First Among Equals: Interagency Cooperation in Stability Operations

A Monograph

by

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This monograph explores the nature of interagency leadership and policy fulfillment during a stability operation without an antecedent combat phase, specifically the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949. Employing John Lovell’s Imaginary Ideal Machine for Making Policy as a theoretical construct, this research establishes three hypotheses. First, in such an operation, the US military element must answer directly to the Department of State to remain integrated within the interagency. Written directives from national through operational-level leadership clear fuzzy lines of authority in the interagency. Second, an articulated line of authority with a commensurate budget is an effective tool to provide unity of effort, a forcing mechanism for cooperation, and an indicator of lead federal agency status. Finally, key players in the interagency must receive prior interagency experience as well as post-assignment incentives to be effective. In this case study, all members received a reward for good work, but causality between good interagency integration and perceived benefits was suspect.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
Abstract


This monograph explores the nature of interagency leadership and policy fulfillment during a stability operation without an antecedent combat phase, specifically the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949. Employing John Lovell's Imaginary Ideal Machine for Making Policy as a theoretical construct, this research establishes three hypotheses. First, in such an operation, the US military element must answer directly to the Department of State to remain integrated within the interagency. Written directives from national through operational-level leadership clear fuzzy lines of authority in the interagency. Second, an articulated line of authority with a commensurate budget is an effective tool to provide unity of effort, a forcing mechanism for cooperation, and an indicator of lead federal agency status. Finally, key players in the interagency must receive prior interagency experience as well as post-assignment incentives to be effective. In this case study, all members received a reward for good work, but causality between good interagency integration and perceived benefits was suspect.
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### Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>AMAG</td>
<td>American Mission for Aid to Greece</td>
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<td>DAG</td>
<td>Democratic Army of Greece</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Administration</td>
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<td>Ellinikós Laikós Apeleftherotikós Stratós</td>
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<td>Imaginary Ideal Machine for Making Policy</td>
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<td>JUSMAPG</td>
<td>Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group</td>
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<td>KKE</td>
<td>Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Regionally Aligned Forces</td>
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Introduction

The prevention and, if need be, the conduct of war must not be approached as purely military enterprises....It is a modest, indeed unarguable, position to affirm. But, all too often, policymakers reach for the gun without considering their strategic challenges holistically.

— Colin S. Gray, 2007

...there can never be any solid friendship between individuals, or union between communities that is worth the name, unless the parties be persuaded of each other’s honesty, and be generally congenial the one to the other; since from difference in feeling springs also difference in conduct.

— Thucydides

US Army doctrine frames the nature of interagency coordination, but does not indicate a lead agency for primacy in stability operations. Within the doctrinal construct, all organizations within the interagency have equal say and influence on a particular stability operation despite the potential for disparate and potentially parochial organizational objectives and interests.¹ With no mechanism to hold the interagency group together and little authority to provide unity of effort at the operational level, a stability operation may run into problems from the onset.

For example, the Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept leverages service capabilities to advise and train foreign militaries. The concept’s intent is to provide a stabilizing effect to deter war in conflict-prone regions. By doing so, RAF supports a combatant commander’s theater shaping activities as well as Department of State security initiatives within a host country.² Sold as an interagency panacea to both Departments of State and Defense, RAF fails to clear up issues with authorities.

The problem is a lack of an agreed lead department to direct country or theater shaping and stabilizing activities. A combatant commander has a responsibility to “plan, conduct, and


assess security cooperation activities.”\(^3\) The Department of State country team, however, is the lead US representative in a foreign country. Its mandate includes “speaking with one voice to others on U.S. policy” and “directing and coordinating all executive branch offices and personnel...except for those under the command of a US area military commander....”\(^4\)

Despite federal directives for better Defense and State coordination – particularly in stability operations – efforts to do so have been halfhearted at best.\(^5\) With no clear lead department to set the overall country goals and direction, both Departments of State and Defense run the risk of redundancy or undermining efforts. The potential for a leaderless interagency may allow for US influence to suffer.

Further, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan may color the nature of the interagency process by indicating a transition from one lead agency to another.\(^6\) In Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, the US military held primacy through major combat operations, but relied on a greater need for the interagency to secure a stable resolution and transition from those countries. However, what happens when the nature of an operation precludes the need for a leading military effort from the outset, but relies on it throughout in a supporting role? These situations may include humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, or other security cooperation events. Further, political implications, executive directives, and limited Congressional funding may constrain the use of force in an interagency operation. Research is


necessary to determine if an interagency community conducting a stability operation requires a single federal agency to serve as overall lead.

When the United States, seeking a broader policy goal, attempts to stabilize regions undergoing armed conflict, policy makers rely on an interagency community to execute those goals. The United States military, as one segment of the interagency, must work within this established community to achieve US political objectives. This study proposes that in many cases the military must fill a supporting role within the interagency. Further, the community must rely on a single line of authority as one lead federal agency, often placing the military element subordinate to another government department. The purpose of this study, then, is to inform strategic and operational-level leaders – military and civilian – on a method to achieve greater unity of effort within the interagency during a stability operation.

Taking a back seat to another executive department or agency may be a difficult pill for a commander to swallow. The military has enjoyed pride of place in recent operations throughout the Global War on Terror. However, just as the United States should never undertake a major operation without allies, the US military should never go it alone without the rest of the federal government. Examination of US involvement in the Greek Civil War from 1947 through 1949, as an example of an effective application of the interagency process, should make this clear.

Further, observers may find that, absent complementary contributions from other elements of national power, there is only so much the military can do to shape the environment. When discussing US operations against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, former Army Chief of Staff Raymond Odierno discussed limitations on military effectiveness. “The issue I learned over the last 10 years or so, is that there [are] limits with military power; and so we can have an outcome, but again...the problem we've had is do we achieve sustainable outcome[s], it's about
sustainable outcomes.”⁷ As only one tool in the national arsenal of influence, the military can create short-term successes, but struggles in consolidating those successes into long-term policy wins.

This study will rely on some key terminology throughout the work. First, policy goals are long-term intents of a state that support national interest. In this case, they are specific to a Presidential administration. Second, a policy objective is a discrete event planned to meet a policy goal that requires the interagency community for fulfilment. Third, the interagency is the grouping of US government departments and agencies, international government agencies, and non-governmental organizations working together and bringing to bear their expertise, resources, and perspectives toward achieving a policy objective. Fourth, stability operations are activities, done in concert with other elements of the US government, intended to “...reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”⁸ As a final administrative point, the Departments of War and the Navy merged to become the Department of Defense at the beginning of the Greek Civil War. Through the 1947 National Security Act and subsequent 1949 amendment, the name changed to the later during operations. This research will refer to it as the Department of Defense throughout the work.

This study will employ the interagency model established in political scientist John Lovell’s Imaginary Ideal Machine for Making Policy (IIMMP) and applied through historian Gabriel Marcella’s study Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security. The IIMMP is a

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formulation of an ideal interagency process shaped through the realities of the process and frames the investigation of US involvement in the Greek Civil War. In this model, ideal policy development goes through five interrelated steps: conceptualization, articulation, budgeting, implementation, and post-implementation analysis and feedback.9 For the interagency to apply the policy, it too goes through five steps: identification of policy issues, formulation of options, offering issues up to an appropriate level of decision, implementing a decision, and overseeing implementation.10 Unfortunately, the reality of the interagency process of implementing policy intervenes at the execution phase. This is due to blurred lines of authority, agency parochialism, and poor communication.11 Ultimately, unity of effort, necessary for an effective interagency operation, breaks down.12 This study will focus the imperative of unity of effort within an interagency operation and evaluate its quality as compared against US involvement in the Greek Civil War.

This research will establish the nature of the interagency community with its inherent pitfalls in execution, specifically to unity of effort. It will examine the current thinking on the subject and establish evaluation criteria by which it will analyze a case study of the US involvement in the Greek Civil War. Ultimately, it will seek to answer this primary research question: Through the lens of US involvement in the Greek Civil War, how can the Army best integrate within the interagency during stability operations? To answer this question, this study will seek to confirm or reject the following hypotheses. First, during a stability operation without a combat phase, the US military element must answer directly to the Department of State to

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9 Gabriel Marcella, Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 17.

10 Ibid.


12 Marcella, Affairs of State, 412.
remain integrated within the interagency. Second, an articulated line of authority with a commensurate budget is an effective tool to provide unity of effort and a forcing mechanism for the Army to remain integrated within the interagency. Finally, key players in the interagency must receive prior interagency experience as well as post-assignment incentives for the interagency community to be effective.

When establishing the Greek Civil War case, this study will use unclassified information only and will leverage the archives of the Truman Presidential Library. The intent is to apply both primary and some secondary sources. Of the primary sources, the research will focus on key US national leadership directives and communication, Departments of State and Defense documents, ambassador cables, and top military leadership assessments as they related to US involvement in the Greek Civil War. Critical secondary sources include histories of the two military commands involved, published during operations or soon after they concluded.

This study will focus on only US involvement of the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949. It will examine British involvement as it tied into the US mission during this period from an interagency perspective. It will not discuss distinct British efforts separate from the United States. Although the research will highlight some of the tactical action during the civil war to explain the conflict’s outcome, it will focus on the operational and strategic levels where the interagency community resided. Although a key concern is the nature of stability operations, it will focus on the primary task of “reestablishing] a safe and secure environment” and will omit the other doctrinal tasks.¹³

This study makes the following assumptions. First, US support to nationalist Greece from 1947-1949, as a policy objective, serves as an example of an interagency effort and that the outcome of the advisement mission was a success for the US Truman Doctrine as a policy goal. Second, US involvement during the Greek Civil War was a stability operation within the current

doctrinal definition. Third, funding of an operation determines a department’s primacy in an operation and indicates the US government’s prioritization of effort within the interagency. The department with greater control of allocated funds represents primacy among the interagency. Finally, the United States will leverage the interagency for all stability operations or stability phases of a broader operation into the future.

This study will begin with a literature review to discuss a theoretical framework to examine the topic of the interagency community within stability operations, current thinking on the subject, and deeper understanding of the research hypotheses. Following this, it will discuss the case study research methodology. Next, it will turn to the case of the Greek Civil War and establish the context of US involvement at the strategic and operational levels. After this, it will provide findings and analysis based on the evaluation criteria established in the methodology portion. Finally, it will conclude with a summary and proposals for future research and study.

**Literature Review**

This section examines the current thought on interagency and stability operations. It begins with the theoretical construct employed to frame the study’s understanding of the interagency. Then it breaks down important concepts as well as recent literature on the interagency, stability operations, and their necessary interaction. It ends with an explanation of this study’s proposed hypotheses before turning to the research methodology.

The theory employed to examine this research is political scientist Dr. John Lovell’s Imaginary Ideal Machine for Making Policy (IIMMP).\(^{14}\) This theory leverages dialectical logic to explain how leaders construct and execute policy for US foreign affairs. To begin, Lovell established an ideal model of policy making that explains the process in a perfect world, free of

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indecision and friction and full of ample budgets and broad consensus among agencies. Policy makers establish clear lines of authority and coordinate among the members of the interagency for execution. Finally, policy implementation is decisive and rapid.

As a comparison to this ideal setting, Lovell explains that perfect policymaking is impossible and prone to failure or inefficiency at the execution phase. This is policy making in reality. Since humans are imperfect and subject to political pressures, they may shift from the original policy intent. Further, policy execution measures of success are subjective and may change as the situation on the ground or public opinion evolve. Particular limitations on policy execution include “breakdowns in communication; fuzzy lines of authority; organizational parochialism; bureaucratic politics; [and] delays.”

This model is critical to understanding the interagency since the outcomes of interagency-run stability operations stem from this policy process. Interagency coordination starts at the highest levels of the US Government where key leaders formulate foreign policy. The President, through the National Security Council, establishes policy goals and passes them on to some variation of interagency group for execution. An assumption in application of this model is that stability operations run into problems primarily through “fuzzy lines of authority” and “organizational parochialism.”

With this theoretical model in mind, this study relies on the key concepts of the interagency and stability operations throughout the rest of the work. These concepts are important to frame not only their individual meanings, but also their direct relationship to one another. This


16 Ibid., 30-31.

17 Ibid., 32.

research starts with and expands on the Joint doctrinal definition of interagency, which is the “United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.” This definition is unsatisfying since it is reducible to “the US Government.” An inclusive definition employed in here is the grouping of US government, international, and non-governmental departments and agencies, working together and bringing to bear their expertise and resources toward achieving a policy objective.

The next concept is stability operations. These are activities, done in concert with other elements of the US government, intended to “…reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” within a foreign country. Stability operations can be part of a broader combat operation, but this research focuses on their other use as a stand-alone mission set without initial fighting. For example, the interagency is necessary to provide humanitarian aid and maintain law and order temporarily, such as US involvement in Haiti, 1994-1995.

The academic and practitioner discussion over interagency coordination in stability is neither new, nor short of opinions, theories, and reports. As such, general trends of recent literature tend to focus on three key areas of concern. First, despite standing as a largely leaderless construct, someone or some agency must be in charge to coordinate efforts. Second, funding makes the interagency world go round and should be a key consideration. Finally, education and incentives are critical for efficient and effective interagency operations.

Gabriel Marcella establishes the Iron Law of the Interagency: “no national security or


international affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone.”22 Although the military under a combatant commander can wield coercive power and substantial capabilities within a theater, an ambassador brings a wealth of diplomatic expertise that the military lacks.23 Marcella bemoans, but does not reconcile the asymmetry in resourcing between the two or that no formal leader is identified within the interagency at the operational level.24

To explain the leadership gap, researchers Corri Zoli and Nicholas Armstrong argue that US Army stability doctrine has set the stage for military primacy in stability operations.25 As stability moved to the fore as a part of national policy since the end of the Cold War, the US Army thrust itself, unofficially, into the lead. A primary problem is determining the right mix of Defense and State responsibilities in current interagency stability operations. Where Zoli and Armstrong fall short is explaining the right, situationally dependent format of formal leadership within the interagency in stability.

Political scientist Clark Murdock et al. asserts that the US Government lacks any kind of doctrine on how to plan for and lead the interagency effort. Further, any designated lead agency has no real authority to coordinate and direct others.26 While acknowledging a need for a lead to direct an interagency operation, this study fails to explain how he or she should coordinate through its various members. It sheds no light on how to organize the interagency for a stability,


23 Ibid., 34-35.

24 Ibid., 37.


who should control funding, or necessary qualifications needed to lead the interagency at the operational level.

From the theoretical perspective of Security Sector Reform (SSR), US Army officer Evans Hanson demonstrated that the Department of State, through a US ambassador, should coordinate overall development of a host nation’s security forces with the military in support.27 What this study does not examine is the nature of an operation that is stability-focused from the beginning. Congress recognized these gaps in SSR and passed legislation for the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) through the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.28 This program attempts to tie portions of both Departments of State and Defense budgets into a unified pool through proportional contributions from both departments. Both would apply this pooled budget toward common efforts in stability and as a tool to encourage better unity of effort in the interagency. Although intended to break down department parochialism, the GSCF has encountered some problems such as disproportionate contributions, unidentified interagency operation leads, and differing approaches to solving stability problems.

Zoli and Armstrong highlight the problem in funding disparity. Although Defense controls the larger portion of authorized funds for current stability operations, State – through the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization – is responsible for a larger portion of stability tasks.29 In this incongruence between funding and authority, the Department of State is in charge of stability on paper only while Defense holds the real power.

Defense researcher Caroline Earle encourages greater interagency coordination through


shared experiences of combined planning, training opportunities, and development. Leaders and planners must find interagency educational opportunities on the cheap, such as through combined authorship of policy documents. A 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) reinforces this notion. Effective integration between the DOD and civilian agencies is not consistent due to a dearth of top-level guidance and military planner’s awareness of interagency capabilities. Unfortunately, both the Earle and GAO studies stop short of addressing how both departments can learn from each other and the interagency as a whole through a more formal process than a collection of ad hoc lessons learned.

Professor of Interagency and Multinational Studies at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Ralph Doughty and CGSC professor Ralph Erwin emphasized the criterion of interagency education in their work. They assert that all players within the interagency community must receive education of each other’s unique roles and capabilities. Members of both Defense and State must undergo broadening assignments outside their departments as well as receive rewards to incentivize positive interagency cooperation. The study stops short of detailing what these incentives may be beyond simply “career enhancing.”

With the reviewed literature focused on the interagency during stability operations, this


31 Ibid., 49.


research proposes the following hypotheses. First, during a stability operation without a combat phase, the US military element must answer directly to the Department of State to remain integrated within the interagency. If a stability operation never started with combat, such as foreign internal defense or peacekeeping, then the US military should not have primacy. The primary department for all foreign engagement outside of war should be the Department of State with Defense supporting. Second, an articulated line of authority with a commensurate budget is an effective tool to provide unity of effort and a forcing mechanism for the Army to remain integrated within the interagency. Once Congress appropriates funds for a stability operation, the department authorized to allocate funds locally among the interagency and set policy for how those funds are used indicates primacy as the lead federal agency. Not only do these two components – local funding allocation and policy direction – indicate primacy, but also encourage interagency integration during a stability operation. Finally, key players in the interagency must receive prior interagency experience as well as post-assignment incentives for the interagency community to be effective. The interagency is made of imperfect humans, in the manner of Lovell’s IIMMP theory. As such, they are prone to departmental parochialism, personal and professional motivations, and other selfish drivers. Members should be knowledgeable of each other’s organizational culture, background, and capabilities. Further, members need positive incentive to “play ball” and work toward a common end.

This research proposes that funding is the critical center around which the interagency community operates and determines primacy among relative equals. While other research laments the financial disparity between the Defense and State, none have been explicit about this budgetary elephant in the room. No research to date has brought to light explicit directives that mandate subordination of one department to another as an effective mechanism to create interagency direction and harmony. Finally, although some research theorized about the benefits of career incentives and interagency education, few have examined if they actually occur or enhance the interagency during an operation. With those aspects in mind, this research intends to
examine them in detail against a case study of the Greek Civil War and shed some light on the role of the military in interagency operations.

This section introduced the Lovell’s model as a frame to understand the interagency during stability operations. It examined some key concepts and current thought on the topic. It also provided an explanation of this study’s proposed hypotheses. Now, it turns to an explanation of the research methodology employed to examine the Greek Civil War case study.

**Methodology**

Following the previous overview of recent literature of the interagency in stability operations, this study focuses now on the methodology necessary for the present research. It begins by examining the structured, focused comparison case study approach as well as a detailed examination of the research question and anticipated findings. It concludes with how it will collect and analyze data within the case study structure.

Due to a number of benefits, this research will employ a structured, focused approach to a case study of US involvement in the Greek Civil War to examine the interagency process during stability operations. First, it allows an opportunity to examine concepts that are not necessarily testable through other methods, such as statistical analysis or laboratory experimentation. The United States was involved in the Greek Civil War only one time, 1947-1949. This experience provides a unique context, so one can never derive a sample pool of data. Case studies develop a context surrounding phenomena and allow the research to identify causality. Without one, most research can only identify correlations between variables. Professor of political science Stephen Van Evera echoed these strengths. Case studies allow a better understanding of cause and effect.

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than empirical research dependent on a large sample pool of data.\textsuperscript{36} If studied phenomena are more pronounced within the case, then their causes and effects should likewise be as pronounced, lending strength to the proposed hypotheses.\textsuperscript{37}

The intent of Greek Civil War case study is not to examine the nature of stability operations, such as foreign internal defense, or transition methods from combat operations to stability and reconstruction. Scholars have researched these in depth and demonstrated that this conflict was a situation where the United States concluded a stability operation with success. This research, rather, looks at the role the military plays within the broader interagency in providing stability within a fragile state. The key difference between the Greek Civil War and any number of stability phases of operations, such as during Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom, is that the military was never the lead federal agency for the effort. Despite significant military support, the Department of State directed the operation from beginning to end. With that in mind, this study seeks to answer this research question: Through the lens of US involvement in the Greek Civil War, how can the Army best integrate within the interagency during stability operations?

By attempting to answer this, the study anticipates the following. First, during the Greek Civil War, the US military element answered directly to the Department of State as it assisted the Greek Nationals. The larger Department of Defense was not the lead federal agency or even an equal partner, so was in a unique situation among modern interagency operations. Despite this arrangement, or because of it, the US Army demonstrated an exemplary instance of integration within the interagency.

A second anticipated finding is an articulated line of authority running from the


\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 69-70.
President, through the Secretary of State, to the US Ambassador to Greece, and ending with the military element commander. This hierarchy correlates to the first expected finding by codifying the supported Department of State to supporting Department of Defense arrangement. As the senior partner in the operation, State controlled the allocated funding and dispersed it to Defense as necessary. An articulated line of authority with a commensurate budget will demonstrate an effective tool to achieve unity of effort and a forcing mechanism for the Army to remain integrated within the interagency.

A final expected finding is that most key US players within the interagency during the Greek Civil War were knowledgeable of each other’s agency capabilities and organizational cultures. Further, most players were rewarded for successful completion of the stability operation. Through prior interagency experience and post-operation incentives, the federal government encouraged positive integration within the interagency then and into the future.

Data analysis will fall under two distinct lines. The first will uncover a clear line of authority throughout the operation with commensurate funding. Within this line of examination, collection will fall under two categories: written directives and funding allocation. Written directives should indicate how national leaders such as the President or Secretaries of State or Defense placed military organizations subordinate and supporting to other organizations. The number of written directives that state or imply that the Department of Defense was subordinate to the Department of State indicate that State was the lead federal agency within the interagency community. Data that indicate this support both the military supporting role and single line of authority hypotheses.

The second category is funding allocation. The underlying assumption is that a department with a larger source of funding or authority to allocate funds to other departments tends to serve as the lead within the interagency. Data analysis will include evidence of what department controlled the preponderance of operational funds, post-Congressional appropriation; what percentage of funds went to each department per year; and who authorized spending during
the operation. Funding control would support both the military supporting role and single line of
authority hypotheses. Written directives and funding allocation categories conclude the first line
of investigation.

The second line examines the key leadership within the operation. Individuals
knowledgeable of other agencies and departments areas of expertise and capabilities allow for
better communication, less department parochialism, and overall more successful stability
operations. Further, departments and agencies must incentivize key leaders to participate and find
success in interagency operations. With that logic, this study will examine the key leaders of the
US effort in Greece. It will identify any variety of interagency education or experience they may
have received prior to the operation as well as their post-Greece careers to see if they received
career enhancing positions or other significant rewards for a successful work.

Employing a structured, focused approach to analyzing a case study of US involvement
in the Greek Civil War, 1947-1949, this research will test its three hypotheses: military
subordination to the Department of State in stability, a hierarchical line of authority demonstrated
through funding, and interagency education and incentives. These will explain, at least in part, the
best way for the Army to integrate within the interagency. Next, this research turns to the case
study.

Case Study

This section will provide a case study of US support to the Greek government during its
civil war. Although the political divide between the Communists and Nationals included a wider
period, this case study will cover from 12 March 1947 through 25 August 1949. This
encapsulates announcement of the Truman Doctrine committing aid to Greece through Operation
Pyros, the final major military defeat of the Communist insurgency. The case study begins with a
strategic overview of the situation in Greece during this period, implementation of the Truman
Doctrine and Marshall Plan, and key US missions, organizations, and players in Greece. Then it
turns to the three structured, focused case study questions.

Road to the Greek Civil War. In Greece, the first battle of the Cold War took place where the last World War recently concluded. Despite nearly $9 billion in US aid through 1946, the damage of World War II still left Europe near disaster. Food and fuel shortages as well as severe drought set the stage for economic and psychological collapse throughout the continent. To make the problem worse in Greece, a growing Communist insurgency threatened political collapse in Athens and turnover to a newly formed leftist government. In these early post-World War II days, the United Kingdom was the only western power in position to help.

Since the Churchill-Stalin Percentages Agreement over post-war, East and West spheres of influence in October 1944, the United Kingdom provided assistance to the Greek government and military. Greece’s position in the eastern Mediterranean was a critical point along lines of communication further toward Middle Eastern oil supplies and soon to be independent British India. Maintaining Greece meant holding together what remained of the post-war empire. Yet despite the intent to prop up Greece economically and militarily, the United Kingdom suffered an economic downturn of its own. Without immediate US economic and military support, conditions forced London to withdraw from Athens, threatening what the Truman administration feared: an insurgent takeover of Greece and a spread of Communist influence in the region.

The insurgency in Greece had roots in the resistance movement during the Second World

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41 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 618.
War with the first act of armed resistance in July 1941.42 While under German occupation, the Communist political faction Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas (KKE) established the National Liberation Front with left organization Ellinikós Laikós Apeleftherotikós Stratós (ELAS) in September of the same year.43 After Greek liberation in 1945, both the United States and United Kingdom pushed the Greek Parliament toward elections to establish a new government and accept the return of King George II, in exile in Egypt during the war.44 The KKE, seeking political legitimacy as well as a socialist future without a ruling monarch, boycotted the elections on 31 March 1946. The boycott failed to sway public sentiment, however, as Greeks voted to install moderate leadership as well as to set the stage for George II’s return. The KKE realized that recognition in Athens would never come through legal means.

By creating a guerrilla force to foment an insurgency in Greece, the KKE hoped to generate support for a change toward a leftist form of government. Leadership from the KKE met with senior military officials from Communist Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in December 1945 and agreed to create the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) for this purpose.45 Yugoslavian President Josip Tito offered weapons, logistical support, and sanctuary within Yugoslavian borders. If the KKE was successful in securing control, Tito would receive a portion of northern Greece (Macedonia region) to form a broader socialist Balkan Federation. Early in 1946, DAG started cross border attacks by raiding Macedonian villages to secure supplies. Before Greek National Army (GNA) units could respond to these attacks, the DAG returned north into

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43 Ibid.


Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania – out of reach for the GNA.46 The insurgency that followed in the years to come pitted the DAG against the Greek National Army and marked the beginning of the Greek Civil War.

Since the early days of the insurgency, the KKE and the DAG were in the middle of a Soviet disagreement on Greek policy goals. Joseph Stalin, as head of the Communist bloc, did not support the Greek leftist insurgency. If the KKE and the DAG were successful, Macedonia would fall under Tito’s Balkan Federation, offering greater influence and a degree of independence from Stalin’s authority.47 To continue its efforts, the KKE needed Stalin’s moral support, which it never received, and Tito’s materiel and safe haven support.48 Safe havens along the Greek border, but inside Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria were critical to sustaining and training DAG forces. They allowed for training camps, hospitals, supply depots, and radio stations all with access to infiltration routes into Greece.49 Nonetheless, the Stalin-Tito split over the Greek question would factor into the ultimate demise of the insurgency.

On a larger geopolitical scale, a threatened Greek government concerned the United States. The impending British withdrawal and possible Communist takeover in Athens would provide a state with eastern Mediterranean basing opportunities for the Soviet bloc.50 The United States needed to act in order to support Greece as well as maintain the balance of power in the Balkans. President Truman used this situation to appeal to Congress and the American people to apply US support.

48 House, A Military History of the Cold War, 67-68.
50 House, A Military History of the Cold War, 59.
In an address to Congress, 12 March 1947, President Truman outlined a foreign policy that defined his Presidency: assisting states in trouble of succumbing to Soviet influence. Known as the Truman Doctrine, the President set the stage for western interaction with the Soviets and Soviet-influenced states throughout most the Cold War as a policy of containment. Among the many challenges facing the nation:

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion....[the United States must] support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.51

Due in part to the critical economic situation facing the Greeks and the burgeoning civil war against Communist separatists, the United States possessed a unique opportunity to provide aid. Support from the United States was necessary to assert global leadership of the free world. Truman asked Congress to authorize $400 million in aid ($350 million to Greece and $50 million to Turkey, also in an economic downturn) as well as civilian and military personnel through 30 June 1948.52 Those specialists would assist in economic recovery, governance improvement, and Greek military development. Truman stressed that a lack of support “may endanger the peace of the world -- and...shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.”53

Passage of Truman’s initiative did not come easily in the US Congress. Opponents saw economic and military aid to Greece as costly American adventurism and an open-ended commitment to nation building for all failing states. In addition to this familiar form of political resistance to modern US foreign policy, many members of Congress protested Greek support as


52 Truman, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress”.

53 Ibid.
an effort to end-run the United Nations in favor of unilateral US intervention. Nonetheless, Congress passed Public Law 75 on 22 May 1947. The bill granted the requested $400 million in aid to both Greece and Turkey.

Historian John Gaddis argued that Truman’s effort to link US security interests to perceived Soviet aggression in Europe as Wilsonian. After announcement of the Truman Doctrine, “[t]he world was now divided between ‘two ways of life’ – not communism versus capitalism, but democracy versus authoritarianism…” Such were the circumstances when the United States took action in both World Wars against German aggression. The Truman Doctrine framed the nascent Cold War in similar terms.

*From Policy Goal to Implementation.* A major component of the Truman Doctrine to support Greece was the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG). Established in 13 January 1947, AMAG was a function of the Department of State and operated from the US embassy in Athens under the direction of US Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh (see Figure 1). MacVeagh did not remain in office long, resigning on 9 March 1948. President Truman appointed Henry Grady to replace him in July 1948.

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54 Jones, *“A New Kind of War”*, 50-51.


56 Dwight Griswold, “A Factual Summary Concerning the American Mission for Aid to Greece” (Athens, Greece, June 15, 1948), 2, 22.

Figure 1: AMAG Organization by End of Operations, 25 August 1947


Public Law 75 charged AMAG to help Greece preserve its independence in the face of a massive economic downturn, poor crop harvests, and – particular to this case study – a Communist insurgency vying for power.58 Its first chief was former Nebraska governor Dwight Griswold.59 He retained that position until disagreements over policy with the military element in


Greece compelled him to resign in 1948.\footnote{House, \textit{A Military History of the Cold War}, 68-69.} His successor was Ambassador Grady who maintained both positions as ambassador and AMAG chief.

Following implementation of the Economic Recovery Program (also known as the Marshall Plan), through the Economic Recovery Act of 1948, AMAG received additional direction on aid spending from the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA).\footnote{Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Public Law 80-472, § 137, \textit{US Statutes at Large} 75 (1948); Jones, \textit{“A New Kind of War”}, 172.} The ECA was the lead executor of Marshall Plan economic policy throughout Europe. Even with ECA oversight, the US embassy in Athens retained overall lead of day-to-day diplomacy as well as AMAG aid delivery.

Public Law 75 also established the military component of AMAG– US Army Group, Greece (USAGG). Although the Truman Administration believed that the primary role of US aid was economic support, the Greek National Army also needed assistance as it combatted the DAG-led insurgency.\footnote{House, \textit{A Military History of the Cold War}, 60; Jones, \textit{“A New Kind of War”}, 61.} Its first commander was COL Charles Lehner, but MG William Livesay assumed command soon after on 19 June 1947.\footnote{Jones, \textit{“A New Kind of War”}, 70.} The role of USAGG was to provide logistical advice to the Greek National Army (GNA), procure necessary supplies and materiel, and provide some training on the new equipment.\footnote{Lawrence S. Wittner, \textit{American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949} (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1982), 223-224.} The military element could only offer advice without any direct combat role. This would change when President Truman expanded the military component and created the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group.

Established in December 1947, the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) expanded the US military role in Greece with a broader mission and more
manpower. Due to several GNA operational losses to DAG and Greece’s push to expand its army’s end strength from 92,000 to 200,000, President Truman authorized formation of JUSMAPG.\textsuperscript{65} Its purpose grew beyond USAGG’s logistical role to a full combat advisory mission to provide the GNA with both staff and field advisor teams. JUSMAPG started at an authorized strength of 200, but expanded to 450 as its role increased.\textsuperscript{66} LTG James Van Fleet took command on 24 February 1948. MG Livesay continued as the USAGG commander, but shifted as a subordinate component command to Van Fleet and JUSMAPG.

*Operations through the End of Hostilities.* Under JUSMAPG and Van Fleet’s tutelage, GNA initially performed poorly, but gained significant experience and materiel support to defeat DAG by August 1949. Various operations in February 1948, such as Operation Pergamos, Operation Falcon, and the Battle of Konitsa were clear GNA defeats.\textsuperscript{67} However, by forcing GNA leadership changes, improving training, and providing better materiel, LTG Van Fleet’s advisors instilled not only an offensive spirit in the Greek military, but also generated better combat results.\textsuperscript{68}

Operation Dawn (April - May 1948) and Operation Coronis (June 1948) symbolized a turning point in the Greek Civil War. These operations provided the first significant tactical victories over the DAG. However, each followed a similar pattern – the GNA inflicted high casualties, but could not defeat the DAG decisively in any operation. After suffering losses, the remaining insurgent elements escaped into the northern Greek Vitsi and Grammos mountains and


\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 65-66, 68.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

cross-border sanctuaries in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. However, Communist state aid to the DAG had an expiration date.

By the middle of 1949 President Tito began to buckle under US pressure to cease his support to the DAG. The growing Stalin-Tito rift discussed earlier, along with US financial support to Yugoslavia to cover declining Soviet funding, compelled Tito to close his borders to the DAG on 10 July 1949. Albania soon followed suit. The insurgency found itself trapped in Greece, surrounded by GNA forces. The final blow to the DAG and the KKE movement came in August 1949 with the GNA’s successful and decisive Operation Pyros along the Bulgarian border. Through foreign military and economic aid, the Greeks overcame a bitter civil war while the United States won the first battle of the Cold War, validating the Truman Doctrine.

What written directives state or imply that the Department of Defense was subordinate to the Department of State? A number of directives from authoritative sources indicate that the Department of Defense element in Greece was subordinate to the Department of State element during the stability operation. These sources include Presidential directives through a bilateral agreement, an agreement between the Departments of State and Defense, and orders from the Department of Defense to officers providing military assistance in Greece. As the lead federal agency in the stability operation, the Department of State provided policy direction to all supporting US elements in Greece. Further, political implications and overall US military end strength encouraged President Truman to place the Department of State in the lead.

In the executive contract between the United States and Greece that outlined the responsibilities of both parties for US aid, President Truman stated that US support was a Department of State-led operation. “The Government of the United States will send to Greece a mission to be known as the American Mission for Aid to Greece….The Chief of the American


70 Ibid., 74.
Mission… will represent the Government of the United States on matters relating to the assistance furnished under the Agreement.” The document provided the broad authorities the Chief of AMAG needed to execute its mission. “Under the direction of the Chief, the Mission will provide such advisory assistance and will exercise such functions as are necessary and proper to assist the Government of Greece…to advance reconstruction and secure recovery…as soon as possible.” Under this document, President Truman gave the Department of State primacy in the aid mission to Greece as well as pride of place among any other members of the interagency. The President codified his intent in Executive Order 9857 by stating:

The Chief of Mission to Greece…shall, under the guidance and instructions of the Secretary of State, direct United States activities within Greece.… The Secretary of State may delegate to the Chief of Mission such powers or authority conferred by this order as he may deem necessary and proper to the effective carrying out of the provisions of the act [Public Law 75]…. The Secretary of State shall make appropriate arrangements with the Secretaries of War and the Navy…in order to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities under the act.

The Department of Defense, in agreement with the Department of State, published orders to refine this relationship further. In a memorandum of understanding between State and Defense, “The [Department of Defense] will assign the requisite number of military and civilian personnel to the military section of the American mission. They will serve under the Senior Army member,  

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72 Ibid.

who will be responsible to the Chief of Mission.” Further, it outlined the channel of 

communication between the military element in Greece and the chief of mission. JUSMAPG and AMAG directed all questions on policy to the Department of State; all technical matters to the Department of Defense. In a letter of instruction from then Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower to COL Charles R. Lehner, the original commander of US Army Group, Greece, “the task of the [USAGG] is to assist the Chief of the United States Mission to Greece….” When Lehner arrived to establish USAGG in Athens, he reported to the Chief of the United States Mission to Greece MacVeagh to serve under his direction.

A number of reasons explain why the Department of State was in the lead for the Greek aid effort. Following World War II, President Truman detected little public interest in military deployments to Europe. If any interest existed for a military-led operation, few troops remained in service to respond. With global commitments, particularly in increasingly militarized Central Europe, the military possessed a strength of nearly 1.6 million across all services. This was after a wartime high of 8.7 million. Finally, Truman believed that any aid rendered to Greece was

74 “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of State and the Department of War Regarding the Greek Aid Program,” memorandum, History of US Army Group, Greece, Volume I, James A. Van Fleet collection, box 53, folder 1, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, KY.

75 Ibid.


77 Ibid.


80 Ibid., 93.
more economic than military, so nominated a civilian, Dwight Griswold, to lead the operation.81

What department, State or Defense, controlled the preponderance of funds after Congressional appropriation and who authorized spending during the operation? Although the Department of State was overall in charge of the Greek aid program, the Department of Defense controlled 75 percent of all appropriated funds. From 22 March 1947 through 31 March 1949, the Department of Defense received nearly $329 million while the Department of State received slightly over $55 million (see Table 1). Further, no evidence indicates that any one department authorized spending during the operation other than the department receiving its portion of appropriated funds for its own programs. As the lead federal agency, federal law authorized State to allocate funding, but did not permit it to direct Defense on how spend its portion of appropriated funds.

Table 1. AMAG Allocations by Federal Department through 31 March 1949.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Allocation (Percent of Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>$328,960,000 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>$55,030,000 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>$54,770,650 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$438,760,650</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: "Seventh Report on Congress to Greece and Turkey" with attached memo, June 29, 1949. Other agencies included the Department of Agriculture, Department of the Treasury, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Federal Security Agency. Congress appropriated a total of $625 million during this period: $438,760,650 for Greece, $161,496,000 for Turkey, and $24,743,350 unallocated.

Following announcement of the Truman Doctrine, Congress followed with Public Law 75. The bill authorized $400 million for aid to both Greece and Turkey and the establishment of AMAG. Of the $400 million, the law dedicated $350 million for Greek reconstruction, relief, and

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military aid.\textsuperscript{82} It also required the President to provide quarterly assessments on the aid program and expenditures and install one senior chief to administer the aid program locally in Greece.\textsuperscript{83} The law permitted his political appointee, initially Dwight Griswold, to allocate aid funding as necessary.\textsuperscript{84} Following passage of Public Law 75, an authorization bill, Congress passed the appropriations bill on 30 July 1947, approving the full $400 million request (see Table 2).\textsuperscript{85}

Table 2. Congressional Authorizations and Appropriations for Greece and Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorization Bill</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Appropriations Bill</th>
<th>Appropriated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Law 75</td>
<td>$400 million</td>
<td>Public Law 271</td>
<td>$400 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 1947</td>
<td></td>
<td>30 July 1947</td>
<td>($350 million for Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Assistance Act</td>
<td>$275 million</td>
<td>Public Law 793</td>
<td>$225 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 April 1948</td>
<td></td>
<td>28 June 1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Appropriated through 31 March 1949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$625 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

By the end of the initial appropriation period, 30 June 1948, AMAG committed $171,850,000 for military expenses and $128,150,000 for economic aid ($300 million total).\textsuperscript{86} Fortunately, many of the economic aid activities, such as road resurfacing, bridge and port improvement, and airport reconstruction, also benefited the military effort by expanding lines of communication for troop movement and military supply imports. However, with funds running out and the insurgency far from defeated, AMAG needed additional funds. The Foreign


\textsuperscript{83} Assistance to Greece and Turkey, Public Law 75, 80th Cong., 1st sess, sec 4b, sec 7, sec 8.

\textsuperscript{84} Department of State, \textit{Bulletin Supplement}, 908-909.


Assistant Act of 1948 authorized an additional $275 million for Greece and Turkey from 30 June 1948 through 30 June 1949.\textsuperscript{87} Congress appropriated only $225 million of this request on 28 June 1948.\textsuperscript{88} Further, the Foreign Assistance Act, as part of the Marshall Plan, established the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) element in Athens. The ECA’s role was to make recommendations on economic matters while leaving the US Ambassador in charge of the aid program in total.\textsuperscript{89}

The Department of the Treasury delivered these Congressional appropriations directly to the respective departments and agencies – per AMAG’s distribution plan – to spend on their specific programs. Although the Department of State was the lead federal agency in the aid mission, no evidence indicates that AMAG had the power to authorize JUSMAPG’s spending prior to execution. As discussed in a prior case study question, Department of State directed on all matters related to policy in Greece while the Department of Defense directed on all technical matters, such as military training and weapons procurement.\textsuperscript{90} Assuming that technical military matters supported policy goals, State’s policy direction informed the nature of the military role. As a result, although JUSMAPG was free to spend its allocated funds as necessary to build the GNA, the GNA was to fulfill State’s goal of a Communist-free Greece. Problems arose when this arrangement broke down.

A dispute evolved between Van Fleet and Grady over how best to implement the aid program. Van Fleet often interacted with his Greek military counterparts unilaterally, offering

\textsuperscript{87} Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Title III "Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948", (April 3, 1948), sec. 302.

\textsuperscript{88} Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1949, Public Law 793, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., (June 28, 1948) ch. 685.

\textsuperscript{89} Jones, “A New Kind of War”, 172.

\textsuperscript{90} “Memorandum of Understanding,” History of US Army Group, Greece, Volume I.
additional aid, support for a larger Hellenic military, and instatement of a new Greek commander-in-chief – all without AMAG approval. The military chief’s anti-Communist enthusiasm coupled with his disregard for spending limits and political oversight fractured his relationship with AMAG. Grady’s predecessor as AMAG chief, Dwight Griswold, recommended Van Fleet’s removal for these reasons, but left office before President Truman could decide on a course of action. Van Fleet’s actions, although successful in generating a Greek National Army capable of handling the insurgency, bucked the mandate for overall Department of State oversight.

Were key leaders knowledgeable of other agencies and departments areas of expertise and did they receive a reward for successful interagency coordination? All key leaders in this case study possessed varying levels of prior interagency experience. Following their work in the Greek stability operation, all individuals involved received a reward of a subsequent prestigious appointment, command, or recognition. The key civilian leaders include Secretary of State George Marshall, US Ambassador to Greece (1943-1947) Lincoln MacVeagh, US Ambassador to Greece (1948-1950) Henry Grady, and Chief of AMAG Dwight Griswold. Director of JUSMAPG James Van Fleet was the key military leader.

Secretary of State George Marshall. A career US Army officer, George C. Marshall’s uniformed professional experience of 41 years culminated as the Army Chief of Staff during the Second World War. One of the few officers to hold the five-star General of the Army rank, Marshall’s duties involved advising two US Presidents, working with various departments within

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92 House, A Military History of the Cold War, 68-69.

93 Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 246-247.

the federal government, and reaching consensus with the militaries and governments of allied countries. After departing the military, Marshall continued in public service. In late 1945, President Truman dispatched Marshall to create a power sharing agreement between the warring Communist Chinese under Mao Zedong and Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek. Unable to broker more than just a ceasefire by 1947, Marshall departed China, leaving conditions for the Communists to gain control over the mainland by 1949.

Upon his return to the United States, Truman appointed Marshall as Secretary of State in 1947. In this capacity, he spearheaded the US effort – dubbed the Marshall Plan – to rebuild Europe and its economy in the wake of the Second World War. He oversaw efforts to assist future NATO member Turkey as well as Greece during its civil war. For his military and civilian efforts, Time magazine named him the 1943 and 1947 Man of the Year. Following a long, distinguished military and civil career, Marshall possessed extensive experience in working with a broad range of agencies and international partners.

Days after the allied landing at Inchon during the Korean War, President Truman replaced Louis Johnson with George Marshall as Secretary of Defense on 19 September 1950. Perhaps considered the only personality with enough clout to manage the strong-willed Douglas MacArthur, Truman rewarded Marshall with the cabinet position. He held the job for only a year while the Korean War still raged. Marshall won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 for his leadership

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during World War II and Marshall Plan implementation.  

US Ambassador to Greece (1943-1947) Lincoln MacVeagh. Lincoln MacVeagh was a career diplomat, publisher, and classical scholar. In his youth, he saw combat in France during World War I and left service as a major.  

As a student of Greek literature and language, the Department of State recruited him as the US ambassador to Greece from 1933 until 1941. During World War II, Nazi Germany occupied Greece forcing MacVeagh to depart. He served as US ambassador to Iceland, South Africa, and again to the Greeks while the Hellenic government was in exile in Cairo, Egypt.  

During the war, MacVeagh reported to the President on the Greek situation and the growing Communist-inspired resistance movement that would precipitate the Greek Civil War. He returned to Athens following the World War II, helped draft what became the Truman Doctrine, and implemented the early stages of US support to the Greek Nationals during the civil war.  

Due to the death of his wife and personality clashes with Dwight P. Griswold, chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, MacVeagh resigned his ambassadorship.  

MacVeagh’s work, however, was indispensable to the future of Greece and Truman’s foreign policy in the region. Truman praised his “scholarly statesmanship and diplomatic judgement” in the crisis.  

Due to his success, the President appointed him as US ambassador to Portugal in 1948. There he shepherded Portuguese entrance into NATO and inclusion into  

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101 Ibid., 242-245.  

102 Ibid., 245-246.  

103 Ibid., 247.
Marshall Plan-related defense support. He ended his diplomatic career as US ambassador to Spain, 1952-1953.

US Ambassador to Greece (1948-1950) Henry Grady. Henry F. Grady held a number of positions that prepared him to serve ultimately as the US ambassador to Greece. He worked as a businessman in New York and San Francisco and in public service as a specialist in international economics. In the latter capacity, he served as the Trade Commissioner to London where he reported on economic conditions following the First World War. In 1934, he became the chief of the trade agreements division within the Department of State. He parlayed this post, as well as political connections with President Roosevelt, into assignments as Assistant Secretary of State in 1939, special envoy to India in 1942, and vice president of the Allied Control Commission in Italy following its capitulation in World War II. These experiences prepared him to oversee post-war elections in Greece, 1945, and ultimately to hold the ambassadorship in July 1948, following MacVeagh’s resignation.

Following Grady’s work as US ambassador to Greece, Truman nominated him to serve as representative to Iran. Because Iran was troubled economically and a prime target for Soviet influence, Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended Grady for the post due to his extensive economic and diplomatic experience. His time as US ambassador was not an easy tenure. Conflicts with Secretary Acheson and worsening conditions in Tehran, a period that concluded

104 Nolan, Notable US Ambassadors, 249.

105 Iatrides, Ambassador Macveagh Reports, 734.


107 Ibid., 10.

108 Ibid., 11.

109 Ibid., 160-162.
with a coup d’état in 1953, drew his ambassadorship to an early end in 1951.  

Chief of American Mission for Aid to Greece Dwight Griswold. Dwight Griswold was a Nebraska-born politician. Early on, he served in the military as a sergeant along the US-Mexico border in 1916 and later as a field artillery captain during World War I. His political career took him to seats in the House and Senate in the Nebraska state house and eventually the governorship from 1940 to 1946. Prior to his appointment as Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, Griswold served as director of internal affairs and communications as part of the military-run occupation of Germany in 1947. Griswold’s appointment as chief of AMAG was a political maneuver. Should aid appropriations become necessary in following years, Democrat Truman needed the Republican Griswold to apply leverage on a Republican-controlled Congress to pass subsequent spending bills. Griswold died in 1954, but held prestigious positions in government after his term as AMAG chief, both as a member of the Nebraska University Board of Regents and US senator. 

Director of Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group James Van Fleet. James Van Fleet was a career US Army officer who held a number of key command positions in both World Wars, culminating in command of III Corps in March 1945. He held two positions outside military formations that provided some interagency insight. First, he served as an ROTC

110 Grady, Memoirs, 202-209.
112 Jones, “A New Kind of War”, 62, 73.
114 Braim, The Will to Win, 137.
instructor and head football coach for the University of Florida, 1923-1924.\textsuperscript{115} Second, as part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, Van Fleet supervised camps for a public works program, the Civilian Conservation Corps.\textsuperscript{116} In this position, he experienced working with Reserve officers and civilian administrators; all new to the career Regular Army officer.

Due in large part to his success as JUSMAPG director, Van Fleet earned a recruiting and training command of US Second Army in August 1950.\textsuperscript{117} Soon after, President Truman appointed General Van Fleet to command Eighth Army in Korea, April 1951.\textsuperscript{118} Truman tapped him to replace Matthew Ridgway, who took command of all United Nations forces following Douglas MacArthur’s ouster. In Truman’s words, Van Fleet was “the greatest general we have ever had...I sent him to Greece and he won the war. I sent him to Korea and he won the war.”\textsuperscript{119}

Throughout all the key leaders examined, each had various prior interagency experience before starting work in the Greek Civil War interagency operation. Levels ranged from a military career culminating as the Army Chief of Staff to civilian occupation duties in support of a military command. Further, all key leaders received a reward for successful interagency work in Greece ranging from a second or third ambassadorship to cabinet posts, higher levels of military command, or a seat in Congress (see Table 3).

\textsuperscript{115} Braim, \textit{The Will to Win}, 43-48.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 57-58.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 228.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 243.

Table 3. Summary of Key Leader Prior Interagency Experience and Rewards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Leader</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Interagency Experience</th>
<th>Interagency Reward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>Civilian Secretary of State</td>
<td>Yes Prior military</td>
<td>Yes Nobel Peace Prize Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacVeagh</td>
<td>Civilian Ambassador</td>
<td>Yes Prior military</td>
<td>Yes US Ambassador to Spain and Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grady</td>
<td>Civilian Ambassador AMAG Chief</td>
<td>Yes Allied Control Commission, Italy</td>
<td>US Ambassador to Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griswold</td>
<td>Civilian AMAG Chief</td>
<td>Yes Prior military</td>
<td>Yes Nebraska Board of Regents US Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Fleet</td>
<td>Military JUSMAPG Director</td>
<td>Yes New Deal Civilian Conservation Corps</td>
<td>Yes Command of US Second and Eighth Armies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by the Author

This section provided an overview of the strategic context to the Greek Civil War and how the United States provided aid to the Greek government and Greek National Army. It then investigated three structured, focused case study questions to provide evidence on how the Army can integrate within the interagency during stability operations. The data indicate, first, that during the Greek Civil War stability operation, the Department of State was the lead federal agency and the Department of Defense was in a supporting role. Second, as the lead federal agency, the Department of State held authority to set Greek development policy and to allocate funds to the military element in Greece. Although in a subordinate role, Defense received a larger portion of appropriated funds than State. No evidence shows that State had the authority to dictate how the military could spend those funds. Third, all key leaders gained interagency experience prior to the Greek stability operation as well as received incentivizing rewards following the operation. In the next section, the research turns to an analysis of the key findings of the case study.
Findings and Analysis

The preceding case study attempted to answer the following research question: through the lens of US involvement in the Greek Civil War, how can the Army best integrate within the interagency during stability operations? It provided an overview of the Greek situation from March 1947 until August 1949, US support of the Greek government and National Army, and answered three structured, focused case study questions. The questions examined the nature of the interagency between the Departments of State and Defense, funding allocation, and key leader interagency experience and post-operation rewards. The outcomes of those questions follow. This section concludes with an analysis of those findings.

The first structured, focused case study question asked what written directives state or imply that the Department of Defense was subordinate to the Department of State. The research found that several directives, orders, and agreements indicate that the Department of Defense element in Greece was subordinate to the Department of State element in the Greek stability operation. Further, these documents established a hierarchical line from established law, to President Truman, through the Department of State, and ending at the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group. Finally, these documents indicate that the Department of State was the lead federal agency in the stability operation.

The second structured, focused case study question asked what department, State or Defense, controlled the preponderance of funds after Congressional appropriation and who authorized spending during the operation. The research found that, despite the Department of State holding status as the lead federal agency, the Department of Defense controlled the preponderance of appropriated funds. Further, no evidence indicates that State held authorization to dictate how Defense should spend those funds beyond providing policy guidance of reconstruction and defense improvement. Federal law authorized State to allocate funding locally to each member of the interagency in Greece, but did not permit it to direct Defense on how spend its portion of appropriated funds regarding defense procurement.
The third and final structured, focused case study question asked if key leaders were knowledgeable of other agencies and departments areas of expertise and if they receive a reward for successful interagency coordination. The research found that all key leaders examined in the case study held varying levels of prior interagency experience. Further, all individuals involved received a reward of a subsequent prestigious appointment, command, or recognition following their work in the Greek stability operation. The key leaders include Secretary of State George Marshall, US Ambassador to Greece (1943-1947) Lincoln MacVeagh, US Ambassador to Greece (1948-1950) Henry Grady, Chief of AMAG Dwight Griswold and director of JUSMAPG James Van Fleet.

This section turns to an analysis of the hypotheses as compared against these findings. The first hypothesis states that during a stability operation without a combat phase, the US military element must answer directly to the Department of State to remain integrated within the interagency. The evidence suggests that this hypothesis is supported. In matters of foreign policy outside of war, the Department of State should be in the lead in “speaking with one voice to others on U.S. policy.” Although involving hostilities within a partnered nation, the Greek Civil War was not the United States’ war.

Further, the Truman Administration made the right decision to identify a lead federal agency in written policy to eliminate fuzzy lines of authority indicated in the Lovell IIMMP policy model. The Department of Defense embraced this subordination to State for a number of reasons. First, most Defense emphasis was focused on Central Europe and potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Although significant to the new Truman Doctrine, Greece may have been a backwater military contingency. Advising the GNA to combat an insurgency was far removed from the recent war the United States recently concluded and the conventional fight it anticipated.

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against the USSR. Second, Defense had little choice but to work within the interagency. Federal law and Presidential directives were unambiguous as to who worked for whom. This clarity and plainness provided a quality and depth all their own.

The second hypothesis states that an articulated line of authority with a commensurate budget is an effective tool to provide unity of effort and a forcing mechanism for the Army to remain integrated within the interagency. The evidence suggests that this hypothesis is supported. President James A. Garfield once remarked, “He who controls the money supply of a nation, controls the nation.”\(^{121}\) This may be modified for interagency operations: he who controls Congressional appropriations gets to be in charge. Funding is a powerful tool not only to indicate a weighted effort in an operation, but also to hold the interagency together, especially if funding comes through one channel. Although JUSMPAG received a preponderance of funding, AMAG dictated that percentage out of the total appropriation. Further, although State and AMAG had no authorization to direct how Defense and JUSMAPG should spend that funding, they did not need it. From the beginning, AMAG and the US ambassador to Greece held the authority to set US policy objectives within Greece in general and in developing the Greek National Army in particular. Force size and structure, key Greek military leadership, and ultimate military objectives – all within JUSMAPG’s ability to shape – had to meet with AMAG’s approval. Funding toward this end had to meet State’s policy thereby giving them ownership of the operation and indirect control and authority. Only when LTG Van Fleet attempted to circumvent or ignore this policy-to-military hierarchy did conflict arise within the interagency.

The third and final hypothesis states that key players in the interagency must receive prior interagency experience as well as post-assignment incentives for the interagency community to be effective. The evidence suggests that this hypothesis is supported. Regarding the interagency

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experience category, the civilians appeared to come out much stronger than the lone military representative examined. Civilian leaders with some military experience, whether veteran status or prior cooperative work, allowed for better interagency coordination. This may be due to two reasons. First, the civilians examined were at the top of the hierarchy throughout the operation. Civilian leaders may not have been as interested in interagency cooperation since their military counterparts had no choice but to follow their direction. Second, historical context is important. During World War II, over 12 percent of the US population served in the military.\textsuperscript{122} Military culture, organization, and capabilities were well known quantities to civilian leaders immediately after the war—a cultural zeitgeist—so required little explanation or interpretation. With less than half of one percent of the US in service today, civilians who serve as part of the interagency may not be nearly as familiar and so need more formal and practical experience working with the military.

The evidence supports the second category of post-assignment incentives, however runs into trouble with causality. Although all key leaders received a reward, those rewards appeared to be correlated to good interagency work and not the cause of it. No evidence indicated that the key leaders performed well within the interagency in order to achieve a greater status later. In some instances, such as Marshall’s Nobel Peace Prize or Griswold’s Senatorship, incentives were not guaranteed or within State or Defense’s ability to provide. Further, all key leaders were late in their careers where any incentives for good work may be more intrinsic than material. Taking on a difficult interagency job for a chance at advancement may mean little when one is already at the top of his or her field. However, the lesson for future members of an interagency operation is that good performance, particularly in critical operations, has observers within management that value teamwork.

This section provided the conclusions to the case study as compared against three structured, focused case study questions in support of the research question and hypotheses. It also provided an analysis of those findings. In the end, the evidence support each hypothesis. In the next section, the research closes with a conclusion and recommendations for further research.

Conclusion

This monograph sought to explore the nature of interagency leadership and policy fulfillment during a stability operation without an antecedent combat phase. Specifically, it sought to find how the Army could best integrate within the interagency during such an operation and employed the Greek Civil War as a case study. Further, it established three hypotheses. First, during a stability operation without a combat phase, the US military element must answer directly to the Department of State to remain integrated within the interagency. Second, an articulated line of authority with a commensurate budget is an effective tool to provide unity of effort and a forcing mechanism for the Army to remain integrated within the interagency. Finally, key players in the interagency must receive prior interagency experience as well as post-assignment incentives for the interagency community to be effective. The purpose of this research was to inform both strategic and operational-level military and civilian leaders on a way to organize the interagency by establishing a lead federal agency in such circumstances.

Through an explanation of the Truman Doctrine as a policy goal and US support to the Greek government and military as a policy objective, this research illustrated a successful stability operation where one federal agency, the Department of State, was in the lead throughout the effort. The research indicated that written directives from the President through cabinet secretaries and down through Defense and State elements in Athens cleared the fuzzy lines of authority Lovell described in his policy formulation model. Written directives, even if potentially unpopular among departments, is the best way to articulate authority in a leaderless interagency construct. This supported the first hypothesis in that State was in charge from the outset despite
Defense holding the lion’s share of responsibility in developing the Greek military. Further, since the United States was not at war in Greece, State rightfully maintained its responsibility as overall policy lead.

The case study also examined the role of funding as a means to indicate lead federal agency status. Although Defense spent a larger portion of appropriations, the embassy in Athens dictated how much the military element received. This was in congruence with State’s charge to manage US policy in Greece with the goal of developing the Greek National Army to defend its borders from a leftist insurgency. Only when operational military leadership attempted to buck or circumvent the ambassador’s direction in spending and execution did problems and disharmony ensue.

Finally, the case study examined the experience of key interagency members and their incentives to work well on the team. Research showed that all members possessed some level of experience working outside their career field prior to the Greek mission. This allowed for a successful operation. Further, all members received a reward for good work, but causality between good interagency integration and perceived benefits was suspect in this scenario.

In the end, this research indicates that the best way for the Army to integrate within the interagency during a stability operation without a preceding combat phase is for cabinet-level leadership to articulate in writing that Defense is to work for State, provide State with funding authority, and provide the operational interagency team with members experienced in working outside their department or agency. Clearly, this construct should not be a default setting in all situations and contingencies, but is a start point to create greater unity of effort within the interagency. Further, there is room for improvement on this model. Additional research may be necessary particularly on the funding aspect and the utility of the foundering Global Security Contingency Fund as means to create greater interagency harmony. In addition, research to propose a plan for better interagency training and education will be useful.
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