SECURITY: THE FOURTH PILLAR OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY. DOES THE REGION NEED A SECURITY ORGAN?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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Security: The Fourth Pillar of the Caribbean Community. Does the Region Need a Security Organ?

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a 15-state regional organization in the Caribbean, which was formed in 1973 as a means of continuing post-independence member states’ cooperation. The mandate of CARICOM has evolved and is now focused on deep interconnectedness and integration. Economic integration, foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation were the pillars on which CARICOM was founded and were the basis for pursuing the regional integration agenda. The objectives of the organization were threatened by the complex security environment of the 21st Century. Given its increasing importance and cross-cutting nature, CARICOM’s leaders agreed to establish security as the fourth pillar of the organization in 2007. This research assessed the security architecture that has been designed to meet the regional security mandate in order to determine if the region requires a Security Organ to support the decision to make security a foundational pillar. The research found that there are moderate risks associated with CARICOM’s current approach. To mitigate these risks, it is proposes a strengthening of the security structure in order to improve coordination and effectiveness be implemented. The research identified various options for strengthening the security structure, but based on CARICOM’s existing design, the establishment of a CARICOM Security Organ is a necessary precursor to other improvements.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a 15-state regional organization in the Caribbean, which was formed in 1973 as a means of continuing post-independence member states’ cooperation. The mandate of CARICOM has evolved and is now focused on deep interconnectedness and integration. Economic integration, foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation were the pillars on which CARICOM was founded and were the basis for pursuing the regional integration agenda. The objectives of the organization were threatened by the complex security environment of the 21st Century. Given its increasing importance and cross-cutting nature, CARICOM’s leaders agreed to establish security as the fourth pillar of the organization in 2007. This research assessed the security architecture that has been designed to meet the regional security mandate in order to determine if the region requires a Security Organ to support the decision to make security a foundational pillar. The research found that there are moderate risks associated with CARICOM’s current approach. To mitigate these risks, it is proposes a strengthening of the security structure in order to improve coordination and effectiveness be implemented. The research identified various options for strengthening the security structure, but based on CARICOM’s existing design, the establishment of a CARICOM Security Organ is a necessary precursor to other improvements.
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I am grateful to my wife Anazieke, for being here with me; you encouraged me to continue going, especially at the most challenging times. I acknowledge the support of my fellow International Military brothers, the Team 16 instructors and my colleagues in Staff Group 16C. I also acknowledge and thank the team at CARICOM IMPACS, for opening my eyes to the realities of security in the Caribbean.

Most importantly, I thank God; it would not have been possible to complete this research without the blessings that He continues to bestow on me.

I dedicate this work to my daughters Victoria Isabelle and Michelle Vanessa.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Introduction

The islands of the Caribbean are known primarily for their beautiful beaches, laissez-faire atmosphere and diverse culture. This makes the region a prime location for tourism. Tourism makes a significant contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of several Caribbean countries. The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) reported that of 12 regions of the world, the Caribbean region is more dependent on travel and tourism than any other.\textsuperscript{1} The same WTTC Travel and Tourism Economic Impact 2015 report indicated that travel and tourism contributed 14.6 percent to GDP in the Caribbean as a region in 2014, and this is expected to increase by 2.9 percent in 2015.\textsuperscript{2}

A 2007 report published by the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) titled Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean, discussed the relationship between tourism and crime in the Caribbean. The report found that crime and violence have had a deleterious effect on tourism and other areas of life in Caribbean countries. Specifically, the report highlighted that the high rates of crime and violence in the Caribbean were undermining growth, threatening human welfare, and impeding social development in the region.\textsuperscript{3} Underscoring the value of tourism to the region, the report indicated that “because of the key role that tourism plays in many Caribbean countries, the effects of crime on tourism are of particular concern.”\textsuperscript{4} The UNODC also reported, in a 2012 Report, that Central America and the Caribbean face extreme violence inflamed by transnational organized crime and drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{5} The report went on to indicate that criminal networks and
their activities disrupt stability, undermine democratic institutions and hinder the economic activity so vital to the region.

**Geostrategic Significance**

The Caribbean region includes a group of countries spanning 2,500 miles in a convex arch from the Bahamas past the south east point of Florida and downward to the island of Trinidad just off the South American mainland. The region is made up of over 7,000 islands. These islands make up the approximately 30 countries and dependent territories within the Caribbean. Many of these countries and territories are archipelagos that have islands that are uninhabited.

The Caribbean region is divided into two regions, the Greater Antilles (in the northwest) and the Lesser Antilles (in the southeast), see figure 1. The largest and most populated islands are in the Greater Antilles. There are approximately seven million people living in the Caribbean. Over 25 percent of the region’s population lives in Cuba, which is largest by both population and geographic size.
The location of the region makes it strategically significant to many countries, including the United States (U.S.). The Caribbean is often referred to as the U.S.’s third border, because it provides direct access to the southern states. The region sits astride several major shipping routes–connecting the western Caribbean Sea with the Pacific Ocean through the Panama Canal.

The Region’s geostrategic relevance to the U.S. is underscored by historical events such as the Cuban Missile Crises, the American occupation of the Dominican Republic and the invasion of Grenada. U.S. policies relating to the region–from the Monroe Doctrine of the 19th and 20th centuries to the Good Neighbor Policy of the last

**History of the Caribbean**

Christopher Columbus first stumbled upon the Caribbean islands in 1492 during his search for a westward passage to Asia. Based on his contract with the Spanish Crown, the countries that he discovered were placed under Spanish rule. During the 16th to the 19th centuries the former imperial powers of Great Britain, Spain, France and the Netherlands fought continually for possessions in the area. At the end of the 19th century to well into the 20th century, Britain was the dominant imperial power exercising influence in the region, having had more colonies than the other significant powers at the time.

The period of colonization was far from peaceful. In the late 18th century, Haiti revolted against their French Colonial masters. At the end of the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) the Haitian people gained independence and the right to self-governance. Similarly, Cuba staged many rebellions against Spanish colonial rule, albeit less successful than the Haitians’. British held territories also faced upheaval over the right of the colonies to self-determination. The Maroon Wars in Jamaica in the late 18th century was among some of the earliest conflicts. However, it was later political activism that led to independence in many of the Caribbean countries. All of which was focused on the desire for political sovereignty.
History of CARICOM

Caribbean states began to gain independence from Britain in the late 1950s. When Britain began to grant independence to many of the Caribbean countries in 1958, efforts were made to create a West Indian Federation. This was envisaged as a political union of states that had been granted independence from Britain. This was similar to what happened when the British influenced the creation of the Canadian and Australian Confederation. However, due to a number of social and political reasons, the West Indies Federation came to an end in 1962.6

The collapse of the West Indies Federation may be regarded as the real beginning of what is now the Caribbean Community. With the end of the Federation, political leaders in the Caribbean made more serious efforts to strengthen the ties between the islands and mainland by providing for the continuance and strengthening of the areas of cooperation that existed during the Federation. In announcing its intention to withdraw from the Federation, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago proposed the creation of a Caribbean Community, consisting not only of the 10 members of the Federation, but also of the three Guianas (now Guyana, Suriname and French Guyana) and all the islands of the Caribbean Sea—both independent and non-independent.7

The first Heads of Government Conference was in July 1963 and attended by the leaders of Barbados, British Guiana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. In July 1965, the Heads of Government announced plans to establish a Free Trade Area. In December that year, Heads of Government of Antigua, Barbados and British Guiana signed an Agreement to set up the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA). The new CARIFTA agreement came into effect on May 1, 1968. In October 1972, Caribbean
leaders decided to transform CARIFTA into a Common Market and establish the Caribbean Community. In April 1973 at the CARIFTA Heads of Government Conference the decision to establish the Caribbean Community was brought to fruition with a legal instrument and with the signing by 11 members of CARIFTA.

The Accord provided for the signature of the Caribbean Community Treaty on July 4 and its coming into effect in August 1973, among the then four independent countries: Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas. Although the new organization (CARICOM) was open for the members of CARIFTA and others to join, they all did not ratify the Treaty at the same time. Table 1 below presents the list of countries that are members of CARICOM and when they joined the organization.

CARICOM’s membership consists primarily of Anglophones by virtue of their historical connection with Britain. However, the regional organization broadened its membership to include states that do not use English as their official language. Suriname, which is a Dutch-speaking state, became the 14th Member State of the Caribbean Community on July 4, 1995. Haiti secured provisional membership on July 4, 1998 and on July 3, 2002 was the first French-speaking Caribbean State to become a full Member of CARICOM. There are no Spanish-speaking member states, however the Dominican Republic has applied to be a member of CARICOM.
Table 1. CARICOM Member States

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Membership Date</th>
<th>Type of Membership</th>
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<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>4 July 1974</td>
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<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>4 July 1983</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>1 August 1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>1 May 1974</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
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<td>Dominica</td>
<td>1 May 1974</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>1 May 1974</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>1 August 1973</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2 July 2002</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1 August 1973</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>1 May 1974</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>26 July 1974</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>1 May 1974</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>1 May 1974</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>4 July 1995</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>1 August 1973</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anguilla</td>
<td>4 July 1999</td>
<td>Associate Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>2 July 2003</td>
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<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
<td>2 July 1991</td>
<td>Associate Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>15 May 2002</td>
<td>Associate Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks and Caicos Islands</td>
<td>2 July 1991</td>
<td>Associate Member</td>
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Organization and Objectives of CARICOM

The original intention when the first regional Heads of Government meeting occurred was to see to the continuation and strengthening of the areas of cooperation that were realized during the brief period of federation. This was refined and codified in the Treaty of Chaguaramas. The pillars of the CARICOM movement were: economic integration, foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation (this third pillar was soon replaced by human and social development). In 2001, the Treaty was revised (Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas) to deepen relations between member states. That
revision of the Treaty set out the objectives for the Community, including the
establishment of a Single Market and Economy (instead of the previous Common
Market). The Revised Treaty specified the objectives of CARICOM. According to
Article 6 of the Treaty, the objectives of CARICOM are:

(a) improved standards of living and work;
(b) full employment of labor and other factors of production;
(c) accelerated, coordinated and sustained economic development and
convergence;
(d) expansion of trade and economic relations with third States;
(e) enhanced levels of international competitiveness;
(f) organization for increased production and productivity;
(g) the achievement of a greater measure of economic leverage and
effectiveness of Member States in dealing with third States, groups of States
and entities of any description;
(h) enhanced co-ordination of Member States’ foreign and [foreign] economic
policies; and
(i) enhanced functional co-operation.

The pillars of the Community were the embodiment of the objectives. The
Revised Treaty articulated Organs of the Community and among them were organs that
were directly connected to each pillar. These Organs were:

(a) Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP);
(b) Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED);
(c) Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR), and
(d) Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD).

These pillars were incorporated into the structure of the Secretariat responsible for the
affairs of the Community through the establishment of directorates. The directorates
support the Organs that were established to ensure that the specific Community
objectives were being pursued and met. To support the pillar of economic integration,
COTED exists and is supported by the Directorate of Trade and Economic Development.
To support the pillar of foreign policy coordination, COFCOR exists and supported by
the Directorate of Foreign and Community relations. To support the pillar of human and
social development, COHSOD exists and is supported by a Directorate of Human and Social Development.

In 2007, the CARICOM Heads of Government recognized security as the fourth pillar of the Community, given its ever-increasing importance and its cross-cutting and fundamental nature. At the Eighteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting of Heads of Government “the Conference agreed that steps should be taken to formalize this decision in the context of a revision of the Revised Treaty.” To date, CARICOM has not revised its Treaty to incorporate this decision.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the absence of security as an Organ of CARICOM is negatively affecting the attainment of the region’s security goals. It is anticipated that this study will provide meaningful input into the ongoing efforts towards achieving regional security.

Research Question

The primary research question is therefore: Should CARICOM establish a Security Organ to oversee and implement the regional security agenda? In order to determine the answer to this question, four secondary questions must be answered:

1. What is the CARICOM security situation?

2. What is CARICOM’s security agenda and what structures are in place to achieve the intended outcomes?
3. What risks exist in CARICOM’s efforts to achieve its regional security objectives without a Security Organ, and are those risks likely to increase to an unacceptable level if one is not established?

4. How can a Security Organ be incorporated into CARICOM’s structure and how can it help to achieve CARICOM’s security objectives?

Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made, during the course of this research:

1. Security issues will continue to exist in the Caribbean that will be beyond the scope of the capacity of any single state to resolve.

2. CARICOM will continue to exist and will remain relevant among the Member States and within the wider Caribbean region.

3. CARICOM countries will continue to exist in an atmosphere of cooperation and collaboration with respect to major issues.

4. The U.S. will continue to be a superpower or at least a major power broker with significant influence regionally and globally in the medium to long term.

Limitations

The researcher was limited by the time available over which to conduct the study. Additionally, the location of the researcher at Command and General Staff College (CGSC) also limited the research by making it difficult to access some resources that may have better informed the research.
Scope and Delimitations

The research does not seek to examine in any detail the reason for the establishment of the CARICOM security architecture in the current form. It also does not intend to evaluate the precise resource (in particular finance) implications for the recommendations made.

Significance of Study

Although CARICOM has recognized the need for a collaborative approach to security, the structures established to provide this security have not been reviewed for over a decade. During this time the security threats to the region have evolved. This study will provide key answers for any such review, or at least add to the body of knowledge that such a review may benefit from.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter presented a background for the study, which included the history of the Caribbean region and CARICOM, as well as an overview of its organization and role as a major regional institution. The chapter also highlighted the geostrategic significance of the region and the implications for regional and hemispheric security. This led to the questions that the research is aimed at addressing. Chapter 2 will examine in more detail the current and emerging security environment and consider carefully the extent to which CARICOM is attaining its regional objectives. Chapter 2 will review the regional security environment and architecture to facilitate later analysis of effectiveness, risks and gaps.

1 World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), Economic Impact of Travel and Tourism 2015: Annual Update Summary (London: World Travel and Tourism Council,
2 Ibid.


4 Ibid., 43.


7 Ibid.


9 Ibid.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 8.


14 Ibid.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the absence of security as an Organ of CARICOM is negatively affecting the attainment of the region’s security goals. This chapter provides a review of relevant literature that is necessary to provide answers to the research questions of the study. This chapter presents the nature of the security threats affecting the Caribbean currently, or with the potential to influence the Caribbean situation in the near future. It also reviews the regional security objectives and the security structure in place to attain those goals. The existing CARICOM structure is scrutinized to develop a better understanding of its traditional design and approach to meeting the mandates of the community. A brief review of alternative structural models that are used by other regional organizations is also presented. Finally, the chapter provides a conceptual framework to assess risk, which will facilitate the analysis which will occur later in the study.

Perspectives on Security

It is important at this stage to define how the concept of security is viewed within CARICOM. Security itself has numerous definitions because it is an “essentially contested concept.”¹ Richard Bloomfield, a former United States Foreign Service Officer, argues that the concept is driven by a state’s geographic location, interests, and prejudice; and it provides the filter through which problems are perceived and thus how solutions are structured.² One definition of security that allows an insight into how security is
perceived by the region is provided by a regional scholar and political scientist, Dr Ivelaw Griffith. Griffith presents a multi-dimensional perspective on security. According to Griffith:

Security is the protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external military attack and coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished political, economic and social values. These values include democratic choice and political stability in the political area, sustainable development and free enterprise in the economic domain, and social equality and respect for human rights in the social arena.  

Griffith in discussing security within the region explains that small states by their very nature are vulnerable to various security threats. Some of the security threats are traditional in nature, but there also are a number of non-traditional and emerging threats. Traditionally security threats are those that are directed towards the state, by another state actor with the emphasis on military and political security. Existing traditional security threats that face CARICOM states are predominantly territorial or border disputes. Non-traditional security threats are well explained by Divya Sprikanth as follows:

Unlike the preceding centuries, in which the gravest security threats that a nation-state faced were invariably the armies of other states, in the 21st century, this is no longer the case. The emergence of a number of non-state actors, such as terrorist networks, drug cartels and maritime piracy networks, and intra-state conflicts (e.g. civil wars) have assumed importance as new-age threats to the national security of present-day states. Apart from such non-state and transnational actors, the impact of environmental degradation on the future of the nation-state, especially the implications of global climate change, has emerged as a credible and serious threat to the future existence of modern-day nation-states.

Niklas Swanstrom made the point that “the security debate has for too long focused on military threats towards the state and the “softer” issues such as environment, trade, transnational crime, human security, etc. have not been seen as potential security threats.” The mainly small states of the Caribbean, generally do not share the narrow
traditional view of security. Their threat perceptions are diverse and more consistent with the threats that Sprikanth identified.

Defining the Threats

In 2013 CARICOM published a CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (CCSS). The CCSS was produced by the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) on the direction of the Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE). That strategy clearly articulates the CARICOM’s perception of the greatest security risks and threats to the region. “The Strategy identifies and prioritizes the common security risks and threats which CARICOM is facing now, and likely to face in the future” and specifically states that:

Caribbean nations [are] contending with high rates of homicide and violent crime, trafficking in guns, ammunition and illegal narcotics, the rise in cyber-crime, the compromising of government programs by organized crime, increasing pressure on water, energy and other resources, environmental degradation and climate change, the growing power of non-state actors including transnational organized crime networks.

These security threats are categorized into tiers of threats (and risks). Tier 1 (immediate significant threats) are high-probability, high-impact events. They are the clear and present dangers. Tier 2 (substantial) threats are both likely and relatively high-impact, but are not as severe as the former category. Tier 3 (significant potential risks) are high-impact, but low-probability. Tier 4 (future risks) are threats where the probability and impact cannot be assessed at this stage. These categorizations are based on regional analysis, but they are generally consistent with how threats are categorized in international security literature. The distinction between threats and risks, in describing groups of security threats, is unique but understandable based on the categorizations used.
Tier 1 Threats

The Tier 1 security threats that CARICOM states face include transnational organized crime;\textsuperscript{12} gangs and organized crime; cyber-crime; financial crimes; and corruption.\textsuperscript{13} As indicated earlier, transnational organized crimes are the most immediate and significant threat to CARICOM states,\textsuperscript{14} as a result they dominate the regional security dialogue. These crimes include trafficking of illicit drugs and illegal guns by non-state actors. Even before the development of the CCSS, Griffith had identified narco-trafficking, gun smuggling, and organized crime as being among the dominant nontraditional threats facing the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{15} The non-state actors in the Caribbean region are mainly transnational criminal organizations (TCO). TCOs are powerful organizations which are globally networked. General John Kelly in his 2015 Posture Statement indicated that “The tentacles of global networks involved in narcotics and arms trafficking, human smuggling, illicit finance, and other types of illegal activity reach across Latin America and the Caribbean.”\textsuperscript{16}

Drug Smuggling

The geographic location of the region places Caribbean islands between the drug-producing states in South America and the drug-consuming countries in North America and Europe. This makes the islands ideal as drug transshipment locations. General Kelly indicated that “The drug trade—which is exacerbated by U.S. drug consumption—has wrought devastating consequences in many of our partner nations.”\textsuperscript{17} The countries’ vulnerability to drug smuggling is further compounded because most of the island states lack the ability to secure their entire coastline. This was a major point that was identified
by the UNODC when it launched its 2014-2016 regional program in support of the CCSS. The UNODC noted that:

The Caribbean is situated in the midst of some of the world's major drug trafficking routes, between the world's main drug producing countries to the South and the major consumer markets of the North. The geographic location of the region, the general lack of adequate law enforcement capacities to effectively monitor vast coastlines, as well as its susceptibility to exogenous shocks, are some of the factors explaining the Caribbean's extreme vulnerability to the threat of transnational organized crime and its various manifestations. The nature of these challenges makes regional cooperation and a coordinated response key factors in addressing the increasing plague of transnational crime.

Gun Smuggling

Although no CARICOM state manufactures any type of firearm, the region has a significant problem with illegal firearms. One explanation for the number of illegal guns in the region is that drug smugglers who have relatively easy access to the U.S. weapons market acquire guns and smuggle them into CARICOM states in order to protect their drug trafficking trade. More recently, Jamaican authorities uncovered a “drugs for guns trade” between that country and Haiti.

The consequences of the massive presence of illegal firearms has been devastating to the region. Illegal firearms contribute significantly to the crime rate within CARICOM states. The International Statistics on Crime and Justice Report, indicated that of the 19 regions assessed, the Caribbean region has the second highest homicide rate in the world in 2010, second only to Southern Africa. This is attributed to gang violence and the actions of organized crime syndicates within many of the CARICOM states. The UNODC report also indicated that 70 percent of the homicides in the Caribbean region were committed through the use of firearms.
The case of Jamaica provides an example of the problem being faced by CARICOM states because of illicit firearms. Jamaica’s Police Commissioner, Dr Carl Williams painted a grim picture of the impact of illegal guns in that country during a news conference. According to Williams:

Guns have wreaked havoc across the island, firearms were used in more than 10,300 murders over the last 10 years, approximately 75 per cent of the 13,780 plus murders recorded over the period, an additional 9,000 Jamaicans were shot and injured, 20,598 persons were robbed at gunpoint, with many of them killed during the course of the robbery. During the same period, guns featured in the rape of some 1,200 defenseless women and girls.20

CARICOM, having identified this grave issue, was at the forefront of the effort to develop the global Arms Trade Treaty. This treaty came into existence in December 2014, however the effect on the trade in illegal firearms in the region has not yet been assessed.

Cyber and Financial Crimes

Cyber and financial crimes have become more significant on an international scale mainly due to technological advancements. The increased level of connectivity has created a vulnerability that is being exploited by criminal elements. According to PwC's Global State of Information Security Survey 2016, cyber-attacks rose internationally by 38 per cent in 2015.21 Over the last five years several CARICOM states have suffered from cyber-attacks on government and business infrastructure. David Jessop identified attacks on government websites in the Bahamas and St Vincent and the Grenadines (in 2015), as well as Jamaica (in 2015).22 Criminals can acquire significant funds through cyber and financial crimes. Jamaican authorities estimated that a lottery scam was used by criminals to fleece unsuspecting people of as high as US$300 million per year.23
The cyber domain is also used to perpetrate financial crimes within CARICOM states. The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2014 (INSCR), which is produced by the U.S. Department of State, identified four CARICOM states as “jurisdictions of primary concern” (major money laundering countries). These countries are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize and Haiti. Nine other CARICOM states are categorized as “jurisdictions of concern” and two are “jurisdiction monitored.”

The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), is an organization of states and territories of the Caribbean basin which have agreed to implement common counter-measures against money laundering and such financial crimes. All members of CARICOM are also party to CFATF. The CFATF coordinates with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). CARICOM is listed as an ‘observer’ to CFATF.

All of this illicit activity can generate large amounts of money that can be used to fuel corruption. Corruption in the region is considered to be high. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which assesses the perceived level of public sector corruption in 174 countries, shows CARICOM states as ranging from 17th (Barbados) to 161st (Haiti). More than a quarter of CARICOM’s member states are ranked in the bottom half of the index. A study by Michael W. Collier on the effects of political corruption on Caribbean development found that the effects were the most pronounced on the states’ economic output and rule of law.

Tier 2 Threats

Tier 2 threats are considered as substantial threats and are both likely and high-impact. The main security concerns in this category include: Trafficking in persons (human trafficking and smuggling); natural disasters; and public order crimes. Public
order crimes have generally been addressed at the local level, however they have the potential to have significant social and economic impact as was the case in Jamaica’s Gas Riots which resulted in loss of life\textsuperscript{33} and over J$30 million (Jamaican Dollars) in losses in the tourism sector.\textsuperscript{34} Increases in electricity costs in Guyana also caused riots resulting in loss of life and other damage.\textsuperscript{35}

The issue of trafficking in persons arises in the Caribbean because of its location and socioeconomic conditions. Most CARICOM states are either signatories, or have ratified the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. The US Trafficking in Persons Report 2014, indicates that most CARICOM states are considered Tier 2 because they are source, transit and destination countries for victims of trafficking in persons. There have not been any significant improvements in ratings of CARICOM member states over the last decade.

Natural disasters are considered a perpetual imminent security threat to CARICOM states. The region experiences the Atlantic Hurricane Season annually from 1 June–30 November. During this period CARICOM states experience hurricanes, tropical storms, floods and landslides, all of which cause damage to critical infrastructure and to the national economies. In the aftermath of these disasters, security forces are often challenged to perform first responder duties, whilst addressing law and order issues such as looting. The environment therefore becomes conducive to various illicit activities.

**Tier 3 Risks**

Security risks that are assigned the label of Tier 3 are those that possess “significant potential risks which are high-impact, but low-probability.”\textsuperscript{36} The CCSS place two security risks under this category: attacks on critical infrastructure; and
terrorism. The strategy identifies the need to protect critical infrastructure from major threats including terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Although the region places terrorism in this (Tier 3) category, the issue of terrorism is much higher on the international security agenda. Whilst the issue of terrorism is not new, it has become a more significant security issue since the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. in 2001. The impact of 9/11 shows the devastation that a terrorist attack can have on any CARICOM state which has far less resources to effect the relatively rapid recovery that occurred in the U.S.

According to the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 “there were no known operational cells of either al-Qa’ida or Hezbollah in the hemisphere, although ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and ideological support to those and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.” The Jamaat al Muslimeen is a radical Islamic organization based in Trinidad and Tobago and is considered a terrorist organization. The Jamaat al Muslimeen, led by Yasin Abu Bakr, was responsible for the coup in the CARICOM state of Trinidad and Tobago in 1990.

Although the Caribbean region has not had a major terrorist event since the terrorist bombing of Cubana Flight 455 in 1976, terrorism remains a concern. Notwithstanding this, there have been many terrorist-related activities in the region that raise alarm. Recently there has been an increase in activity by Iran in the region. This fact has not escaped the attention of security professionals in the region since the U.S. has identified Iran as a “state sponsor of terror” since 1984. Another major issue is that a number of young Caribbean nationals have been enticed into joining ISIS. In March 2013, before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, General John Kelly,
commander U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) reported that “more than 100 would-be militants have left right here in the Caribbean to join Islamic extremists fighting in Syria.” Kelly also highlighted national and regional concerns that “the militants are returning home to conduct terror operations because they don’t have the ability to deal with the problem.”

The ubiquitous nature of the terrorist threat to the region is underscored by John Cope and Jane Hulse, who articulated that:

Terrorists were inextricably linked, often for convenience, to other illegal groups-mostly drug networks-for funding that makes their activities possible... such was the case when police arrested a cousin of the extremist Assad Ahmad Barakat, head of Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Area (South America). He was in possession of more than two kilos of cocaine that he intended to sell in Syria to support Hezbollah.

This observation reinforces the pervasive nature of TCOs and how they can connect easily to terrorist organizations.

Tier 4 Risks

The final group of risks that CARICOM has identified—climate change, pandemics, and migratory pressures—are transnational in scope. In December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal at the Paris Climate Conference (COP21). The agreement is due to enter into force in 2020. The agreement sets out a global action plan to put the world on track to avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C. CARICOM states have long identified the impact of climate change on the (especially island) states that comprise the membership. Issues such as increased floods, droughts, declining fisheries
and rising sea levels—which affects the over 60 percent of Caribbean nationals who live in coastal areas.44

The outbreak of the Ebola pandemic in West Africa was an indication of the impact that pandemics and epidemics can have on a country’s security and economy. The Himelein, Kristen, in a World Bank Group study, identified significant impact on employment (hours of work) and food production.45 Similar issues were identified when there was a Caribbean outbreak of the Chikungunya Virus since December 2013.46 The disease moved from two cases in December 2013 to over 1.3 million cases by April 2015.47 With the interconnectedness of the region, and the world, the movement of viruses and diseases across borders can have serious implications for both health and security.

Traditional Security Threats

The issue of traditional security threats was raised above. The CCSS is somewhat silent on these security threats. However, at least three CARICOM countries, Belize, Guyana and Suriname, have ongoing territorial disputes. Guyana’s over 100-year long border dispute, which has been relatively cold in recent times has escalated to new heights since Exxon Mobil’s announcement that it discovered oil in the disputed Guyanese territory.48 Guyana’s President, David Granger, has reported what was observed in the international media, that President Maduro of Venezuela has started to mass troops and materiel along the border.49

The dispute between Suriname and Guyana (two CARICOM states) over the Tigri area has also resurfaced after Suriname’s latest claim that Guyana “has been making moves on the Tigri area for 40 years now.”50 The border issue between Belize and
Guatemala also continues to simmer as the two countries agree to take the matter to the International Court of Justice after national referendum on the issue. Neither countries held the agreed referendum. According to Sylvestre there are a number of occasions where Guatemala only avoided invading Belize because of the presence of British troops there.\textsuperscript{51} British forces started withdrawal from Belize in 1994 and completed its departure in 2011.

**CARICOM Security Goals**

Having described the nature of the security environment that CARICOM member states must operate, this paper will now discuss the security goals that the community has agreed to pursue. These goals are not contained in the Treaty; they are contained in the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (CCSS). The CCSS was adopted by the CARICOM Heads of Government at the Twenty-Fourth Inter-Sessional meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM on February 19, 2013. The goal of the CCSS is “to significantly improve citizen security by creating a safe, just and free Community, while simultaneously improving the economic viability of the Region.”\textsuperscript{52} According to the document:

> It articulates an integrated and cohesive security framework to confront these challenges, and will therefore guide the coordinated internal and external crime and security policies adopted by CARICOM Member States, under their respective legal frameworks to the fullest extent.\textsuperscript{53}

The CCSS identifies 13 Strategic Goals (see table 2). The strategy identifies the security threats and risks, presents strategic goals to address them, and recommends strategic lines of action to support those goals. A tasking matrix outlining responsible
parties for the flagship initiatives and the timelines for completion of the various strategic actions is also contained in the strategy.

Table 2. CARICOM Security Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Goal</th>
<th>CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy: Strategic Goals</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Goal 1</td>
<td>Take the Profit out of Crime, Target Criminal Assets and Protect the Financial System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Goal 2</td>
<td>Crime Prevention - Addressing the Causes of Crime and Insecurity and Increase Public Awareness of the Key Risks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Goal 3</td>
<td>Establish Appropriate Legal Instruments While Ratifying Existing Agreements</td>
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<td>Strategic Goal 4</td>
<td>Increase Trans-border Intelligence and Information Sharing</td>
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<td>Strategic Goal 5</td>
<td>Enhance Law Enforcement and Security Capabilities and Strengthen Regional Security Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Goal 6</td>
<td>Enhance Maritime and Airspace Awareness, Strengthen CARICOM Borders including Contiguous Land Borders</td>
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<td>Strategic Goal 7</td>
<td>Strengthen the Effectiveness of Criminal Investigation Through Modern Technologies and Scientific Techniques</td>
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<td>Strategic Goal 8</td>
<td>Strengthen CARICOM's Resilience to Cybercrime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Goal 9</td>
<td>Pursue Functional Cooperative Security Engagements to Tackle and Manage Shared Risks and Threats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Goal 10</td>
<td>Strengthen the Justice Sector</td>
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<td>Strategic Goal 11</td>
<td>Modernise and Enhance Correctional Services and Institutions Management</td>
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<td>Strategic Goal 12</td>
<td>Strengthen Mechanisms Against Human Trafficking</td>
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<td>Strategic Goal 13</td>
<td>Improving Resilience to Natural and Man Made Disasters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Goal 14</td>
<td>Promote Resilient Critical Infrastructure Management and Safety at Major Events</td>
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CARICOM’s Security Architecture

The regional approach to security in the Caribbean can be viewed in two clear dichotomies: pre-2005 and post-2005. Pre-2005, there was no formal CARICOM regional security architecture. This period was characterized by states pursuing its individual security goals through a range of methods. The methods used include the use of their own national security organizations and also participation in sub-regional and hemispheric organizations. Some states also pursued bilateral agreements for security assistance with other states. In 2005 CARICOM states agreed to the establishment of a Regional Framework for the management of crime and security.

Regional Security Architecture Prior to 2005

National

Prior to 2005 CARICOM states individually determined and pursued their security objectives. This was mainly done using their national security establishments. All 15 states that are members of CARICOM have a police force, whilst only ten states have military forces. With the exception of Haiti, the states without a military have a small paramilitary element in their police force, often referred to as Special Service Units (SSUs). In addition to police and militaries, CARICOM states have various national security institutions mandated to address the needs of the specific countries. Among their national security architecture, CARICOM states include: border protection agencies, coast guards, disaster management agencies, correctional/prison institutions and fire services, among others. This is consistent with their broad perspective of security.

In addition to their national efforts, CARICOM states all have a plethora of bilateral agreements with other states. They pursue various security agreements with
other CARICOM states as well as third states. All CARICOM states have security agreements with the U.S. Most of the member states also maintain security relations with the U.K. and Canada. Recently, CARICOM states have been forging agreements with non-traditional security partners, including China, Russia, Taiwan and Iran.

Sub-Regional

At the sub-regional level, seven CARICOM states participated in a Regional Security System (RSS). The RSS is a cooperative security treaty organization, which was formed in 1982 through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This MOU was upgraded to a treaty in 1996. According to the RSS Treaty:

The purposes and functions of the System are to promote co-operation among the Member States in the prevention and interdiction of traffic in illegal narcotic drugs, in national emergencies, search and rescue, immigration control, fisheries protection, customs and excise control maritime policing duties, natural and other disasters, pollution control, combating threats to national security, the prevention of smuggling, and in the protection of off-shore installations and exclusive economic zones.

The RSS comprises three military and seven police forces. The force commanders (heads of the military and police forces) provide the means (personnel and equipment) for the RSS to fulfill its purposes and functions.

Pre-2005, there were a number of agencies and organizations with various security-related functions. CARICOM member states as well as associate members states were also members of these organizations. These included the Caribbean Disaster Management Agency (CDEMA), Caribbean Customs and Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC) and the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP). CDEMA was originally established in 1991 as Caribbean Disaster Relief Agency (CDERA). It is a regional inter-governmental agency established for disaster management in the
CARICOM and is therefore tasked to address the disaster management requirements of the region. CDEMA is recognized as an “institution of CARICOM” in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

CCLEC is a multilateral organization that was established in the early 1970s which gained international organization status in 2008. It had its origin as an informal association of Customs administrations within the Caribbean region. Its aim was to build capacity and enhance cooperation between customs administrations and law enforcement agencies throughout the region. Border security is one of the areas of focus for CCLEC. The ACCP was established in 1987 with a purpose of being “the principal regional organization for promoting and facilitating: collaboration and co-operation in the development and implementation of policing strategies, systems and procedures.”

Hemispheric

At the hemispheric level, 14 of the 15 CARICOM states are members of the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS is a hemispheric institution in the Americas which traces its history as far back as 1826. However the first International Conference of American States was held in October 1889- April 1890. The conference, among other things, produced guidelines for the drafting of a treaty on arbitration that could avoid recourse to war as a means to resolve controversies among American nations.

Nine members of CARICOM are also members of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). The IADB was formed in 1942 and is a permanent military organization that was seen by members of the OAS to be indispensable to study and address the challenges that affect the Western Hemisphere. This is a restrictive organization, in that a number of CARICOM states that do not have militaries are not members of the IADB.
That is also the case for the Conference of American Armies (CAA), which has 7 CARICOM states as members or observers. The aim of the CAA is the analysis, debate and exchange of ideas and experiences related to matters of common interest in the field of defense so as to heighten cooperation and integration between the Armies and to contribute from a military thinkers’ point of view to the security and democratic development of member countries. Based on its aim, it is only through cooperation with CARICOM militaries that these organizations tangentially add to regional security.

Regional Security Architecture Post 2005

In the final years of the 20th Century and the beginning of the 21st Century, CARICOM states experienced high rates of crime and security challenges. In 2001, in the face of escalating drug related activities and other serious crimes in the region, CARICOM Heads of Government, agreed to the establishment of a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security to analyse the fundamental causes of Crime and Security threats in the Region. The task force made several recommendations, which included a proposal for the establishment of a Regional Strategic Framework for Crime and Security. It was clear from the work of the task force, that a regional approach was necessary. As Griffith also highlighted, “the transnational character of most of these threats [to the region] is too overwhelming for individual nations to address meaningfully.”

In July 2005 CARICOM leaders “endorsed the establishment of a Framework for the Management of Crime and Security [in the region], which makes provision for a Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement to superintend policy direction; a Security Policy Advisory Committee (SEPAC); and an Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS). At the Head of the
Framework, is the Conference of Heads of Government to which the System is accountable through the Prime Minister with Responsibility for Crime and Security. That Prime Minister, according to the CARICOM Quasi-Cabinet, is the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.69

At the next level is a Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE) which reports to the Conference of Heads of Government through the Prime Minister with responsibility for National Security and Law Enforcement. The framework also has a Security Policy Advisory Committee (SEPAC) comprising representatives at the level of Permanent Secretary, Advisory or other Senior Policy Official and Chairpersons of a number of Standing Committees of CARICOM Heads of Operational Entities.

An Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) was also recommended, to be the nerve centre of the management framework. The Agency would also be responsible for the day-to-day administrative and technical functions. The next section provides further details on IMPACS. The framework is completed with the establishment of five Standing Committees as follows: (1) Commissioners of Police; (2) Chiefs of the Military; (3) Chiefs of Immigration; (4) Comptrollers of Customs; and (5) Heads of Intelligence and Financial Investigative Units. These committees meet routinely to address crime and security issues within their respective fields. Such meetings are coordinated by IMPACS, which serves as the secretariat for all of the committees. Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security.
The framework also provides a coordinating relationship with CDEMA and the RSS. This underscores the significance of the two institutions to the regional security architecture. However, both organizations have their own membership and mandate which are similar to CARICOM’s, but not exactly the same. The post 2005 era of security in the region does not ignore existing national structures and security arrangements, it reinforces them. As Tulchin and Espach argued, “national security in the Caribbean is inseparable from regional security.”

The new regional security framework
is interwoven into the existing national efforts, as well as sub-regional and hemispheric systems. Despite the new structures, in 2012 a UNODC Report highlighted that weak security institutions were a part of the regional security problem.\textsuperscript{71}

**CARICOM IMPACS**

Although the agreed framework made provisions for the establishment of an Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), it was not until July 2006 that the agreement for the establishment of IMPACS signed.\textsuperscript{72} According to the agreement establishing the agency, “IMPACS shall be responsible for the implementation of actions designed to ensure the realization of the objectives of the regional crime and security agenda as agreed by Conference.”\textsuperscript{73}

Among IMPACS’ key functions regarding regional crime and security are: initiate and develop proposals; act as executing agency for regional projects; provide advice; collaborate and coordinate with national and international crime prevention and crime control agencies; conduct research, etc. IMPACS is therefore the nerve centre of the Management Framework with primary responsibility for the implementation of the Regional Crime and Security agenda.

In 2007 the CARICOM Heads of Government agreed to “recognized security as the fourth pillar of the Community.”\textsuperscript{74} In that same year CARICOM formally expanded IMPACS to include two sub-agencies: the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) and the Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC). These agencies were temporarily established to support the region’s security efforts in hosting the International Cricket Council Cricket World Cup 2007 (ICC CWC 2007). The Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) is based in Trinidad and Tobago and provides intelligence support to key
stakeholders in an effort to detect, deter and control crime within the region. The Centre works closely with the JRCC in providing intelligence information to regional security agency personnel and other stakeholders, while providing strategic analysis of threat entities in the Caribbean Region.

The Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC) is based in Barbados and is the central clearing house for the Advance Passenger Information (API) and acts and on behalf of individual CARICOM Member States for the purpose of pre-screening passengers from air and sea carriers traversing the Region. The JRCC acts as a conduit to ensure effective communication among Law Enforcement personnel, thereby enhancing border control related activities. The JRCC assists regional law enforcement personnel in the detection of persons who are travelling with stolen, lost and fraudulent travel documents, along with the identification of and monitoring the movements of persons of interest, including those who may be a high security threat to the safety and security of the region.

The Regional Crime and Security Strategy Central Coordinating Unit (RCSS-CCU), is collocated with IMPACS headquarters in Trinidad and Tobago. The RCSS-CCU is resourced with a Regional Crime and Security Strategy Coordinator and Specialist Advisors in Law Enforcement, Military Affairs and Border Security. They provide technical support, advisory services and assistance to CARICOM member states as part of fulfilling the objective of IMPACS. The RCSS-CCU played a major coordinating role in the construct of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (CCSS) which was adopted by the Conference of Head of Government in February 2013, and is coordinating the implementation of the Strategy at both the national and regional levels.
IMPACS, the primary institution responsible for coordinating the regional security agenda, has been beset by a number of issues since its existence. As the member states grapple with economic hardships, the funding of operations for IMPACS has been impacted. The agency also suffers from staffing challenges, as many of its staff is (by requirement) meant to be serving Law Enforcement personnel, who must be seconded from Member states security organizations.

The agency was also at the centre of a corruption scandal which led to an investigation into “certain management functions”\(^75\) and resulted in a Special Purpose Audit to review systems at the Agency. The Executive Director was fired from her position, in September 2011 after financial audits showed “she owed the security agency thousands of dollars loaned to her as cash advances.”\(^76\) These allegations of corruption at the agency, painted the organization in a negative light, resulting in a number of partner organizations reevaluating their support.

Despite the negative publicity, the IMPACS has maintained close relations with regional and international crime and security organizations. A work program was developed with the UNODC as well as the European Development Fund. Collaboration also continues with UNSCAR and the ICRC to conduct crime and security projects. Working with US SOUTHCOM, the agency developed a Caribbean Counter Illicit Trafficking Strategy. IMPACS remains the secretariat for CBSI, and coordinates the High Level Dialogues.

**U.S. Intervention and Assistance**

Caribbean regional security has often been influenced by the U.S. The U.S. has played a substantial security role in the Caribbean region prior to and after the Cold War.
The U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983 (Operation Urgent fury), and Haiti in 1995 (Operation Uphold Democracy) are two examples of U.S. forces helping to support regional security goals. This not only benefitted the region, but also the U.S. As General John Kelly in his U.S. SOUTHCOM Posture Statement, pointed out “addressing the root causes of insecurity and instability is not just in the region’s interests, but ours [the U.S.] as well.” This has been a generally accepted perspective, and one that was raised much earlier by Philander C. Knox (U.S. Secretary of State 1909-1913), who stated “the logic of political geography and of strategy and now our tremendous national interest created by the Panama Canal make the safety, the peace, and the prosperity of the zone of the Caribbean of paramount importance to the government of the United States.”

The concern that CARICOM states have regarding TCOs and their smuggling of drugs and guns, have not escaped U.S. security officials. Kelly stated that “these smuggling routes are a potential vulnerability to our homeland. As I stated last year, terrorist organizations could seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or even bring weapons of mass destruction into the United States.” Kelly also raised concern that “while there is not yet any indication that the criminal networks involved in human and drug trafficking are interested in supporting the efforts of terrorist groups, these networks could unwittingly, or even wittingly, facilitate the movement of terrorist operatives or weapons of mass destruction toward our borders, potentially undetected and almost completely unrestricted.”

The issues raised by General Kelly as well as others, have led to various U.S. policies focused on improving security in the region. In 2001, the George W Bush
administration launched the Third Border Initiative (TBI). Whilst the TBI had a broader focus than just security, it also provided funding for “critical areas of law enforcement cooperation, such as anti-money laundering, professional development of police and prosecutors, and anti-corruption training and assistance throughout the Caribbean.”

More recently, in 2009, the Barrack Obama led administration launched the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The CBSI is one pillar of the U.S. security strategy focused on citizen safety throughout the hemisphere. CBSI brings all members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic together to jointly collaborate on regional security with the United States as a partner. According to the U.S. State Department, “The United States is making a significant contribution to CBSI, committing $263 million in funding since 2010.”

**Organization of CARICOM**

Having identified security as the fourth pillar of the community, the region went one step further than the previous cooperation and coordination on security matters as intended by the formation of the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security. The region institutionalized security as a part of CARICOM. This has significant implications for the organization. It is useful to discuss the structure of CARICOM and the organization of the Secretariat, as a means of understanding the necessary support required to make a pillar a functional element within CARICOM.

The structure of CARICOM is hierarchical in nature. At the top are those entities established by and stipulated in the Revised Treaty. The CARICOM Treaty describes the system as follows:
The Caribbean Community comprises the Organs and Bodies established by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. There are some autonomous or semi-autonomous organizations which are not within that core structure of CARICOM, but are part of what may be called the CARICOM System. These are Treaty Entities (established by the Revised Treaty), Institutions of the Community (recognized or designated under Article 21) and Associate Institutions (recognized in Article 22 as having functional relationships with the Community).83

The revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (hereafter referred to as the Treaty) establishes two principal organs of the Community: (a) the Conference of Heads of Government; and (b) the Community Council of Ministers which shall be the second highest organ.84 The Treaty explains the composition of both primary organs, as well as itemizes their detailed roles and responsibilities. The Conference of Heads of Government (The Conference) consists of the Heads of Government of the Member States. It is the supreme Organ of the Community and determines and provides policy direction for the Community. The Community Council (The Council) is the second highest Organ and consists of ministers responsible for Community Affairs and any other Minister designated by the Member States.

The composition of the Primary Organs gives an indication of the extent to which the membership is able to focus on Community matters. The Heads of Government provide policy guidance, but they are supported by many other entities. The Council is one such entity, albeit a Primary Organ itself. The Council, in accordance with the policy directions established by the Conference, has primary responsibility for the development of Community strategic planning and coordination in the areas of economic integration, functional cooperation and external relations. These two Primary Organs are supported by four other Organs. These Organs are:
(a) Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP);
(b) Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED);
(c) Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR), and
(d) Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD).85

Whilst all entities play an important role in the attainment of the objectives of the Community, these four Organs play the most significant role in that process. They are the embodiment of the stated objectives of the community and align directly with the pillars of the community–except for the newly added security pillar. The Organs and their functions are clearly articulated in various articles of the Treaty. Both COFAP and COTED have some responsibilities for achieving CARICOM’s economic objectives. Article 14 indicates that COFAP shall have primary responsibility for economic policy co-ordination and financial and monetary integration of Member States. Article 15 states that COTED shall be responsible for the promotion of trade and economic development of the Community. COHSOD, according to Article 17, shall be responsible for the promotion of human and social development in the Community.

Article 16 of the Treaty mandates COFCOR to be responsible for determining relations between the Community and international organizations and Third States. Although not explicitly stated, some researchers have determined that COFCOR assumed a security role. This supports Ogilvie’s view that “while [CARICOM] is primarily economic in nature, [it] also made an implicit provision for security through the coordination of foreign policy.”86 Jessica Byron in presenting evidence of such an argument indicated, that COFCOR has performed functions that address security issues within CARICOM, mainly focused on the situation in Haiti, and boundary and border disputes.87
The pillars were incorporated into the structure of the Secretariat\(^1\) through the establishment of directorates. These directorates, which are aligned to the organs (and therefore to the pillars of CARICOM) are: the Directorate of Trade and Economic Integration; the Directorate of Foreign and Community Relations and the Directorate of Human and Social Development. These directorates support each Organ directly, to ensure that each Organ fulfills its obligations as stipulated in the treaty. Figure 2 shows the organization structure of the CARICOM Secretariat. The Secretary General is the Chief Executive Officer of the Community and performs a wide range of duties subject to the determinations of the competent Primary Organs of the Community and in accordance with the financial and other regulations.\(^88\) In order to support the Secretary General, there are several Assistant Secretaries General who serve as head of the directorates that are aligned to the Organs. The directorates are complete with Executive Directors, Advisors, Project Managers and other staff.

In 2012, the Heads of Government of CARICOM directed a strategic review of the organization generally, and the Secretariat specifically. In the end a *CARICOM Strategic Plan 2015-2019* was promulgated.\(^89\) The Strategy suggests a wide range of changes to the Secretariat to improve effectiveness; however it did not propose any adjustments or improvements to the security framework.

\(^1\) The Secretariat shall be the principal administrative organ of the Community with the headquarters located in Georgetown, Guyana.
Figure 3. CARICOM Secretariat Organizational Structure


Alternative Regional Security Structures

In this section, an overview of three different regional security approaches is considered by looking at the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU). These three regional organizations, take different approaches to how they are institutionally organized to address their security mandate. The manner in which they are organized will provide a valuable instrument to compare and contrast with the CARICOM organization. In addition, it could inform any recommendation for an alternate approach if necessary.
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was established in 1981 when seven Eastern Caribbean countries signed the Treaty of Basseterre agreeing to cooperate with each other and promote unity and solidarity among member states. The cooperation was deepened when the OECS members signed a Revised Treaty in 2010 in St. Lucia, establishing the OECS Economic Union.

Among the purposes of the OECS is to maintain unity and solidarity among the Member States and the defense of their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. The Revised treaty requires members to coordinate, harmonize and undertake joint actions and pursue joint policies inter alia mutual defense and security (including police and prisons). The OECS has five organs; with the Council of Ministers being responsible for security. Figure 5 shows the organizational structure of the OECS Commission (secretariat).

Because the RSS is not an organ of the OECS, it does not appear in the organizational structure of the OECS Commission. It has its own organizational structure, which is displayed in Figure 6. Even though not an organ of the OECS, the RSS does provide security for the OECS countries based on a 1982 MOU—which evolved into a Treaty in 1996. The contracting parties to the RSS Treaty (1996) are not only the OECS member states; it also includes Barbados, a non-OECS state. The similarity of the membership has often led to the RSS being described as an organ of the OECS.
Figure 4. Organizational Structure of the OECS Commission (Secretariat)

Figure 5. Regional Security System Organizational Structure


Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was established on 8 August 1967, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration. This regional organization has 10 Member states. The aims and purposes of ASEAN are; to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region; to promote regional peace and stability; to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance; to provide assistance to each, to collaborate more effectively; to promote Southeast Asian studies; and to maintain close and beneficial cooperation.
The ASEAN Community is comprised of three pillars. There is a security pillar and two other community pillars. There are three Community Councils that form part of the Community organs. Each Community Council has a defined objective and is responsible for the implementation of a “blueprint” associated with that pillar. To address issues of security among ASEAN member states, there is a Community Council which is called the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). “The APSC Blueprint envisages ASEAN to be a rules-based Community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; as well as a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world.”

Another important body within ASEAN is the Secretariat. The Community’s Secretariat is in Jakarta, Indonesia. The basic function of the secretariat is to provide for greater efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN Organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN projects and activities. The Secretariat’s mission is to initiate, facilitate and coordinate ASEAN stakeholder collaboration in realizing the purposes and principles of ASEAN as reflected in the ASEAN Charter. The secretariat is designed with departments that are structured around the three pillars of the community. Figure 6 is the organization structure of the ASEAN Secretariat.
The European Union (EU)

The EU is an economic and political partnership between 28 European countries. The EU was created in the aftermath of the Second World War. The first steps were to foster economic cooperation: the idea being that countries that trade with one another become economically interdependent and so are more likely to avoid conflict. Originally, it was the European Economic Community (EEC), created in 1958, and initially increasing economic cooperation between six countries. This purely economic union has evolved into an organization spanning policy areas, from development aid to environment. It changed its name from the EEC to the European Union (EU) in 1993.

Among the objectives of the Union is “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.” The EU has no standing army. Instead, under its common
security and defense policy (CSDP), it relies on ad hoc forces contributed by EU
countries. In the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, the EU strengthened the security policy area by
creating the post of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and
the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The EU has multiple agencies that address the issue of security. These include
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA),
the European Police (EUROPOL), and the European Defense Agency (EDA).104
Although these agencies play a role, the main efforts for pursuing the EU’s security
mandate is centered under the EEAS, which is the European Union's diplomatic service.
It helps the EU's foreign affairs chief–the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy–carry out the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is also a vice president of the
European Commission as reflected in figure 7, which shows the organizational structure
of the European Commission Secretariat-General.
The European Commission is the EU's politically independent executive arm. It has several departments, referred to as Directorates-General (DGs). Among them is the Secretariat-General, which is based in Brussels and has the responsibility to support the whole of the Commission, helping Europe deliver on its promises. It ensures the overall coherence of the Commission’s work—both in shaping new policies, and in steering them through the other EU institutions.

Several European Union members are also members of regional security organizations. The two most significant are the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic treaty Organization. The OSCE has 57 member states with 27 member states also being EU members.\textsuperscript{105} Twenty-three of the 28 NATO member states are also members of the EU.\textsuperscript{106} Neither of the two organizations are
organs of the EU. Their purpose and design is to address the security requirements of their member states. Based on the overlap of the membership with the EU, there is close coordination and liaison between the institutions and policy direction tend to be similar.

**Strategic Risk**

CARICOM has developed a number of strategies to achieve its various goals and objectives. These strategies cover areas in all the functional areas—economic, human development, foreign policy and security. The CCSS is the strategy for addressing the security pillar. On a broader perspective, CARICOM’s approach to achieving its objectives is also a strategy. Dr Harry Yarger describes a model for understanding strategy, which is generally accepted by strategists and some policy makers. He also presents a perspective on strategic risks which are discussed below.

Strategy, as defined by U.S. Joint Publication 1-02 is “the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” Yarger argued that this definition failed to fully convey the role and complexity of strategic thought at the highest levels of the state. He offered an alternate definition for strategy at this level; strategy, he said, “is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstances.” Strategy, Yarger says, seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success.
Yarger further argues that it is a process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity to circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, and means. The ‘ends’ of strategy are the objectives or the goals. Ultimately, strategy’s success can be measured only in terms of the degree to which its objectives are accomplished.\textsuperscript{108} The ‘ways’ explain how the strategic ends will be attained. This is where resources are linked to the objectives by addressing who does what, where, when, and why to explain how an objective will be achieved. Finally, the ‘means’ refer to the resources necessary to support the ‘ways’. Yarger, identifies two types of means–tangible and intangible.

Tangible resources include forces, people, equipment, money, and facilities. Intangible resources include things like national will, international goodwill, courage, intellect, or even fanaticism. Intangible resources are problematic for the strategist in that they often are not measurable.\textsuperscript{109}

Yarger also posited that once a strategy is valid–suitable, feasible and acceptable–then there needs to be an evaluation of risk. One perspective of risk is that it is the correspondence between what is to be achieved, the concepts envisioned, and resources available.\textsuperscript{110} Risk assessment is not just a measure of the probability of success or failure; it is also an assessment of the probable consequences of success and failure. Arthur Lykke, who shared much of Yarger’s perspective on strategy, offered a model to judge risk. According to Lykke, the ends, ways and means of a strategy are like a 3-legged stool as displayed in figure 9. If the legs are out of balance, then there will be risk.\textsuperscript{111}
Summary and Conclusion

This chapter provided a review of relevant literature that was necessary to provide answers to the research questions of the study. This chapter presents the nature of the security threats affecting the Caribbean. It also reviewed the regional security objectives and the security structure in place to attain those goals. The CARICOM structure was scrutinized to develop a better understanding of its traditional design and approach to meeting the mandates of the community and make a pillar functional. A brief review of the OECS, ASEAN and EU structural models was done. Finally, the chapter highlighted the concept of strategic risk, as described by Dr. Harry Yarger. Chapter 3 will focus on the methodology that is used in the study.


4 Ibid.


9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 13.

11 Ibid., 21-22.

12 The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime outlines that an offence is transnational in nature if: (a) It is committed in more than one State; (b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another State; (c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or (d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.


14 Ibid.


17 Ibid.


24 A major money laundering country is defined by statute as one whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking.

26 Jurisdictions of concern include: Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Jurisdictions monitored are Dominica and Montserrat.

27 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF is a policy-making body which works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms.


32 Trafficking in persons (also called human trafficking) according to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons means “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Smuggling of migrants (also called human smuggling) means the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.

34 Ibid.


37 Ibid.


39 Ibid., 228.


41 Ibid.


44 Ibid.


47 Ibid.


53 Ibid.

54 The states with defence Forces are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Suriname, St Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago. Note that although Montserrat remains a protectorate of the U.K. it is one of few British Overseas territories that is allowed to maintain a military force.

55 RSS member states are: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grenadines.


57 Ibid.


61 Ibid.


65 Ibid.


69 Ibid.


80 Ibid.


84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., 8


90 OECS member states are: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are Associate Members. All members of the OECS are either full or associate members of CARICOM.


92 Ibid.

93 RSS Treaty, March 1996.

94 The RSS membership Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and The Grenadines. Note that is simply Barbados and the OECS member states excluding Montserrat.


98 Ibid.

99 The other two pillars are: ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).


102 Ibid.


104 Ibid.

106 Greece is not a member of OSCE. Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are EU members who are not members of NATO.


108 Ibid.

109 Ibid

110 Ibid

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the absence of a Security Organ within CARICOM is negatively affecting the Community’s ability to achieve its security objectives. In this chapter the methodological approach used in answering the primary and secondary research questions is discussed. The structure of the research paper is also presented.

Research Methodology

This research was done primarily by qualitative content analyses of data in relevant existing literature that could answer the primary and secondary research questions. This data was obtained mainly from library and internet resources. There were no interviews, questionnaires, focus groups or other forms of primary data collection. Available secondary data was utilized to develop an understanding of the general background that led to the formulation of the research question and provided the evidence for the content analysis portion of the study.

Research Questions

The primary research question is: Should CARICOM establish a Security Organ to oversee and implement the regional security agenda? In order to determine the answer to this question, four secondary questions were posed. The four secondary questions that were identified will be addressed sequentially.
What is the CARICOM security situation?

This research will use data that is gleaned from a variety of sources to establish the CARICOM security situation. International reports, journal articles and periodicals emanating from CARICOM states will be used. A number of official CARICOM documents will be consulted, including the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy. Reports from other organizations and bodies will aid in developing the regional security picture by providing specific information relating to the region as a whole and individual countries within the region. Reports from the U.S. State Department including the Trafficking in Persons Report, International Narcotics Trafficking Report and Country Reports on Terrorism will be consulted. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index as well as the U.S. Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) 2015 Posture Statement, will also be referenced to gain further insight into the regional security situation.

What is CARICOM’s security agenda and what structures are in place to achieve the intended outcomes?

The CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy is the seminal security document for the region. An analysis of the strategy will be conducted in order to determine the regional security agenda. The report by the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security will be used to provide the information necessary to clarify the regional security structures. The Task Force report was the basis for designing the existing Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security. Various communiqués from the CARICOM Secretariat as well as documents and reports produced by CARICOM IMPACS will be used to establish the existing security structures in the region.
What risks exist in CARICOM’s efforts to achieve its regional security objectives without a Security Organ, and are those risks likely to increase to an unacceptable level if one is not established?

The Yarger model of strategic risk will be used as to assess CARICOM’s approach to attaining its security objectives. The model will be used to assess the risks associated with the ways and means that CARICOM uses to pursue the ends of the regional security agenda outlined in the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy.

How can a Security Organ be incorporated into CARICOM’s structure and how can it help to achieve CARICOM’s security objectives?

This question will be addressed by reviewing the security structures of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU). The selection of these three regional bodies was done by purposive sampling. By choosing a purposive sample it allowed the researcher to identify regional organizations that were similar to CARICOM based on the organization’s objectives. The three organizations selected were established fundamentally for economic purposes, but also fulfilled a security function as well.

Layout of Research Paper

Chapter 1 provided the background which resulted in the research question being studied. The literature review that is contained in Chapter 2, provided relevant existing literature that was used to provide answers to the secondary questions of the study. The chapter concludes with a conceptual model of strategy and risk, which will be used as part of the content analysis to determine the risk to CARICOM’s current approach making the security pillar functional and effective. Chapter 4 will provide the analysis.
necessary to answer the research questions. Chapter 5 provides the concluding material and suggests a way forward for CARICOM to effectively address its security agenda.

**Summary and Conclusion**

This chapter provided the methodology that was used to obtain relevant information required to answer the primary and secondary research questions. It also explained the basis for the sample selection of alternative structures, and how the information will be used to answer the research question. The next chapter will provide the analysis for the study.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not the absence of a Security Organ within CARICOM is negatively affecting the Community’s ability to achieve its security objectives. In this chapter the previously presented literature will be analyzed with the purpose of answering the research questions. Each of the secondary questions will be considered in order to lay the foundation for a conclusive response to the primary research question regarding the establishment of a Security Organ in CARICOM.

What is CARICOM’s security agenda and what structures are in place to achieve the intended outcomes?

The region established the Regional Framework for Managing Crime and Security in 2005, and established the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) in 2006. In 2007 the regional leaders accepted security as ‘the fourth pillar of the community’ and made IMPACS the nerve center of the security management framework. IMPACS was responsible for the implementation of the region’s crime and security agenda. This awesome responsibility was reposed in a new agency with a fairly small staff.

IMPACS performed creditably during the coordination of events for the International Cricket Council Cricket World Cup (ICC CWC), which was held in the Caribbean in 2007. Because of its small staff compliment, it received significant augmentation with security personnel from across the region. Notwithstanding its
newness and smallness, the agency gained significant acclaim for its role in making this major event a security success.

The excellent performance of the Joint Regional Communication Center (JRCC) and the Regional Intelligence Fusion Center (RIFC) was also noted during ICC CWC. These two centers were initially envisioned as temporary organizations, for the purposes of the ICC CWC, but were retained permanently after the event. They were placed under the auspices of IMPACS as sub-agencies. This led to an increase in the agency’s capacity to coordinate regional security. Some early issues of poor financial management and oversight led to the dismissal of the Executive Director at IMPACS. This highlighted the need for further maturation of the agency and led to greater supervision from CARICOM. This supervision was originally the purview of the Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law enforcement (CONSLE), according to the Agreement Establishing CARICOM IMPACS, consistent with the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security.¹

Although the IMPACS made significant efforts towards addressing the many concerns and recommendations contained in the report by the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security, there was no clearly defined regional security agenda. None existed when the agency commenced in 2006 or even after the recognition of security as a pillar of the community. It was not until 2008 that CONSLE directed the development of a regional crime and security strategy and assigned that task to IMPACS. The CCSS was developed and promulgated in 2013 as the authoritative source for the region’s security agenda.
The aim of the strategy is to improve citizen security while improving economic viability of the region. It calls upon disparate institutions to take action and perform various monitoring roles. Many of these organizations were never included as part of the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security. IMPACS was assigned the significant role of coordinating the activities in pursuit of the CCSS. CONSLE was assigned the oversight function, with IMPACS reporting annually on goal attainment.

The CCSS did not recommend any change to the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security. The absence of any changes to the security framework left an already minimally staffed IMPACS with additional responsibilities. IMPACS was also to face the additional task of coordinating with agencies that had no formal link to the crime and security framework. Whilst some of the responsible parties identified in the CCSS had memoranda of understanding with IMPACS, this was not the case with all of them. This situation left an issue of reporting relationships between independent organizations. Therefore, while the regional security agenda was agreed on and promulgated in 2013, it was to be implemented within the structures that were recommended in 2002 and developed in 2006.

What is the CARICOM security situation?

The Caribbean security situation continues to be shaped by internal and external factors. Internally, the socioeconomic realities of many of the member states have led to security challenges that have the capacity to have regional impacts. Externally, transnational organized crime in the form of drugs and arms trafficking, combined with cyber-crimes threaten to destabilize the region by undermining economic growth, threatening human welfare, impeding social development and tainting the region’s image
on the international stage. Issues of high volumes of murders, drug trafficking and human trafficking are among the areas that immediately effect the regional security outlook.

Homicide rates in the region have continued to escalate. According to the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), the homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to hover around four times the world average. Between 2003 and 2008 the Caribbean averaged 28 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants compared to the world average of 6.7 per 100,000. This placed the Caribbean among the top three sub-regions in terms of highest homicide rates. By 2011, the rates increased to 29.86, still over four times the world average. This increasing trend continues while murder rates in regions like Southeast Asia and Western Europe remain at less than half the world average, and declining. The high rates of murder in the Caribbean have led to high levels of fear of crime among citizens and the feeling of insecurity. Human welfare and development suffers most in such a security situation. The region cannot allow this trend to continue, or it will have deleterious effects on the population and the countries as a whole.

Narcotics trafficking in the region is again on the increase after a decline in the period leading up to 2005. The World Drug Report indicated that the only region where cocaine seizures increased in 2013 was Central America and the Caribbean. It is assessed that the increased pressure on trafficking corridors in Mexico and Central America, through the implementation of the multinational Operation Martillo and the Mérida Initiative respectively has had the unintended consequence of causing an increase in cocaine trafficking through the Caribbean. This is among the reasons that led General John Kelly (former Commander U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)) to express
concern over security in the region and the possible impact on the U.S. The drug trade threatens to destabilize the region and undermine institutions of governance. This is a security challenge that cannot be addressed by any single member state. Only through cooperation and coordination can this major security challenge be mitigated and its impact reduced.

Human trafficking has also been of grave concern to CARICOM states, and the U.S. but the region has not found a way to curb this inhumane practice. The U.S. Department of State has over the last decade added more CARICOM member states to their “watch list” based on the volumes of victims of human trafficking or a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to become compliant with conventions on human trafficking. Human trafficking affects human welfare and social development. If this negative security trend is not reversed, the security situation will get worse and threaten human security.

Despite CARICOM leaders’ 2005 endorsement of the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security there has been no evidence of improvement to the security situation in the region in the ensuing decade. Even though the regional security agenda was promulgated in 2013, there have always been prior efforts to address the most prominent security challenges. However, the existing security framework has not been sufficient to reverse the downward trend of the state of security in the region over the last decade. It is instructive to note the UNODC 2012 Report that was discussed in Chapter 2, highlighted that Caribbean regional security instability was primarily embedded in weak institutions. Institutional strengthening therefore provides an approach to reversing the current security trends and gaining regional security stability.
What risks exist in CARICOM’s efforts to achieve its regional security objectives without a Security Organ, and are those risks likely to increase to an unacceptable level if one is not established?

Risk exists in every strategy, and CARICOM’s strategy for attaining the regional security objectives is no different. Most definitions of risk are focused on the probability and severity of loss linked to a hazard. Other definitions focus on discrepancy between ends, ways, and the means. In determining the strategic risk to CARICOM’s security strategy, the more nuanced definition provided by Yarger in chapter 2 will be used. Risk is an interplay among what is to be achieved, the concepts envisioned, and resources available, i.e. the discrepancies among ends, ways and means.

John Collins identified, that risks are rarely ever quantifiable. No such effort has been made in the research. However an analysis of the CARICOM security strategy within Yarger’s strategic conceptual model provides insights into which elements cause, reduce or increase the inherent risks. Therefore, an analysis of the ends, ways and means will be done. The ends can be taken to be those that have been outlined in the CCSS. The primary objective, and therefore the end, of the regional security strategy is citizen security and economic viability.

The ways—the how—are the various initiatives that have been described in the CCSS as well as those accepted by member states at the international level. In the strategy many ways have been described, among them are: enhance law enforcement and security capabilities and strengthen regional security systems; and pursue functional cooperative security engagements to tackle and manage shared risks and threats. The initiatives have been designed to address the key security challenges that were identified as impacting the region’s security objectives. However, they also display an
understanding that there are deficiencies in the existing systems and the cooperation
required to affect the strategy.

The third component of the Yarger model is the means. The means refers to the
resources necessary to fulfill the ways in attaining the ends, whether tangible or
intangible. The Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security is the
primary means by which the regional security agenda is to be fulfilled. At the center of
this framework is IMPACS. Based on the CCSS, other agencies and institutions are
called upon to play various roles as a means of pursuing the strategy. Many of these
institutions are not a part of the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and
Security.

Analysis of CARICOM’s ends, ways and means reveals that the greatest
challenges relate to the means available to pursue the strategy. Four particular challenges
are apparent: the current ineffectiveness of the existing Regional Framework for the
Management of Crime and Security; the inclusion of agencies and bodies that are not a
part of the security framework as key actors in effecting the strategy; shortage of
financial resources; and, the intangible means that may impact CARICOM’s ability to
attain the strategic ends.

Firstly, the evidence uncovered so far has identified that the Regional Framework
for the Management of Crime and Security has proven to be ineffective over the decade
of its existence. The only part of the framework that is permanently focused on regional
security is IMPACS; however, as identified earlier, the IMPACS staff is too small to
bring the strategy to complete fruition. Whilst the Regional Framework for the
Management of Crime and Security was able to satisfy the ad hoc requirements such as
the ICC CWC, it was incapable of addressing the broader crime and security situation in
the region. Of particular note, is the fact that the Regional Framework for the
Management of Crime and Security was proving to be ineffective before a specific
security agenda was promulgated. Now that the region has accepted the CCSS as an
important step towards improving the regional security issues there are more
requirements for the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security to
perform—not just ad hoc events.

It is not clear if CARICOM had assessed the second and third order effects of
placing those additional responsibilities on the existing security framework. There
appears to be the possibility of an unintended effect of degrading the regional security
situation if the current framework is not improved. If one contemplates the limited
effectiveness of the existing framework in addressing regional security (as described
earlier), then adding additional responsibilities could lead to further diffusion of focus
and even effectiveness in more areas.

Secondly, the fact that many of the key actors for the success of the strategy are
not part of the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security can also
have negative implications. The dependence on an agency that is not a part of the security
framework can be perilous. If those actors have no mandate to act as directed in the
CCSS, then that leaves a gap in the means. Additionally, whilst some of these agencies
and bodies have memorandums of understanding with IMPACS and the CARICOM
Secretariat, some of them do not. This makes it challenging for the small IMPACS
agency to coordinate with them. It also presents difficulties in holding actors accountable
for task completion and reporting since they would not have, by their own mandate and
design, a reporting relationship with any entity at the CARICOM Secretariat.

Financial resources are required to support projects and programs that will bring
effectiveness to the CCSS. CARICOM Secretariat was designed to be funded by
contributions from member states. However, there have been constraints on member
states’ contributions to the Secretariat’s budget. These constraints have arisen due to
various situations; most recently the global financial crisis of the late 2000s significantly
affected all member states. Even as member states slowly recover, many of them have
been challenged to make their full scheduled contribution. The CARICOM Secretariat is
therefore required to identify and mobilize external support in order to implement
projects to achieve the objectives of the Community. This situation does cause some risk
within the strategy since financial means are necessary for implementing many of the
projects and programs that form the ways identified to fulfill the strategic ends.

An associated factor that affects strategic risk is what Yarger calls intangibles.
Yarger lists intangibles such as national will and international goodwill as intangible
resources which are a part of the means of a strategy. Because the institution is not a
union, national will is particularly important to CARICOM’s success. It is therefore
important that member states gain national support for any action that is agreed under the
auspices of CARICOM. International goodwill is also a significant intangible.
CARICOM states try to maintain a positive image on the world stage and seek to do the
right things by international standards. Security is a major issue internationally generally,
and to the U.S. specifically, which is just a few miles from the northernmost CARICOM
states. CARICOM states leverage international goodwill to gain support for their actions
as well as to attract tangible support from the international community, in particular the U.S., EU, UK and Canada. In 2011 more than 50 percent of the CARICOM Secretariat budget was provided by external donors.\textsuperscript{11} Whilst the current amounts were not accessed during this research, there is little evidence that this situation has changed dramatically. External donors have limited resources and are likely to use those resources to support countries and regions that display serious dedication to security.

The CARICOM Secretariat does not have a directorate that is focused on security. This gives a negative perception of the level of importance that is placed on regional security, especially when compared to other pillars of the Community. In the existing organogram of the CARICOM Secretariat each security organ (and by extension each pillar) is designed with a directorate which is led by an Assistant Secretary General. These Assistant Secretaries General have specific responsibility for overseeing the fulfillment of the objectives of the community organs. The absence of a Security Organ can be perceived by member states, other agencies and the international community as CARICOM not placing equal emphasis or priority on security (when compared to the other three pillars). This perception can easily cause a lack of national will within member states to support the security efforts. It can also lead to a loss of international goodwill which, as mentioned earlier, can translate to tangible support being withheld, or redirected by external donors.

Based on Yarger’s definition of strategic risk, there are a number of factors that can cause or increase the risk to a strategy. The indications are that the risks in the CARICOM security strategy emanates mainly from the means necessary to implement the strategy. These means are tangible and intangible. Yarger, like many other strategic
thinkers, recommend an adjustment to ends and ways when means are insufficient. The alternative to adjusting the ends and the ways, is to improve the means. CARICOM must acknowledge that these risks to the strategy exist, and are likely to increase. This is particularly likely as the region adopts the CCSS, which will place greater strain on the existing means, these means include: the limited financial means, the waning intangibles, and the ineffective Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security. Additionally, challenges in coordination, structure and perception are means that also increase risk if they are not addressed. Improving these means will reduce existing risks.

Whilst each identified risk cannot be easily quantified, they all appear low. However, taken together, the overall strategic risk can be assessed as medium. It is likely that if nothing is done, the risk will gradually increase to high and may result in strategic failure.

**How can a Security Organ be incorporated into CARICOM’s structure and how can it help to achieve CARICOM’s security objectives?**

As discussed in chapter 2, many other regional institutions that have similar mandates as CARICOM have approached security in different ways. The Secretary General for CARICOM argued that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean states (OECS) sets a good model for CARICOM to follow as the region slowly moves towards its ultimate objective of full integration.12 Whilst he did not specifically speak to security, it is may be reasoned that his general comments include all aspects of the OECS structure, inclusive of security. The OECS security is pursued through the RSS. The RSS is a completely different treaty from the treaty forming the OECS. This would likely take years for CARICOM member states to draft and agree on a separate treaty for security.
CARICOM has generally been slow on reforms, as evidenced by the 17 years that it took to implement the single market, which was expected to take only 4 years. It is therefore unlikely that a new RSS-like treaty will be pursued, especially having already agreed to a regional security strategy within the existing Treaty of Chaguaramas.

The Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) provides another alternative to the existing CARICOM framework. The two organizations are very similar with fundamental pillars and organs. ASEAN has however established a political-security pillar, supported in the ASEAN Secretariat by the Political and Security Community Organ. This provides the organization with oversight of the region’s security agenda (the ASPC Blueprint) at its headquarters through the Political and Security Department. The benefits that ASEAN derive from this structure can also be derived by CARICOM if it made similar changes. This could be done by expanding another Community Organ, for example the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR), and establishing a directorate for security at the Secretariat. This was among the recommendations in the report from the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security. The report suggested that “as a medium [to] long term measure [CARICOM should] strengthen the Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RCM) within the Secretariat, requiring a marginal increase in professional staff . . . as part of the COHSOD system.”

Whether this ASEAN-type approach of a joint Security Organ, or an independent Security Organ is used, it would yield greater benefits than the existing disparate arrangement and reduce the strategic risk. Specifically, CARICOM would benefit from the synergies arising from overlapping policy concerns of other Community Organs. It would also provide effective management and administration of the regional priorities for
crime and security that are contained in the CCSS and as determined by the relevant bodies of CARICOM.

Although the EU is an economic union, and CARICOM is not, the EU’s approach to attaining its regional security objectives provides another possible model for CARICOM. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who is also a vice president of the union) is assisted by a directorate in the European Commission Secretariat. From a CARICOM perspective, this could be a task assigned to the Deputy Secretary General, and the establishment of a directorate in the CARICOM Secretariat where he currently operates. However, this would still require the assignment of a Security Organ by revising the Treaty.

The benefits of having a Security Organ are many. Among these benefits are improved coordination and management of the regional security agenda at the secretariat level. Further, it would allow the CARICOM Secretariat to be the primary entity to interact with third states (such as the U.S., UK and Canada) who have shown a keen interest in Caribbean security for strategic reasons. The effect of the perception of security being placed at higher significance must not be undervalued. This will help to close the cognitive dissonance of the statements about the importance of security to the region and the appearance of its management falling so low on the hierarchy of CARICOM.

**Summary and Conclusion**

This chapter provided the necessary analysis of the literature, which was used to answer the secondary questions of the research. Analysis of CARICOM’s security agenda and the structures used to achieve that agenda. It also reviewed the effectiveness of
CARICOM’s Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security in combatting the regional security challenges since it was developed in 2005. The risks associated with the region’s approach to meeting attaining its security objectives was analyzed using the ends-ways-means construct. The issue with the lack of means was identified as the greatest risk factor. Finally, the chapter considered ways that a Security Organ could improve regional security and considered mechanisms/options for designing such a body within the CARICOM construct. Chapter 5 will answer the research question, provide a conclusion and present a recommendation.


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10 Ibid.


CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The primary research question for this research was: Should CARICOM establish a Security Organ to oversee and implement the regional security agenda? In order to answer this question four secondary questions were identified. Based on the data uncovered during this research, each of these questions can be answered.

1. What is the CARICOM security situation? The security situation in the Caribbean (and specifically among CARICOM member states) is among the worst of all the regions of the world and it has not been improving over the last decade.

2. What is CARICOM’s security agenda and what structures are in place to achieve the intended outcomes? CARICOM’s security agenda has been set by the Heads of Government through the promulgation of a regional crime and security strategy in 2013. The goal of the strategy is to “significantly improve citizen security by creating a safe, just and free Community, while simultaneously improving the economic viability of the Region.” The main structure in place for attaining the strategy is the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security, with IMPACS as the nerve-center of the framework.

3. What risks exist in CARICOM’s efforts to achieve its regional security objectives without a Security Organ, and are those risks likely to increase to an unacceptable level if one is not established? CARICOM faces the risk of continued ineffective coordination and weakened security institutions and an overwhelmed security framework. These risks are mainly based on means, and are likely to increase if security
is not placed higher on the CARICOM hierarchy, whether by a Security Organ or some other method.

4. How can a Security Organ be incorporated into CARICOM’s structure and how can it help to achieve CARICOM’s security objectives? CARICOM will need to revise its treaty to include a Security Organ. This may be a separate organ, or included as a part of an already established organ. Within the CARICOM Secretariat, there should be a Directorate of Security with an Assistant Secretary General responsible for leading that directorate. This will provide the CARICOM with direct oversight of the region’s security agenda at its headquarters. It will also send the unambiguous message to regional and international observers, that CARICOM deems security as a significant issue and accords it the appropriate level of significance.

Additionally, the incorporation of a Security Organ will address the concerns regarding coordination of agencies and institutions responsible for implementing the CCSS. All agencies have a direct (mainly subordinate) relationship with the Secretariat and therefore would be report actions and progress routinely up the chain of command to the Secretariat. This will be a significant improvement to the situation currently taking place between the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security (through IMPACS) and those agencies as outlined earlier.

Another advantage of the new structure will arise because the Directorate of Security will be within the Secretariat. This will place security at the same level as other pillars and increase the routine interaction with other directorates. The Directorate of Security would benefit from the synergies arising from overlapping policy concerns of other directorates in the Secretariat. Given its ever-increasing importance and its cross-
cutting and fundamental nature, the Security Organ will need to be conscious of and plan for: the economic and development concerns of the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED); the foreign policy issues being addressed by the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR); and, the human security matters that are currently dealt with by the Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD).

There are also benefits to be derived from a Directorate of Security being at the Secretariat where administrative and support staff can overlap, resulting in reduced costs to the Community and also greater integration.

The purpose of this study was to determine whether or not the absence of a Security Organ within CARICOM was negatively affecting the Community’s ability to achieve its security objectives. It has been determined that the absence of a security organ within CARICOM, with a Directorate for Security within the CARICOM Secretariat is negatively affecting the Community’s ability to achieve its security objectives. The answer to the primary research question is yes; CARICOM should establish a Security Organ responsible for overseeing and implementing the regional security agenda.

**Recommendations for CARICOM**

Based on the findings of this research, CARICOM must improve and upgrade the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security. The following specific recommendations are offered. Firstly, CARICOM should revise its Treaty to include the 2007 declaration of security as a pillar of the institution. The treaty revision should also include a Security Organ, which may not necessarily be an independent organ. If an independent Security Organ is not established, then security should be established as part of the existing Council of Foreign and Community Relations.
The CARICOM Secretariat should establish a Directorate for Security, with the mandate to coordinate, oversee and manage the attainment of regional security. It should be staffed with the relevant experts in crime, security and safety fields. The Directorate of Security should assume the role of coordinating the implementation, monitoring and updating of the regional crime and security agenda. The first task of the Directorate of Security should be to review, update and improve the Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security. This review should determine the future role of IMPACS. However in the interim, CARICOM should place IMPACS under the auspices of the Directorate of Security, relieving CONSLE (if it remains in this form) of the management and supervision functions.

Good organization does not necessarily guarantee success, nor does poor organization preclude it. However, the organizational changes that have been recommended for the CARICOM Secretariat, in this study, will certainly reduce the strategic risks identified and improve the probability of CARICOM attaining its strategic security goals.

**Further Research**

It is suggested that further research be conducted to determine the need for and feasibility of a regional security headquarters, which can mobilize and exercise command and control over regional security forces when such a need arises. Over the next few years, it would also be useful for studies to be conducted to determine the effectiveness and impact of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy in attaining the regional strategic security ends. Doing this after 2018 would allow an initial five years to elapse between promulgation and assessment.
Additionally, although this study uncovered numerous inefficiencies in the current Regional Framework for the Management of Crime and Security, it is recommended that a detailed study be conducted focused on this framework. That study should try to uncover the issues that are faced by the framework and the issues that have caused it to be ineffective in addressing the security challenges that the region continues to face.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glossary</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>An interplay among what is to be achieved, the concepts envisioned, and resources available, i.e. the discrepancies among ends, ways and means.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Security is the protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external military attack and coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished political, economic and social values. These values include democratic choice and political stability in the political area, sustainable development and free enterprise in the economic domain, and social equality and respect for human rights in the social arena.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Is the disciplined calculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomes than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others. Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of today and a desired future. It is a process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity to circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, and means.</td>
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