Interoperability, Integration, and Interdependence between the United States and Canadian Forces: Recreating the Devil’s Brigade

A Monograph

by

Lt Col Jesse W. Lamarand
US Air Force

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2016

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
This monograph addresses US Army Warfighting Challenge fourteen: How to integrate joint, inter-organizational, and multinational partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military options. In today's complex security environments, the United States' need for allies is greater than ever. While the demands on US ground forces to defend allies and deter adversaries are significant and growing, the ability to project strategic landpower due to fiscal and political constraints is shrinking. Clearly, a strategy is needed to balance the cost of war with the responsibility of successfully partnering with allies. As a result, developing a more comprehensive understanding of allied military capabilities, capacities, and strategies is important as the US Army faces budget cuts and force structure changes. Canada is one such ally. Over the past decade, the two armies have revised how they organize, train, equip, and employ forces. Coupled with an uncertain fiscal and political environment, these adaptations offer an opportunity to see where they are mutually supportive. Canadian and US doctrine present opportunities for units to "plug-in" to each others formations, enhancing integration, interoperability, and interdependence.
Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: Lt Col Jesse W. Lamarand

Monograph Title: Interoperability, Integration, and Interdependence between the United States and Canadian Forces: Recreating the Devil’s Brigade

Approved by:

__________________________________, Monograph Director
Anthony E. Carlson, PhD

__________________________________, Seminar Leader
James W. Wright, COL, IN

___________________________________, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL, IN

Accepted this 26th day of May 2016 by:

___________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency.(References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.
Abstract

Interoperability, Integration, and Interdependence between the United States and Canadian Forces: Recreating the Devil’s Brigade, by Lieutenant Colonel Jesse Lamarand, USAF, 42 pages.

In today’s complex security environment, the United States’ need for allies is greater than ever. While the demands on American ground forces to defend allies and deter adversaries are significant and growing, the ability to provide strategic landpower due to fiscal and political constraints is decreasing. Clearly, a strategy is needed to balance the costs of war with the responsibility of deterring adversaries to win in a complex world. This monograph addresses Army Warfighting Challenge fourteen: How to integrate joint, interorganizational, and multinational partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military operations. Specifically, to what degree should the Department of Defense develop more effective Canada-United States interoperability, integration, and interdependence to provide more rapid and agile responses to emerging threats and security challenges? During World War II (WWII), the First Special Service Force (FSSF), a unit consisting of Canadian and US soldiers, was an elite formation that produced a whole greater than the sum of its parts against Germany. During the Korean War, unlike in Italy and France during WWII with the FSSF, Canadians were unable to integrate effectively into the coalition effort. High-level political-military communications, planning, integration, and logistics were continual problems throughout operations. With the new Army Operating Concept and Army Vision 2025, there are opportunities for Canadian elements to “plug in” to US units. In the end, this could lead to more efficient, rapid, and better-employed forces for allied operations. By forming a permanently standing integrated brigade, the United States and Canadian armies can maximize independent comparative advantages and increase multinational interoperability, integration, and interdependence to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military operations.
## Contents

Acronyms .........................................................................................................................................v

Figures ........................................................................................................................................... vii

Tables ........................................................................................................................................... viii

Introduction: .....................................................................................................................................1

  Significance ........................................................................................................................ 3

  Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 8

  Scope .................................................................................................................................. 9

Section II: Historical Precedents ....................................................................................................11

  WWII and the Devil’s Brigade................................................................................................. 11

  Korea ................................................................................................................................ 18

Section III: Canadian and US Army Future Force Employment and Structure .......................23

  The Canadian Army of the Future.................................................................................... 23

  The US Army of the Future.............................................................................................. 28

Section IV: Analysis.......................................................................................................................32

  Historical Analysis ........................................................................................................... 36

Conclusion......................................................................................................................................37
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCT</td>
<td>Armored Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Pamphlet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADO</td>
<td>Adaptive Dispersed Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Army Functional Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Army Operating Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWFC</td>
<td>Army Warfighting Challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Budget Control Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBA</td>
<td>Bipartisan Budget Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIBG</td>
<td>Canadian Infantry Brigade Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMBG</td>
<td>Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cdn Div</td>
<td>Canadian Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBCT</td>
<td>Infantry Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I3</td>
<td>Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIMP</td>
<td>Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCFA</td>
<td>National Commission on the Future of the Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCO  Overseas Contingency Operations
PB  Presidential Budget
PAM  Pamphlet
PJBD  Permanent Joint Board on Defense
PPCLI  Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Brigade
UN  United Nations
Figures

1  I3 Force HQ Example ........................................................................................................34
2  I3 Unit structure concept..................................................................................................34
Tables

1  Canadian Army Levels........................................................................................................24
Introduction:

I’d love to have the Devil’s Brigade, but if that is not possible, as close to it as possible.
—General Martin Dempsey, July 2014

Coalition-based grand strategies have been key to maintaining the balance of power in a post-Westphalian world order for centuries. Since the American Revolution, a critical part of United States grand strategy has been its worldwide network of allies and partners. The coalition system has provided the United States with the ability to sustain and maintain a global presence, enhance deterrence, and, when asked, provided men and material necessary to fight wars.

In today’s complex security environments, the United States’ need for allies is greater than ever. While the demands on United States’ ground forces to defend allies and deter adversaries are significant and growing, the ability to project strategic landpower due to fiscal and political constraints is shrinking. Clearly, a strategy is needed to balance the cost of war with the responsibility of successfully partnering with allies. As a result, developing a more comprehensive understanding of allied military capabilities, capacities, and strategies is increasingly important as the United States Army faces budget cuts and force structure changes. For American strategists and operational artists, understanding what assistance allies can provide now and in the future is critical to winning in a complex world.

This monograph will address US Army Warfighting Challenge fourteen: How to integrate joint, inter-organizational, and multinational partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military options. Specifically, to what degree do we develop more effective Canada-United States cooperation to provide more rapid and agile responses to emerging threats and security challenges?
Canada is the second largest country on earth by landmass.\footnote{“The Largest Countries in the World,” \textit{World Atlas}, accessed December 6, 2015, http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-largest-countries-in-the-world-the-biggest-nations-as-determined-by-total-land-area.html.} However, it ranks thirty-ninth in population (35.1 million).\footnote{“The World Factbook,” \textit{Central Intelligence Agency}, last modified July 2015, accessed 6 December 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html.} It does not have the human capital and tax base to build and train a comparable army to the United States. Although United States and Canadian air power established strong interdependence through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), integrated landpower has largely been ignored and is usually based on an ad hoc basis. Over the past decade, the two armies have revised how they organize, train, equip, and employ forces. Coupled with an uncertain fiscal and political environment, these institutional adaptations present an opportunity to see where they could be mutually supportive.

Successful coalition strategies are based on history, experimentation, doctrine, and organization. This monograph will evaluate United States and Canadian Army integration history and experimentation. It will then evaluate Army doctrine and organization for future force employment, force structure, and capability concepts in order to provide a framework for an integrated force. The United States and Canadian forces have already demonstrated effect through integrating NORAD. However, integration via the land domain has been ignored for too long.

The dynamic contemporary environment presents an opportune time to re-examine interoperability, integration, and interdependence (I3) in the land domain. The US Army is reducing its manpower and changing the way it structures Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), while at the same time, global security commitments are increasing. Addressing manpower concerns, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno said in January 2015 that the Army's active-component end strength had been reduced by 80,000 Soldiers, while the Reserve
component was cut by 18,000 troops. The cuts amounted to a reduction of thirteen active-component BCTs and three active aviation brigades, including more than 800 rotary-wing aircraft. How can the Army offset reductions in combat power and manpower? One way is to “team up” to offset capability and capacity reductions. Furthermore, the Canadian and US armies often exercise together so it is likely they will work together again in the future. The question is, will the armies be willing to pay the price for integration now, or will it be passed on to troops on the ground during a future operation? By forming a permanently standing integrated brigade, the United States and Canadian armies can maximize independent comparative advantages and increase multinational I3 to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military options.

Significance

Defeating the Islamic State with airpower alone has not achieved decisive results. Russian aggression will also not likely be deterred by airpower alone. Chinese anti-access and area denial capabilities may continue to limit airpower and seapower. The US Army’s role is to prevent, shape, and win in a complex world. Landpower facilitates this by extending and solidifying the temporary effects of battlefield gains by the presence of boots on the ground. Indeed, as US Army doctrine argues, “No major conflict has ever been won without boots on the ground.” Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1 defines landpower as “the ability—by threat,
force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.\textsuperscript{5}

According to doctrine, landpower includes the ability to:

- Impose the nation’s will on an enemy, by force if necessary.
- Engage to influence, shape, prevent and deter in any operational environment.
- Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development.
- Address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and man-made—to restore the infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.
- Secure and support bases from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an operational environment.\textsuperscript{6}

The ability to seize and hold ground, deny key terrain, and defeat enemy fighting formations will remain paramount to influencing the future operational environment. However, all too often the United States’ answer to new and more dangerous threats is investing in cutting-edge technologies and weapon systems. Current fiscal realities suggest that continued investment in expensive technologies might not be a sustainable offset strategy, especially at the risk of accepting smaller land forces in the near term. New strategies do not need to be technologically based. Landpower-based strategies can stem from discovering operational problems that drove adaptation and innovation. For example, “Air-Land Battle grew as much out of the training and doctrine reform started after the Vietnam War and linked to the 1973 Yom Kippur War as it did new technology.”\textsuperscript{7} Air-Land Battle helped solve the operational problem of countering and deterring large Soviet Army formations through the clever integration of available forces.

The Department of Defense (DoD) budget has been unstable almost every year since 2011 and this makes it difficult for the Army to develop long-term strategies. In August of 2011, Congress passed the Budget Control Act (BCA), also known as sequestration. In January of 2013,


\textsuperscript{6} ADP 1, 1-4.

the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 made substantial changes to the original BCA funding levels, along with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 passed in December of 2014. To add to the confusion, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA15) changed DoD funding levels yet again. Total DoD base funding has declined by seven percent while the Army base funding has declined by fourteen percent from Fiscal Years (FY) 2010 to 2015.\(^8\) However, the Army has partially mitigated that loss through the supplemental Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. OCO funds paid for activities to maintain readiness and other critical requirements that normally would have been paid for via the non-OCO budget.\(^9\) Under these conditions, no viable long-term funding approach provides the Army with the resources needed to invest in modernization, maintaining and building readiness, and ensuring the overall health of the force. As such, the Army’s fiscal future could go three ways: sequester-level funding, funding under the President’s Budget for FY 2016 (PB16), or higher funding levels, which is highly unlikely.

Sequester-level funding remains a possibility for 2018. While DoD received some relief from sequestration cuts when Congress passed the 2015 BBA, it only established a budgetary framework for the next two years. Defense Department Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer Mike McCord highlighted the problem when he testified before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee in May of 2015: “If there is no further relief from the BCA of 2011 after this two-year budget deal (BBA 15), we [DoD] return to sequester-level caps in 2018, [and] we would still


\(^9\) NCFA, \textit{Report to the President and Congress}, 39.
absorb about $800 billion in cuts over 10 years from the BCA.”10 However, due to the 2015 BBA, the DoD should receive about 98 percent of what it requested for FY 2016, providing some short-term relief from sequestration.11 Nevertheless, after 2017 the DoD and Army may be constrained by the BCA—referred to as sequester-level funding—which the 2014 DoD report Estimated Impacts of Sequestration-Level Funding suggested will be unable to keep pace with inflation.12 In addition, according to the American National Commission of the Future of the Army (NCFA), if faced with a continuation of sequestration-level funding and limited OCO funding, the Army stated it would need to reduce its active duty force to 420,000.13 According to then Secretary of the Army John McHugh and Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, sequester-level funding has already had a detrimental impact on Army readiness and modernization.14 Moreover, the NCFA concluded that a force of 420,000 active duty personnel would be insufficient to meet national security requirements as specified in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Furthermore, readiness and modernization efforts would suffer, leaving the nation too exposed to risk.15

However, the NCFA also concluded that the funding in Presidential Budget (PB) 2016 “provides the Army with the minimum resources necessary to meet requirements at acceptable


11 Ibid.

12 NCFA, Report to the President and Congress, 40.

13 Ibid.


15 NCFA, Report to the President and Congress, 40.
levels of risk to the nation.” Yet the PB 2016 did not account for recent changes to the strategic environment. It assumed the troop drawdown in Afghanistan would continue, and it failed to account for the instability in Syria and the tenaciousness of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). For instance, General John Campbell, the former top US commander in Afghanistan, recommended to the Senate Arms Service Committee that the United States should keep more American forces in Afghanistan through 2016, abandoning the current plans to reduce the US presence. In addition, the top US general in Iraq as of March 2016, Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, recently reported the United States will need more troops for conventional warfare operations targeting ISIS.

Moreover, the instability in the Balkans continues. To address the instability, *Stars and Stripes* reported that DoD is requesting 3,000 to 5,000 more troops for the European Reassurance Initiative, which is an effort to reassure European allies of the United States commitment to their security as members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Additionally, DoD requested $3.4 billion dollars in the FY17 budget for the Initiative—four times the amount requested for 2016 ($780 million). This is occurring as the Regular Army is scheduled to reduce

---

16 NCFA, *Report to the President and Congress*, 43.


its personnel strength from 490,000 to 475,000 soldiers by FY17 with more cuts to follow depending on funding levels.20

A strategy is needed to offset and mitigate growing operational commitments and shrinking resources. A possible offset strategy includes increased I3 with allied nations’ military forces. This would be congruent with—and expand—the Army Operating Concept and the Army’s Beyond 2025 initiative. There are historical precedents for this approach. During WWII, for instance, the First Special Service Force (FSSF), a unit consisting of Canadian and United States soldiers, constituted an elite I3 formation that produced landpower effects greater than the sum of its parts. The need to increase coalition burden sharing is evident, as described by current Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. He recently emphasized that the United States has shouldered the heaviest load and conducted “68% of the 6,655 airstrikes in Iraq and 94% of the 3,305 airstrikes in Syria since August 2014.[and] that some allies are not doing enough, or nothing at all.”21

Methodology

Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, provides the doctrinal basis for United States military coordination during multinational operations. JP 3-16 suggests that six tenets form the foundation for mutual confidence in coalition operations.22 The tenets are respect,
rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, trust and confidence. JP 3-16 also
provides fundamental concepts to facilitate interoperability at the political and strategic levels.
First, building a coalition starts with political decisions and diplomatic efforts at the national
leadership level. Second, the result of these discussions needs to result in the nature and limit of
the response, the command structure, the military objectives, and the end-state.23

Scope

The fundamental challenge in multinational operations is effective I3 to achieve common
policy objectives—unity of effort. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 11-31, Army
Security Cooperation Handbook, defines multinational force interoperability as “the ability of the
forces of two or more nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution
of assigned missions and tasks, and the ability to act together coherently, effectively and
efficiently to achieve allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives.”24 Today’s Army uses a
tiered framework to assess a partner nation’s capability, capacity to perform military missions,
and its potential interoperability with the US Army:

(1) C–0: Partner army is a security importer and cannot contribute forces to multinational
operations.
(2) C–1: Partner army is capable of providing up to battalion size units or niche
capabilities to multinational operations.
(3) C–2: Partner army can deploy and sustain a brigade regionally or globally with
assistance.
(4) C–3: Partner army can deploy and sustain a brigade+ globally and conduct the range
of military operations upon arrival.25

In addition, the US Army recognizes four levels of interoperability with partner armies:

(1) I–0: Partner army has no demonstrated interoperability with U.S. Army;
command and control C2 interface with the U.S. Army is only at the national
level; has no regular engagement with the U.S. Army.

23 JP 3-16, x-ii.
24 Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 11-31, Army Security Cooperation
25 DA PAM 11-31, 10.
(2) I–1: Partner army shares information or situational awareness through liaison teams with U.S. systems (analog to digital conversion required); requires alignment of capabilities and procedures to establish operational norms; has some routine engagement with U.S. Army.

(3) I–2: Partner army has digital [Command and Control] C2 capabilities; actively participates in IO solutions with the U.S. Army; routinely exercises or operates with the U.S. Army.

(4) I–3: Partner army’s interoperability is network-enabled through: shared situational awareness; command and control on-the-move; collaborative planning; networked fires; combat identification; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.26

The United States aims to raise a partner nation’s capability and capacity to higher interoperability levels with its military. While interoperability is the goal, integration and interdependence are more valuable to the warfighter. The next section will argue that during WWII, the United States and Canada were able to form and deploy an integrated brigade for successful operations, even though Canada was at level C-2 and I-1. Force integration raised unit interoperability levels to C-3 and I-3 (absent the digital and network technology that was not available then). As a result, the Devil’s Brigade was combat effective and accomplished its objective above and beyond what was expected. However, during the Korean War, the Canadian Army remained at C-2 and I-1. Canada elected to remain part of the British Commonwealth Division and did not integrate with a US unit. As a result, many challenges arose when attempting to utilize the Canadian contribution in the war.

26 DA PAM 11-31, 10.
Section II: Historical Precedents

WWII and the Devil’s Brigade

Prior to WWII, the last major combat engagement between US troops and Canadian militia occurred during the War of 1812. By WWII, the Canadian and US relationship had improved. The United States and Canadian armies during WWII was successful because both nations demonstrated respect, rapport, patience, and adaptability at the highest political level down to the unit in combat.

Establishing respect and rapport began with political leadership. In August 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King issued the "Ogdensburg Declaration." It outlined joint defense concepts and sanctioned the establishment of a group to carry it out. Canadian and US leadership formed the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), a bi-national working group for continuous high-level consultations on common defense matters. Collective security for continental defense was a vital interest to both nations. On the East Coast, US Navy and US Army Air Forces worked with Canadians in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland as they managed trans-Atlantic aviation and maritime logistics mobility operations to the European theater. On the West Coast and Alaska, 33,000 United States and 16,000 Canadian troops constructed the 1,523-mile Alaska-Canada highway and pipeline. In August 1943, fearful that Japanese troops had captured Kiska Island, Canadian troops came under US command in a conscripted Western Hemispheric defense unit that assisted in the unopposed occupation of the island the Aleutian Island chain. The United States and Canada treated each other with respect, and built rapport throughout the war. Force integration bestowed

---

each nation with knowledge about the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, history, and values of their new partner.

Canadian and American soldiers gained their first combat experience as part of an integrated force during WWII named the FSSF. The Canadian Army was pivotal in contributing high quality forces to the FSSF—precursor to today’s Special Operations Forces. Known as the Devil’s Brigade, it was originally formed for mountain and arctic raids against German forces in Norway. However, the Devil’s Brigade was sent to Italy and France in 1943 where it served with legendary distinction before being disbanded in December of 1944.

The story of the Devil’s Brigade began in 1942. The idea originated with British strategist Geoffrey Nathanial Pyke. Pyke was a member of British Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten’s group of wartime civilian strategists. They worked out of his London headquarters for Combined Operations and generated ideas for Allied strategy. Pyke envisioned an indirect approach that used a specialized airborne land force to counter German advantages stemming from the Norwegian occupation. A surprise strike from the north would garner German attention and force them to send large formations into the area, diverting German strength from central and southern Europe. However, British manpower reserves were already taxed and devoted to other theaters. Pyke’s indirect strategy was outlined in a memorandum sent to Lord Mountbatten, which “advanced the use of a new military strategy…one in which a small but tough British force might be able to attack successfully an infinitely larger number of Germans if provided with the type of machinery which would give them versatility and speed.”


29 Millet, ALLIES OF A KIND, 2.

30 Quoted in Robert H. Adleman and George Walton, The Devil’s Brigade (Philadelphia:
the plan called for a force of well-trained men to parachute into the snow-covered areas of Europe with machines that could travel quickly over snow. They would destroy bridges, tunnels, trains, tracks, hydroelectric stations, oilfields, and other targets of opportunity in quick succession in Romania, Northern Italy, and Norway—creating a third diversionary front in northern Europe. Operations were planned for the winter of 1942-1943.31

Respect and rapport between Canadian, British, and US high-level leadership were essential to making the idea a reality. Lord Mountbatten supported and passed Pyke’s plan to Winston Churchill, Harry Hopkins (President Franklin Roosevelt’s representative), and US Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall. They immediately recognized the idea’s potential, and Churchill recommended the inclusion of Canadian troops. Canadian troops would enhance the formation and relieve Britain’s manpower burden. Lord Mountbatten proposed it to the Canadian government and the Canadian Lieutenant General Kenneth Stuart, Chief of Staff, agreed to support it. However, American operational planners disagreed with the idea at first.32 Once General Dwight Eisenhower threw his support behind the plan, it was approved. The concept capitalized on Canadian experience in cold weather operations, US manufacturing, training, and basing capacity. From that point forward, it was full steam ahead.33

Planners capitalized on knowledge of United States and Canadian comparative advantages to build an efficient and lethal force with minimal impact to ongoing operations. From the outset, responsibility and cost sharing was essential to success. Britain could not afford to

---

31 Stacey, SIX YEARS OF WAR, 105.
32 Adleman, The Devil’s Brigade, 17. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Frederick was placed in charge of determining the efficacy of the project. He had authored a secret memo recommending the project be abandoned or redirected. However, in May of 1942 Eisenhower told Mountbatten in London that they would do it.
33 Ibid.
send troops and material. As such, the United States agreed to build the specialized armored fighting snow vehicles, and carry out the planning and intelligence gathering. Canada offered tactics, techniques, and procedures for cold weather operations, troops, and snow covered training areas.  

Since many challenges plagued the formation and administration of a bi-national force, patience was required to forge a mutually-beneficial relationship. What would it look like? Who would command and staff it? How would responsibilities be divided? Where would they train? What uniform would they wear? How would costs be divided? US Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert Frederick was placed in command of the unit. Its membership was strictly volunteer, and he had the foresight to recruit men who shared experiences soldiering and living in cold, mountainous regions. He anticipated that the size of the force be smaller than a division. Closely resembling a brigade, it would be composed of three regiments, a headquarters company, and a service battalion.  

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick addressed the issue of the command structure by writing a memo, signed by General George Marshall, stating, “commissioned and enlisted personnel of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Norway…may be placed under the command of, or in command of, United States Army personnel as is appropriate to the individual’s military rank, and is desirable for the efficient accomplishment of the mission.” Both countries had trust, confidence, and a level of respect that facilitated allowing their troops to be commanded by another nation’s officers. An American commanded two of the three regiments with a Canadian deputy, and a

34 Adleman, The Devil’s Brigade, 35.  
35 Ibid., 46.  
Canadian commanded the third with an American deputy. Interestingly, Canadians sent their best and toughest troops, while the Americans contributed "lumberjacks, forest rangers, hunters, north woodsman, game wardens, prospectors, and explorers."37

Demanding and specialized multinational training enhanced knowledge of partner capability. Norwegian ski and mountain survival experts traveled to Helena, Montana, and trained the group in the summer of 1942. Helena was near the continental divide and provided the high altitude, snowy, and harsh topography necessary for appropriate training. A member of the Third Regiment, John Bourne, described it as being of great value when the unit combat in the mountains of Italy during the winter of 1943-1944.38

The United States and Canadian armies demonstrated adaptability and patience after the Norwegians backed out of Operation Plough. The unit had been training for weeks for a specific mission and the loss of a key partner threatened its existence. However, General Marshall and Eisenhower recognized the project’s value and suggested adapting the unit for use in raids, sabotage, and guerrilla operations. The Canadians agreed and, as a result, the unit trained for any physically-demanding clandestine task that needed execution. The grueling training in harsh weather for long periods of time produced a strong sense of pride, respect, and rapport that transcended nationalistic divisions prior to deployment.39

The United States financed the majority of the force, including housing and equipment; clothing (American uniforms were furnished to the entire force); transportation costs once

37 Adleman, The Devil’s Brigade, 48.
38 Ibid., 84.
39 Ibid., 65.
Canadian personnel reported for duty; and hospital, medical, and dental services. The Canadians financed the pay, allowances, and pensions of Canadian personnel.40

The Brigade arrived in Casablanca on 5 November 1943. On 22 November, the FSSF was assigned to the 36th Division (part of II Corps, Fifth Army).41 The Fifth Army had pushed north from Salerno, Italy, in the previous two and a half months. It and had cleared Naples, but had slowed before the German “Winter Line,” which was series of defensive lines in front of Rome.42 The first line consisted of a “chain of heavily fortified hills, linked together by some of the toughest German Army units in the European theater.”43 The key to breaching this line were two mountains named Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetenea. The FSSF’s mission was to attack and seize these mountains from the Germans. By capturing the mountains, the follow on American and British forces would exploit the breach, then engage and destroy the German defenses. The mission was called Operation Raincoat, most likely due to the incessant rain during November (November is Italy’s heaviest month for rainfall).44 On 2 December, after a ten-mile hike through German minefields and a 3,000 foot climb, 600 members of the Devil’s Brigade snuck by German emplacements by slitting the throats of the German troops.45 Planners believed it should have taken three days to destroy the German stronghold on Monte la Difensa. However, according to Robert Adleman and George Walton, “in just two hours of fighting, the German stronghold…ceased to exist. It had held back the progress of an Army, repelled many determined and extended attacks…Battle-wise historians still regard this feat as a mission they would have

40 Stacey, SIX YEARS OF WAR, 106.
41 Burhans, The First Special Service Force, 11.
42 Ibid.,11.
43 Adleman, The Devil’s Brigade, 118.
44 Burhans, The First Special Service Force, 90.
45 Adleman, The Devil’s Brigade, 127.
labeled impossible had it not actually happened.” Canadians and Americans had demonstrated the benefits of training and employing a fully-integrated and interdependent unit that was greater than the sum of its parts.

The FSSF disbanded on 5 December 1944 on the Loup River flats at Villeneuve-Loubet, France. According to Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Burhans, author of *The First Special Service Force*, WWII had grown into a mass operation of armies, corps, and divisions. The need for a small, elite assault force had passed. The end of the war was approaching and it was only a matter of time until the Germans surrendered. American and Canadian war plans changed their focus to a post-war stance, in which there was little need for the FSSF.

After the war, Allied leadership struggled with rebuilding Europe and containing Soviet power. Allied reporting indicated both France and Great Britain were weak and could do little more than defend the British Isles. US political leadership wanted American armed forces rapidly demobilized and deep reductions in defense spending. The German and Japanese threat was gone, but in its place came a rising Soviet Union. According to Steven T. Ross, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recognized that United States and Soviet relations were deteriorating and many viewed the USSR as an aggressive power. However, since the Soviets lacked atomic weapons, a long-range air force, and a blue water navy, the JCS anticipated the Soviets would exercise restraint and avoid direct challenges to American interests. As a result, the US government took a calculated risk and reduced its armed forces after 1945 while maintaining austere defense budgets through the late 1940’s. The risk was based on the JCS’s assessment

---

49 Ibid., 4.
50 Ibid., 155.
that the Soviets were recovering as well, and after the 1950’s, the United States could rely on nuclear weapons to offset Soviet conventional strength.

Over the course of the war, the United States and Britain had forged a special relationship. According to Ross, “for several years after 1945 the military planners regarded Great Britain as America’s only reliable great power ally, even after the formation of NATO, the Anglo-American relationship was viewed as critically important.” However, due to Britain’s post-war condition, its WWII economic recovery was slow.

Canada realized that as a result of Britain’s postwar economic and military state, Canada’s defense would depend largely on a strong and stable relationship with the United States. NORAD became the standard for cooperation. By 1947, Ottawa and Washington announced the principles of future military cooperation, including consultation on air defense issues, constituting the initial discussions about NORAD. However, interoperability eroded because Canada focused on Air Force interoperability via NORAD and landpower contributions to NATO and the United Nations (UN). The next opportunity to test force integration occurred during war Korea.

Korea

The Korean War represented a lost opportunity to facilitate closer I3 between US Army and Canadian Army forces. A lack of political consensus and deficiencies in all four tenets of multinational operations contributed to poor I3 throughout preparation and execution of operations. Useful integration did not occur due to United States policy changes, lack of Canadian readiness, and sovereignty concerns. During the course of the war, the two armies largely remained unintegrated separate entities.

51 Ross, *AMERICAN WAR PLANS*, 152.
When the Korean War began, Canadian and United States Army relations were minimal. Respect, rapport, and knowledge of each other’s landpower capabilities had deteriorated since WWII. There were no Army-to-Army agreements for officer exchanges in alliance staffing or professional military education. Allied initiatives were considered in talks, but high costs and Canadian Parliamentary criticism constrained any real efforts. On one hand, Canadian Liberal Party Leader, the Honorable Brooke Claxton, supported US and Canadian partnerships. As Defense Minister (1946-1954), he increased the Canadian military mission in Washington by ordering it to develop stronger ties with the US Army’s research and development agencies. Yet, he also found most projects constrained by a small Canadian defense budget of which half went to air defense, and he considered US weapons overpriced and oversold on performance.

Nevertheless, as a member of the UN, Canada’s Prime Minister announced on 7 August 1950 that Canada would send ground troops to Korea. At this time, UN forces had been pushed back to the Pusan perimeter. The Canadian Active Force (regular Army) numbered only 20,369 personnel. It consisted of three infantry battalions, two armored units, and a regiment of field artillery, which had been organized as a mobilization base for a future wartime force. In addition, Canada had not yet completed stationing the brigade in Germany that it owed to NATO. Ultimately, Canada did not have a deployment-ready expeditionary force for combat operations.

---

52 Millet, ALLIES OF A KIND, 4.
53 Ibid., 5. Half of Canada’s government expenditures ($2.7 billion per year, 10% of GNP) went to defense.
54 Canadian Army, Canada’s Army in Korea: the United Nations Operations, 1950-1953 and Their Aftermath; A Short Official Account, Historical Section, General Staff, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1956), 7.
55 William Johnston, A War of Patrols; Canadian Army Operations in Korea, (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2003), xv.
Canadian leadership wanted to create a new unit from scratch, forming the Canadian Army Special Service Force, called the Twenty Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (CIBG). Canadian Army leadership estimated that it would take six months for the group to be ready.\textsuperscript{56} During those six months, the nature of the war significantly changed as the Chinese entered the conflict in late October 1950. Had the CIBG been activated from the Canadian regular forces, it may have reached Korea in six weeks, (18 September 1950) prior to the Chinese offensive.\textsuperscript{57}

From September 1950 to December 1950, the Canadian and United States relationship at the political strategic level was rocky. The governments disagreed on how to use the Canadian contribution as well as objectives. The Canadian government thought that their Army offering should go to NATO (based in Germany), with a small battalion chopped to UN Command for occupational duties in Korea. At the start of the war, MacArthur had requested only a battalion, thinking he had defeated the North Koreans prior to Chinese entry. Circumstances in Korea dictated otherwise. As the Chinese offensive pushed back the Eighth Army in November 1950, Secretary of Defense George Marshall emphasized that the United Nations needed as many allied troops as possible and the Canadian force should join combat operations in Korea.\textsuperscript{58}

By 21 November 1950, the 25th CIBG began training at Ft. Lewis, Washington. US Army leadership at Ft. Lewis provided American trainers, live-fire ranges, ammunition, vehicles, petroleum, and lubricants. More importantly, it was an opportunity for the Canadians to establish respect, rapport, and knowledge of their American partners prior to deploying. However, a battalion from the group, the Second Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), would


\textsuperscript{57} Millet, \textit{ALLIES OF A KIND}, 9.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 14.
travel to Korea on 25 November as part of a UN occupation force. The battalion missed an opportunity to build mutual confidence with their US partners. The rest of the CIBG trained at Ft. Lewis until March 1951.

The United States did not properly exercise respect and patience with the Canadians when they arrived in theater. The Eighth Army commander tried to send the Canadians into combat before they were ready. The Canadian government and the 2nd PPCLI expected an eight-week window to complete its training upon arrival in Korea, then assume occupation duties as its mission. However the United States mission focus had changed due to the Chinese offensive. The Eighth Army headquarters wanted to commit the untrained Canadian battalion to patrol against guerrilla forces within fifty miles of the front, without allowing them the eight week training period. When the Canadians arrived, they had completed only four training days in the United States, even though it was standard to conduct some pre-combat and terrain familiarization training after entering the theater. The 2nd PPCLI was not ready for combat, creating friction between the 2nd PPCLI’s commander and US Eighth Army leadership. While Eighth Army commander, General Walton Walker granted six weeks instead of eight for the unit to train, US and Canadian political leadership did not achieve shared mission focus and knowledge of partners before Canadian forces deployed.

Canadian Minister of External Affairs (similar to the US Secretary of State) Lester Pearson established the Canadian political-strategic context that shaped Canadian-US ground relations in Korea. Like US General John Pershing during WWI, he understood the challenges of

59 Johnston, A War of Patrols, 42.


61 Johnston, A War of Patrols, 58.
a newly-formed, smaller Army joining an established larger one. As such, Canadian policy emphasized the operational independence and national identity of the Canadian Army in Korea.\textsuperscript{62} This meant serving under its own officers, wearing its own uniforms, and using its own equipment when possible, increasing the cost and time needed to integrate the unit. The Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) pushed for his troop formations to fall under the British Commonwealth Division, which had a similar policy of non-integration. Learning from the British, Canada understood that the secret of independence was to keep requests for outside assistance to a minimum, and to exhibit enough operational capabilities and professionalism to discourage amalgamation. According to historian Allen Millet, “Canada might create a military presence and political leverage greater than its real operational contribution.”\textsuperscript{63}

Overall, US demand for Canadian troops led Canada to deploy troops in combat earlier than they expected not allowing for sufficient combined readiness training. However, Canada should have maintained a military organization that was fully prepared for a range of operations, especially in a highly contentious theater such as Korea. American and Canadian forces did not have the opportunity to build respect, rapport, and knowledge of partners, and the US struggled to exercise patience and mission focus after the Chinese offensive. The US and Canadian armies’ interoperability challenges during the Korean War highlighted the difficulties that emerge when units attempt to work together on an ad hoc basis. The War constituted a lost opportunity to facilitate better I3. It is logical to conclude, then, if Canadian and US forces exercised better I3 at start of the war, a Canadian ground combat force would have been available earlier, and achieved the unity of effort that was not present between US and Canadian armies during the Korean War.

\textsuperscript{62} Millet, \textit{ALLIES OF A KIND}, 5.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 14.
The Canadian Army of the Future

According to the Government of Canada, “the United States is Canada’s most important ally and defence partner.” It is in Canada’s strategic interest to be a reliable partner, given the common defense and security requirements for North America it shares with the United States. Geographic proximity shapes the need to cooperate as defense partners to achieve greater North American security than could be achieved individually. This relationship informs Canadian defense strategy at all levels.

The Canada First Defence Strategy calls for Canadian Forces to be a strong, reliable defense partner able to “lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period…and deploy forces in response to crisis elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.” To meet these goals, Canadian Forces will need to be interoperable and integrated with key allies and partners as part of an effective international force. To understand how the Canadian Army plans to accomplish this, this section will discuss where the Canadian Army stands today, where it is headed, and how it will get there.

According to Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy 3rd Edition, “The [Canadian] Army is a medium-weight force, reinforced with armor capabilities, capable of leading and sustaining complex land-based operations, up to divisional level, across the full spectrum of

---


65 Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008), 3-8.
Like the United States Army, it is designed to live, train and fight as part of a combined arms team. It is divided into seven levels:

**Table 1. Canadian Army Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 7:</th>
<th>Formation Brigade (Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 6:</td>
<td>Unit (Regiment or Battalion) and Combined Arms Unit (Battle Group and Battalion Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 5:</td>
<td>Combined Arms Sub-unit (Combat Team and Company Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4:</td>
<td>Sub-unit (Squadron, Battery and Company) less Field Artillery Battery, Combined Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3:</td>
<td>Sub-sub-unit (troop/Platoon) and Field Artillery Battery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2:</td>
<td>Section, Crew and Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1:</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Created by author.

The Canadian Army is currently focused on modernizing, sustaining, and employing the force. Canada believes the future security environment will be complex, multidimensional, and continually changing, which will require forces that are “agile, precise, network-enabled, multipurpose, and capable of full-spectrum operations…supported by a comprehensive approach within a joint, interagency, multi-national, and public (JIMP) environment.” Canada intends to employ its forces through a concept called Adaptive Dispersed Operations (ADO).

According to *Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, ADO is conceptual framework for the deliberate use of dispersion and

---


68 Ibid., 31.
aggregation by adaptive forces in order to create and sustain tactical advantage. ADO is a conceptual guide for Canadian army transformation for the 2020-2030 timeframe. Similar to concepts in the US Army, it is based on network-enabled forces, enhanced soldier capability, and the creation of integrated effects that build upon the doctrine of maneuver warfare and mission command. It will also be allied network-enabled and designed to work within a Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public (JIMP) environment (similar to the US JIM acronym). The system will enhance soldier capability by linking dispersed soldiers in time, space, and purpose in order to meet threats with enhanced precision, lethality, and protection. The fundamentals of ADO are grounded in the maneuver warfare core functions of find, fix, and strike. Its key principles include:

- Developing situations prior to contact
- Maneuvering to positions of advantage
- Influencing the adversary beyond his ability to influence the situation with fires and other capabilities
- Destroying the enemies cohesion, will and support with lethal and non-lethal precision and area fires
- Conducting close combat and close engagement at the time and place of our own choosing
- Transitioning between operations without focus or momentum

The spirit of ADO includes the “ability to conduct coordinated, interdependent, full-spectrum actions by widely dispersed teams across the psychological, physical, and informational planes of the operating space, ordered and connected within an operational design created to achieve a desired end-state.” The Canadian Army’s transformational goal is to have the ability to conduct ADO in a JIMP environment in order to “plug in” to allied formations. But, in order to do so, it

---


71 DND, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 31.

72 Ibid.
must change its force structure. As a result, unit structure will be modular and interchangeable at
the brigade and battle group level, enabling these units to integrate into larger allied formations.

The structures will be task-oriented in organization, but retain flexibility and integration with
multinational forces. Figure 1 depicts the envisioned structure of expeditionary forces:

---

Figure 1. Land Operations 2021 Formation Elements

Source: Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), Waypoint 2018: The Canadian Army
Advancing Toward Land Operations 2021 (Kingston: Canadian Army Land Warfare Center,
2015), 13.

The Land Force will have the ability to generate modular forces from the model above that are
interoperable with select allies, and tailored for specific operations. Its primary function will be

---

an infantry-heavy combined arms medium force. Figure 2 represents the force employment model for sustained and surge expeditionary brigade structures. In the absence of a specific assigned mission, it is designed to meet four potential missions (described in Canadian doctrine as Lines of Operation 1-4):

![Figure 2. Force 2018 Employment Model](image)


LOO one and two are homeland security focused while Lines of Operation three and four are focused on expeditionary operations. For example, Line of Operation three states: “Conduct a
sustained expeditionary mission for an international crisis in an environment ranging from low to high intensity, enabled by CAF capabilities and as part of a coalition force.”

Three Regular Force brigade groups, the 1st, 2nd, and 5th CMBGs, form the standing core from which primary fighting units will be generated. As Figure 2 depicted, individual units within each CMBG will allow for integration with multinational forces. What is important for US Army planners to recognize is that the 1st CMBG is an armored ground maneuver force. It utilizes the Leopard 2A4 Main Battle Tank, light air-mobile infantry, and artillery (M777s). The 2nd and 5th CMBGs are armored reconnaissance brigades that operate the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) III, Coyote, with light infantry and artillery regiments attached. Along with the core maneuver units, the CMBGs have organic supporting arms and services that are capable of integrating with other formations to meet mission specific requirements. The three Regular Force Brigade groups will provide the elements that make up an expeditionary Battle Group, which is Canada’s version of a combined arms Brigade Combat Team (BCT). These capabilities nest nicely within the US Army primary force projections units—infantry, armored, and Stryker brigades.

The US Army of the Future

The US Army of the future is based on Army Operating Concept (AOC) Force 2025 and Beyond. Developed by the Army Capabilities Integration Center, Force 2025 and Beyond is the US Army’s strategy to ensure the Army of tomorrow can win in a complex world. By 2025, a smarter, leaner, more lethal, and agile Army must operate, enable forces, and organize differently as part of a joint force operating with multinational partners. The Force 2025 and Beyond concept


will set the ends, ways, and means for long-term change along three primary lines of effort: force employment; science and technology and human performance; and force design. The next section of this paper will focus on force employment and design, as it enables integrated multinational forces.

Six new Army Functional Concepts (AFC) encompass Force employment. AFCs guide changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities while directing the integration of future army forces as part of joint, multinational coalitions to win in a complex world. Each concept addresses one of the warfighting functions: fires, mission command, intelligence, movement and maneuver, sustainment, and protection. Each AFC has its own doctrinal publication. While it is beyond the scope of this monograph to analyze all of them, each publication has a section that highlights how future US Army forces will integrate all warfighting functions in expanded multinational full-spectrum operations. For example, the United States Army TRADOC Pam 525-3-4: Functional Concept for Fires 2016-2028, explains how the Army will enable multinational fires on the ground and through airspace in decentralized operations by enhancing operationally adaptive fires capabilities. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-4 defines this as:

versatile capabilities to respond to uncertainty and complexity; enable the defeat of a wide range of threats; provide timely and responsive fires in environmental and operational conditions; provide a range of precision to conventional scalable capabilities to engage ground targets and aerial threats, prevent fratricide and minimize collateral damage; provide access to and integrate joint, Army, and multinational fires capabilities at the lowest appropriate levels.

---


78 TRADOC Pam 525-3-4, 10.
To provide operationally adaptable fires for the future operating environment, the Army will:

expand the Army fires warfighting function; employ versatile Army fires capabilities; identify, locate, target, and engage threats with increased discrimination; integrate joint, Army, and multinational capabilities; and distribute fires for decentralized operations.\(^79\)

When compared to past fires concepts, this is an expanded view of fires that enables the Army to plug gaps, gain synergies, counter future force projected threats, and improve integration with multinational forces. The AOC requires the above capabilities, which are derived from Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs). AWFCs are the capabilities the Army has determined it needs to win in a complex world. AWFC 14 directs the US Army to “integrate joint, interorganizational, and multinational partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military operations.”\(^80\) As a result, future Army forces will integrate the fires capabilities of multinational partners into the concept of operations, enabling joint and combined interdependencies from the tactical to strategic levels. The Army’s functional concept for fires explains that integration with allies on the battlefield will be accomplished by field artillery commanders and air defense artillery commanders. The commanders will be assisted by fire support and control officers, tactical directors, fire control officers, noncommissioned officers, and fires cells at all echelons during defense design planning, and the follow-on operations and targeting processes. Furthermore, these leaders will enable integration with other maneuver commanders and sensors, taking full advantage of multinational interdependencies.\(^81\) This means that allied officers will need to be integrated at the planning and execution stages at all levels before, during, and after operations.

In addition to force employment changes, the US Army made significant changes to its force structure in 2004, and plans more changes in the future. According to Army Field Manual

\(^79\) TRADOC Pam 525-3-4, 10.
\(^80\) Ibid., 32.
\(^81\) Ibid., 16.
Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations, in 2003 the Army shifted from a division-based force to a brigade-based force. Based on the operational environment, the Army needed to reorganize around smaller, more versatile formations to deploy quicker and fight longer, while satisfying global commitments in non-combat regions. In 2004, the Army introduced the “Modular Force” through which BCTs changed from three-maneuver battalion formations to two-maneuver battalion formations, but also gained a reconnaissance squadron, special troops battalion, and brigade support battalion. Maneuver BCTs became the Army’s principal fighting formations and strategic landpower projectors. Today, the Army combines three types of BCTs: infantry, armored, and Stryker; a mix of multifunctional and functional brigades; and division and corps headquarters as required in expeditionary force packages. Under the US Army BCT 2020 concept, infantry and armored BCTs will return to the original three-battalion formation as the army has determined it is a more effective fighting formation. Moreover, a third maneuver battalion and additional engineer and fires capabilities will be added to each armor and infantry BCT. Stryker BCTs will remain three-battalion formations. However, they will receive an additional brigade engineer battalion. Since these elements will need to be taken from other organizations the Army is reducing its number of BCTs. As part of restructuring, the number of Regular Army BCTs will be reduced from a high of forty-five in 2013, to thirty by the end of FY17.

---


84 FM 3-94, 1-1.

With the expected BCT reduction happening by the end of FY17, the Army will be left with twelve armored BCTs, fourteen infantry BCTs, and seven Stryker BCTs. Those numbers could change in the future, based on the fiscal environment and the threat. However, rather than decrease the number of BCTs, Congress, the President, and senior military leaders could ask Canada to supplement light infantry and reconnaissance elements to form an integrated brigade.

History has demonstrated Canadian and US Army forces have routinely deployed and operated as coalition partners. Future operational environment assessments provide the context for that trend to continue. Current doctrine directs both force reductions and fiscal constraints. It also directs both armies to be capable of coordinating and employing the warfighting functions from joint and multinational constructs. This is a force multiplier as multinational capabilities from each of the warfighting functions, not just fires, can provide redundancy to offset restrictions, constraints, restraints, resource shortfalls, and gaps in coverage.

Section IV: Analysis

Constructing an integrated force requires several actions. The force would rely on existing United States and Canadian modular combat structures in order to facilitate smoother planning, training, and equipping. In other words, it would need to be a conventional force similar in nature to existing US BCTs, or the Canadian Force 2018 Force Employment Model for a Battle Group. In doing so, the force could maximize utilization of home-station unit structure and resources during Phase 0 operations as it has done in the past. It must be scalable and task-tailorable to meet proposed, projected, and emerging global threats. The headquarters must be integrated and the units interoperable. Its combat power would emerge from its interdependence. A good example of integrated command structure is found in NATO where a commander is

---

designated from a member nation, but the staff is an amalgam of officers and soldiers from various nations. An integrated unit’s combat power and effectiveness must be balanced with cost effectiveness to both nations. Additionally, the force must not adversely affect any individual nation’s national tasks, commitments, and sovereignty.

The headquarters should be permanent, use existing bases, and be easily accessible to both nations. It would have an integrated bi-national headquarters staff with its core permanently stationed at the headquarters (similar to NORAD). The remaining staff and assigned units would be home-station based in each country with nationally-designated units. Its structure would resemble a BCT with enablers drawn from both countries armies based on needs. The headquarters must be geographically proximate to the unit to permit mobilization for training and exercises. The headquarters should be based on existing affiliations and relationships and operate according to the classified Canada-US Army-to-Army engagement strategy. Some possible locations in the US include Fort Drum (10th Mountain Division) and Joint Base Lewis-McCord (JBLM) (I Corps/7th ID).

Figures 3 and 4 provide a graphical representation of an integrated force headquarters and unit:
Figure 3. I3 Force HQ Example

Source: Created by author

Figure 4. I3 Unit structure concept

Source: Created by author
On the east coast, Fort Drum allows for the integrated force brigade under a US division while using the existing infrastructure. It is near the Canadian border, which would allow for easy troop and supply transit between the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and 2 CMBG/4th Canadian Division at Petawawa, Ontario (3.5-hour drive). The unit would be readily deployable due to its geographic proximity to Canadian Air Force strategic airlift from Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Trenton (2.5-hour drive), which is the hub responsible for airlifting Canadian troops and equipment worldwide.

On the West Coast, JBLM, home of the US I Corps, offers similar advantages. An integrated force located there would allow for the brigade construct under a Division, similar to the US 3d Stryker BCT under the 2d Infantry Division. For example, the 3rd Canadian Division (Cdn Div) and the US 7th Infantry Division could provide elements to form an integrated force as the 3rd Cdn Div is “responsible to provide combat ready land forces in accordance with assigned tasks, conduct general purpose training in preparation for various land operations, and provide support services to other organizations as directed or as mutually arranged.” The 3rd Cdn Div is located at Edmonton, British Colombia, which is within a days drive from JBLM. JBLM is close to the Canadian border (3 hours) and is co-located with two USAF airlift wings, the 62nd and 446th—providing rapid response airlift capability to the Pacific area of operations (50 C-17 Globemasters). Moreover, both the United States and Canada have publicly announced a pivot in strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region. An integrated force based at JBLM would provide military power projection (expeditionary) capability to both countries, strategically communicating the pivot to the Pacific.

87 FM 3-94, 1-3.
Historical Analysis

The successful creation, training, deployment, and combat performance of the Devil’s Brigade offers findings and implications that point to the efficacy of building a standing I3 force today. Political-military strategic leadership engagement, combined training, burden sharing (cost/manpower), regional specialization, and overcoming sovereignty issues early on are key to building an effective I3 force.

High-level political-military leadership commitment is key to pushing integration. With the right leadership, sovereignty and command issues can be managed at the strategic level first, setting the tone for combined operations as demonstrated by the Devil’s Brigade in WWII. At the operational and tactical levels, sovereignty concerns are generally not an issue—as the troops are more concerned about mission accomplishment. That is not to say national identity and sovereignty are not important; Canadians are patriotic and proud of their heritage, as are Americans. The military is a reflection of the cultural norms and beliefs of a society.

If the process by which the Devil’s Brigade prepared for war was institutionalized, then interoperability could be maintained and it would be much quicker to have a viable force ready for operations in any theater for future contingencies. The incentives to both countries must be seen as valuable enough to pursue. The Devil’s Brigade provided a landpower-based indirect approach strategy against Germany that allied leadership thought valuable enough to follow. In addition, it did not inhibit the preparation for Operations Husky or Bolero. The Canadians saved on cost by utilizing US bases, equipment, and training. The United States (and Britain) did not have to populate the entire force—therefore saving American lives; and in the end, it enabled the US Fifth Army to finally break the stalemate in Northern Italy.
Conclusion

By forming a permanently standing integrated brigade, the United States and Canadian armies can maximize independent comparative advantages and increase multinational I3 to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military operations. The future is characterized by an increasingly complex and dangerous security environment, coupled with undulating fiscal realities. Looking to the past may be the best way to determine key tendencies to inform better probabilities for coalition victory.

During WWII, the Devil’s Brigade showed that an integrated force could be successful in combat. After WWII, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that the one basic thing that made allied commands work was mutual confidence, which emerges from years of working with coalition partners. Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, suggests six tenets that form the foundation for mutual confidence. They are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, trust and confidence. An I3 force develops understanding, clarity, and focus from working together over and over again, forging the mutual trust, confidence, and understanding underpinning successful alliances. Developing this is a conscious, collaborative act rather than something that just happens. The proposed construct in this monograph is a place to start. DoD leaders can look at a series of operational problems such as weak states and extremism in the Middle East and Africa, hybrid warfare, and anti-access/area denial in the Pacific, and then determine how to organize, integrate, and design interdependent units with a close ally in order to provide forces relevant and specially tailored to the operating environment.

There are several areas of additional research that should be examined through the lens of a US and Canadian integrated force. Those areas include homeland defense, overseas threats, and

---

mitigating risks. According to the NCFA, the Army is incurring unacceptable risk in capabilities that would be required early in major contingencies including shortfalls in attack aviation, armored capabilities, and deployed or deployable mission command elements. The most pressing scenario the Commission assessed included three significant near-simultaneous events: a large-scale homeland defense response, a large-scale conventional force operation, and a limited-duration deterrence mission elsewhere.

Homeland defense is the US and Canadian Army’s top priority. The US Army provides United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) with a full-time, three-star Service component command solely focused on the homeland mission, Army North. In the event of a large-scale homeland defense response, Army North will employ support, sustainment, and mission command elements from all Army components to support USNORTHCOM. Army North regularly trains and exercises with Canadian forces. Furthermore, in 2012, Canada and the United States signed a classified Combined Defense Plan (CDP). The CDP is a planning framework that describes the authorities and means by which the US and Canadian governments would authorize homeland security military operations in the event of a mutually agreed upon threat. It updates and formalizes many existing arrangements and incorporates new security architectures put in place since 11 September, 2001. The CDP combines Canadian Joint Operations Command, USNORTHCOM, and NORAD planning and cooperation efforts should they require each other’s assistance. However, the two nations have yet to train and exercise Army units as described in the

---

90 NCFA, *Report to the President and Congress*, 54.
91 Ibid., 47.
Plan. A permanent and integrated landpower-based homeland defense force could help both nations with priority number one and set the conditions for a Western Hemisphere landpower defense force. An existing exercise such as Vigilant Shield, or Determined Dragon, could incorporate a Combined Defense Plan rehearsal.

During a large-scale conventional operation, the NCFA highlighted that the US Army will have significant gaps in its tactical wheeled vehicle fleet and shortfalls in field artillery.93 This is an area where the Canadian Army may be able to help fill gaps. In addition, the NCFA recommended that the Army should emphasize “enabling units to operate in a dispersed manner, with smaller and more flexible formations that better leverage partners and respond to hybrid challenges.”94 This statement seems to reflect the Canadian ADO concept, from which the United States may be able to learn and adapt to its own operations if well integrated in Canadian formations.

Frequent overseas rotations create operational risks and impose additional costs by increasing the amount of personnel and equipment required to sustain a forward presence. Overseas deterrence missions are often sourced by units rotating from the United States as the preferred solution to meet Manning requirements. Canada could fill a rotation, or provide comparable forces to supplement a US rotation, sharing the burden. As an example, the NCFA recommended the US Army forward station an Armored BCT (ABCT) in Europe, rather than rotate units through.95 A US and Canadian integrated ABCT in Europe would allow both countries to share the burden while creating the space and time for the tenets of multinational operations to build mutual confidence. Moreover, NCFA recommendation eighteen states that the

93 NCFA, Report to the President and Congress 49-50.
94 Ibid., 35.
95 Ibid., 54.
Army should increase ABCT capacity to provide forceful response options against potential Russian threats and aggression towards Europe.96 By activating integrated ABCTs, the United States and Canada could increase both the capability and capacity of ABCTs and mitigate the risk of further reductions in the overall quality of ABCTs.

The NCFA also recommended that the Army should reduce up to two Regular Army Infantry BCTs (IBCTs) and reallocate the manpower to reduce personnel shortfalls stemming from sequester reductions.97 Instead, the Army could reduce one IBCT, and integrate with Canadian IBCT units so they would not have to reduce landpower capacity.

Furthermore, NCFA recommendation twenty-two states: “The Congress should require the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff to oversee the modeling of alternative Army design and operational concepts—including the Reconnaissance Strike Group, Hybrid Battalion Task Force, Stryker Global Response Force, and the Reconnaissance and Security Brigade Combat Team.”98 Canada possess elements of, and specialization in, each one of those conceptual units. Now is the time to build them as integrated units.

The US and Canadian armies’ future force concepts can be seen as excellent opportunities to provide forces for increased I3. Both countries have much to gain by forming a standing commitment to provide troops to I3 units. The units could be regionally-aligned and task or mission oriented, taking advantage of regional expertise and unique capabilities. A permanent unit would require predictable funding, instead of requesting funds on a contingency basis. An institutionalized, regularly recurring expense stream would be less of a risk to both US and Canadian armed forces’ budgets, especially in an era of austerity. An integrated unit would also provide direction with respect to aligning Canadian doctrine and training with the United States.

96 NCFA, Report to the President and Congress, 54.
97 Ibid., 57.
98 Ibid., 56.
A decision to employ troops in combat would require permission from both governments, and steps would need to be taken to ensure the preservation of national sovereignty. However, once the decision is made, the institutional construct will have been in place, accelerating mobilization, deployment, and readiness timelines. Naturally, there may also be bi-national competition and cooperation that drives the performance improvement of both armies. An integrated force could become the foundation for North American continental defense, or an enhanced expeditionary capability for contingency operations.

Integration is recognized as a viable strategy outside of North America as well. In a recent *Foreign Affairs* article, Elisabeth Braw described how Germany and the Netherlands recently integrated forces.99 The Netherlands’ 43rd mechanized Brigade is permanently joining Germany’s First Tank Division. They are also sharing tanks, ships, and other military equipment in what the author terms a military sharing economy. Cuts to Netherlands military spending over two years ago left them without tanks. They could not purchase more or maintain those they had. The German government stepped in and agreed to share tanks belonging to the Bundeswehr’s First Tank Division, which is stationed under forty miles from the Dutch border.100 The Dutch share a 5,000 ton capacity supply ship and incorporate Germany’s Sea Battalion into the Dutch Marine Corps.

Coalition operations have been part of warfare for years, but integrated and interdependent co-fighting formations are becoming a method by which countries can save money and enhance defense at the same time. Braw highlighted that Germany and France have operated a 4,800-staff brigade since 1989. It is based in both countries, and units from that


100 Ibid.
brigade are currently deployed to Mali to train local forces.\textsuperscript{101} European Union member states have begun to create combined battle-groups that are deployed as rapid-reaction forces. However, as Braw pointed out, “it is exceptional for two countries to combine an entire division...in which their troops intermingle...the Dutch German division is part of the regular Bundeswehr, not a separate international unit.”\textsuperscript{102}

To win in a complex world, one should look to the past to find and adopt new complex solutions for the future. Coalition based grand strategies have been the key to maintaining the balance of power in a post-Westphalian world order for centuries. The coalition system provided the United States with the ability to sustain and maintain a global presence, enhance deterrence, and provide men and material necessary to fight wars. In today’s complex environment, military integration has the potential to enhance coalition warfare. The Devil’s Brigade is the ultimate expression of how integration can make coalition forces stronger. The importance of integrating forces is summed up best by Shoto Watt, of the Montreal \textit{Standard}, who wrote,

> But the importance of the First Special Service Force in world history, and their influence on the future, are much greater than even their outstanding military merit would deserve. The significance of this Force is that it was the first joint force of its kind, drawn from two neighbor democracies, and that it was a brilliant success throughout. It is by no means fanciful to see it in the prototype of the world police of that world community which has for so long been the dream of men of goodwill...Their legend [is] a feat of arms which will remain celebrated in military history which should be remembered even longer—an example of international brotherhood which deserves enduring honor.\textsuperscript{103}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{101} Braw, “The Military Sharing Economy.”
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Quoted in Burhans, \textit{The First Special Service Force}, 300.
\end{flushright}
Bibliography


