Security Cooperation Activities: Strengthening a Partner Military and its Governing Institutions

A Monograph

by

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Determining the right mix of military to civilian aid to strengthen partner militaries and their governing institutions will challenge operational artists in the future. Military planners who broaden their fields of study to include a partner nation’s military, government, and economic capabilities approach the problem with a holistic understanding. Recently, the United States concluded two wars, planned to reduce the size of the US Armed Forces, and planned to increase reliance on allied partners abroad. In the future, US military and foreign allies will expand partnerships while maintaining a global presence through security cooperation activities. Security cooperation activities train and equip partner militaries, while security sector reform increases a government’s ability to manage its security forces. US efforts that empower security forces without strengthening that government’s ability to control brings unintended consequences like coups d’etat. Using comparative observations across two cases of US security cooperation, Vietnam 1961-1963 and Mali 2002-2012, this monograph supports the hypothesis that military aid without targeted civilian aid strengthens a military and threatens its government in times of crisis.

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Abstract


Determining the right mix of military to civilian aid to strengthen partner militaries and their governing institutions will challenge operational artists in the future. Military planners who broaden their fields of study to include a partner nation’s military, government, and economic capabilities approach the problem with a holistic understanding. Recently, the United States concluded two wars, planned to reduce the size of the US Armed Forces, and planned to increase reliance on allied partners abroad. In the future, US military and foreign allies will expand partnerships while maintaining a global presence through security cooperation activities. Security cooperation activities train and equip partner militaries, while security sector reform increases a government’s ability to manage its security forces. US efforts that empower security forces without strengthening that government’s ability to control brings unintended consequences like coups d’état. Using comparative observations across two cases of US security cooperation, Vietnam 1961-1963 and Mali 2002-2012, this monograph supports the hypothesis that military aid without targeted civilian aid strengthens a military and threatens its government in times of crisis.
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### Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOM</td>
<td>Government of Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>Partner Nation</td>
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<td>Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces</td>
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Introduction

Counterinsurgency skills aren’t very helpful when it comes to main force-type units if there were to be engagement of nations. I am very comfortable that what we’re doing is very much above board and is commensurate with what the country has said they need.

—General James T. Conway, “Commandant in Georgia to Discuss Training,” Marine Corps Times, August 21, 2009

Security cooperation activities encourage and enable international partners to cooperate with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.¹ Aims for these activities range from increasing a partner nation’s security force capacity to maintaining peacetime access to a partner nation’s ports and airfields.² Programs that arm, train, and equip partner nations are instrumental for US Department of State’s ambassadors and Department of Defense’s geographic combatant commanders maintaining influence around the world; therefore, the United States government must continue providing security assistance. Planners strive to maximize the effects of this assistance with limited available resources as the country transitions from a robust wartime military budget to a reduced peacetime one.

Operational artists charged with planning security cooperation activities account for partner nation characteristics when deciding to apply military or civilian aid, e.g., money for military weapons or defense ministry training. Despite their best efforts to understand the environment, planners fail to recognize security cooperation pitfalls. For example, planners occasionally focus solely on a partner’s military shortfalls at the cost of weakening a nation’s governing civilian institutions. The purpose of this monograph is to test the hypothesis that an abundance of US military aid, without targeted civilian aid, increases the strength of military institutions at the expense of the governing civilian institutions.


² Ibid.
This topic is relevant because well-executed assistance efforts should facilitate achieving national security objectives. It is important to execute security assistance correctly in light of the recent move to strategic defense and reduction in manpower and budgets. Policy derived from the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff signals a distinct change in course. For example, the President reminds National Security Strategy 2015 readers that the United States concluded two wars, plans to reduce the size of the US Armed Forces, and will increase reliance on allied partners abroad. Nested with this strategy is the Chairman’s declaration that the US military and foreign military allies will expand partnerships while maintaining a global presence through security cooperation activities. Evidence of a planned drawdown is the US Army’s projected force restructure going from 470,000 active component soldiers in 2015 to 420,000 in 2019. Following suit, the US Marine Corps’ force-reshaping plan reduces the active component from 183,400 in 2015 to 182,000 in 2017. The relevant point here is two-fold. First, the US military’s two ground forces will have fewer personnel with which to project power in the near future. Second, the US government will rely on partner nations to maintain a presence abroad and achieve operational goals linked to strategic objectives.

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7 Captain Alexandra C. Fitzgerald, US Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 14 October 2015, email message to author regarding the FY17 QQ Grade Adjusted Recapitulation Report.
The tools through which the US government bolsters partner nation military capabilities are subsets like Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs. Both subsets aim to train, educate, or equip partner nation security forces, but they do so using different financial streams. Examples of Security Assistance programs are foreign military sales and international military education and training, and Security Force Assistance. Department of Defense-administered programs include Global Train and Equip and Training and Education. Simply put, this plethora of programs involves investment of US tax dollars and US service member time in partner nation security forces for the anticipated returns listed in the opening paragraph, e.g., increased interoperability, partner security force capacity, and partner nation access. Sometimes, the return on the investment of US monies and time is the opposite of the desired US result. This monograph will explore what happens when a strong military, complemented by a weak government, face a crisis. A common unintended consequence is a coup d’état. This study then examines scholarly works to understand US assistance and partner nation characteristics leading to a coup d’état. This monograph’s aim is to assist operational artists planning future military assistance to avoid similar outcomes when applying findings and recommendations.

This monograph defines and tests its hypothesis using the following four sections; literature review, methodology, historical qualitative case study comparison and analysis—Vietnam 1961-1963 and Mali 2002-2012, analysis and conclusion for future operational artists planning security assistance operations. The literature review section establishes a common language for understanding assistance goals and terms followed by a review of professional academic research analyzing the effectiveness of past security cooperation. From these studies, the literature review will examine aspects of US assistance and partner state characteristics leading to intended or unintended consequences. Lastly, this section explores partner nation characteristics, which predispose a polity to a coup d’état.

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8 Grafton, 1-7.
The methodology section explains how a congruence procedure using comparative observations across two cases tests the hypothesis that military aid, without corresponding targeted aid for weak civilian institutions, strengthens a military and threatens its government in times of crisis.\(^9\) A congruence analysis enables an observer to make a prediction about variables within a case. These predictions inform a hypothesis. Analysis of the predictions proves or disproves the hypothesis, which then informs a new theory. This monograph explores a case correlation between US security cooperation activities in South Vietnam, 1961-1963, and Mali, 2002-2012. This study defines the conditions influencing US tax dollars spent relative to a partner nation’s gross domestic product and types of programs applied. Conditions defining allied state characteristics are military structure, government polity rating, and economic stability measured in gross domestic product per capita.\(^10\)

Section three, the historical qualitative case study comparison, will assign values to the variables listed above and makes a number of paired observations of values for the variables.\(^11\) For example, US aid amounting to 10 percent of a partner nation’s gross domestic product for a homogeneous military administered by a transitioning autocracy leads observers to conduct predictive analysis. Analysis for this case could assume that aid money will make the military stronger than its administering government. These values will provide quantifiable data from which to make analysis, justifying the high or low degree of a military overmatching its government, resulting in a coup d’état.

Finally, the conclusions section will summarize all the findings from this study. These findings will then inform recommendations for operational-level planners planning military

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\(^11\) Van Evera, 62.
assistance activities. This research will lead operational planners to recognize military and government characteristics signaling for targeted civilian aid.

**Literature Review**

Four sections form this literature review, which establish a framework and common language for this study. The first section identifies aims associated with US security assistance, defines security cooperation, describes the management and implementation hierarchy, and identifies a common taxonomy used throughout the remainder of this research. The second section examines three leading theorists’ analyses of the US pursuing assistance goals. Divined from these theories are variables used to describe US aid and allied government characteristics. The third section examines theories on coups d’état and military intervention in politics. The fourth section identifies the information gap left by those theorists and establishes a hypothesis for how military aid in the absence of civilian aid, given certain characteristics, can lead a partner military to displace or supplant a civilian government.

The Department of Defense conducts security cooperation to “encourage and enable partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives,” which include aims like building defense relationships, developing partner nation military capabilities, and providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. Central to all assistance efforts is the primacy of US strategic objectives above all other resulting effects. The partner nation may benefit from the effects, but those benefits are subordinate to the aims of the US government. An overarching national goal guiding all security cooperation efforts is regional stability defined as the “[deterrence and or resolution of] local and regional conflicts to preserve peace and minimize

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harm to the national interests of the United States.”13 Therefore, for the purpose of this study, any effects not aligned with the goals listed above are unintended consequences. One unintended consequence resulting from a strengthened military and weakened government is a coup d’état. Charles Tilly offers that a coup is a type of revolution where one member of a polity attempts to displace another via a temporary seizure of a major instrument of the government, with only a brief interval of multiple sovereignty.14 He borrows from Trotsky to describe a revolution as the presence of more than one bloc effectively exercising control over a significant part of the state apparatus.15 With an understanding of assistance goals and unintended consequences, this study next defines security cooperation, and discusses how the US Departments of State and Defense manage and administer these programs.

Security cooperation is “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”16

Management for many defense programs guiding security cooperation resides with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, a subordinate department of the US Office of the Secretary of State.17 The US Department of State manages all foreign international programs for

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15 Tilly, 519.


17 Grafton, 1-1.
the US government, while administration for some programs falls to other agencies, e.g., Office of the Secretary of Defense and geographic combatant commanders.18

Security cooperation consists of seven categories: Security assistance administered by the Department of Defense; global train and equip; international armaments cooperation; humanitarian assistance; training and education; combined exercises; and contacts. This study focuses primarily on the effects of assistance administered by the US military, global train and equips categories, and training and education.19 Security assistance is a group of programs, authorized by law, through which US military personnel or commercial contractors provide defense articles and services in support of national policies and objectives. The way the US government employs security assistance is through strategy established in a multiyear plan developed by US civilian leaders and coordinated with key elements of US military leaders.20 Funding requests and legal management responsibilities reside with Secretary of State, while US service members interface with partner nations to conduct security assistance functions. Military personnel are generally responsible for the outcomes of these assistance efforts; therefore, they assume the security assistance mission as a subset of overall security cooperation efforts.

A security cooperation subset especially relevant to this monograph is Building Partner Capacity. Building Partner Capacity of foreign military programs encompass security cooperation and security assistance activities that are funded with US government appropriations, and

18 Grafton, 1-3.

19 Ibid., 1-8.

administered as cases within the foreign military sales infrastructure to support allies’ counterterrorism and coalition interoperability.\footnote{Grafton, 1-9. These programs may provide defense articles and services to other US government departments and agencies under the authority of the Economy Act or other transfer authorities for the purpose of building the capacity of partner nation security forces and enhancing their capability to conduct counterterrorism, counter drug, and counterinsurgency operations, or to support US military and stability operations, multilateral peace operations, and other programs.}

Congress authorized the Build Partner Capacity program in Public Law 109-163 (P.L. 109-163), Section 1206, National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2006 to “equip, supply and train foreign military forces.”\footnote{National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-163, \textit{US Statutes at Large} 119 (2006): 3136.} The aforementioned law allocates money annually to the Department of Defense to conduct the global train and equip mission, a subset of defense-authorized security cooperation programs.\footnote{Grafton, 1-8.} It is necessary to understand that building partner capacity, in the context of this study, means any activities taken by the US military to enhance a partner nation’s ability to maintain stability within its borders and protect itself against external threats to preserve its sovereignty. This study retroactively applies this assistance program to evaluate cases predating the P.L. 109-163’s institution that had no negative impacts upon this study’s analyses.

One program administered by the Department of Security Cooperation Agency is the Foreign Military Finance Program. This Finance Program appropriates grants and loans to foreign governments to purchase US defense articles.\footnote{Ibid, 1-2.} The Military Assistance Program is a discontinued means through which the government appropriated grant funding to partner nations...
to purchase US defense articles. In 1990, the Security Cooperation agency merged the Military Assistance Program into the Finance Program.

The US government also provides non-military aid to countries. For example, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) mission statement reads, “We partner to end extreme poverty and to promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.” The agency’s focus is development assistance focused on economic, democratic, and medical growth. Included in development assistance is security sector reform, which is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice. Department of State, through USAID, leads and provides oversight for collaboration with interagency representatives and other civilian organizations to design and implement security sector reform strategies, plans, programs, and activities that build partner capacity. Security sector reform is the civilian aid previously mentioned in this study.

Money and training applied in this program seek to strengthen the institutions that administer, manage, and oversee host nation security forces. The military’s primary role in this program is security force assistance, which is a military activity that contributes to unified action by the US government to support the development of the capacity and capability of a foreign security force, i.e., military, paramilitary, and police.

With an understanding of what security cooperation activities are and which agencies manage, administer, and implement them, it is necessary to examine leading theorist positions.

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28 Ibid., 1-10.
analyzing the conduct of US assistance actions. First, Christopher Paul’s RAND study, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, analyzed US efforts developing and improving foreign militaries and security forces comparing historical case studies of twenty-nine selected countries spanning twenty years of data representing US build partner capacity efforts following the end of the Cold War. Security objectives for building partner capacity in this report are based on threats or needs. The study defines threats as identifiable conditions within a country or region that create instability requiring security force solutions. The United States aided nations in these cases by helping to build capacity. This study acknowledges the significance of building capacity as a way for the United States to protect its interests and maintain influence abroad.

While Paul’s study used a large sample population to analyze how well or poorly the government conducted security cooperation to build capacity, the second study examined one case where US efforts resulted in regional instability. Dr. Michael Mihalka and Mr. Mark Wilcox covered the trends in liberal democracy in the South Caucasus in light of economic development. It then mapped trends to regional changes in civilian-military relations and assessed to what extent the US security assistance contributed to regional instability using the US efforts in Georgia as a single case study. Mihalka asserts that Georgia’s low democratic government, corruption due to economic growth, and US Marines-led counterterrorism training to the Georgian Army threatened Russia and emboldened Georgia, provoking the 2008 Russo-Georgian War in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Mihalka highlights that economic development consistently correlated with liberal democracy, but in 1998 to 2008, Georgia was an exception to this rule.

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29 Paul, xiv.

The third study analyzed US Army security cooperation activities’ effectiveness as a preventative tool to maintain regional stability and avoid the creation of terrorist safe havens.\(^{31}\) Michael J. McNerney, et al.’s study, *Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventative Tool*, established empirical linkages between states’ high fragility levels and the incidence of major unrest or instability.\(^{32}\) This study focused on the correlation between security cooperation and reduction in state fragility using a large sample population of 107 countries where the US Army conducted foreign military assistance between 1991 and 2008. McNerney placed emphasis on cooperation instances where prevention of instability was the aim. Because security cooperation does not produce instant results, the team measured government fragility five years after the security assistance was provided.\(^{33}\) Unsurprisingly, the study’s findings support the preventative hypothesis that security efforts have a statistically significant relationship with a reduction in fragility.\(^{34}\) The conditions surrounding successful assistance operations are nuanced and depend on conditions in the recipient country.

The studies listed above offer useful observations to describe aspects of security cooperation. Political support for a cause emerges in many forms, e.g., troop and financial commitments. Clausewitz posits that passion or hatred motivate people to support war morally and financially.\(^{35}\) Despite a population’s willingness to finance a cause, there is a limit to the amount of capacity the US can build inside another country’s military force. Paul supports this


\(^{32}\) McNerney, xiii.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., xiv.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

observation with his study. Capacity reaches diminishing returns based on the assisted
government’s absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity refers to a nation’s ministry of defense
or interior to plan for and manage the military and security forces. Every security assistance
case has a dollar limit to the amount of capacity building potential. Additional monetary
investments beyond the case’s limit sets conditions for state corruption and dependency.
Understanding that context influences how far an investment will go and predicting that limit
preserves limited financial resources.

The next assistance characteristic is the type of program applied to an ally military or
government. McNerney found that non-material aid, e.g., International Military Education and
Training and law enforcement training, improved stability in nations with more frequency than
material aid, e.g., Foreign Military Sales. Investments in human capital netted high returns. The
idea that a human capital investment achieves large returns comes as no surprise. The limitation
with such returns is the time required to realize it. For example, the International Hall of Fame
walls in the Lewis and Clark Building displaying photographs of hundreds of foreign general
officers who graduated the US Army Command and General Staff Officers’ College bear
testament to the International Military Education and Training return. Foreign general officers,
like those in the International Hall of Fame, serve as long-distance allies to US military
contemporaries. Such friends guarantee access and promote interoperability. However, returns
require time to mature and flourish. For example, US Army Command and General Staff College
1988 classmates, General Martin Dempsey and Pakistan Army Chief of Staff, General Ashfaq
Parvez Kayani, maintained contact as institutional-level leaders twenty years after graduation.

36 Paul, 35.
37 Paul, xx.
38 McNerney, 4, 93.
39 Melissa Bower, “CGSC Welcomes New Deputy Commandant,” Fort Leavenworth
Mihalka’s study, where US Marines provided counter-terrorism training to Georgian forces, hurts McNerny’s hypothesis, and proves that regional context impacts how partner nations and regional neighbors perceive US assistance efforts.\footnote{Mihalka and Wilcox, 29.}

Paul notes that incorporating sustainment considerations into Build Partner Capacity efforts increases the likelihood of the partner retaining a capability.\footnote{Paul, 74.} The US military administers several material assistance programs, e.g., Foreign Military Sales, drawdowns, and excess defense articles. These programs provide equipment to partner militaries. Foreign Military Sales, defense articles sold to allies using ally funds or loans, include a total package approach anticipating requirements for the weapons, initial and follow-on support articles and services necessary for introduction and sustainment of the system.\footnote{Grafton, 5-5.} The Excess Defense Articles program does not bring a full suite of support.\footnote{Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Excess Defense Articles (EDA),” accessed March 3, 2016, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-defense-articles-eda.} Shipping and repair costs fall to the receiving state. The State Department administers both programs, but the Defense Department plays a significant role identifying capability requirements and delivering material to end users. Making a new capability endure with an ally military requires a comprehensive sustainment plan supportable by the gaining government and administering bodies.

Picking the right partner to assist is the best way to avoid unintended consequences. Unfortunately, geographic combatant commanders do not get to choose countries similar to the US in democratic governance and economic standards. States’ characteristics greatly influence

operational planners. Four areas worth consideration are the US and partner goal alignment, government type, economic stability, and absorptive capacity.

Paul’s study proves substantial differences in goals reduce capacity building effectiveness. Capacity building efforts are more successful when the US government aligns strategic aims with those of the allied nation and when efforts address areas of mutual concern. The converse to this point explains how unintended outcomes occur. US military forces conducting security cooperation seek to align goals, but US goals have priority in every case. An example of misaligned goals may be where an ally seeks to increase a special force unit’s ability to conduct internal defense, but the geographic combatant commander desires a deployable infantry force capable of working as members of a coalition.

Mihalka’s study supports this hypothesis and adds the element of perception into the equation. The US investment of $64 million in the Georgia Train and Equip Program from 2002 to 2004 targeted internal terrorists, pipeline protection, and coercion to join the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition. The goals, clear in the minds of US politicians, were not shared with the Georgian government or its Russian neighbors. It stands to reason that a country will invest more in a program that aligns with its goals. Therefore, misaligned goals contribute to unintended consequences. Operational planners must open frank dialogue and communicate clearly and frequently with partners when determining a state’s needs.

The next characteristic relevant for predicting assistance success is the type of partner type. All the theorists generally support the idea that a high democratic score, e.g., World Bank Governance Indicator percentile rank, maturity of democracy, and partial or full transition, correlates to more effective cooperation assistance results. The World Bank Governance Indicator

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44 Paul, 68.

45 Mihalka and Wilcox, 29.
percentile ranking determines a country’s democratic score. Assistance efforts are more effective with democratic partners who have relatively positive governance indicators.46 Paul’s study shows that partial or transitional democracies are more vulnerable than mature democracies when attempting to build capacity.47 Mihalka offers that transitional governments trend toward external violence without considerable efforts in security sector reform.48 Similarly, authoritarian and liberal democratic governments experience the least amount of internal violence while transitional governments experience the most. McNerney highlights that the correlation between cooperation and improvements in countries’ stability are strongest in countries with more-democratic regimes.49 Fragile transitional governments are ill equipped to counter the power of corrupt local warlords or other polities contesting government control. A point especially relevant to this study is that transitional governments with a low democratic score lead to instability and increased chances of unintended consequences.

Economic stability is another indicator for forecasting security assistance success and avoiding unintended consequences. Economic stability may be measured using tools like the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator database to measure a host of trending variables like gross domestic product. Gross domestic product is the standard measure of the value of final goods and services produced by a country during a period minus the value of imports.50 It is a broad measurement of a nation’s overall economic activity and stability. Dividing gross domestic

46 Paul, 71.

47 Paul, 40.

48 Mihalka and Wilcox, 28.

49 McNerney, 62.

50 Investopedia, “Gross Domestic Product - GDP,” 2016, accessed March 11, 2016, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp. Gross domestic product is an indicator of economic health, but it fails to account for other account underground or unofficial economy; i.e., black market or under-the-table businesses not reported to the government.
product by the number of population is an additional economic health indicator predicting the extent to which the population can share its country’s total production.51 It is logical to suppose economically stable nations will invest military aid money for its intended purpose instead of shunting aid funds into private coffers. Capacity building effectiveness increases when the program is consistently funded and sustained, well-matched to partner capabilities and interests, and shared with a partner that supports the effort and is healthy economically.52

While a nation’s increasing gross domestic product is a positive indicator for success, the interdependence of government type and regional context cannot be dismissed. All countries in the South Caucasus saw rapid economic growth from 2000 to 2007. For example, economic growth rates in Georgia ranged from 5-10 percent; in Armenia, 10-15 percent; and Azerbaijan, 10-35 percent.53 Although Georgia’s national and local governments are democratic and retains a thriving social society, there are few checks on executive power.54 The nature of economic growth, the corrosive effects of unresolved internal conflicts, and the unfortunate geopolitical position of the region explain the failure of liberal democracy in South Caucasus.

Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia benefited from transit fees from pipelines carrying hydrocarbons from Azerbaijan to Western clients.55 This dynamic effectively made each a rentier state reliant upon this revenue for economic growth. The guaranteed income stream led to more autocratic and less democratic governments. Rapid growth coupled with a lack of institutional

52 Paul, xviii.
53 Mihalka and Wilcox, 25.
54 Ibid., 26.
55 Ibid.
and policy reforms stifled Georgia’s democratic growth. Lacking government competence hampered the advancement of liberal democracy. It is reasonable to assume that focused security sector reform efforts in the South Caucasus could have positively influenced Georgia’s unfortunate 2008 outcome.

Absorptive capacity is another characteristic indicative of successful assistance, and is measurable with indicators such as literacy rates, maintenance and equipment readiness levels, and the effectiveness of defense institutions. Willing, but otherwise unprepared partners with lower absorptive capacity limit the effectiveness of security cooperation efforts. One can imagine a case where a military needs the capability to transport general-purpose forces across a desert interior to assert control over a border region. A range of military vehicles may satisfy the requirement. A condition of the foreign military sales case, however, would be a literate, gaining force capable of reading operating manuals, funding maintenance necessities, and modifying organizational doctrine.

The next section examines theories on military intervention in politics, conditions that lead to coups d’état, and what characteristics predispose a government to coups d’état. Finer offers a model to approach a military’s involvement in politics in non-liberal democracies. There exists a class of governments repeatedly subjected to interference by their armed forces. This has not been the case in liberal democracies like Great Britain and the United States, where the military subordinates itself to civilian control. When the varied modes of military intervention in politics are examined, and the levels to which the military press such intervention are

56 Mihalka and Wilcox, 27.

57 Paul, 40.

recognized, the phenomenon appears distinctive, persistent, and widespread.\textsuperscript{59} In summary, Finer suggests the level to which a military intervenes in politics correlates directly to the order of political culture.\textsuperscript{60} On the lowest end of Finer’s scale is minimal political culture, a country ethnically divided, politically weak, and placing low value on legitimacy. Such a country is likely to see a disenfranchised military supplant a civilian regime. At the highest end of the scale is a mature political culture that views legitimacy as paramount. Mature political cultures may witness military influencing civilian government through non-violent means. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the order of political culture and expected level of military intervention. Operational artists planning security cooperation benefit by understanding the political culture of non-liberal democracies to anticipate the level and type of military intervention in politics. Additionally, this understanding highlights the type of targeted civilian aid a government needs to bolster its absorptive capacity.

\textsuperscript{59} Finer, 4.
\textsuperscript{60} Finer, 139.
Tilly notes that a revolution begins when a government previously under the control of a single sovereign polity becomes the object of effective competing, mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities; it ends when a single sovereign polity regains control over the government. The condition leading to a multiplication of polities occurs from a fragmentation of the military from the incumbent government seeking to exercise political influence.

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61 Tilly, 519.
control, because the military finds itself faced with incompatible demands from the government.\textsuperscript{62} A coup d’état is a revolution in which one member of a polity attempts to displace another via temporary seizure of a major instrument of government, with only a brief interval of multiple sovereignty.\textsuperscript{63}

Three necessary conditions exist for military-political intervention based upon the order of the political culture. First, a professional officer corps confines the military to its role and politicians to their role. This dynamic impels the officer corps to intrude in foreign affairs and domestic matters that the corps finds frustrating.\textsuperscript{64} Second, the rise of nationalism provides the military with a civic religion compelling loyalty to a nation and not a government.\textsuperscript{65} A crisis normally spurs popular masses to action and causes the military to intervene with politics. Third is an insurrectionary army working for the liberation of national territory or for the overthrow of an incumbent government.\textsuperscript{66}

It is necessary to understand four proximate conditions of a revolution with the caveat that all governments exercise incomplete control over their subjects. The first revolutionary condition is the appearance of contenders or coalitions of contenders advancing alternative claims to the control of the incumbent government.\textsuperscript{67} The second condition is a demonstrated

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 520.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Tilly, 523.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Finer, 7; Powell, 1022. As a counterpoint, Huntington argues it is the professional officer corps that enables liberal civilian democracies to exert control over their military forces by keeping the officers well paid and equipped.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Finer, 206.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 208.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Tilly, 520.
\end{itemize}
commitment to those claims by a significant subject population.\textsuperscript{68} The third condition signaling revolution is the formation of coalitions between members of the polity and the contenders advancing alternate claims. The fourth and most powerful condition is the unwillingness of the agents of the incumbent government to suppress alternative coalitions.\textsuperscript{69} Put another way, revolution is a means by which an opposing party seeks political control based upon grievances legitimated by the population and a government demonstrating inability to suppress the opposing coalition.

Partner nations exhibit coup-prone and coup-proof characteristics. A brief examination of these characteristics informs the operational planner’s decision on what type of aid to recommend based on partner characteristics. The nature of a government’s economic base determines susceptibility to a coup. For example, poverty caused by a narrow export base subject to radical market fluctuations makes a country prone to coups.\textsuperscript{70} Nigeria’s dependence on oil for 10 percent of its gross domestic product, and 70 percent of its government revenue is an example of a narrow export-based economy. Oil’s falling price as of January 2016 places Nigeria at the threshold of a crisis.\textsuperscript{71} Coups are related to economic weakness defined by low income and economic growth.\textsuperscript{72} Poverty caused by a weak, narrow economic base leaves the military rightfully scrutinizing the

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{69} Tilly, 520.


\textsuperscript{72} Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, \textit{Military Spending and the Risks of Coups D’état} (Oxford: Oxford University, October 2007), 20.
government. Well-intentioned aid money, intended to offset civilian suffering, increases the risk of coups and military spending.\textsuperscript{73}

Military regimes are five times more likely to suffer a coup.\textsuperscript{74} Places like present-day Thailand, pre-2015 Myanmar, and pre-1982 Argentina serve as at-risk models described by Powell. Additionally, a greater occurrence of a coup in a government’s history and a higher instability rating translate to an increased probability of coups.\textsuperscript{75} Examples of instability are the occurrence of a past coups, anti-regime activity, and overt signals of loss of legitimacy for the government.\textsuperscript{76}

Conversely, countries can also exhibit coup-proof characteristics. One way to exert control over a military force is through appeasement. For example, structuring rewards like pay, benefits, and material provision keep the military feeling that the net benefits to rebellion is always below that of the status quo.\textsuperscript{77} Coup-prone African nations support this hypothesis by increasing military spending to insulate the incumbent government from rebellion.\textsuperscript{78} Higher expenditures per soldier equip the force well, but it increases chances of success if the military attempts a coup. Another indicator of coup-proofing is the presence of military cohesion obstacles like the size and fractionalization of a military.\textsuperscript{79} An assessment for this indicator seeks multiple branches, equal resourcing, and shared authority within the military. Organizational obstacles

\textsuperscript{73} Collier and Hoeffler, 20.

\textsuperscript{74} Powell, 1035.

\textsuperscript{75} O’Kane, 295; Powell,1019.

\textsuperscript{76} Powell, 1028.


\textsuperscript{78} Collier and Hoeffler, 3.

\textsuperscript{79} Powell, 1022.
make coup coordination difficult and execution uncertain. Counterweights like paramilitary forces or ministry of interior security forces add an additional layer of coup-proofing. Armed forces not easily coopted into supplanting a regime deter coup conspirators. An enduring caveat remains when considering a country’s characteristics; context influences outcomes.

The information gap left within the literature review is a finer examination of how security assistance relates to relative military growth and a determination of how the United States avoids unintended consequences when conducting security assistance activities. This study is unique, because it uses two examples where the United States government conducted security assistance resulting in a coup d’état. The aim of this study is to aid the operational artist in identifying the combination of characteristics that define US security assistance efforts and partner nations that cause unintended consequences. Recognizing positive or negative trends will help operational artists develop plans that account for shortfalls in foreign military capabilities and partner governments’ capacity. This study seeks to support the hypothesis that an abundance of US military aid without targeted civilian aid increases the strength of the military institution at the risk of the governing civilian institutions.

Methodology

This monograph uses a congruence procedure to compare typical values and explore a case correlation between US security cooperation efforts in one Cold War and one post-Cold War case where a strong military supplanted a weak government in times of crisis. South Vietnam, 1961-1963, and Mali, 2002-2012, offer positive examples where US assistance strengthened military forces at the expense of their civilian institutions. Table 1 reflects the hypothesis guiding this study.

80 Powell, 1023.
This hypothesis assumes that assistance, defined as money and program types, contribute to weakening civilian institutions when planners fail to account for a nation’s coup-prone conditions. US assistance and partner government conditions emerge from the theories above. These prove the strongest variables on which to study unintended consequences due to their high frequency and strong deterministic value. An explanation of each characteristic is necessary to understand how they inform the hypothesis.

US assistance characteristics consist of the average percentage of gross domestic product aid spending and the type of aid program applied, military, or civilian. Partner nation conditions consist of military characteristics defined by three components measured as coup-proof (+) or coup-prone (−). First, the number of military specialized branches of armed services represents military cohesion obstacles. Low values for this sub-component suggest that the military is prone to coups. Second, the numbers of armed counterweights outside of the regular active duty forces; e.g., armed militias or interior guards serve as obstacles to coup conspirators. Third, entry-level academies, advanced academies, and the presence of a general staff define a professional officer
Following Finer’s model, a professional officer corps isolates the military from civil control. This isolation fragments the existing polity and lays the foundation for contested control in times of crisis. This hypothesis supposes that a professional officer corps’ education and organization increases the ability to assume control in the face of a weakened government.

The second characteristic predisposing a government to a coup is a polity trend measuring government type for the case study years. The Center for Systemic Peace graph values polity scores ranging from democratic (+6 and above) to autocratic (−6 and below) on a scale of −10 to +10. A low polity score trending away from liberal democracy and towards oppressive autocracy should indicate a need for targeted civilian aid to make assistance efforts endure. The third characteristic predisposing a government to unintended consequences is poor economic stability measured in gross domestic product growth per capita over the case study periods. If the research hypothesis holds, low economic stability indicates a need for targeted civilian aid to stabilize the economy and bolster the institutions administering the military.

The historical qualitative case study comparison assigns values to the security assistance and partner state characteristics listed above, and make a number of paired observations of values for the variables. These values will provide quantifiable data from which to conduct analysis, justifying the high or low degree of the unintended phenomena of a weakened civilian institution.

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81 Finer, 218.
82 Finer, 206.
83 Tilly, 520.
85 Van Evera, 62.
The case studies will open with a brief narrative followed by a description and valuation of each character. Values will inform the analysis at the end of each case study.

Case Study 1: Vietnam, 1961-1963

Post-World War II Vietnam shrugged the yoke of Japanese rule, only to be again subjugated by French rule seeking to control its pre-war colonial holdings. Ho Chi Minh declared himself President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945, but President Truman refused to recognize Minh’s declaration. The US government supported French Indochinese claims to coopt France’s commitment in European defense programs. Viet Minh forces defeated the French army in North Vietnam, dividing the country. This arrangement left Ho Chi Minh leading the North and President Ngo Dinh Diem leading the South. By December 1960, Ho Chi Minh claimed Communism as the political ideology of the National Liberation Front’s political party and sought to unify the Fatherland. The Truman Doctrine underpinning the US Cold War policy led the US government to pursue collective security with free nations resisting subjugation by outside pressure. Brigadier General Richard Stilwell recommended that the Army increase Special Forces adviser ranks and select the best officers for advising indigenous forces in the anti-

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87 Ibid.


Communist sub-limited war effort. In turn, US security forces adviser ranks in South Vietnam grew from 746 in 1961 to 23,300 in 1964. Pacification was one approach the US government used to defeat the Viet Minh’s insurgency in the South by extending the Republic of South Vietnam Government’s presence throughout the country. President Diem’s oppression of the Buddhist population and perceived corruption spurred disgruntled officers to attempt an unsuccessful coup d’état in November 1960. Diem suppressed the rebellion with loyal troops from his Presidential Guard. The US government suspended aid to Diem’s regime due to his military’s lack of offensive spirit. A vainglorious and disgruntled Lieutenant General Ton That Dinh supplanted and assassinated President Diem in November 1963. Empowered by President Kennedy’s authority, Henry Cabot Lodge, the US Ambassador to South Vietnam, did not oppose the event. This describes a cycle that would repeat itself twice in the two years following. An examination of qualitative data defining US security cooperation and partner characteristics assist in understanding how US military assistance contributed to a coup d’état in South Vietnam.

This monograph analyzes the amount of money spent and the type of programs applied in assistance to the Government of Vietnam (GVN) between 1961 and 1963. President Kennedy’s authorization of $41.1 million dollars to increase the military and civil guard force and readiness

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90 Richard G. Stilwell, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 13, 1961), 2, 3, 44.


94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.
levels marked the beginning of many US government efforts to bolster the Republic of Vietnam’s security forces. US foreign grant and credit money to the Government of Vietnam amounted to the following data sets displayed by year in millions of dollars and percentage of South Vietnam’s gross national product: 1961-$151;2 percent, 1962-$157;1.9 percent, and 1963-$212;2.4 percent. These totals averaged 2.1 percent of South Vietnam’s gross national product for the case study period. Total military assistance program spending in 1962 and 1963 was $1.8 billion and $1.6 billion dollars respectively. The increase in grant money to the Government of Vietnam reflects the growing Viet Cong insurgency problem in South Vietnam and the US commitment to containing Communism abroad.

US military training programs and money were inadequate to meet the rising counterinsurgency threat in South Vietnam; Viet Cong forces established control over countryside villages and disrupted Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and GVN rear areas around Saigon. Destabilizing enemy effects frustrated the military leadership contributing to a coup. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam efforts centered on strengthening the RVNAF to resist external aggressions in counterinsurgency warfare at the expense of improving combined arms maneuver skills. The US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam organized, trained,
advised, and equipped the armed forces from the tactical to ministerial levels. Efforts in 1960 initially focused on increasing the armed forces’ conventional warfighting capability through a cadre of 1,375 officers and soldiers trained in the Off-Shore School Program similar to today’s International Military Education and Training program.

US objectives shifted as the insurgency threat in South Vietnam grew. In response, MACV developed three lines of effort to increase the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces’ capability and capacity to preserve its sovereignty against internal threats. The first line of effort focused on defeating the Viet Cong in rear areas and in the countryside villages with South Vietnamese forces and US advisers down to the infantry regiment-level. The second line of effort was to recruit, train, and equip replacement forces to increase military ranks and relieve units conducting current offensive operations. MACV advisers established training centers to grow the regular military and territorial forces. The third line of effort involved institutional transformation establishing a joint general staff and a campaign plan. These changes placed one commander in charge of the security of South Vietnam and created a plan to unify efforts of all GVN security forces. Kennedy’s Presidential Action Program allocated $41.1 million military assistance program dollars to increase regular and territorial force levels by 20,000 and 68,000. According to two South Vietnamese generals, Army advisers created a force dependent upon endless material support; however, the GVN could not independently sustain a capital-intensive army.

100 FM 3-22, 1-10.
101 Collins, 15.
102 Ibid., 16, 18, 20.
103 Ibid., 22.
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam programs addressed the enemy threat in South Vietnam, an insurgent Viet Cong force. US programs provided too little aid and advisor effort to reverse Viet Cong gains in 1961. The unstable security environment dashed RVNAF’s confidence in President Diem. It is logical to assume too little aid contributed to revolution.

Next, the case study highlights the number of cohesion obstacles in the Republic of South Vietnam’s security force structure. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces total regular forces stood at 219,000, while the territorial forces numbered 97,000 in 1962. At a glance, the military appears to contain Powell’s structural obstacles to coup planning and coordination.105 For example, by 1960 the active duty forces consisted of an army, an air force, a navy, and a marine corps.106 The echelons organizing the active forces were three corps headquarters, seven infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, three marine battalions, a small air force, and a navy.107 The regional force, a militia charged with guarding key terrain like bridges and ferry sites in South Vietnam, formed one-half of what later would be named the territorial forces. The other half consisted of the popular forces, a militia group that secured villages and hamlets.108 In 1962, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group mobilized to conduct special counterinsurgency operations.109

A closer look at each institution proves that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, numbering 136,000 in 1960, was the dominant military institution based on its relative size. Other branches lacked the ability to stop Lieutenant General Dinh’s coup. The next largest service was

105 Powell, 1021.


107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

the South Vietnam Air Force with 4,600 forces equipped with twenty-nine light ground attack and fighter aircraft.\textsuperscript{110} The air force had the capability to assist ground defenders repelling seditious forces but lacked the ability to clear and secure the capital. The naval forces took third and fourth place in the relative-size ranking with the navy’s 4,300 sailors and the corps’ 2,000 marines. Naval forces retained little ability to mobilize a ground reaction force to counter a coup like the one Lieutenant General Dinh conducted. 49,000 regional forces and 48,000 popular forces offered little in the counter-coup effort, because their loyalties aligned with hamlet chiefs and hamlet defense.\textsuperscript{111} Finally, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group whose counterinsurgency ranks filled to 15,000 in 1962 armed with old World War II-era rifles could do little against armored and mechanized forces.\textsuperscript{112} Another factor compromising the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces’ cohesion obstacles was the employment of army forces.

President Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem’s political adviser and brother, carried army suspicions forward from the 1960 coup attempt. They placed army units led by officers loyal to President Diem to the north and south of the capital, Saigon.\textsuperscript{113} Three conspirator generals negated this plan in two ways. First, they convinced Adviser Nhu to declare martial law in South Vietnam to control dissident Buddhists and supporters. This ruse allowed conspirators to shuffle forces in response to a perceived threat. Second, the generals moved two regime-loyal airborne battalions into the countryside and replaced them with two disloyal marine battalions who


\textsuperscript{111} Historical Branch, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), Command History United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam 1964 (Alexandria, VA: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1964), 3.

\textsuperscript{112} Global Security, “Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.”

\textsuperscript{113} Halberstam, “Coup in Saigon.”
participated in the coup.114 Armed counterweights in this case consisted of the Catholic 
Presidential Guard unit headed by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ngoc Khoi.115 This force of 2,500 
loyal soldiers wielded the combat power of ten M-24 tanks, twelve armored personnel carriers, 
heavy machine guns, and recoilless rifles.116 When the test came, the brigade-sized counterweight 
acquitted itself well. It remained loyal and defended the presidential palace and presidential guard 
barracks for one and one half days until the South Vietnamese marines, coup-supporters, stormed 
the palace and declared success.117 This case supports Powell’s cohesion obstacle and 
counterweight hypotheses. Both factors made the coup’s planning and achievement difficult, but 
their combined efforts could not reverse the revolution. Next, it is necessary to test Finer’s 
hypothesis that a professional officer corps increases the likelihood of violent military 
intervention in low political cultures.118

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces had a professional officer corps, which 
facilitated violent military intervention in the Government of Vietnam politics. By the end of 
1958, the military had a national training academy, a command and general staff college, a 
replacement training center, and numerous occupational specialty schools.119 The Vietnamese 
National Military Academy evolved from a French to an American model of twenty-four months
of education and training aimed at creating infantry platoon leaders. Applicants’ results from a
two-day battery of academic and physical screening determined academy appointments. RVNAF future company and battalion commanders benefited from the French Expeditionary
Corps’ Tactical Instruction Center dating back to 1952. The refined curriculum served as a
basis for the Command and General Staff College opened in Saigon in 1961, which trained high-
ranking officers. These formal education academies created an academic elite class in the low
political-cultured South Vietnam.

The GVN Department of National Defense delegated its authority to the military joint
general staff. The Chief of the Joint General Staff had the military responsibility of the security of
the nation, and he had a general staff through which to plan and execute actions. The Chief of
the Joint General Staff assigned operational control of tactical units to corps commanders
assigned to four tactical control zones; however, President Diem frustrated this system by
personally tasking commanders in the field. French and American adviser-influence appeared
in the military’s staff structure between 1955 and 1965, i.e., J-1 personnel, J-2 intelligence, and J-
3 operations. Organizationally, the Joint General Staff enabled the military to delegate
authority and allow staff experts to add depth and specificity to operational plans. It is now

120 Ibid., 133.
121 Collins, 134.
122 Collins, 137.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., 19.
125 The BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Omnibus
Volume II South Vietnam (n.p.: Publisher Unknown, 1980), 5-44.
126 Michael Do, “Polwar in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces,” 4th Triennial
Vietnam Symposium Texas Tech University, Lubbock, April 11-13, 2002, accessed March 13,
apparent that the armed forces created an elite class of educated officers, and structured itself in a way to plan, execute, and assess operations. This reinforces the fact that the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces had a professional officer corps isolated from its political leaders. A crisis of perceived oppression impelled professional officers to intervene in domestic matters and seize control of the government.

The Republic of Vietnam’s polity score for case study years places the government consistently at a negative three, indicating an unstable government prone to coups. This score reminds readers of Paul’s and Mihalka’s positions that transitional governments like the Government of Vietnam 1954-1975 trend towards violence and require aid targeted at security sector reform aid to prevent such effects.\textsuperscript{127} Figure 2 displays the factionalism that Vietnam experienced from 1954 to 1976. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s score trends toward total autocracy while the Republic of Vietnam scored a negative three, borderline autocracy. Though the US government granted aid money, the system it worked to improve required a leadership change. President Kennedy’s national security advisers identified that there was no feasible alternative to Diem in the short term.\textsuperscript{128} Mr. Komer recommended bolstering Diem’s confidence with money, military equipment, and political advice to reform the Government of Vietnam while retaining the regime change option.\textsuperscript{129} President Kennedy must have understood that aid money and advice would not improve with Diem at the helm. Diem’s low polity score also contributed to the 1963 coup.

\textsuperscript{127} Paul, 71; Mihalka and Wilcox, 28.


\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
South Vietnam’s economy enjoyed an increase in its gross national product from 84.5 billion piasters in 1961 to 100.3 billion piasters in 1963.\textsuperscript{130} This growth disproves O’Kane’s hypothesis that a weak economy is a reliable predictor of coups, but the case’s outcome begs further questioning.\textsuperscript{131} Gross national product equals gross domestic product plus income earned from overseas investments minus income earned within the domestic economy by overseas


\textsuperscript{131} O’Kane, 1.
residents. Due to the lack of gross domestic product data and accurate population data for South Vietnam during this period, gross national product is used as a substitute to measure economic growth. Rice and raw rubber were South Vietnam’s two main exports. North Vietnam relied upon South Vietnam as its major food source. Dacy’s gross national product data is misleading, because rice exports dropped from $30,000 dollars in 1960 to $12,000 dollars in 1962 due to the war’s impact on farming. The Government of Vietnam’s agricultural economy received a boost from US aid money through the Commercial Import Program. This program’s purpose was to offer relief by importing raw materials unavailable in South Vietnam. US aid money accounted for the steady increase in gross national product strengthening the economy.

Table 2. Case 1. Vietnam SCA 1961-1963 Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US SCA</th>
<th>Trends</th>
<th>PN Conditions</th>
<th>Trends</th>
<th>Unintended Consequence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average US aid; % GNP: 2.1</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Military characteristics: −/+/−</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>RVNAF stronger relative to GVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of aid (Military/Civilian): More military than civilian</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Polity trend: −3</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GNP: Increase*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Case 1 Findings.


133 The BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Omnibus Volume II South Vietnam, 4-1.

134 Ibid., 4-12.

135 Ibid., 4-7.
Findings depicted in Table 2 support the author’s hypothesis that an abundance of military aid, given certain characteristics, strengthens the military at the expense of the civilian institutions. US security cooperation efforts addressed the immediate problem of an insurgency problem in South Vietnam from 1961 to 1963; however, US efforts provided too little support in light of the mounting Viet Cong threat. An earlier commitment of US combat forces could have afforded the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and US advisers an operational buffer to build a lasting capacity. The increase in US aid money support correlates with increased insurgent activity. The Kennedy Administration, through the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam commander, directed support to the most immediate obstacle to Communist forces, the South Vietnamese military. The US economic aid intensified the Government of Vietnam’s 1961 economic hardship by creating an illegal black market, which further destabilized the government.

The South Vietnamese military characteristics indicate a negative (–) for low cohesion obstacles, positive (+) for effective armed counterweights, and a negative (–) for a professional officer corps. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam was the dominant military power with no cohesion obstacles preventing a successful coup. The armed counterweight, the Presidential Guard, slowed the coup forces, but could not reverse the tide. The professional officer corps created an educated and well-organized class isolated from the government. The culmination of these characteristics proves the military was coup-prone and capable of pursuing its own objectives in times of crisis. The Polity IV table reflects a steady negative three governance score, but this score overstates South Vietnam’s stability. The Government of Vietnam was in transition from 1954, the fractionalization, through 1963, culminating in the successful coup. Additionally, President Diem’s oppression of Buddhist groups coupled with his self-serving corruption placed President Kennedy in a difficult position. Kennedy recognized Diem’s destabilizing effect on the Government of Vietnam. The US government had to support the least-worst option it had, Diem. Finally, Commercial Import Program aid money gives a false impression that South Vietnam
experienced positive gross national product growth. South Vietnam’s economic base was narrow, rice and raw rubber, and the war stymied rice growth in 1961. The aid infused ailing economy had destabilizing effects weakening civilian institutions of government.

Case Study 2: Mali, 2002-2012

Mali’s post-colonial history depicts a government challenged by five revolutions in forty-nine years, 1963-2012. The disenfranchised Tuaregs, nomads occupying Mali’s northern desert expanse, led two rebellions due to perceived mistreatment by the Government of Mali (GOM). The Malian military successfully supplanted the civilian government in the other three cases.

This case study focuses on US Security Cooperation Activities from 2002 to 2012. Following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, the US State Department assessed Mali as being proactive in combating terrorism and terrorism financing; however, a lack of resources hampered the Malian Armed Forces’ (MAF) effectiveness. The US government sought to deny Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, a terror group, basing areas in Mali’s northern desert region for terror activities in neighboring countries. The US military administered several small scale and inconsistent security assistance initiatives like military training, education, and exercises to increase the

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137 Keita, 1-10.


Malian Armed Forces’ operating capacity. The unbalanced assistance approach, coupled with 1,500 former Libyan Tuareg fighters reinvigorating the plight for an independent Tuareg state, led to Malian Armed Forces defeats and frustration. The military’s perception of how poor governance led to the Tuareg uprising nudged Captain Amadou Sanogo to supplant President Toumani Toure on March 22, 2012. A quantitative examination of security cooperation and Mali characteristics will inform this case’s analysis.


Prior to the coup, the United States was one of the largest bilateral donors to Mali, with aid programs focusing on food security, health, education, governance, counterterrorism, and military professionalization.\footnote{US Congressional Research Service, Crisis in Mali: 7-5700 (R42664; January 14, 2013), by Alex Arieff, accessed March 18, 2016, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdf, 15.} Figure 3 reflects US military and economic aid spending on Mali.
between 2002 and 2014. The annual military aid amounts averaged $3,750,000 with spikes in 2007 and 2011 to $6,446,027 and $8,354,151. Put another way, total military aid in 2002 amounted to $379,341, and in 2012, the sum was $793,696. The US commitment to Malian Armed Force development is best described as inconsistent and low. Military aid programs included counterterrorism and counterdrug training, train and equip programs, and training exercises. Economic aid to Mali amounted to $290,763,000 for the case study period, averaging $26,433,000 annually. Only $5,000,000 of this total went to the Economic Support Fund, monies to improve governance and rule of law, in 2009 and 2010. The bulk of the economic aid funded development assistance, e.g., food, medical, and infrastructure improvements. This data reveals a flawed approach to resource allocation. The US government spent $26,251,701 to strengthen the Malian Armed Forces, but the government spent only $5,000,000 to strengthen the weak civilian institutions administering the security forces. The 2012 military coup comes as no surprise.


147 Security Assistance Monitor, “Mali.”


150 Security Assistance Monitor, “Mali.”

151 Ibid.
The pre-2012 Malian Armed Forces consisted of three service branches, but the army’s relative size nullified Powell’s cohesion obstacles. Military ranks numbered seven thousand soldiers in the army, four hundred airmen in the air force, and one hundred sailors in the riverine force. The army organized itself into four infantry regiments, two armor regiments, two special forces regiments, two artillery regiments, and one engineer regiment. Its companies by number and type were two air defense artillery, one surface-to-air-missile, two commando, and one riverine. It is important to understand that the regiments during this time equaled understrength US battalions. The country recruited using a two-year selective service system for eighteen-year-old males. The Malian Armed Forces, primarily a counterinsurgency and peacekeeping force in the region, showed particular interest in strengthening its borders and the Pan Sahel Initiative. Mali faced three crises following the March coup: the need to reestablish constitutional order, the territorial seizure of northern Mali by Tuareg rebels, and the emerging terrorist threat.

152 Powell, 1022.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
158 US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 5.
With an understanding of the armed forces, it is necessary to examine the armed counterweights under the government’s control. The Malian militia, 3,000 former soldiers, and the gendarmerie, eight companies of military police, provided for Mali’s internal security.\textsuperscript{160} Security forces used small arms and army equipment as needed, e.g., rifles and light trucks, but did not have their own armored vehicles.\textsuperscript{161} The gendarmerie protected key infrastructure, while militias reinforced regular army forces in the state’s Saharan regions.\textsuperscript{162} Presidential protection responsibility fell to the Republican Guards distinguished by red berets and armored vehicles. On the day that Captain Amadou Sanogo’s National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State Revolution attacked, Republican Guards delayed attackers at the presidential palace. Mutineers and loyalists traded small arms fire around the presidential palace before Sanogo’s soldiers finally claimed victory.\textsuperscript{163} Armed counterweights outnumbered the conspirators; however, only the Republican Guards made a stand in defense of the presidential palace. Observers believe the event occurred suddenly and armed counterweights outside the Republican Guard implicitly supported the coups d’état.\textsuperscript{164}

Mali had a professional officer corps described by Finer’s definition, and the professional officer corps contributed to the March 22, 2012, coup.\textsuperscript{165} A military education system placed Malian officers in an independent class separate from political leaders. For example, selected

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment}, 392.
\item\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment}, 392.
\item\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 386.
\item\textsuperscript{165} Finer, 218.
\end{itemize}
officers attended training in the USSR and Warsaw Treaty Organization Nations dating back to
the 1970s and 1980s.166 As of 2002, Malian enlisted soldiers and officers attended entry-level
training at the Joint Military School at Koulikoro, Mali, under Russian supervision.167 The US
government also invested $2,247,534 in educating Mali’s officers at the US Army Command and
General Staff College and the US Army War College from 2002 to 2012.168 More recently, Mali
used three training centers hosted by the Economic Community of West African States for
tactical, operational, and strategic-level officer education. The Kofi Annan International
Peacekeeping Training Center, the Peacekeeping School at Bamako, and the Nigeria’s National
Defense College curricula cemented the professionalization of Mali’s officer corps.169

The Malian Armed Forces’ organization into a joint general staff and unified command
with the army as the lead agency since 2005 contributed to the professionalization of the officer
corps.170 Captain Sanogo, the coup’s leader, visited the United States several times to receive
professional military education, including basic officer training through the International Military

166 *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment*, 386.

167 *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment*, 386.

168 Security Assistance Monitor, “Mali.”

169 Peace Operations Training Institute, “The School of Peacekeeping Alioune Blondin
web.int/report/mali/mali-inauguration-peacekeeping-school-bamako.

africa/mali/organzn/index.html; IHS Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, “Mali –
isplay/1303754.
Sanogo’s education and the structure of his army predisposed him to seek government control in a time of crisis.

Mali’s polity score was seven from 2002 to 2012. See Figure 4. This indicates that the Government of Mali’s unitary republic trended toward liberal democracy following a period of factionalism from 1998 to 2002. Such a high polity score indicated stability and should negate the need for security sector reform monies, because partner capacity building efforts should be effective with democratic partners who have relatively positive governance indicators. The consistently high polity score punctuated by a coup indicates a need for a closer examination of the Government of Mali.

High rates of corruption in governmental services and the inability of the government to address the basic social needs such as education, health, and employment created a general lack of trust in national institutions. The government rarely acknowledged this challenge, which was especially prevalent in the northern regions. Prior to the January 2012 Tuareg rebellion, specific human rights challenges concerned both civil and political rights, i.e., restrictions on freedoms of speech and assembly, impunity and widespread corruption. A dysfunctional

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173 Paul, 71; McNerney, 62.


175 Ibid.

democracy, poor conflict resolution mechanisms, and an ill-trained national army fueled insecurity and weakened political institutions.\textsuperscript{177} The Malian Government, however, generated temporary stabilizing effects when it decided to address problems in the north. For example, initiatives dating back to 1991 to represent Tuaregs in the government and military, and increased development spending, contributed to ten years of relative stability.\textsuperscript{178} The inflow of 1,500 Tuareg rebels, free from Qadhafi’s employ, crashing through the northern Sahel and the Malian security forces posted there brought an end to the decade of peace.\textsuperscript{179} An overwhelmed and weakened Malian Government unable to respond to this crisis enabled the resulting military coup.

\textsuperscript{177} Mindzie, 6.

\textsuperscript{178} Keita, 19.

\textsuperscript{179} Lacher, 2; Fabian, 1.
Mali’s low per capita gross domestic product contributed to the 2012 coup. This case supports O’Kane’s hypothesis that a poor economy is a reliable predictor of coups.\textsuperscript{180} Mali’s gross domestic product per capita in current dollar terms was $272.03 in 2002 to $641.79 in 2012.\textsuperscript{181} The positive economic growth in West Africa’s smallest gross domestic product per

\textsuperscript{180} O’Kane, 1.

capita reflects the government’s efforts to remedy long-term economic mismanagement and corruption.\textsuperscript{182} The Malian economy is principally based on the cultivation of cotton, food crops, e.g., rice, millet, sorghum, fonio, peanuts, and corn, and livestock, e.g., cattle, sheep, and goats.\textsuperscript{183} According to official statistics, Mali was one of the poorest countries with major exports like gold and livestock products vulnerable to fluctuations in prices on international markets described by O’Kane.\textsuperscript{184} Mali was also heavily dependent on international foreign aid from the United States, the World Bank, France, and China.\textsuperscript{185} Mali’s weak economy and aid money were destabilizing forces as defined by Collier and Hoeffler.\textsuperscript{186}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{US SCA} & \textbf{Trends} & \textbf{PN Conditions} & \textbf{Trends} & \textbf{Unintended Consequence} \\
\hline
Average US aid % of PN GDP: .033 & Negative & Military characteristics: $-/+/-$ & Negative & MAF stronger relative to GOM \\
\hline
Type of aid (Military/Civilian): More military than civilian & Negative & Polity trend: 7 & Negative & \\
\hline
GDP per capita: Increase* & & & Negative & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Case 2. Mali SCA 2002-2012 Findings}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{182} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 367.


\textsuperscript{184} O’Kane, 1.

\textsuperscript{185} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 368.

\textsuperscript{186} Collier and Hoeffler, 20.
Findings depicted in Table 3 support the author’s hypothesis that an abundance of military aid, given certain characteristics, strengthens the military at the expense of the civilian institutions. US security cooperation efforts addressed the immediate problem of the weak military forces facing Tuaregs and Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb operating in the northern Sahel region through training and equipping army forces. Average aid to Mali was low and military aid outweighed civilian aid indicating a negative trend for both categories. Targeted security sector reform money could have improved the government’s ability to conduct rule of law and conflict resolution efforts. A commitment of this type may have influenced the Malian Tuareg population to advocate for status quo instead of rebelling against the Malian military and government. International economic aid contributed to Mali’s instability, because it enabled graft and irresponsible spending.

The Mali military characteristics indicate a negative (−) for low cohesion obstacles, positive (+) for an effective armed counterweight, and negative (−) for a professional officer corps. The Malian army faced no cohesion obstacles preventing a successful coup. The Republican Guard, armed with rifles and two mechanized vehicles failed to stop Captain Amadou Sanogo’s revolution. The professional officer corps established an educated and organized body capable of overthrowing the government following the second Tuareg rebellion. The Malian Armed Forces displayed a negative trend indicating the likelihood of military control of the government.

The Polity IV table governance score of seven deceives observers, warranting a negative trend. A close look reveals the reality that the Malian government failed to address grievances and provide services to the Tuareg population. Neglect created ripe grounds for rebellion in 2011 when Libyan Tuaregs flowed southwest. The resulting Second Tuareg Rebellion sparked the military’s revolution in March 2012. Mali’s low gross domestic product per capita rating
indicated a weak economy, which correlated to a weak government administering the military. Non-military aid money likely intensified Mali’s instability by enabling corruption and continued government neglect.

**Analysis**

US military assistance reinforced military institutions and weakened governing civilian institutions in both cases. In Vietnam, the US government facilitated a coup through President Kennedy’s inaction. In Mali, US training and equipment empowered the Malian military to a degree greater than that of the governing civilian institutions. Both case studies support the author’s hypothesis that an abundance of military aid, absent targeted civilian aid, increases the strength of a military institution at the expense of the governing civilian institutions. Total military aid spending suggests two points worthy of consideration. First, the amount of military aid reflects US commitment level and partner nation need. The militaries of both countries, South Vietnam and Mali, grew stronger as a result of US military aid. Case Study 1 shows a high percentage of military aid accounting for the Government of Vietnam’s gross national product with an increase from 1961 to 1963. Case Study 2 reflects low and inconsistent US commitment for building capacity of the Malian Armed Forces.

Second, aid money has conflicting effects for security cooperation. On one hand, military forces receive necessary equipment and training. On the other hand, the economic transfusion promotes corruption and graft. A steady cash stream into the economy does little to incentivize a partner nation’s anti-corruption efforts.

Security cooperation activities provide necessary equipment and training for undeveloped security forces to accomplish objectives for the United States. Communist containment succeeded from 1961 to 1963, and Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb area denial partially succeeded in the Sahel between 2002 and 2012. However, both case studies reflect a lack of significant security sector reform aid money to the ally countries. The Department of Defense approaches security
cooperation seriously. Formations of South Vietnamese and Malian soldiers rose in proficiency
due to US adviser efforts. An absence of focused civilian aid money to educate civilian leaders
about the rule of law, anti-corruption, and institutional reform stagnated government institutions.
The militaries grew stronger while civilian institutions grew weaker, relatively. In Vietnam, Diem
maintained his oppression of Buddhists while President Toumani Toure failed to anticipate the
Tuareg influx from Libya.

Security forces have characteristics signaling the coup-prone or coup-proof tendencies
described by Powell. Powell offers cohesion obstacles as a measure of a coup-proof military.
Both cases show low cohesion obstacles to planning and conducting coups d’état. The Army of
the Republic of Vietnam and the Malian Army dominated the military active ranks by
overwhelming numbers and contained the leading conspirator officers. Another coup-proof
measure a country can invest in is the armed counterweight. Presidential guard units, though
small in number, proved the most competent armed counterweights outside the active military.
Both units defended against mutinous attackers, but a lack of armed counterweight numbers
prevented coup cessation.

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and the Malian Armed Forces met Finer’s
criterion for a professional officer corps. This was the backbone of the military intervention
movement in South Vietnam and Mali. Professional training academies like the French
Expeditionary Corps’ Tactical Instruction Center and the Joint Military School at Koulikoro
educated officers in both cases. Additionally, both militaries organized themselves using a
general staff. Education and structure increased military strength.

Governance scores in South Vietnam indicated a negative trend and in Mali, they
indicated a positive trend. Juxtaposing both cases leads an analyst to view Diem’s regime as

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187 Powell, 1022.

188 Finer, 206.
vulnerable and Toure’s regime as sound. A closer look at both reveals contextual issues not depicted in their polity score. For example, Diem’s oppressive measures isolated Buddhist opposition groups inside South Vietnam. War impacted his ability to grow rice, one of the South’s major exports. Viet Minh threatened Diem’s sovereignty internally and the North Vietnamese Army threatened sovereignty externally. Instability from a weak economy and internal security problems threatened his capital and sovereignty. Toure’s challenges matched Diem’s with Tuareg belligerents threatening Malian sovereignty. Both governments suffered from economic instability, corruption, poor rule of law, and low administration of justice. Government and economic stability indicate the strength a political institution has to exert control over its military forces. These case studies prove that security assistance without targeted security sector aid strengthens the military at the expense of their governing institutions. A strong military is then inclined to intervene in politics using violence when faced with a crisis. The conclusion section will discuss considerations for operational artists planning security cooperation activities.

**Conclusion**

Determining the right mix of military to civilian aid to strengthen the military and its governing institutions will challenge operational artists in the future. Partnering with liberal democratic countries with high polity scores, strong economies, and coup-proof militaries offers a high probability for successful security cooperation. Unfortunately, like South Vietnam and Mali, future partner nations will often fail to meet those criteria. Operational artists succeed when considering the following recommendations for future security cooperation operations. Recognizing the conditions surrounding a partner country and understanding the relationships between internal and external actors aids operational artists in framing the problem.\(^{189}\) Case Study 1 highlighted the effects of the North Vietnamese Army, the Viet Minh, and the oppressed

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\(^{189}\) Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 2015) 3-3.
Buddhist population. Case Study 2 illuminated the Malian and Libyan Tuaregs’ destabilizing effects. Examining the army’s structure gives planners an idea of how to apply necessary progressive training. For example, general purpose forces may need to zero their weapons before learning to patrol. Institutional-level leaders may benefit from specialized training through programs like the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative, a Defense Security Cooperation Agency program promoting accountable, professional and transparent partner defense establishments.190 A tendency exists to bolster the most competent units, because those units provide the hope of a speedy solution. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger units and Mali’s Special Forces received focused training because of their proficiency levels.

Understanding the branches within the army should identify the presence of cohesion obstacles. Promoting equal resourcing and training for other branches within the military helps planners avoid empowering a single unit. Foreign military forces are vital, but other security forces like national police or territorial guards add depth to a partner nation’s security structure, e.g., guarding key terrain and augmenting regular army operations in desolate locations. Increasing the capacity of other security forces promotes additional armed counterweights outside the military.

Professionalizing the partner nation officer corps, while strengthening its governing institutions, should move planners closer towards their desired effects. Developing partner militaries’ professional officer corps and general staff assists with interoperability as members of a coalition. The International Military Education and Training program offers promising returns. Its long-term gains provide informal channels between the United States and partner countries. Graduates also carry with them the promise of copying US civilian-military relations in their home countries. Conditional military aid packages bundling tactical-level training with operational-level education offer a holistic approach to building lasting military capacity. For

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example, company formations may conduct border security training while corps-level leaders attend the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies to improve democratic institutions and whole-of-government solutions.\textsuperscript{191}

The US military’s role in security cooperation activities goes beyond the provision of troops to advise foreign militaries.\textsuperscript{192} Military planners who broaden their fields of study to include a partner nation’s military, government, and economic capabilities approach the problem with a better understanding of the whole picture. Operational artists offer valued security cooperation planning inputs when that advice is bounded by the reality of an ally’s true capacity.\textsuperscript{193} Additionally, when assessing government capacity ratings, planners should do so through multiple lenses and apply critical analysis to polity scores. Future partner governments and their economies may be unstable. Security cooperation planners stand a better chance of achieving desired effects when accounting for partner nation characteristics. Strengthening a foreign military in conjunction with its governing institutions offers a greater promise of the United States achieving its desired strategic aims. Operational planners who recognize government shortfalls and recommend targeted civilian aid to compensate avoid unintended consequences described in this monograph.


\textsuperscript{193} DODD 5132.03, 2.
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