The Truth Unveiled: An Inquiry into the Reasons for a Lack of US Military Readiness for World War II

A Monograph

by

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As the military draws down from its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is undergoing budgetary and force structure challenges similar to that of the post-WWII period. During the interwar years from 1919 to 1941, the US military conducted detailed mobilization and war plans that encompassed myriad possible threats to the US mainland and its territories, and attempted to achieve US foreign policy goals. However, despite numerous US Army Chiefs of Staff warnings about decaying military readiness, US political leaders were unable and unwilling to provide the political willpower and appropriations necessary to provide a ready force. To avoid some of the same mistakes made during the interwar years, and to prevent tomorrow's military catastrophe, it is necessary to understand the reasons behind the US military's lack of readiness for World War II. These reasons were deeply-rooted within the US society and exacerbated by the Great Depression and the Nye Committee, all of which kept public interests focused on internal issues and staunchly against the idea of a strong military and entanglement in Europe.

War Plans Division, Mobilization, Readiness, Operational Art
Abstract


As the military draws down from its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is undergoing budgetary and force structure challenges similar to that of the post-WWI period. During the interwar years from 1919 to 1941, the US military conducted detailed mobilization and war plans that encompassed myriad possible threats to the US mainland and its territories, and attempted to achieve US foreign policy goals. However, despite numerous US Army Chiefs of Staff warnings about decaying military readiness, US political leaders were unable and unwilling to provide the political willpower and appropriations necessary to provide a ready force. To avoid some of the same mistakes made during the interwar years, and to prevent tomorrow's military catastrophe, it is necessary to understand the reasons behind the US military's lack of readiness for World War II.

These reasons were deeply-rooted within the US society and exacerbated by the Great Depression and the Nye Committee, all of which kept public interests focused on internal issues and staunchly against the idea of a strong military and entanglement in Europe. The post-World War I return to the time-honored principles of peace, isolation, and a focus on economic prosperity indicates foundational principles upon which the United States rests, consisting of deeply-rooted mental models that governed the thoughts and actions of the people of the United States throughout the interwar years. These mental models, including a fear of standing armies, a lack of enmity on the part of the American people, and beliefs in the impenetrability of North American geography and oceans, the Navy as the first and principal line of defense, and in Business Pacifism, combined to comprise a national paradigm of false security that was resistant to change. Despite the best efforts of the military leadership, this paradigm prevented the military from obtaining the appropriations and force strength needed to build and maintain a ready force in the face of a worsening global situation.
Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Dr. Fullerton. As my monograph director, his extensive knowledge of the interwar years, painstaking reviews of my numerous lengthy drafts, and positive encouragement were vital to the accomplishment of this project. Also, I wish to thank the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) staff for going the extra mile to locate and provide myriad useful resources to make this project feasible. Next, I wish to thank my syndicate for their help and fun during the SAMS journey from start to finish. Lastly, thank you to the joy of my life, my son Logan, who sacrificed in so many ways to ensure I had the time necessary to get this monograph done.
### Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>FDR</td>
<td>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Defense Act</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Selective Service Act</td>
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<td>Universal Military Training</td>
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<tr>
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<td>World War II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Figures

1. US Military Active Duty Personnel as a Percent of US Population ........................................ 14
2. Interwar US Political Leadership .......................................................................................... 19
3. WWI US Army Manpower Mobilization .............................................................................. 23
4. WWI Mobilization Statistics ............................................................................................... 24
5. US WWI Expenditures .......................................................................................................... 25
6. WPD Mobilization Estimates ............................................................................................... 32
Introduction

What transpires on prospective battlefields is influenced vitally years before in the councils of the staff and in the legislative halls of Congress. Time is the only thing that may be irrevocably lost, and it is the first thing lost sight of in the seductive false security of peaceful times.

—General Malin Craig, Annual Report of Chief of Staff, 1939

To paraphrase Robert Burns’ famous poem, to determine the future is very difficult, despite the best plans of mice and men, those plans often go awry and leave nothing but grief and pain.¹ The Austrians in 1866 felt they had a great military mobilization plan. Austrian diplomats, “were fond of brandishing in their negotiations with other powers” that they could mobilize eight hundred fifty thousand soldiers. In reality, the Austro-Hungarian Empire only mobilized five hundred twenty-eight thousand soldiers, which dwindled to an effective fighting force of three hundred twenty thousand soldiers for a two front war against Prussia and Italy.² Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke unleashed to devastating effect the awesome power of superior peacetime mobilization planning, organization, equipping, and training of the Prussian Army, by smashing the Austrian forces into retreat and capitulation in only a month’s time. Moltke’s skillful usage of railway, telegraph, and the latest breech-loading rifles enabled the Prussian Army to converge rapidly onto the battlefield and pour overwhelming amounts of firepower into the Austrians.³ The Prussians kicked the Austro-Hungarian Empire out of German affairs, enabled Prussia to dominate the North German Confederation, sparked a surge in German patriotism, and seriously altered the European balance of power.⁴

¹ Robert Burns, “To a Mouse, on Turning Her Up in Her Nest with the Plough,” accessed September 12, 2015, http://www.robertburns.org/works/75.shtml.
³ Ibid., 23.
⁴ Ibid., 170-172.
In 1870, Napoleon III felt he had a great military plan. However, when France attempted to mobilize to fight the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, two hundred thousand French troops choked and congested the roads and railways to reach the Prussian border. Napoleon’s poorly conceived peacetime military readiness and mobilization plan cost the French the initiative, Napoleon his empire, and nearly led to the collapse of France. For Prussia, victory provided the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, enabled “crippling indemnity to keep the French republic down,” provided time for the unification of the non-Prussian half of Germany, and created a powerful and proud military state.

As shown in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 or the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the survival of nations depends upon the rapid mobilization of human and materiel resources. Military readiness and mobilization plans must be based upon actual manpower and materiel capabilities, rehearsed in peacetime, backed by capital, and the appropriate amount of coercion enabled by a strong legal justification. The speed with which nations mobilize has often been a key determinant in gaining surprise, forcefully taking the initiative, and throwing the enemy off balance.

The official US Army World War II (WWII) history reported that during the interwar period (1919-1941), the United States allowed, “military strength to decrease and decay to the point where it became tragically insufficient and, even more important, incapable of restoration save after the loss of many lives and the expenditure of resources beyond man’s comprehension.” Many have blamed the US Congress for failing to appropriate enough money and some have blamed the interwar Presidents for failing to request enough money in their annual

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6 Ibid., 301.

7 Mark S. Watson, *The War Department, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), 17.
budgets, while others have blamed the military leadership for failing to voice forcefully their concerns over insufficient funding or for becoming too complacent to develop properly or maintain the force. The US Congress went so far as to create the Mead Committee of Congress in 1946, to lessen public criticism by shifting the blame to the military agencies for being complacent, which generated a sharp rebuttal from both civilian and military leaders. The response included War Department annual reports from 1919 to 1934, military congressional testimony, and speeches of US Army Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March and every succeeding interwar period Chief of Staff. However, the reasons cited for the lack of US military readiness in the face of belligerent German blitzkriegs across Europe and Imperial Japanese warmongering in Asia are insufficient, and fail to address the underlying problems.

The reasons for the US military unpreparedness were deeply-rooted within the US society and exacerbated by the Great Depression and the Nye Committee, all of which kept public interests focused on internal issues and staunchly against the idea of a strong military and entanglement in Europe. This research focused on determining the root causes of the US military’s lack of readiness in the interwar years to assist today’s operational planners to avert a future catastrophe. This subject is particularly important in light of recent US military budget cuts and downsizing post-Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, while the military might of China rises, and Russia reasserts itself in the Ukraine. To avoid future military failure, the US military, government, and people must acknowledge the cost of military preparedness today versus the cost of military failure tomorrow.

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9 Ibid., 18.
10 From 1934 to 1936 Republican US Senator Gerald Nye chaired the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry (a.k.a. the Nye Committee), which conducted a highly sensational investigation into the profits and political influence of industrial munitions, chemical, and financial firms. Additional information and analysis on the impact of the Nye Committee is provided in Section Three of this monograph.
Methodology

The methodology utilized to study the roots of the interwar US military readiness problem has three sections. In Section One, deeply-rooted societal challenges were identified, which have been addressed by applying the lessons taught by Professors Peter Berger, a Professor of Sociology at Boston University, and Professor Thomas Luckman, a Professor of Sociology at the University of Constance, Germany. Together they wrote the influential, The Social Construction of Reality. Berger and Luckman’s theory points to several strongly held convictions, socially constructed since the earliest days of the United States. First, the citizens’ fear of large standing armies taking away the right to freedom.11 Second, the belief that North America was nearly unreachable by any potential enemy given the safety afforded by geography and the oceans.12 Third, the belief that since the citizen-soldiers and the power of the militia was always successful, that it would always be the appropriate method to provide for military operations.13 Fourth, congressional and military resistance to new forms of warfare such as armor and airpower prevented US military preparedness.14 Lastly, the socio-economic influence called “Business Pacifism,” pervasive throughout the United States and which included Puritan religious beliefs, economic liberalism, and mutually interdependent state economies, was viewed as the way to eliminate motivations for war between states.15

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13 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 143-162.

14 Watson, The War Department, 17.

15 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 222.
Additionally, in Section One, the late Professor Thomas Kuhn, who was a Harvard graduate that taught at the University of California at Berkeley, Princeton University, and spent many years at Massachusetts Institute of Technology created the paradigm shift theory, which he published in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. His paradigm shift theory indicates that despite US military model crisis during World War I (WWI), which showed that attempting to create an effective modern military required many factors, most importantly of which was time. Time was required to convert industry to manufacture the massive amount of military equipment. Time was required to assemble, organize, train, equip, and project military power. But, the lesson of the time requirement and other lessons to build and maintain a modern army failed to overcome the resistance to the paradigm shift, which pitted preparedness advocates against a coalition of anti-military and perpetual peace advocates. The established US mental models about military readiness were entrenched and resisted change, despite laudatory attempts to break the paradigm with legislation like the National Defense Act of 1920.

In Section Two, this research highlighted a lack of enmity within the US public. As promulgated by Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, the blind natural forces of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity mainly reside with the people, and when not aroused, the people have no interest in wasteful military pursuits. This research looked at US public opinion and reactions to events to determine that US public hatred was not aroused. For instance, in late 1937, Japan sank the USS Panay, which was at anchor in the Yangtse River. Rather than calls for retaliation, the US public reaction to this event called for the complete withdrawal of the United States from Asia. Next, in 1937, the War Department’s Director of the War Plans Division (WPD), General Stanley Embick recommended to FDR “abandoning the Philippines in favor of a


shorter defensive line in the Pacific, further indicating that the proposal had the unqualified
support of most of the General Staff.”18 The withdrawal from China, after being brutally attacked,
and military recommendations to abandon the Philippines were clear indicators of the lack of
enmity within the US public.

In Section Three, this research applied Clausewitz’s Trinity, which was Clausewitz’s
attempt to understand the total phenomenon of war. He believed the dominant tendencies of war
“always make a remarkable trinity.”19 The trinity metaphorically included the people, the
military, and the government. By a review of the actions, opinions, and interrelations of the US
public, the military, and the government throughout the interwar years, the reasons for why the
US military was so ill-prepared for WWII become evident. This researched showed US public
opinion as the dominant driver that elected government officials who ensured the focus of the
nation was directed toward a policy of economy to reduce national debt and foster the rise of
capitalism at home, while simultaneously staying out of European entanglements.20

Section One: Deeply-Rooted Societal Challenges

The roots of the United States’ problem lie within Berger and Luckmann’s theory about
the Social Construction of Society and Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Berger and Luckmann laid out the moments through which individuals and societies undergo the
process of socialization. One should view society as an, “ongoing dialectical process composed of
the three moments of externalization, objectivation, and internalization.”21 The first moment of
externalization involves the individual or society confronted with new information, which
through the process of objectivation humans create an objective world reality, which then

19 Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard, 89.
20 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 222-224.
becomes “retrojected into the consciousness” where humans assign personal meaning.\textsuperscript{22} Once the process of internalization completes, humans assign emotional attachments to the created reality. These emotional attachments make information that conflict with the internalized reality more difficult to accept. Further, Kuhn’s work also addressed the issue of adding new information to the current stock of information. Kuhn utilized the term for currently accepted information as a paradigm. Once the paradigm solved the problems confronted by society, attempts to change the paradigm become resisted. According to Kuhn, normal evolutionary changes typically have not been strong enough to enable paradigm shifts. Paradigm shifts more typically happen once the current paradigm undergoes model crisis, which requires a model revolution to make a change. These two theories about the receipt of new information and the ability to act on new information as a society provide the context necessary to understand why the United States was so ill-prepared for the start of WWII.

The acceptance of new information or theories that run counter to societal beliefs and norms has proven to be a dangerous proposition. Numerous examples of famous scientists like Galileo Galilei, who in 1604 mounted evidence to support the Copernican Theory about the earth and planets revolving around the sun. Galileo’s evidence challenged the theories of Aristotle and the Catholic Church. The Church therefore ordered Galileo not to teach his theory, threatened him with torture, convicted him of heresy, and placed him under house arrest for the remainder of his life.\textsuperscript{23} The danger of negative reactions or model crisis with the injection of new ideas throughout history has plagued many a theorist, politician, or military leader. The interwar period of 1919 to 1941 was no different in this regard. In 1925, the court martial of General Billy Mitchell provided a disconcerting warning to all interwar period military innovators.\textsuperscript{24} As the first US air power

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 61.


\textsuperscript{24} Carroll V. Glines, “William ‘Billy’ Mitchell: An Air Power Visionary,” \textit{Aviation
visionary, he faced extreme resistance to his predictions about the revolutionary capability of air power on the modern battlefield, and his prophetic warning about an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese.25 While Mitchell was not court martialed for his innovative or revolutionary new air power theories, his ideas challenged the status quo and threatened to alter how significant amounts of money were spent in the War Department. Mitchell’s frustration with the deeply-rooted old paradigm of army and navy power led to his combative and insubordinate tone of communication, which made many who appreciated Mitchell’s ideas lose patience with his combative approach.

The mental models seared into the belief structures of the US psyche were deeply-rooted and highly resistant to change. These mental models included the fear against large standing armies, the belief that North America was nearly unreachable by any potential enemy given the safety afforded by geography and the oceans, the belief in citizen-soldiers and the power of the militia, and the failure to embrace new forms of warfare such as armor and airpower.26 Despite many attempts by the US Army Chiefs of Staff (such as Generals Pershing, Summerall, MacArthur, etc.) over the interwar period, these mental models proved largely too difficult to overcome in a pre-Pearl Harbor mindset.

These mental models began right at the infancy of the American colonies dating back to 1607, when King James I of England gave the Virginia Company a charter to found the first permanent settlement on the North American continent.27 The English heritage of militias mixed

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26 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 143-162.

with the American environment but retained its distinctly English fear of a standing army. This fear was pronounced by early US leaders such as Samuel Adams who described standing armies in 1776 as, “nurseries of vice,” “always dangerous to the Liberties of the People,” and “should be watched with a jealous eye.”

Further, in the US Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson emphasized colonial disgust for King George’s policy to “render the military independent of and superior to civil power,” “for quartering large bodies of troops among the people,” and “protecting them from punishment of any murders which they should commit.” Lastly, James Madison, the fourth President of the United States, and known as the Father of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, stated in 1787 before the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, “The means of defense against foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved a people.”

The distaste for large standing armies created strong hatred and enmity of the American colonists toward the British Army and was a major motivator for the Revolutionary War. The distaste for large standing armies continued after the creation of the United States with hostility from President Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809) and President Andrew Jackson (1829-1837). In the 1920s, the powerful move away from Wilsonian ideals to make the world safe for democracy and toward thirteen consecutive years of conservative republican leadership focused on a policy of economy displayed the strong desire of US citizen’s to prevent large standing armies.

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29 Hamner, “American Resistance to a Standing Army.”


armies and refrain from European entanglements. As Berger and Luckmann have promulgated, the internalization of these thoughts gave them deep emotional meaning. The US colonists were confronted with the reality of a large British Army quartered inside their towns, restricting their freedoms, which created a powerful meaning with which to objectify and internalize the reality they faced. The internalized reality created a powerful new paradigm that no longer allowed for large standing armies and resisted any effort to change the paradigm.

Beyond the fear of a standing army there were other reasons why the United States believed they did not need one. The geography of the United States was a likely reason for why the US citizens felt reasonably safe from attack. Specifically, “Two vast oceans insulate the United States from Asian and European power, deserts separate the United States from Mexico to the south, while lakes and forests separate the population centers in Canada from those in the United States.” The Pacific and Atlantic Oceans are the two largest oceans in the world, which cover approximately forty-eight percent of the world’s surface. The formidable geography prevented the fear of coercion associated with large armies able to mass quickly and move across a nation’s border at any moment like in Europe.

By the mid-1930s, US military spending demonstrated deeply-held beliefs about massive oceans. The US, “Army was less favored, presumably because there was a continuing public confidence, shared by the White House and Congress, in oceans as a bulwark and a belief that the Navy could safely be thought of not merely as the traditional first line of defense but as the only

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34 Ibid.


really necessary line of defense.”37 Large ocean barriers were clearly on the mind of Henry L. Stimson, the US Secretary of War from 1940-45 in the crucial years prior to WWII, who wrote in his book, On Active Service in Peace and War, about the Navy Department where, “Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the US Navy the only true Church.”38 British military historian, John Keegan described Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1840-1914) as, “the most important military strategist of the nineteenth century.”39

Mahan’s lasting influence went well beyond the “writing of twenty books and 137 articles, the latter usually written at the request of the editors for such journals as the Atlantic Monthly, Forum, North American Review, and Century Magazine.”40 Mahan personally mentored President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) for the better part of twenty years, from about 1894 until his death in 1914.41 Mahan’s mentorship occurred while FDR’s family ran a successful shipping, commerce, and trade business in the far reaches of the Pacific, which provided FDR the opportunity to become a talented sailor. At the same time, FDR’s father gifted him Mahan’s most famous literary works to study.42 Mahan’s conclusion was that sea power was the key to the successful ending of the American Revolutionary War with, “sea power in the hands of France, foiling as it had, the Royal Navy’s relief of Lord Cornwallis.”43 Further, Mahan argued that the defeat of Napoleon was the result of sea power in the hands of the British, with Lord Nelson’s
famous victory at Trafalgar on October 19, 1805 and, “that noiseless pressure upon the vitals of France that cut off French resources and destroyed it.” Thus, in the mid-1930s, when the US Army leadership requested materiel for new forms of warfare like armored vehicles and strategic bombers, only the Navy was allowed, “a cautious increase in appropriations, to make start on a new shipbuilding program which by that time was acutely needed.”45 The preferential treatment for the US Navy occurred due to the belief in the Navy as the first line of defense against foreign aggression from potential enemies like Japan and Germany who had already withdrawn from the League of Nations and abandoned the Washington and London Naval treaties.46 Unfortunately, as a result, the US Army languished in a state of deep disrepair and neglect, while the world was already rearming for war. The failure to consider the necessity for a strong and ready US Army after the paradigm shattering events of WWI, and the obviously bellicose nature of Hitler’s rearmament in Germany, Japanese aggression across Manchuria, and Italian military adventurism in Ethiopia represented significant resistance to the post-WWI military paradigm.47

Next, the primary source of US ground-based military power has rested in the citizen-soldier and the concomitant militia. The militia was critical in the early phases of US colonial development to fight off native Indians, prevent slave rebellions, enforce local laws, and to prevent foreign aggression. Each colony created its own militia and it rarely served far from home, a principle argued at length amongst the founding fathers in defining the power of the

44 Ibid., 452.
45 Watson, The War Department, 15.
federal government vis-à-vis the states. The militia became a major political issue in early US presidential races, with Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe all elected to office as Democratic-Republicans for States’ Rights and state control over militias. The small militias proved capable of handling the broadcast of power over sparsely settled lands, like the US western frontier. However, had the United States been located on the European continent and surrounded by large, well-trained, equipped, and experienced armies, then the United States would have required a more powerful land army. The problem with a successful militia was that it reinforced the mental model that the militia was sufficient to care for the needs of the United States. Experiences like the American Revolution, War of 1812, Mexican-American War, Civil War, and Spanish American War taught that only for short periods does a standing army need to be assembled, and that it could be assembled quickly, succeed, and then disbanded. As Figure 1 US Military Active Duty Personnel as a Percent of US Population displays, the US military was significantly less than one percent of the total US population until the American Civil War 1861-1865, which was not caused by a foreign aggressor. Further, in 1917, the United States mobilized for WWI of its own volition and not because of the existential threat posed by an attacking aggressor to the US mainland. Therefore, the United States from inception to 1940 had many years of experience internalized within US society, which taught that a militia was adequate and that a large standing army was unnecessary.

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Lastly, and perhaps the most powerful deeply-held belief in US society was the strong socio-economic cultural force that famed historian Samuel P. Huntington called “Business Pacifism” in his book titled *The Soldier and the State*. Business Pacifism contained the “ideals and philosophy of business liberalism, individualism, the Horatio Alger creed, [which] became the ideals and philosophy of the nation, accepted and adhered to by all significant groups in American society.” There were three sources of Business Pacifism, which included religious,

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49 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 222. After the American Civil War, the novels of Horatio Alger, Jr., portrayed the classic rags to riches story. By leading exemplary lives, struggling valiantly against poverty and adversity, Alger’s key characters gain both wealth and honor, thus achieving the American Dream.
economic liberalism, and Social Darwinism. First, the “religious moralism associated with the Puritan version of the Protestant ethic,” which considered war as evil because of killing, and the worship of work and economic productivity vice the waste of militarism that lives off the fruit of other men’s labors like parasites. 50 Second, economic liberalism believed international free trade among nations created strong mutual interests, which rendered bellicose patriotism and its concomitant pathway to war unthinkable. 51 Third, the highly pacifist form of the English and American Social Darwinism that redefined survival of the fittest as economic competition and struggle for the best price. 52 America’s strong beliefs in Business Pacifism distracted and practically convinced the citizenry that war was not only wasteful, but that by staying focused on pacifist business ideals they would avoid war indefinitely. This mindset was dangerously naïve, and reinforced anti-militarist and pacifist public views.

In summary, Section One presented the firmly established mental models, which contributed to the deterioration of the US military during the interwar years and resulted in a lack of preparedness for WWII. The mental models included the fear against large standing armies, the belief that the United States was nearly unreachable given the safety afforded by geography, the reliability and strength of the citizen-soldier militia, and a trust that Business Pacifism had integrated world economies to the point of making war too costly. The United States’ societally-constructed worldviews and paradigms came under model crisis during WWI and repeatedly under attack throughout the interwar period. A myriad of obvious signs that perpetual peace was unlikely failed to overcome resistance to paradigm shifting, which prevented the development of a military capability competitive with world rivals.

50 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 223.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 224.
Section Two: The Role of Enmity in Society

This research highlights Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity, and the role enmity plays within society and how it influences military readiness. An underlying context that applies to the entirety of the interwar period was the lack of enmity within the US people. The Clausewitzian lens helps to understand how enmity and a nation’s preparation for war go hand in hand. With WWI over, it would be appropriate to reverse Clausewitz’s famous dictum, and say, “Peace is the continuation of struggle only by other means.”53 Part of that struggle took place in the realm of foreign policy.

During this period, US foreign policy had, “but small ability, as measured by a military force-in-being,” to make any strong assertions toward other nations.54 Clausewitz explained the reason for this small ability by stating, “Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions.”55 Further, “Clausewitz noted that war only approximates to its ‘pure form’ when a ‘grand and powerful purpose’ is at stake. Only then will the full mobilization of national resources become a possibility, and only then will the drivers and sometimes conflicting goals that various national groups pursue in time of peace be displaced by a single overriding strategic aim—‘the overthrow of the enemy.’”56

Clausewitz’s trinity provided the lens with which to measure hostile feelings in the United States during the interwar period. First, Clausewitz said the concept of “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity are to be regarded as a blind natural force,” and “mainly concerns the people.”57 Second, “the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free

54 Watson, The War Department, 85.
55 Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard, 76.
57 Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard, 89.
to roam,” and mainly concerns “the commander and his army.”58 The third part of the trinity is “an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone” and mainly concerns “the government.”59

The passions of the people were measured through public opinion polls (the people), US military leadership (the commander and his army), and Congressional appropriations and Presidential policy (the government). This research gathered a variety of sources to determine US public opinion throughout the interwar period. For instance, this research includes various newspapers, small interest groups, and Gallup Polls from Dr. George H. Gallup’s American Institute of Public Opinion founded in 1935.60 In 1935, Dr. Gallup acknowledged that, “the people were strongly in favor of increasing appropriations [for the Army and Navy]…at a time when Congress was going exactly in the other direction.”61 However, despite the public’s perceived sympathy toward additional defense expenditures, there was no vigor, passion, or enmity within the people to lead change. This was evident by the fact that “Congressmen-and Presidents, too-normally responsive to any vigorously expressed wishes of constituents, did not by their speeches or by their votes demonstrate any pronounced change of heart toward a strong defense policy, nor do the records show that they were unseated at ensuing elections because of their lethargy on the rearmament question.”62 The military leadership, both military and civilian, throughout the interwar years “sounded ample warnings” to Congress, the President, and the Budget Bureau about the lack of military readiness.63 Yet, Congress set appropriations and the Presidents set policy with no significant concerns about the military, other than trying to limit the

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
61 Watson, The War Department, 17.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 21.
growth of military capabilities in accordance with arms limitations treaties and to reduce military appropriations to free up money to balance the budget, reduce taxes, or fund the New Deal. This research shows that the passions of the people were not ignited with the hot flame of enmity required to drive the political process toward military armament and readiness. The lack of enmity was evident throughout the interwar period as the interactions of Clausewitz’s trinity (the people, the military, and the government) show why the US military was so unprepared for WWII.

Section Three: The People, The Military, and The Government

During the interwar period, there were five US presidents, Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt. The presidents faced challenges to their leadership in the Senate, the House, or both while in office, which created tension. (See Figure 2: Interwar US Political Leadership.) The US Constitution adopted in 1787, specified in Article II, Section Two that the

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<td>Republican</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Calvin Coolidge</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Herbert Hoover</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Franklin Roosevelt</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: None of the Interwar Presidents had any prior military experience.

Figure 2. Interwar US Political Leadership


“President is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.” However, US presidents rely on Congress for the duties detailed under Article I, Section Eight, which stipulates that Congress

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64 The New Deal was a series of domestic programs from 1933 to 1938 in response to the Great Depression. The goal was to provide relief for the unemployed and poor, recovery of the economy to normal levels, and reform the financial system to prevent a repeat depression. Carol Berkin et al., Making America, Volume 2: A History of the United States: Since 1865 (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2014), 629-32.

shall have the power to raise and support Armies.\textsuperscript{66} Further, Congress provides and maintains a Navy, makes rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and declares war.\textsuperscript{67} Therefore, when evaluating the readiness of the US military it has been important to understand the discourse, compromise, and agreement within the US political system, while also evaluating the military leadership to understand what recommendations they made to the political leadership.

On November 5, 1918, US citizens sent a strong message to President Wilson and the international community. The US Senate and House of Representatives had a changing of the guard at a most critical point in time. The Democrats lost both the Senate and House to the Republicans, repudiating the leadership of Wilson and weakened his negotiating position as he went to the Versailles Peace Conference in December, 1918.\textsuperscript{68} Further, Wilson did not have the agreement of General John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe, who like the US Plenipotentiary to the Paris Peace Conference, General Tasker H. Bliss, and the French Marshal Philippe Pétain, all disagreed with Wilson’s intent to offer a fair and just peace to Germany.\textsuperscript{69} These successful military leaders were adamant that peace would not last without final victory, unconditional surrender, and breaking the Germans’ will to fight.\textsuperscript{70} In December 1918, this was evident in Great Britain, with newly re-elected Prime Minister David

\begin{footnotes}
\item[66] Ibid.
\item[67] Ibid.
\item[70] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Lloyd George, who ran on a platform of “Make Germany Pay.”71 Further, “Hang the Kaiser!” was a popular newspaper slogan during the Treaty of Versailles negotiations.72

Wilson’s plan, which included his Fourteen Points, membership in the League of Nations for collective security, and the desire to create a peaceful international community that accepted the rule of law, stumbled. His plan may have been the right solution to ward off WWII.73 But, the Democratic loss of Congress, and public opinion at home and abroad, instead sought stiff reparations for Germany.74 The shift in Congress from Democrats to Republicans came after a long string of international interventions by Wilson, to include Mexico in 1914, Haiti in 1915, Dominican Republic in 1916, Cuba in 1917, and Panama in 1918.75 The Wilsonian belief in making the world safe for US democratic and social values, and a moderate punishment for Germany faced serious backlash throughout the world.76

The backlash would be so fierce that Republicans would come to dominate the Presidency and Congress for the next thirteen years. The rejection of Democratic leadership enabled Republican President Warring G. Harding to win the 1920 presidential election with seventy-six percent of the electoral vote and over sixty percent of the popular vote in what remains the largest popular-vote winning margin in US history.77 This realignment of


73 Gideon Rose, How Wars End, Why We Always Fight The Last Battle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 47.

74 Ibid.


76 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002), xvii.

77 US Election Atlas.org, “1920 Presidential General Election Results,” accessed
Republicans in control of the White House and Congress increased the size of the “win-set” and made for the likelihood of less voluntary defectors and larger coalitions to get political efforts accomplished. This enabled the re-emergence of traditional Jeffersonian beliefs about a foreign policy that was less concerned with spreading democracy abroad than about safeguarding it at home. However, it did not eliminate or simplify the difficult problems of rising Bolshevism, Japanese empire building, subsequent German rearmament, or world economic collapse.

During the post-WWI political challenges, and what the Republicans called the, “return to time-honored policies in favor of peace declared by Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe,” the US military was undergoing a rapid and chaotic demobilization of four million soldiers. As Secretary of War John W. Weeks stated in his 1921, 1922, and 1923 annual reports, “it is the height of folly to continue the present policy of cutting our financial support of the War Department…We are already cut below our vital needs.” However, despite the drawdown, the War Department regularly conducted mobilization and industrial planning for potentially mobilizing the entirety of the United States in a post-WWI resource and antiwar constrained environment.

The War Department conducted mobilization and industrial planning based on an understanding of the experience of WWI. The US Army mobilization experience developed during WWI in 1917-18 demonstrated what Kuhn identified as model crisis, which required a new paradigm. The new paradigm provided a new model upon which to base future analysis and...
expectations of mobilization. The new model showed (See Figure 3: WWI US Army Manpower Mobilization) that when US political aims aligned the people, the government, and the commander of the army that rapid military expansion was feasible. It was the speed of this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DIV</th>
<th>TROOPS</th>
<th>% CHG</th>
<th>EUROPE</th>
<th>NOTES:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun-1916</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Defense Act 1916 (Regular + Guard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-1917</td>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>314,731</td>
<td>-45.3%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Actual # of US Army troops (Regular + Guard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-1917</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Selective Service Act for all 18-45 males.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-1917</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>344.8%</td>
<td>Jan-1919</td>
<td>Requested number of Army Divisions from General Pershing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-1918</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>114.3%</td>
<td>May-1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-1918</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3,733,333</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>Apr-1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-1918</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,666,667</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>Mid-1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-1918</td>
<td>62*</td>
<td>3,685,458</td>
<td>-20.7%</td>
<td>Nov-1918</td>
<td>Actual figures as of November 11, 1918.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Actual # of DIVs Created = 62, of which 43 arrived in Europe.

Figure 3. World War I - US Army Manpower Mobilization


mobilization, which the US Army General Staff leadership over the interwar period used as the basis for how they would refine their estimates for full mobilization. In 1918, the US Army reached 3,685,458 soldiers, while the US Census estimated the US population at over one hundred three million, meaning the US Army comprised only 3.57 percent of the US population. According to General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who later wrote the Victory Plan of 1941 for WWII mobilization, he discovered through historical examples that roughly ten percent of the total population of any nation could be taken into the armed forces without doing serious harm to the economy and social life of the nation.” Wedemeyer’s ten percent estimate was

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82 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 64.

83 Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard, 89.


85 Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present, Writing the Victory Plan of 1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2011), 78.
based on the idea that women would enter the workforce and that the industrial and agricultural workforce would work with maximum efficiency.86 When compared to other WWI combatants, the United States mobilized far fewer soldiers. As depicted in Figure 4 WWI Mobilization Statistics, barely more than four percent of the US population was mobilized for WWI versus greater than twenty percent of the French and British. Thus, far greater mobilization of the US population was possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% Mobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4,355,000</td>
<td>103,208,000</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8,410,000</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Empire</td>
<td>8,904,467</td>
<td>42,000,000</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Empire</td>
<td>11,000,000</td>
<td>65,000,000</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. World War I Mobilization Statistics


The key to US mobilization came through the potential provided through the Selective Service Act (SSA), which had been voted into law on May 18, 1917. The SSA provided compulsory drafting of all males from eighteen to forty-five years old, which resulted in 2.8 million men drafted during WWI.87 US Army planners during the interwar period understood that theoretically far greater numbers of US citizens were available, and through a legal basis such as the SSA, could make personnel mobilization a reality and in an orderly manner in which equipment and facilities were available.

While population available has always been a critical variable, so have the economic resources available with which to procure the necessary soldiers and wartime materiel. WWI was an example for US Army planners on what amounts of money may become available in the event of total wartime mobilization. For instance, Figure 5 US WWI Expenditures demonstrates the

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86 Ibid.
dramatic increase in funding availability given social and political support for vast increases in the national military capability. This dramatic increase in funding during WWI presented a host of issues associated with employing large amounts of money efficiently and effectively in short periods of time. To solve this problem, the War Industries Board (WIB), created on July 28, 1917, coordinated purchase of supplies, assisted with price negotiations, and expedited mass production to support the war effort. Despite the best efforts of the WIB, in WWI the US Army in Europe had no US tanks, planes, or artillery, which required borrowing vast quantities of equipment from the British and French. The challenge of mobilizing industry to mass produce military equipment was a significant lesson learned. The industrial mobilization challenges faced in WWI, set the tone for additional focus on planning, preparation, and industrial mobilization improvements during the interwar period, such as the National Defense Act of 1920. The NDA 1920 created an Assistant Secretary of War focused on procurement of military supplies and the start of the Army Industrial College in 1924. The Army Industrial College was established specifically to focus on wartime procurement and mobilization procedures. Further, the NDA 1920 set the size of the Regular Army at two hundred eighty thousand soldiers, preserved the National Guard at four hundred fifty thousand soldiers, organized the Reserve Corps into

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>War Department</th>
<th>% Chg</th>
<th>Navy Department</th>
<th>% Chg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>$183,176,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$153,854,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>$377,941,000</td>
<td>106%</td>
<td>$239,633,000</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>$4,869,955,000</td>
<td>1189%</td>
<td>$1,278,840,000</td>
<td>434%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>$9,009,076,000</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>$2,002,311,000</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


89 Ibid.
divisions, and established nine new geographically-ordered corps areas.90 Lastly, and most importantly, the NDA of 1920 created the requirement to conduct contingency planning by mandating mobilization plans be developed during peacetime.91

The WWI experience socialized the US military, industrial, and political leadership about the requirements of total war mobilization. It provided the critical lessons that led to the creation and implementation of the SSA and the WIB to mobilize the population and industry respectively. Yet, the experience only lasted twenty months from April 1917 to November 1918. This was not enough time to have taught all the necessary lessons, nor implement those lessons that were learned. When combined with the idea that some of the US public believed that entry in WWI was voluntary, or at worst the US public was tricked into joining the war for commercial reasons, or that it was “the war to end all wars,” it seemed reasonable to return to “normaely,” and let go of these painful and expensive lessons as unnecessary.

As a result, the US Army demobilized from a WWI high of 3,673,888 in November 1918 to only 363,540 by the end of 1920, with only 200,367 active duty members, of which only 15,519 were officers.92 The speed and size of the demobilization was chaotic and poorly-coordinated in part due to political tensions between Wilson and the Republican Congress. Wilson wanted a demobilization board to coordinate the process, but because of Republican demands to approve of demobilization boardmembers, Wilson instead opted for dismantling the wartime boards and regulatory agencies.93 By September 1919, Wilson lamented that

90 Griffith, Jr., Men Wanted for the US Army, 22.
disagreement with the Republican Congress forced the rapid demobilization of the US Army, which would be critical to have kept, since “with absolute certainty that within another generation there will be another world war if the nations of the world do not concert the method [i.e. the League of Nations] by which to prevent it.”

Given United States political resistance to membership in the League of Nations and Wilson’s failed attempt at a demobilization board, it showed the loss of alignment of the people, the government, and the military. This highlights that once the passions of the people were no longer aligned, the conflicting goals of various interest groups overrode the best interests of the United States, which began the interwar years on a foreboding note. This should also be understood as a failure to accept the new military preparedness concerns created by the model crisis of the pre-WWI military mobilization and readiness paradigm.

WWI was not the first crisis that prompted strong condemnation of the US government military policy. General Emory Upton graduated from West Point in 1861, and through exemplary service during the Civil War became the youngest Major General in the United States’ history at the age of twenty-four. He wrote a compelling argument in 1880 titled, *The Military Policy of the United States*. He argued for a military policy commensurate with the growth of the land, population, and myriad risks that could spark internal or external conflict at any time. He argued against the deleterious effects of untrained militias, uneducated officers, and an unorganized decentralized US military. Upton outlined numerous examples of the US military forming on the battlefield at the start of conflict, only to be crushed like US militias and volunteers at the beginning of the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Union troops at

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Bull Run in 1861. Upton proposed a centrally-organized expandable Regular Army, National Volunteer Army, and a state controlled militia with officers selected by a central authority and provided post-graduate level military education by the national government.

The War Department attempted to build upon the National Defense Act of 1916, an Uptonian-like military policy, to promote a new post-WWI military preparedness paradigm. In January 1919, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March went to Congress to request an expandable active duty force of five hundred thousand soldiers, with no mention of Universal Military Training (UMT) or the National Guard, which was denied after a host of Congressmen chewed up the idea. Baker’s request “offended virtually every interest group concerned with military affairs” to include, the return to “normalcy” group that wanted a pre-WWI one hundred thousand soldier Army, the pro-UMT group, the pro-National Guard group, and the pacifist-antimilitarist group. Further, Baker and March’s proposal was lacking the solidarity of the military community to include civilian and military leadership for how best to design a comprehensive approach to national defense. For example, General of the Armies Pershing, former Army Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood, former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and then current deputy of the WPD Colonel John M. Palmer, all presented Congressional testimony that showed a wide variety of vastly different ideas about how to best protect the nation. Unfortunately, they combined to deliver the coup de grace for Baker and March’s initial plan and set conditions for a small standing army with the main feature being a

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 The National Defense Act of 1916 was the first act to create The Army of the United States. It expanded the Regular Army to one hundred seventy-five thousand troops and the National Guard to four hundred fifty thousand troops. Further, NDA 1916, authorized the President to federalize the National Guard. Therefore, Uptonian-like policy, although in its infancy, was recognized before WWI as the basis for better military preparedness.
100 Ibid., 10-15.
trained citizen army, not an expandible force following Uptonian principles.\textsuperscript{101} Thus, upon final approval on February 22, 1919, Baker’s request was pared back to one hundred seventy-five thousand soldiers, as Congress agreed to return to the provisions of the NDA of 1916.\textsuperscript{102} Unfortunately, the provisions of the NDA 1916 were never realized pre-WWI, as the quantity of soldiers actually appropriated never met the authorization in either the Regular Army or the National Guard. As the pre-WWI and interwar period showed, authorizations do not equal appropriations, and paper armies do not train or prepare to fight real wars.

Throughout 1919, the War Department studied the WWI experience and refined their recommendations in light of the political climate for how best to provide for national defense. In the 1919 War Department Annual Report, March provided the most salient recommendations. First, and most importantly, March stressed the necessity to relieve the legislative restrictions, which prevented an adequate General Staff from being able to coordinate and execute the military program in time of peace and war.\textsuperscript{103} In light of the fact that the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919 eliminated the German General Staff, the treaty demonstrates how vital a centralized planning, programming, and executive body is to the overall success of military operations. Second, reserves of clothing and equipment had to be ready at a moments notice to train, equip, and mobilize. The Army suffered serious delays from a lack of winter clothing and equipment. For example, “it became necessary to send to France entire Brigades of Artillery with such meager and totally inadequate training as could be obtained from drill with wooden logs mounted on ash carts.”\textsuperscript{104} Third, a large supply of trained officers and replacements must be trained and ready at all times. WWI required the training of one hundred eighty thousand officers, since the Army had

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 10-11.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
less than six thousand officers trained and one thousand of those had less than two years of experience. WWI had taught that war is won, not by some new and terrible invention or by modern science, but, “won like every other war in history, by men, munitions, and morale.”

Fourth, the development of complementary branches of service to support the infantry must be created, expanded upon, and understood as critically important to the overall success of the military. Fifth, the need for regular large-scale combined-arms tactical training and maneuvers to ensure the exercise of the troops, an indepth understanding of the doctrine, and real-time execution with the actual warfighting equipment. Sixth, the national development of strategic transportation capabilities to include highways, railways, ports, and shipping. Seventh, a sizable peace strength army, to include, one field army with five corps manned at fifty percent strength. Eighth, mandatory UMT to develop physically, mentally, and morally the youth of the country, while making them better citizens and soldiers. Lastly, to mandate legally the recommendations in the 1919 War Department Annual Report into a national military policy.

In response, Baker adjusted his position in favor of UMT, only to be thoroughly debated and defeated again. Further, as negotiations continued in search of a military policy that was supported by the public mood of the times, even watered-down four-month volunteer training and standby draft authority for the president were eliminated from the final bill. What emerged on June 4, 1920 became the NDA 1920. To the chagrin of the military preparedness groups, those in support of the NDA 1920 argued that it created the largest peacetime army in the history of the United States. However, only about one hundred thirty-five thousand on average were funded

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105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., 473.
107 Ibid., 477.
108 Ibid., 471-478.
110 Ibid. The NDA 1920 directed mandatory war mobilization planning during peacetime.
by Congress over the interwar period. Begrudgingly, Wilson, who supported the original request for a five hundred thousand soldier army signed the bill and said, “there are, unhappily, many things which this war has taught us but which we have not learned.”111 Thus, the Wilson years ended without a large army, UMT, a voluntary training plan, or standby draft authority, which set the tone for the interwar years ahead. March stated in his 1921 Annual Report, “The act did not provide for UMT nor for the application of the draft system in future emergencies—two things essential for the security of a country with so small an armed force.”112 The military took a back seat to serious economic challenges domestically and around the world, as well as Republican ideals to return the US to “normaley” by doing away with progressive notions, shrinking the government, and attempted to reduce the risk of war through international arms limitation treaties vice military preparedness.113

Regardless of the failure to obtain the desired active duty force, mobilization planning began immediately. One year after the armistice with Germany, on November 14, 1919, the WPD of the General Staff produced estimates for a post-war mobilization plan.114 Figure 6 WPD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Plans Division Mobilization Estimates, Nov 14, 1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M = Mobilization Day, M + 1 = 1 month to activate the Nat'l Guard and Reserves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: WPD Mobilization Estimates


111 Ibid.


113 Francine Sanders Romero, Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt through Coolidge, 1901-1929 (Westport, CT: Greenword Press, 2002), 158.

Mobilization Estimates shows what planners thought was feasible for the growth of the US Army in a very short period of time. The estimates included an exact number of active duty, guard, and reserve officers available for duty or recall to duty, number of camps and airfields available to house and train soldiers with estimates for expansion included, railroad personnel transportation capacities, and accounted for the differences between an offensive and defensive war. These estimates were built for a combat goal of fifty-six infantry divisions, four cavalry divisions, fourteen corps, and four-plus armies. This initial plan lacked specific tables of organization and equipment required by the Army supply officers to conduct procurement analysis and estimate expenses, but it did show immediate initiative on behalf of the War Department to start the mobilization planning discourse.

In the early 1920s, War Department leadership and preparedness groups protested in vain to overcome a fierce peace coalition of pacifists, antimilitarists, isolationists, and parsimonious Republicans. The peace coalition included politicians typically from rural midwestern, southern, or mountain states, where old Populist or States’ Rights attitudes concerning big government and traditional antimilitary and isolationist views continued to prevail. Further, the peace coalition included powerful groups, such as, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the National Council for the Prevention of War, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, and the American Committee for the Outlawry of War, and many more. These groups were bolstered by popular novels of the period including Erich Remarque’s *All Quiet on the Western Front*, Ernest Hemingway’s *A Farewell to Arms*, and others. The public, for a variety of reasons, some of which include apathy, distrust of preparedness advocates, concerns about economic well-being, and a lack of

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116 Ibid., 55.
117 Ibid.
fear for any immediate threat, essentially gave President Harding and the Republican Congress carte blanche to put a stranglehold on the military. For instance, recently-elected Harding told Congress, “that he favored reducing the present Army of two hundred eighteen thousand men to one hundred seventy-five thousand at the earliest possible time, and that a little later another reduction, bringing it down to one hundred fifty thousand should be made.”118

Next, Harding introduced the Bureau of the Budget in the Treasury Department, which moved swiftly to reduce expenditures.119 It required all government agencies to submit annual appropriation requests through the Budget Bureau for approval prior to submission to Congress. Even General of the Armies Pershing, who became Army Chief of Staff in 1921, and had earlier fought against a five hundred thousand soldier Army proposed by Baker, now grew concerned. He told the Senate that a strength reduction, “to one hundred fifty thousand will…end many combat organizations, or reduce them to a strength which will destroy their value as a nucleus around which to build fighting organizations in an emergency.”120 Despite Pershing’s concern, Congress took the Army down to one hundred twenty-five thousand and then by 1926 reached an interwar period nadir of approprating less than one hundred eighteen thousand soldiers. According to historian and former West Point History instructor Robert K. Griffith, Jr., the “policy of economy…more than any other development during the [interwar] decades, affected the volunteer army.”121

The severely-reduced military appropriations had dramatic effects on the Army. In order to drop the Army down to 117,691 soldiers, it required a host of draconian measures such as, involuntary discharges, pay cuts, promotion freezes, forced demotions, increased length of overseas tours, cut travel and transportation allowances, telephone services, fuel allotments,

118 Ibid., 59.
119 Ibid., 55.
120 Ibid., 60.
121 Ibid., 55.
rationed coal and consolidated facilities, and eliminated laundry and clothing repair services.\footnote{Ibid., 53-70.}

These measures caused Pershing to confide that he feared the army had deteriorated to a condition worse than that of the prewar years.\footnote{Ibid., 63.}

President Calvin Coolidge, who was Harding’s Vice President from 1921 to 1923, and President from 1924 to 1929, vigorously defended the economic frugality stating that,

\begin{quote}

this is by no means a doctrine of parsimony…it was perfectly apparent that the key by which the way could be opened to national progress was constructive economy. Only by the use of that policy could the high rates of taxation, which were retarding our development and prosperity, be diminished, and the enormous burden of our public debt be reduced.\footnote{Calvin Coolidge, \textit{The Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge} (New York: J.J. Little & Ives Co., 1929), 182.}

\end{quote}

In addition to the policy of economy, the pacifists, antimilitarists, and isolationists were making significant headway throughout the interwar years, which had a major impact on the US military. A brief review of the roots of pacifism aides understanding the interwar years peace movement. Beginning long before the interwar years, in the 1670s, English philosopher John Locke wrote the \textit{Two Treatises of Government}, among many other influential works, which made him one of the most influential thinkers during the Enlightenment and commonly known as the Father of Liberalism.\footnote{W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, \textit{A History of Political Philosophy: From Thucydides to Locke} (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2010), 291.}

In 1789, Locke was referenced by President Thomas Jefferson as one of “the three greatest men that have ever lived, without any exception,” for having laid the “superstructures” of the moral sciences.\footnote{National Archives, Founders Online, “From Jefferson to John Trumbull, 15 February 1789,” accessed December 26, 2015, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-14-02-0321.}

This influence was readily apparent in Jefferson’s 1776 US Declaration of Independence which established, “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” as unalienable rights from the Creator. Further, in 1795 German philosopher
Immanuel Kant published *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, which lays out the three
legged stool for how to ensure perpetual peace. The three legs of his argument were that through
democracy, capitalism, and a confederation of peaceable princes there would be a peaceful world
community.

These influences gained momentum, and at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 upon the
conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, when the Quadruple Alliance (which included Austria,
Prussia, the Russian Empire, and the United Kingdom) agreed to an unprecedented level of
international cooperation through what they called the Concert of Europe. The Concert of Europe
was developed to regulate the balance of European power and set European borders as an attempt
to end future wars.\(^{127}\) While there were European wars that occurred, the entirety of Europe was
not engulfed in war, thus the Concert of Europe, Immanuel Kant, and prominent philosophies
about peace were all contributors to a relatively peaceful hundred years until WWI. It was the
Concert of Europe which set the foundation for Wilson’s desired system he called the League of
Nations. Wilson strongly believed that in order to achieve worldwide cooperation and perpetual
peace, the United States and all other countries needed to join the League of Nations.

As a Twentieth Century Jeffersonian, Wilson fought hard for a ‘Confederation of
Peaceable Princes’ in his League of Nations. At the Paris Peace Conference to conclude WWI,
fourtty-two nations agreed to become the founding members of what would eventually become
sixty-three nations.\(^ {128}\) Republican concerns over US sovereignty and being drawn into European
entanglements, however dashed Wilson’s hopes to obtain the two-thirds Senate ratification
required for United States membership. Wilson’s Postmaster General, Albert Burleson argued
with Wilson to return the “(League of Nations) Treaty back to the Senate and say what

\(^{127}\) *David Stevenson, 1914 – 1918: The History of the First World War (London: Penguin
Books, 2004), 4.*

\(^{128}\) Indiana University, “League of Nations Photo Archive,” accessed December 26, 2015,
reservations he would accept. Otherwise people will think Wilson’s stubborness killed the Treaty.”

In Coolidge’s autobiography, he stated that, “a much larger body of Republicans were much disappointed that it [the Republicans] did not declare in favor of ratifying the treaty with reservations.” Further, Coolidge said that, “the Massachusetts Republican State Convention in the fall of 1919 had adopted a plank favoring immediate ratification with suitable reservations.” Despite not joing the League of Nations, these examples show that both Democratic and Republican support existed for peace and arms limitation initiatives taken during the interwar period, which they hoped reduced the likelihood of war and consequently reduced the need for military forces.

President Harding led notable initiatives such as the Washington Conference in 1921-22, which resulted in seven treaties. The treaties included the outlawing of poisonous gases in war, an attempt to stop the naval arms race involving the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, respect the Open Door Policy with China, and stablization of the Pacific region in light of Japanese intentions to build an empire. Harding recommended, Coolidge strongly supported, and Wilsonians agreed that the US should join the World Court, an international court designed and managed by the League of Nations. However, the United States did not accept the World Court jurisdiction until 1935, and never ratified the treaty. Coolidge signed the popular Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact to renounce war as an instrument of national policy and declare only pacific

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131 Ibid.


means to resolve disputes. In 1929, the US Senate overwhelmingly approved with an eighty-five to one vote to ratify the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. Sixty-two nations ultimately signed the treaty, and Kellogg received the Nobel Peace Prize for his part in it. Notably, Germany, Italy, and Japan all signed the treaty. According to Kellogg, Coolidge ultimately considered this the most important contribution of his administration.

Peace advocates were even more encouraged by the efforts of Coolidge’s successor, President Herbert Hoover, who had previously directed the US Food Administration under Wilson and was Secretary of Commerce under Harding and Coolidge. His experience, reputation, and desire for perpetual peace was second to none as he entered twenty-five new treaties of arbitration and seventeen new treaties of conciliation. Of particular importance was his calling for the London Naval Treaty, a six year treaty that reduced the size of the United States, Japanese, and British fleets by a total of three hundred thousand tons and saved the US over $500 million in naval construction costs, plus the savings to operate and maintain those ships. This was critically important because it limited all varieties of naval ships, versus the Washington

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136 Ibid.


138 Romero, Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt through Coolidge, 227.


140 Ibid., 596.
Conference in 1921, which had only limited battleships. Additionally, Hoover fought to get the United States to ratify the World Court treaty, helped Europe through financial collapse in 1931 by negotiating moratoriums on intergovernmental debts accrued from the WWI, and fought hard to get Congress to ratify land arms limitation treaties. Hoover was a true leader in arms limitation; to gain world public support during the World Disarmament Conference, he released his detailed plan for how and why the world should reduce land, air, and naval forces by one-third, to include the abolition of all offensive weapon systems.141

While the peace advocates were making big news and headway, the preparedness group was continuing their fight as the military had been significantly neglected during the first half of the interwar years. The preparedness group included politicians typically from northern states, and urban or industrial districts.142 Further, the preparedness group included the American Legion, the National Guard Association, the Military Training Camps Association, the Reserve Officers’ Association, the National Rifle Association, many contemporary military leaders, and powerful arms and munitions manufacturers. They voiced concerns through a variety of forums, to include the Army and Navy Journal, the New York Times (whose assistant publisher, Julius Ochs was a member of the Officers’ Reserve Corps), and on the floor of Congress.143 The preparedness group fought to alleviate some of the effects suffered from rapid demobilization, an apathetic public, a return to Republican “normalcy,” parsimonious economic policy, severe cuts to force size, and a lack of immediate threats to United States interests.

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141 Wilbur and Hyde, The Hoover Policies, 608-609. Hoover described offensive weapons as defined by the Geneva conference to include all tanks, chemical warfare, large mobile guns, bombing planes, and to maintain only enough forces to provide for the internal policing and defense of a nation.

142 Griffith, Jr., Men Wanted for the US Army, 122.

143 Ibid., 121.
Promisingly, in 1927, a glimmer of hope for preparedness advocates shined as “Congress showed a willingness to grant [the military] modest increases for specific improvements.”144 Army Chief of Staff from 1926 to 1930 Charles P. Summerall felt some of his many efforts to persuade Congress, the President, and others for increased appropriations worked.145 He proclaimed that through strengthened ties to Congress and honesty with the public, he helped improve severely dilapidated housing and increased the rations allowance for the troops. For example, Summerall told the San Diego Chamber of Commerce that, “it was without precedent in history that a victorious army returned to its own country and was housed in conditions worse than its enemy prisoners during the [Great] war.”146 Coolidge was angry with Summerall’s public comment, and “claimed that $22 million had been authorized for housing improvements…but the president also admitted that only $8 million had actually been appropriated.”147 The economy policy greatly impacted more than housing and rations. It prevented many Regular Army, Guard, and Reserves from conducting marches, field training, and maneuver exercises. This inadequate training situation required difficult budget adjustments and direct intervention from Summerall to mandate at least one week per year of collective training.148 Also, it did more than shrink the Regular Army to dangerously low levels; Summerall’s attempt to increase the National Guard from one hundred ninety thousand to two hundred five thousand soldiers backfired, when he only obtained money for one hundred forty-five thousand.149

144 Ibid., 111.
149 Ibid.
Beyond the policy of economy, during Coolidge’s presidency, Summerall identified what he believed was a major flaw with the NDA 1920 that was not corrected until after the start of WWII, the establishment of the position of Assistant Secretary of War, which had been placed in charge of all the Bureau Chiefs, to include the Ordnance Department. The Bureau Chiefs controlled the appropriations, which stifled visionary Army Chief of Staff initiatives to develop light, medium, and heavy tank designs, improve aviation, organize a mechanized force, develop a new 105mm all purpose field howitzer, and to expedite a new semiautomatic machine gun.\textsuperscript{150} Summerall stated, “if the Chief of Staff had had authority of over the Ordnance Department, the Army would have been much better prepared for WWII.”\textsuperscript{151} Summerall’s, “interest in mechanization was crucial to its development in the US Army in the interwar years. When few senior officers were really interested in tanks and mechanization, Summerall’s support helped overcome the innate conservatism and parochialism of the branch chiefs.”\textsuperscript{152}

While Summerall battled the branch chiefs, he continued work on his initiatives for preparedness. His number one priority was the mobilization of the tactical and supply units required for six field armies.\textsuperscript{153} Under his watch, practice of rapid and innovative methods to mobilization were conducted on paper and deemed to be successful. Further, weekly Joint Board meetings were held to prepare, revise, and coordinate all war plans.\textsuperscript{154} Specifically, Summerall identified war plans Red and Orange as most significant, meaning the likelihood of war against

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 205.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 206.
\item William Gary Nichols, \textit{American Leader in War and Peace: The life and times of WWI soldiers, Army Chief of Staff, and Citadel President General Charles P. Summerall} (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 2011), 345.
\item Summerall, \textit{The Way of Duty, Honor, Country}, 211.
\item The Joint Army and Navy Board was established in 1903 by President Theodore Roosevelt. After WWI, the Joint Board was revitalized and assigned to develop mobilization plans for the next war. The Joint Board was the precursor for what is now the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
\end{itemize}
England, Japan or both simultaneously.\textsuperscript{155} He emphasized that the final war plan included, “every conceivable factor...by the ablest group [the Joint Board] I have ever known.”\textsuperscript{156}

Summerall continued his service into the administration of President Hoover. While Hoover was known as a peace advocate, he was also concerned about preparedness. In May 1931, Hoover told the International Chamber of Commerce, that even though twelve years had passed, “The world expenditure on all arms is now nearly five billions of dollars yearly, an increase of about seventy percent over that previous to the Great War. We stand today with near 5.5 million men actively under arms and twenty million more in reserves.”\textsuperscript{157} Throughout Hoover’s presidency, beginning with his inauguration speeches he held that, “There are two co-operating factors in the maintenance of peace-the building of good will...and the adequate preparedness for defense. We must not only be just, we must be respected.”\textsuperscript{158}

Hoover’s policy was “complete preparedness, but solely for defense; and an earnest desire to reduce military strength in proportion with other nations.”\textsuperscript{159} Hoover’s policy led to a noticeable jump of approximately seventy million dollars per year in the amount approved by the Budget Bureau for the War Department, going from an approximate average of two hundred sixty-five million under Coolidge to three hundred thirty-five million under Hoover.\textsuperscript{160} Hoover’s skepticism of events around the world, such as, the financial collapse of Europe in mid-1931

\textsuperscript{155} In the late 1920s and early 1930s, US Army and Navy planners developed color-coded plans to defend against potential enemies. War Plan Red discussed fighting the British Empire, while War Plan Orange contemplated fighting the Japanese Empire. These plans developed because of the history of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, 1905, and 1911 (which ended in 1923). In addition, both were significant players in the naval arms race that the Washington and London Naval Treaties were attempting to prevent, and together they could shut the United States out of the eastern Atlantic and the western Pacific Oceans. These potential threats to the United States warranted the development of war plans.

\textsuperscript{156} Summerall, \textit{The Way of Duty, Honor, Country}, 197-199.

\textsuperscript{157} Wilbur and Hyde, \textit{The Hoover Policies}, 606.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 579.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 614.

\textsuperscript{160} Griffith, Jr., \textit{Men Wanted for the US Army}, 239.
which brought revolutions, the rise of military dictatorships, an evil spirit of exploitation, vicious nationalism, and Japanese repudiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, all tended to favor continued increases in military funding.\textsuperscript{161} However, the Great Depression was becoming severe by 1931, and as new Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur said, “Hitler was still popularly regarded as a windbag, Japan publicized as a fake, and our government promising it would forever keep us out of war.”\textsuperscript{162} Thus, hotly contested cuts in military spending were made.

MacArthur and preparedness interest groups were influential with Hoover and Congress to preserve personnel from additional cuts below what he called, “the minimum peace strength.”\textsuperscript{163} It was at this point on May 5, 1932 that the US Army and preparedness advocates reached a new low of the interwar years. Plans were developed by Congress to take the officer corps down to ten thousand (which was four thousand officers below MacArthur’s recommended minimum number), eliminate funds for the Reserve Officer Training Corps and organized reserve summer training, and suspend civilian military training camps for a year.\textsuperscript{164} Paradoxically at this time, mechanization of the army was started in earnest as a method to reduce the cost of personnel.\textsuperscript{165} While the army remained a skeleton, and the politicians argued to eliminate more of it as an effort to reduce spending, MacArthur fought to retain it. Ultimately, Congress’ plan was thwarted and Hoover argued that he left the White House with the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Civilian Training Corps in a state capable of quick expansion.\textsuperscript{166} This included a

\textsuperscript{161} Wilbur and Hyde, \textit{The Hoover Policies}, 584.


\textsuperscript{163} D. Clayton James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, vol. 1, 1880-1941 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), 360-361.


\textsuperscript{165} Griffith, Jr., \textit{Men Wanted for the US Army}, 117.

\textsuperscript{166} Wilbur and Hyde, \textit{The Hoover Policies}, 618.

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forty percent increase in the air forces of the army and navy from two thousand to about two thousand eight hundred planes.167

FDR’s sweeping victory in the 1932 elections, combined with Democratic control of the House and Senate, however, portended negatively for preparedness. The nadir of the interwar military was nigh. FDR’s first Hundred Days were busy spending all money available on the New Deal, a policy developed to resuscitate the US economy to stave off unemployment and poverty associated with the Great Depression. To help pay for the New Deal, new cuts to the US military were proposed. FDR’s budget chief directed a ninety million dollar decrease in the 1934 War Department appropriations, which included as much as a fifteen percent pay cut for all federal employees, froze all employee pay at present levels, and proposed to furlough officers on half pay since FDR was about to cut three to four thousand more officers.168 The War Department originally requested three hundred nineteen million dollars for fiscal year 1934, but the Budget Bureau under Hoover cut it down to two hundred seventy-eight million dollars, which was twenty-seven million dollars less than fiscal year 1933.169 The potential ninety million dollar cut represented, an approximate thirty-seven percent reduction from the War Department’s original request for fiscal year 1934.

In response to FDR’s proposed cuts, MacArthur made strong pleas to the House, Senate, and FDR. MacArthur recounted his lost temper toward FDR, “when we lost the next war, and an American boy, lying in the mud with an enemy bayonet through his belly and an enemy foot on his dying throat, spat out his last curse, I wanted the name not to be MacArthur, but Roosevelt.”170 Ultimately, Congress and FDR backed down after strenuous opposition, to include many warnings about German and Italian rearmament programs, and Japan’s continued conquest

167 Ibid.
168 Griffith, Jr., Men Wanted for the US Army, 129.
169 Ibid., 128.
of Manchuria. The result still included the fifteen percent pay cuts and a seventy-five million dollar cut in appropriations from fiscal year 1933, but fortunately, the furlough plan and cuts to officer and enlisted strength were eliminated. However, the effects of the appropriation cuts forced difficult trade-offs in military preparedness. For instance, the Army suspended all army field training for the year, eliminated ROTC and civilian military training camps summer activities, and reduced armory drill days from forty to between twelve and twenty nights a year.171 Further, in order to maintain the officer and enlisted end-strength, MacArthur stunted the growth of Army mechanization and stifled research and development.

FDR continued to work against the best interests of military preparedness with two specific actions. Beginning in February 1934, Congress agreed to restore the fifteen percent pay cut in three five percent increments; however, FDR claimed the increase was unjustified and vetoed the bill, being quickly overridden by sizable majorities in both houses.172 This was especially disheartening in light of FDR’s Civilian Conservation Corps pay being higher than junior US Army enlisted pay.173 For fiscal year 1936, the House and Senate both approved an enlisted strength increase to the long sought after one hundred sixty-five thousand soldiers. But, despite the Senate specifically writing the bill to remove presidential discretion on whether to allow the end-strength increase, FDR found a way to hold back the appropriations money to allow only an end-strength of one hundred forty-seven thousand enlisted soldiers.174

FDR’s attempts to reduce the US military make sense when measured against his foreign and domestic policy objectives. His foreign policy initiatives signaled a lack of a requirement for a strong military. For example, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy reassured Latin America that the

171 Griffith, Jr., Men Wanted for the US Army, 131.
172 Ibid., 161.
173 Ibid., 158-159.
174 Ibid., 137.
United States would not interfere nor intervene in their domestic affairs. Pan Americanism sought to create, encourage and organize diplomatic, political, economic, and social relationships, and cooperation among the states of the Americas. FDR altered the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to show that the United States’ role was no longer sole guarantor of freedom from foreign aggression in the Americas, but would act in a supporting role to aid American countries in their fight against foreign aggression. Further, he openly opposed armed intervention by the United States, and advocated unselfishness. In addition, he referenced President Wilson’s efforts to establish world peace through the League of Nations, and quoted his belief and support for Wilson’s pronouncement that “the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.” Additional peace initiatives included FDR’s opening dialogue with the Soviet Union after sixteen years of silence. He pleaded with the representatives of the World Disarmament Conference to find a solution to eliminate all offensive weapons. However, FDR acknowledged one major issue that showed an incongruence between his foreign policy objectives and his fiscal constraints on the US military. FDR acknowledged that by May 1933 (two months after his inauguration), that after a year of deliberations, the World Disarmament Conference was in crisis. He attributed that crisis to the “attitude of the German Government

176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid., 132.
180 Ibid., 128-131.
181 Ibid., 114-122.
182 Ibid., 114.
and by putting forward of European political and racial difficulties at the expense of the wider world.”

Domestically FDR and Congress went further than ever before to ensure neutrality in the event of war. In 1934, the Johnson Debt Default Act banned private loans to countries that failed to pay their war debts, such as Great Britain. From 1934 to 1936, Republican US Senator Gerald Nye chaired the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry (a.k.a. the Nye Committee), which conducted a highly sensational investigation into the profits and political influence of industrial munitions, chemical, and financial firms. The Committee identified American and international commercial efforts to undermine, evade, and influence the 1922 Washington Disarmament Conference, Geneva Arms Control Conference of 1925, Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1927, and more. Further, the Committee pointed out the aid and assistance from the War, Navy, and Commerce Departments which had condoned the unethical practices so that “the munitions companies may stay in business and be available in the event of another war,” even to the point of selling foreign countries the latest secret weapons and munitions. Further, the Nye Committee condemned commercial interests for usurping United States and international law. For example, the Nye Committee alleged that commercial interests facilitated rearmament of Germany in 1924, provided Japan the latest munitions manufacturing techniques in 1932 (despite international condemnation of their aggression in Manchuria), and circumvented diplomatic efforts and embargoes at every turn since WWI.

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183 Ibid., 115.
184 Moser, Presidents from Hoover through Truman 1929-1953, 105.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
The Nye Committee hearings and final report strongly reinforced isolationist, pacifist, and antimilitarist sentiment throughout the United States. It confirmed for many that the United States entry into WWI was directly the result of commercial interests. In response, the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937 prohibited arms sales to countries at war, while also making it illegal to travel on cruise ships owned by countries at war for fear of those ships sinking with US citizens that might incite pro-war sentiment.\textsuperscript{188} Next, in 1935, Democratic congressman Louis Ludlow proposed the Ludlow Amendment to the US Constitution, which would require a national referendum before the country could declare war.\textsuperscript{189} Despite public opinion polls which showed seventy-three percent in favor of the Ludlow Amendment, the amendment was stuck in the House judiciary committee until late 1937, when FDR fought and barely defeated the amendment.\textsuperscript{190}

Further evidence of attempts to keep the United States neutral and anti-interventionist surfaced. In late 1937, Japan sank the USS Panay, which was at anchor in the Yangtse River. Rather than calls for retaliation, the US public reaction to this event called for the complete withdrawal of the United States from Asia.\textsuperscript{191} Next, in 1937, the War Department’s Director of the WPD, General Stanley Embick recommended to FDR “abandoning the Philippines in favor of a shorter defensive line in the Pacific, further indicating that the proposal had the unqualified support of most of the General Staff.”\textsuperscript{192} The withdrawal from China after being brutally attacked, and military recommendations to abandon the Philippines were clear indicators of the lack of enmity within the US public, as well as the strength of the peace coalition guiding the United States.

\textsuperscript{188} Moser, \textit{Presidents from Hoover through Truman 1929-1953}, 105.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Griffith, Jr., \textit{Men Wanted for the US Army}, 179.
Despite FDR’s focus to create conditions for world peace and revive the domestic economy with his New Deal, the overall quality of the soldiers in the US Army went up as a result of the depression.\textsuperscript{193} Recruiting high quality soldiers became easier as the unemployment rate soared from almost nine percent in 1929 to twenty-five percent by 1933.\textsuperscript{194} This increased demand for employment allowed the emplacement of controls to ensure high quality first time enlistments or reenlistments. These controls included raising the minimum US Army intelligence test score from thirty-four to forty-four, which set the bar at the eighth grade education level for all potential recruits.\textsuperscript{195} Also, high unemployment allowed the Army to prevent reenlistment of soldiers unless they were considered of “very good” quality, as well as eliminating potential recruits with minor physical defects, such as flat feet. While the quality controls varied from year to year, the bottomline was that the quality issues of the 1920s did not carry forward into the 1930s, which meant the meager little army made some improvement.

In 1935, the quality of the soldiers was improving, and the overall size of the enlisted force did rise slightly to one hundred forty-seven thousand (although nowhere near the two hundred eighty thousand soliders authorized in the NDA 1920). Despite improvements, a WPD study warned that the current Regular Army was not big enough to mobilize effectively to execute the four-army plan.\textsuperscript{196} Further, at the same time, a G-4 Supply Office study announced that the equipment shortages were equally as critical at the personnel shortages.\textsuperscript{197} While personnel and equipment shortages were serious, the US Army Chief of Staff from 1935-1939, General Malin Craig added “time” as an additional and perhaps more critical component overlooked thus far by the General Staff, the Congress, the President, and the public. The failure

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 162.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 149.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 151.
\textsuperscript{196} Kreidberg and Henry, \textit{History of Military Mobilization 1775-1945}, 437.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
to identify “time” as a major component of military preparedness, reflected a lack of realism in military war plans. Craig stated that the military leadership prior to his arrival had,

comprehended many paper units, conjectural supply, and a disregard of the time element which forms the main pillar of any planning structure…What transpires on prospective battlefields is influenced vitally years before in the councils of the staff and in the legislative halls of Congress. Time is the only thing that may be irrevocably lost, and it is the first thing lost sight of in the seductive false security of peaceful times.198

The time factor was also addressed to the American Legion in August 1938, by then Deputy Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall when he said, “new types of military planes cannot be designed and produced overnight. Development requires about five years, and later production at least a year.”199 Then, he lamented about the time and cost of bombs, runways, maintenance, training, and a steady flow of replacement parts for new airplanes.200 Next, he stated, “there has been a great deal said about anti-aircraft materiel, most of which requires nearly a year-and-a-half to produce, and is quite expensive.”201 Further, after twenty years since WWI, the National Guard was still “armed with rifles of the type produced thirty-five years ago and with machine guns of war vintage. Our light artillery is the famous old French Soizante-Quinze seventy-five millimeter…Remember that the time element is a vital factor to American preparedness.”202 Thus, by August 1938, the US Army was not prepared to defend the continental United States, much less support FDR’s altered Monroe Doctrine, or to project power anywhere. Further, due to the length of time required to procure modern military equipment, build an army of formidable size, and conduct collective division or corps sized maneuvers, it would likely be years before such an army could exist.

198 Ibid., 438.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid., 623.
FDR announced to Congress his concerns about military readiness on January 28, 1938. He said, “As Commander in Chief…it is my constitutional duty to report…that our national defense is, in the light of the increasing armaments of other nations, inadequate for purposes of national security.” Then he asked for a twenty percent increase in naval rearmament and a fourteen percent increase in army appropriations, primarily for antiaircraft facilities. Given the poor state of the army, this meager request does not indicate that FDR was truly concerned about the national defense. It would also be wrong to say that FDR was not knowledgeable about what the requirements were for true preparedness. His twenty years of mentorship from Mahan and his role as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913 to 1920 gave him adequate knowledge. To be fair, even if FDR had wanted to increase greatly the military, it would have been impossible without public support and Congressional appropriations approval. Upon review of Gallup polls in 1938, “public ambivalence on preparedness suggests that most people viewed the increases as necessary for the preservation of American neutrality, but not for actual use in war.” Further, FDR tried and failed to repeal the arms embargo to enable sale of arms to Britain and France once war began. 

It was not until November 14, 1938 that FDR finally determined that the state of US military preparedness required a fresh look. FDR had watched the rise and rearmament of Hitler’s Germany, the devastating effects of modern air power on the 1936 Spanish Civil War, the Pacts of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the abandonment of the League of Nations, and the blatant disregard for the Kellogg-Brand Pact, among many others, to become concerned about the

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203 Griffith, Jr., *Men Wanted for the US Army*, 175.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid., 178.
206 Ibid., 179.
likelihood of war coming to the United States. Yet, only after the fate of Czechoslovakia was in the hands of Hitler in 1938 did the US Ambassadors to Germany and France both shock FDR with frightening tales of German air power.\(^{208}\) Germany’s estimated annual production capacity was twelve thousand airplanes and Italy could produce twenty-four hundred, versus a British and French combined eighty-four hundred per year.\(^{209}\) In response, FDR said he wanted twenty thousand airplanes, but believed he was ahead of US public sentiment, and that Congress would only approve ten thousand airplanes over the course of two years.\(^{210}\) However, he sought to create the production capacity for a program even larger, since, in his mind, the airplanes were not principally-destined for the US Army Air Corps, but for direct purchase by the air forces of Great Britain and France.\(^{211}\)

FDR’s call for airplanes above all other weapons, despite the grave shortages of ground force equipment was part of a consistent theme he voiced to use US production facilities for aiding the Allies, even to the point of shipping out materiel that Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring contended should be retained for the US forces.\(^{212}\) In September 1939, FDR declared a limited national emergency to enable limited war powers necessary for him to spark increased appropriations to ready the military to preserve neutrality and outfit the military to the extent authorized in peacetime. The concern about military readiness enabled the final Neutrality Act in November 1939, which lifted the arms embargo and placed trade with belligerent nations under the terms of “cash-and-carry,” whereby belligerents must pay cash and carry the materiel using their own transportation.\(^{213}\) Cleverly, FDR knew that Great Britain and France were the only

\(^{208}\) Ibid., 15-16.

\(^{209}\) Ibid., 16-17.

\(^{210}\) Ibid., 17.


\(^{212}\) Ibid.

\(^{213}\) Moser, *Presidents from Hoover through Truman 1929-1953*, 129.
belligerents that had cash available to make arms purchases, which worked well until they started to run out of money.\textsuperscript{214} This led to the Lend-Lease program signed into law on March 11, 1941, which eliminated the Neutrality Acts and ultimately provided fifty billion dollars in assistance to more than thirty countries.\textsuperscript{215} The trouble with Lend-Lease was that the “total requirements then announced were in excess of America’s production powers,” which meant accurate detailed equipment estimates were required, and careful matching of supplies with the highest priority demands was critical.\textsuperscript{216} Lend-Lease, to the benefit of the United States, added close coordination with the British, but the program also added a requirement to equip fully ten British divisions on top of plans to equip and train the US Army’s 4.1 million soldiers as planned in the Victory Program.\textsuperscript{217} In addition, the Chinese, Soviets, South American countries, and others were all desperately seeking weapons and ammunition from the United States. At certain times, supply estimates or demand priorities would change drastically leading to great anxiety throughout the War Department and the Lead-Lease managers. In one example, the supply and demand estimates changed so drastically that Marshall commented that “no more thirty calibre ammunition should go to Britian from Army stocks, because there now was a shortage of 1.077 billion rounds.”\textsuperscript{218}


\textsuperscript{216} Watson, \textit{The War Department}, 324.

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 322-361. On September 16, 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act was the first peace time draft in the United States and was needed to repair quickly the severe shortages and neglect to US military readiness suffered over the interwar years. The SSA was limited to nine hundred thousand soldiers in training for twelve months. In May 1941, US Army Chief of Staff General Marshall assigned the development of what became the Victory Program to the WPD, which was principally authored by then Major (later Lt. Gen.) A.C. Wedemeyer. The Victory Program was completed September 10, 1941, and planned how to mobilize, train, and equip the US military for extensive operations to participate in the war under Rainbow Plan Five by July 1, 1943. The plan estimated the need for two hundred fifteen US Army divisions, or 4.1 million soldiers.

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., 313.
February 1941, Marshall said, “we have had to reduce the amount of ammunition for training to
about sixty percent of requirements.”\textsuperscript{219} There were shortages of powder to make munitions,
shortages of machine-tools, and requirements straight from FDR that US maintenance crews
would go with equipment to Egypt, the Soviet Union, and other places to ensure US Lend-Lease
equipment was properly maintained.\textsuperscript{220}

Overall, preparedness advocates suffered throughout the interwar years. Concerns about
steep pay cuts, poor quality of recruited troops, high and increasing rates of desertion and
purchase discharges, as well as low rates of reenlistment were all symptoms of a severely
neglected US Army. This neglect, however, was not due to the Army Chiefs of Staff, each of
whom, “warned of the dangers that would befall the nation.”\textsuperscript{221} The interwar Presidents enacted
policies that were generally supported by the public, and when they were not, incumbents were
replaced by others who more accurately reflected the public’s views.

Analysis, Recommendations, and Conclusion

The reasons for the US military unpreparedness were deeply-rooted within the US society
and exacerbated by the Great Depression and the Nye Committee, all of which kept public
interests focused on internal issues and staunchly against the idea of a strong military and
entanglement in Europe. The US public’s strongly-held beliefs about the detriment to liberty
posed by large standing armies, a belief in the impregnable geography that surrounds the United
States, and a successful record accorded to the military tradition of civilian-soldiers showed a
failure to grasp the reality of the post-WWI military paradigm. The socially constructed
worldviews of the US public became deeply entrenched, and despite persistent model crisis in the
face of obvious signs, the US public failed to call for and the US government failed to provide a

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., 315.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., 314-330.
\textsuperscript{221} Griffith, Jr., \textit{Men Wanted for the US Army}, 119.
ready military. A few of the obviously dangerous signs included German rearmament, withdrawal from the League of Nations, disregard for the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the London and Washington Naval treaties, and the failure of the World Disarmament Conference. Right in the face of grave danger, the United States allowed, “military strength to decrease and decay to the point where it became tragically insufficient and, even more important, incapable of restoration save after the loss of many lives and the expenditure of other resources beyond man’s comprehenson.”

To alter these internalized beliefs would have required a model crisis (larger than WWI) so severe that there would be no resistance to the new paradigm. Further, Clausewitz’s instruction on the role of enmity in the mobilization of societies rings true. The passions of the people must be aroused to warrant risking massive loss of life, financial expenditures that risk bankrupting ones nation, and to jeopardize the sanctity of why the United States was formed, i.e. life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Clausewitz’s trinity provided a useful lens to examine the people, the military, and the government. To blame the President or Congress, who represent the entirety of the nation’s populace, would be to deny that they represent the voice of their constituents. The evidence clearly alleviates the military establishment from doing everything within their power to ensure military readiness, even as the Nye Committee alleged complicit behavior to achieve preparedness ends. In the end, US public opinion and the desire to be a peaceful democracy precluded military readiness at the risk of military failure and collapse of the United States to the Axis powers.

This research concludes that WWI was a crisis so large that it enabled the development of a new military readiness paradigm reflected in the NDA 1920. If the United States had adhered to the provisions of the NDA 1920, a reasonably-sized and ready Regular Army, National Guard, and Reserves would have provided the critical foundation from which to build military power.

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The force proposed in the NDA was large enough to conduct collective maneuvers on a regular basis. However, the NDA 1920 did not go far enough. It failed to specify monies for the research and development necessary to maintain a modern military capability, nor did it specify maintenance and mandatory collective training on existing military equipment. The development, procurement, and training of a modern military are equally important as having the right number of soldiers. The Uptonian approach, advocated for by March in the 1919 War Department Annual Reports, would have provided for a large pool of trained and well-educated officers, a diverse set of complimentary military career fields with the training and equipment necessary to expand rapidly the professional military. Sadly, resistance to new paradigms has always been and will always be a challenge for all to wrestle. Military disaster could potentially strike at any time, and the United States must have a large enough force with the most modern equipment that is always trained and ready.

The purpose of this research was to determine the root causes of the US military’s lack of readiness in the interwar years to assist today’s operational planners to avert a future catastrophe. This subject is particularly important in light of recent US military budget cuts and downsizing post-Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, while the military might of China rises, and Russia reasserts itself in the Ukraine. To avoid future military failure, the US military, government, and people must acknowledge the cost of military preparedness today versus the cost of military disaster tomorrow. Based on Figure 1, the internalized worldview developed early in the heritage of the United States may continue to play a role in today’s military drawdown, which shows a decline of US military personnel to about one-half of one percent of the US population.

This research voices concern for a US population that is largely divorced today from any association or knowledge of their military. Beyond the concerns of the small and ever shrinking US military is the disturbing idea that politicians are discussing elimination of the draft all together. The lesson of the interwar years is that, “Peace is the continuation of struggle only by
other means.” Thus far, history has proven that no known antidote exists for the disease of war. Hoover codified the right approach when he said, “There are two co-operating factors in the maintenance of peace—the building of good will…and the adequate preparedness for defense. We must not only be just, we must be respected.” Therefore, like March recommended in his 1919 Annual Report, a larger and more active proportion of society should contribute to and share the burden to defend and preserve the country. The ideal state would ensure a non-intrusive universal military training program to ready the youth of the country physically, mentally, and morally. This not only ensures the readiness of the state, but also makes informed and aware citizens, vice the apathetic ones of the interwar years and now.

Further, a bipartisan congressional committee should conduct an independent study of the impact of military budget decisions on collective training and maneuver exercises at the US military Combat Training Centers. The interwar years has taught that soldiers without modern weapons and equipment and collective training do not make effective militaries. The US public must be privy to military readiness studies to understand the full ramifications of budget decisions. To keep soldiers without equipment or to spend on research and development without producing equipment with which soldiers train is a mistake. The interwar years prove that a balanced military approach with the right amount of soldiers, equipment, training, and transport is the only proven method for obtaining military preparedness.

Lastly, in an era of quickly rising educational costs, the US government should better tie national military readiness objectives with opportunities for education and job training, vice recent political discussions to give away free community college. The Uptonian military model urges that building capable soldiers and leaders takes time because of the absolute need for advanced education as a critical component of military readiness. The military planners should

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ensure thorough and challenging military educational programs as part of both enlisted and officer training at every echelon of command. The US Army School of Advanced Military Studies has developed the Five Pillars of Design Education, which include history, theory, doctrine, philosophy, and practice.\textsuperscript{225} This would be a useful starting point to develop a comprehensive curriculum for any unit. The rapid growth of the computerization and sophistication of military forces requires education levels that far surpass earlier military eras. Thus, attempting to train, equip, and mobilize rapidly for war now may take much longer than during WWI or WWII. Therefore, peacetime readiness must be elevated in the national discussion. The US public must remain vigilant and prepared in peace, because as history has shown, the next war will come rapidly and unexpectedly.

\textsuperscript{225} School of Advanced Military Studies, \textit{Art of Design Student Text, Version 2} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Center, 2010), 27.
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