FIELDING A DIVISION STAFF IN THE MODERN DAY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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General Studies

by

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Fielding a Division Staff in the Modern Day

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History has proven that the time and location of the next war will be unexpected. The U.S. Army forces are currently deployed around the world to respond to many different threats to the American way of life. Balancing this demand, during an interwar period plagued with financial restriction, has forced the Army to reduce its size. Active division headquarters, the largest tactical organization to manage forces, are currently fully engaged in managing the current situation. This research focuses on determining whether the Army can conduct a full mobilization creating multiple division headquarters. To answer this, the research will review the last full mobilization that took place in World War II and partial mobilization that occurred in Vietnam to identify how the Army can once again expand division headquarters. The research will review current demand, doctrine, and capacity that exists today in the Army to support once again growing the force to respond to a major conflict.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

FIELDING A DIVISION STAFF IN THE MODERN DAY, by Major Christopher George Williams, 77 pages.

History has proven that the time and location of the next war will be unexpected. The U.S Army forces are currently deployed around the world to respond to many different threats to the American way of life. Balancing this demand, during an interwar period plagued with financial restriction, has forced the Army to reduce its size. Active division headquarters, the largest tactical organization to manage forces, are currently fully engaged in managing the current situation. This research focuses on determining whether the Army can conduct a full mobilization creating multiple division headquarters. To answer this, the research will review the last full mobilization that took place in World War II and partial mobilization that occurred in Vietnam to identify how the Army can once again expand division headquarters. The research will review current demand, doctrine, and capacity that exists today in the Army to support once again growing the force to respond to a major conflict.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

So there are a lot of myths out there about the size of the force, training the force, that you can bring an Army down very, very small and then in a time of crisis, add water, circle the wagons there, and stir up and we’ll have an Army, it’s not quite that simple.¹

— Gen Mark Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army, Defense News

Overview

General Milley’s comment drives home the point that rapid military expansion from a proposed skeleton peacetime presence to a fully-capable fighting force during conflict requires careful coordination and planning. Many top leaders in the U.S. have expressed concern over the continued downsizing of the Army and its implications for future wars. Currently the U.S. Army is globally engaged in the Middle East to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and then transition authority to local governments, in Europe by partnering with allies to deter Russian aggression, and in South Korea to deter escalation of a nuclear North Korean force. Concurrent with these commitments, the U.S. military is actively monitoring China's growing military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The combination of a complex global environment, growing allied commitments, and defense of domestic and international interests leaves the U.S. Army overtasked and understaffed. As the Army’s primary tactical warfighting entity, division

headquarters is charged with preparing, training, and executing the responses to these threats and many other responsibilities.

The division has multiple roles: tactical headquarters command multiple brigades, joint force land component command or multinational force land component, and joint task force for limited contingency operations or Army forces (ARFOR) for a small contingency operation. A division also provides additional assets to reinforce the strength of a brigade combat team (BCT), including a division artillery component, an aviation brigade, surveillance brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade, sustainment brigade, civil affairs, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), Special Forces, history detachment, and public affairs. These coordinated assets are allocated to different BCTs based upon the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilian considerations. The additional division resources provide brigades tactical reinforcements and synchronization to ensure unity of effort. An increase in demand on divisions worldwide continues to drive the cost of operations up in the Army, and this combined with current fiscal restrictions limits the Army's readiness and ability to respond to future conflicts.

Impact from the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 and sequestration of 2013 reduced the U.S. active duty Army end strength to the smallest it has been since before World War II. In the most recent set of cuts the Army will reduce personnel from


490,000 active duty component members down to 450,000, eliminate two BCTs, decrease staff of division and larger size headquarters by 25 percent, and establish a new operation procedures. With only 11 active duty divisions the Army’s resources and personnel are already stretched thin; the above proposed restrictions require the U.S. Army to accomplish even more in spite of having access to far less.

The current environment, as it relates to the United States financial crisis, has had a negative effect upon the U.S. Army's readiness. Testimony given to the Senate Appropriation Committee by the former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Odierno stated, “However, if sequestration-level spending caps resume in FY 16, we will be forced to reduce end strength to levels that will not enable the Army to meet our Nation’s strategic requirements.” In his review General Odierno went into great detail on the negative effects of further cuts to the Army’s ability to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012. With increasing funding reductions and growing global instability, demands on a shrinking military are rising.

Concern regarding the U.S. military's ability to handle future crises is at the forefront of many top leaders' concerns. With the financial impacts of sequestration resulting in a downsized force, the United States military’s readiness and ability to

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quickly respond comes into question. Currently many nations challenge the United States’
ability to project global influence to all regions. “Putin (Russia) is counting on the U.S.
fear of escalation and fear of confrontation to stop any thought of retaliation. Aggression
unanswered, historically, has led to more aggression.” General (Ret.) John M. Keane
expressed concern that inaction would create a greater problem. Russia’s aggression in
Syria, Ukraine, and occupation of territory in Georgia has escalated the tension in
Europe. Another global concern voiced by Senate Arms Committee Chairman John
McCain is that, “China’s land-reclamation and construction activities on multiple islands
across the Spratly chain, and the potential command and control, surveillance, and
military capabilities it could bring to bear from these new land features, are a challenge to
the interests of the United States and the nations of the Asia-Pacific region. Such
unilateral efforts to change the status quo through force, intimidation, or coercion
threaten the peace and stability that have extended prosperity across the Asia-Pacific for
seven decades.” These statements from senior leaders demonstrate the uncertainty of
U.S.-mediated global security while other governments, who retain a peer-sized military,
continue to exert their influence contrary to U.S. interests. Clearly, the United States
military is strained with a high operational tempo, reduced budget, and operational

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6 U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Arms Services Committee, Russian Strategy and
Military Operations: Hearing before the Senate Arms Service Committee, October 8,
imo/media/doc/Keane_10-08-15.pdf.

7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Arms Services Committee, U.S Pacific Command
and U.S. Forces Korea: Hearing before the Senate Arms Services Committee, April 16,
challenges, and as such the U.S. Army must consider how to respond if forced into a peer conflict. An example of a current threat can be drawn from looking at a peer military.

Currently the Chinese Army has 1.25 million soldiers on active duty in 25 divisions. According to the Annual Report to Congress, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015*, the modernization of the Chinese Army tanks, armored personnel carriers, air defense, and artillery have brought their capability to “near world standards.” What the People’s Liberation Army lacks in its ability to equal technology in a ground war, it makes up for in size of its forces and mass of artillery. With the number of U.S. divisions available limited, a Chinese escalation would require the U.S. military to dramatically expand in size to adequately respond.

While the U.S. seeks a solution to its financial issues, the responsibility of the military remain. Projection of forces globally, with the intent to keep war far from our shores and our citizens, continues to be a priority. The United States military has the responsibility to win our Nation's wars, and this demand will most likely fall on the shoulders of a division headquarters to manage. Understanding the U.S. Army's ability to generate division headquarters in a time of crisis is necessary in order to win in the next peer war.

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9 Ibid., 60.

Primary Research Question

Is the Army prepared to generate additional division staffs in a time of crisis?

Secondary Research Questions

1. How did the U.S. Army generate division staffs in World War II and Vietnam?
2. What changes have occurred in divisions since World War II and Vietnam?
3. What division staffs currently exist and how many are available to assist in generating new forces?
4. What current capabilities and capacity exists in the army to train division staffs?

Assumptions

Division and division headquarters continue to be deployed at a high rate due to ongoing threats to national security.

Financial restrictions continue to force the military to manage a force with minimal resources.

There exists a threat that would require the Army to field multiple division staffs.

Division staff in 2015 are comparable to division staff prior to World War II and Vietnam.

Scope, Limitations, and Delimitations

This study focused upon the division staff that includes coordinating staff, special staff, and personal staff, and did not take into account the additional struggles faced with training, equipping and manning subordinate units due to the significant amount of additional research and time this required. This research focused upon the division
headquarters level, which serves as the highest level of a tactical guidance through an
experienced and capable staff required to address complex and difficult global conflicts.
Specifically, this review focused upon infantry division staff size, organization, purpose,
and time required to train due to changes occurring over time. Studies of infantry
divisions in World War II and Vietnam provide historical references on how the U.S.
Army produced multiple staffs in the past, allowing contrast between current and past
approaches. Analysis of historical divisions provides data pulled from infantry divisions
and will not evaluate the differences in World War II and Vietnam with armor or cavalry
division headquarters. One limitation to this review was restricted access to lessons
learned by the currently deployed 7th Infantry Division due to classification and time
available. An additional research limitation regarding the Army’s plan to generate new
divisions was due to the sensitive nature of this topic. Other limitations are the lack of
records retained for the generation of the 9th Infantry Division during the Vietnam War.
This research was conducted utilizing the resources available through the internet and the
Combined Arms Research Library located at Fort Leavenworth.

**Conclusion**

This paper reviewed the current purpose, size, training, and structure of division
staffs in the active duty Army, National Guard, and Army Reserves. The review
evaluated historical models of WWII and Vietnam divisions to compare and contrast with
modern division staff. Understanding historical responses to generating division staffs
provided context on how the U.S. Army can be better prepared today for future large
scale conflicts. The chapter 2 literature review utilized army doctrine, force structure
models, professional essays, individual testimony, letters, and historical records to better
understand (1) the means to generate new divisions, (2) the purpose, size, and structure of division staff, and (3) their training and preparation. An explanation of the methodology used in the research is described in chapter 3. Chapter 4 answered the secondary questions and provided analysis to assist in answering the primary question. Chapter 5 summarized conclusions and recommendations for standing-up divisions to better prepare for future crises.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Currently minimal open source literature exists regarding the U.S. Army’s plan to rapidly generate a large force in a time of crisis. To gain an understanding of how the U.S. Army can rapidly generate new division staffs in a time of crisis, this review analyzed past methods used in World War II and in Vietnam. Review focused upon division structure, force generation and problems that occurred. The first section reviewed literature focused on the last time there was a large demand to generate multiple division staffs in the 1940’s in response to World War II. The second section reviewed division headquarters during the Vietnam conflict and the standing up the 9th Infantry Division. The final section reviewed current U.S. Army division structure, doctrine and current capabilities that exist that will support creating new division headquarters.

World War II

The Center of Military History provides a collection of books, commonly known as the “Green Books,” detailing an understanding of the U.S. Army during World War II. The Organization of the Ground Combat Troops and The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops are two publications in this series that provide an in-depth understanding of how the U.S. Army responded to generating forces in World War II.

The Organization of the Ground Combat Troops focused upon how the U.S. Army fielded and trained divisions, highlighting the resulting challenges to conduct this training. General Headquarters (GHQ), led by General McNair, prepared, developed, and published a plan in January 1942 seen in figure 1, served as a template for newly
activated divisions. This plan provided a timeline from start to finish on how a division would field its staff, outlining all training requirements necessary prior to combat deployment. Proper development of a division staff traditionally occurred through educational means prior to the actual physical assembly. With this step completed, a division spent one year preparing itself to further develop and prepare the staff. Despite this year of training, several residual challenges remained.

Figure 1. Building an Infantry Division

Newly formed division staff faced a number of difficulties, as outlined in *The Organization of the Ground Combat Troops*. The major staff issue identified was a shortage of quality field grade officers. With promotion of top-level majors to battalion command positions and junior officers fielded from Officer Candidate School, the remaining staff positions were often filled with less capable field grade officers. To solve this issue GHQ tasked other divisions to identify officers to fill these vacancies; however, the tasked division typically released only their least capable personnel. To further complicate the issue, many capable field grade officers were stripped from their existing division and shipped to fill slots of already deployed units in theater. While one solution to this field grade level shortage was promotion from within the division, a lack of quality personnel remained.  

*The Organization of the Ground Combat Troops* provided a perspective of how to manage the U.S. Army as a larger force. One of the major organizational changes made was the transformation from square to triangle formations. This change in division force structure reduced the size from approximately 22,000 to 15,000, enabling the U.S. Army to reallocate the remainder to create new divisions. Reduction in divisions was not focused just at reducing the number of formations, but also the staff size. General McNair believed that large staffs created additional work, relying upon special subordinate

commanders to provide planning guidance to their higher level staffs.\textsuperscript{12} Headquarters staff reductions allowed allocation of residual personnel to fill vacant positions necessary for new divisions.

\textit{Maneuver and Firepower; The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades} provided understanding of the evolution of divisions and brigades. In this book the author Wilson provided an understanding of the changes that took place during the interwar period of World War I leading up to World War II and through the war itself. After World War I the U.S. Army went through a downsizing yet retained skeleton structures in order to provide the framework needed to expand the force.\textsuperscript{13} This account outlined the changes that occurred in creating a triangular division and also the difficulties faced with the expansion of the force. Also included in this book is information about changes that occurred to the division during Vietnam.

Field Manual 101-10, \textit{Staff Officers’ Field Manual Organization, Technical Data Part I}, was published in February 1941, and provides by composition of division headquarters for both square and triangle divisions. The manual has extensive amounts of technical data that assisted planners in the 1940’s in preparing for operations for logistics and tactics.

\textsuperscript{12} Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, \textit{The Army Ground Forces; The Organization of Ground Combat Troops} (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army 1987), 360.

Vietnam

The 9th Infantry Division completed its deployment into Vietnam on 31 January 1967, providing another example of a division creation in a time of crisis.\textsuperscript{14} The literature review for this research focused upon relevant factors in the \textit{FM 101-5 Staff Officers’ Field Manual Staff Organization and Procedure and Table of Organization and Equipment} to gain an understanding for a division’s purpose, size, and organization of staff. \textit{Maneuver and Firepower}, written by John B. Wilson, provided an overview of the structural changes with the formation of a more flexible division termed ROAD, or Reorganization Objective Army Divisions. Additionally, a review of the creation and deployment of 9th Infantry Division was provided through analysis of the \textit{Operational Reports – Lesson Learned} provided by Major General Kenneth G. Wickham in 1966.

Review of doctrine provided limited information regarding the type of training required to prepare a division staff. \textit{FM 101-5 Staff Officers’ Field Manual Staff Organization and Procedures} offered minimal detail regarding the training conducted in preparing a staff. This manual states simply that training the staff focused on individual training and team training, both of which were the responsibility of the Chief of Staff to facilitate and evaluate.\textsuperscript{15} Organization of the division staff during the Vietnam conflict was divided into the general staff, special staff, and personal staff. The general staff consisted of the Chief of Staff and the primary staff functions. The special staff focused


on specialized activities associated with their respective branches, including chaplain, division surgeon, engineer, signal, aviation, artillery, chemical, finance and adjutant general.\textsuperscript{16} Similar to the division staffs of World War II, the 1964 tables of organization established special staff that were both subordinate commanders and staff (figure 2). The size of the staff, while on the surface appeared smaller, actually expanded. More sections were separated to run a subordinate headquarters, accounting for the appearance of a smaller size division staff.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 3.
Evolution of the U.S. Army Division 1939-1968 provides a detailed review of the Army modification in its division organization during Vietnam. The U.S. Army made multiple adjustments to its division structure with the goal of promoting flexibility. Many of these changes were the result of new technology, to include the introduction of the atomic weapon. In 1961 the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor,
recommended a revision to division structure that created a more “flexible response,” laying the foundation and later adoption of ROAD in 1965.\textsuperscript{17} This division structural change was similar to modifications made during World War II, returning to a triangular formation to enhance command and control. On February 1, 1966, the 9th Infantry Division was stood up using the ROAD structure.

Operational Report–Lesson Learned, produced by the 9th Infantry Division in 1968, provided an account of the process of fielding a division and deploying into Vietnam. Very little information exists on the process and support the 9th Infantry Division received prior to deploying to Vietnam. This report explains how the division staffed was manned and supported. It provides an account of the year it took to generate forces and prepare for deployment. The report delivered information over the period from its activation in 1966 through initial deployment to Vietnam in 1967 with the purpose to offer the army with lessons learned. It provided an understanding how the 9th Infantry Division was established and what issues it faced. Review of this report offered research regarding the use of cadre, training and supporting the division staff, and issues faced with establishment of the division.

Current Day Divisions

Multiple resources exist to understand U.S. Army divisions in the current day. These resources are doctrine, websites, and established units. Army doctrine provides guidance to construct a headquarters through a clear understanding of purpose, organization, structure, and its tasks. The Army Training Network is a website

\textsuperscript{17} Ney, \textit{Evolution of the U S Army Division 1939-1968}, 71-83.
established by the army outlining how military units at all levels conduct specified task
by providing standards, resources required, and evaluation criteria. To evaluate division
headquarters readiness, the U.S. Army created the Mission Command Training Program
that provides structured scenarios, evaluators, and assessments.

FM 3-94 *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* explains the purpose and
organization for echelons above brigade, focused on the headquarters. The division and
associated staff have multiple roles: tactical headquarters commanding multiple brigades,
joint force land component command or multinational force land component, and joint
task force for limited contingency operations or ARFOR for a small contingency
operation. Division subordinate units consist of armor, infantry and Stryker brigades
that include: a division artillery component, an aviation brigade, surveillance brigade,
maneuver enhancement brigade, sustainment brigade, civil affairs, EOD, Special Forces,
history detachment, and public affairs. These coordinated assets are allocated to
different BCTs based upon the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilian
considerations. These additional division resources provide brigades tactical
reinforcements and synchronization to ensure unity of effort.

Division headquarters training is outlined in the Army Techniques Publication 3-91
*Division Operations*, more commonly referred as ATP 3-91, with further detailed
guidance published in Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP) 3-0, 3-07 and 3-

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18 Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and

19 Ibid., 6-3.
ATP 3-91 delineates different techniques for army division training in order to accomplish its missions, focused on the three elements of decisive action: offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Decisive actions represent the divisions directed Mission Essential Task List (METL) established by the Chief of Staff of the Army. ATP 3-91 provides the fundamentals of decisive action, organized by the various warfighting functions. Additional this manual prescribes how a division conducts reconnaissance, security, mobility, cyber, air support, and the U.S. Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces. Responsibility for supervising the division's staff in preparing for these type of operations is the Chief of Staff.\textsuperscript{21} The Mission Command Training Program (MCTP), located at Ft. Leavenworth, was created to validate a division staff's ability to execute its core METL.

MCTP, formally known as Battle Command Training Program, was established in 1987 to train headquarters for divisions and corps levels.\textsuperscript{22} \textit{History of the U.S. Army Battle Command Training Program, 1986-2003} provides a context for why the U.S. Army created an organization to train, evaluate, and mentor headquarters for echelons above brigade. More recently, a 2014 publication called \textit{MCTP Trends in a Decisive Action Warfighter Exercise} provided an updated understanding of the current size, purpose, capabilities, and lessons learned from FY 14 training. This training was

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., ix.


conducted using computer simulations to generate reports and updates, and combined with a master scenario environment outlined methods to meet the division commander's training objectives.23

Review of what current capabilities exist in the Army the research used *Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005*, and *A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure*. Both works provided reasons why the U.S. Army adjusted force structure to what is currently being used. *Transforming an Army at War* provided a detailed account of how Chiefs of Staffs of the U.S. Army each tackled the problem of the modern day. It provided additional details regarding changes created in echelons above brigade size and the type of changes made. *A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure*, is a Rand study commissioned by the senate to account for the changes made and answer the questions;

(A) The operational capability of the Army to execute the core mission of the Army to contribute land power to joint operations.  
(B) The ability to manage the flexibility and versatility of Army forces across the range of military operations.  
(C) The tactical, operational, and strategic risk associated with the heavy, medium, and light modular combat brigades and functional support and sustainment brigades.  
(D) The required and planned end strength of the Army.24

This study compared and contrasted changes made pre-modularity and accounted for changes made through 2011.

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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research was to determine if the U.S. Army is prepared to generate multiple division staffs for future conflicts, based upon answers to the following questions:

1. How did the U.S. Army generate division staffs in World War II and Vietnam?
2. What changes occurred in previous divisions since World War II and Vietnam?
3. What division staffs currently exist and how may these expand to address future conflicts?
4. What current capabilities and capacities exist in the army to train division staffs?

This review used qualitative case study methodology to analyze how the Army generated division staffs during World War II and Vietnam. The research focused upon previous times in history where the U.S. Army expanded division staffs, and ways these methods may be implemented once again to expand the size of the force in the future.

How the U.S. Army generated division staffs during World War II and Vietnam was determined through analysis of each conflict independently, and by evaluation of relevant factors such as how divisions were structured, manned and trained. After understanding which elements contributed in each period independently, factors common to both time periods were identified to ascertain what may be used today.

A review of World War II, Vietnam, and current divisional staff organization highlighted important similarities and differences between these historical periods, contributing a better understanding of division staff expansion. The second supporting
question examined what adjustments were made to divisions and their headquarters since
the period of World War II and Vietnam. In this analysis the research provided
understanding of the reasons for these changes. Analyses of this data may determine that
these previously used methods remain applicable for current and future staff expansion
requirements.

Critical evaluation of existing and historical division staff assets may outline
relevant methods required for rapid and effective Army expansion requirements. Analysis
of current manpower resources provided an improved understanding of the complex
demands placed upon existing force structures, revealing additional considerations to
relieve overburdening of the current systems. Regarding the third supporting question,
research identified active duty and National Guard division resources that may either
generate new staffs or assist in the reassignment of currently tasked divisions.

Research addressing the final supporting question reviewed existing military
education and training capabilities, focused upon how these resources may be utilized to
expand, train, and prepare division staffs for war.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to provide analysis in support of the primary research question, is the Army prepared to generate additional division staff in a time of crisis, and addressed the secondary research questions listed below:

1. How did the U.S. Army generate division staff in WWII and Vietnam?
2. What changes have occurred in divisions since World War II and Vietnam?
3. What division staff currently exists and how many are available to assist in generating new forces?
4. What current capabilities and capacity exists in the army to train division staffs?

How did the Army generate division staffs in World War II?

World War II resulted in the largest expansion to the United States military in history and the most recent experience in generating multiple division staffs in response to a peer threat. During the interwar period the U.S. isolated itself from the rest of the world and little value was seen in retaining a large military force. Subsequently following World War I, Congress cut the active duty force to 136,000 soldiers by 1922.\textsuperscript{25} It was not until the actions that took place in 1939 across Europe that the U.S. government prioritized expanding the armed forces. The changes in division structure, cadre system,

\textsuperscript{25} Wilson, \textit{Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades}, 111.
education, and training were the major factors in establishing new division staffs during World War II.

Divisions Reorganize

A poll conducted on March 1940 demonstrated that ninety percent of Americans were against going to war with Germany.26 Despite the desire to remain neutral, the U.S. Army under General Marshall, expanded with the understanding that the U.S. must be ready for self-defense. From 1939 to 1941 the U.S. Army expanded from 189,839 to 1,462,315 personnel by reorganizing its divisions and federalized the National Guard.27

Initial expansion resulted from reductions in division force structure that enabled the U.S. Army to activate two additional divisions. The square divisions existing since World War I allowed the army to fight a defensive war, but these were too large and unwieldly to keep up in the new modern style of warfare. It was referred to as a square division because it was constructed with two brigade headquarters and four regiment headquarters, creating a square configuration. Figure 3 depicts the overall structure of a square division, composed of 22,272 soldiers when fully manned.28 Many division structural changes occurred as a result of mechanized and motorized advancements made

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before World War II. During the mid-1930’s the U.S. Army created a smaller division that improved maneuverability and reduced supply requirements. Two weeks after the German invasion of Poland in September 16, 1939, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall, approved the restructuring of active army divisions to the triangle division structure.\textsuperscript{29} The triangle formation structure, which got its name by being configured of three regimental headquarters, depicted in figure 4 required 7,000 fewer personnel. The elimination of the brigade headquarters reduced the total number of regiments from 4 to 3. The resulting 7000 personnel surplus allowed the U.S. Army to activate the 5th and 6th Divisions.\textsuperscript{30} General Marshall directed General McNair to be responsible for managing the army’s expansion. General McNair also focused upon reducing the size of headquarters by reducing staff personnel as a part of these adjustments. With an understanding that available personnel were limited, General McNair stressed the need for smaller and more efficient staffs.

\textsuperscript{29} Ney, \textit{Evolution of the U S Army Division 1939-1968}, 133.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
### Figure 3. Square Division Structure

General McNair was adamant about reducing the size of headquarters' staffs.

These triangular division structure adjustments reduced the number of officers by over sixty percent. These reductions were imposed upon division, headquarters, and even General McNair's personal staff. To manage the additional workload, subordinate commands such as artillery, engineers, medical, and quartermaster each provided
individuals to assist in division staff planning. Subordinate and their higher headquarters improved efficiency by fostering a stronger understanding of their organizational capabilities, which was reinforced through the inclusion of a liaison officer to facilitate parallel planning. The reduced size of staffs and removal of redundancy facilitated personnel availability for future expansion.

In early 1940 the U.S. President and Congress doubled the army’s budget to $853 million to fund an additional 227,000 active and 235,000 reserve members, and to reorganize the National Guard.³² As the German war machine continued to march into France, the U.S. President and Congress granted General Marshall additional funding and authorizations to further expand the military. Figure 5 displays 36 active divisions available on the day Pearl Harbor was attacked. To assist in the training and expansion of the military, the National Guard was transitioned to federal service and subsequently ordered to reconfigure their divisions into the triangular formations. As a combined force, the National Guard and active army focused the subsequent year on training their staffs and subordinates for defense. The initial actions in 1940 to expand the army to over 460,000 members were small in comparison to later U.S. Army expansion efforts. The actions on December 7, 1941 brought an end to any isolationism in America, and on December 8, 1941, the United States government declared war. From September 1939 through 1945 the U.S. Army expanded to almost 8,300,000 soldiers.³³ This sudden


expansion required the formation of many new divisions to command and control forces in the European and Pacific theaters, as well as defense of the homeland.

Figure 5. Active Divisions on December 7, 1941

Following the declaration of war, the War Department estimated 200 divisions were required; however, Gen McNair reduced this to 100 divisions, implemented at a rate of three divisions per month between March 1942 and 1943.\textsuperscript{34} Responsibility for executing the training and deployment of these units was initially the General Headquarters, which later transitioned to the Army Ground Forces (AGF).\textsuperscript{35} This plan activated 38 divisions in 1942, followed by 17 more in 1943.\textsuperscript{36} The factors that played a significant role in accomplishing this task were establishing a cadre system and schools for division staffs.

General Marshall and General McNair established a cadre system to manage the limited resources in manpower and determine how to distribute the officer core in a quickly expanding army. The active army had 13,797 officers and the National Guard had 21,074 officers, which constituted 75 to 90 percent of the eight existing divisions in 1941.\textsuperscript{37} The cadre system was designed to transform officers and enlisted into leaders responsible for training the division. The enlisted Soldiers originated from a designated “parent” unit for promotion, preparing them for their responsibilities in the new

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 198.

\textsuperscript{35} Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, \textit{The Army Ground Forces; The Organization of Ground Combat Troops}, 5.

\textsuperscript{36} Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, \textit{The Army Ground Forces; The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops}, 433.

\textsuperscript{37} Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, \textit{The Army Ground Forces; The Organization of Ground Combat Troops}, 11.
division. In preparation these parent divisions received an over-strength push of new recruits two to three months prior to releasing these identified cadre to their new division. The expectation was the parent division identified junior ranking Soldiers demonstrating an ability to perform tasks associated with the next grade. In practice, however, newly formed divisions reported that some of these received Soldiers were often cast-offs of the parent unit rather than top-notch personnel. While parent divisions identified and prepared these cadre for detachment, the receiving divisions trained its staff at a number of existing formal schools.

The majority of officers selected originated from the War Department, while the remainder were chosen by the new division commander. The War Department identified the division, assistant division, and division artillery commanders, and then worked with the division commanders to select their Chief of Staff, G1, G2, G3 and G4 personnel. Divisions sent their cadre to schools across the nation, addressing critical aspects needed for future success. The identified division staff attended a newly designed course at the Command and General Staff School (CGSS) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas while specialized staff, selected from their respective branches, attended schools pertaining to their functions (figure 6). Similar to today’s Command and General Staff College, CGSS

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39 Ibid., 500.

40 Ibid., 440.

prior to January 1940 at Ft. Leavenworth was a one year course that supported a class of approximately 225 officers and their families.\textsuperscript{42} Captains and Majors were selected to attend the course based upon their demonstrated capacity to serve at a higher level.\textsuperscript{43} After the U.S. declared war, the CGSS curricula underwent multiple adjustments to the course length before finally settling on a 9 week course.\textsuperscript{44} To facilitate the needs of the Army to generating divisions, the curricula separated its courses into different sections to train G1, G2, G3, G4 and additional special staff sections to train individuals by their branch. One month of the course was allocated to a division commander and selected staff members to support the initial step in establishing a new division.\textsuperscript{45} A year after the course was adjusted the college graduated 1,286 students, which was equal to the total produced in the previous six years.\textsuperscript{46} The newly trained division staff and cadre then regrouped at their new home duty station and began preparations to receive recruits directly from replacement centers.

\textsuperscript{42} Orville Z. Tyler, Elvid Hunt, and Walter E. Lorence, \textit{The History of Fort Leavenworth 1937-1951} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1951), 1-10.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 11.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 12.
The plan provided a division one year to conduct the necessary training required for theater deployment. This year allowed sufficient time to gain understanding and foster cohesion within the division staff; however, the plan was not without problems. Unit training to prepare personnel on basic and individual skills required 14 weeks, followed by 12 weeks of platoon and company training, and concluded with 12 weeks of combined arms training (38 weeks total).

During this period division staffs managed the planning and operations of the subordinate cadre as they conducted their 40 weeks of division training. As these members formed functional, cohesive teams, many were pulled away for duty elsewhere and replaced with personnel lacking their predecessors' knowledge and skills. The results of this turmoil degraded teamwork and placed additional stress on the division staff. In 1942 the AGF headquarters issued a revision to the divisions' timeline and reduced their
training time from 44 to 35 weeks.\footnote{Ibid., 444.} The intent was to maintain division staff integrity such that they completed their deployment training intact before competing requirements fragmented the team.

The expansion of the total number of divisions that took place in World War II employed multiple methods to generate division staffs. First, restructuring the division organization and headquarters' staffs both lowered the overall size and provided a pool of Soldiers to field new divisions. Second, division staff received formal education and training before establishing their headquarters, rather than sending individuals to receive training after the division formation, which was critical to preserve key team integrity during division training. This combined with cadre inclusion enabled the creation of a newly formed division and the associated staff and leaders needed to organize it. The year of training and preparing for combat solidified division staffs, empowering them to achieve victory in both Europe and the Pacific.

How did the Army generate a division staff in Vietnam?

Review of the 9th Infantry Division's activation for deployment to Vietnam provided an understanding of some similarities and problems found in generating a division staff compared to World War II. This analysis took into account the major difference with World War II and a full mobilization of multiple divisions compared to Vietnam’s limited mobilization of one division. As a result of a partial mobilization during Vietnam, only a limited amount of resources was provided by the Army in support
to generating the 9th Infantry Division. Despite this, review of the 9th Infantry Division staff creation provides insight through comparison and contrast to World War II methods, highlighting advantages and disadvantages of adjusting the division structure, and inclusion of the cadre system and division staff to generate new divisions.

In both Vietnam and World War II the U.S. Army managed major reorganization during mobilization while at war. The Army in 1965 activated the 9th Infantry Division to provide the nation with a strategic force after committing divisions into Vietnam.\textsuperscript{48} The 9th Infantry Division was fielded using the new division structure known as Reorganization Objectives Army Divisions (ROAD), which demonstrated the ability to make large organizational changes when generating divisions. After the Korean War the U.S. Army made multiple adjustments to the division structure to create a more flexible alternative to the pentomic division. In 1961 the Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, recommended a revision to division structure creating a more “flexible response” that was adopted in 1965 as ROAD.\textsuperscript{49} The change to division structure was similar to modifications made for World War II, which returned to a triangular formation to enhance command and control. ROAD addressed the problems created from the pentomic plan that created smaller divisions and reduced effectiveness against insurgencies and conventional threats. The pentomic divisions depicted in figure 7 provided five subordinate headquarters beneath the division headquarters; however, these lacked sufficient manpower. The concept behind these division structures was that the ROAD

\textsuperscript{48} Wilson, \textit{Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades}, 325.

\textsuperscript{49} Ney, \textit{Evolution of the U S Army Division 1939-1968}, 71-83.
design provided three brigade headquarters and multiple other battalions directly to the division as indicated in figure 7. Divisions assigned battalions subordinate to the brigade headquarters based upon this situation, providing the flexibility required to respond to conventional, unconventional, and nuclear threats.\textsuperscript{50} The challenges faced in generating the 9th Infantry Division did not occur because of a change in division structure, but rather as a failure to identify its commitment to deploy until after its activation.

Figure 7. Reorganization of the Infantry Division


\textsuperscript{50} Stanton, \textit{Vietnam Order of Battle}, 78.
Figure 8. ROAD Division Organization


The 9th Infantry Division had difficulties using the cadre system and forming its division staff in comparison to how divisions were established in World War II. Multiple factors played a part in the difficulties facing the 9th Infantry Division. The first problem the division faced was not having a trained division staff. Activated on January 22, 1966, General Eckhard, commanding general of the 9th Infantry, was required to merge the Fort Riley post staff with the division for five months. This requirement allowed individuals the opportunity to pursue formal education and receive training. The second problem the division faced occurred from being identified for deployment to Vietnam.

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after their activation. Initial fielding of personnel for the division did not anticipate deploying to Vietnam, and many of the personnel provided were coded non-deployable, which resulted in the division losing 2,284 personnel, half of which were cadre. The lack of cadre forced the division to dismantle their assets in order to provide adequate cadre to support the brigade training. The last problem was that the Officer Candidate School program removed 400 of the division’s best Soldiers. These 400 Soldiers were taken early in the creation of the division, further limiting the ability to train and prepare units. Despite these delays the division deployed to Vietnam by January 31, 1967.

The 9th Infantry Division demonstrated that reorganizing structure, developing staff at established schools, and implementing a cadre system worked in Vietnam and provided the U.S. Army an effective means to generate division staffs. The expansion challenges facing the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam were similar to those experienced during World War II. Reports from the 9th Division stated a high rate of early replacements due to non-deployable Soldiers being removed and caused delays; however, despite these delays the 9th still deployed in one year and demonstrated system functionality.

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52 Ibid., 3.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 2.
Both World War II and Vietnam provided a base understanding of what measures may be undertaken to generate new division staffs. The common factors to both World War II and Vietnam were a change in organizational structure, use of a cadre system, schools for division staff training, and sufficient time to develop a division staff with its subordinate units. In both periods, changes occurred in order to respond to the demands placed upon the U.S. Army.

The adjustments to organizational structure, while both for different purposes, demonstrated that a major organizational change to manage a new threat can be accomplished while the nation is at war. World War II reduced the size of staffs and made subordinate units responsible to support division plans. Current threats the U.S. Army faces are best managed using the brigade-centric force, however, if a new threat emerged from a peer size military, the Army again would reorganize its formations.

World War II and Vietnam provided understanding of the use of current schools to train their division staffs. Both periods used previously established schools to support division staff training. World War II from 1941 – 1943 documented an increased school attendance in order to provide division staffs a greater number of trained individuals. The growth in the number of staff officers attending these schools demonstrated the value commanders placed in investing additional manpower to this critical phase. Vietnam demonstrated the importance of accomplishing this training before activating a division to prevent lost time and to identify support required to stand up new units. Sending officers to schools after activation, and the resulting reduced efficiency that ensued, forced the commanding general to take personnel from other organizations to make up
for these losses. Both periods demonstrated the need for training a division staff and the importance of conducting it prior to activation.

Another common theme to both periods was the use of cadre. The cadre system provided experienced leaders necessary in filling critical positions in a division. The two periods provided two methods in selecting cadre. World War II used a parent unit to identify individuals capable of higher-level responsibilities and send them forward to the new division. Advantages of using a parent unit to determine cadre was a better recognition of individual capabilities through familiarity, resulting in improved cadre quality. While isolated reports indicated some individuals provided were not capable, the general consensus was the cadre provided were critical in the formation of the division. Vietnam used a centralized departmental selection of cadre. The principal issue with this system was that centralized selection failed to recognize the potential for the 9th Infantry Division deployment to Vietnam, and as a result required a large turnover of staff and cadre that delayed unit readiness. Advantages to this method was a greater selection pool of Soldiers, however, there was a lack of ability to assess an individual’s potential.

Adjusting the structure of divisions, sending key staff to schools prior to activation, and fielding new divisions with cadre as conducted during World War II and Vietnam are methods this research considered for generating division forces today. To better understand what other factors are relevant, one must reconcile previous division changes from the past to today.
What changes have occurred in divisions since World War II and Vietnam?

Arguably the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War was the most significant event to occur after the Vietnam War. As a result, the U.S. Army has since debated and researched what the next major conflict may be and how best to prepare for it. Today the largest changes to division headquarters since World War II and Vietnam resulted from its assumption of joint task force command (JTF) headquarters responsibilities, transitioning to brigade modularity, and the integration of computer technology.

Divisions remain the U.S. Army’s major tactical headquarters, responsible for coordinating subordinate brigades in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. One significant change to divisions today is their ability to serve as a multinational JTF headquarters or the role of the land component headquarters for a JTF. While the concept of working with other nations in war is not new, the idea that a division would manage this role did not exist in World War II or Vietnam. Figure 9 outlines the visual concept given to the Chief of Staff of the Army in 2004 to flatten the levels of command provide the U.S. Army more options to manage multiple theaters with corps and divisions responsible for joint campaigns. Operations conducted during previous periods placed divisions at the tactical level, while integration of multinational and other armed forces was managed by higher headquarters. To assist divisions in managing these operations the U.S. Army created the concept of modularity.

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Figure 9.  Concept of Flattening the Levels of Command


Modularity was the U.S. Army’s answer to creating smaller sized units capable of deployment to multiple theaters of war. From 1991 through 2003 the U.S. Army conducted research to identify a method that provided political and military leaders options to deploy smaller sized elements in response to threats across the globe. Before modularity the only option was deploying division-sized elements similar to what was used in World War II and Vietnam. Deploying divisions with over 14,000 Soldiers often delivered too large of a force for the problem at hand, when in fact a smaller unit was much more appropriate for the task. The Global War on Terror created the need for the

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U.S. Army to deploy formations smaller than divisions. This demand brought about a change from division-centric operations to brigade-centric operations. The combined results of adjusting to JTF capabilities and modular brigades likewise increased the size of staffs in brigades, divisions, and corps.

Current division headquarters force structure expanded significantly compared to previous versions. A Rand study from 2012 provided data depicted in figures 10 and 11, contrasting the size of headquarters for divisions and corps before and after modularity was implemented. This growth occurred not only in division and corps headquarters, but also at the brigade level headquarters. The reason for this growth is attributed to the JTF capability and a need for increased flexibility, expanded command and control, and continuous operations. Additional growth resulted from requirements to conduct autonomous operations. With brigades deployed independently, divisions could no longer rely upon subordinate headquarters to assist in facilitating planning as it had in previous wars.

57 Ibid., 33.

58 Ibid., xii.
World War II relied upon subordinate headquarters to augment their own staffs, but this is not practical today due to modularity. Figures 12 and 13 contrast the size differences between World War II and the 25th Infantry Division in 2016. This information was gathered by reviewing the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)
for each organization. Figure 12 displays 1* for the artillery, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal sections of a division headquarters during World War II. These sections were provided by subordinate formations to augment the division headquarters staff. This enabled the U.S. Army to reduce staff sizes, establish unity of command and effort, and prevent redundancy. The Adjutant General’s section (AG) depicted represents the largest section during World War II. The AG sections was responsible for postal duties and processing all division personnel records. ⁵⁹ During the war one of the greatest responsibilities for the AG section was managing the actions required for the death of a Soldier. While the AG staff in World War II was larger than the current version, the division staff as a whole has grown significantly more.

Figure 12. World War II Division Staff


Figure 13 displays the 25th Infantry Division headquarters MTOE from 2016. The size of a division headquarters since World War II has grown from 162 to 485 personnel. One of the contributing factors to division headquarters growth is the removal of the responsibility of specialized subordinate headquarters to provide personnel in support of planning. Today the AG, ordinance and quartermaster sections have consolidated under their respective general staff sections. Removing subordinate headquarters’ support from division headquarters required an increase of 123 personnel to address the shortfall from
that withdrawal. Additional factors that contributed to the growth of these sections and the division headquarters was changes in technology.

| Section/Rank            | MG | BG | COL | LTC | MAJ | CPT | LT | WO | E9 | E8 | E7 | E6 | E5 | E4 | E3 | E2 | E1 | Total |
|-------------------------|----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|
| Command Section         | 1  | 2  | 1   | 1   | 1   | 2   | 1  | 1  | 3  | 2  | 2  |    |    |    |    |    |    | 16   |
| Chief of Staff Section  | 1  | 4  | 4   | 3   | 1   | 3   | 4  | 7  | 4  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 13   |
| G1                      | 1  | 2  | 2   | 1   | 1   | 3   | 4  | 7  | 4  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 25   |
| G2                      | 3  | 7  | 6   | 14  | 2   | 3   | 8  | 14 | 20 | 34 | 20 | 69 |
| G3                      | 6  | 19 | 12  | 1   | 3   | 5   | 8  | 3  | 7  | 3  | 2  |    |    |    |    |    |    | 69   |
| G4                      | 1  | 4  | 4   | 6   | 5   | 2   | 7  | 1  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 31   |
| AG                      |    |    |     |     | 0   |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Aviation                | 1  | 3  | 1   | 5   | 3   | 4   | 1  | 3  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 21   |
| Artillery               | 2  | 2  | 3   | 7   | 1   | 1   | 3  | 1  | 4  | 2  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 26   |
| Chaplain                | 1  | 2  |     | 1   |    | 1   |    |    | 5  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 5    |
| Chemical                | 1  | 3  | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 10   |
| Ordnance                |    |    |     |     |    |    | 0  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Quartermaster           | 0  |    |     |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Surgeon                 | 2  | 7  | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 2  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 14   |
| Engineer                | 1  | 3  | 2   | 1   | 1   | 3   | 1  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 12   |
| Finance                 | 1  | 11 |     |     | 1   | 1   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 15   |
| IG                      | 1  | 4  |     |     | 1   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 8     |
| Legal                   | 1  | 2  | 9   | 1   | 1   | 2   | 5  | 1  | 1  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 25   |
| Provost                 | 1  | 1  | 1   |     | 1   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 6     |
| PAO                     | 1  | 1  | 1   | 1   | 2   | 1   | 1  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 7     |
| Space                   | 1  | 1  |     |     | 1   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 3     |
| Signal                  | 1  | 5  | 7   | 7   | 1   | 3   | 7  | 8  | 5  | 4  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 48   |
| Total                   | 1  | 2  | 2   | 30  | 78  | 52  | 2  | 45 | 17 | 21 | 58 | 46 | 46 | 55 | 30 | 0  | 485   |

Figure 13. Division Staff from 2016


Technology integrated into a division headquarters increased the demand on manpower and contributed to its growth in size. Since World War II and Vietnam, the computer age revolutionized division headquarters. The ease of gathering information in the computer era has had the opposite impact in division headquarters. Today the U.S
Army has an unprecedented number of automated systems to collect data, resulting in an increased need for trained personnel for each specific system, data collection, and analysis to better support the division commander for informed decision making. Figure 14 displays the number of different systems that existed in 2005. Some of these systems were upgraded; however, the numbers of different systems in a division headquarters continues to grow. The G2 section alone experienced the greatest impact from this technology. Previous figures 11 and 12 display the change in the need for personnel in the G2 section to have grown from 10 to today needing 131 personnel. This is a direct result of automation integration into division headquarters. Technology provides division commanders greater understanding of operations; however, one resulting consequence is an increased demand for information and support personnel.
Analysis of changes that have occurred since historic case studies

Analysis addressing the first question of this research indicated that one of the measures taken to expand division staffs for prior conflicts was to reorganize force structure. To facilitate full mobilization in World War II the U.S. Army reorganized the division structure, and as a result two new divisions were created. Today division headquarters conduct multi-national and joint operations, a requirement that necessitated doubling the headquarters' staff at the brigade, division, and corps levels. The same
method can be applied with the current brigade-centric force. Returning to the previous force model of a division-centric, the U.S. Army could then create a pool of personnel required to expand division headquarters. Returning to pre-modular formations, division headquarters could be doubled in both the Army Reserve and active forces with minimal growth to the overall force. Reducing the size of headquarters to a brigade-centric structure will be difficult due to technology.

Since 2005 the U.S. Army has expanded its division headquarters to take advantage of the technological advancements. This technology provides division commanders a greater understanding of their environment and enhances their ability to make better decisions. Returning to a smaller sized headquarters will force division headquarters to reduce their reliance on these systems, which in turn will degrade their situational awareness and understanding. One consequence of this proposed reduction is that division headquarters can no longer serve as a JTF. In order to accomplish this, however, the answer to the following question is required: what division staffs currently exists and how many are available to assist to generating new forces?

What division staffs currently exist and how many are available to assist in generating new forces?

Active Duty

Using the model provided by expansion during World War II, the U.S. Army would rely heavily upon the current divisional force structure to develop new division staffs. Today the U.S. Army is engaged in many theaters and overtasked due to a high operational tempo. The number of divisions available is limited and if a peer threat were to emerge the capacity to respond must be considered. Answers to the above posed
question may provide an understanding of what divisions are currently available in both the Army Reserves and active duty force to support future expansions.

Today the active duty army has ten fully-staffed division headquarters and one partially-staffed training headquarters to manage 31 BCTs. These 11 division headquarters remain deployed at a high operational tempo, with 3rd Infantry Division in Afghanistan, 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq, 1st Armored Division in Jordan,\textsuperscript{60} 4th Infantry Division in Germany,\textsuperscript{61} and 2nd Infantry Division permanently stationed in Korea. The remaining headquarters are aligned against currently deployed forces as their rotational replacements. The 7th Infantry Division was reactivated in 2012 to provide training and readiness, allocating approximately half its staff in support of this mission. Despite this limit, the 7th Infantry Division will deploy in 2015 for the first time in 25 years to Afghanistan with the mission to advise Afghan security forces.\textsuperscript{62} With the active component fully engaged in the current environment, the Department of Defense relies upon additional division headquarters from the National Guard as a reserve.


National Guard Division Headquarters

Divisions in the National Guard provide command and control of military units for both state and federal governments. Funded mostly by the federal government, the National Guard is a unique military force that can be activated by either the President of the United States or state Governors to respond to natural or man-made emergencies. The National Guard consists of eight division headquarters that are the same size as the active duty component. The federal government deployed National Guard divisions in the past to assist in missions across the globe. The most recent example is 34th Infantry Division headquarters from Minnesota deployed to Iraq from 2009-2010. Unique to the National Guard are the responsibilities it has for internal security of the United States.

Currently two programs exist: State Partnership Program (SPP) and Domestic All-Hazards Response Team (DART), both supported by the National Guard division headquarters. Coordinated with the Department of Defense and Department of State the SPP partners National Guard units with 76 nations around the world to deter future threats and promote regional awareness. The SPP program assists in developing relationships between the National Guard and the active combatant commanders to better


64 Patrick D. Cornwell, “ARNG Division Headquarters in an Era of Persistent Conflict” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 2013), 27.

prepare for future threats. Federal and state governments also developed DART to plan, command, and control in the event of a U.S. emergency. This program assigns two divisions to DART every two years, with the remaining six divisions providing a strategic reserve for the active duty component.

Analysis of available current division headquarters

Together the active duty and National Guard provide the U.S. Army a total of 18 fully-staffed division headquarters. With the active duty divisions fully committed to either current operations or deploying to replace forces in theater and the National Guard division supporting DART, only six divisions remain available to support expansion. If a peer threat were to emerge, the U.S. Army may choose to reorganize unit commitments overseas in order to create a more even distribution of active and reserve divisions. Reorganizing division structure will not be an easy solution with the current demands, however both World War II and Vietnam demonstrated that a change of this size is possible while at war. Applying these past lessons may enable the Army to rapidly generate additional headquarters.

The first step used in the reviewed World War II case model, reorganization of division and headquarters structure increased the number of division headquarters. Returning to pre-modularity formations initially could provide sufficient manpower to

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66 Ibid., 19.

double the number of division headquarters to at least 20 in the active component and 16 in the reserves. The next steps in expanding the division headquarters included implementation of formal officer education, cadre implementation, and allocation of sufficient time for training and cohesion. This initial expansion required identifying junior leaders poised to further their career with additional education and training. A critical lesson learned from Vietnam is that expansion of new divisions should be completed before forming the division as a whole. To facilitate training new division staffs, this research study reviewed the current capabilities present in the Army.

What current capabilities and capacity exists in the Army to train division staffs?

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command also known as TRADOC was established in 1975 to provide training for all personnel and development of how the Army organization operates. Within this organization exists the personnel and infrastructure to recruit, train and develop the Army’s Soldiers. TRADOC also contains subordinate units that are capable of assisting the Army in training and developing division staffs.

Division staffs focus their training on Department of the Army directed mission essential tasks list, or METL. METL training is directed by the Department of the Army and is universal for all division staffs. The directed METL for a division is (1) Conduct Mission Command, (2) Conduct Offensive Operations, (3) Conduct Defensive Operations, and (4) Conduct Stability Operations.\(^\text{68}\) These tasks prepare division staffs to

conduct a broad spectrum of operations and is tailored according to commander
requirements. To develop a staff, a division will conduct various exercises in order to gain
a better understand of their METL and how to integrate each section of the staff into a
common purpose or mission. Training a division staff is a large, complex, and difficult
undertaking due to the high amounts of both support and information required to create a
realistic event. Command and General Staff College and the Mission Command Training
Program are two of the major contributing capabilities that enhance the capacity to train
division staffs in the U.S. Army.

Some changes have occurred over time, but the CGSC remains the primary
educational platform that prepares field grade officers to serve on division staff. Figure
15 displays the current 10 month curricula that consists of Common Core, Advanced
Operations, and Electives.69 The Advanced Operations portion contains critical courses
that prepare field grade officers to serve as staff officers on a corps, division and brigade
headquarters. The combination of O100, O200 and O300 courses contain a total of 238
hours of course work.70 CGSC would be reconfigured similar to the 1940 model and
implement an abbreviated curricula focused on Advanced Operations to facilitate rapid
development of new division staffs. The capstone of the abbreviated course would be
conducted in a practical exercise that is also referred to as warfighting exercises.

69 Department of the Army, CGSC Circular 350-1, U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College Catalog (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, 2016), 7-3.

70 Ibid., 7-11–7-12.
A warfighting exercise enables a division staff to focus its training based upon its METL and commander's guidance. These exercises are conducted in many forms from simulated exercises, command post exercises, field training, and other similar events. These warfighting exercises provide the staff an opportunity to train with their subordinate units, civilian agencies, and coalition partners. The time to train a staff on each system to execute a warfighting exercise will vary based upon the experience of the staff. The Chief of Staff, working under the guidance of the commander, will assess and plan based upon the capabilities and experience of their staff. To further evaluate and facilitate training higher level headquarters, the U.S. Army established MCTP.
MCTP, previously known as Battle Command Training Program, was established in 1987 to provide the U.S. Army the capability to train and evaluate large size headquarters. It is comprised of expansive computer simulations capable of replicating battlefield reports and effects, and a professional staff of over 500 personnel to construct and conduct large scale exercises. The MCTP staff create complex scenarios, contribute teams representing opponent forces, and provide evaluators trained in current Army doctrine that offer constructive feedback to enhance headquarters of brigades units and larger. In 2014 MCTP conducted a total of 13 exercises that trained a combined 65 unit headquarters. With the capacity to train multiple headquarters simultaneously, the MCTP offers the U.S. Army a resource to leverage for generating and developing multiple division level headquarters.

Analysis of capabilities and resources to support generating new headquarters

Today CGSC and MCTP constitute vast resources that support division staff development. As the result of the CGSC’s expanded role today compared to its predecessor of World War II, it has the capacity to graduate over 1,300 officers per year. Transition of the CGSC curricula to a nine-week course focused only upon Advanced Operation courses could graduate 7,800 officers in the same timeframe. If the U.S. Army

71 Bohnemann, MCTP Trends in a Decisive Action Warfighter Exercise, 5.


73 Ibid., 1-3.
transitions to pre-modular formations depicted in figure 11, the average size of staff would be approximately 270 personnel. Utilizing this modified CGSC abbreviated course, the Army could provide sufficient field grade officers to fill over 30 new division staffs in one year. The MCTP could in turn provide training exercises for these newly formed divisions to reinforce and validate their capabilities, and subsequently integrate training for the brigade headquarters as well. Collectively these resources provide sufficient capability to the U.S. Army to form, train, and develop a vast number of newly formed divisions in a relatively short amount of time.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The U.S. Army cannot be certain where the next war will be, however a plan of how to organize a division structure to full mobilization must be considered. The purpose of this thesis was to ascertain if the U.S. Army is prepared to generate additional division staffs in a time of crisis. The conclusion will answer the thesis by providing an overview of the process on how the Army can establish new division headquarters with the methods, units and resources, discussed in chapter 4.

The first step to generate additional division headquarters is establishment of an overall plan under a single responsible headquarters. Using the current U.S. Army structure outlined in Army Regulation 500-5 Army Mobilization, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is identified in AR 500-5 as the “responsible agent and/or supported command within CONUS, minus special operations forces (SOF), for unit mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution planning and execution, within the policy and guidance established by the Department of the Army.”

FORSCOM’s responsibilities are coordination with Training and Doctrine Command, Army Material Command, Installation Management Command, the Surgeon General, U.S. Army Reserves, and the National Guard to: (1) determine the number of required divisions needed, (2) establish a new division-centric force structure, (3) identify

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locations capable of housing and requisite infrastructure to manage expansion, (4) determine the sequence of divisions to adjust, (5) coordinate school and division activation dates, (6) coordinate with the Department of Army and Combatant Commanders to adjust deployment dates, (7) establish division requirements to validate deployment readiness, and (8) identify which divisions will serve as parent units. Should these modifications double the existing force structure, then additional steps must be taken to properly implement and manage an expansion of that magnitude.

Federalizing the U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard are necessary to execute full mobilization. With authorization from the President and Congress, the Army Reserves and National Guard are activated. This activation enables the U.S. Army to utilize resources found in the reserves, and to transition the National Guard division structure simultaneously with active duty divisions to previous force structure.

Returning to a division-centric force structure provides the U.S. Army with sufficient increasing the number of total division headquarters with minor adjustments to overall endstength. The current brigade-centric force structure increased the size of headquarters for brigades, divisions, and corps. On average this increase has more than doubled the number of personnel manning these staffs. Non-JTF engaged divisions may return to the division-centric structure that will create a pool of personnel sufficient to establishing new division headquarters. During this step the reassigned officers will attend schools necessary to prepare them for their future assignment. The division commander, assistant division commander, and subordinate headquarters staff will be identified by the Department of the Army G-1 centralized boards. The remaining key positions; Chief of Staff, G-staff, and special staff will be determined by their respective
branches based on guidance from the Department of the Army. Once these key individuals are identified and assessed, they will be reassigned to the appropriate school for appropriate education and training.

In preparation, key officers will be assigned to a restructured Command and General Staff College. CGSC will establish a 9-week course focused on advance operations. Similar to the CGSS curricula conducted during World War II, this modified CGSC will focus on developing the staff in preparation for their future roles and responsibilities. These courses will vary depending on position requirements, and once complete, will prepare field grade officers the understanding and training required to fulfill their roles. The final four weeks of the course will be conducted with the division commander present, fostering cohesion and team building between the new division staff members. The U.S. Army can also leverage MCTP to facilitate the four-week evaluation of the new division staff as an option outside of CGSC. Upon graduation these individuals will transfer to their new location where they will form, prepare, and train subordinate members. This may be accomplished with minimal adjustments to the size or capacity of the current CGSC.

The next phase for preparing division staffs is expansion of the MCTP and tasking it to train and validate division and subordinate headquarters in preparation to deploy. After sufficient time for division activation, reception of subordinate units, and equipping and training, the MCTP will schedule a warfighting exercise to validate division readiness. The MCTP will be tasked to conduct a computer exercise that best replicates the missions the new divisions will face. Uniquely equipped, the MCTP provides expert opponent forces, observer controllers, and assessment tools to aid
division commander's development and assessment of their headquarters staff. Once validated, these divisions are ready for deployment.

The only divisions unable to begin the transition to a pre-modular formation are those currently assigned as JTF headquarters. FORSCOM will be required to coordinate with combatant commanders to determine the impact this poses to current operations and to determine updated division personnel requirements. Upon completion of their current JTF headquarters obligations, these previously excluded divisions will transition to the new division-centric force structure.

Once all the divisions have adjusted to the new force structure, the U.S. Army will employ a parent unit method to generate additional headquarters. Based upon the analysis of this study, the U.S. Army is capable of doubling the total number of division headquarters from the current 18 (excluding the 7th Infantry Division that is not manned at full strength) to 36 total divisions. If the Department of the Army projects more than 36 divisions are required, then it will execute the parent unit method. The parent unit method identifies a division, complete with transitioning to division-centric organization, to receive an increase in personnel. These newly assigned soldiers will bolster the receiving division to an over-strength status, thus enabling it to identify and reassign a portion of its cadre and officers to form new divisions and division staff. Those Soldiers will be individuals that have demonstrated an ability to perform at the next grade and duty. The identified officers will be sent to CGSC and the cadre will be sent to the school best aligned to their next position.

Paramount to the U.S. Army's needs is to retain current basic training and officer recruitment, and training required to generate replacements to units. In both historical
case studies, the newly formed divisions were responsible for conducting basic training. Today TRADOC provides units and personnel responsible to train new Soldiers. In order not to repeat mistakes observed during World War II, deployed units suffering casualties will receive replacements from TRADOC, and the Department of the Army should refrain from pulling personnel from newly generated divisions. Removing trained, integrated team members from newly-formed divisions is disruptive and degrades headquarters' abilities when deploying into theater.

Using similar full mobilization methods implemented during World War II, the U.S. Army can be prepared to generate multiple division staffs to respond to a peer military threat. Currently the Army contains all the necessary components needed to fully mobilize new division staffs, however, the potential for these options may diminish over time. The solution this research has come to may face issues if not addressed. Some of these issues are the Army’s plans to reduce the size of headquarters, integrating National Guard divisions, and the demand of system automations on division headquarters.

**Recommendations**

To protect the ability to generate multiple divisions in response to full mobilization, the U.S. Army must limit its reductions to the headquarters. The U.S. Army continues to refine the size of its force structure in a division and larger headquarters, with projections to decrease personnel to 420,000. In 2013 the CSA commissioned Focus Area Review Groups (FARG) to propose force structure changes to these higher-level staffs. Based upon projections provided from the Army Capabilities Integration Center and Headquarters, the Department of the Army proposed to shrink the size of division staffs by 25 percent and to utilize the Army Reserve components to augment the resulting
shortfalls. The FARG recommended that division staffs now only deploy with their Tactical Command Posts, while the Main Command Posts remain in the United States. These recommendations will change the division staff roles. Augmentation from the Army Reserves will provide additional staff in preparation to deploy for an operation. The number of available divisions is critical for the U.S. Army’s successful ability to respond to future crises.

While the recommendation to reduce headquarters still maintains a larger size staff than those of the pre-modularity era, thought must be paid to retaining some capability to assist in facilitating expansion. Relying on reserves to augment headquarters will diminish the ability to create a pool of personnel by returning to pre-modularity practices. Information gathered from FMSWeb indicates that current division headquarters size is at 485 personnel. The pre-modular staff was approximately 250 personnel. Reducing current headquarters staff by the proposed 25 percent will yield 363 personnel. Using the reduced headquarters personnel to transition to the pre-modular force structure would provide a pool of 113 personnel. Based on this projection it would require two divisions restructured from the FARG model to create one new division. Based upon current force structure, this would reduce the total number of division headquarters the Army could be capable of generating under full mobilization. Additional cuts to a headquarters' size will erode the pre-modularity structure, thus removing it this option to generate new division headquarters.

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The Army needs to consider increasing the deployment of National Guard divisions. Today active duty divisions continue to be deployed at a high operational tempo. The National Guard however has only deployed division headquarters twice since September 11, 2001. While it is common to see brigades from the National Guard continue to deploy in support of operations, the U.S. Army underutilized the total number of divisions available. Deploying National Guard divisions will not only reduce the demand that is currently on active duty divisions, but will also assist in increasing the readiness of these units. Benefits from increasing the rotation of National Guard divisions will increase mobilization speed, better support the U.S. Army Total Force Policy, and reduce the demand for active duty divisions.

To facilitate the ability to reduce divisions staffs, this research recommends the Army research ways to limit the demand on automated systems in the headquarters. The sheer numbers of systems that occupy a division headquarters have created a demand for training, tracking and analyzing the information to support the commander. Recent upgrades to some of these systems have been consolidated into a single platform, however, a large number of the systems remain. Chapter 4 demonstrated how the G2 section requirements have resulted in creating the largest staff section in a division headquarters. Effort must be made to reduce the demand on these systems either through consolidating the information into a single database, or determine a method that removes the need for personnel to track and compile the data. Continued research into the

76 Cornwell, “ARNG Division Headquarters in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” 46.

advantages and disadvantages of automation may provide improved methods on how
brigade size and larger headquarters can reduce the demand on information and
personnel.

This study does not provide an analysis of how to generate divisions under partial
mobilization. The potential to expand limited numbers of division is more likely to occur,
and this practice warrants additional research. Limited expansion could occur for a
number of reasons and not require generation of more than one or two new division
headquarters. This research should identify how the U.S. Army may learn from previous
partial mobilizations to reduce time it takes to provide additional forces, which may also
provide insight to intermediate actions required prior to full mobilization. Establishing
methods for partial mobilization will provide the Army with options to expanding the
force without making major adjustments to force structure or established capabilities like
CGSC or MCTP.


Cornwell, Patrick D. “ARNG Division Headquarters in an Era of Persistent Conflict.” Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2013.


