The major contributions of immigrants to the elements of American national power – Economic, Political, and Military – evokes a powerful narrative, promoting US interests and values throughout the world. This monograph examines three immigrant groups, the Irish, the Mexicans and the Chinese. Today, all three groups comprise significant diaspora populations in the United States. They offer unique insights and as well as continuities between past, present, and future immigration and US Army service. Immigration policy affected the level of inclusion and integration these groups experienced in American society and concomitantly their representation in the US Army. For the US Army to gain increased access to the immigrant population, this monograph recommends continuing the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, with a proven track record of enlisting high-quality non-citizens, and the enlistment of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) immigrants, mainly represented by Mexican youth. These programs greatly expand the recruiting market and provide the US Army with needed strategic depth in manpower and key skills vital to the national interest.
Abstract

Immigrants and the US Army: A Study in Readiness and the American Dream, by LTC Che T. Arosemena, USA, 71 pages.

The major contributions of immigrants to the elements of American national power – Economic, Political, and Military – evokes a powerful narrative, promoting US interests and values throughout the world. This monograph examines three immigrant groups, the Irish, the Mexicans and the Chinese. Today, all three groups comprise significant diaspora populations in the United States. They offer unique insights and as well as continuities between past, present, and future immigration and US Army service. Immigration policy affected the level of inclusion and integration these groups experienced in American society and concomitantly their representation in the US Army. Currently, immigrants comprise nearly five percent of yearly Regular Army and Army Reserve accessions. For the US Army to gain increased access to the immigrant population, this monograph recommends continuing the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, with a proven track record of enlisting high-quality non-citizens, and the enlistment of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) immigrants, mainly represented by Mexican youth. These programs greatly expand the recruiting market and provide the US Army with needed strategic depth in manpower and key skills vital to the national interest.
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I would like to dedicate this monograph to my late Father, Enrique Antonio Arosemena-Silvestre, an immigrant from Panama, who came to the United States an eight-year-old boy in 1949, joined the Army Paratroopers at age eighteen, served his country with honor, and set a fine example for me to follow. My wife, Katia, also an immigrant from Panama and fellow US Army officer, reminds me of the American Dream every day. A special acknowledgment to Margaret Stock, Esq., and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), US Army Reserve, as her initial guidance and mentorship was invaluable and helped me understand the complex interrelationships of immigration law, politics, and the military. Finally, I could not have completed this monograph without the know-how and direction of Dr. Barry Stentiford, a great mentor and historian, who made the effort to track down his “prodigal son” from time to time.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFQT</td>
<td>Armed Forces Qualification Test</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
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<td>AVA</td>
<td>All Volunteer Army</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>Critical Foreign Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>DACA</td>
<td>Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMDC</td>
<td>Defense Manpower Data Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DREAM</td>
<td>Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>HCP</td>
<td>Health Care Professionals</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>House Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>INA</td>
<td>Immigration and Naturalization Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>Lawful Permanent Resident</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAVNI</td>
<td>Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest</td>
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<td>NPS</td>
<td>Non-Prior Service</td>
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<td>NYSV</td>
<td>New York State Volunteers</td>
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<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>QMA</td>
<td>Qualified Military Available</td>
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<td>RA</td>
<td>Regular Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEM</td>
<td>Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Total Army Analysis</td>
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<td>United States Citizenship and Immigration Service</td>
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Introduction

Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp! cries she
With silent lips. Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!


The United States is both a nation of and built by immigrants. The former implies that the “golden door” that Emma Lazarus spoke of is responsible for the fabric of American society while the latter suggests that the nation’s immigrants contributed to the United States’ rise to global leadership. During a conference at Princeton University on Military Man Power and American Policy in 1942, Dr. Edward Mead Earle stated that “[m]an power is a definite factor in the world balance of power, and, what is more important, it is a constantly changing factor…the nature of these changes and their probable effect…should be thoroughly understood in order that the national interest may be safeguarded…”1 Today, the Correlates of War project applies this same logic in explaining the factors that indicate national power. Three of those indicators — military personnel, urban population, and total population — are directly influenced by immigration.2

European immigrants and their future generations have contributed to the Army’s end-strength from the Revolutionary War until the present.3 During World War II, European

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immigrants and new Americans of different ethnicities would learn to work together for a common cause, forging a new American identity.\textsuperscript{4} The All-Volunteer Army (AVA) has struggled to incorporate two significant immigrant populations into its ranks, the Mexicans and the Chinese, despite their long history of immigration to the United States. This demonstrated that the “golden door” was open for some and closed to others. This monograph argues that the United States should adopt a more open immigration policy, resulting in concomitant changes to Army enlistment policy and greater access to a recruiting pool of new immigrants.

In times of war, the US Army has called on immigrants to enlist in the military either voluntarily or through conscription. The American Civil War and the Global War on Terrorism are notable examples where the United States incentivized immigrant military service through expedited naturalization to meet end-strength requirements.\textsuperscript{5} Today, approximately five percent of Regular Army and Army Reserve accessions are non-citizen immigrants.\textsuperscript{6} During and prior to the Vietnam War, all legal immigrants, regardless of status, could enlist in the military.\textsuperscript{7} Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force in 1974, Department of Defense (DOD) policy has limited the recruitment of immigrants to lawful permanent residents (LPR) of the United States in peacetime.\textsuperscript{8} In 2006, the DOD policy became US law, which statutorily restricted military service to US citizens, US nationals, LPRs, and “individuals described by one of the Compacts of Free

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\textsuperscript{4} Thomas A. Bruscino, \textit{A Nation Forged in War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along} (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 2010), 6.
\textsuperscript{7} Naomi Verdugo and Margaret Stock, \textit{The Impact and Potential of America’s Foreign Born Population on Army Recruiting and Force 2025} (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army Manpower and Reserve Affairs, January 23, 2015), 3.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Association with the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, or Palau.9

This monograph examines three immigrant groups, the Irish, the Mexicans and the Chinese. They offer unique insights as well as continuities between past, present, and future immigration and US Army service. Each of these three immigrant communities was drawn to the United States because of opportunities for work, education, and/or rights — civil, religious, or political — that they did not have in their native lands. Today, all three of these groups comprise significant diaspora populations in the United States.10 According to the Migration Policy Institute, both the Irish and Mexicans comprise the second and third largest diasporas (the Germans are the largest), while the Chinese comprise the tenth largest and fastest growing diaspora population.11

The Irish, particularly the Irish Catholics, began a wave of mass immigration to the United States, starting in the late 1840s. Their integration into American society was facilitated, in great part, by their military service in the Civil War. They formed communities and political institutions in major US Cities such as Boston, New York City, Chicago and Philadelphia.12 The Irish are an excellent example of “[t]he… presence of immigrants in the military [having] a

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10 According to the Migration Policy Institute, the term “diaspora” includes individuals born in the country as well as those who cited that origin as their ancestry, race, and/or ethnicity regardless of where they were born.

11 US Census Bureau, 2011 *American Community Survey (Table B05006 Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population)*. Data for the “diaspora” represent estimates from the Migration Policy Institute’s analysis of the 2011 ACS microdata.

…historical precedent…[as immigrants] composed half of all military recruits by the 1840s and twenty percent of the 1.5 million service members in the Union Army during the Civil War."\cite{13}

More Mexicans have immigrated to the United States than any other immigrant group since 1980.\cite{14} Mexican immigrants and citizens comprise the largest share, nearly seventy-five percent, of the Hispanic population in the United States.\cite{15} Most Mexicans immigrated to the United States to escape poverty and to find work in agricultural, manufacturing, or service industries. The transient nature of Mexican labor immigration, gaps in education, socioeconomic status, immigrant localization in the Southwest, and periods of mass deportation adversely affected the Mexican immigrant population’s acculturation.

The Chinese, who were excluded from immigration and naturalization from 1882 to 1947, are likely to be among the largest contributors of future immigrants. Chinese and other Asian immigrants tend to have strong Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) backgrounds and are incentivized by access to higher education and industry.\cite{16} Therefore, to compete with US industry for their skills, the US Army must maintain adequate recruitment programs for this population.

Figure 1 shows the number of immigrants (LPR) who have arrived in the United States from 1820 to 2009 by country of origin for the ten largest contributing nations. Vernon Briggs, a labor economist at Cornell University, described four waves of immigration in his 1996 book,

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\cite{14} Jeanne Batalova, *Mexican Immigrants in the United States* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, April 23, 2008), 1.
\end{flushright}
Mass Immigration and the National Interest. The first wave lasted from the 1830s until 1860 with a peak in the 1840s with the arrival of Irish, French Canadian and German immigrants, primarily unskilled laborers for nonagricultural work. The second wave lasted from the early 1860s until 1880, with more Irish, German, British, and Canadian immigrants as well as new immigrants from Scandinavia and China, also unskilled nonagricultural laborers.

![Graph showing immigration by country and decade](image)

Figure 1. Immigration (LPR) to the United States by country of origin from 1820-2009


The third wave of immigration, primarily eastern and southern Europeans, lasted from 1880 until 1920. This period was the largest period of mass immigration in the nation’s history,

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18 Ibid.


20 Northern Ireland included in Ireland prior to 1925.
with a shift from nonagricultural to agricultural laborers.\textsuperscript{21} This period was also selective and exclusionary, thus closing the “golden door” to certain ethnicities and countries of origin, like the Chinese. At the end of this period of immigration, the United States passed the Immigration Act of 1924 or National Origins Act, which “[had] popular support from virtually every influential quarter of society…[and] imposed the first numerical restriction on immigration.”\textsuperscript{22}

The fourth wave of immigration began after 1965 and was characterized by a return to a more liberal immigration policy, consequently, reopening the "golden door." This current wave of immigration, primarily from Mexico, but since 2010 is increasingly composed of Asian immigrants from India, China, and the developing world.\textsuperscript{23} According to Briggs, the Immigration Act of 1965 and the disregard of the subsequent Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy recommendations in 1979 were central reasons for the unprecedented rise in immigration from Mexico and the developing world with negative economic consequences for the American working class.\textsuperscript{24} Additionally, Briggs asserted that subsequent immigration reform laws only exacerbated the problem and increased poverty.\textsuperscript{25} This view is openly debated by immigration economists who argue for the net benefits of immigration. In 2008, economist George Borjas, established “that immigration increased the real income of the native born by about 0.2%.”\textsuperscript{26} A 2012 article by Benjamin Powell argued that restrictive immigration policy such as “completely

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Briggs, \textit{Mass Immigration and the National Interest}, 53.
\item Ibid, 4; Robert A. Divine, \textit{American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952} (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 28. According to Divine, the 1924 law was enacted for “the restriction of immigration from southern and eastern Europe to preserve a predominance of persons of northwestern European origin…”
\item Briggs, \textit{Mass Immigration and the National Interest}, 9.
\item George J. Borjas, “Immigration,” in \textit{The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics} (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2008), 256.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
closing US borders” could cost the United States up to 193 billion dollars in Gross Domestic Product.27

By 2023, the immigrant share of the US population is estimated to be at levels exceeding the early 1900s, its historical peak, which has spurred policy discussions in the United States about the need for further immigration reform.28 “The US population is currently projected to reach majority-minority status (the point at which less than half of the population is non-Hispanic white) in 2042.”29 Amplifying the rise in immigration is the rise in illegal immigration, in particular from Mexico. It is estimated that about eleven million illegal or undocumented immigrants currently live and work in the United States.30 Nearly six million or 56 percent of the illegal immigrants come from Mexico.31 As white and black native-born populations in the United States continue to get older due to lower birth rates, Hispanics, influenced by a large immigrant population, remain younger and maintain higher birth rates.32 Nearly half of all US infants are racial or ethnic minorities according to a 2012 US Census bureau report.33

As the demographics of American society change over the next thirty years, new immigrants will become an increasingly important recruiting base for the US Army. To succeed in

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recruiting this new population, inherent challenges in the recruitment of immigrants must be
overcome to include current immigration law and policy, age, language, medical fitness, family
status, and education level. The US Army can overcome these challenges through commitment
and investment in programs and policies to further expand, incentivize, and focus immigrant
enlistment. This will require a skills-based emphasis to immigration policy. Briggs aptly invoked
President John F. Kennedy when he wrote, “the guiding principle [of immigration policy] should
be what immigrants can do for this country, not what this country can do for them.”34

34 Briggs, Mass Immigration and the National Interest, 246.
Literature Review

This monograph used various sources to include the US Census, the US Citizenship and Immigration Service, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), numerous books, reports, and related monographs on the subjects of immigration, naturalization, assimilation, military recruitment, immigration law and policy, as well as national strategic documents, and Army doctrine. In particular, this review focuses on three studies of non-citizens in the military, written in 2004, 2005, and 2011 respectively. This review explores areas of previous research to gain a deeper understanding of the problem and to develop a novel approach by contrast.

The first study, *Noncitizens in the US Military*, was completed in March 2004 by Naval Postgraduate School students, Lieutenant Commander Lynn G. O’Neil and 1st Lieutenant Omer S. Senturk. It included a review of US immigration policy and military service during four distinct time periods of American history, interviews with non-citizen enlistees, and a quantitative analysis of non-citizen enlistee attrition, retention, and promotion versus their citizen counterparts. They concluded that the two largest sources of immigrants in 2004 were from Mexico and the Philippines and that these sources were also the largest for non-citizen military members. Using DMDC accessions data from fiscal year (FY) 1990-1998, O’Neil and Senturk found that non-citizens have “significantly lower predicted first-term attrition rates than do citizens in the enlisted force…and retention beyond the first term of enlistment.”\(^{35}\) They linked these statistical results with practical considerations stating that “[immigrants] stand the chance to gain economic benefits from enlistment[,]…benefit [from] assimilation into [American] society[,]…and have more to lose from unsuccessful enlistments…[as] a less-than-honorable discharge”\(^{36}\) may limit their chance of future employment and naturalization.

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\(^{36}\) Ibid.
O’Neil and Senturk recommended new policies such as better administrative tracking of non-citizens in the military as over 31 percent of their DMDC data was missing a country of origin. They identified that security clearances required for many military specialties could be declassified to allow for more non-citizen enlistment. Furthermore, they recommended “an immigration quota for qualified individuals for a specific period of time in exchange for citizenship.”37 They offered “…the Navy’s highly successful Philippines Enlistment Program…”38 as a potential model. Finally, they recommended “expedited permanent resident status for family members…”39 of immigrant non-citizens serving on extended active duty to incentivize military service as an alternative for the long waiting period for family green cards. O’Neil and Senturk suggested that further studies should be conducted on specific ethnicities of interest in the non-citizen population, in particular Mexicans, “as they account for the largest number of non-citizen recruits.”40

The second study, Non-Citizens in Today’s Military: Final Report, was published in April 2005 by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and comprised of a team of five researchers — Anita U. Hattiangadi, Aline O. Quester, Gary Lee, Diana S. Lien, and Ian D. MacLeod. The report provided a comprehensive review of the non-citizen population, how they are recruited, and how many naturalize. Like O’Neil and Senturk, the CNA research team used regression analysis to study the Army Translator Aide (09L) pilot program, three-month and thirty-six-month attrition of non-citizen accessions, non-citizen accessions who became US citizens while in the military, and time-to-citizenship with DMDC accessions data from FY 1988 to FY 2003. This study came on the heels of President George W. Bush’s 2002 expedited naturalization executive order, the 2003 Army force structure transformation to the Modular Force, the 2004

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 83–84.
40 Ibid., 84.

First, [non-citizens] are more diverse than citizen recruits—not just racially and ethnically, but also linguistically and culturally. This diversity is particularly valuable as the United States faces the challenges of the Global War on Terrorism. Second, we find that non-citizens do extremely well in the military. In fact, black, Asian and Pacific Islander (API), and Hispanic non-citizens have 3-month attrition rates that are 7 to 8 percentage points below those for white citizens. Furthermore, non-citizens have 36-month attrition rates that are 9 to 20 percentage points lower than the attrition rates of white citizens.41

With regard to the likelihood of becoming a citizen while in the military, the researchers found “the predicted probability that a non-citizen accession without dependents—our base case—becomes a citizen while in the military was 25.8 percent.”42 This base probability increased or decreased based on marginal factors such as education, race/ethnicity, age, branch of service, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score, dependency status, and sex. At the time of their report, the researchers also found that the average time to citizenship for all services was under ten months and “for non-citizen recruits between 1998 and 2002, [President Bush’s] executive order may have reduced their actual waiting period for citizenship by up to 3 years.”43 Finally, they evaluated the Army Translator Aide (09L) pilot program, which to that point had only 270 recruits. They point out the high initial attrition rate, up to 50 percent, in the program due to cultural and language differences and “misunderstandings on the parts of the recruits,”44 which the Army took steps to rectify and had largely overcome by the time of their report in 2005.

The authors recommended that policy to the military services’ recruitment of non-citizens focus on “eligibility for expedited citizenship, the benefits of filing for citizenship while in the

42 Ibid., 77.
43 Ibid., 80.
44 Ibid., 100.
military, and the benefits of attaining citizenship.”45 They also recommended “investigating reasons for differences in service policies regarding non-citizens and publicizing the results of such a study.”46 Ironically, the results of this study were not able to be implemented by the Army during FY 2005 when the simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan raised the US Army’s active and reserve component end-strength requirements to 80,000 and 22,175 respectively.47 In 2005, the Army failed to meet its yearly mission by 6,705 soldiers in the Regular Army and 2,775 soldiers in the Army Reserve.48 This failure prompted a November 2005 Congressional Budget Office report, which “examined the recruiting and retention rates of the Army and the implications of those rates, because it was the only service that failed to achieve its recruiting mission that year.”49

The third study, *Non-citizens in the Enlisted US Military*, by Molly F. McIntosh, Seema Sayala, and David Gregory of CNA was authored in November 2011. The authors revisited the CNA study of April 2005 with an evaluation of the non-citizen population, how non-citizens are recruited, citizenship status, and first-term performance, citizenship attainment, and time-to-citizenship using a sample of FY 1999 to FY 2008 DMDC accessions data. The researchers also conducted a review of the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Program. McIntosh, et al. developed three major findings:

First, the number of [US] non-citizens who are eligible for enlisted military service is large. Approximately 1.2 million non-citizens are in the desired age range (18 to 29) and have the requisite education, resident status, and English language ability for enlistment. Second, [the] data suggest[s] that a sizable share of the recruitable [US] non-citizen

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46 Ibid., 3.
48 Ibid.
49 George L. Moore, “Low Quality Recruits - Don’t Want to Go to War with Them, Can’t Go without Them: Their Impact on the All-Volunteer Force” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), 1.
population comes from diverse backgrounds and possesses language and cultural skills that are of strategic interest to the [US] military. Third . . . non-citizen recruits are far less likely than citizen recruits to attrite in the first term, even after controlling for demographic and service-related characteristics that likely affect attrition.  

The researchers aptly pointed out a caveat to their assertion on attrition rates. They stated that the gap between non-citizen and citizen recruits might decrease as the services recruited more non-citizens “if, for instance, the marginal recruit’s commitment to serving his or her country decreases as the pool of non-citizen enlistees increases.”

Additionally, McIntosh et al. found an increase in citizenship attainment and marked decrease in time-to-citizenship across all services, which they attributed to the services and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) playing a much larger role during initial training to promote naturalization. They singled out the Army’s basic training naturalization program, started in 2009 as having “paved the way” for the other services. The Army program was created “in response to a need to naturalize soldiers accessing through MAVNI.” The Army then rapidly expanded “its expedited naturalization processing for all non-citizens to include LPRs.” For the Army, McIntosh et al. found a positive effect, plus five percent, on citizenship attainment if the non-citizen was an Asian-Pacific Islander and a negative effect, minus 2 percent if non-citizen was Hispanic. In this study, the researchers were better able to evaluate the effects of President Bush’s 2002 executive order. The Army’s time-to-citizenship rate post-2002 was the lowest of all the services. Interestingly, McIntosh et al. found that Hispanics and Blacks had a significantly longer time-to-citizenship rates, on average, four to nine months.


51 Ibid., 58.

52 Ibid., 34.

53 Ibid., 34.

54 Ibid., 46.
McIntosh et al. highlighted four policy implications based on their analysis. First, they recommended that the services develop recruiting strategies for non-citizens, which take advantage of non-citizens’ unique language and cultural skills. Second, they advised that DOD and USCIS share administrative data on non-citizens to maintain “visibility on who attains citizenship and when.” This, in conjunction with DOD’s attrition data, would provide an accurate picture of those service members who are not completing their required “service obligations in exchange for expedited citizenship.” 55 Third, they encouraged the continuation of basic training naturalization programs. Lastly, the researchers suggested that unless new policies were made to allow for the enlistment and expedited naturalization of non-citizens outside of war, the services would be unprepared for a potentially difficult future recruiting environment. 56

55 McIntosh, Sayala, and Gregory, Non-Citizens in the Enlisted US Military, 58.
56 Ibid., 59.
They Came from the West – The Irish

Irish Immigration - Historical Context

The Irish have come to America as early as 1584’s expedition to North Carolina’s Outer Banks led by Sir Walter Raleigh. Timothy Meager writes that “[t]he last Irish man or woman may never come, because few things have been as constant in the histories of Ireland and the United States as immigration to the United States.” In the wake of the Great Famine in Ireland, about one and a half million Irish immigrated to the United States from 1847 to 1854, causing a tension in the economic and cultural balance of the East Coast cities. The rapid influx of immigrants raised growing concern over the impacts of uncontrolled immigration. The tragedy of the Irish during this period is analogous with the Jewish holocaust or the African middle passage. It is estimated that about one million Irish died during the famine years, creating a strong pull factor for Irish immigration to the United States. The Great Famine migration exposed a dichotomy between the “Ulster” Irish Protestants, who immigrated to America from 1717 to 1775, and the new Irish immigrants of Roman Catholic faith. During the ‘famine’ migration, the Irish Protestants sought to distinguish themselves from the Irish Catholics by adopting the title “Irish Scots or Scotch-Irish,” alluding to their Presbyterian Scottish and hence longer American

57 The ‘West’ is an intentional play on words. The Irish migrated from the East. The connotation is that the Irish are part of the larger Western world culture.


60 Ibid.


62 The Ulster Irish were Scots who resettled in Ireland during the seventeenth century and later immigrated to America in the early to mid eighteenth century to escape religious persecution of the Anglican Church and poor economic conditions in Ireland. Susannah Ural Bruce, The Harp and the Eagle: Irish-American Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2006), 7-8.
lineage. The Irish Scots sought to identify themselves with American values and culture, rather than with their Scottish or Irish heritage. Growing tensions between Protestants and Irish Catholics led to a rise in Nativism. Clashes between the Irish Catholics and Nativist groups throughout the mid-1800s resulted in the destruction of Irish Catholic areas in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia and the deaths of Irish Catholics. A notable example was the May 1844 riot by local Protestants in the Kensington district of Philadelphia resulting in the burning of dozens of homes and two churches, St. Augustine’s and St. Michael’s, killing sixteen Irish Catholics.

The challenges for the new Irish immigrants to survive in a hostile America created resilient Irish communities throughout the country. By 1860, Irish Catholic communities were rapidly growing in American cities from the East Coast to San Francisco. The Irish developed a practical approach to achieving parity with their fellow Americans, the ballot box. The Irish used the vote, sometimes illegally, to gain advantages in their local governments and to climb the socio-economic ladder. This new voting power exacerbated the differences between the Nativists and Irish Catholics. Protestant Americans, who viewed the Irish Catholics as a threat to the United States and its Protestant traditions, formed the American or “Know-Nothing” party of the 1830s to 1850s. The Know-Nothings maintained ties based on political convenience to the Whig and Free-Soiler parties and comprised the right-wing of American politics. This nativist alliance eventually weakened the Whigs eliminating them as a major political party leading to the

63 Bruce, The Harp and the Eagle, 7-8.
64 Nativism is associated with anti-immigrant political policies and some notable movements are the American or “Know-Nothing” Party of the 1840s to 1850s (anti-Irish Catholic), the Immigration Restriction League of the 1890s (anti-Chinese), and the Tea Party Republicans of the present (anti-Mexican). For a exemplary description Anti-Irish nativism and Anti-Romanism see, James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, vol. 6, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 130-135.
65 Bruce, The Harp and the Eagle, 12; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 32.
66 Bruce, The Harp and the Eagle, 16-18.
creation of the new Republican party. Due to the anti-slavery and/or anti-immigrant stance of these parties and their contempt for Catholics, the Irish flocked to the Democratic Party, who actively sought out immigrants to increase their voting base.

Although the Irish gained a voice in politics, most young Irish immigrants lacked the necessary skills to succeed in the labor force. The Irish worked as house servants and day laborers, the jobs undesired by native-born Americans. Unskilled labor was full with uncertainty, abuses by profiteers and unscrupulous foremen and pit bosses. Therefore, the steady pay and supplements that accompanied military service, such as housing and medical benefits, attracted many Irish men to the Army. From 1850 to 1851, nearly two-thirds of the immigrants who entered the United States Army were Irish men. In the 1850s, nearly two-thirds of the Army was foreign-born and 60 percent of the foreign born enlistees were Irish. Out of the crucible of the Great Famine and a politically hostile America, Irish immigrant men found purpose and livelihood in the US Army. This new Irish immigrant manpower would form a number of Union Army volunteer regiments during the American Civil War.

The Irish Volunteers of the Civil War

According to John H. Doyle, a professor of history at the University of South Carolina and author of the 2014 book *The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War*:

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68 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 140.
69 Bruce, *The Harp and the Eagle*, 23.
70 Ibid, 84.
71 Jobs such as dockworkers, house servants, dishwashers or janitorial workers were filled by low-skilled Irish Catholic immigrants. Many poor Irish women turned to prostitution in order to make enough money to survive. The terms “white slaves” or even “white niggers” were used as derogatory slang for Irish Immigrants by native-born Americans. Bruce, *The Harp and the Eagle*, 31.
72 Ibid.
In 1860, about 13% of the U.S. population was born overseas—roughly what it is today. One in every four members of the Union armed forces was an immigrant, some 543,000 of the more than 2 million Union soldiers by recent estimates. Another 18% had at least one foreign-born parent. Together, immigrants and the sons of immigrants made up about 43% of the U.S. armed forces.\textsuperscript{74}

Therefore, according to Doyle, there was a 25 percent immigrant participation rate in the Civil War. Other estimates place the participation rate at about 18 percent.\textsuperscript{75} Historians estimate that over 150,000 Irishmen fought for the Union Army and that 20,000 to 30,000 fought for the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{76} Most of these soldiers were immigrants, “exiles in their own right,” who arrived looking for the freedom and opportunity that America provided but also with an eye towards the future liberation of Ireland from British rule.\textsuperscript{77}

Irish immigrants saw the Civil War as an issue of constitutional rights. Although the Irish were fearful that President Lincoln’s emancipation of the slaves would create a labor imbalance and wanted the status quo with respect to the rights of the Southern states, they understood that if the US Constitution dissolved then their struggle for equality both in the United States and back in Ireland was hopeless.\textsuperscript{78} The Irish saw their rights as new Americans tied to the US Constitution but also as a powerful agent for change in their native Ireland.

Few Irish-Americans saw the war purely as Americans. The vast majority of military-age Irish-American males were recent immigrants who had spent the majority of their lives in Ireland, and many did not see their journey to America as one taken by choice but rather


\textsuperscript{78} Bruce, \textit{The Harp and the Eagle}, 43.
as a matter of exile. Recruiters and Irish-American community leaders recognized this and commonly mentioned dual loyalties to encourage military service. 79

The dual loyalties of the Irish caused unrest with native-born Americans, who saw the Irish volunteerism as a means to promote Irish nationalism and the future liberation of Ireland from Great Britain. This mix of dual loyalties manifested itself during the visit of the Prince of Wales to New York City in October 1860, only one month before Abraham Lincoln’s election. The 69th New York State Volunteer (NYSV) Regiment protested by refusing to march in the parade or attend the ball in the Prince’s honor under the argument that as the likely successor to the British throne, he was the figurehead of a nation seen as the oppressor of Ireland. 80 The protest caused a great deal of anti-Irish press and brought into question the Irish’s willingness to serve American interests in time of war.

The 69th NYSV regiment was closely linked to the staunchly Democratic Tammany Hall political machine in New York City. 81 Tammany Hall’s political clout was at risk as they were responsible for the formation of the 69th NYSV regiment. The prevailing climate of Anti-Catholicism and enmity toward Irish immigrants created the impetus for the Irish to demonstrate they “could be as soldiery, patriotic and courageous as native-born Protestant Americans.” 82 Therefore, the 69th NYSV regiment was one of the first militia units to mobilize after the Battle of Fort Sumter in April 1861, and their formation led to the creation of the Irish Brigade comprised of the 69th, 63rd, and 88th New York, the 28th Massachusetts, and the 116th Pennsylvania Infantry volunteer regiments. 83

79 Bruce, The Harp and the Eagle, 54.
80 Ibid., 43.
82 Ibid.
Although the volunteer system would be augmented by national conscription starting in 1862, “many Americans [and leaders] including [President Abraham] Lincoln…and many Governors held on to voluntarist values.”\(^84\) Northerners boasted that the South, to its shame, had forced unwilling soldiers into combat while, the North was defended by “the heroic volunteer.”\(^85\) Consequently, the Irish enlisted in vast numbers, heeding President Lincoln’s call for volunteers.\(^86\) By volunteering, the Irish demonstrated their courage and willingness to become Americans. But volunteerism also meant that they could elect their cadre of officers and remain in the company of their kin, thereby satisfying their dual loyalties. In the end, they volunteered for the causes of the American Union, gratitude, and loyalty to the US Constitution, which gave them the protections they could never have in Ireland, but also out of hope for a future Irish liberation.\(^87\) US citizenship was offered as a recruiting tool to promote volunteerism among the Irish.\(^88\) This early example of expedited citizenship for military service served as a precedent for future administrative action and immigration law.

While there are no official figures for the total number of Irish who may have died during the Civil War, the Irish Brigade and its subordinate regiments suffered heavy casualties at the Battles of Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg, totaling in the thousands.\(^89\) Of the

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\(^{85}\) Ibid.

\(^{86}\) Bruce, *The Harp and the Eagle*, 147.

\(^{87}\) Ibid.

\(^{88}\) “Understanding the desire of many Irishmen and other recent émigrés to become American citizens, on July 17, 1862, Congress passed a bill that allowed any alien twenty-one years or older who volunteered for military service and was honorably discharged to become a citizen of the United States. Even if he had not previously declared his intent of naturalization, the soldier need only prove that he had lived in the United States for one year.” *The Harp and the Eagle*, 147.

2,000 Union Regiments that fought in the Civil War, the 69th and its sister Irish regiment the 28th, “ranked sixth and seventh, respectively, in the number of men killed or mortally wounded.” Overall, the 69th NYSV regiment amassed a 27 percent mortality rate or roughly one death for every four enlistments, a tremendous sacrifice for a mostly immigrant regiment. President Lincoln, paid homage to the “Fighting 69th” when he “kissed the regiments colors in June 1862, saying ‘God Bless the Irish Flag’.” The “Fighting 69th” still marches in the yearly Saint Patrick’s Day parade (see Figure 2) in New York City and will celebrate its 165th anniversary in November 2016. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, on September 11, 2001, killed several members of the regiment, also New York City firefighters, and the regimental armory served as an aid station for the wounded. The regiment remains one of the most significant symbols of the Irish Catholic community in the United States.

Figure 2. The 69th NYSV Historical Association marches in the New York City Saint Patrick's Day Parade in 2013.

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92 Ibid.
The Integration of Irish and European Immigrants

In 1876, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the administration of immigrants was the exclusive purview of the federal government. Shortly thereafter, began a wave of unprecedented immigration which, from 1880 to 1920, brought a yearly average of nearly one million people to the United States. With the Immigration Act of 1891, the office of the Superintendent of Immigration was created within the Treasury Department. On January 2, 1892, Ellis Island’s immigration station was opened in New York Harbor, effectively ending the era of open immigration to the United States. By this time, the Irish had firmly established themselves in the American fabric. From 1900-1920, 14.5 million immigrants arrived from southern and eastern Europe. This wave of mass immigration spurred the formation of Presidential and Congressional commissions that would recommend more restrictive immigration policy, resulting in the Immigration Act of 1917, as the Government tried to better cope with mass immigration from southern and eastern Europe and “[poor] conditions among immigrants in the United States.” “During the First World War, the U.S. government drafted into military service nearly half a million immigrants of forty-six different nationalities, creating an army with over 18 percent of its soldiers born in foreign countries.”

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95 Immigration Policy in the United States, 1.
97 Nancy Gentile Ford, Americans All!: Foreign-Born Soldiers in World War I (College Station, TX: Texas A and M Press, 2001), 3.
In many ways, World War II continued to demonstrate both the first and second
generation immigrant commitment to the American nation. In his book, *A Nation Forged in War: How World War II Taught Americans to Get Along*, Thomas Bruscino, a professor of History at the US Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies, discussed the integrating effect that military service, through large-scale mobilization and conscription, had on white Americans, of diverse European ancestry, to include the Irish.98 Bruscino concluded that Americans of different national origins, ethnicities, and religious backgrounds became more tolerant and acceptant of differences, transforming into a new American whole.99 Bruscino’s example of this transformation was made evident in the election of President John F. Kennedy, an Irish Catholic, who overcame the sectarian differences between a traditionally Protestant America and the new American identity forged by World War II.100 Today, the Irish continue to have an enduring presence in the United States military. The 17th, 18th, and 19th Chairmans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Army General Martin E. Dempsey and Marine General Joseph Dunford, Jr. all have Irish ancestry.101 Additionally, noted Genealogist, Megan Smolenyak, traced the current President and Commander-In-Chief Barack Obama’s lineage to Irish ancestors.102

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98 Bruscino, *A Nation Forged in War*, 4.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
They Came from the South – The Mexicans

Mexican Immigration - Historical Context

Mexico and the United States have a tightly intertwined and contentious history. Mexicans “occupy a unique status in contemporary American society: they are among the newest and the oldest of ethnic groups in the [United States].” Much of the American southwest and California was Mexican territory before 1848. Until that point in history, Mexicans freely migrated in and out of Alta California, Santa Fe de Nuevo México, and Coahuila y Tejas or what is now known as California and the American Southwestern states. The Mexicans have always considered this territory part of their heritage, lost to them as the American spoils of the Mexican-American war. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase in 1853, a small population of Mexicans, about 75,000, were “annexed by conquest” and conferred US citizenship. This population, although small, set a precedent for Mexican laborers in the Southwest.

Mexican immigration to the United States began anew with the Mexican Presidency of Porforio Diaz (1876-1910). Diaz attempted to transform Mexico into a modern country by expanding the railroad system, privatizing land ownership and switching from “peonage” to “wage labor.” Diaz’s authoritarian presidency resulted in the upheaval, displacement, and

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103 The ‘South’ represents the developing world, primarily, the African and Latin American cultures.


105 Ibid.


107 Briggs, Mass Immigration and the National Interest, 35-36.

disenfranchisement of Mexican peasant workers or *campesinos* from their communal lands. Over five million *campesinos* were forced to search for a new way of life, which began nearly 100 years of labor migration between Mexico and the United States.109

The Mexican government built the first rail linkage with the American southwest at El Paso, Texas in 1884.110 Mexicans provided the industrial agricultural labor force and transformed the Southwest through a three-decade expansion that encompassed 39 million acres of territory in California, New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. In 1930, the Mexican population in the United States surged to about one and a half million and American agribusinessmen chose Mexicans workers because they were less problematic than Filipino workers, who were more militant and actively sought to organize labor strikes.112 The Southwest became the most productive and profitable agricultural region in the United States, primarily on the backs of Mexican labor.

After the onset of the Great Depression, the US Government placed increasing pressure on Mexican immigrants and their US born children to repatriate to Mexico with estimates of nearly 400,000 Mexican-Americans participating in official repatriation programs.113 In total, nearly 1.6 million Mexicans left the United States, a mass exodus, which Mexican authorities believed would contribute to increased social and economic development in Mexico.114 New agricultural colonies were created in Mexico but most failed due to the lack of infrastructure and


a sense of cultural alienation among the newly repatriated families. Many of the repatriates, who saw themselves as Americans, returned to the United States by the end of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{115}

The second wave of Mexican immigration to the United States came with the \textit{Bracero} program.\textsuperscript{116} The program was a measure between the Mexican and United States governments to create a symbiotic relationship between US industry and Mexican modernization. Its primary purpose was to meet wartime production requirements during World War II. The \textit{Bracero} program consisted of nearly 2 million workers meeting the demand for over 5 million contracts from 1942 to 1964.\textsuperscript{117} Kelly Lytle Hernández, a historian at UCLA, explained that the impacts of this program are still debated. Some historians, such as Ernesto Galarza, described the program as an exploitation of the Mexican worker inside the context of US imperialism.\textsuperscript{118} Other historians, such as Deborah Cohen, described the program as an agricultural internship for the rural \textit{campesinos}, which would serve to modernize Mexico and Mexicans.\textsuperscript{119} Intertwined with the \textit{Bracero} program was a steep rise in illegal immigration to the United States.\textsuperscript{120} Hernández concludes that most of the blame for this is connected to the corruption of Mexican and American

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} “On August 4, 1942, the United States government signed the Mexican Farm Labor Program Agreement with Mexico, the first among several agreements aimed at legalizing and controlling Mexican migrant farmworkers along the southern border of the United States…a temporary, war-related measure to supply much-needed workers during the early years of World War II, the Bracero (Spanish for "arm-man"—manual laborer) program continued uninterrupted until 1964.” Fred L. Koestler, “Bracero Program,” The Handbook of Texas Online, Texas State Historical Association (TSHA), 1, last modified June 12, 2010, accessed October 5, 2015, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/omb01.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Borjas, “Introduction,” 4.
\end{itemize}
officials awarding the contracts and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) who offered illegal immigrants with contracts as a form of amnesty.\textsuperscript{121} Additionally, agribusinessmen disenchanted with the \textit{Bracero} program hired illegal immigrants to side-step “workplace and labor relations interventions engendered by the \textit{Bracero} program’s bi-national framework.”\textsuperscript{122}

Due to the tension between legal \textit{Bracero} and illegal immigration, the INS executed Operation Wetback, in the summer of 1954. This operation was a major roundup of undocumented migrants by the United States Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents with the full cooperation of the Mexican Army. The INS deported or repatriated 1.1 million Mexicans during the operation. The apprehension of these immigrants by Border Patrol and INS agents was given great publicity by government officials and President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration. In reality, the success of the operation rested on factors such as the growth of the Mexican economy, also known as the ‘Mexican Miracle,’ and not solely on the efforts of US immigration authorities.\textsuperscript{123}

In the early 1970s, the growth in the Mexican economy waned and by 1975 had bottomed out to zero growth. This period of poor growth continued throughout the 1980s causing mass unemployment and a reduction of the minimum wage. The problem was exacerbated by heavy US investment and the privatization and deregulation of “protected areas of the Mexican economy.”\textsuperscript{124} Based on the dire economic outlook, migration to the United States increased “as a strategy for national survival.”\textsuperscript{125} The dependence of Mexicans on the American economy deepened with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. With the lifting

\textsuperscript{121} Hernández, “Mexican Immigration to the United States,” 27.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Hernández, “Mexican Immigration to the United States,” 27.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
of trade barriers, US and multinational corporations moved into Mexico seeking to exploit the massive labor pool. This drove rural campesinos to the US-Mexico border, where many of these corporations had established factories inside of Mexico. The poor wages and harsh working conditions in the factories, and inadequacy of suitable housing forced many families to make a decision to either remain in poverty or to improve their lives north of the US-Mexico border.\textsuperscript{126}

Since 1980, Mexicans have comprised the largest immigrant group in the United States. The Mexican immigrant population in 2011 totaled 11.7 million or 29 percent of all immigrant groups, the largest of any single group, comprising 4 percent of the total US population with 58 percent residing in California and Texas alone.\textsuperscript{127} In the 2010 census, Mexican-Americans comprised 31.8 million or 63 percent of the 50.4 million Hispanic-Americans in the United States. As a separate group, Mexicans comprised 10 percent of the US population whereas all Hispanics (Mexicans included) comprised 16 percent.\textsuperscript{128} The number of Mexicans grew by 11.2 million from 2000 to 2010 and accounted for over three-quarters of the overall Hispanic growth.\textsuperscript{129} However since 2010, Mexican immigration has been on the decline and Asian populations such as the Chinese and Indians have continued to rise.

Mexican-Americans in World War II

The sons of Mexican immigrant families of the Southwest have served their country with distinction. Mustered in the American Southwest, one of the Army’s storied units, the “Bushmasters” of the 158th Infantry Regiment, were a largely Mexican-American unit. In 1942, they guarded the Panama Canal and later fought against the Japanese on Luzon, Philippine

\textsuperscript{126} Hernández, “Mexican Immigration to the United States,” 28.

\textsuperscript{127} Sierra Stoney and Jeanne Batalova, \textit{Mexican Immigrants in the United States} (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, February 28, 2013), 1-2.


\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
Islands in 1945, successfully reopening the Visayan passages, which were critical for allied shipping. General Douglas MacArthur praised their service during World War II stating, “No greater fighting combat team has ever deployed for battle.”

On the home front, despite the valiant deeds of Mexican-Americans in war, Mexicans living in Los Angeles were attacked during the ten-day long Zoot Suit Riots in June 1943. US military personnel, mostly sailors and marines, with the tacit support of local law enforcement and the media, conducted these attacks. US Military officials "all but admitted that [they] could not control…the servicemen who…participated in the riots." The cultural and ethnic tensions between Mexicans and white Americans boiled over into mob violence and police rounded up over 600 Mexicans. None of the service members who participated in the violence were ever prosecuted. The incident undermined the military’s efforts to integrate Mexican-Americans and Bracero contract workers into the war effort while adding to racial tensions across the United States.

The All-Volunteer Army and Hispanic recruitment

At the inception of the All-Volunteer Army in 1974, Hispanics accounted for less than two percent of the enlisted force. In general, Hispanics have been underrepresented throughout

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134 Lawrence, “Zoot Suit Riot,” 964.

135 Ibid.

the All-Volunteer Army's history. In 2007, Hispanics composed 17 percent of the US population from 18 to 40 years old and 12.8 percent of the QMA population of but only 11.4 percent of US Army enlistments. In 2014, underrepresentation continued to be an issue as Hispanics comprised approximately 22 percent of the US population from 18 to 24 years old but only 15 percent of US Army enlistments.

In a 2007 RAND Corporation study, Beth Asch et al. concluded that health obstacles, particularly failure to meet weight standards, was the most significant factor explaining the gap in Hispanic enlistments. The “Hispanic paradox” refers to the observation of the better-than-expected health outcomes of military recruits in Hispanic immigrant populations. The study also examined national origin and concluded that immigrant Mexican males were found to be healthier than their Mexican-American US-born counterparts, therefore, confirming the paradox. Other independent studies observed similar results in other ethnic groups and the phenomenon is now referred to as the “immigrant paradox.” This has implications for the Army as it suggests that immigrants are more likely to pass the Army’s rigorous physical requirements.

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139 Asch, Buck, and Klerman, Military Enlistment of Hispanic Youth: Obstacles and Opportunities, xv.

140 “The two main explanations for the paradox center on the selectivity of immigration and on the effects of acculturation. The immigration hypothesis suggests that only the healthiest individuals can undertake moving to another country, legally or especially illegally, resulting in better health among immigrants. The acculturation hypothesis suggests that immigrants start with healthier lifestyles, eschewing smoking, alcohol, and unhealthy 'Americanized' diets. However, the longer immigrants live in the US, the more acculturated they become, taking on more unhealthy behaviors. The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and there is evidence to support both.” Asch, Buck, and Klerman, Military Enlistment of Hispanic Youth: Obstacles and Opportunities, 52.
They Came from the East – The Chinese

“好铁不当顶，好汉不当兵” “Good iron is not used for nails, good men are not used as soldiers.”

— Anonymous, Chinese Proverb

Chinese Immigration - Historical Context

The Century of Humiliation, which lasted from the First Opium War in 1842 until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, negatively impacted the relationship between China and the international community. Author David Scott concluded that this “period of humiliation and unfulfilled potential cast a long shadow that continues to affect Chinese foreign policy, strategic culture, and weltanschauung worldview.” He proposed “three overlapping themes” for China’s role in the international community during this period: “culture and identity, race, and images.” Scott argued that “China’s normative sense of its own place in the world was diametrically opposed to the place allocated to it in the international system.”

A manifestation of Scott’s themes is represented in the history of Chinese immigration to the United States. The California Gold Rush of 1849 impelled Chinese immigration to the United States and by the end of 1852, 25,000 Chinese residents (10% of the total population) resided in the state. The rapid influx of Chinese created a backlash in the state government. Governor John Bigler asked the state legislature to take measures to limit Chinese immigration.

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141 The ‘East’ is an intentional play on words. The Chinese migrated from the West. The idea is that the Chinese are part of the greater Eastern world culture.


143 Ibid., 34.

144 Ibid., 4.

145 Ibid., 33.

146 Ibid, 34.
campaign of racial hatred, in the Californian press, was unleashed on the Chinese. In 1852, California’s Chief Justice Hugh Murray affected a ban on Chinese and Blacks testifying against Whites and labeled them “a race of people whom nature has marked as inferior.” By 1858, California proposed banning all Chinese immigration. The Californians’ attitude toward the Chinese determined the direction of American foreign policy in the coming years.

The fear of the Chinese immigrant rose from racism but more significantly from economic concerns. China was considered a “sleeping giant” or the “lurking Yellow Peril” with the potential to dominate the US market economy, if awakened. The domestic turmoil in China caused by the First Opium War, the loss of Hong Kong to Great Britain in 1858, and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) fractured the Qing dynasty and greatly increased labor immigration to the US Pacific Coast. Chinese merchants provided American companies with low-cost labor, excluding white American workers. It was the collision of these two market economies in California that fueled American resentment.

The economics of Chinese immigration led to landmark legislation. In 1868, the Burlingame-Seward Treaty established reciprocal protections for both American and Chinese through most favored-nation status. The treaty allowed for open immigration for Chinese to the United States and access to education and schooling. At the time, many industrialists considered it as a watershed for “American commercial interests,” as it allowed for an uninterrupted flow of

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147 In the Californian press, the Chinese were characterized as ‘Apes,’ ‘Brutes,’ ‘social lice…unfitted for Caucasian civilization.’ These racist ideologies ran equally for Indians, Blacks and Chinese. Scott, *China and the International System, 1840-1949*, 34.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid., 35.

151 Ibid.


153 Ibid., 17.
lost-cost Chinese labor to US firms. Nonetheless, the enmity of Americans toward the Chinese grew substantially in the years following the Burlingame-Seward Treaty. American politicians and industrialists became increasingly anti-Chinese and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, repealed the free immigration clauses in the Burlingame-Seward Treaty. This legislation effectively ended Chinese labor immigration into the United States, prevented Chinese from becoming US citizens and impacted the status of Chinese laborers in the United States, making reentry difficult if they exited the country.

The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 signified the beginning of an era of increasing selectivity and “gatekeeping” in US immigration policy. The law was a response to the political climate created by native-born Americans and industrialists in California who were increasingly hostile to the poorly educated low-cost Chinese laborers who had settled in the West during the California Gold Rush in 1849 and constructed the First Transcontinental Railroad from 1863 to 1869. Explicit in the arguments for exclusion were several themes, which would “characterize American gatekeeping ideology” and the challenges of determining who should and should not be an American. For the Chinese, these themes were that they were inferior to whites along racial, class, and cultural lines. Chinese immigrants were isolated and controlled “through limitations in economic and geographic mobility and prohibitions on naturalization.”

The impact of this period of Chinese exclusion was not overcome until Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which “once and for all removed national origin

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155 Ibid.


157 Ibid.

158 Ibid.
quotas from immigration law.”159 In 1978, China reopened its market economy and created a new pathway for immigration. According to the Migration Policy Institute: “Unlike the 19th century immigrants, post-1965 Chinese immigrants are predominantly skilled.”160 “Additionally, China is now the principal source of foreign students in US higher education, and the second-largest recipient of employer-sponsored temporary work visas, after India.”161 Since 2000, the Chinese are the largest growing immigrant population in the United States.162 This is significant because MAVNI seeks to enlist both immigrants and non-immigrant aliens on work or student visas.

Chinese in the US Army – Civil War to World War II

Despite the Anti-Chinese measures, the Chinese have served in the Army since the Civil War albeit in small numbers. On 30 July 2008, House Resolution 415 recognized the 30-year Army career of Edward Day Cohota. Mr. Cohota received his last name from being a stow-away on the ship Cohota, which left Shanghai in 1845. He enlisted in the 23rd Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry and fought in the Civil War battles of Drury’s Bluff and Cold Harbor and later served in the Indian Wars. Representative David Wu (D-Oregon) stated:

Remarkably, despite the fact that many people of Asian and Pacific Islander descent were not allowed to naturalize during this period, a disproportionately high percentage enlisted to fight on both sides of the Civil War. After the war, however, scores of these soldiers and sailors were unjustly denied their due recognition and benefits. 163


160 Kate Hooper and Jeanne Batalova, Chinese Immigrants in the United States (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, January 28, 2015), 2-3.

161 Ibid.

162 The Chinese are the most rapidly growing immigrant group with 591,711 legal permanent residents from 2000-2009 followed closely by the Indians with 590,464 LPRs from 2000-2009. From 2010 to 2013 the Chinese have had 297,831 LPRs and the Indians have had 261,342 LPRs. Source: Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Service, 2015.

During the Mexican Expedition, from 1916-1917, Chinese-Mexicans assisted Major General John Pershing’s Army forces with food and supplies. After the Chinese were massacred by Francisco “Poncho” Villa’s rebel sympathizers in Chihuahua and threatened with the death penalty for conspiring with the Americans, General Pershing successfully petitioned the US Government to have 527 Chinese-Mexican immigrants resettled in San Antonio, Texas. This enduring population was referred to as “Pershing’s Chinese” becoming the largest Chinese population in Texas.

The US Army Center for Military History captures the impact of Chinese-American and immigrant service during World War II:

When the United States entered World War II, about 29,000 persons of Chinese ancestry were living in Hawaii and another 78,000 on the mainland. By war’s end, over 13,000 were serving in all branches of the Army Ground Forces and Army Air Force…An estimated 40 percent of Chinese-American soldiers were not native-born citizens. After Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, many took advantage of their military service to become naturalized.

The New Chinese in America

In the first quarter of the 20th century, a second generation of better educated American-born Chinese began to move out of the exclusionary, provincial Chinatowns into mainstream society. They sought to “circumvent the social barriers of discrimination” and become first-class citizens through professional education in medicine, law, accounting, and pursuing “scholastic careers, research, [and] teaching.” This generation spoke better English than Chinese and read

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165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
They formed political institutions and lobby groups like the Chinese American Citizens Alliance, which fought for Chinese rights in spite of attempts to marginalize them at the local, state, and federal governmental levels.

During and after World War II, the issue of dual loyalties was a concern because of the continuing civil war in China. The second and now third generation Chinese were very cognizant of this and “postponed [any] return to China until more auspicious times.”

In the Chinese community at large, a socioeconomic shift was underway and they organized themselves and leveraged the propensity of their rising middle class through various social, economic, and political organizations. By 1960, 53.5 percent of Chinese-Americans were American-born. This period was the high-water mark for acculturated American-born Chinese.

The success of the Chinese in America, their development from the rural, unskilled laborers of the Guangdong (Canton) to a generation of highly successful white-collar workers attracted other Chinese to immigrate to America. These new immigrants “were not from the rural areas…of Guangdong like the older immigrants but Mandarin-speaking intellectuals and businessmen from capitalist and middle class families…” However, the new Chinese immigrants still experienced discrimination, despite their success and rising socio-economic status.

Thomas Sowell, a noted Stanford economist, defined that perceptual discrimination occurs because a group is “perceived to be less capable or less responsible by employers, landlords, or any other possible transactors.” This form of discrimination would fit the examples of phrases such as “No Irish need apply,” or “whites only.” Sowell fittingly explained

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169 Chen, *The Chinese of America*, 220
170 Ibid., 221.
171 Ibid., 223.
173 Ibid.
that with the Chinese a notable exception takes place. Instead, “…[a]nti-Oriental feelings and actions were often based on a belief that…[t]he Chinese…were too capable and therefore ‘unfair’ competition for other Americans who could not (or should not be expected to) work so hard and long…to save for the future.”  

The 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) removed immigration quotas, which enabled new inflows of Chinese immigrants. This resulted in a near doubling of Chinese population in the United States by 1970. Additionally, this onset of mass immigration tipped the balance to the foreign-born who outnumbered the American-born Chinese, now a minority at 46.9 percent. In 1972, President Richard Nixon normalized diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but the implications of this new relationship would not be felt until 1979 when Congress granted Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC separate immigration status and yearly limits. Over the next three decades, new Chinese immigration “[l]ed to a more than ten-fold growth in the Chinese population” in the United States with over 76 percent of new immigrants, arriving in the past 20 years, mostly from the PRC.

While Chinese immigrants from the PRC are the largest group of new immigrants, the modern perception of the Chinese as “model minorities” is mainly attributable to the first and second generation of Taiwanese and Hong Kong Chinese, who have made significant contributions to American society. Based on the success of the highly educated first generation, the second generation Chinese have attended the very best US schools and positioned themselves

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174 Sowell, Markets and Minorities, 28.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
well in the labor market. Chinese students have outperformed whites academically, which has led to resentment and political battles have erupted over the large numbers of Chinese attending top institutions.  

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), a top-tier US university, has been “referred to as Made in Taiwan” due to the large numbers of Taiwanese who attend yearly. Most importantly, Chinese immigrant parents tend “to encourage careers in science, engineering, medicine, and law because they are professions in which their children can more easily avoid discrimination or glass ceilings.” However, the second generation is continuing to expand its “range of professions into finance, business, and the arts.” The challenge for the Army is to convince the new Chinese that the Army is in fact a profession, is not discriminatory, provides for education, and upward mobility in wages to ensure a strong future for their families.

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180 Ibid., 367.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
The Impact of Immigrants on Recent Army End-Strength and Readiness

How does the Army maintain balance among modernization, force structure, and readiness through 2020, 2025, and beyond to win in a complex world?

— Force 2025 and Beyond Problem Statement

The beating heart of the All-Volunteer Army (AVA) is its end-strength. Figure 3 shows that as the largest of military services, the AVA, has experienced two downsizings and one buildup in its 42-year history. The first downsizing came after the end of the Cold War in 1989 and lasted through the Persian Gulf War and Bosnian War until 1996. In 1997, David McCormick, a Princeton PhD and former Army officer, wrote, “…dramatic downsizing… compromised the Army’s institutional health in ways not fully acknowledged or completely understood and that qualitative reform measures [were] needed to restore the Army’s vitality…Downsizing the Army [was] a story of both failure and success.”

Figure 3. Active Component end-strength by service since inception of the All-Volunteer Force


From 2005 to 2010, the Army increased end-strength to ease the strain of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and transformed into a Modular Force of fifty-four Brigade Combat Teams or BCTs.\textsuperscript{184} The Army’s failure to achieve the active component accessions’ mission in 2005 caused the civilian leadership to look for new solutions.\textsuperscript{185} This placed an increased focus on the potential recruitment of immigrants and certain non-immigrant aliens. The AVA was conceived as a principally citizen Army, therefore this increase in immigrant recruitment needed to be balanced with national interests in order to be acceptable to the service chiefs and civilian leadership. The Translators/Interpreters (09L) pilot and the MAVNI programs were implemented to improve the Army’s language and cultural skills and hard to fill health professions specialties, but only modestly tapped into the manpower potential that immigrants could provide.

As the Army implements its new operating concept, it will continue to adapt its force structure to cope with lower accessions, lower quality, and the downward pressures of potential sequestration imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act. According to a 2015 report by Army Colonel John Evans, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institute, the Army end-strength should remain at pre-2001 levels and go no lower than 490,000 for the active component.\textsuperscript{186} In January 2016, the National Commission on the Future of the Army nearly concurred with Evans:

> The demands from the Combatant Commands for Army capabilities are significant and, in many cases, increasing. Yet, the Army is down-sizing. After all we have heard, read, seen, and analyzed, we find that an Army of 980,000 is the minimally sufficient force to meet current and anticipated missions with an acceptable level of national risk. Within that Army of 980,000, the Commission finds that a Regular Army of 450,000, an Army National Guard of 335,000, and an Army Reserve of 195,000 represent, again, the


\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 22.
absolute minimums to meet America’s national security objectives.\textsuperscript{187}

These internal pressures are exacerbated by an increasingly difficult recruiting environment. Figure 4 demonstrates a rapid decline in the number of applicants for military service with a steep increase in recruiter conversion rate from applicant to accession. This highlights a strong trend towards a more difficult recruiting environment. Figure 5 further demonstrates that trends in high-quality accessions are related closely to the economy and the youth unemployment rate. Therefore, “as youth unemployment rates improve, recruiting will become more difficult, and…recruit quality [should be expected] to fall.”\textsuperscript{188} Therefore, when troop levels need to rise again, the Army will require a qualified pool of applicants to reconstitute Army capabilities.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.png}
\caption{AC enlisted applicants, NPS enlisted accessions, and the accession-to-applicant ratio, FY81–FY14}
\label{fig:figure4}
\end{figure}


Which Non-citizens can the Army Recruit?

There are three potential sources of non-citizens available for recruitment: Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR), Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and certain non-immigrant visa holders. According to US Census Bureau:

Mexico was the leading country of origin of the LPR population in 2013. An estimated 3.3 million or 25 percent of LPRs came from Mexico. The next leading source countries were China (0.7 million) and the Philippines (0.6 million), followed by India (0.5 million) and the Dominican Republic (0.5 million). Forty-two percent of LPRs in 2013 were born in one of these five countries.\(^{189}\)

In 2013 alone, the LPR population, ages 20-39, numbered 420 thousand, or nearly 50 percent of the yearly immigrant total.\(^{190}\) Currently, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)


immigrants do not have a statutory pathway into the military and are therefore largely inaccessible to recruiters.¹⁹¹ In 2014, DACAs accounted for 643 thousand youths in the United States with the potential to increase to 1.66 million.¹⁹² Finally, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program recruits from a broad population of non-immigrants, with various classes of visas, DACAs, and LPRs who either possess language and cultural skills or are trained in the health professions.¹⁹³ The combination of these three populations has great potential for the future of Army recruiting.

Universal Conscription

The most effective way to realize immigrant manpower potential is universal conscription or the draft, but this solution has two substantial obstacles. One, it currently excludes the female population. Two, it requires Congressional approval and a Presidential order, both politically untenable unless the nation is in a major declared war. The United States has not declared war since World War II and has not instituted the draft since the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, every male non-citizen, age 18-26, in the United States, to include undocumented immigrants and certain non-immigrants such as refugees, asylees, and agricultural workers, must register for selective service.¹⁹⁴ In 2014, the overall selective service registrant population, ages 18-25, stood at 16.9 million.¹⁹⁵ Selective Service maintains a close association with many


¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 33.
immigrant rights organizations such as the National Council of La Raza and the Organization of Chinese Americans actively promoting enrollment in the Latino and Asian communities. In 2014, the Selective Service System maintained an overall compliance of 88 percent for all eligible enrollees, just below the 90 percent target for 2014.196

Naturalization of US Army Personnel

US Citizenship is an effective recruiting incentive for immigrants. There are two military naturalization statues within the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA): Section 328, the peacetime military statue, and section 329, the wartime military statute.197 In 2002, President George W. Bush, signed an executive order, which reduced the wait times for military naturalization from three years to one day.198 From October 2002 to September 2015, 109,321 military personnel have naturalized in service.199

“While [President Bush’s] executive order remains in effect, LPR [immigrants] may be able to naturalize under more than one statute. In contrast, those [aliens] who are not LPRs or US nationals may naturalize only under [INA section 329, as] the civilian statutes are not available to them.”200 An important caveat is that under the INA’s military statutes citizenship can be revoked if the service member does not complete five years of honorable service. As an additional incentive for military service, USCIS expedited the citizenship of military spouses and children

196 Selective Service System, Annual Report to the Congress of the United States, 5, 15.
200 Stock, Immigration Law & the Military, 32.
and has also allowed them, since 2008, to naturalize abroad under sections 319 and 322 of the INA.  

The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act

The DREAM Act is legislation that seeks to reform immigration law, to allow a large segment of the current population of young, undocumented immigrants, mostly Mexicans, to receive lawful permanent resident status through education or military service. Senator Orrin Hatch from (R-Utah) and Senator Richard Durbin from (D-Illinois) first proposed the Act in August 2001. Various versions of the DREAM Act has been debated and stalled in the US Congress for nearly fifteen years. Among the Act's strongest supporters was the late Senator, Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts). In 2006, during a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Kennedy commented that:

> When immigrants join the military, they take the same oath of enlistment as any American soldier, sailor, airman, or marine…I can think of no greater commitment to their adoptive land. They take that solemn promise to heart, and, in all of our wars, immigrants have fought side by side with Americans with great valor. Immigrants make up 5 percent of our military today. They [have] earn[ed] 20 percent of the Congressional Medals of Honor, and at least 101 have made the ultimate sacrifice to our country in Iraq and Afghanistan…we must take serious steps to secure our borders and enhance enforcement, but common sense suggests that we are not going to deport 12 million undocumented immigrants…we owe it to our Nation to take into account what these hardworking immigrant families have to offer to America and provide them with a path to earn the privilege of American citizenship.

The DREAM Act's critics suggest that it will increase illegal immigration and be used to promulgate widespread fraud as was the case with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act,

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201 “Naturalization through Military Service,” 2.


which granted amnesty to 3.2 million undocumented immigrants.\footnote{Mark Krikorian, "DREAM on," Center for Immigration Studies, December 1, 2010, accessed February 26, 2016, http://cis.org/node/2440.} A counter to these criticisms is that the 1986 Act imposed strict rules on American industry, and until 1986, there was no Federal law prohibiting the hiring of undocumented immigrants.\footnote{Hiroshi Motomura, \textit{The President’s Discretion, Immigration Enforcement, and the Rule of Law} (Washington, DC: American Immigration Council, August 2014), 3.} The employer sanctions actually had the opposite effect, as migrants, mostly Mexican and Latin American, “driven by harsh economic and political conditions, [in their home countries], came to take jobs that employers were ready to offer—often outside the law, for there was no other way.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)

Based on Congress’s inability to pass the DREAM Act, many undocumented immigrants have been given temporary protection through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy instituted by President Barack Obama in 2012. DACA allows qualified undocumented immigrants to remain in the United States on two-year renewable work permits.\footnote{First-time DACA applicants must be age 15 or older; under 31 at the time of the program’s announcement (June 15, 2012); in the United States before the age of 16; physically present in the United States as of June 15, 2012; lived in the United States for at least five years, currently in school, have earned a high school diploma or its equivalent, or are honorably discharged veterans of the US armed forces or Coast Guard; and have no felony convictions, significant misdemeanor, or three or more lesser misdemeanors, and pose no threat to public safety or national security. Jeanne Batalova, Sarah Hooker, and Andy Capps, \textit{DACA at the Two-Year Mark: A National and State Profile of Youth Eligible and Applying for Deferred Action} (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, August 11, 2015), 2.}

According to Naomi Verdugo and Margaret Stock:

Today there is no pathway to US citizenship for those who have DACA status. Although the Selective Service System does require DACAs and other undocumented males to register, none of the Services accept undocumented individuals for service. But this was not always the case. During World Wars I and II, the Korean [War], and the Vietnam [War], the Army accepted undocumented applicants if they were otherwise eligible; they earned US citizenship for such service.\footnote{Verdugo and Stock, \textit{The Impact and Potential of America’s Foreign Born Population on Army Recruiting and Force 2025}, 13.}
The DACA eligible population is currently 2.1 million in the United States with “Mexican, Central American, and Peruvian youth more likely to apply than Asian youth.”\textsuperscript{209} Verdugo and Stock concluded that, “[t]he potential lift for military recruiting would be significant, adding approximately 1.489 million to the recruiting pool…[and a]s happened with the MAVNI program, opening enlistment to DACAs would give military recruiters access to a large, highly motivated, US educated and US resident population.”\textsuperscript{210} Currently, one of the long-term benefits of enlisting from this population is that veterans are twice as likely as non-veterans to have a son or daughter serve in the future and “roughly eight-in-ten veterans have an immediate family member who has served in the military.”\textsuperscript{211} These facts suggest that enlistment of DACAs will have positive long-term effects for Army end-strength and the acculturation of the immigrant Hispanic population.

There have been two notable challenges to President Obama’s DACA administrative action. The first was from former Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, who signed a State executive order in 2012 prohibiting DACAs from obtaining Arizona driver’s licenses.\textsuperscript{212} Arizona also had passed controversial immigration legislation in 2010, SB 1070, the omnibus immigration law. In 2012, the Supreme Court struck down all but one part of the legislation on grounds that it violated the Federal “Supremacy Clause,” but allowed one provision to remain: the right for Arizona law

\textsuperscript{209} Jeanne Batalova, Sarah Hooker, and Andy Capps, \textit{DACA at the Two-Year Mark: A National and State Profile of Youth Eligible and Applying for Deferred Action} (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, August 11, 2015), 2.


officals to demand proof of citizenship during a lawful stop.\textsuperscript{213} The second challenge came from a group of ten USCIS agents who sued the former Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, in 2012, for forcing them to knowingly break the law in order to process DACA applicants.\textsuperscript{214}

Overall, the debate over comprehensive immigration reform has been tempered by the downsizing of the Army, induced by the Budget Control Act of 2011. But, while end-strength is not an immediate concern for the Army that does not mean that it will not be in the future. John Evans summed up the challenge posed by the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review’s assertion that “our forces will no longer be able to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations[,]”\textsuperscript{215} as “a misguided perception that future warfare will somehow be largely devoid of ground combat and long term peacekeeping operations.”\textsuperscript{216} Evans’s insight is telling. At some point in the future, the Army will require an increase in manpower and immigrants are one means of achieving it.

Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI)

In 2006, Title 10 USC section 504(b), the uniform enlistments practices statute, created a requirement for immigrants to possess a green card, both in peacetime and in wartime, in order to enlist, which “dramatically reduced the wartime manpower pool available to the US [Army], because the law statutorily prohibit[ed] an immigrant from voluntarily enlisting in the US [Army without LPR status].”\textsuperscript{217} Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and immigration lawyer, Margaret

\textsuperscript{213} Lucas, \textit{State & Local Immigration Enforcement}, 2.


\textsuperscript{216} Evans, \textit{Getting It Right}, 2.

Stock concluded that because of long wait times for LPR status, up to ten years in some cases, large numbers of military-age immigrants were precluded from service and “millions of immigrants residing in the United States…[are now] off limits to [Army] recruiters.”

In 2008, the Department of Defense initiated the MAVNI pilot program to enlist “certain legal, non-immigrant aliens who are licensed health-care professionals (HCP) or possess critical foreign language (CFL) skills.” The creation of the MAVNI program was intended as a test to see if the Army could fill the gap created by the uniform enlistments practices statute. The legal loophole, in Title 10 Section 504 of the US Code, provided that aliens could be enlisted without LPR status if deemed by a Service Secretary to be vital to the national interest in time of war. The fact that most MAVNI applicants were non-immigrants was a matter of semantics. The program would require that all obtain US citizenship in order to obtain a security clearance or work in the health professions.

A 2013 report on the program’s results demonstrated that MAVNI soldiers possess significantly higher AFQT scores, on average 17 points, and levels of education, on average 4 years more, than non-MAVNI soldiers. MAVNI soldiers had excellent English-proficiency skills and rated higher than non-MAVNI soldiers in 13 key performance areas. Over the course of two surveys, MAVNI soldiers exhibited high resiliency and over 50 percent indicated that they wanted to stay in the Army through retirement. On average, the MAVNI program enlistees obtained US citizenship within 3.6 months of joining the program. Most MAVNI soldiers are

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220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
Asian — Korean, Indian, Chinese, and Nepalese — and address critical shortfalls of HCPs and CFLs crucial to success in both General Purpose and Special Operations Forces. In fact, the United States Special Operations Command played a significant role in the development of the MAVNI program and priority is given to SOF units for the assignment of MAVNI soldiers.  

The CFL-MAVNI applicants must enlist for a 4-year active duty term. HCP-MAVNI applicants must enlist for a 3-year active to 6-year term in the Selected Reserve. HCPs must be licensed and certified in their field and “fully qualified to practice their specialty.” Due the accelerated naturalization of MAVNI applicants there is great potential for upward mobility. CFLs can meet officer requirements and attend Officer Candidate School. HCPs obtain citizenship and then meet officer requirements and “can stay in the Reserves or move to active duty.” Due to the initial success of the MAVNI program, in 2015, the DOD expanded MAVNI to include eligible aliens under DACA. This is only a discretionary authority and not statutory.

Unfortunately, the MAVNI program is a poor vehicle for DACA enlistments. First, most DACAs, nearly seventy-five percent, are Mexican youth, but Spanish is not one of the 51

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224 In September 2012, the Army opened the MAVNI program up to all recruiters nationwide and the CFL program has increased from 35 to 51 languages. MAVNI applicants must meet the following requirements: Hold Tier I education credentials - High School Diploma; score a minimum of 50 of the AFQT; Not require a drug, alcohol, or moral character waiver; not be a member of the armed forces of another state; hold the necessary legal status (asylee, refugee, temporary protected status, or certain non-immigrant categories); have resided in the United States for at least two years; and not had a single absence from the US of more than 90 days in the 2 years prior to enlistment. Ani S. Difazio et al., Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest: Final Program Evaluation, 11-12.

225 “The Selected Reserve is defined by law as those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve that have been designated by their respective services as so essential to the national military strategy that they have priority over all other Reserves. Most members of the National Guard and Reserve who train regularly are members of the Ready Reserve,” Stock, Immigration Law & the Military, 40-41.

226 Ani S. Difazio et al., Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest: Final Program Evaluation, 12.

227 Ibid.

languages available under the program. It is unlikely that a Mexican youth will enlist as a Hindi speaker or for that matter in any of the languages offered. Second, the program does not seek to enlist entry-level health care assistants but rather professionals with advanced degrees and specialties. The average DACA immigrant is too young to have completed this level of health care training. Finally, the program is capped at 5,600 applicants for Fiscal Year 2016, which does not access the full potential of the DACA population even if the other constraints, language and education, did not apply.

Non-Citizen Soldier Deployments in support of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)

Deployment data from DMDC for OCO from September 2001 to December 2015 were analyzed to better understand immigrant non-citizen deployment during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Non-citizens comprised 3.8 percent of the overall non-prior service (NPS) Army accessions, both Regular Army (RA) and Army Reserves (AR), from 2002 to 2013. Figure 6 shows the non-citizen percentage of overall Army accessions for both RA and AR. The yearly numbers fluctuate between three to five percent for both components. Figure 7 compares US Army non-citizen NPS total accessions and DOD Naturalizations by year from 2002-2015. There was an initial increase in the numbers of non-citizen immigrant RA enlistments through the end of FY 2004, which indicated a positive response to the new expedited naturalization policy. But, starting in FY 2005, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with their concomitant increased casualty

229 Ibid., 13.
232 Overseas Contingency Operations include personnel deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), or Operation New Dawn (OND).
233 DMDC accessions data, FY 2002 to FY 2013.
numbers and troop deployments, kept immigrant recruitment numbers down through FY 2009 before rising again in FY 2010. This was due, in part, to an added focus on non-citizen recruitment programs, such as MAVNI, which recruited 334 non-citizen soldiers. Figure 8 illustrates non-citizen and overall RA accessions compared to FY goals. Since 2002, in every recruiting year except 2009, the Army would have failed its RA mission without non-citizen enlistments. Additionally, since 2002, the Army would have failed its AR mission in 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 without non-citizen enlistments.

Figure 6. Non-citizen percentage of overall US Army accessions RA and AR, 2002-2013


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Figure 7. Non-citizen accessions and total DOD naturalizations by year from 2002-2015


Figure 8. RA non-citizen and total non-prior service accessions and goals by year from 2002-2013


“A total of about 2.5 million Americans, roughly three-quarters of 1 percent [of the US population], served in Iraq or Afghanistan at any point in the post-9/11 years, many of them more
than once.”

Table 1 illustrates that from the inception of the Global War on Terrorism on September 2001 until December 2015, the US Army, including the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, conducted 2.3 million deployments in support of OCO. Of these deployments, non-citizens conducted 1.3 percent, roughly equal to the percentage of the Army’s non-citizen enlisted force (see Table 2) during the same time period. It was expected that non-citizen deployment percentage would equal or exceed the percentage of non-citizen end-strength. The data suggests that non-citizens have been equally represented in OCO deployments. Although, there were 20,099 records in which the citizenship status was unknown, creating a standard error of 0.433 percent in the data set.

Table 1. Number of unique US Army deployments in support of OCO, Sep 2001- Dec 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Active Duty</th>
<th>Non US citizen or national</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>US citizen</th>
<th>US national</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Active Duty</td>
<td>20,541</td>
<td>18,494</td>
<td>1,521,291</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,560,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>5,342</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>499,201</td>
<td></td>
<td>504,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>4,458</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>251,843</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>257,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,341</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,099</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,272,335</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,322,818</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data provided by DMDC, Scott Seggerman and Arnulfo Organista, Operations Research Analysts.

Table 2 illustrates yearly RA non-citizen enlisted end-strength from September 2001 to September 2015. Observed non-citizen immigrant RA accessions rates, between three to five percent (see Figure 11), were greater than known non-citizen RA enlisted end-strengths, between zero to two percent (see Table 2), from 2001 to 2015. As of January 2016, non-citizens

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239 Ibid.
comprised 1.6 percent of the active duty Army end-strength.\textsuperscript{240} There was a wide deviance in the numbers because of the large numbers of records with unknown citizenship.

Assuming factors such as attrition and naturalization null, higher non-citizen accessions rates should result in an increased non-citizen overall end-strength. Previous research, such as McIntosh et al., observed shorter naturalization wait times for the Army than for any other service and Hattiangadi, et. al., observed lower 36-month attrition rates for non-citizen enlistments along with a base probability that 25.8 percent of non-citizens would naturalize.\textsuperscript{241} Therefore, a likely reason for the observed result is naturalization, which lowered the overall non-citizen enlisted end-strength prior to deployment, a side effect of the 2002 expedited naturalization policy on the non-citizen force.

Table 2. RA enlisted non-citizen end-strength, September 2001 – September 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (Sep)</th>
<th>Non-Citizen</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Citizen</th>
<th>Overall RA</th>
<th>Non-Citizen</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Citizen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>17,648</td>
<td>382,386</td>
<td>400,303</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5,343</td>
<td>8,402</td>
<td>392,438</td>
<td>406,183</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>10,357</td>
<td>9,007</td>
<td>394,333</td>
<td>413,697</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7,124</td>
<td>5,944</td>
<td>400,447</td>
<td>413,515</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5,113</td>
<td>7,755</td>
<td>392,407</td>
<td>405,275</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,725</td>
<td>8,155</td>
<td>408,285</td>
<td>420,165</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,269</td>
<td>7,850</td>
<td>421,982</td>
<td>433,101</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,032</td>
<td>8,245</td>
<td>440,788</td>
<td>452,065</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,803</td>
<td>8,871</td>
<td>446,546</td>
<td>458,220</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,665</td>
<td>10,215</td>
<td>454,368</td>
<td>467,248</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11,517</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>451,571</td>
<td>463,605</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>11,410</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>435,257</td>
<td>447,074</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>11,038</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>417,003</td>
<td>428,923</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>9,071</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>396,361</td>
<td>406,519</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>7,926</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>384,365</td>
<td>392,327</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average 6,311 6,335 414,569 434,089 1.5 1.5 97.0

Source: DMDC Reports, Active Duty Citizenship Status, September 2001 to September 2015.

\textsuperscript{240} DMDC Report, Active Duty Citizenship Status, January 2016.

The DMDC deployment data was further examined to show a picture of immigrant ethnic representation in the deployed non-citizen enlisted force during OCO. Of the 30,341 non-citizen deployment records, those records with ethnicity categories of unknown or none (totaling 2,895) were not counted. From the remaining 27,446 records, Figure 8 graphically depicts the non-citizen ethnicities that deployed in support of OCO. In particular, Mexicans (15 percent) and Filipinos (9 percent) have provided the largest individual ethnic contributions. The large percentage of others is likely due to poor accountability of records as 11,579 records (42 percent) were coded as others in the DMDC database. Of note are the significant contributions of non-citizen Asians (20 percent) and Hispanics (38 percent) in support of OCO operations.

![Ethnic representation in the deployed non-citizen enlisted force in support of OCO, Sep 2001 – Dec 2015](image)

Source: DMDC deployment data, FY 2001 to FY 2015.

The Military Enlistment Opportunity Act and Beyond

There is an ongoing debate in Congress with regards to the best way to integrate the large undocumented immigrant youth population into American society. Many legislators believe the military is a useful instrument to accomplish this task. The DREAM Act has been effectively
frozen and is not likely to be passed soon. President Obama’s DACA administrative action opened the door for further legislation on the military enlistment of immigrants. The 2006 uniform enlistment practices statute imposed an LPR requirement for all services while leaving an open door for recruits that are “vital to the national interest” in wartime. This new law ended the statutory symmetry that existed with the existing naturalization policy and the Army’s enlistment policy.242 During this period of war, USCIS worked closely with the military services to ensure that naturalization of non-green card holders was not denied under INA section 329, the wartime naturalization statute.243 Nonetheless, once the present war ends, all non-citizens other than LPRs, will be ineligible to enlist or naturalize.244

There are two recent legislative proposals: the Encourage Newly Legalized Immigrants to Start Training (ENLIST) Act and the Military Enlistment Opportunity Act enabling the future enlistment of the aforementioned non-citizens.245 Each of these legislative measures would increase the available recruiting pool, but each would do so in different ways. A major distinction between the two Acts lies with respect to who is eligible to enlist. The Military Enlistment Opportunity Act requires that a potential enlistee has received DACA status or any other lawful immigration status in the United States for at least two years.246 It only changes the citizenship or LPR requirement to enlist but otherwise does not alter any existing enlistment standards.247

243 Ibid., 5.
244 Verdugo and Stock, The Impact and Potential of America’s Foreign Born Population on Army Recruiting and Force 2025, 8.
Essentially, it gives the military full access to the DACA population without the constraints of the MAVNI program’s language or health professions requirements. In contrast, the ENLIST Act allows for unauthorized or illegal immigrants to join the military if they can prove that they were *illegally* present in the United States on New Year’s Day 2011. To verify if applicants were present on this date will require independent adjudication, which will be prohibitively expensive for the military services. Additionally, those denied DACA, who are in the United States illegally, may still be able to enlist.

The Integration of Today’s Immigrants

There are many perspectives on the subject of integration ranging from “can-do” to “mission impossible.” The term itself is often restated as assimilation, absorption or acculturation, which have their own connotations. Thamar Jacoby, an expert in immigration, elucidated that “[t]he poverty level and social background of many [immigrants] is a cause for some concern…and the United States is basically a middle-class country importing a new lower class.” The primary question that arises is: Will immigrants make good Americans? Jacoby believed the answer was yes and that new immigrants are integrating effectively today and will continue to into the foreseeable future.

Jacoby explained integration as having three key components, work, education, and language. She dispelled the assumptions that new immigrants are somehow attracted by

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249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
253 Ibid., 2-3.
welfare benefits or will not acculturate due to language and cultural differences. To illustrate this, she described the foreign-born of Silicon Valley, mostly immigrant scientists, who “account for a third of the scientific workforce.”\textsuperscript{254} She explains that Hispanics, particularly males, have the highest workforce participation rate in the United States.\textsuperscript{255} Jacoby also pointed out that immigrant children study longer and do better in school and that the average immigrant achieves larger incomes than the average US-born citizen by the time they have resided in the United States for 10 to 15 years.\textsuperscript{256} She clarifies the fact that 60 percent of immigrants speak English prior to arriving in the United States and that close to 98 percent of second-generation immigrant children speak English well by the end of High School.\textsuperscript{257} In support of her arguments Jacoby, illustrates that home-ownership, naturalization, and intermarriage are indicators of the success of integration. She expounded that 60 percent of immigrants are homeowners after 20 years, 80 percent have naturalized since 1970 and the liberalization of immigration law, and 50 percent or more of third generation children of Asian and Hispanic immigrants marry a different ethnicity.\textsuperscript{258}

The implications of Jacoby’s ideas are significant. The US Army can provide many, if not all of the integrating factors required by immigrants. Many immigrants join the US Army for a job but the Army also provides a pathway to further education and consequently requires its members to speak a common language, English. New immigrant soldiers can achieve home-ownership, naturalization, and are exposed, often for the first time, to people of other ethnicities. Future studies on immigrant soldiers should focus on the relationship between military service and integration.

\textsuperscript{254} Tamar Jacoby, “Immigrant Integration — The American Experience,” 2.
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., 4-5.
Conclusion

Although subject to racism, religious hatred, nativism, and the resultant labor inequities of the mid 1800s industrializing Eastern US cities, Irish immigrants acculturated into American society through political movements such as New York City’s Tammany Hall and the formation of volunteer regiments during the American Civil War. The Irish came to the United States to find work, escape the Great Famine, the repression of the British government, and gain the protection that the US Constitution afforded them. But, while many of the Irish volunteered to fight for the Union Army during the Civil War, they never lost their sense of being Irish. Many Irish volunteers used their military training to support the cause of Irish nationalism. Nonetheless, the Irish served their new country with distinction in war, formed political power bases, rose up the socio-economic ladder and contributed to society at large.259

Like the Irish, Mexican immigrants came to the United States to find work and escape political repression. Mexican acculturation was severely limited because of US immigration policy, which forced their repatriation to Mexico in the 1930s and mass deportation in the 1950s.260 The acculturation challenges were further compounded by corrupt and exploitative labor agreements, such as the Bracero program, which resulted in mass illegal immigration. Racism, lower incomes, poor access to education, language differences and Mexicans desire, based on historical ties, to settle primarily in the American Southwest created further barriers to acculturation. In recent years, Mexican immigrants have been criminalized and families and communities disrupted as lawmakers exploit immigration law to deport “criminal immigrants,”


not only illegal aliens but also LPRs most of whom have no previous criminal history and “have deep [family and labor] roots in this country.”

Despite these barriers, Mexicans immigrants have served in the US Army with distinction. Since 1985, the US Army’s percentage of Hispanics (largely Mexicans) on active duty has grown from three percent to thirteen percent in 2014. Mexicans currently represent the largest group of Hispanics in the recruitable population, therefore, their ability to meet military standards is critical to maintaining future end-strength. The “Hispanic or Immigrant paradox” represents an opportunity to recruit from a healthier immigrant population than the native-born population can provide as Mexican immigrants join the Army in larger numbers than any other immigrant group.

The Chinese experienced a long period of racial and economic exclusion, which greatly reduced their immigration and naturalization into US citizens. Consequently, the Chinese were localized on the US Pacific Coast and communities in eastern US cities. While this changed with the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, it was not until 1979 and the reopening of the Chinese economy that immigration restarted. New Chinese immigrants came to the United States with high-skills and education. The influx of new Chinese immigrants has implications for the US Army. “Chinese immigrants are…the third-largest foreign-born group in the United States after Mexicans and Indians, numbering more than 2 million and comprising 5 percent of the overall immigrant population in 2013.” Chinese immigrants are highly capable of filling future requirements for Soldiers with Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM),

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263 Asch, Buck, and Klerman, *Military Enlistment of Hispanic Youth: Obstacles and Opportunities*, 118.

264 Hooper and Batalova, *Chinese Immigrants in the United States*, 2.
cultural, and language skills. Chinese cultural and language skills are also vital to our national interests as the United States seeks to “rebalance to the Pacific”\textsuperscript{265} region.

Immigrant recruitment ensured that the US Army met its recruitment goals during the past fifteen years of war. In the immediate future immigrant enlistment, at its current levels, would not be required to maintain force structure in a downsized US Army totaling 980,000 soldiers. In the near term, the loss of the three to six thousand immigrants, who enlist yearly, could be made up in the citizen population by increasing enlistment bonuses, advertisement, or number of recruiters.\textsuperscript{266} But, this would significantly increase the Army’s recruiting costs in a highly resource constrained environment and would take needed resources from other key programs.

While the loss of immigrant recruits could be overcome in the short-term, immigrant service provides significant and vital long-term benefits to the US Army. Immigrants are highly propensed to join the military, serve longer, consistently outperform citizen soldiers, and provide skills that are vital to national interests.\textsuperscript{267} Additionally, immigrants would not require significant expenses – advertising or bonuses – to recruit as naturalization is a strong incentive for enlistment.\textsuperscript{268} Therefore, the maintenance of programs such as the Army Translator Aide (09L) and MAVNI program are essential in continuing to provide key capabilities to Army special operations and general purpose units. The MAVNI program should be expanded to attract STEM skilled Asians, particularly Chinese. More critically, if the Army is to remain agile in its recruiting approach, DACA immigrants should have a clear statutory pathway to Army service


\textsuperscript{266} Bicksler and Nolan, \textit{Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force}, 34-35.


and expedited naturalization. The DACA population gives the Army the required strategic depth to rapidly increase manpower and force structure, if needed. In the current fiscal environment, the Army could improve its quality by enlisting high-quality DACA applicants immediately.

The United States Constitution serves as a compass for integration. The Declaration of Independence, Preamble to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights all define the national ethos or “American Dream”. The unalienable rights to “…Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness”\textsuperscript{269} that Thomas Jefferson spoke of and Emma Lazarus’s “golden door” are symbolized by the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor. This symbol of hope and liberty, linked with the major contributions of immigrants to the elements of American national power – Economic, Political, and Military – evokes a powerful narrative, which promotes US interests and values throughout the world. The future Army cannot be built through exclusionary or “gate-keeping” policies but rather by adhering to those principles, which have guided America since 1776. If the United States remains focused on the promotion of these values in those who seek to become Americans, the resultant immigration policy will have positive reciprocal effects on our new citizen’s willingness to integrate into society in a meaningful and productive way.

The Military Enlistment Opportunities Act or similar policy, would vastly increase the military eligible population with millions of potential applicants, while staying consistent with “the guiding principle [of]… what immigrants can do for this country, not what this country can do for them.”\textsuperscript{270} It is a significant step in solving the long-term problem of Army manpower, while providing a pathway to citizenship and acculturation through military service. This policy will not sacrifice our security or flood our military with undesirables. Rather, it will create an open recruiting system, which can adapt to changes in the domestic economic and political environments. This nests with the 2015 Army Vision’s concept of agility for the Army of 2025

\textsuperscript{269} The Declaration of Independence, Action of the Second Continental Congress, July 4, 1776.

\textsuperscript{270} Briggs, Mass Immigration and the National Interest, 246.
and a “whole of Army recruitment and retention strategy…[which] require[s] further investments in military professional development and formal education…”  

The US Army can provide a gateway through which immigrants can achieve their educational goals while serving the nation and integrating into society. The recent creation of the Army University at Fort Leavenworth is a step in this direction and should be fully funded, staffed, and accredited to create a credible pathway for soldiers to obtain college degrees. By empowering the Army to serve in an educational capacity, the nation can improve civil-military relations at all levels: local and state through the National Guard, in the working and student population through the Army Reserve, and in the Active force to ensure the Army's future end-strength requirements are met and the Army creates a highly educated veteran population ready to further contribute to society. Immigration, military service, education, and integration can work together to create a positive American narrative at home and abroad, expand opportunities for future cooperation with the developing world, and serve as a model for North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners as they transform their militaries to volunteer forces and seek to cope with large immigrant populations in their countries.

The US Army's initiative on the professional ethic has great potential to provide a foundation for integration. Its guiding principle is the civil-military relationship. The civil-military relationship is built when military members “swear or affirm to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign or domestic,” and “bear true faith and allegiance” to the US Constitution’s principles while subordinating themselves to civilian

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authority. 274 Army Doctrine Publication 1, *The Army*, illustrates that “[s]oldiers accept unlimited liability in the service of our Nation. This becomes the foundation of [their] profession.”275 The military service of immigrants binds them to the civil-military relationship and creates a meaningful and transformative bond, which integrates them into American society, allows them to pursue the “American Dream”, and advocates the unique and powerful American message of *E Pluribus Unum* or “out of many, one.”

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275 ADP 1, iv.


Defense Manpower Data Center, DMDC Reports, Active Duty Citizenship Status.


