmons established a foundation for the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. By promoting Japanese-Americans as a loyal population, Emmons influenced other military and political leaders to consider a positive perception of Japanese-Americans. Conversely, DeWitt destroyed the trust the Nikkei had for the US government. DeWitt's actions had a direct impact on the feasibility of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. While Emmons built and maintained a trust with Hawaiian Nisei that would foster Nisei military service, DeWitt forced the Nisei into camps and limited the potential to serve to those who could overlook the massive slights against the Nikkei. Although Emmons response was far from Field Manual 6-22 perfection, it was closer in adherence than DeWitt's and increased the probability of positive results.

63 Ibid., 19.
64 Ibid., 20.
Rebuilding Trust

Two key leaders were responsible for trust between Japanese-American soldiers and the US military. The first was 100th Infantry Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Farrant L Turner. The second was first 442nd Regiment Combat Team commander, Colonel Vigil Pence. Turner and Pence were responsible for forming, training, and deploying the first Japanese-American military organizations prior to their first combat experiences. Examining Turner and Pence’s actions provides an opportunity to exam trust building actions at the direct leadership level. For background, there are three important focus areas that add to the conditions leaders overcome: the emergence of a Japanese-American force option, history of the 100th Infantry Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team's creation, and the actions of the organization.

The emergence of a Japanese-American unit is important because it drove unintended leadership challenges that emerge in the assessment. Two factors in particular are important: leaders who opposed to DeWitt's logic and Emmons’ ability to maintain Nisei military forces in Hawaii. First, as the previous section mentions, many political and military leaders disagreed with DeWitt's actions and logic. Although most saw internment as a necessary, most disagreed with DeWitt’s premise that Nikkei were disloyal because of their ethnicity and a need to maintain internment until the war ended or the US military successfully redistributed the Nikkei across the United States and away from the Pacific west coast. Some, such as Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, believed that full-scale internment was necessary because of the possible threat a portion of Nikkei represented and the lack of time available. However, once at the camps, McCloy believed that the United States should start to determine loyalty and release those not a threat. Others believed that internment was necessary because of the hardships and potential violence the Nikkei would experience if they remained in the prejudicial west coast
environment.\textsuperscript{65} While this logic places the cost of preventing violence on the Nikkei rather than addressing a need for the government to protect the population, it still does not follow DeWitt's logic that all Nikkei were disloyal. Others, particularly those in the military who opposed full-scale internment because of the significant logistic and manpower needed, looked at the camps as a waste of much needed resources. While this logic did not take a moral stance on the treatment of Nikkei, it implied that the Nikkei threat did not meet the opportunity costs associated with internment.

From this opposition, leaders began to attack DeWitt's premise that all Nikkei were disloyal because of their ethnicity. McCloy implemented an indirect approach that slowly attacked DeWitt's loyalty premise and desire to exclude Japanese-Americans from the west coast indefinitely. First, McCloy used Japanese-Americans in the military as a vehicle to shift DeWitt's narrative regarding the Japanese-American population. If a Jap is a Jap, McCloy postulated that a G.I. was a G.I.\textsuperscript{66} By using "GIs" as a new element of the Japanese-American narrative, McCloy transposed the respect and dignity afforded to soldiers to the Japanese-American population.

McCloy also pushed for loyalty questionnaires to begin distinguishing who was a threat or eligible for selective service.\textsuperscript{67} However, by virtue of its existence, the questionnaire implied two important details. First, there was a way to determine the loyalty of Japanese-Americans. Second, many Japanese-Americans in the camps were similar to the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii in regard to a desire to serve. Although many Nikkei perceived the questionnaires as a slight against honor or to little-too late, it did identify a select portion of the internment


\textsuperscript{66} Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 225.

\textsuperscript{67} Asahina, 43. Roosevelt also approved re-categorization from 4C to 1A (fit for active military service).
population that was willing to serve. 68

The second factor that influenced the generation of an all Japanese-American force option were Japanese-Americans soldiers in Hawaii. Japanese-American soldiers in Hawaii remained in the National Guard, the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments. Since the territory of Hawaii remained under territorial control instead of federal control, Japanese-Americans in Hawaii remained in the force. Along with other Nikkei groups, Japanese-Americans in the National Guard assisted in repair and security.

After visiting Hawaii, McCloy learned about the efforts of Hawaiian-Japanese Americans and recommended Hawaiian Nisei for activation to the President. Not only would a Japanese-American force provide a means to undercut DeWitt, but would also give Japanese-Americans a chance for military service and a method of countering Japanese propaganda focused on highlight ethnic tensions in the United States. Lastly, moving a Japanese-American military forces addressed concerns about what threat Japanese-Americans represented if Japan invaded Hawaii. 69

After President Roosevelt approved the creation of a Japanese-American unit, Japanese-Americans in the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments boarded ships to the continental United States for training as the Hawaiian Provisional Battalion. 70 Once they arrived to Camp Shelby, the US Army re-designated the Hawaiian Provisional Battalion as the 100th Infantry Battalion. After the US Army assessed the training progress of the 100th Infantry Battalion as positive, the President approved the increase of Japanese-American segregated forces to a full regiment, the

68 Asahina, 51. Because the US Army poorly worded the questionnaire, only 1,208 men volunteer for service.

69 Hoichi Kubo, "If I am Filial..." In Japanese Eyes, American Heart: Personal Reflections of Hawaii's World War II Nisei Soldiers (Honolulu, HI: Tendai Educational Foundation, 1998), 278.

70 Asahina, 31. General Marshal orders Emmons to organize the 298th and 299th into the Hawaiian Provisional Battalion. Part of that process included disarming Hawaiian Nisei.
442nd Regimental Combat Team.\textsuperscript{71} As the 100th Infantry Battalion completed its training and deployed to Italy, the men who would later form the 442nd Regimental Combat Team began their training.

The 100th Infantry Battalion arrived in Salerno, Italy on September 22, 1943 to join the 34th Division, under the 5th Army. By then, Allied Forces completed Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, and were executing of Operation Avalanche, the invasion of Italy. Operation Avalanche was General Clark's first operation as the Fifth Corps commander. Struggling to get his feet underneath him, General Clark's forces met stiff German resistance, trapping Allied force just miles from their beachhead.\textsuperscript{72} Still in their summer issue uniforms, the 100th Infantry Battalion fought as an attached battalion of the 133rd Infantry Regiment, 34th Division.\textsuperscript{73} The 100th Infantry Battalion fought from Salerno north to Benvento, then east across the Voturno River, and finally north to the towns of Monte and Cassino on the Rapido river. The 100th Infantry Battalion adapted quickly to combat, but not without sacrifices. In its fight to Monte and Cassino, the battalion lost five officers and 118 enlisted men and twenty-two officers and 368 enlisted men wounded in action.\textsuperscript{74} By February 22, 1943, the 100th Infantry Battalion returned to Salerno. \textsuperscript{75} Of the approximately 1,300 Soldiers in the 100th Infantry Battalion at the initial

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Orville C. Shirey, \textit{Americans: The Story of the 442d Combat Team} (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 19. The US Army did not assign historians to the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. As a result Major Shirley's, the regimental intelligence officer, publication on the regiment is considered by most of the men as the unit's history.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Doulas Porch, \textit{The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II} (New York, NY, 2004), 419.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Lyn Crost, \textit{Honor by Fire: Japanese Americans at War in Europe and the Pacific} (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994), 76. Hawaii state representative, Joseph R. Farrington, assigned Lyn Crost the 100th Infantry Battalions war correspondent during World War II.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 90, 94.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 115.
\end{itemize}
landing in Italy, 521 were combat effective, resulting in the battalion earning the "Purple Heart Battalion" moniker.  

During their training, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team continued to send replacements forward to the 100th Infantry Battalion as losses mounted. Once the 442nd Regimental Combat Team completed its training, the 1st Battalion of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team remained in the United States to train future Japanese-American replacements while the rest of the Regiment deployed to Italy. Once in Italy, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team absorbed the 100th Infantry Battalion in place of 1st Battalion.

The 100th Battalion became the building block for the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. The impressive reputation the 100th Infantry Battalion purchased with valor and sacrifice set a positive environment for the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. So much so that when US Army later ordered the reallocation of the 100th Infantry Battalion to France in support of Operation Anvil, General Clark argued to keep the battalion, since it had, "become an integral part of the 34th Division, and a strong feeling of mutual respect and admiration has been established between [the 100th Infantry Battalion] and the rest of the division."  

Lieutenant Colonel (Albert) Farrant L. Turner was the 100th Infantry Battalion's first commander. Turner was a native of Hawaii, born and raised on Hilo. After serving in World War I, he returned to Hawaii as the executive officer of the 298th Infantry Regiment, Hawaiian National Guard. Following the Pearl Harbor attacks, Turner took command of the Hawaiian Provisional Infantry Battalion, an all Japanese-Americans battalion the US Army created from

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76 Asahina, 75.

77 Asahina, 108

Japanese-Americans in the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Turner also hand selected MAJ James Lovell as the battalion's executive officer. A Nebraska native, Lovell joined the Hawaiian National Guard in 1931. Although his time with Japanese-Americans prior to the outbreak of World War II was substantially less then Turner, Lovell adopted many of Turner’s views on Japanese-Americans.79 Turner and Lovell were not only responsible for reforming, training, and deploying the 100th Infantry Battalion at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, but also rebuilding the climate of trust within the organization.

A strength indicator under sets personal example for trust is showing respect for others. The men of the 100th Battalion noted that part of what made Turner effective in building trust was the climate of acceptance he formed for his men.80 As a native of Hawaii and as someone who witnessed the unreasonable treatment the men endured, he often empathized with the men and understood the pressures they were under to serve proudly. 81 Knowing that, Turner consistently argued for a combat role for the 100th Infantry Battalion. After arriving to Oran, Africa on August 21, 1943, the US Army subsequently assigned the 100th Infantry Battalion to the 34th Division in a support capacity. Rather than relegate the battalion to guarding supply trains, Turner fought for a combat role.82 By focusing on the desires of his men, Turner created an


opportunity for Japanese-Americans to become the decorated unit they are today. Turner also influenced the men to set aside funds for obstacles he knew they would face in the future.83 The fund eventually turned into the Club 100, then the 100th Infantry Battalion Veterans, a currently active organization that promotes Japanese-American activities.

A strength indicator under the takes direct action to build trust sub-component is unwillingness to tolerate discrimination. Turner demonstrated this by correcting subordinates, peers, and, sometime, superiors when they use prejudicial language. In one instance, Turner dressed down a senior officer for using the term Jap.84 Turner remained adamant throughout his time as the commander to ensure other units and commanders treated the men as Americans, not Japanese-Americans.85 Turner also refused to join the training camp's (Camp McCoy) officer club since it restricted Japanese-American officers.86 While building camaraderie with fellow officers on the installation had benefits, Turner and the other officers opted to build their own club, rather than join a club that would propagate ethnic divides.

A strength indicator under the sustains a climate of trust sub-component is maintaining high unit morale. Part of what made Turner's contributions to build trust in the 100th Infantry Battalion so unique is that the high morale he fostered remained well after he departed the organization. Despite the heavy fighting and casualties, wounded 100th Infantry Battalion soldiers deliberately went absent without leave from the hospitals to return to the unit.87

84 Ibid., 17.
85 Asahina, 33.
86 Turner, 153.
87 Crost, 107.
The trust Turner, and his other officers, built in the unit for Japanese-Americans had an enduring effect. Due to the high operations tempo and inherent danger, the 100th Infantry Battalion experienced high turnover in its leadership and soldiers, yet the unit maintained high morale. While escorting the Secretary of the Navy during a visit in Italy, General Ryder mentioned that the 100th Infantry Battalion was his "best outfit" during a military review. Clark saw the 100th Infantry Battalion as "among his ablest Soldiers." However, Turner experienced difficulties separating trust and empathy for his Japanese-American soldiers. Officially, Turner was relieved for poor reconnaissance and tactics. However, other sources indicate that Turner had grown too close to the men as their commander. He struggled to protect the lives of his men while accomplishing the tough tasks needed in Italy.

The next commander to assess is Colonel Vigil Pence. Pence was the 442nd Regimental Combat Team's first commander during its formation, initial training, and first campaign in Italy and France. Although Turner had already changed over command by the time Pence arrived to Italy, the benefits of Turner's trust building measures paved the way for the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Pence remained in command until he sustained injuries during the regiment's rescue of the "Lost Battalion" in France. The Lost Battalion was an operation in France where the 442nd Regimental Combat Team fought to rescue an isolated unit, the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, 36th Infantry Division, which German forces isolated in the Vosage Mountains on October 24, 1944. At the cost of over 800 men, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team regained contact with 211 isolated men in the "Lost Battalion." After the rescue, the

88 Ibid., 55.
89 Ibid., 158.
90 Crost, 84.
91 Shirey, 65.
regiment's executive officer, Virgil Miller, assumed command. A profoundly professional and competent leader who cared deeply for the Japanese-Americans in the unit, Miller led the regiment at the Battle of Bruyeres and later through the Po Valley Campaign in Italy. Although most 442nd Regimental Combat Team literature focuses on Miller, Pence played a vital role in rebuilding trust.

Similar to Turner, Pence demonstrated several trust building sub-components. Understanding that some of the men in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team had to deal with significant family struggles before leaving the camps, Pence wrote letters to the family of his men to acknowledge and reinforce the family's sacrifice in the face of adversity.92 Similar to Turner, Pence also fought for a continuing combat role for the regiment. Additionally, knowing that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were anxious to prove themselves to the veteran 100th Infantry Battalion, Pence deliberately allowed 2nd and 3rd Battalions to assume the lead during the regiment’s first campaign in Italy.93 During the rescue of the "Lost Battalion," Pence and his subordinate officers kept the men's concentration on re-establishing contact with the isolated battalion, rather than the mistrust the men had for the division commander, Major General John E. Dahlquist.94 Lastly, like Turner, the men of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team praised Pence's leadership and values after he left the organization.95

The biggest issue Pence dealt with was tensions caused by sub-cultures. Turner had the

92 Asahina, 66.


94 Asahina, 134.; Young O. Kim, "Keynote Address: 40th Anniversary Banquet" Puka Puka Parade 36, no. 3 (July-August 1982), 4.

95 Ibid., 189.
initial advantage of not only serving with his men before they left Hawaii, but also starting with Nisei from the same environment. Pence, on the other hand, had both Hawaiian and mainland Nisei volunteers and draftees in his organization. While Turner had the advantage of Emmons trust building efforts to build on, Pence had to repair deep tensions DeWitt created.

There were steep divisions between Hawaiian and mainland Nisei. Language was not even a commonality. Mainland Nisei spoke American-English, after a lifetime of assimilation, Hawaii Nisei spoke Hawaiian pidgin, a mix of Portuguese, Japanese, and English. Each group also labeled each other differently. Hawaiian Nisei called mainland Nisei kotonks, the sounds their heads made when banged against the floor. Mainland Nisei called the Hawaiians buddaheads, a play on the word pig.96 Both groups of Nisei, and some Anglo officers, used haole, meaning no breath in reference to a traditional Hawaiian greeting, for Caucasian officers.97 While the different names eventually became badges of honor, their initial uses were much more prejudicial.

Hawaiian and Nisei also volunteered from communities with very different levels of support. When the War Department announced the call for 4,500 volunteers for the 442nd Combat Team, 10,000 Hawaiian Nisei tried to volunteer for the 2,500 slots open for Hawaii.98 Many wanted to follow the example of their 100th Infantry Battalion peers and answer the 100th Infantry Battalion motto, "Remember Pearl Harbor." Conversely, mainland Nisei were not nearly as supportive and had no tangible association with the attack on Pearl Harbor. Of the approximately 16,000 eligible Nisei, only 805 volunteered for the 442nd Regimental Combat

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97 Hanley, xiv.

Team initially. In some camps, disgruntled Nikkei formed protest groups or became draft resisters; something unheard of in Hawaii. The lack of support within the camps added an additional obstacle mainland Nisei had to overcome. The Hawaiian Nisei had extravagant parades when they left Hawaii, where as mainland Nisei from the camps often left quietly in the middle of the night to avoid confrontation.

Hawaiian Nisei thought mainlanders were snobby, unconfident, and had a "whipped dog" complex with Caucasians. What made the perception worse was the Hawaiian Nisei never understood why mainland Nisei behaved the way they did and the mainland Nisei were not eager to talk about it. Unlike mainland Nisei, Hawaii Nisei did not come from a "separate but equal" culture nor did they experience the strong anti-Japanese propaganda in the United States. The Hawaiian Nisei gambled most of their earnings and saw mainland Nisei as frugal, not realizing

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101 Asahina, 56.


103 Ibid.

that they were sending their money back to the camps.105

The second sub-component of build trust is, “takes direct action to build trust.” One of the strengths Pence used to fix the sub-culture problem was identifying areas of commonality and trust building actions to build upon shared experiences. The Hawaiian Nisei arrived to the unit after Caucasians and mainland Nisei filled the roles of the cadre, officers and non-commissioned officers.106 The differing attitudes and views of the United States combined with rank power struggles created friction that led to fighting that continued even after the unit started training together. The fights not only threatened order and discipline, as enlisted gangs beat up non-commissioned officers, but also they threaten the existence of the organization as evaluators considered closing down the entire Regimental project.107 This is why Pence's actions were so important, more important than the decisions he made in combat. If he did not fix the sub-culture problem, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team would cease to exist.

To fix the problem, Pence identified dozens of Hawaiian Nisei soldiers he saw as informal leaders. He then scheduled a series of trips to nearby internment camps in Jerome and Rohwer, Arkansas. Traveling with ukuleles, aloha shirts, and an upbeat attitude, the Hawaiian Nisei were emotionally crushed once they realized what life in the internment camps was like.108

105 “Historical Information: 442nd Regimental Combat Team.”


107 “Historical Information: 442nd Regimental Combat Team.”

Fights between Hawaiian and mainland Nisei ceased and a sense of camaraderie developed.\textsuperscript{109} The regiment became the cohesive team that would later impress Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall during the unit's final inspection.\textsuperscript{110} This moment of transition was the most formative period the 442nd Regimental Combat Team experienced other than combat. Pence was one of the few leaders that addressed trust issues within the Japanese-American soldier community in addition to trust issues between Japanese-Americans and the US military.

By the time the 442nd Regimental Combat Team arrived in Italy, the 100th Infantry Battalion that left was much different than the one that the men of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team saw leave Camp Shelby in August 1943. Losing well over half of its force in Italy, its composition moved away from only having men from Hawaii and included Nisei from all over the United States. Pence integrated the 100th Battalion into the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, but as the 100th Infantry Battalion, not 1st Battalion; using the pride the men of the 100th Infantry Battalion earned as a means to maintain regimental morale. Integrating the 100th Infantry Battalion with its original 100th designation helped Pence harness the esprit de corps the 100th Infantry Battalion built and acknowledge the sacrifices the 100th Infantry Battalion made. Similar to the Hawaiian and mainland sub-cultures, Pence minimized the 100th Infantry Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team sub-cultures as well. After arriving in France in September of 1944, the Regiment added to its legacy during the "Rescue of the Lost Battalion" and more valorous acts during the Po River Valley Campaign in Italy.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109} Keegan.

\textsuperscript{110} Shirey, 27.

\textsuperscript{111} Shirey, 51-70.
Conclusions

Leaders can gain insight for future applications or evaluations of Field Manual 6-22 trust actions by examining DeWitt, Emmons, Turner, and Pence's decisions during World War II. These insights can guide leaders in future trust building by providing an example of application and a means for discussion. Based on the decisions DeWitt, Emmons, Turner, and Pence made, there are six leader considerations in applying or evaluating trust-building actions.

The first consideration is that a leader's environment can influence the perceptions and actions of leaders. For DeWitt, the significant anti-Japanese climate in California melded with his prejudices. For Emmons, strong pro-Nikkei support in Hawaii experienced helped him maintain a positive perception of Japanese-Americans within and outside the island. Just as DeWitt received positive feedback from the community for his actions, Emmons experienced the same, despite the vast difference between DeWitt and Emmons' decisions. Leaders using trust-building actions must understand the environment's reinforcing influence and its ability to obscure decisions that go against the US Army values.

The second consideration is that the mention of trust within leadership doctrine does not automatically produce compliance. There is a certain level of interpretation for application. Although World War II leadership doctrine does not reflect all of the lessons learned in the decades that followed, trust still played an integral part in a unit's performance. World War II leadership doctrine contained aspects of the "Golden Rule" - treat others, as you would want to be treated, just as the contemporary US Army values reflect. However, the personal perceptions of individual leaders will influence the actual results. Just as personal bias, perceptions, and

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prejudices influenced decision making during World War II, those same qualities can influence decisions today.

The third consideration is that breaches in trust are not permanent. It is possible for follow-on leaders to overcome the mistakes of previous leaders using trust-building measures at the direct leadership level. The foundation of values and competencies that underpins the US Army leadership levels (Figure 2) provides a self-organizing means for the US Army as an institution to fix mistakes. Although American society, federal and state actions, and military decisions led to internment, Pence and Turner used trust-building measures rebuild trust with Japanese-Americans and the US military and create an effective team.

The fourth consideration is that there is a gap in leadership doctrine for trust misjudgments. Field Manual 6-22 does not include any actions, recommendations, or discussions about situations where higher leaders go against the Army Values. By not mentioning or discussing instances or situations where superior or senior leaders are wrong, it implies it will never happen. Ideally, it will not. Nevertheless, the US Army is a people business, and people are flawed. Rather than leaving the topic as a personal challenge, including a section similar to the leadership competencies and actions tables in Field Manual 6-22 will drive dialogue and discussion.

The fifth consideration is trust is complex, thus building trust is complex. Although assessment focused on DeWitt, Emmons, Turner, and Pence, other factors influenced trust within the organization. For example, Nisei in the Military Intelligence Service established a positive perception of Japanese-American Soldiers before the 100th Infantry Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team existed. By setting a positive image of Japanese-American Soldiers, Nisei in the Military Intelligence Service established an inclination for other senior leaders to build trust with Japanese-American soldiers, both for 442nd Regimental Combat Team in combat
and once the soldiers returned home.\textsuperscript{113} To believe that the singular efforts Pence and Turner turned the 442nd Regimental Combat Team into a success is short sighted. Pence and Turners actions certainly assisted in rebuilding trust, but were not the only factors.

The sixth consideration is the complexity of trust means the prescriptive guidance in Field Manual 6-22 is not entirely accurate or predictable. Leaders building trust according to the manual must understand that the prescriptive guidance has the potential to lure junior leaders and evaluators into a false sense of causality. Although the manual outlines techniques built on a long history of US Army leadership, the prescriptive guidance is only an indicator, not the entirety of options or effects possible. Leaders, especially those evaluating trust-building measures, should take great care in associating the prescriptive measures as the only means of success or failure. Evaluators should also consider the environment, the leader's biases, and the decisions of external influences for the leader's span of control.

The treatment of Nikkei after the attack on Pearl Harbor was dreadful. Succumbing to fears of another attack and allowing ethnic tensions to drive the narrative, US policy and military leaders negatively influenced the lives of all Nikkei in the United States and Hawaii. Yet this same population spawned one of the most decorated and courageous units in military history. Transitioning a conglomerate of unconvinced Japanese-Americans required leaders capable of building and maintaining trust through direct leadership level engagements.

By underpinning the US Army leadership model with the time-tested values, the current

\textsuperscript{113} General Charles W. Ryder, the 34th Division commander in Italy, was one of the many generals sent to the Pacific after Pearl Harbor. General Alexander M. Patch, the 7th Army Commander in France for Operation Dragoon, was previously the commander of the Americal Division and the XIV Corps in Guadalcanal. General Stillwell, the China-Burma-India and later Western Defense Command Commander, was DeWitt's operations officer and later became one of the Nisei's biggest champions after the war. General Mark W. Clark, the 5th Army and 15th Army Group commander in Italy, opposed internment while a member of the Army General Staff.
Army leadership requirements model allows tactical leaders using direct leadership skills and attributes to overcome societal and operational misperceptions and errors for building and maintaining trust. The values required for combat overshadow unnecessary prejudices and assumptions. This becomes more apparent when examining the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, where trust in the US military was exceptionally low.

Future leaders should never assume that today’s society and military are incapable of repeating the same mistakes of the past. While it may seem unlikely that the United States would intern an entire population based on ethnicity again, similar targeting scenarios are possible. The US military recently shifted polices for homosexuals in the military from a full-ban to Don't ask, Don't Tell, to full integration. The US military is in the process of testing female integration options. Currently, the US military is discussing issues with transgender soldiers. On July 13th, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stated,

The Defense Department's current regulations regarding transgender service members are outdated and are causing uncertainty that distracts commanders from our core missions. At a time when our troops have learned from experience that the most important qualification for service members should be whether they're able and willing to do their job, our officers and enlisted personnel are faced with certain rules that tell them the opposite. Moreover, we have transgender soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines - real, patriotic Americans - who I know are being hurt by an outdated, confusing, inconsistent approach that's contrary to our value of service and individual merit.114

If society places a majority perception over the US Army values foundation for a population, then the same type of situation is still possible. As the US military deals with other values related issues, the trust decisions leaders make at the tactical and operational level will have significant impacts on the performance of the unit. Additionally, many of our partnered and allied militaries may deal with the same types of friction points. However, similar to Pence and

Turner, adhering to military values, or advising other military partners to do the same, will increase the chances of avoiding future missteps. Tactical level leaders, who build and maintain trust, can overcome operational and strategic level errors.
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