Focused vs Broad in World War I: A Historical Comparison of General Staff Officer Education at Pre-war Leavenworth and Langres.

A Monograph

by

MAJ Daniel W. Johnson
US Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Focused vs Broad in World War I: A Historical Comparison of General Staff Officer Education at Pre-war Leavenworth and Langres

The US Army entered World War I with less than 200 Leavenworth Staff College graduates. The shortage of Leavenworth men combined with the plan to create several square divisions and corps presented a problem to Pershing and the AEF GHQ. The solution was to establish a Staff College in Langres, France. This research examines if a Langres Staff College model offers an effective form of general staff officer education such as that provided by the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College. The Langres Staff College curriculum lacked the depth and breadth in the curriculum required to produce flexible general staff officers adept at coping with uncertainty. The Langres Staff College's methods of instruction lacked innovation, which stymied the students' growth as reflective practitioners. The Langres Staff College students did not share a similar knowledge and experience base with one another, which made it difficult for the school to equally develop Regular Army, National Army, and National Guard students as general staff officers. Several Langres students came from well-established units in France, which disrupted American units in the midst of training. The Langres Staff College model does not provide an effective form of education.

General Staff Officer Education, Leavenworth Staff College, World War I, American Expeditionary Forces, Langres, France.
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Name of Candidate: Major Daniel W. Johnson

Monograph Title: Focused vs Broad in World War I: A Historical Comparison of General Staff Officer Education at Pre-war Leavenworth and Langres.

Approved by:

__________________________________, Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, PhD

__________________________, Seminar Leader
Charles T. Lombardo, COL

__________________________, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL

Accepted this 26th day of May 2016 by:

__________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

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Abstract

Focused vs Broad in World War I: A Historical Comparison of General Staff Officer Education at Pre-war Leavenworth and Langres, by MAJ Daniel W. Johnson, 70 pages.

World War I introduced new complexities of warfare to the US Army. These complexities posed unique challenges to the AEF’s ability to conduct war. To address these challenges, General John "Black Jack" Pershing approved the AEF's adoption of the general staff system for divisions, corps, and armies. The US Army officer corps entered World War I with less than 200 Leavenworth Staff College graduates. The shortage of Leavenworth men combined with the plan to create several square divisions and corps presented a problem to Pershing and the AEF GHQ. The solution was to establish a Staff College in Langres, France. The Langres Staff College was Pershing’s and the AEF GHQ’s attempt to close the gap between available two-year Leavenworth men and vacant general staff officer positions throughout the AEF. This research examines if a Langres Staff College model offers an effective form of general staff officer education such as that provided by the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College.

First, the Langres Staff College curriculum lacked the depth and breadth in the curriculum required to produced flexible general staff officers adept at coping with uncertainty. The Langres Staff College curriculum produced specialized officers proficient in one general staff position for the World War I environment. The broad curriculum of the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College exposed students to military history and theory. The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College curriculum facilitated the students' maturation as general staff officers who could solve problems, regardless of the environment. Secondly, the Langres Staff College's methods of instruction lacked innovation, which stymied the students' growth as reflective practitioners. The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College's methods of instruction consisted of innovative methods, which provided students with more opportunities to reflect and synthesis of course material. The Langres Staff College students did not share a similar knowledge and experience base with one another, which made it difficult for the school to equally develop Regular Army, National Army, and National Guard students as general staff officers. In contrast to Langres, the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College received officers on relatively equal knowledge and experience levels since they were top graduates from the rigorous School of the Line. Additionally, a large portion of officers who filled the seats at Langres came from well-established units in France, which disrupted AEF units in the midst of planning, training, or combat operations. Finally, most of the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College students graduated from the School of the Line and their second year of education did not disrupt US Army's ranks.

The Langres Staff College model does not provide an effective form of general staff officer education such as that provided by the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College. The most important lesson garnered from the research is that effective general staff officer education is an extended process and building a bench of competent general staff officers would increase the US Army's readiness for a war with a near peer or peer enemy.
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## Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td>American Expeditionary Forces</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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Introduction

A specialist who has spent half his life trying to master every aspect of some obscure subject is surely more likely to make headway than a man who is trying to master it in a short time.

-Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

World War I introduced new complexities of warfare to the US Army. These complexities posed unique challenges to the American Expeditionary Forces’ (AEF) mobilization, training, and operations. In his book, *America’s School For War*, Peter J. Schifferle argued that, “the new complexity of operations required significantly different competencies across different echelons of command, requirements not experienced by US officers before 1917.”¹ To address these challenges, General John “Black Jack” Pershing approved the AEF’s adoption of the general staff system for divisions, corps, and armies. The officers who filled these general staff officer positions played a substantial role in the outcome of World War I. Edward M. Coffman, a renowned World War I historian, stated the AEF’s “officers directed the great mobilization and successfully led a force of more than a million into combat on the Western Front.”² George C. Marshall and Jonathan M. Wainwright were two of those officers Coffman references who served as division, corps, and army-level general staff officers and executed the planning behind the AEF’s operations.

George C. Marshall, popular for his military leadership role in America’s World War II victory, served as an AEF general staff officer during World War I. Marshall graduated from Fort Leavenworth’s School of the Line in 1907 and Staff College in 1908. After graduating from the

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Staff College, Marshall remained at Leavenworth as an instructor for two years. Following his Leavenworth duty, Marshall served in various infantry regiments in Arkansas, Texas, Massachusetts, and the Philippines. Additionally, Marshall was as an Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier General Hunter Liggett and Major General James Franklin Bell. During World War I, Marshall was 1st Division’s Operations Officer (G-3) until he received orders assigning him as a general staff officer in the AEF GHQ’s Operations Section. Marshall’s reputation as a gifted general staff officer did not go unnoticed by AEF leadership, particularly Pershing and his Chief of Staff, Hugh A. Drum. As the AEF prepared for the largest Allied operation in October 1918, Drum informed Marshall that he would be First Army’s G-3. The First Army, with (then Colonel) Marshall as the G-3, organized and directed fifteen divisions and three corps headquarters (with over one-million soldiers) during the execution of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, which was the AEF’s final campaign before the November 11th Armistice.

Jonathan M. Wainwright, similar to Marshall, also served as an AEF general staff officer during World War I. Historians and military professionals mostly refer to Lieutenant General Wainwright as America’s highest ranking POW during World War II. Long before his World War II distinction, however, Wainwright gained a reputation as a skillful general staff officer for the 82nd Division during World War I. After graduating from West Point in 1906, Wainwright served in the 1st Cavalry Regiment in Texas for two years. In 1908, Wainwright experienced combat while serving in the Pacific as part of the US Army’s efforts to quell rebellion in the Philippines. Leading up to World War I, Wainwright trained officers at the Plattsburgh Camp in

3 The Command and General Staff School, Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates of The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 1881-1939 (Fort Leavenworth: The Command and General Staff School Press, 1939), 13, 26.

New York. In early 1918, Wainwright received orders to report to Langres, France as a student in the AEF’s three-month Staff College. Wainwright entered the Langres Staff College’s second course with a follow-on assignment pinpointing him as the G-3 for the 76th Division, a National Army unit that served as a depot division in France. Wainwright did extremely well at Langres which caught the attention of the school’s director, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred W. Bjornstad. Bjornstad reassigned Wainwright to a newly formed National Army unit, the 82nd Division. Wainwright served as the 82nd Division’s Operations Officer (G-3) and guided the division through the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. In his publication, The All Americans at War, James J. Cooke referred to Wainwright as “the busiest man in the 82nd Division.” In contrast to Marshall’s two-year Leavenworth education during peacetime, Wainwright experienced a compressed general staff officer education at Langres during wartime. AEF officers shared Wainwright’s Langres general staff officer education.

From the US Army’s 5,791 officers available at the start of the war, only 379 officers had graduated from Leavenworth’s School of the Line, Staff College, or both schools. Generally, approximately 5% of the AEF officer population had completed Leavenworth education. Given the importance of the general staff officer role during World War I, it was crucial for Wainwright to receive this education.

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6 James J. Cooke, The All-Americans At War: The 82nd Division in the Great War, 1917-1918 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 32-33, 68; Army General Staff College – Langres, "Recommendations made by Director at conclusion of course, May 25, 1918," 2nd Staff College Course (NARA II, RG120 AEF Entry 267, G-3 Files, Box 3221, 1918), 6.

7 Cooke, The All-Americans At War, 68.

8 The Command and General Staff School, Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates, 43. Despite attending the Langres Staff College in 1918, Wainwright later attended Leavenworth’s General Staff School in 1931. Walter Krueger, George S. Patton, Preston Brown, and Joseph Stillwell also attended the Leavenworth Schools, either in the years before or after their attendance at the Langres Staff College.

9 Mark E. Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12; Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 157-158. Nenninger provided a breakdown, by year and rank, for Leavenworth School of the Line and Staff College graduates from 1905-1916. The breakdown reflected total number graduates, but does not reflect the number of School of the Line and Staff
about half of each School of the Line class earned admission into Leavenworth’s Staff College. The US Army officer corps entered World War I with less than 200 Leavenworth Staff College graduates. Historiography acknowledges the contributions of two-year Leavenworth men to the AEF’s World War I performance. Timothy K. Nenninger, the foremost historian on pre-war Leavenworth officer education, summarized why Pershing pursued Leavenworth graduates to fill general staff positions throughout the AEF ranks:

Because of their training Leavenworth graduates were among the best qualified officers to plan, organize, train and staff a large expeditionary force. Pershing recognized this and placed Leavenworth men in important positions because the schools [School of the Line and Staff College] had taught them the proper functioning of a general staff, operational planning, teaching tactics, and simply coping with large numbers of troops.

In his 2004 book, *The Regulars*, Coffman argued that “Leavenworth really paid high dividends during the war, as so many graduates put their training to good use in key staff positions in the AEF.” In his memoirs from the war, Pershing stated that “Our most highly trained officers as a rule came from the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.” Despite their competence as general staff officers, there were not enough two-year Leavenworth men to fill all general staff officer positions throughout newly formed AEF divisions and corps.

The shortage of Leavenworth men combined with the plan to create several square divisions and corps presented a problem to Pershing and the AEF GHQ. The solution was to establish a Staff College in Langres, France. The Langres Staff College was Pershing’s and the AEF GHQ’s attempt to close the gap between available two-year Leavenworth men and vacant

College graduates who were still on active duty at the start of World War I.

11 Ibid., 134.
general staff officer positions throughout the AEF. Intended to resemble the Leavenworth Staff College, the Langres Staff College was a three-month course responsible for producing qualified division-level general staff officers. During the school’s thirteen-month existence, 777 officers attended Langres, however, the Staff College assessed only 537 of these officers as “qualified to perform general staff officer duties.”

Comprehensive research exists that covers the history of the US Army’s general staff officer education both before World War I and during the interwar period. Nenninger’s work provided an exhaustive analysis on Fort Leavenworth’s officer education beginning with the first Infantry and Cavalry class to the last Staff College classes before World War I. Schifferle’s book conveyed an-depth assessment on Leavenworth’s interwar officer education and the school’s impact on World War II. There exists, however, a historical gap in research on the Langres Staff College’s general staff officer education during World War I. This monograph’s focus is on general staff officer education and on the Langres Staff College model’s similarities and differences to the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College model.

This monograph’s primary research question is: Can a Langres Staff College model offer an effective form of general staff officer education such as that provided by the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College? This monograph seeks to answer to the primary research question, but more importantly, to attain valuable lessons that military professionals can apply to the US Army’s future general staff officer education.

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14 Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, “Report of the G-5, Appendix 3, History of the Army General Staff College,” AEF Records (National Archives Washington, DC. Call No. RG 120, Box 22, Folder 218, 1919), 1-2, 9. This report contains handwritten marks that corrected the total count for Langres graduates. The original number in the report was 527, but several handwritten marks depict the final total as 537 students deemed qualified to perform general staff officer duties.


16 Schifferle, America’s School for War.
This research determines that a Langres Staff College model does not provide an effective form of general staff officer education such as that provided by the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College. First, the Langres Staff College curriculum lacked the depth and breadth in the curriculum required to produced flexible general staff officers adept at coping with uncertainty. The Langres Staff College curriculum produced specialized officers proficient in one general staff position for the World War I environment. The broad curriculum of the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College, however, exposed students to military history and theory. The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College curriculum facilitated the students’ maturation as general staff officers who could solve problems, regardless of the environment.

Secondly, the Langres Staff College’s methods of instruction lacked innovation, which stymied the students’ growth as reflective practitioners. The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College’s methods of instruction, however, consisted of innovative methods, which provided students with more opportunities to reflect and synthesize course material. Furthermore, the Langres Staff College students did not share a similar knowledge and experience base with one another, which made it difficult for the school to equally develop Regular Army, National Army, and National Guard students as general staff officers.

Additionally, a large portion of officers who filled the seats at Langres came from well-established units in France, which disrupted AEF units in the midst of planning, training, or combat operations. In contrast to Langres, the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College received officers on relatively equal knowledge and experience levels since they were top graduates from the rigorous School of the Line. Furthermore, most of the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College students graduated from the School of the Line and their second year of education did not disrupt US Army’s ranks.

Lastly, the most important lesson garnered from this research is that effective general staff officer education is an extended process and building a ‘bench’ of competent general staff officers would increase the US Army’s readiness. The idea that the US Army could fight a war
with a near peer or peer enemy is not implausible. A war against a near peer or peer would require the mass mobilization of available Army Reserves and Army National Guardsman, thus requiring proficient general staff officers to plan and coordinate the efforts of significant sized formations.

**Establishment of the Leavenworth Staff College**

In the years prior to the Great War, the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth was the US Army’s primary institution for providing officers with a general staff officer education. In 1902, under Elihu Root’s military education reforms, the War Department established the General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. The two-year General Service and Staff College replaced Leavenworth’s one-year Infantry and Cavalry School. According to Nenninger, The General Service and Staff College “was supposed to be a school for generalists, with an emphasis on staff work.”

Shortly after his arrival as the General Service and Staff College’s Commandant, Brigadier General James Franklin Bell submitted several recommendations for the school to the War Department. Bell proposed to reduce the amount of lectures and recitations and increase student practical work. Additionally, Bell suggested splitting the two-year General Service and Staff College into two separate one-year courses. In his plan, Bell proposed that the top-half graduates of the first course would make up the second course’s student body. The second course’s curriculum would be advanced, and second year students would also assist in the instruction of the first course. In 1904, the War Department approved Bell’s recommendation and established two separate schools. The Infantry and Cavalry School (renamed the School of the Line in 1907) would focus primarily on tactics. The Staff College, consisting of the Infantry and

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Cavalry School’s top graduates, would focus on general staff officer education. The War Department’s 1904 *General Orders No. 115* stated the Staff College’s mission:

The object of the Staff College is to instruct specially selected officers of engineers, cavalry, artillery, and infantry in the duties of general staff officers in time of war; also to investigate such military inventions, discoveries, and developments as affect the arms of service represented at the college, to disseminate information thus acquired, and to make such recommendations as may concern the practical efficiency of the several arms of the service in war.  

Initially, the Staff College began as a course only slightly different from the Infantry and Cavalry School. In his 1905 *Annual Report of the Commandant*, Bell stated, "It has been found rather difficult to coordinate the work of the two schools to the best advantage, thus far…the Staff College is yet so young." However, the Staff College evolved throughout the pre-war years. By 1916, the Staff College provided 251 students with a broad education on general staff officer duties and prepared those officers for a variety of general staff officer positions.

**Leavenworth Staff College Curriculum**

During the period before World War I, the Staff College curriculum featured instruction from four departments. Students received instruction from the Engineering, Language, Law, and Military Art departments. The Department of Military Art, however, provided students with instruction most aligned with the War Department’s intent for the Staff College. The Department of Military Art educated students on general staff duties, history, strategy, logistics, and tactics.

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18  Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army*, 70-73. Generally, between 1904 through 1916, the School of the Line’s Honor and Distinguished (top fifty percent) graduates gained admission into the Staff College. 157-158.


20  James Franklin Bell, “Staff College,” in *Annual Report of Commandant, Infantry and Cavalry School and Staff College* (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1905), 5. Bell stated that it was “difficult” for the two different schools to coordinate their efforts. Additionally, Bell mentioned that “mature experience” will provide opportunities for progress and improvement. Part of Bell’s concern was the establishment of the Signal School, which would begin the following year, and his faculty’s ability to manage and instruct three different schools.
According to Nenninger, this department “was the most important department at the Staff College.”\textsuperscript{21} During the pre-war years, the Department of Military Art’s instruction possessed the highest amount of allocated half-days compared to the other departments. During the 1905-06 class, the Department of Military Art educated students for 188 half-days of the Staff College’s 412 half-day allocation. The Engineer Department was second with 106 half-days, followed by Department of Law with 60 half-days, and Department of Languages with 58 half-days.\textsuperscript{22} Despite the subtraction and addition of blocks of instruction throughout the pre-war years, the Department of Military Art owned most of the Staff College’s curriculum in the years before World War I.\textsuperscript{23}

From 1904 through 1916, the influences on the Staff College’s curriculum consisted of a mixture of US Army \textit{Field Service Regulations}, foreign theoretical publications and manuals, and faculty publications. In 1905, the US War Department published the first \textit{Field Service Regulation} (FSR), which served as “the authority on which all tactical instruction at Leavenworth was based.”\textsuperscript{24} During the years prior to the Great War, The School of the Line relied extensively on the 1905 and 1910 FSR as the school trained student officers on tactics and operations for divisions and below. In the Staff College, however, the War Department’s FSR influence on the curriculum diminished as the school increased its focus on general staff officer education throughout the pre-war years.

In contrast to the School of the Line’s focus on lower-level tactics, the Staff College, beginning with the 1911-12 class, focused entirely on preparing students for “higher staff duties”

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\textsuperscript{21} Nenninger, “The Fort Leavenworth Schools,” 211.
\textsuperscript{22} Eben Swift, “Staff College,” \textit{Annual Report of Commandant} (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1906), 2.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Annual Report(s) of Commandant}, 1905-1916. During the pre-war period, the Military Art Department provided the preponderance of Staff College instruction.
\textsuperscript{24} Nenninger, \textit{The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army}, 93-94.
\end{flushleft}
within divisions and corps. Pre-World War I doctrine depicted that the “largest permanent unit of the Regular Army in time of peace was the regiment.” On the eve of the US Army’s entry into the European war, the War Department’s doctrinal emphasis was on regiment and below tactics and organization, with minimal reference to divisions, corps, and armies. The School of the Line depended on doctrine to provide the foundation for instruction on troop leading and tactics at division and below. In contrast to the School of the Line’s tactical focus, the Staff College focused on advanced instruction that introduced military theories and educated students on general staff officer duties. US Army doctrine did not provide the Staff College with the necessary foundation to provide students with an advanced academic year. To advance the curriculum, the faculty incorporated several foreign publications during the pre-war years.

For the school’s inaugural year, the Staff College’s curriculum mirrored the Infantry and Cavalry School’s (renamed the School of the Line in 1907) curriculum. The 1904-05 Staff College students attended most lectures intended for the Infantry and Cavalry students. Prussian publications of Otto von Griepenkerl's *Letters on Applied Tactics* and Julius von Verdy du Vernois’ *Simplified War-Game* influenced the combined tactics-focused curriculum for the Infantry and Cavalry School and the Staff College. Additionally, *Transportation of Troops and Material* by US Army Major Chauncey B. Baker provided the basis for logistical instruction within the curriculum. During the 1905-1906 academic year, however, the faculty advanced the Staff College’s curriculum from the Infantry and Cavalry’s curriculum. Staff College students still attended most Infantry and Cavalry lectures, but the faculty supplemented the curriculum

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with more Prussian publications to add depth to the students’ understanding of tactics. Staff College students read and discussed the works of Cardinal von Widdern’s *Staff Duties in the Field*, Verdy du Vernois’ *A Tactical Ride for Cavalry*, Hugo von Gizycki’s *Strategic-Tactical Problems*, and Helmuth von Moltke’s *Tactical Problems*.\(^{28}\) The additional publications improved the students’ understanding of tactics, which many applied immediately after graduation while assigned as instructors, umpires, and trainers in maneuver camps.\(^{29}\)

One formative Prussian publication introduced to the 1905-06 Staff College students was Baron von der Goltz’s *The Conduct of War*. According to Eben Swift, 1905-06 Assistant Commandant, the Staff College “simply needed a manual” on strategic theory and “Goltz has done very well” for the study of strategy.\(^{30}\) Von der Goltz’s *The Conduct of War* was an influential publication to the Staff College curriculum throughout the pre-war years. In his 2001 paper titled, “The Roots of Modern American Operational Art,” Michael R. Matheny highlighted that von der Goltz was one military theorist who “drew upon Clausewitz for inspiration.”\(^ {31}\) The Staff College students received doses of Carl von Clausewitz’s ideas about war and warfare through von der Goltz. Similar to Clausewitz’s views, von der Goltz argued that “war is an outgrowth of politics,” center of gravity is the “enemy’s main army,” and that “if possible to unite all available forces for the decisive moment.”\(^ {32}\) Von der Goltz routinely referenced Clausewitz’s

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\(^{29}\) Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army*, 113.


notions on war and warfare and cited *On War* throughout his book.\(^{33}\) While the first three Staff College classes primarily developed tactical experts, despite von der Goltz’s influence, the school’s focus on general staff officer education was minimal during the school’s early years. For the 1907-08 class, however, the Staff College increased the curriculum’s focus on general staff officer education.

For the 1907-08 Staff College class, when Marshall was a student, the faculty incorporated Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf’s *The Duties of the General Staff* into the Staff College curriculum.\(^{34}\) Including this publication further separated the school’s curriculum from the School of the Line’s tactically focused curriculum. John F. Morrison, as the senior instructor for the 1907-08 class, explained that fragments of von Schellendorf’s work “were assigned (to students) each day to be carefully read and the conference was devoted to a discussion of the text which was supplemented by outside matter. I believe great value was derived from this part of the course.”\(^{35}\) The Prussian staff officer’s manual provided the Staff College with a foundational work to educate student officers on general staff officer duties in higher-level staffs. Nenninger argued that the publication provided “history, theory, organization, and operation of general staffs.”\(^{36}\) Von Schellendorf’s handbook provided eight tasks that general staffs should perform, which Nenninger summarized in his 1974 dissertation:

- Reconnoitering the enemy and terrain in vicinity of operations, reporting the progress of battle to the commander, keeping track of enemy and friendly positions, conveying orders to subordinate commanders, assisting subordinates in changing their dispositions,
selecting positions for artillery, explaining matters to subordinates needing information and assistance, and looking after casualties and prisoners.  

Nenninger argued that von Schellendorf’s manual suggested that general staff officers “gathered information, assisted the commander in preparing a plan of action, translated the plan into orders, and ensured that subordinates carried out the orders.”

The 1910 FSR loosely paraphrased von Schellendorf’s general staff officer tasks, but failed to address, in detail, the relationships between commanders and their staff officers. Von Schellendorf argued, “A good General Staff officer is therefore certainly not asking too much if he claims the complete confidence of his General, and the grant of a certain amount of independence in the details of his duty.” Von Schellendorf’s belief in general staff officer independence resonated with many pre-war Staff College students and faculty. In a 1912 Infantry Journal submission, James W. McAndrew, a Staff College instructor, argued that educated chiefs of staff should have the freedom to make decisions while serving under an uneducated commander. As Leavenworth’s general staff officer education evolved during the pre-war years, Staff College graduates gained confidence in their abilities, which created friction between general staff officers and commanders during World War I. One example occurred during the

37 Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 100; Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, trans., by H.A. Bethell, J.H.V. Crowe, and F.B. Maurice (London, UK: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1907), 5. Schellendorf provided a comprehensive list of seven general staff tasks with detailed explanations for each task.

38 Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 100; Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, 5.


40 Schellendorf, The Duties of the General Staff, 4.

41 James W. McAndrew, “The Chiefs of Staff,” Infantry Journal (Sep-Oct 1912), 181-214, in Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 100-101. McAndrew graduated from the Staff College in 1911 and was a faculty member from 1911-1912. He would become the director of AEF Schools in Langres, France during World War I and later replaced James G. Harbord as Pershing’s AEF GHQ Chief of Staff.
Meuse-Argonne offensive in October 1918. The new 3rd Corps Commander, John L. Hines, relieved his chief of staff, Alfred W. Bjornstad, for issuing operations orders without Hines’ awareness or approval. Bjornstad, known for doubting decisions from those who “were not trained staff officers and were not Leavenworth men,” was a 1910 Staff College graduate and Leavenworth instructor from 1915-1916.42

From 1907 to 1910, the Staff College curriculum primarily consisted of an amalgamation of tactics, strategy, general staff duties, and military history. Beginning with the 1911-1912 class, the Staff College removed all tactics instruction and the curriculum’s renewed focus was “devoted to preparation for higher level staff duties,” while the School of the Line curriculum focused exclusively on tactics.43 Beginning with the 1911-1912 class, the curriculum consisted of strategy derived from von der Goltz, duties of the General Staff from von Schellendorf, and military history. Both of Leavenworth’s schools incorporated military history into their curriculums throughout the pre-war period, but the Staff College’s military history instruction improved through the pre-war years.

Early in the Staff College’s existence, both School of the Line and Staff College students attended the same military history lectures. For the 1905-06 class, The Department of Military Art presented thirty-three military history lectures to School of the Line and Staff College students. Some of the lecture topics included the Revolutionary War, Gettysburg Campaign, Metz Campaign, Siege of Plevna, South African War, and Russo-Japanese War.44 During the early Staff College years, students often attended history lectures they had already received while

42 Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 143; The Command and General Staff School, Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates, 11, 26.
43 John F. Morrison, Annual Reports (Fort Leavenworth: Army Service School Press, 1912), 8.
School of the Line students. Once Arthur L. Conger arrived as a faculty member, however, the repeated lectures ceased and Conger developed military history instruction specifically designed for Staff College students.

Conger attended the 1906-07 the Staff College class and following graduation became an instructor in the Department of Military Art at Leavenworth.\footnote{The Command and General Staff School, \textit{Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates}, 11, 26. Conger was a two time instructor at Leavenworth from 1907-10 and 1913-1916. Conger was a two time instructor at Leavenworth from 1907-10 and 1913-1916.} Morrison, as the department’s senior instructor, assigned Conger with military history instruction for the School of the Line and Staff College. Conger believed that the school’s military history lectures were not productive because they failed to reach the necessary depth and detail to garner useful lessons.\footnote{Nenninger, \textit{The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army}, 96-97.} Disappointed with the school’s past military history instruction, Conger introduced Staff College students to historical research. Conger, an 1894 Harvard graduate, presented lectures on historical research to Staff College students. In addition to the lectures, Conger required his students to conduct independent research on the 1862 Peninsular Campaign. Using original sources from the Fort Leavenworth library, students researched and prepared individual papers on the Civil War campaign.\footnote{John F. Morrison, “The Army Staff College,” \textit{Annual Report of the Commandant} (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1908), 64; Nenninger, \textit{The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army}, 96-97. Morrison gave credit for the revamped military history instruction to Conger. Nenninger noted that Conger also studied history in Berlin and one of his instructors was famed historian Hans Delbruck. Nenninger also provided details about Conger’s reputation as a “first-rate” historian and “genius.”} Morrison believed that Conger’s military history instruction was an “innovation” and stated that the students “did splendid work and spent many extra hours in the library.”\footnote{John F. Morrison, “The Army Staff College,” \textit{Annual Report of the Commandant} (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1908), 64.} The 1907-08 Staff College class was just the beginning for Conger’s military history instruction reform. The following year, he extended the Staff College’s military history instruction.
Anchoring to Conger’s success from the previous year, the 1908-09 class experienced three times more military history instruction from the previous year. Conger added several more military campaigns that facilitated instruction and student research. Staff College students researched and discussed the Civil War campaigns of Fort Donelson, Peninsular, and Overland. Conger also added the foreign campaigns of Waterloo, Metz, and Paardeberg. Conger’s 1908-09 improvements served as the standard for the Staff College’s military history instruction for the remainder of the pre-war years. Under Conger’s military history instruction, students conducted campaign analysis using maps and original resources and prepared in-depth papers on numerous American Civil War and European campaigns. During their analysis, students studied the movements of both armies and discussed “what happened and why” with classmates and faculty.

Beginning with the 1908-09 class, military history instruction accounted for more half-days than any other block of instruction at the Staff College. During the pre-war years, the Staff College added depth to the school’s curriculum led by the use of theoretical works from von der Goltz and von Schellendorf and by the increase of military historical instruction.

**Leavenworth Staff College Method of Instruction**

The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College’s primary method of instruction was the applicatory method, which facilitated students’ abilities to apply and synthesize course material. Arthur L. Wagner, a Leavenworth instructor during the late 1800s, first incorporated the applicatory method of instruction into Leavenworth schools. Originating in the German Army’s Kriegsakadamine, the applicatory method is an educational technique where students apply theoretical knowledge in practical work. Leavenworth’s use of the applicatory method required students to apply theoretical lessons, from lectures and conferences, during practical work such as


50 Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army*, 96-98.
map problems, war games, and terrain exercises.\textsuperscript{51} Eben Swift, a protégé of Wagner’s, later refined Leavenworth’s applicatory method by adding tactical map exercises and writing orders as part of the students’ practical work.\textsuperscript{52} Swift’s version of the applicatory method remained the Staff College’s primary method of instruction during the pre-war years.

Similar to the evolution of the school’s curriculum, the Staff College method of instruction progressed in the years before World War I. Lectures and recitations were methods of instruction utilized in the Staff College. As the Staff College faculty navigated through the pre-war years, however, the school’s use of the applicatory method increased. Seventy percent of the Department of Military Art’s half-days, for the first two Staff College classes, consisted of lectures and recitations. Even with the bulk of instruction consisting of lectures and recitations, Staff College students conducted practical work while also serving as assistant instructors to the Infantry and Cavalry School.\textsuperscript{53} Staff College students developed map problems, umpired exercises, and presented lectures to Infantry and Cavalry School students.\textsuperscript{54} For instance, during the 1904-05 academic year, Staff College student William D. Connor developed and presented a lecture titled, “The Operation and Maintenance of a Railroad in the Theater of War” to the


\textsuperscript{52} The Command and General Staff School, \textit{Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates}, 14; Nenninger, \textit{The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army}, 13-15, 44-46.

\textsuperscript{53} Eben Swift, “Appendix A, Staff College,” in \textit{Annual Report of the Commandant} (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1906), 8. For the 1905-06 Staff College class, The Military Art Department lectures and recitations consisted of 67 and 110 half-days, respectfully.

\textsuperscript{54} Eben Swift, “Appendix A, Staff College,” in \textit{Annual Report of the Commandant} (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1906), 2. Swift stated that the Staff College did not require students to recite material from Infantry and Cavalry School lectures. However, Staff College students were responsible for producing several problems and lectures for the Infantry and Cavalry School.
Infantry and Cavalry School students. Connor would serve as Pershing’s AEF GHQ G-4 during World War I, until he moved to the AEF’s Services of Supply in July 1918.55

Staff College students in the 1905-06 class also presented lectures to Infantry and Cavalry School students. Fox Conner, who later was the AEF’s GHQ G-3 during World War I, prepared and presented a lecture on “Night Attacks.” Staff College student, Farrand Sayre, lectured Infantry and Cavalry School students on “The Office Duties of the General Staff in Time of Peace.” Stuart Heintzelman presented a lecture on “The Military Geography of the Mississippi,” and also provided military history lectures for the school. Following graduation, Heintzelman would become the Second Army’s Chief of Staff during World War I and later served as a two-time instructor and Commandant at Leavenworth.56 The use of lectures and recitations, whether having students presenting or attending them, was viewed as temporary by the school’s faculty. In his 1906 report, Swift indicated that "it is expected that with more skill and experience the methods of applicatory instruction will continue to improve and become a permanent feature."57 Swift’s expectations were partially met the following year.

During the 1906-07 class, lecture requirements diminished and the school increased its use of the applicatory method in student research and writing requirements. Daniel H. Boughton, Assistant Commandant in 1907, claimed that the “applicative system is used and whenever


56 Eben Swift, “Appendix A, Staff College, Department of Military Art,” in Annual Report of Commandant (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1906), 10-13; The Command and General Staff School, Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates, 7, 12, and 26; Pershing, My Experiences in the First World War, 402. Heintzelman also served in the AEF GHQ’s Operations Section during World War I and helped plan the St. Mihiel offensive.

57 Eben Swift, “Appendix A, Staff College, Department of Military Art,” in Annual Report of Commandant (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1906), 3.
possible the instruction consists of studies, map problems (including the war game), terrain exercises, and maneuvers.”  

A strategy research paper requirement replaced the time allocated to lectures (presented and attended) during the previous academic year. As part of the strategy block of instruction, faculty required each Staff College student to produce a 4000 word original research paper based from von der Goltz’s book. Additionally, the Staff College allocated twenty-five half-days to the “preparation and discussion of original papers.”  

As the Fort Leavenworth library’s inventory increased, so did the research and writing requirements for Staff College students during the pre-war years. As a student in the 1909-10 class, Paul B. Malone researched and produced a paper on “The military geography of the Atlantic seaboard considered with reference to an invading force.” Bjornstad, one of Malone’s classmates, submitted a paper on “How to best instruct the officers of our army in tactics.” During World War I, Malone was Pershing’s first G-5 and Bjornstad was the Langres Staff College’s first Director.  

The Staff College used research and writing requirements as an additional means for students to apply theoretical lessons during practical work.

The Staff College also used historical staff rides to enhance the education at the Staff College before World War I. According to William Robertson, author of *The Staff Ride*, states that a (historical) staff ride

consists of systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each. It envisions maximum student involvement before the arrival at the site to guarantee thought, analysis, and discussion. A staff ride thus links a historical

58 Daniel H. Boughton, “Appendix A, Staff College, Department of Military Art,” in *Annual Report of Commandant* (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1907), 97.
59 Ibid., 102-104.
event, systematic preliminary study, and actual terrain to produce battle analysis in three dimensions.\textsuperscript{61} Beginning with the 1905-06 class, the Staff College students participated in annual historical staff rides executed on Civil War battlefields. According to Boughton, "The staff rides in the college curriculum are similar to terrain exercises of the Infantry and Cavalry School, but more extended and applicable to larger commands."\textsuperscript{62} The School of the Line conducted terrain exercises, but the Army Staff College’s historical staff rides required more work from the students.

In preparation for the 1906 Georgia staff ride, the faculty assigned students specific roles and various epochs of campaigns to research in advance of the staff ride. The staff ride focused students on the 1864 campaigns of Generals Sherman and Johnston. To enhance the twelve-day Georgia staff ride, the faculty required students to research either Sherman’s or Johnston’s armies during a specific period of the 1864 campaigns. For instance, Heintzelman researched Sherman’s movements from Chattanooga to Resaca. Harold W. Butner, an artillery brigade commander during World War I, researched Johnston’s movements during the same period. On day three of the staff ride (July 7th), Heintzelman and Butner briefed their assigned armies’ situations at various stops as the class rode horseback to Resaca, Georgia.\textsuperscript{63} All students on the staff rides experienced similar research and briefing requirements as Heintzelman and Butner endured. The Staff College continued to use historical staff rides to augment instruction throughout the pre-war years.

The Staff College also took advantage of unique opportunities for students to synthesize and apply course material. Frequently, Staff College students joined the faculty and developed


\textsuperscript{62} Daniel H. Boughton, “Appendix A, Staff College, Department of Military Art,” in \textit{Annual Report of Commandant} (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1906), 98.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 20-26.
solutions to map problems issued to the School of the Line’s students. Additionally, Staff College students umpired the School of the Line’s terrain exercises. 64 Unique opportunities for Staff College students, however, extended beyond the School of the Line. The 1910-11 class produced a portion of a war plan for the War Department. Staff College students, which included two future AEF GHQ staff officers, produced a fifteen-page solution to a War Department problem. In his 1978 book, Nenninger summarized the extent of the students’ work:

In this problem the students planned a move of thirteen divisions, located at posts throughout the United States, to Seattle and San Francisco as quickly as possible. The solution included the order in which the troops would move, the number of trains required to move each division and its supplies, expedients to use in obtaining the needed trains, the routes and schedules for the trains, the places of debarkation, and the complete account of supplies each division needed. The class had two days in which to complete the work. 65

James W. McAndrew and Harold B. Fiske were two of the Staff College students who helped developed the solution to the War Department’s problem. During World War I, McAndrew served as the Commandant for the AEF’s Langres schools and later as Pershing’s Chief of Staff while Fiske eventually replaced Malone as Pershing’s G-5. 66

The Staff College also utilized relationships with Army units and officers to enhance the students’ education. In 1914, Fox Conner (a 1906 Staff College graduate) marched his Field Artillery battery from Fort Riley to Fort Leavenworth. Conner provided the Staff College class with a demonstration of various Field Artillery tasks, which included “forty rounds of shrapnel.” 67 In the same year, the Staff College students traveled to Fort Sill. While visiting the School of Fire, Staff College students “witnessed school firing as well as working out some

64 Dastrup, The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 54-56.
66 Pershing, My Experiences in the First World War, 404.
67 William P. Burnham, Annual Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Service School Press, 1914), 15. Burnham, Acting Commandant, described the details of Captain Fox Conner’s demonstration and stated that it was “interesting and instructive.”
special problems,” which benefitted the students’ understanding of the “uses of Field Artillery in a time of war.”

The Staff College’s 1915-16 supply course demonstrated the school’s commitment towards incorporating innovative methods to enhance the students’ education. As the Assistant Commandant in 1912, Morrison first developed a plan for a supply course and submitted a proposal to the War Department for approval. The War Department approved a modified version of Morrison’s plan in 1915. William K. Naylor developed and managed the inaugural course. In his 1916 report, Naylor described the intent for the supply course:

To instruct prospective General Staff Officers in their duties as members of the administration section, particularly in questions of supply, so that they could give intelligent aid to their chiefs, and not compel the latter to rely solely upon the commercial world for advice.

Captain Naylor’s supply course began with several conferences and practical problems pertaining to laws and their applicability to domestic and foreign supply operations. Furthermore, supply course students studied foreign armies’ supply systems and distilled what aspects of those systems might be useful to the US military while “paying particular attention to the present European War.” Naylor administered six convoluted staff-related supply problems to students. The problems required students to develop plans for establishing cantonment areas and camps, properly equipping a force, transporting a unit to seaport for overseas exportation, utilizing railroads or other means of transportation, chartering transports, loading and embarking units, and

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68 William P. Burnham, Annual Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Service School Press, 1914), 15. Burnham stated that, “the class greatly benefitted by this short experience, and all were enthusiastic in their praise of the manner in which they were entertained and instructed by the authorities at Fort Sill.”


71 Ibid., 27.
supply officer’s actions while embarking on an enemy’s coast. In addition to the staff-related supply problems, students “produced a monograph on the terminal facilities of a certain principal railroad center in the United States.” To augment the lectures, problems, and monographs, the supply course students took two trips to the Missouri Pacific Terminal Company in Kansas City to meet with company officials and discuss railroad operations. For the 1915-16 Staff College class of twenty-three students, eight students participated in Naylor’s supply course. Two of those eight students were Joseph W. Beacham and Conrad H. Lanza. Beacham, who coached Dwight D. Eisenhower’s West Point football team in 1911, served as the 6th Division’s Chief of Staff during World War I. Lanza was a Field Artillery officer in First Army’s Operations Section during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Throughout the pre-war years at Leavenworth, the Staff College faculty advanced the school’s use of the applicatory method in order to enhance the students’ ability to apply and synthesize course material.

Leavenworth Staff College Students

The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College students were competent and motivated officers who shared a common knowledge base and desire to become professional military officers. Staff College students during the pre-war era experienced a year without grades. The absence of marks in the Staff College was a drastic difference for students who attended the School of the Line.

72 Naylor, “Department of Staff Supply Report to the Assistant Commandant,” 28. Naylor and the students started producing a military railroad map of the United States, which he claims that once the map is complete, “will be invaluable.”

73 Ibid., 28.


75 Pershing, My Experiences in the First World War, 404.

Most students attended the School of the Line the year before they earned admission into the Staff College. Students in the School of the Line worked hard in their studies in order to earn a second year of education at Leavenworth. The Staff College typically accepted the top fifty percent of the School of the Line graduates (Distinguished and Honor Graduates). The School of the Line students studied for long hours at night to position themselves ahead of their peers because, according to Nenninger, “competition was intense and students considered admission (into the Staff College) a real honor.” Before graduating the Staff College in 1907, Walter Krueger was a student in the 1905-06 School of the Line class where he believed that “everyone worked hard” and claimed that he and his classmates “didn’t average six hours sleep.” Krueger later served as a German language instructor at Leavenworth and also attended the Langres Staff College during World War I. In his 1975 dissertation about Hugh A. Drum, Elliot Johnson asserted that Drum believed that the School of the Line was “quite demanding” and “left little time for relaxation or socialization.” The School of the Line was an arduous experience for most students. The students who gained entry into the Staff College had survived the line school’s

77 Edward, Cox, Grey Eminence: Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship (Stillwater, OK: New Forums Press, 2010), 9. Fox Conner was one of the few officers who attended the Staff College without graduating from the School of the Line.

78 Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 85, 157-158. In Nenninger’s Appendices he depicted the ranks of students (by number) for each School of the Line and Staff College class. During the pre-war ear, most students in both schools were captains particularly after 1909.

79 Krueger quoted in Kevin Conrad Holzimmer, "A Soldier's Soldier: A Military Biography of General Walter Krueger" (Ph. D. diss., Temple University, 1999), 40, 59-60; The Command and General Staff School, Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates, 12, and 26. Krueger’s Leavenworth quotation is in Holzimmer’s dissertation on page 40. Holzimmer referenced Krueger’s Langres Staff College attendance on pages 59-60. Krueger was a German language instructor at Leavenworth from 1909-12.

academic rigor, thrived in a competitive environment, and demonstrated their motivation for advanced learning.

Staff College students with exemplary intellect and those who possessed enthusiasm for learning were recruited as Leavenworth instructors. Morrison actively sought out gifted Staff College students to be Leavenworth instructors. To use a Nenninger phrase, ‘Morrison Men’ often stayed at Leavenworth (or came back after regimental duty) for instructor duty, which included officers such as Marshall, Drum, Conger, Heintzelman, Fiske, McAndrew, and Leroy Eltinge who was Pershing’s Deputy Chief of Staff throughout World War I.81 The emphasis on recruiting Staff College graduates as instructors dramatically increased during the pre-war years. For the 1905-06 academic year, there were only two Staff College graduates out of the sixteen total Leavenworth instructors. Throughout the pre-war years, more and more Staff College graduates replaced non-Staff College officers as instructors at Leavenworth. Once the 1915-16 classes commenced, thirteen of the sixteen Leavenworth instructors were Staff College graduates. Most of those 1915-16 instructors, which included Bjornstad, Drum, Conger, Naylor, Heintzelman, and Fiske, were key AEF general staff officers during World War I.82

The Staff College graduates who became Leavenworth instructors advanced their abilities through interactions and professional writing. Staff College graduates who stayed at Leavenworth became more familiar with “tactical and doctrinal issues of that era” and many “translated foreign tactical works, wrote original books on American tactics, and prepared problem-solving

81 Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 89; Pershing, My Experiences in the First World War, 401.
82 James Franklin Bell, Annual Report of the Commandant (Fort Leavenworth: Staff College Press, 1906), 2-3; Charles Miller, Annual Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Press of the Army Services School, 1916), 14-15; The Command and General Staff School, Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates, 10-14, 26-27.
Instructors also benefited from their interaction with students. The students’ original research illuminated new insights for instructors, particularly during military history instruction. In his 1915 Assistant Commandant report, William A. Holbrook stated that "historical work in the staff class is considered of very great value not only for the general staff officers but also for our instructors that they may have reliable historical data upon which to base their conclusions."84

As instructors, Staff College graduates produced hundreds of military-related publications, manuals, and problems during Leavenworth’s pre-war era. During the few years before World War I, their written works were sent to over 4,000 people who subscribed to Leavenworth’s mailing list. Among those on Leavenworth’s mailing list were Staff College graduates who left instructor duty or received orders to regiment immediately after graduation.85

In 1912, the Manchu Law forced officers to serve in positions within their regiments for at least two years before seeking detached assignments. The Staff College students who did not remain at Leavenworth rejoined their regiments and performed duties as commanders, trainers, and umpires for unit maneuvers and exercises.86 Before coming back to Leavenworth for instructor duty, Drum served as a company commander in Indiana, regimental staff officer in Texas, and as General Frederick N. Funston’s adjutant during the 1914 Vera Cruz Expedition.87 One assignment that Staff College graduates rarely filled was as a staff officer in the War Department’s General Staff. Although it was an expectation of Elihu Root’s reforms, most pre-

83 Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army*, 86, 90.
war Leavenworth graduates did not fulfill general staff officer duties within the War Department. During the years before World War I, only twenty Leavenworth graduates served in the War Department’s General Staff. 112 officers without a Leavenworth or War College education made up the bulk of the War Department’s General staff from the turn of the century to World War I.88

The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College produced competent general staff officers who were problem solvers for several reasons. First, the Leavenworth Staff College curriculum continued to evolve through the pre-war years. During the curriculum’s evolution, one constant remained, which was a broad education in military history, theory, and doctrine. Secondly, the Leavenworth Staff College used innovative means to employ the applicatory method of instruction. Historical staff rides, original student research, guest instruction and demonstrations, and experience as assistant instructors for the School of the Line provided students with more time and opportunities for the application and synthesis of course material. Finally, the students’ common knowledge base and motivation supplemented the effectiveness of course material. The Leavenworth Staff College students attended the second year course for one purpose – to become professional officers. The professionalism of Leavenworth Staff College graduates greatly improved the efficacy of AEF general staffs during World War I. While overseas with 1st Division, Marshall stated in a letter that “all the ‘Leavenworth men’ were in France, former students and instructors alike.”89 The problem for the AEF was that there were not enough “Leavenworth men” in France. The Langres Staff College was the AEF’s attempt to solve this problem.


Establishment of the Staff College in Langres, France

On 28 May 1917, General John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, and his staff boarded the S.S. Baltic at Governor’s Island, New York, for a voyage to Liverpool, England. Prior to his journey, on 26 May 1917, Pershing issued General Orders No. 1, which listed, by name and rank, fifty-three US officers separated into various general staff sections. Additionally, Pershing selected officers that formed the nucleus of his general staff. Five of the original general staff officers had graduated Leavenworth’s Staff College.

According to MAJ James Harbord, the AEF’s first Chief of Staff, Pershing selected the officers because “they spoke the service vernacular” and knew they would execute tasks with “competent seriousness.” Before the SS Baltic anchored in Liverpool, Pershing assigned difficult deployment and operational problems to his general staff.

Once the S.S. Baltic set sail, Pershing and his general staff analyzed problems the AEF would face upon its entry into the European theater. Harbord mentioned, “time of the voyage across the Atlantic was well spent…the General named certain Boards of Officers to study our immediate problems and make recommendations.” Due to the general staff’s estimates and recommendations, Pershing visualized the need for at least 1,000,000 soldiers and developed


92 Harbord, The American Army in France, 75.

93 Ibid., 73.
initial plans for the “composition and organization” of a strengthened AEF. Additionally, Pershing and Harbord realized that the US Army’s pre-World War I staff organization required modification. Dialogue between Pershing and Harbord led to a preliminary outline for the organization and duties of the AEF General Staff. At the conclusion of the journey, Pershing sought to refine the initial concepts on the composition and organization of the AEF and the organization and duties of the AEF General Staff. The refinement of the concepts became influential to general staff officer education during World War I.

Pershing and his staff arrived in Liverpool on June 8th and after a short stay in England reached France on June 13th. For the remainder of the month, the American officers observed French and British staff systems. On July 5, 1917, Pershing issued General Order No 8, which officially organized the AEF General Staff and specified duties and responsibilities for the respective staff sections. According to Harbord, the organization of the AEF General Staff was developed from “a comprehensive study of the staff organization of the French and British armies, and are intended to adapt the requirements of modern field conditions to our own staff system.” Initially, the order separated the AEF General Staff into three sections; Administration Section (G-1), Intelligence Section (G-2), and Operations Section (G-3). However, on August 11, 1917, Pershing, My Experiences in the First World War, 43.

95 Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, “Report of the G-5, Appendix 3, History of the Army General Staff College” AEF Records (National Archives, Washington, DC. Call No. RG 120, Box 22, Folder 218), 31. The 1914 FSR depicted that a US Army general staff consisted of a Chief of Staff, and three subordinate sections (Combat, Administrative, and Intelligence), 118; Pershing, My Experiences in the First World War, 43; Johnson, ”The Military Experiences of General Hugh A. Drum,” 201. While on the S.S. Baltic, Harbord briefed subordinate staff officers on the outline for general staff organization and assigned each section specific problems to solve during the remainder of the voyage.


97 Ibid., 13.
1917, Pershing amended the order and expanded the AEF General Staff organization to include a Coordination Section (G-4) and Training Section (G-5). In addition to the organization and duties of the staff, *General Orders No. 8* described the duties of the Chief of Staff.98

*General Orders No. 8* also served as the model for subordinate staffs’ organization and duties. In the order, Harbord states, “The distribution of staff duties in the headquarters of divisions, army corps, and other commands subordinate to these headquarters will conform in principle to the distribution shown in these tables.”99 Only the AEF and army-level general staffs would possess five general staff sections. Army corps and divisions would maintain general staffs consisting of only G-1, G-2, and G-3 sections. In lieu of possessing G-4 and G-5 sections, G-1s in corps and divisions would undertake coordination responsibilities. Corps and division G-3s would assume responsibilities for training their respective units.100 After Pershing approved the organization and duties of the AEF General Staff and subordinate staffs, the AEF Commander turned his attention towards the composition and organization of his forces.

On July 6, 1917, Pershing informed the War Department that he needed 1,000,000 men by May 1918.101 The War Department informed Pershing that they could only mobilize and transport about 635,000 soldiers to France by June 1918.102 At that time, however, Pershing was not aware that the Secretary of War, Newton Baker, had ordered a 12-man independent mission to Europe to “study the Allied methods and recommend the organization best suited” for the

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102 Smythe, *Pershing*, 35.
Colonel Chauncey Baker led the independent mission, known as the Baker Mission. Shortly after Pershing’s original request to the War Department, Baker informed the AEF Commander of the independent mission. Before submitting the Baker Mission’s recommendations to the Secretary of War, Baker, Pershing’s West Point classmate, informed the AEF Commander that he would like to go over those recommendations with the AEF General Staff.

On July 7, 1917, Pershing and key members from the Operations Section of the AEF General Staff met with the Baker Mission and discussed each group’s recommendations pertaining to organization of the AEF. Both groups met and agreed upon a set of recommendations known as the General Organization Project. With respect to the size of the AEF, the project recommended 1,000,000 men with plans for an increase of up to 3,000,000. The project’s most important recommendation, however, was the composition of AEF divisions and the inclusion of corps into the AEF structure. Pre-World War I doctrine depicted smaller sized divisions and listed armies as the next level above divisions, thus omitting corps from the US organizational structure. In addition to incorporating corps into the AEF structure, the General Organization Project recommended a robust division composition. The proposed division

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106 War Department, *Field Service Regulation: United States Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1914), 10. Doctrine stated, “When divisions are acting together they may be grouped into field armies.” Additionally, the 1914 *FSR* lists three infantry brigades in one division, but those combined brigades had a smaller composition than the proposed two infantry brigades (in one division) recommended by Pershing’s AEF General Staff and the Baker Mission; Harbord, *The American Army in France*, 103. Additionally, Pershing created a “Committee of Operations Section on organization” to study the French and British organizations and recommend an organization for the AEF. The committee members were Fox Conner, Hugh Drum, and Alvin Barber. They recommended for the AEF to adopt a larger division, which they argued would be conducive to open warfare doctrine.
would consist of 28,000 officers and soldiers, with the preponderance of a division’s force within two infantry brigades. One field artillery brigade, one engineer regiment, and several specialized battalions supported the infantry brigades. Pershing and the AEF General Staff assessed that in order to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield, divisions needed to be robust. In his account of World War I, Harbord stated:

With the deep and very powerful defense developed in the World War, no decisive stroke could be secured in battle without a penetration necessitating several days of steady fighting. It was thus reasoned that the infantry of the division must be the strength as to permit it to continue in combat for such a number of days that continuity of battle would not be interrupted before [sic] decision was reached.

By August 1917, Pershing’s General Orders No. 8 and the General Organization Project created a pressing issue for the AEF. Less than 200 officers had graduated from Leavenworth’s Staff College by the time the school closed in 1916. The new general staff organizational structure within the larger divisions would require many more competent staff officers. The new divisions required over 100 officers to fill just the primary staff positions (chief of staff, G-1, G-2, and G-3) and thousands of officers to fill every position in each staff section for every division. Pershing realized the dilemma and sent requests to the War Department on the need for educated general staff officers. Despite his plea, the War Department did not send the trained general staff officers Pershing requested. Pershing turned to the AEF GHQ staff to solve the problem. The responsibility fell on Majors Hugh A. Drum and John M. Parker, staff officers in the AEF’s GHQ Operations Section (G-3). Drum and Parker agreed on the requirement for a general staff college.

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107 Smythe, Pershing, 37; Pershing, My Experiences in the World, 101; Harbord, The American Army in France, 102-103. Habord’s account stated that in a May 1917 recommendation to the War Department, the War College proposed a division organization consisting of 24,352 men – see page 103.


109 Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 158.

110 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 154-155.
in France, but did not agree on the general staff college’s instruction focus. Parker argued that the
general staff college should train officers on army-level staff operations. Drum disagreed with
Parker’s recommendation and argued that the general staff college’s focus should be to educate
officers on division-level staff operations. Drum’s recommendation proved convincing to
Pershing and the AEF Commander agreed that the general staff college will focus students on
division staff operations.111

Following Pershing’s approval, Drum developed the training plan for the general staff
college. Before the war, Drum had been an instructor at Leavenworth. The training plan Drum
produced for the general staff college mirrored the training plan utilized at Leavenworth. Once
complete, Drum briefed Harbord and Brigadier General Robert Bullard the draft general staff
training plan. After Harbord consulted with Pershing about Drum’s plan, the AEF Commander
approved Drum’s plan. Pershing assigned the Chief of the Training Section (G-5), Lieutenant
Colonel Paul Malone, with responsibility for implementing the general staff training plan.112

The AEF GHQ and Pershing chose Langres, France as the location for the AEF General
Staff College. Brigadier General James W. McAndrew and Colonel Alfred W. Bjornstad, who
were students and faculty members at Leavenworth’s Staff College, developed the “outline and
scheme of instruction for a three month course and arranged for representative Missions of
French and British Staff Officers to assist the instruction.”113 The first course commenced on

112 Ibid., 234; John F. Votaw, The American Expeditionary Forces in World War I (New
York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 12-15. At the time of Drum’s brief to Harbord, the AEF General
Staff expanded to five sections. The Training Section (G-5) under Paul Malone assumed the
duties and responsibilities for all AEF training. Pershing initially selected Bullard to command all
AEF schools in France.

History of the Army General Staff College” AEF Records (National Archives, Washington, DC.
Call No. RG 120, Box 22, Folder 218, 1919), 1.
November 28, 1917 at Carteret-Trecourt Barracks in Langres. McAndrew served as the Commandant of Army Schools in Langres. Bjornstad served as the first Director of the Langres Staff College. The Langres Staff College executed four courses over thirteen months. In total, 777 officers attended the Langres Staff College. The Staff College faculty, however, deemed just 537 officers as “graduated and recommended for duty as staff officers.”

Wainwright, along with the other 776 officers who attended the Langres Staff College, experienced a general staff education vastly different from Marshall’s Leavenworth education.

**Langres Staff College Curriculum**

The compressed and focused curriculum of the Staff College at Langres was unlike the broad and diverse curriculum at Leavenworth’s Staff College. In contrast to Leavenworth, the Langres school provided students with pertinent information and practical work necessary to execute the duties of specific staff positions within general staffs. During the first few weeks of each course, the faculty assessed each student’s potential as a division staff officer. By the fourth week, the faculty assigned a notional division-level general staff position to each student. Based on each student’s potential, faculty assigned students to an Administrative Section (G-1), Intelligence Section (G-2), or Operations Section (G-3). Additionally, students who arrived at Langres, from units where they served in a specific general staff section, were generally assigned to that staff section while in the Staff College. During the first two courses, students received about forty percent of instruction while formed in their respective staff sections. The sections received lectures and attended conferences related to the functions of their assigned staff.

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114 Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, “Report of the G-5, Appendix 3, History of the Army General Staff College,” 8. The G-5 report listed 770 total attendees on page 8. However, if you add the number of each course’s students, the combined total equals 777.

positions. For instance, intelligence lectures informed Major Paul B. Clemens, a second course student in the G-2 Section, on “the collection of military information and conduct of combat intelligence,” which was “the greater part of the work” for the G-2 Section. Langres Staff College students navigated through the course while focused on either G-1, G-2, or G-3 duties.

The primary influences on the Staff College’s curriculum were the AEF’s open warfare doctrine and Allied trench warfare experiences. The 1914 FSR served as the foundational doctrine for Langres’ open warfare instruction. In order to ensure AEF training inculcated an offensive spirit into newly arriving soldiers and officers, Pershing ordered all AEF schools to emphasize open warfare as the American method of war. In a guest lecture to the first course’s students, Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Fiske, the AEF’s GHQ G-5, said that the Langres Staff College would use the US Army’s FSR as the primary guide for planning open warfare, but the faculty will “build up a system here to fit our needs in trench warfare.” During the Langres Staff College’s first two courses, Allied trench warfare experiences provided the groundwork for the school’s curriculum, with only a fraction of the curriculum devoted to open warfare.


118 Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, “Report of the G-5,” 34-38; Pershing, My Experience in the War, 152-155. Pershing’s original intent was to have mobilizing troops in the US receive training on the principles of open warfare. Pershing believed that if soldiers received open warfare training before arriving in Europe, they would develop a foundational offensive spirit before the Allies introduced them to trench warfare methods, which Pershing assessed as defensive in nature.

119 Army General Staff College, “First Course Lecture No. 9: Map Problems, December 7, 1917” (Langres, FR: Army General Staff College-AEF, 1917), 12. Fiske’s lecture No. 9 was the only first course lecture delivered by a US officer.
Due to the unavailability of qualified AEF general staff officers, the Langres Staff College relied on experienced British and French general staff officers to serve as faculty for the first three courses. During the first course, the Langres Staff College faculty consisted of five British officers and four French officers. The Allied trench warfare experiences proved influential on the first course’s curriculum. The Allied faculty delivered all but one (Fiske’s) of the fifty-nine lectures, facilitated the school’s sixty conferences, and administered the Staff College’s twenty map problems. The first three map problems focused on open warfare. Approximately forty percent of the school’s lectures and fifteen percent of the conferences provided students with the principles and information, derived from the US Army’s FSR, needed to solve the open warfare map problems. The remaining seventeen map problems, lectures, and conferences fixated on trench warfare. Allied experiences, with supporting British and French doctrine, guided the Staff College’s trench warfare instruction. Map problem number twenty, “Trench Warfare - Attack by a Division,” was the culminating event for first course students. Allied faculty utilized an expired French order and French publications to develop the problem and school solution for map problem number twenty.

For the second course, when Jonathan W. Wainwright was a student, Bjornstad selected four students with previous staff experience, to serve as student-instructors. Bjornstad chose

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121 Army General Staff College, “First Course Lectures” (Langres, FR: Army General Staff College, 1917), 1-2; Army General Staff College, “First Course Schedule,” 1-11; Army General Staff College, “First Course Conferences” (Langres, FR: Army General Staff College, 1917), 1-2.

122 Army General Staff College, “First Course Sample Order for Attack, Trench Warfare” (Langres, FR: Army General Staff College, 1917); Army General Staff College, “First Course Addendum I to Situation, Map Problem No. Twenty” (Langres, FR: Army General Staff College, 1917). Authors noted that Allied faculty extracted information from the French October 1917 publication, “Instructions for the Offensive Action of Large Units in Battle” to develop map problem number twenty.
Majors Offner Hope, Martin C. Shallenberger, Edward R. Kimble, and Captain Wilhelm D. Styer to assist the Allied faculty. In addition to their student responsibilities, the student-instructors assisted in the conversion of Allied instruction into terms applicable to the AEF. Despite the addition of US officers to the faculty, the school’s second course curriculum still concentrated on trench warfare. The Staff College managed to add three open warfare map problems to the curriculum, but the remaining fourteen map problems, along with the majority of lectures and conferences, focused on trench warfare. Due to the reliance on Allied faculty, trench warfare overshadowed open warfare in the Langres Staff College’s curriculum during the first and second courses.

Prior to the third course, Bjornstad selected second course graduates to bolster the Staff College faculty. After graduation, Colonel F. W. Stopford, Lieutenant Colonels Clement A. Trott and Quinn Gray, and Majors Fay W. Brabson, Emmett Addis, Adna R. Chaffee II, and Thomas C. Lonergan spent two weeks observing units on the frontlines before returning to Langres as third course instructors. Bjornstad selected the seven US officers due to their performance as students in the second course. In his assessment of second course students’ potential, Bjornstad issued ‘A’ letter grades to Trott, Gray, Brabson, and Chaffee under the category of ‘Instructor, Army General Staff College.’ Bjornstad also selected Lieutenant Colonel William M. Fassett, a

123 Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, “Report of the G-5, Appendix 3, History of the Army General Staff College,” 2, 4-6; The Command and General Staff School, Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates, 26. Shallenberger later served as Third Corps’ G-1 during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, graduated the Leavenworth Command and General Staff School in 1927, and became Leavenworth’s Deputy Commandant in 1941. Styer served as an AEF observer in the British Expeditionary Forces and reached the rank of Lieutenant General during World War II.


125 Ibid., 6.

126 Army General Staff College – Langres, "Recommendations made by Director at conclusion of course, May 25, 1918," Second Course (National Archives, Washington, DC. Call
second course graduate, as the next Langres Staff College Director. Fassett, who also graduated Leavenworth’s Staff College in 1909, did extremely well as a Langres student. Bjornstad granted Fassett an A on his potential as a division chief of staff. Only four other officers received an A for their potential in that role. Those officers were Preston Brown (1914 Leavenworth Staff College graduate), Raymond Shelton (1905 Leavenworth Staff College graduate), Duncan K. Major (1907 Leavenworth Staff College graduate), and Stanley H. Ford. Brown, Shelton, Major, and Ford all served as division chiefs of staff after graduating the Langres Staff College. Fassett, however, remained at Langres as Bjornstad’s replacement. Under Fassett’s leadership, the Langres Staff College significantly increased the students’ exposure to open warfare. During the third course, the US faculty delivered open warfare lectures, facilitated open warfare conferences, and administered open warfare map problems. The Staff College combined the US faculty’s open warfare instruction with the Allied faculty’s trench warfare instruction. Due to the work of the US and Allied faculty, the third course’s curriculum consisted of an even mixture between trench warfare and open warfare instruction.

The balanced curriculum during the third course did not carry over into the fourth course. The third course ended during the St. Mihiel offensive, which increased the AEF’s need for...

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127 Army General Staff College – Langres, "Recommendations made by Director at conclusion of course, May 25, 1918," 2; Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, “Report of the G-5, Appendix 3, History of the Army General Staff College,” 6-7; The Command and General Staff School, Commandants, Staff, Faculty, and Graduates, 26. Bjornstad vacated Langres and served as the III Corps Chief of Staff. Other than Fassett, only four second course students received an ‘A’ on their potential as a division chief of staff. Those four officers were: Lieutenant Colonels Preston Brown (1914 Leavenworth SC graduate), Raymond Shelton (1905 Leavenworth SC graduate), Duncan K. Major (1907 Leavenworth SC graduate), and Stanley H. Ford. All four served as division chiefs of staff after graduating Langres.

general staff officers familiar with open warfare.\textsuperscript{129} The fourth course marked a transition point for the Langres Staff College curriculum. Twelve US officers, who graduated from previous courses, made up the majority of the fourth course faculty. All US instructors were third course graduates except for Gray, Addis, and Lonergan who were second course graduates. Only one British officer and one French officer served as instructors during the fourth course. During the two weeks between the third and fourth courses, the US instructors visited frontline units during the St. Mihiel offensive. Most likely due to the St. Mihiel offensive and the AEF’s anticipated spring 1919 offensive, the fourth course’s curriculum represented a complete shift towards open warfare instruction, with minimal trench warfare instruction.\textsuperscript{130}

The majority of the fourth course’s map problems centered on offensive operations within open warfare. Particularly in the second half of the course, map problems included “Counter Attack,” ”Advance to Fill a Gap,” “Attack in Open Warfare,” and the course’s scheduled culminating map problem was “Outpost and Pursuit.” The November 11\textsuperscript{th} Armistice, however, altered the Langres Staff College curriculum. Due to the Armistice, the Staff College canceled the final three map problems, so the school could take advantage of an opportunity to execute a historical staff ride on World War I battlefields, immediately after European combat operations ceased. From December 18, 1918, through January 1, 1919, the students and faculty methodically studied the Battle of Verdun and the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Beginning on January 2, the fourth class executed a nine-day historical staff ride to Verdun and the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

\textsuperscript{129} Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, “Report of the G-5, Appendix 3, History of the Army General Staff College,” 7. About thirty percent of third course students graduated three weeks early to join AEF units conducting combat operations in the St. Mihiel offensive.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 8-9; Army General Staff College, “Fourth Course: Outline, Course of Instruction” (Langres, FR: Army General Staff College, 1918), 1-8. The fourth course outline provided a day-by-day schedule for the entire fourth course and included the instructor assigned to each lecture, conference, and map problem. Jacobsmeyer, "Intelligence in the American Expeditionary Force,” 64.
Argonne battlefields. Several general staff officers from the AEF’s First Army accompanied the Langres students and faculty during the staff ride.131

The 316 fourth course students experienced a vastly different curriculum from that of the first course’s students. The 461 students in the first three courses received significant amounts of Allied trench warfare instruction, with the only the third course’s 220 students exposed to a balanced curriculum of trench warfare and open warfare instruction. The majority of the first three course’s students graduated the Langres Staff College while the war was ongoing and most left Langres to fill general staff officer positions throughout the AEF. The fourth course’s students, instructed primarily by US faculty, received mostly open warfare instruction. The Armistice, however, prevented them from joining the AEF’s frontline units and having an immediate impact, as Langres graduates, during wartime.

In addition to Allied and US faculty influence, the shared lessons from non-Langres officers, such as AEF general staff officers or military officers with expertise on unique subjects, helped advance the Langres curriculum. In July 1918, while serving as First Division’s G-3, Marshall sent a letter to Fassett, who at the time was Langres’ director. In the letter, Marshall provided Fassett with copies of 1st Division’s plans and offered insights pertaining to general staff work:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the various orders issued for the relief of this Division by two French divisions, which is now taking place. I believe this will be interesting to you at LANGRES in view of the fact that it is a rather normal relief, arranged hurriedly and in a battle sector. I am also enclosing copies of a portion of the Plan of Defense, and a map which will give you an idea of our dispositions. Since seeing you the other day I have had more experience with the employment of the Division arranged with regiments in line each in column of battalions. It has proved a pronounced success for a number of

Marshall’s shared lessons most likely influenced the fourth course’s curriculum. During final Langres course, students attended a conference titled, “Relief of a Division,” facilitated by Chaffee, who at the time was the III Corps G-3. One week after Chaffee’s conference, Lonergan administered the “Relief of a Division” map problem to fourth course students.133

Additionally, the Langres Staff College curriculum absorbed shared lessons through guest lectures and conferences. During the first course, the Commandant of the French Staff College delivered six lectures, over the course of six days, on the Battle of Verdun to Langres students and faculty.134 In late March 1918, Marshall lectured second course students and faculty on “the practical working of the American Division.”135 For the third course, the Langres Staff College increased the quantity and diversity of guest lectures. Major General Hugh Trenchard, Commander of the British Independent Air Force, lectured students and faculty on airpower. The AEF GHQ G-4, Brigadier General George Van Horn Mosely (a 1909 Leavenworth Staff College graduate), lectured about the AEF’s supply operations. Major Alexander M. Patch, Commander of the AEFs Machine Gun School, also provided guest lectures to students and faculty.136

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133 Army General Staff College, “Fourth Course: Outline, Course of Instruction,” 2 and 4.

134 Army General Staff College, “Additional Lectures, First Course” (Langres, FR: Army General Staff College, 1918), 1.


Following the Armistice, fourth course students received a barrage of guest lectures and conferences. Once fighting officially ceased, numerous AEF general staff officers traveled to Langres and lectured students and faculty on various subjects. Brigadier General Dennis M. Nolan, Pershing’s G-2 for the entire war, facilitated a conference titled, “Organization of Intelligence Personnel.”

Brigadier General Drum, the First Army Chief of Staff, provided Langres students and faculty with three lectures addressing the lessons learned from AEF operations, specifically addressing the St Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Additionally, former Langres graduates, serving on division and corps general staffs, provided guest lectures following the Armistice. One those Langres graduates was Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell, a second course graduate and the IV Corps G-2, who lectured the students and faculty on intelligence.

Also a second course graduate, Colonel George S. Patton delivered a lecture titled “Light Tanks in Exploitation.” Patton, the foremost tank expert in the AEF, was the 304th Tank Brigade Commander during the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. By the time the Staff College expanded the breadth of the school’s curriculum, during the fourth course, it was too late to impact the war. For the students who graduated Langres during the war, their general staff officer education was vastly different than those who graduated from the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College. In contrast to the broad curriculum at pre-war Leavenworth, the

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137 Army General Staff College, “Fourth Course: Outline, Course of Instruction,” 4; Pershing, My Experiences in the First World War, 401. After World War I, Nolan became the Chief of Military Intelligence for the War Department.

138 Army General Staff College, “Fourth Course: Outline, Course of Instruction,” 1 and 5; Pershing, My Experiences in the First World War, 402-403. Stilwell, later known as ‘Vinegar Joe,’ became a General and commanded in Africa and Asia during World War II.

139 Army General Staff College, “Fourth Course: Outline, Course of Instruction,” 5; Army General Staff College, “Light Tanks In Exploitation, Fourth Course Lecture” (Langres, FR: Army General Staff College, 1918); Coffman, The Regulars, 211; Woodward, The American Army, 230-232.
Langres Staff College’s curriculum provided students with specific information pertinent to execute the duties of one general staff position during World War I.

**Langres Staff College Methods of Instruction**

The Langres Staff College employed repetitive methods of instruction which consisted of lectures, conferences, and practical work. The practical work habitually consisted of map problems. The faculty administered approximately twenty map problems to students, per course. The map problems were tedious and typically lasted the entire day. As a third course student, Patton wrote to his wife that he “had another map problem today and worked from 8 till 4 with out [sic] lunch so feel rather empty. I did not do very well as I am lazy when it comes to stupid details.” Langres students worked on map problems twice a week, typically every Wednesday and Saturday. For each map problem, students formed into several groups, which consisted of students who represented one of the three staff sections. Each group replicated a division-level general staff and produced one solution to the map problem. Within the groups, each student focused on the aspects of the map problem related to their assigned staff section. Students in the groups combined their staff work to produce one group solution to the map problem. For


example, as a second course student assigned to the G-2 Section, Paul B. Clemens produced “estimates on the enemy and terrain” for his group during trench warfare map problems.143

At the end of map problem days, each student turned in his portion of the group’s map problem solution. The faculty then issued each student one of his classmate’s portion and then students produced a written review on their classmates’s work. The faculty compared the school’s solution (developed by Langres instructors) to the student’s review. Following the comparison, the faculty applied a grade to each student’s section of their respective group’s map problem solution. Two days after the class turned in their solutions, students attended a conference where the faculty provided students with the school’s solution, handed students their graded work, and discussed common issues identified from the students’ solutions.

The final map problem of the course was the school’s culminating event. For the last map problem, the students received a corps-level order and, within their staff groups, produced a written division-level order. The Langres Staff College’s application of map problems remained constant throughout all four courses.144 Although map problems were central to Langres’ method of instruction, the school also used lectures and conferences.

Generally, lectures and conferences provided students with the information pertinent to the proceeding map problems. Lectures, in particularly provided students with specific information that “had a bearing on the following problem.”145 Typically, faculty delivered three sequential one-hour lectures in the morning, two days before each map problem. Students


received specific information on subjects such as “Quartering a division,” “Supplying a division in quarters,” and “Movement.”\textsuperscript{146} The Langres Staff College used conferences to discuss lecture material and map problems. In the day preceding each map problem, faculty facilitated conferences where students and instructors discussed previous lectured material and the next day’s map problem. Additionally, a US officer facilitated the “X” conference, which served as a forum where students received an American interpretation of Allied terms and doctrine addressed in previous lectures. Generally, students attended lectures and conferences four days a week, from 0830 hours to 1430 hours. In the afternoons and evenings, students studied lecture and conference material.\textsuperscript{147}

First course students attended sixty-three lectures, sixty conferences, and executed twenty map problems. For the second course, the amount of hours dedicated to lectures, conferences, and map problems remained consistent with the first course’s ratio. First and second course lectures accounted for about forty percent of the school’s instruction.\textsuperscript{148} For the third course, however, the US faculty reduced the number of lectures, increased the number of conferences, and added practical exercises to the schedule. The increased number of conferences facilitated more discussion between students and US officers.

The addition of practical exercises required students to perform more practical work than required during the previous two courses. The US faculty added “liaison and message center

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{146} Army General Staff College, “First Course Schedule,” 1; Army General Staff College, “Fourth Course: Outline, Course of Instruction,” 2.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Army General Staff College, “First Course Schedule,” 2-10; Army General Staff College, “Fourth Course: Outline, Course of Instruction,” 1-6.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, “Report of the G-5, Appendix 3, History of the Army General Staff College,” 3; Army General Staff College, “First Course Schedule” (Langres, FR: Army General Staff College, 1917), 2-10. For the first and second courses, students spent about twenty-four hours attending lectures and conferences every week. Students worked on map problems approximately fifteen hours per week.
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work” practical exercises to the third course schedule.\textsuperscript{149} For these practical exercises, students formed into groups in which each group represented a battalion, brigade, or division staff. The faculty assigned a room and a practical problem to each staff. The focus of the practical exercises was for students to use telephones and liaisons to communicate with subordinate, adjacent, or higher-level staffs in order to solve the problems. The purpose of the practical exercises was for the students to practice communicating with subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters while producing solutions to problems.\textsuperscript{150}

The third course signified a shift in the school’s method of instruction. The US faculty facilitated more discussion, increased the amount of student practical work, and reduced the amount of time students spent in lectures. The school’s increased emphasis on discussions and practical work, than lectures, continued into the fourth course. The fourth course schedule included twenty-three lectures, eighty-four conferences, three practical exercises (four days in duration), and twenty-one map problems. From the first course to the fourth course, the amount of lecture-based instruction decreased by about twenty percent, while discussions and practical work increased by roughly twenty-five and five percent, respectfully. Although the Staff College fluctuated the amount of lectures, conferences, and practical work, the school’s core method of instruction remained centered on map problems throughout World War I.

**Langres Staff College Students**

In contrast to the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College students, the Langres Staff College students did not share a similar base of knowledge with one another. A mixture of Regular Army, National Army, and National Guard officers attended Langres. The military experiences varied significantly among the students, which put the less experienced “Non-Regulars” at a


\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 7. Emmett Addis, a US instructor and second course graduate, developed the practical exercises for the third course.
disadvantage as they attended Langres. Paul B. Clemens, a second course student and National Guard officer, stated, “At the Staff College I had a most strenuous time. The course was designed primarily for men who had had [sic] a thorough course in military subjects as well as long experience. As I was without these except the training I received in the National Guard I was very much handicapped.”\textsuperscript{151} Patton, a Regular Army officer, also shared Clemens’ view on the difficulty for non-regular officers. As a third course student, Patton acknowledged that the course material was hard and he was surprised that “any one but a regular [officer] of considerable experience” could survive the course.\textsuperscript{152} Despite Clemens’ trouble at Langres, he graduated and served as the 32nd Division’s G-2 throughout the remainder of the war.\textsuperscript{153}

Seventy percent of the officers who attended the Langres Staff College gained the status of qualified to perform general staff officer duties. At the end of each course, the Director produced an assessment on each student’s potential to perform in various positions within the AEF organization. The Director’s assessment included letter grades (A - C) for each student under one or more of thirty-two different positions graduates could fill following graduation. Some of those positions included: division chief of staff, Langres Staff College instructor, various AEF GHQ positions, G-1 through G-3 positions for army down to division-level, brigade adjutant, understudy for G-1 through G-3, and liaison officer. The Director’s assessment influenced where the AEF GHQ assigned each student after graduation. For instance, Clemens received an A under the G-2 understudy position, but did not receive a grade under any of the other thirty-one positions. Following graduation, Clemens rejoined his original unit, the 32nd

\textsuperscript{151} Clemens quoted in Jacobsmeyer, "Intelligence in the American Expeditionary Force,” 59.

\textsuperscript{152} Patton quoted in Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 545.

\textsuperscript{153} Jacobsmeyer, "Intelligence in the American Expeditionary Force,” 60-62; Army General Staff College – Langres, "Recommendations made by Director at conclusion of course, May 25, 1918,” 1.
Division. Jonathan M. Wainwright, however, received nine grades under several different positions, one of which was a C under the division chief of staff category.¹⁵⁴

Typically, the students who did well during the course received a letter grade under the division chief of staff position, followed by several letter grades issued for various staff positions under each unit echelon. Among the second course graduates, Regular Army officers accounted for thirty of the thirty-four students with a letter grade under the division chief of staff category. Just over fifty percent of second course students received various letter grades under corps and division-level G-1 through G-3 positions. Forty-six second course graduates received letter grades as potential understudies for G-1, G-2, G-3; these forty-six consisted of nineteen National Army officers, fifteen National Guard officers, and twelve Regular Army officers. Twenty-three second course students did not receive a letter grade under any of the thirty-two positions. Instead, the Director marked these students as “Not Recommended” and the school did not consider them as qualified to perform general staff officer duties. The “Not Recommended” students consisted of ten National Guard officers, nine National Army officers, and four Regular Army officers.¹⁵⁵ Regular Army officers fared better at the Langres Staff College than their National Guard National Army classmates.

The differences in the student knowledge base did not go unnoticed by the AEF GHQ. After the Langres Staff College deemed just sixty percent of the first course’s students as


¹⁵⁵ Army General Staff College – Langres, "Recommendations made by Director at conclusion of course, May 25, 1918,” 1-6. Five second course students receive an “A” letter grade under the division chief of staff position. Three of those students were pre-war Leavenworth Staff College graduates, which included Preston Brown (1914), William M. Fassett (1909), and Raymond Sheldon (1905). Four of the five students became division chiefs of staff after graduating Langres. Fassett became the Director of the Langres Staff College.
qualified to perform general staff duties, the AEF GHQ established the School of the Line at Langres. The School of the Line’s purpose was to “give tactical instruction to all students in such manner as will bring about the study and application of the use of all arms and services in combination.”

Under the leadership of Colonel Kirby Walker, a 1916 Leavenworth Staff College graduate, the School of the Line’s first course commenced on February 4, 1918. In total, the School of the Line executed four courses and graduated 497 students, predominantly National Army and National Guard officers. For each School of the Line class, about twenty percent (top twenty) of the graduates attended the Langres Staff College. From June 1918 to October 1918, the School of the Line provided the Langres Staff College with 100 students. Due to the School of the Line’s February 1918 start, the two schools’ schedules overlapped. When the first School of the Line class graduated on April 30, 1918, the second Langres course was still in session. The School of the Line’s first course graduates, selected to attend the Langres Staff College, waited one and a half months before their general staff education started as the Staff College. Only the third and fourth Staff College courses received School of the Line graduates. From those two Staff College courses, with School of the Line graduates as students, approximately sixty-five percent of the students graduated as qualified to perform general staff officer duties. Therefore, the Staff College’s graduation rate, with School of the Line graduates as students, increased only five percent from the first course when the Staff College did not have School of the Line graduates as students.

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In addition to the inconsistencies among the students’ abilities, the Langres Staff College competed with AEF units for available officers. General Pershing’s intent was to fill the Langres Staff College seats with officers from newly formed divisions in the United States. Pershing envisioned divisions sending their general staff officers to the Langres Staff College in advance of the units’ deployments to France. Under Pershing’s concept, following graduation general staff officers would rejoin their divisions in France and guide their organizations through unit training and serve as competent general staff officers during combat operations.\(^{159}\) A lack of available shipping, however, prevented the War Department from transporting enough troops across the Atlantic to fulfill Pershing’s intent.\(^{160}\)

Most of the first course’s students came from units that were in the midst of collective training in France, included the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd Divisions. The AEF established several Langres schools (including the Staff College) in the fall of 1917. As the various AEF schools commenced operations in late 1917, the AEF could not procure a large number of US officers from the United States to fill the school’s seats. To produced students for the various courses, like the Langres Staff College, the AEF GHQ tasked American units in France to provide instructors and students.\(^{161}\) For the first course, Allied officers served as faculty for the school, but the AEF GHQ tasked four US divisions to provide the students. Almost all the first course’s seventy-five students came from AEF units engaged in collective training in France.\(^{162}\) The departure of

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1918. The Langres Staff College’s second course began on March 4, 1918 and ended May 30, 1918. The School of the Line’s first course graduates, scheduled to attend the Langres Staff College, waited over one and a half months to attend Langres’ third course which commenced on June 17, 1918.

\(^{159}\) Pershing, *My Experiences in the First World War*, 155-156.

\(^{160}\) Coffman, *The Regulars*, 211.

\(^{161}\) Coffman, *The War to End All Wars*, 137.

officers from divisions to attend the Staff College created problems for these divisions. As 1st Division’s G-3, Marshall argued that “the departure for the Staff College or Corps Schools of nine out of twelve battalion commanders has seriously handicapped regimental commanders in the starting the first week of regimental training.” The burden of providing officers to the Langres Staff College also created problems for the 42nd Division. In December 1917, a division board of officers relieved Colonel Charles D. Hine from his regimental command due to his unit’s poor performance during a training march in France. Hine argued “that all three of his battalion commanders and six company commanders were still in school…as his deputy, a lieutenant colonel, and his senior majors were in staff school.” Regardless of his justification for the regiment’s poor performance, the board relieved Hine from command of the 165th Infantry Regiment.

The AEF finally received several newly formed divisions from the United States once General Peyton March took over as the Army Chief of Staff and after the British increased the amount of available shipping in the spring of 1918. The second course, which began on March 4, 1918, received a mixture of students from units training in France and students from newly arriving units. Almost half of the second course’s 166 students came from newly arriving AEF divisions. Despite the arrival of new divisions, established units immersed in collective training, like the 1st and 42nd Divisions, still provided fifty-five percent of the second course’s students.

165 Ibid., 36.
166 Coffman, *The Regulars*, 211.
In June 1918, however, nearly seventy percent of the third course’s 220 students and came from newly arriving divisions. The fourth course, which commenced in October 1918, shared a similar student breakdown as the third course. For the fourth course, the ratio of students remained weighted towards students from newly arrived units. The AEF GHQ, however, still required established units, in the middle of planning and preparing for the Meuse-Argonne offensive, to provide students to Langres’ fourth course. In a 1930 letter to General Pershing, Marshall (the First Army’s G-3 during the time referenced in his letter) offered criticism on the First Army’s loss of staff officers on the eve of the Meuse-Argonne offensive:

The most severe criticism I could launch pertains to the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle. We refer to it as our greatest and one of the greatest battles in history, determining in winning the war. We point to the great strength of the German position, describe your offer to undertake this most difficult task with fresh young American troops. We dwell on the fact that we had to make the opening fight with but partially trained, and in some instances, wholly inexperienced divisions. Yet, knowing all this, the staffs of these inexperienced divisions were absolutely scalped a few days before the assault, in several cases I believe the day before—in order that the next class at Langres might start on scheduled time. The amount of confusion and mismanagement resulting from this was tremendous. A delay of ten days at Langres would have permitted the machine to get well under way—even a week would have helped immeasurably. Students and instructors were demanded and secured.

The 316 students who entered the Langres Staff College on the eve of the Meuse-Argonne offensive did not return to their units before the Armistice ended the war. The constant pull of officers from AEF units, for the Langres Staff College, disrupted units as they trained, planned, and prepared for combat operations. In total, from the 777 Langres Staff College students, only

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342 (forty-four percent) officers graduated as qualified to perform general staff duties and returned to the AEF’s ranks before World War I ended.171

The Langres Staff College produced officers who specialized in one general staff position, for the World War I environment. Doctrine and lessons from the frontlines were the basis for the curriculum. The Allied trench warfare instruction guided the curriculum, particularly early in the course. As US instructors took over instruction from the Allied faculty, open warfare instruction eclipsed trench warfare in the curriculum. Most graduates left Langres specialized in the duties of one general staff section in the World War I environment. The methods of instruction used at Langres remained consistent throughout the school’s existence. The Staff College used scheduled lectures and conferences to prepare students for the bi-weekly map problems. The students produced solutions to the map problems and the faculty issued students grades based on the school’s solutions. The knowledge and experience base among the Langres Staff College students varied significantly. Regular Army officers succeeded at Langres more often than National Guard and National Army officers. Finally, the removal of officers from AEF units conducting training and combat operations, to attend the Langres Staff College, proved disruptive to AEF units. In the end, the Langres Staff College provided seventy percent more general staff officers than the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College provided to Pershing’s AEF. Ironically, many of those Langres graduates attended Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff School in the years after the World War I. Langres graduates such as Jonathan M. Wainwright, George S. Patton, Harold R. Bull, and William H. Simpson spent time as students at Leavenworth before serving as generals during World War II.172
Conclusion

Following the examination of both Staff Colleges’ curricula, methods of instruction, and students, a Langres Staff College model does not offer an effective form of general staff officer education. First, the Langres Staff College curriculum lacked the depth and breadth necessary to produce flexible general staff officers who could solve problems within an ambiguous environment. Furthermore, the Langres Staff College’s methods of instruction lacked innovation, which hindered the potential for students to develop into reflective practitioners. Additionally, the students’ divergent experience and knowledge base was an impediment to Langres’ success as less than seventy percent of students graduated and deemed qualified to perform general staff duties. Lastly, the unceasing pull of officers from within France to attend the Langres Staff College disrupted AEF units’ planning, training, and combat operations. The Langres Staff College did not provide an equivalent general staff officer education as the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College provided to officers before World War I.

The Langres Staff College curriculum lacked the depth and breadth necessary to produce flexible general staff officers who can solve problems within an ambiguous environment. The Langres Staff College utilized doctrine (both Allied and US) and lessons from the frontlines as the basis for the school’s curriculum. Additionally, the school’s students concentrated on one specific general staff section. Most of the Langres graduates filled the AEF ranks with the knowledge useful to perform the duties of one general staff section for a specific type of warfare, whether that be trench warfare or open warfare. For instance, a first course graduate, who received mostly trench warfare instruction as a G-2, would have been at a disadvantage attempting to understand and solve open warfare-related problems as a G-3 during the Meuse

Graduate from Leavenworth in 1924. Bull graduated from Leavenworth in 1928 and served as General Eisenhower’s Operations Officer during World War II. Simpson was a Distinguished Graduate from Leavenworth in 1925 and was the Ninth Army’s commander during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II.
Argonne offensive. The Langres Staff College’s focused curriculum produced specialized general staff officers for one type of environment.

In contrast to Langres, the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College curriculum possessed depth and breadth. Military history and theory served as the foundation for the Leavenworth curriculum. The use of military theory and history aided in the school’s ability to develop general staff officers who knew when and how to apply doctrine as general staff officers. Equipped with an understanding of military theory, including von der Goltz and von Schellendorf, Leavenworth students garnered valuable lessons from military history, specifically from historical research and campaign analysis. Additionally, Leavenworth students received a holistic education on the functions of a general staff. It is evident that the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College produced flexible officers grounded in history and theory who could perform all general staff duties, regardless of the environment.

The Langres Staff College method of instructions lacked innovation, which hindered the student’s ability to develop into reflective practitioners. Almost all Langres instruction centered on division-level map problems, either trench warfare or open warfare problems. Langres students performed map problems twice a week in which a sequential pedagogic process remained throughout the school’s existence; lectures provided specific information relevant to the map problem, conferences that clarified lectured information, students produced solutions to map problems, students provided critiques on classmates’ solutions, faculty issued students the school’s solution and solution grades, and then the school repeated the process for the next map problem. The Langres Staff College’s methods of instruction were redundant and did not offer students additional opportunities to reflect and improvise beyond the school’s map problem solutions.

The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College used innovative methods, primarily through the applicatory method, to enhance the students’ abilities to reflect, synthesize, and apply course material. Leavenworth students executed practical work in a variety of ways. The pre-war
students conducted original research, delivered lectures, prepared and participated in historical staff rides, solved map problems, attended demonstrations, and produced solutions to War Department problems. The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College provided several opportunities for practical work, which developed general staff officers as reflective practitioners who understood when and how to apply course material.

The Langres Staff College’s students did not share the same knowledge and experience base, which was an impediment to the school’s ability to produce general staff officers. Less than seventy percent of Langres students graduated as qualified to perform general staff duties. Langres’ most successful students were Regular Army officers, many had previous operational experience while some even graduated from the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College. Many National Army and National Guards students did not fare well at Langres, as the majority of these non-Regular students made up the bulk of the “Not Recommended” for general staff duties by the school’s Director.

The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College’s students shared a similar knowledge and experience base. Almost all Staff College students graduated from the School of the Line before entering their second year education at Leavenworth. Generally, the top fifty percent of School of the Line graduates made up the Staff College’s student body. The School of the Line was rigorous and the school’s top graduates proved they possessed the knowledge and experience for an advanced general staff officer education. The pre-war Leavenworth Staff College students were not only on the same intellectual level, but their motivation to learn enhanced the school’s ability to develop all students into capable general staff officers.

The AEF’s unceasing pull of officers from within France to attend the Langres Staff College disrupted AEF units’ planning, training, and combat operations. Beginning with the first course, the students who filled the school’s seats came from units in the midst of collective training. Although the ratio of students from new units increased throughout the school’s existence, well-established AEF units, conducting wartime activities, remained tasked with
providing students to Langres. Although the AEF required an abundance of general staff officers, the investment of officers into the Langres Staff College was problematic for AEF units engaged in a war.

In regards to generating the school’s student body, the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College was not disruptive to the operational force. For the most part, officers did not leave US Army regiments to attend the Staff College. Generally, the students began their Staff College education immediately after graduating from the School of the Line. Most Staff College graduates returned to their units with additional knowledge, which they applied as unit trainers and umpires for unit maneuvers. Additionally, many Staff College graduates remained at Leavenworth as instructors for several years before returning to their regiments. Rather than create problems throughout the US Army, the investment of officers into the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College leavened their regiments with professional military knowledge.

**Recommendation**

The examination of the Langres Staff College and pre-war Leavenworth Staff College provides lessons applicable to the US Army’s general staff officer education in today’s environment. The US Army should consider expanding the number of slots available in the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) in order to raise officer intellectual creativity and therefore the US Army’s state of readiness. Developing an adequate bench of AMSP graduates would saturate the US Army with an additional general staff officer capability necessary to fight and win in a war with a near peer or peer enemy. When anticipating the US Army’s future enemies, a student of history would know it is foolish to disregard the possibility of fighting a peer or near peer enemy. The US Army’s readiness is vital for planting the seeds of victory, particularly when a formidable adversary emerges and poses a credible threat to US interests. A major part of readiness is having enough proficient general staff officers in large formations able to plan and coordinate theater openings, division or larger decisive action operations, and the integration of interagency and joint force capability during a major campaign. In the event of a
war with near peer or peer enemy, and if the US requires a mass mobilization of National Guard and Reserve Forces, does the US Army have enough capable general staff officers within the ranks to enable a victory?

For World War I, the benefit of Allies, able to buy time as America mobilized for war, gave the AEF the flexibility to produce hundreds of specialized general staff officers in short order. Today, it is improbable that America will have the luxury of Allies, with the military capability and capacity, to hold off a near peer or peer enemy as the US Army prepares for war. This was a concern of George C. Marshall’s during the interwar period. However, the need for thousands of general staff officers was the circumstance for the US Army during World War II. In order to produce the general staff officers needed to fill large unit staffs, the US Army established a one-month “Special Course” at Fort Leavenworth to educate officers in general staff duties during World War II. Similar to World War I, however, Leavenworth’s two-year men outshined the mass produced specialized general staff officers.

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173 H. A. DeWeerd, *Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army* (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Inc., 1945), 27. In 1939, during a testimony before the House of Representatives, Marshall stated, “Fortunately the AEF had Allies to protect it for more than a year, while it found itself. The future problems of our Army visualize no such protected period for overcoming peacetime military deficiencies. We must be prepared to stand on our own feet.”


The Advanced Military Studies Program is the US Army’s modern day equivalent to the pre-war Leavenworth Staff College. On average, about 100 US Army officers graduate the AMSP each year. Military History (Campaign Analysis) and theory form the basis of the AMSP curriculum and the primary methods of instruction are discussions and practical work. A recommendation for future studies should examine the ratio of active AMSP graduates to the potential size of a mass mobilized US Army in preparations for a war with a near peer or peer enemy.
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