Sleeping with the Elephant: A Canadian Strategic Culture

A Monograph

by

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This paper examines the strategic culture of Canada and immerses the reader in the way Canada represents the world surrounding it. With the concept of strategic culture as the basis of the argumentation, this paper looks back at the history of Canada since the 1867 Confederation and a number of post-Second World War strategic documents in the search of the common experiences and accepted narratives that have formed a set shared of belief amongst Canadian leaders. The analysis demonstrates that Canada’s geographical proximity, economic nexus and interdependent connections with the United States permeate all thinking to the point where the United States becomes the de facto center of gravity in any Canadian strategy-making processes. The study of these geographic, economic, and interdependent factors confirms the presence of a powerful attraction force exerted by the United States which influences the development of Canadian military strategies and defence policies. These elements, through the years, became elevated to the ranks of axioms and now form the base of an integrated systems of symbols, pervasive and enduring, which Canadian military strategies abide by when formulating concepts for the role of Canadian military forces. This is Canada’s strategic culture.
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Abstract

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This paper examines the strategic culture of Canada and immerses the reader in the way Canada represents the world surrounding it. Many observers have described Canada as a country “which cannot be successfully invaded, nor defended.” Maybe in part because of this conundrum, commentators have argued that Canada does not usually get a choice as to how, and when, it employs its military forces. This is an intriguing proposition given that the employment of military forces is usually considered one of the most visible and profound element of a nation’s sovereignty. While many fields of studies explore the ramifications of this Canadian reality, the relatively recent concept of strategic culture offers new possibilities to analyze, and maybe understand Canada’s primary strategic determinants. With the concept of strategic culture as the basis of the argumentation, this paper looks back at the history of Canada since the 1867 Confederation and a number of post-Second World War strategic documents in the search of the common experiences and accepted narratives that have formed a set shared of belief amongst Canadian leaders. The analysis demonstrates that Canada’s geographical proximity, economical nexus and interdependent connections with the United States permeate all thinking to the point where the United States becomes the de facto center of gravity in any Canadian strategy-making processes. The study of these geographical, economical and interdependent factors confirms the presence of a powerful attraction force exerted by the United States which influences the development of Canadian military strategies and defence policies. These elements, through the years, became elevated to the ranks of axioms and now form the base of an integrated systems of symbols, pervasive and enduring, which Canadian military strategies abide by when formulating concepts for the role of Canadian military forces. This is Canada’s strategic culture.
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## Acronyms

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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
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Introduction

Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.

Pierre Elliot Trudeau

Many commentators describe Canada as a country “which cannot be successfully invaded, nor defended.” Maybe in part because of this conundrum, not a whole lot of literature exists on Canadian military strategic thinking and the individual determinants of Canadian strategy. Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General Jonathan Vance, pointed out the same deficit in a paper, published in 2005, titled “Tactics without Strategy, or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign.” The essence of his argument centered on the fact that Canada usually does not get a choice in how it employs its military forces in the context of coalition warfighting. It is, however, his commentary on the reasons why Canada used its military power in Afghanistan in the first place that warrants attention: “Nations like Canada do not direct their tactical forces at the operational level to achieve national strategic ends…Canadian strategic objectives are more concerned with the political advantages of being seen to participate.”

A good portion of the Canadian population also noticed at the time this tactical to strategy continuum missing link. Starting in 2006, as Canadian citizens realized that Canadian soldiers were engaged in war activities, popular support for the Afghanistan mission declined from 55% to 41%. While a number of factors underlie this decline, some analysts have proposed that the perceived poor connection between the war activities and the national objectives was central to the decrease in support. These poor connections between the ends, ways, and means strategic formulation is

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certainly counterintuitive for numerous military strategists. Despite the apparent broken link in the tactical to strategy continuum, however, Canadian officials and military officers alike design, disseminate and act upon policy statements and military strategies (like the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy and various previous White Papers). If the suggestion is that military strategies are not linked to the operations or military advantages, how can they be produced in the first place? What are the primary determinants of Canadian strategies and defence policies? The answers to these questions might lie in the relatively recent field of strategic culture studies. The proposition, by some academics, that a state’s national strategic culture is central and, perhaps, even more predominant than strategic analysis in determining policy directions, leads to an interesting approach to how Canadians understand and apply strategy.

This conceptual paper analyzes how Canada’s leadership thinks about military strategy and the accompanying theoretical underpinnings under the light of its unique strategic culture. This monograph argues that a typical Canadian strategic culture exists. This strategic culture is based on Canada’s relationship with the United States, which in turn skews the alignment of Canada’s national strategies. Canada’s geographical proximity, economic nexus and interdependent connections with the United States permeate all strategic thinking to the point where the United States becomes the de facto center of gravity in any Canadian strategy-making processes.

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Canadian strategy makers need to comprehend how the nation’s strategic culture influences them in filling the gaps between policy directions and the making of strategies. When Canadians appreciate and accept their national strategic culture they can come to terms with how its soldiers, sailors, and air personnel are employed. Canadians would then better understand the employment of their armed forces. Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau said and argued for it; Canada must recognize that its strategies are designed more to impress Canada’s friends than frighten its rivals.5

This paper uses the terms ‘strategic culture’ and ‘strategy’ in broad senses and in the context of Canadian strategic making processes. No consensus exists on the meaning of these terms, however. It is worthwhile to start from workable definitions on these terms. The first two sections of this monograph therefore propose, in sequence, definitions for ‘strategic culture’ and ‘strategy,’ positioned in the Canadian environment. The third section of this paper identifies the qualities of the United States-Canada relationship that have been elevated, through the years, to the rank of cardinal principals. These fixed points of reference, this paper argues, then form the basis for a Canadian-wide set of beliefs that generations of Canadian leaders have shared and transmitted. These factors constitute the cornerstone of a typical Canadian strategic culture.

The Elements of Strategic Culture

The convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office.

Henry A. Kissinger

The idea that there are national styles of strategy is not new.6 While students of history


will see examples throughout their era of expertise, the attentive reader can also find a trace of it in some of the most classical military works like those of Clausewitz and Jomini. The latter, however, likely offers the most attractive image of the impact of strategic culture. Jomini indeed expressed that nations have characteristics that permeate through its soldiers and its armies. As he wrote in 1838:

Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics; and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy it. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have never been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind which were highly ridiculous. ...In this respect, the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others. The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions.

More recently, the expression of style in the conduct of the war (‘way in warfare’ or ‘way of war’) as developed by historians, appears relatively close to the notion of strategic culture. One could argue that the British military historian B.H. Liddell Hart popularized the concept of ‘way of war.’ His studies claimed that some countries had historically based strategic national particularities. By way of example, in the case of Britain, Liddle Hart highlighted the indirect approach, the use of economic means and naval forces as being fundamentals to the creation of a uniquely British way of war. The ideas of Liddell Hart then, in turn, influenced some contemporary historical reflections on strategy. In the United States, Russell F. Weigley later published *The American Way of War*, which contended the presence of an American way of war based on the strategic habit of the annihilation of the enemy.

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7 For example, the Assyrians developed warfare styles in accordance with their social and economic organization in order to meet their political objectives. See Wayne E. Lee, ed. *Warfare and Culture in World History* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 27.


The concept of strategic culture, as currently understood, developed in the 1970s perhaps out of a critique that we should not treat Soviets as rational actors in our mirror image. In the context of the US-Soviet Cold War, some perceived a need to move beyond the limitations of distilling two unique states with distinct historical, political and geographic features to merely two rational actors. The concept of strategic culture seems therefore as a logical follow-on thought to the idea that nations’ have distinct ways of war, as both notions stress the need to understand variations and particularities of experience. What is less intuitive, however, is whether the term ‘strategic culture’ has replaced ‘ways of war.’ In his book Strategic Culture and Ways of War, Lawrence Sondhaus explores these ideas and attempts to reconcile the seemingly unique concepts – only to conclude that it is impossible.¹¹ In order to keep the scope of this paper relatively limited and in line with Sondhaus’ thesis that the two concepts cannot be synonymous, this monograph will utilize the construct of ‘strategic culture’ as a different notion that ‘way of war.’ It will therefore not analyze if Canada, due to its culture, has a national way of prosecuting warfighting operations. This monograph instead concentrates on the notion of strategic culture as it emerged, as a separate field of study, in the 1970s.

Jack Snyder, a RAND Corporation analyst, published a report in 1977 with the idea that there was such a thing as ‘strategic culture.’ He introduced the notion in response to a very specific strategic environment. The United States Air Force commissioned Snyder’s report following the 1972 signing of the Strategic Arms limitation Treaty (SALT I). Snyder’s report principal objective was to provide United States security policy makers with “a context for better understanding of the intellectual, institutional and strategic-culture determinants that would bound the Soviet decision making process in a crisis.”¹² One basic concept of the Cold War, and


as some would say the principal safety mechanism against going to a Third World War, was the notion of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The theory, based on deterrence and as understood by United Security policy makers in the 1970s, is relatively straightforward to assimilate: the capability to use nuclear weapons against an enemy – even after a surprise first strike by that enemy – prevents the enemy’s use of those same weapons. This proposition, however, assumes that your enemy thinks like you. The United States policy makers, therefore, if MAD was to work, had to believe the Soviets would have the same reasoning as them. Some strategists, however, doubted this fact based on Soviet military writings. In his book *Soviet Military Strategy*, Marshal Vasilii Danilovich Sokolovskii did not discuss the Soviet strategic delivery capability in terms of deterrent forces, but in terms of war fighting.13 This so-called-‘Sokolovskii doctrine’ actually cast some doubt on the effectiveness of MAD and got the United States worried (and Snyder thinking) that the Soviet Union was not seeing the nuclear arsenal being used the same way as them.14 If the Soviet strategic leaders (as described by Sokolovskii) do not share the United States’ assumptions about nuclear warfare, then it could mean that the United States’ might have built its deterrence theory on a false foundation. In fact, the most striking contrast between the two views is the fact that Soviet strategic thinking was not making the same doctrinal distinction between ‘deterrence’ and ‘defence’ which was made by American

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strategists. If two countries have the same weapons, with nearly the same geographical challenges and advantages, why was it that the employment strategy would differ? If all data were the same, why would it create a difference in strategy? A difference in strategic culture, Snyder posited, was the reason. Snyder’s study demonstrated how Soviet and American strategists were locked, due to their inherent and different cultures, to only certain behavioral choices. Moreover, Snyder, extrapolating from his Soviet nuclear strategy analysis, then posited that there was a unique “Soviet-style” in dealing with strategic issues. In using the term ‘strategic culture,’ Snyder wanted to portray that this Soviet-style affected strategic decisions over a long period and that “new problems are not assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the strategic culture.” He outlined that the Soviet Union’s strategic situation, the historical legacy and the role of the military in the Soviet policy process, were influences on the development of Soviet strategic thinking that are unique to the Soviet experience. He concluded: “strategic culture can be defined as the total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other about nuclear strategy.”

Ken Booth, following Snyder, published a systematic critique of strategic studies and its practitioners in his 1979 book *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. According to Booth, strategists have demonstrated an ethnocentric vision. Strategists have repeatedly ‘constructed’ their potential opponent based on the strategists’ country domestic concerns and not according to the actual threat. Put simply, according to Booth, the strategist lacks the critical curiosity about his/her envisioned competitor. In other words, the strategist’ intellectual universe is too limited and, therefore, finds it difficult to considers his/her competitor’s perspective. With this in mind, Booth

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16 Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, V.
17 Ibid., 22-35.
18 Ibid., 8.
highlighted the need for cultural awareness in the realm of strategic studies and decision-making as ethnocentrism is endemic throughout the theory and practice of strategy. He went on to say that “strategic theories have their roots in philosophies of war…National strategies are the immediate descendants of philosophies of war.”

Booth, following the logic of his argument, then posited that strategic culture, as a concept is viable: “understanding strategic culture is a fundamental part of ‘knowing the enemy,’ one of the most basic principles of war. It contributes to an appreciation of another state’s behavior in its terms, and this is the initial point of understanding.” This importance to understand another state’s behavior in its terms becomes crucial to the work of Colin S. Gray, one of the most prolific commentators on strategic culture.

Gray, with his first article on strategic culture in 1981, set the tone for much of the discussion that would take place the following years. According to him, historical experience and how one perceives oneself are the basis of any strategic culture. As he contemplated it, strategic culture is a mixture of many factors, including amongst other history, geography, political philosophy and civic culture. In fact, Gray presupposed the existence of distinct strategic cultures in all societies that exhibit fundamental attachment to these environmental factors. He considered them as an environment that influences decision-making. As he later wrote, “ideas about war and strategy are influenced by physical and political geography, some strategic cultures plainly have, for example, a maritime tilt, by political or religious ideology, and by familiarity with, and preference for, particular military technologies. Strategic culture is the world of mind, feeling,

19 Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, 73.


and habit in behavior.”

The concept of strategic culture has its detractors and Ian Alistair Johnston is among the most vocal critics of it. The crux of his argument against strategic culture rests on his argument that the concept is both under and overdetermined, as the idea alone is held to have a strongly deterministic effect on behavior. Gray himself also warned that “as with many concepts alleged to have explanatory power, strategic culture lends itself to abuse.” If no care is applied, strategic culture may well become a bottomless basket where reasons as to why strategic choices are made, fall in.

Despite its drawbacks, however, strategic culture has utility as an analytic explanatory concept. To prove that point, one needs to look no further than Johnston when he describes the concept as an integrated system of symbols that acts to establish pervasive and enduring strategic preferences by formulating notions of a national military force’s role in political affairs. The strategic culture thus reflects national preoccupations and historical experience as much as it does purely objective responses to any given threat environment. Another author on the subject, Carnes Lord, took a similar view and discussed strategic culture not just as it regards to military practice but also in terms of the social, political and ideological characteristics centrally constitutive of a state. For Lord, strategic culture is the customary habits of thought by which a country organizes and employs its military forces to attain political goals. Lord identified the six


factors effecting strategic culture: the geopolitical setting, military history, international relationships, political culture and ideology, the nature of civil-military relations and military technology.\textsuperscript{27}

With all this said, there is little doubt that a country’s experiences of the past shape its strategic culture. As French philosopher Raymond Aron wrote, “there is no historic present without both memory and presentiment…a person’s historical consciousness, his awareness of the present, varies according to the continent, country, and party to which he belongs.”\textsuperscript{28} We can now explain what strategic culture means for the purpose of this monograph. Rather than suggesting a new definition or using one from a previous era that would necessarily focus on warfighting modus operandi, this paper uses a contemporary description of strategic culture. The following characterization integrates the most important elements of the concept as discussed above:

Strategic culture is viewed as a set of shared beliefs, and assumptions derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which influence the appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.\textsuperscript{29}

The preceding definition offers traits that lend themselves naturally to a case study of strategic culture such as Canada. This definition establishes a clear and direct link between enduring strategic assumptions a country make and the country’s commonly agreed upon narrative. It is the notion of ‘transmission,’ arguably the most important one in discussing strategic culture. The idea that ways of thinking (or, in other terms, habits of mind) and preferred methods of operations are recurrent, through time, in a country’s narrative and transmitted via different conduits is crucial.


As Gray argued, for an element to be deemed ‘part of the culture,’ that element must be part of a long, national narrative, rooted in historical facts and arguments. This notion essentially entails, for the country being analyzed, the discovery and description of habits of mind that are part of a timeless narrative. The distinction of the temporal variables of national strategy from the elements that are truly pervasive to any country’s strategic decision-making elevates the latter to the status of national reference points.

The above definition highlights the impact of beliefs, which are those assumptions that influence and shape a nation’s relations to other countries. This element is central when one thinks of strategy-making because if this holds true, a grouping of national strategic beliefs or ‘immutable facts’ could be found in the Canadian strategic making process and its documents. This description also ties the strategic assumptions unswervingly to the expression of strategic choices as an equation of ends, ways, and means – an appealing construct to the military strategist. Finally, this definition does not imply that a country’s strategic culture solely influences the ways it fights its wars; it actually permeates all national-level strategic actions and narrative. This is an appealing quality because as the next section describes, strategy is understood in Canada today as more than the highest level of warfighting.

How Canadian Leaders Understand Strategy

In its simplest and oldest form, the expression the ‘art of the general’ has described strategy. As the years progressed, the term developed to represent more than just an art senior military officers performed. It was to be known as many things: a general concept about problem-solving, a way of thinking about actions in the future or even how to “manage events that cannot be managed.” This confusion is certainly the reason there is no universal definition, nor even

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31 Many books have discussed the etymology of the word strategy. For one analysis, see
the approximation of a consensus on the meaning of the term. Nevertheless, this should not impede the proposition of a workable definition as well as a useable framework to adhere to when one thinks about strategy in the context of Canada’s strategic culture.

Few contemporary books discuss the art of war without referring to Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini or Liddell Hart. Many commentators describe these intellectuals as ‘great military minds’ and the vast majority of military academic establishments around the world study their writings. Canada’s military institutions are no different. Clausewitz’s writings, for example, are prevalent in its military training and education centers. On strategy, Clausewitz argued that tactics and strategy were two distinct concepts, yet linked by the use of the armed forces. According to his classification then, “tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.” Another writer, often contrasted to Clausewitz, is Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini. “Strategy,” Jomini argued, “is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations.” These definitions, however, both have drawbacks when it comes to defining the concept of strategy in the context of this paper’s argument. For one, they are war-focused. If this paper were to use these definitions, then only the historical periods where Canada was actually at war (or preparing for war) would be relevant, leaving important gaps in the analysis of Canada’s strategic culture. Second, these definitions are inward looking regarding linkages. They undeniably unite strategy with the battlefield, but they lack the connection to the reasons for going to war in the first place. It might be for this reason that Liddell Hart defined strategy more broadly as the “art of distributing and employing military

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means to fulfill the ends of policy.”35 And it is for the same reason that this monograph situates the discussion on Canada’s strategic culture at that level – the one which relates to the discussion between the political domain and military strategies. The use of this understanding of strategy (vice taking strategy as it relates to warfighting) allows the discussion to take place at the level where a national narrative is found which, in turn, influences the appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives. This the level where strategic culture has the more profound impact on how a country utilizes its military power.

It would therefore not be sufficient, in the context of this monograph, to associate strategy merely with conflict, as strategy must always be in the service of the policies of the state. Colin Gray also contends that strategy is “the use of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.”36 For both Liddle Hart and Gray, strategy is the linking of particular means (like military assets) to specific ends, which are always political. It follows then that the first level is the one of policy as guided by politics. This level, referred to sometimes as the level of ‘grand strategy,’ a term that Liddell Hart help popularized, chooses between war and peace. It orients and defines the possible strategies of war and peace with the resources allocated by the political level – this is where politicians operate. The Canadian Department of National Defence senior officials and the Canadian Forces Chief of Defence Staff, Canada’s principal providers of defence policy and military advice, also operate in that space. Through their best advice, they help the political level to choose, direct and define the best possible military options within the political environment.

Doctrinally, the Canadian Armed Forces abides by the above-described logic as it distinguishes four level of warfare: the national strategic, the military strategic, the operational, and the tactical:

a. National strategic is the level where the nature and quantity of a country’s resources dedicated to achieving national policy objectives are determined by the political


leadership. It is at this level that the coordination of all instruments of national power occurs and military-political aims are established.

b. Military strategic is the level where goals consistent with the desired national policy end state of a conflict are determined. At this level, military strategies are formulated, resources allocated, and political constraints established. Military actions at the strategic level are frequently joint.

c. Operational is the level that links the military strategic and tactical levels. At the operational level, major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained, to accomplish military strategic goals.

d. Tactical is the level where battles and engagements are planned and conducted.37

Strategy has also been described in military circles as a logical statement, where strategy is characterized as consisting of objectives, ways, and means. United States Army Colonel Arthur Lykke expressed this concept of strategy as an equation: “Strategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which some end can be achieved).”38 This definition of strategy, maybe because of its simplicity and focus, has reached the status of a normative expression in military circles. Canada also recognizes this equation. Canadian Armed Forces’ interpretation of this framework is that “strategies are plans, or ways, of achieving desired ends, utilizing defined means.”39

Finally, and to tie this discussion back to the impact of strategic culture on a nation, we could note that other writers have also attempted to describe strategy as a process. Lawrence Freedman, for instance, illustrated strategy simply as “the best word we have for expressing attempts to think about actions in advance, in the light of our goals and our capacities.”40

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39 Canadian Forces Joint Publication: Canadian Military Doctrine CFJP 01, 3-2.

40 Lawrence Freedman’s seminal work, Strategy, obviously provides much more depth to the analysis of strategy than what “thinking about actions in advance” simply suggests. He acknowledges, however, that while there are many valuable definitions of strategy, the vast array
Dolman, a United States Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies professor, has argued that essentially, strategy is the art of getting and remaining in a position of continuous advantage.\[^{41}\] These definitions provide interesting elements to the concept of strategy as a process, as they imply the notion of ‘strategizing’ or, in other terms, the cognitive process leading to the establishment of a strategy. Henry Mintzberg, in his book *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, discussed the relationship between planning and strategy. One of his central argument is that good strategizing comes from the ability to think strategically within the context of the organization and culture you have. The famous French philosopher Raymond Aron also wrote along the same lines: “strategic thought draws its inspiration from each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which event themselves pose.”\[^{42}\] This idea then leads back to the previous discussion of strategic culture and its impact on the Canadian leaders’ process of ‘strategizing.’ If having a strategic culture implies that individuals are socialized into a distinctively native mode of strategic thinking (i.e. strategizing) then, as Snyder would contend, a semi-permanent set of beliefs and behavioral patterns on the level of ‘culture’ could be found in a country’s behavior.\[^{43}\] The next section reviews Canada’s recent history of defence policy and strategy making to search for those set of beliefs that have achieved an axiomatic level.

### The Determinants of Canada’s Strategic Culture

Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies. Those whom nature hath so joined together, let no man put asunder.

John F. Kennedy


\[^{43}\] Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, V.
For a democratic nation, policy and strategy development usually follows a familiar process. A debate of ideas takes place, the country’s people and officials alike discuss values and national interests, the elected representatives hear the public opinion, and then the government generates the policy. Strategy making, the process related to policy-making, is almost no different except for the ends, ways, and means framework that provides the construct of the strategy discussion. In Canada, however, commentators, academics, and the public alike automatically ask an additional question: What will the United States think?

For Canadians, maintaining relations with the United States is not an option but an obligation. Canadian historian Jack Granatstein noted that “Canada is inescapably part of North America, and, however much some Canadians may wish they could alter this fact, they cannot.” With such an undeniable reality, it is interesting to analyze to what extent this proximity affects the strategies developed by Canada and how it galvanizes the Canadian strategic culture. As Canada’s Defence Research Board analyst Robert J. Sutherland wrote in 1962, fundamentals exist in the making of Canadian strategies such as geography, economic potential, and the broader national interests. These fundamentals serve as a basis for understanding the United States’ influence in the process of developing Canadian military strategy and defence policies.

Canada could be considered the first anti-American country. Given the thesis of this paper, this is an intriguing proposition – but it only take a quick survey of the long history of friendship between the two countries to realize that matters started on the wrong foot. Canadians had to defend twice against invasions coming from the south: in 1812 and at the time of Canada’s

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Confederation in 1867. These skirmishes only helped fuel an emerging Canadian national sentiment and identity. Canadian historian Arthur Lower sums it up eloquently: “The War of 1812, turning the people of the republic into foes, completed the separation which the War of the Revolution had begun, and confirmed Canadians in that determination on which their separate nationhood more than anything else has been built, the determination not to be ‘Americans.”’46

The relationship between the two countries evolved and gained in maturity during the one hundred years between the War of 1812 and the Great War. The peaceful division of the continent’s northern part and the subsequent coexistence had been realized despite ‘manifest destiny’ policies, numerous border incidents and trade disputes.47 Canada, just like the United States, was still a young country and it was looking for points of references. Canada, however, faced a fundamental dilemma to determine where its place in the world was: politically it was in Great Britain; geographically it was in the United States – in either case outside Canada’s boundaries.48

This multilateral relationship with Great Britain and the United States formed the base upon which Canada build-up its confidence to play on the world stage. At the turn of the twentieth century, under the direction of their first French-speaking Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Canadians experienced a growth of nationalist sentiment and a spirit of confidence in themselves, as exemplified by the debate on the Boer War.49 But the links back to the motherland

49 In 1899, while a majority of English Canadians supported the cause of London in South Africa, the majority of French Canadians openly questioned why Canada should participate in a war so far from its shore. Laurier, with a view to safeguard the country's stability and in a strident gesture of independence, did not initially commit Canada to what was considered purely an English matter. The links with the Empire, however, were strong and Laurier agreed to send a battalion of volunteers.
were still strong and, few years later, Canada entered the Great War through a decision of the British government. Canadians, throughout the conflict, fought hard on two fronts: first against a forceful enemy and, second, to create a sense of national identity. Success ensued on both counts and, at the end of the hostilities, Canada was able to assert its right to participate in peace negotiations, sign treaties, and even became a founding member of the League of Nations. As Canadian Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton reflected in 1944 about Canada’s place in post-First World War international organizations, “Canada’s part in the last war raised her to the status of nation. Canada’s part in this war has given her the opportunities and responsibilities of worldwide interests. Today Canada stands in the shadow of no other land.”50 Despite this realization, Canada’s biggest diplomatic difficulty remained. Canada had to persuade the United States that it could be simultaneously a British dominion and a global citizen with a self-determining role on the world stage.51 Michael Fry, in his book Illusions of Security, describes Canada’s attention to its relations with its Atlantic partner:

The Canadian government, consuming the security provided by the Monroe Doctrine and the British sea power, and tending toward postwar isolationism, sought the most economical and satisfying policy for her. In an Atlantic entente, Canada could play her role of persuasion in the formulation of British Empire policy and function as a junior but vital partner in the North Atlantic Triangle. This was the summit of her expectations.52

The world events of the late 1930’s tested those expectations. Unlike the United States at the moment, Canada was inextricably embedded in European power politics due to its tie to Great Britain. Canada had to enter a war, for a second time in less than thirty years, independent of the United States’ isolationist stance. It was clear, even before the start of the Second World War,


that the international situation was straining the bilateral relationship between the Canada and the United States. The American flyer Charles Lindbergh, who became an outspoken advocate of keeping the United States out of the world conflict, summed up the debate during a continent-wide October 1939 radio-address, asking: “But have they [the Canadians] the right to draw this hemisphere into a European war simply because they prefer the Crown of England to American independence?”

It is evident that, in the case of discrepancy between the Canada and the United States’ strategic visions of the European crisis, there was going to be adjustments made regarding the defence of the North American continent. The two countries’ leader of the moment, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister William Mackenzie King, clearly advocated what that meant to them in two different speeches, only days apart. On August 18, 1938, as the war seemed imminent in Europe and in the midst of the Sudetenland Crisis, President Roosevelt declared before an audience at Canada’s Queens University in Kingston, Ontario, “the Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire.” In other words, the United States would not watch with indifference if a great power came to threaten the physical security of Canada because of the participation of the Canadians in a war in Europe.

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53 For an interesting insight on Canada’s positioning vis-à-vis the United States at the onset of the Second World War, see John B. MacCormac, Canada: America’s Problem (New York: Viking Press, 1940).


For his part, Prime Minister King promised, on August 20, 1938, in North York, Ontario – following a visit to Canadian military troops – that Canada would do nothing that could threaten the physical security of the United States. As MacKenzie King summarized in his diary for that day:

I took the position that Roosevelt’s assurance only added to our responsibilities; that we would have to see that our coasts were so defended that no enemy forces could operate from Canadian territory against the United States. This I know is what will please the Americans above all else, and is right. I think at last we have got our defence programme in good shape. Good neighbor on one side; partners within the Empire on the other. Obligations to both in return for their assistance. Readiness to meet all joint emergencies.56

Each of the two countries understood that it was its duty, ‘as good neighbours,’ not only to refrain from any activity that could endanger the security of the other but also to demonstrate almost the same attention to the needs of the physical safety of other than to those of itself.57 These promises eventually led to the August 18, 1940, Ogdensburg Accord, which formalized the bilateral relationship to “consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.”58 Not only Prime Minister King, but also the general Canadian population, saw the benefits of such association with the United States. Some of Canada’s press correspondents went as far as describing the accord as a “happy, almost miraculous event.”59 The narrative for a Canadian strategic culture had found its starting point.


The nuclear era that followed the Second World War emphasized the importance of geography in Canada’s defence. As Stéphane Roussel argued in his book *The North American Democratic Peace*, the conviction that the Soviet Union was the next opponent in a possible war confirmed, for the United States, the strategic importance of Canada. From this point of view, the North American continent is that of a singular geopolitical region because of its isolation and seas that surround it. It would consequently be axiomatic to say, in the context of strategy making, that the United States and Canada constituted one target. Even academic critics of Canada’s continentalist approach in the 1960’s conceded that Canadian defence interests coincided with those of the United States: “this assumption is hardly debatable. From the purely strategic standpoint, the continent is best considered as a unit, and its unity is not affected by drawing an imaginary line along its 49th parallel. [...] a nuclear war fought directly between the United States, and the USSR would lead to the destruction of Canada.” This reality would be the major theme for Canada’s first White Paper on Defence.

In 1963, Lester Pearson’s Liberal Party defeated the Conservative Party led by John Diefenbaker in a federal election. Seizing the initiative to distance themselves from the previous Conservative government, newly elected Prime Minister Pearson initiated a defence review to produce a White Paper. This White Paper, which would be later known as the 1964 White Paper on Defence, was the first formal defence policy statement since the end of the Second World War. This post-war period, for Canada, saw two defence-related major themes contradict with

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each other in terms of resources: post-war demobilization and a Cold War-dominated environment. Some of the other important factors that influenced the 1964 White Paper included the desire for a growth in Canada’s social programs, and design more realistic and modest defense objectives.63 The 1964 White Paper addressed how Canada should reduce its defence objectives, with a smaller force and budget, in a rapidly changing environment. The 1964 White Paper is primarily known for two principal elements: the unification of all services into a single military force and its affirmation that “many of the basic principles that govern Canada’s defence policy are constant [emphasis added] because they are determined by factors, such as geography and history, which are specific.”64 The first element of the 1964 White Paper, the unification of the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force, created a single organization called the Canadian Forces, led and commanded by a single four-star general (or flag) officer. This Chief of Defence, in turn, is the only military officer responsible to the government for the training, equipping and operation of the military forces of Canada. This unification, as Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer argued at the time, would lead to better management and control as well as result in savings in operating costs that could be diverted to capital programs.65 One of the reason was also an attempt to unite the separate service’s culture – an objective for which a verdict of success is still debated to this day.66 Nevertheless, partly due  


64 Canadian Department of National Defence, White Paper 1964, 5.


66 For a fuller discussion on the unification of Canada’s military services and the impact of Canadian military culture, see Allan D. English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 87-110, accessed February 10, 2016, ProQuest ebrary. It is also interesting to note that this book was written as a response to the question whether the Canadian Forces were being ‘Americanized.’ It concluded, quite forcefully, that if the Canadian Forces ever abandon bilingualism, there would be very little other than
in part to the Canadian Forces’ small size or to the prevalence of joint training (officers go
through joint education and training at the rank of major), it is relatively safe to argue that the
services sub-cultures’ influences on the nation’s strategic culture remain relatively minor in
comparison to the United States’ Air Force, Army, Marines and Navy.

The second element of the 1964 White Paper, in the context of the nuclear confrontation
of the two major superpowers, was the discussion around what some commentators have
described the “obligated Americanism.”67 As the 1964 White Paper prescribed, “it is, for the
foreseeable future, impossible to conceive of any significant external threat to Canada which is
not also a threat to North America as a whole. It is equally inconceivable that, in resisting clear
and unequivocal aggression against Canadian territory, Canada could not rely on the active
support of the United States.”68 In turn, the 1964 White Paper stated that in order for this sine qua
non condition to be accomplished, Canada had to be able to: maintain surveillance of its territory,
airspace, and territorial waters, manage incidents on its territory and coasts, and contribute, within
the limit of resources, to the defence of Canadian airspace. In itself, these core and essential tasks
were nothing less than the ways required to balance the strategic equation with the stated end of
protecting North America’s physical security. It is interesting to note that the 1964 strategic
equilibrium, as stated in the White Paper, rested on the capacity, for Canada, to demonstrate and
persuade the Americans of its ability to defend itself – even, if, in the end, Canada could not
defend itself.

67 The 1964 White Paper uses as a point of departure the fact that Canadian defence
policy is based on collective arrangements within NATO and a continental defence partnership
with the United States. See Bruce A. Harris, “Trends in Alliance Conventional Defense
Relationship: The Politics, Strategy and Technology of Defense, ed. David G. Haglund and Joel J.
The decade that followed saw the Canadian Liberal government produce a new White Paper in 1971. The context surrounding the production of the 1971 White Paper, including the personality of the Prime Minister himself, is interesting to analyze because it shows the influence of Canada’s strategic culture at that moment. As soon as elected in 1968, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau asked for a general review of Canada’s foreign and defence policies. He specifically requested two government-produced reports (independent of one another) on the feasibility of the reduction of military forces in Europe. Unsurprisingly, the reports concluded that it was in Canada’s economic, political and military interests to maintain the status quo in Europe. The strategic and nuclear environment intuitively called for, at the minimum, the maintenance of current military forces: the Soviet Union’s military strength had not changed (evidenced by the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia), Canada had the same level of military resources available and, finally, NATO’s adoption of the flexible response strategic concept energized the debate over conventional defence requirements. In addition and to add to the argument, the Prime Minister’s closest advisors and certainly the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, all advised Trudeau to maintain, in the name of Canada’s crucial relationship with the United States, the status quo with Canada’s NATO forces. Despite these arguments, Trudeau decided to reduce the number of troops stationed in Europe (resulting in a reduction from 10,000 Europe-based troops to 5,000). If all the aforementioned elements remained the same, what had changed in the calculus so that Canada would alter its commitment, in an apparent contradiction to the strategic environment? Simply put, Trudeau saw a political

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69 Liberal Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson stepped down in 1968, opening the race for the Liberal leadership and, by extension, that of Prime Minister. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, a prominent Cabinet Minister under Pearson, was elected at the April 1968 Liberal Convention as the new Liberal leader. He was sworn in as Prime Minister two weeks later.

opportunity, took advantage of it, and, in the words of Fortman and Larose, “imposed a strategic
counterculture to the prevailing one.”\footnote{Ibid., 539.} It is therefore precisely this suggestion – that Trudeau
made his decision against a prevalent Canada-United States relationship-based strategic culture
– that implies to prove the existence of a strategic culture in the first place.

Given the thesis that the United States relationship is central to Canada’s strategic
culture, it is worth explaining how someone could break free from it and make what may seem a
counter-intuitive decision. First, Canada’s population had just elected Trudeau’s Liberal party
with a strong majority. Second, a growing segment of the Canadian population was disapproving
American foreign policies in general and especially those related to the conflict in Vietnam.\footnote{Greg Donaghy, “Domesticating NATO: Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance, 1963-68,” \textit{International Journal} 52, no 3 (summer 1997): 446, accessed January 6, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203220.} Third, Trudeau was not a typical political leader of the time; he was young, non-conformist, and
had the status of a ‘rock star’ with the young electorate. Journalists coined his pre-election time as
the ‘Trudeaumannia’ of Canada. Fourth, through the so-coined ‘Trudeau Doctrine’ he certainly
wanted to create and protect a true Canadian identity. The ‘Trudeau Doctrine,’ as it is known, is
the assembly of six policy papers developed under Trudeau’s guidance in 1970 on the topics of
Defence, Latin America, Pacific, Europe, United Nations and International Development, with a
maybe due to his independent intellectual mind – that Canada-United States relations did not
require a comprehensive strategic roadmap bounded by the relationship at the cost of all other
Party leader) and his willingness to create and protect a true Canadian identity, felt free to break from any Canadian-strategy making stereotypes.\textsuperscript{75}

The 1971 White Paper recognized primarily that, in the defence of North America, Canada was inevitably closely associated with the United States. Simply put, even if no warheads landed in Canada in the event of general nuclear war, a strategic attack on the US, which could leave 100 million dead in North America, would have cataclysmic consequences for Canada. The 1971 White Paper carried forward, from the 1964 edition, the usual themes, albeit worded differently: the surveillance of Canada’s territory and coastlines, the protection of North America and the fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon. This new phrasing is interesting in light of this paper discussion. All three elements of the strategic ends, ways, and means equation, are found in a single group of “Priorities for Canadian Defence Policy” which, in itself seems to suggest these are Canada’s security objectives.\textsuperscript{76} While arguably the protection of the North American continent and its population is the ‘ends’ of the strategy, the ways are essentially the surveillance of our coast and territory – which was to satisfy the American requirements that Canada did not become an avenue of approach for any enemy. As the 1971 White Paper described:

> From a potential enemy’s point of view, however, North America can only logically be seen as one set of targets. Canada’s centres of population and industry logically form part of the major target plan for a strategic nuclear on North America. [...] Regardless of the circumstances leading up to such an attack, logically, for geographical reasons if no other, we must plan on the basis that we shall inevitably be gravely affected.\textsuperscript{77}

The geographic reality that positions Canada between the two superpowers, therefore, led

\textsuperscript{75} These conditions never truly reappeared in the years that followed – although some journalists are making, maybe to their own peril, a hasty parallel with a close relative: Canada’s newest Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau.

\textsuperscript{76} Canadian Department of National Defence, \textit{White Paper 1971}, 16.

Canada, out of necessity, to retain its commitment to a continental defence policy. The major component of the continental defence plan which Canada obliged itself to, as referenced in both the 1964 and the 1971 White Paper, is Canada’s participation in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Above all, the Canadian Government has long recognized that the continental security is a de facto obligation for the Canadian security apparatus.

As Canada and the United States share common interest in continental security, both governments have agreed since the Second World War that it is in the strategic interest of Canada to participate in the continental defence.78 In the unlikely scenario that Canada would avoid altogether the bilateral agreements on the defence of the continent, however, the United States would still take all the means necessary for survival, including the defence of Canada. As stated James Eayrs, Canadians “can rely on the United States to provide a place for us under the umbrella of its deterrent and defensive forces, which shelter Canadians to the same extent that they shelter Americans, and will continue to do so whatever the form of Canada’s defence and foreign policies.”79 It has been repeatedly argued since the Cold War that the United States were tied to the need to defend Canada.80

Given the above, we can deduce beyond any doubt the physical proximity and the continental geography have always been and will remain a critical factor in the making of Canadian military strategies. The reciprocal promises of 1938, which came back to the forefront of Canada-United States relations in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attack, brought back to

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79 Jame Eayrs, Northern Approaches; Canada and the search for peace (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1961), 36.

80 Philippe Garigue, 548.
the agenda Canada’s responsibility to protect its points of entry to the United States. Regarding
the standard North American protection, initiatives such as NORAD confirm the geostrategic
importance of Canada. Moreover, even if Canada were to decide to isolate itself politically, the
United States would not stand idle. Geographical-based historical decisions have left little room
for liberty and free-range thinking in Canadian decision-making. A Canadian strategic culture
was articulated in 1938 out of geographical necessity and is still alive today, courtesy of another
point of national reference: the Canada-United States common economy.

The two countries, along with most international commentators, have long recognized the
strength and potential of their economic relationship. Already in 1937, André Siegfried, a
renowned French academic and political commentator, claimed that “the word proximity is
hardly strong enough, for the two countries (Canada and the Unites States) have a common
economic atmosphere and are, in this respect, both the same country...Such conditions exist
nowhere else in the world.”81 This economic proximity, of course, has continued to grow. In
1998, a consortium of large US marketing companies admitted that it considered the Canadian
market as an extension of the United States market.82 Indeed, a common language and exposure
to the same media mean that the preferences of Canadian and American consumers converge on
the same path – and a discussion on this idea will take place further down. The fact that
Americans and Canadians enjoy similar income not only contributes to the similarity of economic
behavior but also reinforces the idea of the natural integration of the two economies. As for the
business side, one cannot ignore the fact that the longest undefended border in the world sees a
daily transit of more than two billion American dollars, or as others have put it, one million
American dollars in goods and services exchanged every minute. Moreover, the United States is

81 André Siegfried, Canada: An International Power, 2nd ed. (New York: Duell, Sloan
and Peace, 1949), 135.

82 Joseph K. Roberts, In the Shadow of the Empire; Canada for Americans (New York:
Canada’s largest importer and is also the first export market for 36 of the 50 states. This double import and export market annually represents over 8.7 million truckloads. These statistics illustrate the interdependence of the two economies. Since the Canadian economy is closely emeshed in the United States economy, it is easy to understand the importance that politicians give to the Canada-United States relationship.

The 1987 White Paper exemplified the importance of the economic relationship. The 1987 White Paper, produced by a Conservative government for the first time, opens up with a litany of critiques about the previous Liberal governments’ realizations. In fact, this White Paper openly stated that the previous government had it wrong. The Liberals had been too optimistic about the evolution of East-West relations, had undermined Canada’s credibility with its allies (through such decisions as to reduce Europe-based troops committed to NATO) and, more importantly, had allowed a ‘capacity gap’ emerge with the Canadian Forces which led directly to a higher threat the North American continent. In what many considered a direct rebuke to previous Liberal policies, the White Paper stressed that “for Canada, this quest [of liberty and peace] continues to pursue best through cooperation with our allies. This is in


86 Much of the three-page introduction is devoted to half-veiled critiques of the previous government policy decisions. The Liberals, under Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s leadership, had been in power since 1968, except for a short period of one year.

recognition of our shared history, our shared interests and our community of values.” 88 Of all White Papers, this is probably the most representative of Canada’s quintessential relationship with the United States. The text is peppered with comments on the requirement to recognize Canada’s links with the United States and goes as far as saying, “not surprisingly, Canada has political, cultural and social ties with Europe unmatched by those with any other parts of the world, save the United States.” 89

By 1993, the Cold War had ended and the Liberals were back in power. They produced a White Paper to distance themselves from the previous Conservative government. Released in 1994, this White Paper sought to chart a course that would allow Canada to cope with the transformed international security environment that it faced abroad and the stark fiscal realities that it faced at home. 90 It reflects the more secure, yet uncertain international strategic environment that Canada faced. “Canada,” the White Paper prescribed, “will continue to rely on the stability and flexibility of its relationship with the United States to help meet defence requirements in North America and beyond.” 91 To that end, the White Paper ordered the Canadian Forces to maintain the ability to operate effectively in all domains with the US military in defending the continent. Interestingly enough, this White Paper resurrected the 1960’s the argument of United States assured defence. Canada, even if it were to choose to reduce its level of cooperation with the United States significantly, would still be obliged to rely on the United States for help in assuring the security of its territory and approaches – and this assistance would

88 Canadian Department of National Defence, White Paper 1987, II.
89 Ibid., 5.
90 For fiscal year 1994-95, the federal deficit was $38 billion, or more that 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, while the accumulated debt totaled $546 billion. The Liberals vowed to bring the deficit back to $24 billion by 1996, and to surpluses by 1997. To accomplish this goal, the Liberals implemented major reductions in expenditures, including on social services and defence. See Sokolsky, Canada, Getting It Right This Time, 1.
then come on strictly US terms.\textsuperscript{92}

The importance of this relationship, however, comes often at the price of the Canadian fear to lose its identity. Over the years, the two countries have indeed ratified a multitude of agreements and policies to strengthen economic relations. Canadian officials, however, always designed these agreements to maintain a degree of independence for Canada. The Trade Agreement of 1990, which led to North America Free Trade Agreement in 1994 and the conclusion in 2005 of the North American Partnership, are the best examples of these provisions. In fact, according to Canadian diplomat, academic and author John Wendall Holmes, “the need for all these agreements comes from the urgency for Canada to regulate these relations, under threat of losing any Canadian identity.”\textsuperscript{93} This finding aptly highlights the invasiveness character of the predominant United States’ economy and its impact on Canadian politics. At the same time, however, Canadian policy makers must seek a delicate balance between protecting Canadian identity and free access to the United States market. As James Taylor discussed, “to have unhindered, trouble-free access to the worlds’ closest, richest and most open market is a vital Canadian interest.”\textsuperscript{94}

The attacks of September 2001 highlighted the consequences of an integrated economy between Canada and the United States. The shock wave created by the border closure has had a significant impact on the Canadian economy. More than all the losses caused by this physical shutdown, it was probably the psychological effects of the fear of a complete or partial closure of the border that most influenced Canadian policy makers. As argued by the Canadian Council of

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93} John Wendall Holmes, \textit{Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 72.

Chief Executives back in 2004, any loss of confidence in Canada’s ability to access the most lucrative markets has serious economic implications. That is why the Canadian government gives priority to its economic relations with the United States. Whether bilateral, regional, or international, the majority of the government actions always relate directly to the management of privileged economic relationship that Canada has with the United States. A natural convergence of consumption patterns, together with trade, regulated or not, but still larger, has brought the Canadian economy to be more and more dependent on the United States economy. This dependence has a direct impact on policy-making and strategies; Canada, on behalf of its interests, goes to great lengths to maintain its free access to the United States market. Canada will hardly ever pursue military strategies that would jeopardize the economic bond with the United States, as this paper will illustrate later when discussing Canada’s decision to not take part in the Iraq war. In summary, as Carnes Lord’s definition of strategic culture would describe it, Canada’s obligation towards its shared economy with the United States has become, over the years, “centrally constitutive” and a point of reference for the Canadian state.

One of Sutherland’s most central arguments was certainly the country’s natural alignment based on a natural community of interest. According to him, the most powerful alignment in Canada’s case is the United States. Thus, in addition to close ties regarding security and the economy, it is also a cultural affinity or a fundamental compatibility of institutions and social attitudes (which go beyond any ordinary conception of common interests) that influences the Canadian strategic making process. This part of the monograph addresses how political, diplomatic and cultural interactions helped to fortify the community of interests between the two countries and how they serve in establishing a typical Canadian strategic culture. All these elements allow us to conclude that the most powerful alignment of Canada has always been and remains to the United States.

The Canada-United States diplomatic and political relationship has all the characteristics of complex interdependence. This interdependence, as expressed by political theorists Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye in 2001, refers to the mutual influence that have two separate players from each other.\textsuperscript{95} The geographical proximity, the density of bilateral trade, a community of interest, and even a cultural and ideological convergence were cited as factors promoting the interdependence, and subsequent alignment, between two countries.\textsuperscript{96} In 1949, Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent explained in this regard that the fact that Canada and the United States adopted similar policies so often that this fact, in and of itself, it could prove that “our two peoples have the same ideals and ideas, the basic way of life.”\textsuperscript{97} Even more to the point, in 2005, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs described the Canada-United States relationship as being “built upon more than two centuries of close economic, security and personal ties. Over several generations, Canadians and Americans have intermingled through migration, cross-border work and travel, and the exchange of ideas.”\textsuperscript{98} In Canada, economic, cultural, scientific, academic, artistic and commercial share their spheres with that of the United States. Allan Gotlieb, Canadian Ambassador to the United States between 1981 and 1989, confirmed this statement for the political environment:

In the Canadian public sector, the relationship is driven by hundreds of institutions and organizations in both the national and provincial capitals, each interacting with points of contact south of the border. This has always been the case, at least in the postwar history of our relations. But as these relations deepened and became more penetrating, and as domestic regulation and intervention mushroomed in both countries, the number of direct cross-border contacts on the functional level also exploded.\textsuperscript{99}

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\textsuperscript{95} Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, \textit{Power and Interdependence} (Toronto: Little Brown, 2001), 21.

\textsuperscript{96} Stephane Roussel, 17.


\textsuperscript{99} Allan Gotlieb, \textit{I’ll be with you in a minute, Mr. Ambassador: The Education of a Canadian Diplomat in Washington} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 118.
\end{footnotesize}
A different angle of approach also allows us to analyze how the cultural convergence between the two countries takes place. American culture is pervasive in Canada; any cursory look at a movie theater schedule can convince anyone. Beyond this reality that may seem trivial, however, it is the latent and invisible integration of cultures that deserves consideration. Indeed, the United States exports its American culture through various media and many quickly adopt its products. Canada is certainly no exception to this reality. Canadians remain the largest single group of foreign consumers of American popular culture, importing more than four billion dollars of cultural commodities annually, four times the value of United States cultural imports from Canada. In television broadcasting, for example, the Canadian television viewer’s interest in the United States’ programs intensified during the 1990s and has not stopped since. Most surprisingly, in 2000, the American shows *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire*, *ER*, and *Ally McBeal* all rated ahead of *Hockey Night in Canada*.100

We can state, without assuming that there is an Americanized messages propaganda conspiracy oriented towards Canada, that many of the media reflect American national identity at the expense of Canadian identity. It is for this reason that Canada, in 1996, adopted policies to protect its cultural identity from an excessive cultural convergence. Much of these policies are still in place today, and Canada has updated them to reflect the realities of the new millennium.101

With so many links, it is easy to understand how the two countries, through their mutual influence over millions of exchanges, slowly line up.102 In quite a subtle way, values and interests


102 Albeit rare, some commentators have tried to argue the opposite; that, in fact, Canada and American’s values and interests were drifting apart. See Michael Adams, Amy Langstaff and David Jamieson, *Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging Values* (Toronto: Penguins Canada, 2003). The authors use a vast array of statistics that they compiled while conducting more than 14000 individual interviews and numerous focus groups and survey
of the two countries collide and merge. As John Kirton states: “The United States is also at times a penetrative influence within Canada’s politics, with a presence that can be active or amorphous, deliberate or unintended, benevolent or malevolent, and welcomed or resented in the fabric of Canadian national life.”\textsuperscript{103} This penetrative influence is best exemplified in the two most recent Canadian published strategic documents – albeit not called White Papers as such. Respectively titled \textit{A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence} (2005) and \textit{Canada First Defence Strategy} (2008), both documents recognized the new security environment and argued for an even closer relationship with the United States on security issues. The 2005 document went as far as saying that the defence of North America (and not Canada) is the Canadian Forces’ first priority.\textsuperscript{104} Also, and maybe more surprisingly because found in a Canadian national strategic document, \textit{A Role of Pride and Influence in the World} mentions that a US Presidential Directive calling for a national maritime strategy will undoubtedly have an impact for Canada – leaving therefore little room, if any, for Canadian officials to freely design a national strategy.

In light of all these facts, one can easily conclude that the United States is an attractive force for Canada in terms of alignment. Canadian and American interests come together, mix and get lost in a web of relationships woven between the two countries. So let there it be no doubt, just like Prime Ministers and Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy, and King have stated before, the United States and Canada continue to be a natural alliance based not only on geography and economics but also on shared values and interests.\textsuperscript{105} By extension, and according to the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item{}\textsuperscript{103} John Kirton, \textit{Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World} (Toronto: Thomson and Nelson, 2007), 263.
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previously mentioned definition of strategic culture, this slow and pervasive alignment of interests clearly defines an important point of reference in Canada’s strategic culture.

**The Canadian Strategic Culture**

As discussed earlier, strategic culture is viewed as a set of shared beliefs and assumptions derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written). Strategic culture then shapes the collective identity and relationships to other groups, and influences the right ends and means for achieving security objectives. The factors of geography, economics and interdependence can certainly be given the quality of being invariable in the relationship between the United States and Canada. These elements, as Gray explained in its work on strategic culture, have become part of the culture, i.e. they are the points of national reference in the Canadian national narrative, rooted in historical practices and arguments. Because of their permanent nature and their contribution to the community of mutual interests, these points of references then necessarily serve as pillars for the development of Canadian policies and therefore, are the backbone of a typical strategic thought. Indeed, as we have seen in the earlier section on strategy, Canadian strategy-makers abide by the notion of strategy being an equation between the ends and the means, which represents a combination of policy and doctrine designed to facilitate a coherent and timely national response to a precise strategic environment. In this context, and if it is agreed that the strategic constants are truly immutable, then the ends of any military strategies in Canada are invariably linked to the relationship fostered in unison with the United States.

First, geography has a significant impact on all policy areas that are intimately connected to current Canadian strategic interests. The issues of Canadian sovereignty over parts of the Arctic region and access to the Northwest Passage, the evolution of NORAD and a tighter control of the border are all subjects from geographic considerations that deserve priority attention of Canadian leaders. As Michel Fortman and David Haglund wrote in 2002, “territorial defence will put forward such a variety of initiatives that will provide decision makers with unprecedented
opportunities and challenges.”

As for the economy, if there is a close second in the race to being the most important Canadian vital interest, it has to be it. It is evident that the slightest failure in the working of the bilateral economic relations can have the most severe repercussion in Canada – as it always has. The crucial importance of healthy economic ties with the United States to Canadian politicians has achieved level never seen before in the world. As a consortium of financial specialists mentioned in 2002: “Canada: has a lot at stake – and much more to lose – in its relationship with the United States, particularly in its economic dimension.”

Finally, the alignment resulting from the interdependence between the two nations affects Canadians deeply. The values merge, the ways to see the world follow parallel paths; it naturally affects the policy-making apparatus. Nevertheless, as it regards the case under consideration, both nations are severely disproportionate. One is big, the other small. Although the theory of interdependence advances that the smallest of the country does not have to sacrifice its moral and cultural sovereignty, the fact remains that the fear of extreme alignment, if not integration, is always present. This fear, in itself, adds to the argument of these elements being constantly part of the national narrative. Whether Canadians like them or not, these points of national reference are de facto present in Canada’s policy-making scene.

These strategic constants remain indeed at the base of a bitter, and always present, debate in Canada. This question of Canada’s ‘Americanization’ has divided generations of Canadians. Simply put, while they acknowledge the requirements to maintain a close relationship with the

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United States, the Canadians’ profound desire is to remain truly independent. The tenacious debates of recent years on Canada’s participation in the war in Iraq or missile defence are part of the evidence. It has been argued that the main reason why Canada joined the fight in Afghanistan in 2002 is rooted precisely in that reasoning – i.e. to not be seen at the mercy of American decision-making. As Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang argued at length in their description of how Canada got involved in Afghanistan, “the political problem was how to support Washington in its War on Terror without supporting the War in Iraq – and the answer was the so-called Afghanistan solution.”¹⁰⁹ The idea was that by deploying troops to Afghanistan to support the War on Terror, Canada had no more troops to dedicate to Iraq – an American war (in the view of most Canadians) that was highly, if not entirely, politically unacceptable in Canada. At the same time, one could not ignore the impact of this decision on Canada-United States’ relations. As Eddie Goldenberg, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s most senior policy advisor later wrote, “For Canada to say no to the United States – the world’s only superpower, our next-door neighbor, our very close ally and friend, and the destination of 87% of our exports – is not a decision to be taken lightly.”¹¹⁰ Trying to distance Canada from American foreign policies decisions and not willing to rush into the War on Terror as well as having to preserve its closest ally expectations, Prime Minister Chrétien walked a fine line in balancing Canadian political independence and supporting its American friend and neighbor. This thought is reminiscent of a comment Henry Kissinger makes in his book *White House Years* on Canada’s policies towards the United States: “It [Canada] requires both economic relations with the United States and an occasional gesture of strident independence.”¹¹¹ The previous examples rounds up the argument – national point of


references exist in Canada that shape the collective identity and relationships to other groups, and influence the right ends and means for achieving security objectives. These points of references have become the primary determinants of Canada’s strategic culture.

Conclusion

This paper argued that a distinct Canadian strategic culture exists. It has argued that a typical Canadian strategic culture is real and based on its relationship with the United States. As seen, already in 1962, Sutherland was looking for constant and reliable data on which Canada would base its policies and strategies. He came to the assumption that the geographical, economic realities and natural alignment with the United States would prove to be stable Canadian factors that would transcend generations. The study of these geographical, economical and alignment factors underlying this statement enabled, without the shadow of a doubt, the confirmation that the powerful, attractive force exerted by the United States always influences the development of security policies of Canada. In turn, these axioms have manifested themselves in a variety of strategic documents over the years. The repetition of these clichés lays the base for an integrated system of symbols, pervasive and enduring, which Canadian policy and strategy abide by when formulating concepts for the role of military force in international affairs.

This reality constitutes Canada’s strategic culture. If a nation’s strategic culture is viewed as a set of shared beliefs and assumptions derived from common experiences, then Canada’s recent bilateral history with the United States is a testament to this reality. The continental bond, in turn, shapes Canada’s identity and its action in the world. Canada’s actions in Afghanistan (and non-action in Iraq) and the quintessential debate on Canada’s cultural sovereignty over the United States, amongst other examples, are further proof of the existence of a strong, unique and inescapable strategic culture for Canada.

The Canadian strategy-makers must understand this reality. Strategic culture is definable and, more importantly, this paper indicates that strategic culture significantly affects strategic
decision-making. Therefore, strategic culture is a crucial variable to consider for strategic planners and decision-makers. Knowing the characteristics and consequences of a nation’s strategic culture will help them identify immutable strategy and policy underpinnings.

This monograph had the ambition to persuade the reader that Canada has an unavoidable strategic culture based on its relationship with the United States – or, in other words, Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s elephant. The relationship with this elephant dominates Canada’s strategic culture. Canada’s political leaders, government officials, and military officers alike must recognize the elephant’s weight in the continental bed. Canada’s only choice is to share its vital space, learn to predict the elephant’s next move and accept its longevity.
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