THE EFFECTS OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY GROUP IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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**The Effects of the Boko Haram Insurgency Group in West and Central Africa**

**ABSTRACT**

Demonstrated by the last decade of conflict, the next adversary the U.S. military will contend against will be unconventional. Often, these unconventional threats begin small in size and limited in scope of influence. However, when the host nation government ineffectively controls these threats, international military intervention is usually required. Boko Haram (BH) is one of these insurgent groups that began small and later spread outside the control of their host government. Today, BH has expanded its operational reach outside of Nigeria and inside the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Due to Nigeria’s inability to combat it, BH is now affecting the social, economic, and military aspects of governance in these four countries. Consequently, the U.S. military is now required to assist these African countries in combatting BH. Since 2013, the U.S. military conducted five phase zero operations against BH. It is the purpose of this thesis to determine what effects, if any, BH had on the governments of these four case countries. Understanding these effects will provide important insight into why the affected countries were alone incapable of combatting BH and what future U.S. military phase zero operations must occur in order to achieve successful intervention.

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ABSTRACT


Demonstrated by the last decade of conflict, the next adversary the U.S. military will contend against will be unconventional. Often, these unconventional threats begin small in size and limited in scope of influence. However, when the host nation government ineffectively controls these threats, international military intervention is usually required. Boko Haram (BH) is one of these insurgent groups that began small and later spread outside the control of their host government. Today, BH has expanded its operational reach outside of Nigeria and inside the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Due to Nigeria’s inability to combat it, BH is now affecting the social, economic, and military aspects of governance in these four countries. Consequently, the U.S. military is now required to assist these African countries in combatting BH. Since 2013, the U.S. military conducted five phase zero operations against BH. It is the purpose of this thesis to determine what effects, if any, BH had on the governments of these four case countries. Understanding these effects will provide important insight into why the affected countries were alone incapable of combatting BH and what future U.S. military phase zero operations must occur in order to achieve successful intervention.
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

It is nearly impossible to predict the next adversary a nation-state will be required to combat. In order for a nation’s military to be most prepared for war, it is only prudent their military professionals study as much as they can on all known and potential adversaries.

Although the United States and its allied partners excelled at defeating the conventional based Iraqi Army in March 2003, they were largely unprepared to combat the insurgency that followed. Accordingly, as warfare in the twenty-first century continues its trend towards unconventional warfare, as seen with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), it is critically important for Western militaries to become adeptly familiar with how insurgencies form and subsequently spread.

Many insurgencies begin as a small group formed around a common radical belief. Over time, ineffective containment of insurgencies allows them to spread at a rapid rate. When violent insurgencies have room to spread, they often become too difficult for a single nation-state to combat, and therefore often require international military intervention. Boko Haram (BH) is one of these insurgent groups that began small and later spread at a rapid rate.

Mohammed Yusuf, a poor Muslim cleric from Nigeria, founded BH in 2002.\(^1\) BH, when translated in English, means “western education is forbidden.” The initial aims

of the group were to overthrow the government in northern Nigeria to create an Islamic
date, or caliphate, under Sharia law. However, the group has expanded in size, influence,
and operational reach since its initial creation in 2002. In the last seven years (2009-
today), BH brazenly expanded insurgency operations into multiple West and Central
African countries. In 2009, the group officially announced itself an Islamic insurgency
and in 2013, the United States officially labeled BH a terrorist group. More recently, in
2015, BH switched their allegiance from Al Qaeda to ISIL—thus making BH a potential
global adversary. Today, it is currently unknown what BH’s goals are outside of
establishing a caliphate in northern Nigeria.

To effectively combat insurgencies, governments must proactively shape, control,
and roll back insurgencies before they are able to increase in size and influence. This
paper explores what effects BH had on the social, economic, and military aspects of
governance in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Understanding these effects provides
important insight into why the governments of West and Central Africa were alone
incapable of combatting BH, and to what end multinational intervention will be required
to defeat them.

Thesis Statement

To date, BH has significantly affected the social, economic, and military aspects
of governance in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. These effects became
impediments for the governments of West and Central Africa. Due to minimal and

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2 Noah Rayman, “U.S. Labels Nigeria’s Boko Haram a Terrorist Group,” Time,
labels-nigerias-boko-haram-a-terrorist-group/.
delayed governmental involvement, BH expanded their operational reach and influence outside of Nigeria. As a result of this mishandling, international intervention is now required to combat and prevent further spread. Successful intervention will only occur if military professionals understand the effects of BH on the governments of West and Central Africa. Understanding these effects allows international militaries the ability to succinctly apply resources to the affected areas of governance.

**Primary Research Question**

What effects has the BH insurgency group had on the governments of West and Central Africa?

**West and Central Africa**

The regions of West and Central Africa consist of 24 countries and approximately 500 million people, most of whom practice either Islam or Christianity.³ For the purpose of this study, the four countries most impacted by BH are analyzed. These countries are Nigeria and Niger in West Africa, and Chad and Cameroon in Central Africa.

Of geographic importance to West and Central Africa is the location of Lake Chad. Lake Chad is located along the seam of West and Central Africa and touches all four of the case countries. Due to its central location in West and Central Africa, and the difficulty for the surrounding countries to control borders along the lake, Lake Chad contributes greatly to why BH can easily extend their operational reach outside of Nigeria. Today, with approximately 9,000 fighters, the group conducts scores of terrorist

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attacks in Nigeria and in the countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. This is the genesis for these governments recently assuming a greater role in assisting Nigeria in preventing the spread and influence of BH.

**Boko Haram**

The first known attack by BH was in December 2003, and included approximately 200 militant fighters attacking a Nigerian police station along the border of Niger.\(^4\) BH continued to carryout terrorist attacks from 2003 to 2009; however, they were mostly small in scale and limited in scope—aimed primarily at disrupting the largely Christian based Nigerian government in the northern state of Borno. This limited form of warfare would drastically change following the BH Uprising in 2009. The Uprising was a street war between BH and the Nigerian Police Force in northern Nigeria. The aftermath was significant for both parties, with BH losing approximately 700 fighters, and the Nigerian Police Force losing approximately 300 members. Of the 700 BH fighters killed, none was more important than the leader and founder, Mohammed Yusuf.\(^5\) Abubakar Shekau, the deputy for Yusuf at the time of the Uprising, assumed control and quickly swore vengeance on all non-Muslims.\(^6\) Of critical importance, this


\(^5\) Ibid.

Uprising drove BH to announce themselves as an Islamic insurgent group—resulting in a subsequent campaign of violence.

In summary, since 2010, the BH insurgent group is responsible for conducting approximately 130 media-reported attacks that resulted in approximately 30,000 media-documented deaths. Of note, the majority of these attacks were against Nigerian Christians in the northern Nigerian state of Borno. However, starting in late 2014, BH extended their operational reach outside of Nigeria and into the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Below are the most notable attacks, by calendar year:

In 2010, BH conducted two media-reported attacks:

1. September 2010: 200 heavily armed BH insurgents freed 721 Nigerian prisoners after conducting an aggressive night siege on the Bauchi prison in northern Nigeria. Out of the 721 freed prisoners, 120 were part of BH. Since then, only 35 of the prisoners have been re-arrested.8

2. December 2010: Insurgents from BH killed four civilians and wounded another 26 after conducting a bomb attack in a crowded market next to the military barracks in Abuja, Nigeria.9

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In 2011, BH conducted six media-reported attacks in northern Nigeria that resulted in approximately 500 media-documented deaths.\textsuperscript{10} Below summarizes the five most notable attacks:

1. May 2011: Insurgents killed 13 civilians and wounded another 40 after conducting three bomb attacks. Of note, this attack occurred just hours after Goodluck Jonathan became president of Nigeria.\textsuperscript{11}

2. June 2011: An insurgent killed several civilians near the police headquarters in Abuja by conducting a suicide car bombing. This is the first reported BH suicide bombing attack.\textsuperscript{12}

3. August 2011: Insurgents killed at least 21 and wounded another 73 employees of the United Nations by conducting a suicide car bomb attack at the United Nations headquarters building in Abuja.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} Bunche and Campbell.


4. November 2011: Insurgents killed over 100 civilians in the northern Nigerian town of Damaturu. In this attack, BH targeted and destroyed multiple Roman Catholic churches and the headquarters building of the Yobe state police.\textsuperscript{14}

5. December 2011: Insurgents killed over 39 and wounded another 52 Christians after a series of car bombings and shootings targeted the Christmas Day church services in northern Nigeria.\textsuperscript{15}

In 2012, BH conducted eight media-reported attacks that resulted in approximately 1,500 media-documented deaths.\textsuperscript{16} Below summarizes the five most notable attacks:

1. January 2012: BH issued a warning to all Christians that they have three days to evacuate northern Nigeria.\textsuperscript{17} To support their demands, BH conducted two significant attacks in northern Nigeria during this month. On 5 and 6 January, BH killed at least 37 Christians after attacking civilians attending church


\textsuperscript{16} Bunche and Campbell.

services. On 20 January, fighters killed over 156 people after attacking Nigeria’s police headquarters and barracks in Kano.

2. April 2012: An insurgent killed 38 and wounded many other civilians in Kaduna, Nigeria, during Easter Day services.

3. June 2012: Insurgents killed at least 16 civilians by conducting a series of bomb attacks at three separate Christian churches in the northern state of Kaduna.

4. August 2012: Two insurgents killed 19 civilians by walking into a church in the town of Otite, Nigeria, and opening fire on the Christian worshipers.


18 Mshelizza.


In 2013, BH conducted 17 media-reported attacks that resulted in approximately 2,000 media-documented deaths. Below summarizes the five most notable attacks:

1. February 2013: Multiple insurgents on motorcycles shot and killed nine female polio vaccinators in the northern Nigerian city of Kano.\textsuperscript{25}

2. June 2013: Insurgents killed a total of 22 teachers and students in two separate attacks in northern Nigeria.\textsuperscript{26}

3. July 2013: Insurgents killed a total of 42 teachers and students by attacking the school’s dormitories with rifles and bombs. This attack occurred in the northern Nigerian state of Yobe.\textsuperscript{27}

4. September 2013: Multiple significant attacks occurred in September. On 19 September, insurgents killed 159 civilians in two separate attacks in northeast Nigeria. In this attack, insurgents donned military uniforms, set up vehicle checkpoints, and proceeded to kill innocent civilians while dragging them from

\textsuperscript{24} Bunche and Campbell.


\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
their vehicles. On 29 September, insurgents killed upwards of 50 Gujba college students in Yobe state.

5. October 2013: Insurgents attacked Nigerian military soldiers in Yobe state. The attack lasted for approximately five hours and resulted in at least 95 insurgents killed, 23 Nigerian soldiers killed, and eight Nigerian police officers killed.

In 2014, BH conducted 41 media-reported attacks that resulted in approximately 10,000 media-documented deaths. Additionally, 2014 marks the first time BH extended its operational reach into the bordering countries of Lake Chad. Below summarizes the five most notable attacks:

1. February 2014: Insurgents killed 121 Christians after raiding a Christian village in Borno state. During this attack, insurgents dressed in military uniforms in an attempt to hide their identity before using rifles and knives to kill innocent civilians.

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29 BBC News, “Nigeria Attack: Students Shot Dead as They Slept.”


31 Bunche and Campbell.


3. May 2014: Insurgents killed as many as 300 people in the town of Gamboru, Nigeria, along the border of Cameroon, by opening fire on a marketplace full of civilians. Subsequently, insurgents set fire to homes across the town for over 12 hours while killing civilians attempting to flee.

4. November 2014: Two insurgents conducted suicide bombings in Kano during weekly prayers outside a Muslim mosque. The bombings resulted in at least 64 Muslims killed and another 126 injured.34

5. December 2014: Over 1,000 insurgents attacked civilians in five towns in Yaounde, Cameroon that resulted in approximately 30 civilians killed.35 36 This attack marks the first time BH attacked into Cameroon.


In 2015, BH conducted 56 media-reported attacks that resulted in approximately 10,000 media-documented deaths.³⁷ Below summarizes the five most notable attacks:

1. January 2015: Insurgents conducted a series of raids in Baga, Borno, resulting in at least 2,000 people killed. As a result, close to 10,000 Nigerians fled to Chad to escape the rising violence in northern Nigeria.³⁸

2. January 2015: Insurgents attacked a Cameroon military camp. However, the attack was unsuccessful and resulted in 143 insurgents killed.³⁹

3. February 2015: 30 insurgents conducted the first reported attacks in Chad. Insurgents used four motorboats to cross Lake Chad to attack a village. The attack resulted in one Chadian soldier killed, four Chadian civilians killed, and two insurgents killed.⁴⁰

4. February 2015: Insurgents conducted the first reported attacks in Niger. Insurgents conducted three attacks in Diffa, Niger, five kilometers from the

³⁷ Bunche and Campbell.


Nigerian border that resulted in five people killed. Niger’s army was successful in ultimately repelling BH back across the Niger/Nigerian border.⁴¹

5. June 2015: Two teenage female insurgents conducted suicide bomb attacks at a crowded mosque in Bauchi, Nigeria. The attack resulted in 30 people killed.⁴²

This campaign of violence is still very prevalent today. Figure 1 illustrates the areas in which BH inflicted the most deaths from July 2009 to January 2015:


Figure 1. Boko Haram Conflict Related Deaths


Current U.S. Strategy against Boko Haram

The United States is actively assisting the governments of West and Central Africa. Assisting, or shaping, in U.S. joint doctrine is phase zero of the six phase operational model used to determine the level of effort during conflict. Phase zero operations are “intended to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational
cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives.”\(^{43}\) Additionally, phase zero operations generally focus on building partnership capacity with allied governments, and not on directing resources against enemy combatants. Ever since the United States labeled BH an insurgency in 2013, it supported the governments of Western and Central Africa in the fight against BH. Over time, the level of effort remained at phase zero. Currently, it is unknown when or if the United States will begin conducting phase one operations. Phase one operations, or deter, is best described as the overt demonstration of some or all of the military capabilities available to deter a potential adversary.\(^{44}\)

Beginning in 2013, the United States conducted five phase zero operations aimed at assisting governments to defeat BH. In 2013, the United States deployed 100 military personnel to Niamey, Niger to assist in intelligence collection.\(^{45}\) In 2014, the United States deployed approximately 80 military personnel to Nigeria and Chad to assist with locating the 234 abducted Nigerian female students.\(^{46}\) Additionally, in 2014, the United States supported Nigeria in standing up a Special Operations Command.\(^{47}\) Most recently,


\(^{44}\) Ibid., 42.


\(^{46}\) Ibid.

in 2015, the United States deployed 300 military personnel to assist Cameroon with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance missions in support of military operations.48

Summary

This chapter provided an overview of the problem surrounding the effects of insurgencies on government. The attacks committed by BH significantly increased over time—from two in 2010 to 56 in 2015. U.S. intervention is now required to combat BH.

Chapter 2, literature review, analyzes previous literature regarding the effects BH had within West and Central Africa. Of note, an important deficiency is there is currently little written on the holistic understanding of the effects of BH on governance. Available literature discusses single facets of governance (social, economic, and military)—and not the holistic view. This paper combines the single facets of literature.

Chapter 3, research methodology, describes the type of qualitative comparison case study used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. This study analyzes the period effects of BH during four separate years: 2001, 2010, 2012, and 2014. This study analyzes the spatial effects of BH in four case countries: Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Two types of tables display the data from the comparison case study: Aspects of Governance and Analysis. The Aspects of Governance Table contains data to

answer the secondary research questions. The Analysis Table contains data to answer the primary research question. Examples of these tables are also provided.

Chapters 4 and 5, analysis, answers the primary and secondary research questions. Chapter 4 is the analysis of the two case countries in Western Africa: Nigeria and Niger. Chapter 5 is the analysis of the two case countries in Central Africa: Chad and Cameroon.

Finally, chapter 6 draws conclusions and describes the implications of this study on future military planning and research. It summarizes the findings from chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, this chapter provides recommendations on areas to expand and refine this research.

Definitions

For the purpose of this study, definitions for the respective terms are below. When able, U.S. military doctrinal definitions were used. However, the U.S. military does not define caliphate or conventional warfare in its doctrinal publications. Therefore, the most appropriate definitions are used in the context of this study.

Caliphate: “a unified federal Islamic government for the Muslim world, ruled by a head of state or caliph.” 49

Conventional warfare: “the waging of war in set military battles, as opposed to waging guerrilla warfare or fighting insurgencies.” 50


**Counterinsurgency:** “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root cause.”\(^{51}\)

**Insurgency:** “The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.”\(^{52}\)

**Terrorism:** “The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.”\(^{53}\)

**Unconventional warfare:** “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”\(^{54}\)

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\(^{53}\) Ibid., 243.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 251.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The BH insurgency has only existed since 2002. Literature on the effects of the group on nation-state governance is therefore limited. Most of the available literature is open-news reporting covering real-time current events—mainly terrorist attacks. An important deficiency is there is little literature written on the holistic understanding of the effects of BH on governance in West and Central Africa. What little literature is available discusses single facets (social, economic, military)—and not the holistic view. A categorical organization of literature is below.

The Effects of Boko Haram in Nigeria

BH has most affected the social aspect of governance by targeting schools and the minority Christian population in the northern state of Borno. In 2012, Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), a humanitarian news and analysis company, published an insightful article that discussed the challenges of keeping schools open in Borno. IRIN claims the only schools regulated by the government were schools that included Western education in their curriculum. Because of this regulation, BH deliberately targeted Western education based schools to send a clear message to Nigerians that Western education is forbidden. IRIN reported 14 schools burnt down in the first four months of 2012 and these attacks made it very difficult to persuade parents to keep children in

Musa Inuwa, the Commissioner for Education in Borno state, remarked, “we are appealing to parents to keep their children in school and not to be intimidated.” Moreover, IRIN observed schoolteachers and staffs were shrinking due to BH’s increased success targeting schools.  

Due to Nigeria’s decision not to fund or regulate Islamic schools, the system known as Almajari filled the educational gap for young Islamic boys. In Almajari, young boys are sent to live with a Mallam, an Islamic teacher of the Koran, for up to 10 years. In addition to Islamic teachings, the Mallams have the responsibility to care and provide for their pupils. Most often, however, this care is nothing more than a form of hard labor. Consequently, according to Inuwa, this form of unregulated education resulted in Muslim children not being highly employable later in life. Inuwa states, “Having only Islamic education will not make you employable, which is why we need to encourage parents to choose Western education for their children.”

In 2014, *The Economist* claimed that due to the rapid increase in the targeting of schools, the government was essentially powerless and unable to respond quickly enough to prevent many of the attacks from occurring. Because of this inability to respond, the government in Borno state closed a large percentage of their secondary schools. These closings resulted in about 10 million school-aged Nigerians forced out of school.

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56 IRIN, “School Attendance Down after Boko Haram Attacks.”

57 Ibid.

Subsequently, females married sooner than desired and teenage males were recruited by BH more quickly than the government could intervene—resulting in a continuous cycle of poverty and instability.\(^{59}\)

In 2015, 1,200 or so attacks on schools in northeast Nigeria resulted in hundreds of teachers and students killed.\(^{60}\) The targeting of education negatively affected the growth of Nigeria’s economy. Due to the low number of school-enrolled children, Nigeria will have an uneducated society for the near future.\(^{61}\) Thus far, violence displaced 1.4 million children from northern Nigeria; 200,000 of which are not attending school. Additionally, BH killed 600 teachers since 2009. Although the Nigerian military’s offensive operations against BH resulted in 450 schools reopening in Borno, the negative impact of lack of education already resulted in economic growth plummeting. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped from 6.23 percent in third quarter 2014 to 2.35 percent in second quarter 2015.\(^{62}\)

Contrary to producing great fear among parents sending their children to school,\(^{63}\) Margee Ensign, president of the American University of Nigeria in Yola, states the

\(^{59}\) The Economist, “Boko Haram’s impact on Nigeria Education in Crisis.”


\(^{61}\) Ibid.

\(^{62}\) Ibid.

\(^{63}\) IRIN, “School Attendance Down after Boko Haram Attacks.”
demand for education increased.\textsuperscript{64} Ensign exclaims “in our travels north, I saw a great deal of destruction-schools, farms burned; bridges destroyed . . . [but] the desire—hunger—for education is so great that the insurgency in some ways has only made students and their parents want education even more.”\textsuperscript{65}

In 2013, Akunyili Tochukwu described the effects on the Nigerian economy.\textsuperscript{66} Tochukwu claims that since 2010, foreign direct investments into Nigeria plummeted due to the spike in BH activity. More precisely, foreign direct investment dropped by 21.3 percent from 2011 to 2012; resulting in almost a two billion dollar loss in state revenue. Tochukwu predicted the drop in foreign direct investment will have negative impacts on trade, the productivity of domestic investments, and most importantly, Nigerian’s ability to export oil—their largest export.\textsuperscript{67}

More localized in Nigeria, Tochukwu remarked that the mass exodus of people in the northern state of Borno resulted in many small businesses closing as well as service industries incapable of maintaining sufficient workforce to stay operational.\textsuperscript{68} Many of the workers requested relocation due to fear of violence. As a result, unemployment increased, banks closed due to a drop in economic activity, and insurance premiums rose. The impact of BH on the economy is especially important to understand due to the

\textsuperscript{64} Winsor.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
strategic importance of Nigeria’s economy on the overall regional security of sub-Saharan Africa; which, of note, includes a direct link to the economies of Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.\(^{69}\)

Contrary to Tochukwu’s analysis,\(^{70}\) Kathleen Caulderwood reported GDP rose by 89 percent in 2014—resulting in Nigeria becoming the largest African economy.\(^{71}\) The economic growth was attributed to the revised process of how Nigeria calculates GDP; which now accounts for growth in the film and telecom industries.\(^{72}\) Notably, Nigeria’s oil sector now only accounts for 15 percent of the GDP as compared to 32 percent in 2013. The revised method in calculating GDP means Nigeria’s economy grows on average about six percent per year, ranking twenty-sixth worldwide.\(^{73}\) Although Nigeria’s economy grew, poverty still increased. For example, in 2014, 61 percent of the population lived off one dollar per day as compared to 54 percent in 2004.\(^{74}\)

Caulderwood published additional literature in 2014 continuing her analysis of the economic effects of BH as well as the significant divide in economic strength between

\(^{69}\) Tochukwu.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.


\(^{72}\) Ibid.

\(^{73}\) Ibid.

\(^{74}\) Ibid.
northern and southern Nigeria. Amadou Sy, an African economist at the Brookings Institute, is quoted saying, “Nigeria’s north is definitely poorer than the south and the conflict is having a negative impact.” Due to its stronghold in northern Nigeria—where most farmlands lie—the only impact BH had on economic growth was in the agriculture sector. In northern Nigeria, food prices rose sharply and commercial traders departed en masse. BH commonly stole food, cash, and equipment from commercial venues to sustain their insurgency. Contrary to Tochukwu’s article, Caulderwood reports Nigeria’s foreign direct investment grew by 28 percent from 2012 to 2013.

In summary, Caulderwood posits BH affected the agricultural growth in the north but not the overall growth of Nigeria’s economy. Samir Gadio, an emerging market strategist at Standard Bank, states, “the impact on the economy has actually remained muted given the violence did not spread to Lagos or the oil-rich Niger Delta.”

From 2002 to 2009, the Nigerian military conducted limited combat operations against BH. These limited operations, however, proved ineffective in preventing the spread and influence of BH. As such, since 2009, Nigeria’s level of involvement and commitment in combating BH has risen sharply. Sustaining this rise, however, has been

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76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Tochukwu.

80 Caulderwood, “Boko Haram and Nigeria’s Economy.”
difficult. In 2015, the Nigerian military had tremendous difficulty recruiting and retaining soldiers to fight BH.\textsuperscript{81} Nigerian troops complained of having insufficient weapons and low salaries as a reason for not fighting.\textsuperscript{82} Due to the large number of deserters, the Nigerian government decided to execute deserting soldiers. Specifically, in 2015, 54 soldiers from the 111th Nigerian Special Forces Battalion were sentenced to death for mutiny and desertion.\textsuperscript{83} Beginning in 1999, and of particular interest into the history of military management in Nigeria, the Nigerian government deliberately kept its military weak to prevent possible coups from occurring.\textsuperscript{84}

Although Nigeria’s 2015 defense budget is six billion dollars, much of the money is lost to corruption.\textsuperscript{85} Corruption directly affected Nigeria’s ability to effectively arm and train its soldiers. Nigeria is currently on the verge of military incompetence, according to James Hall, a former military attaché.\textsuperscript{86} This incompetence has resulted in an increase of both human rights abuse cases and killings of innocent civilians. Due to this incompetence, Nigeria has required troops from Chad and Niger to support military operations. Military incompetence also affected Nigeria’s ability to purchase new weapons from foreign military sales. For example, the United States canceled an

\textsuperscript{81} Kevin Seiff, “The Nigerian military is so broken, its soldiers are refusing to fight,” \textit{The Washington Post}, 10 May 2015.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
agreement to sell Cobra attack helicopters due to growing concerns surrounding Nigeria’s
ability to maintain and employ the equipment. Specifically, the United States was
concerned helicopters would be used irresponsibly and result in an increase in the number
of civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{87} The Nigerian government, because of the U.S. decision to cancel
the sale of Cobras, canceled a bi-lateral training exercise between one of their special
forces battalions and an unnamed U.S. military unit.\textsuperscript{88}

In 2015, Tomi Oladipo wrote that due to Nigeria’s ineffectiveness in fighting BH,
President Muhammadu decided to move the Army’s Command and Control Center from
Abuja to the northern city of Maiduguri.\textsuperscript{89} This decision expresses the resolve of the
newly elected president to combat BH. Moving the base closer to the epicenter of attacks
will “cut the bureaucracy and speed up decision-making.”\textsuperscript{90} Additionally, the president’s
decision to move the base closer to the fight will increase cooperation with regional
partners and will help the military restore the confidence of its international partners.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{87} Seif.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
Finally, Oladipo substantiates previous reports\textsuperscript{92} of Nigerian soldiers deserting the military and complaining of being ill equipped.\textsuperscript{93}

**The Effects of Boko Haram in Niger**

According to Thomas Fessy, the social effects in Niger are significant. Specifically, BH was relentless in the recruitment of teenagers, and many of the displaced refugees from northern Nigeria migrated to Niger.\textsuperscript{94} BH paid Niger teenagers approximately $3,000 U.S. dollars to defect to Nigeria and join their ranks.\textsuperscript{95} Although BH is founded and operated by an Islamist ideology, the teenagers being recruited are not defecting for religious beliefs, but instead are driven by monetary compensation.\textsuperscript{96}

According to Fessy, the refugee crisis in southern Niger is growing. The United Nations Refugee Agency reports 50,000 Nigerians found refuge in Niger since the start of the conflict in 2009.\textsuperscript{97} Due to having insufficient number of camps, Niger was unable to manage the amount of refugees. Interestingly, the government purposely avoided building refugee camps in fear of them becoming easy targets and recruitment centers. Instead of establishing refugee camps, Niger and the United Nations planned to expand

\textsuperscript{92} Seiff.

\textsuperscript{93} Oladipo.


\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.

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pre-existing neighborhoods by building new housing.\textsuperscript{98} As Fessy points out, Niger has difficulty providing for their own population—let alone 50,000 Nigerian refugees.

In 2015, 47,000 residents fled and 150 schools closed in Diffa, Niger, located along the border of northern Nigeria, due to the growing violence.\textsuperscript{99} The school closings forced some 12,000 students out of school according to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{100} Contrary to Fessy,\textsuperscript{101} many of the displaced students are using refugee camps built by the government.\textsuperscript{102}

Economically, Niger negatively felt the impact of BH. Export traders in the city of Diffa lost business due to the border closing with Nigeria.\textsuperscript{103} This is troubling. The strong economy of Nigeria historically benefited Diffa more than the weak commercial centers of Niger. Since the border closings, price of grain doubled and price of livestock plummeted.\textsuperscript{104} The World Food Programme predicted people would eventually run out of

\textsuperscript{98} Fessy.


\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{101} Fessy.

\textsuperscript{102} Yahoo News, “Boko Haram attacks force 12,000 pupils from Niger schools: UN.”


\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
food if they cannot sell their goods. In particular, Diffa’s livestock market was erased (camel, sheep, and goat prices are less than half of what they were before) and the costs of fuel rose sharply. Niger’s government assisted by providing grains for half the market price, but the future effect of this intervention is unknown.

According to Peter Hannaford and Robert Zapesochny, it is important uranium deposits in Niger are secure before BH is able to capture the rare mineral. Due to BH swearing allegiance to ISIL, the international community must make a concerted effort to prevent BH from controlling one of the world’s largest uranium reserves. At the time of this study, uranium is Niger’s largest export. The authors propose the United States should work with the French and Chinese in providing economic aid to defeat BH before they are able to secure the uranium.

In 2015, Niger’s Parliament deployed troops to Nigeria. In an unlikely coincidence, there were four reported attacks in Diffa the week of this decision. Abdullai Adah, Red Cross in Diffa, exclaims, “people are in a panic . . . all the stores are closed

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105 IRIN, “Diffa traders hit by Nigerian border closure.”
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
and we are hearing heavy artillery from the Nigerian side.”¹¹¹ As a result of the increase in violence, Niger committed more than 3,000 soldiers to Diffa.¹¹²

The Effects of Boko Haram in Chad

According to Frances Martel, the government imposed a state of emergency in the Lake Chad region of southern Chad. Declaring the state of emergency allowed for better use of military resources and authorized the government to impose curfews and tighter restrictions at border control points.¹¹³ Martel reported that President Idriss Deby, allocated close to five billion dollars for use in creating infrastructure, health, and education in southern Chad. The money also equipped Chadians with better weapons, and ideally provided young men more and better employment options versus joining BH.

Socially, President Deby ordered a ban, in 2015, on all burqas and religious turbans that could conceal the faces of potential insurgents. However, one month after this ban, BH insurgents, wearing burqas, killed 15 people in N’Djamena by suicide bombing.¹¹⁴

In 2015, Chad joined the fight against BH because of the overrunning of the joint military base in Baga, Nigeria; which was to house the Multinational Task Force

¹¹¹ Nossiter, “Niger Adds Its Troops to the War on Boko Haram.”


¹¹⁴ Ibid.
established in 2014 and consisting of troops from Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Ukwu reports, however, that Chad was already preparing to combat BH due to their negative effects on the economy. Economically, violence caused Chad’s oil prices to fall and trade costs to rise. Due to the violence along the border, trade and commerce with Nigeria stopped. Accordingly, one of Chad’s principle military goals was to re-open the border with Nigeria.

Of specific importance to trade is the security of commercial boat traffic in Lake Chad. Merchants traveling from Nigeria to Chad were forced to take longer routes through Niger to by-pass BH—resulting in increased transportation costs and price of goods. Furthermore, the location of violence cut off other important Chadian trade routes with Cameroon. Specifically, BH affected the trade route from Chad’s capital to the port of Douala, Cameroon—where most of their goods are imported. Militarily, Chad deployed 2,400 soldiers with helicopters and vehicles to assist Nigeria in fighting BH.

Socially, violence is effecting the number of displaced people within its borders. According to Medecins Sans Frontieres, an organization similar to Doctor’s Without

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116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.
Borders, the number of displaced people in Chad was 75,000 in 2015.\textsuperscript{121} Of those, 14,000 were Nigerian refugees. Medecins Sans Frontieres also reported that due to the increase in violence, the Chadian military increased its security presence in the Lake Chad area. Medecins Sans Frontieres supported the Chadian Ministry of Health with mobile clinics across the affected areas.\textsuperscript{122}

**The Effects of Boko Haram in Cameroon**

Ngala Chimtom, in 2012, summarized how the economy suffered since BH began operating along the Nigerian and Cameroon border.\textsuperscript{123} Due to the increase in violence, Cameroon closed its border amid fears of BH infiltrating its far north region near Lamine. Import goods such as fuel, sugar, milk, and flour doubled in price, and state revenue in the northern region declined.\textsuperscript{124} Specifically, revenue from customs dropped significantly since the border closings. Overall, Cameroon’s far north region was losing on average one million dollars per month while the regional economy shrunk by 80 percent.\textsuperscript{125}


\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
In 2014, *The Economist* substantiated Chimtom’s report of increased costs of trade along the border, but also provided unique analysis of how BH affected tourism. The far north is home to the Waza National Park, which alone accounts for most of the tourism in the region. However, ever since the kidnapping of French tourists there in 2013, tourism declined sharply.\textsuperscript{126} Foreign embassies advised travelers to avoid this region of Cameroon. The travel advisory severely impacted Cameroon’s far north economy.\textsuperscript{127} Once considered the most stable African country, Cameroon has since seen a sharp decline in international business.\textsuperscript{128}

According to The United Nations Children’s Fund, school closings increased due to violence.\textsuperscript{129} The report included an analysis of schools in the far north Cameroon cities of Diamare, Logone et Chari, Mayo Tsanaga, and Maya Save. Overall, the report found that from 2014 to 2015, 120 schools, consisting of almost 33,000 children, closed because of threats. Additionally, Nigerian refugees overtook 30 percent of the closed


\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.

schools and another 18 percent were housing armed and violent groups participating in the conflict.¹³⁰

Refugee management is also of great concern. Not only does Cameroon host a large number of Nigerian refugees seeking protection, they also host the majority of the Central African Republic refugees. The United Nations Refugee Agency website lists 240,000 refugees in Cameroon, with only 14,000 of them being Nigerian.¹³¹ Conversely, Medecins Sans Frontieres, in 2015, stated they assisted 45,000 Nigerians in the Minawao refugee camp in northern Cameroon.¹³² Health issues revolving around the Nigerian refugee camps—cholera and malnutrition—continue to be a problem.¹³³

Militarily, the effects of BH resulted in Cameroon reinforcing its internal borders as well as deploying troops externally. Internally, the government sent thousands of troops to its far north region near its capital city Yaoundé.¹³⁴ Externally, according to Edgard Ngo’o, “the president of Cameroon authorized the deployment of 2,450 soldiers

¹³⁰ United Nation Children’s Fund.


¹³³ Ibid.

to join the multinational force.”135 This Multination Task Force, headquartered in Chad, consists of soldiers from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. The increase in troops triples the amount of soldiers previously committed by Cameroon. Of the soldiers being committed, 500 of them came from Cameroon’s Navy and deployed to Lake Chad.136

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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Primary Research Question

What effects has the BH insurgency group had on the governments of West and Central Africa?

Secondary Research Questions

1. What are the social effects of BH in West and Central Africa?
2. What are the economic effects of BH in West and Central Africa?
3. What are the military effects of BH in West and Central Africa?

Research Method and Design

Qualitative research is a type of scientific research that uses a predefined set of guidelines to answer a research question.\textsuperscript{137} The guidelines provide the researcher with a specific method of how to collect evidence and data to answer the research question. Guidelines can include the deliberate controlling of variables, like time and space. In some cases, qualitative research produces unplanned findings. Qualitative research can also use social and economic aspects of a targeted population. A strength of qualitative research is its flexibility.\textsuperscript{138} Flexibility allows the researcher to use an open-ended research question and adjust the research design according to what evidence is being gathered.


\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
collected and learned. A weakness of qualitative research is its generalizability. However, as this research aims to inform government policy strictly for West and Central Africa, generalizability is a secondary concern.

This is a qualitative study due to the complexity of Central and West Africa, the subjective nature of the data, and the dynamic nature of terrorism and insurgency. Though some aspects of the data may be in numerical form, the overall study remains qualitative. Moreover, this study uses a comparison case study to show the effects BH had on the governments of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon from 2000 to 2014. This comparison case study specifically covers the social, economic, and military aspects of governance. This study uses the same methods to research each of the four countries in order to maintain integrity and consistency in the comparison case study method. Consistency supports answering the primary research question and the three secondary research questions. The research compares across both time and space.

To account for period effects, data for each country’s governments are from the same four main sample years. These sample years are 2000, 2008, 2010, and 2014. Because some of the data is unavailable for each of these main sample years, supplemental years are used in order to provide plausible data points for the overall analysis. Supplemental data is footnoted. To detect relative effects, the data from each time-period is compared to the previous period’s data. For example, data from 2008 is

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compared to 2000, data from 2010 is compared to 2008, and data from 2014 is compared to 2010.

The sample years were selected because of the importance each year had regarding the rise of BH. The year 2000 serves as the baseline data for this comparison case study due to it being two years before the creation of BH. The year 2008 is significant due to it being one year prior to BH announcing themselves as an insurgency. The year 2010 was one year after BH announced themselves as an insurgency as well as the year it began its campaign of violence in Nigeria. The year 2014 is significant for three reasons. First, it marks the first time BH extends their operational reach outside of Nigeria and into the bordering countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Secondly, it marks the infamous BH kidnapping of 234 Nigerian female students from the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno state—which notably garnered the most international attention regarding the efficacy of BH. Lastly, 2014 is one year after the United States began phase zero operations in West and Central Africa—thus indicating the effectiveness of phase zero operations in relation to the conflict.

To compare across space, the same three aspects of governance are used—social, economic, and military for all four countries. Chapters 4 and 5 will answer five questions regarding the aspects of governance. These questions and answers provide the data needed to compare what effects, if any, BH had. This study uses an increase and decrease ranking system for each measure. This ranking system is based on a point scale to help facilitate case study comparison. An answer with “increase” scored one positive point. An answer with “decrease” scored one negative point. Finally, an answer with “remain the same” scored zero. The questions for each aspect of governance are listed below.
Social Questions
1. Did the primary school completion rate increase, decrease, or remain the same?
2. Did the average life expectancy increase, decrease, or remain the same?

Economic Questions
1. Did the percentage of employment increase, decrease, or remain the same?
2. Did the Gross Domestic Product increase, decrease, or remain the same?

Military Question
1. Did the budget increase, decrease, or remain the same?

Table 1
Table 1 is an example of how the answers to the questions are recorded and organized in chapters 4 and 5. Due to researching three specific aspects of governance, each of the four case countries will have three tables. The organization of these answers in a table format allows the identification of possible negative and or positive trends. The “TOTAL AGG” column provides an aggregated analysis of how BH affected each individual aspect of governance within each of the four case countries. Note the findings in the Aspect of Governance Tables support answering the three secondary research questions and not the primary research question. Secondary research questions ultimately support answering the primary research question.
Table 1. Example of Social Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Completion (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>Avg. Life Expectancy (age)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

Table 2

Table 2, the Analysis Table, consolidates the cases. The organization of these answers in a table format allows the identification of negative or positive trends. These trends have the potential to highlight both strengths and weaknesses for each of the four countries. The “TOTAL AGG” column for each country provides an aggregated analysis of how BH has effected the governance of each respective country. Analysis Tables answer the primary research question.
Table 2. Example of Analysis Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

Limitation of Data

A noteworthy limitation is the paucity of data. In some cases, respective data for each aspect of governance is unavailable. For consistency, only one database is used, The World Bank. Their wide collection of data is most applicable and depresses measurement error.

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF WEST AFRICA

West Africa consists of 17 countries and one British Overseas Territory: Benin, Burkina Faso, the island nation of Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, of Saint Helena (island, UK), Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe and Togo. This chapter analyzes the two West African countries most affected by BH: Nigeria and Niger.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria

The Federal Republic of Nigeria gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960. Today, it is the most populous country in Africa and eighth in the world in population size with approximately 181 million people. The capital is Abuja. Administratively, it consists of 36 different states and one territory. The largest city is Lagos and it consists of approximately 13 million people. The official language is English and the two most common religions are Islam (50 percent) and Christianity (40 percent). The northern population consists mainly of Muslims and the southern population consists mainly of Christians. This geographical split in religion explains why BH first originated and has since conducted the majority of their attacks in northern Nigeria. The current elected chief of state is 72-year-old President Muhammadu Buhari. President Buhari made history in 2015 by becoming the first opposition candidate in

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Nigeria to defeat an incumbent. The incumbent he defeated, by a margin of only four percent, was President Goodluck Jonathan. President Buhari, however, is not new to leading Nigeria, as he ruled there from 1984 to 1985 after leading a successful military coup. Due to President Buhari being a retired major general from the Nigerian Army, many consider him more adept at defeating BH than was his predecessor.

**Nigeria’s Social Aspect of Governance**

Reference table 3, BH marginally affected the social aspect of governance from 2000 to 2014. During this period, overall social standing improved four out of a possible six points. Only in 2008 did Nigeria not see improvement. Interestingly, the presence of BH actually improved, or at least not hindered, the social standing of Nigeria.

BH’s goal of removing Western education had a polarizing effect on a large portion of Nigeria’s population. In particular, BH’s oppressive activities sparked renewed emphasis on education. Accordingly, primary school completion rates increased by one point from 2000 to 2014. The only decrease in school completion rates was in 2008. This decrease is attributed to the brutal attacks conducted by BH against schools and religious centers. These attacks resulted in many school closings, displaced and killed students, and a general fear amongst Nigerians regarding school attendance. It was not until 2009 when BH announced themselves an Islamic insurgency. Afterwards, BH switched their focus of attacks from schools to the Nigerian security forces—which contributed to the

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143 Ibid.
increase in primary school completion rates from 2010 to 2014. Unless BH changes their targeting paradigm back to schools and religious centers, primary school completion rates will continue to improve.

Although BH killed more civilians in each subsequent year following its inception in 2002, Nigeria’s average life expectancy increased by five years; which equates to three points per this study’s scale. This increase in average life expectancy is surprising considering the majority of BH’s attacks have been in Nigeria. A significant reasoning for this increase is the growth in the number of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). The number of NGOs has steadily increased since 2002 in an attempt to match BH’s activity. NGOs, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, provided much needed health care and support to many of the poorest communities. Nigeria’s average life expectancy can be expected to increase so long as NGOs continue to respond in kind to the increase of violence.
Table 3. Nigeria’s Social Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>School Completion (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>Avg. Life Expectancy (age)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>80.5&lt;sup&gt;144&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>73.3&lt;sup&gt;145&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>76.0&lt;sup&gt;146&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>52.4&lt;sup&gt;147&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nigeria’s Economic Aspect of Governance

Reference table 4, Nigeria’s economy improved two out of a possible six points from 2000 to 2014. Percentage of employment stayed largely the same and annual GDP growth increased each sample year with the exception of 2014. Overall, BH had little negative effects on Nigeria’s economy.

<sup>144</sup> Data from year 2007 because none existed prior to this time.

<sup>145</sup> Data from year 2009 because none existed past 2010.

<sup>146</sup> Data from year 2010 because none more recently available.

<sup>147</sup> Data from year 2013 because none existed in 2014.
Although BH forced many local and international businesses out of Borno, where the majority of attacks occurred, major economic cities like Abuja and Lagos saw a steady increase in the percentage of employment. The employment percentage in Nigeria was unaffected by BH.

Today, Nigeria possesses the largest economy in Africa based on size of GDP. Nigeria’s lowest annual economic GDP growth occurred in 2000—prior to the inception of BH. Although annual GDP growth decreased over one percentage point from 2010 to 2014, Nigeria’s economy still grew at historically high rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employment (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>GDP Growth (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nigeria’s Military Aspect of Governance

Reference table 5, BH negatively affected military capacity from 2000 to 2014. Specifically, military budget scored a negative two out of a possible three points. Military budget decreased in 2010 and 2014 compared to its 2000 and 2008 levels. The timing of the decrease in military spending is surprising for three reasons. First, BH steadily increased the number of attacks per year in Nigeria since 2008. Secondly, the Nigerian military increased the number of offensive operations against BH since 2009. Thirdly, the United States twice provided phase zero assistance to the Nigerian military in 2014 to assist in their fight against BH.

Of note, the Nigerian military conducted its four most significant offensive attacks against BH from 2013 to 2014. In January 2013, the military conducted an attack on BH’s stronghold in the northwestern town of Maiduguri, Nigeria. The attack resulted in one Nigerian soldier and 13 BH insurgents killed.\textsuperscript{148} In September 2013, the military conducted a raid against a training camp in Borno. The raid resulted in 150 insurgents and 16 Nigerian soldiers killed.\textsuperscript{149} In October 2013, the military conducted an air and ground attack against two BH insurgent camps in Borno. The attack resulted in 74


insurgents and no Nigerian military soldiers killed.\textsuperscript{150} In June 2014, following an attack that resulted in the death of 21 civilians in Abuja, the military conducted two raids on BH insurgent camps in Borno. The raids resulted in approximately 100 insurgents killed.\textsuperscript{151}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Budget & Point & TOTAL \\
 & (% of GDP) & Value & \\
\hline
2000 & 0.8 & - & - \\
\hline
2008 & 0.8 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline
2010 & 0.5 & -1 & -1 \\
\hline
2014 & 0.4 & -1 & -1 \\
\hline
TOTAL & - & -2 & - \\
\hline
TOTAL AGG & - & - & -2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Nigeria’s Military Questions}
\end{table}


Summary

Overall, BH had minimal effects on the government of Nigeria (table 6). In fact, Nigeria’s social and economic aspects of governance improved since the inception of BH. Only was the military negatively affected by the presence of BH. Nigeria scored four out of a possible 15 points regarding its effectiveness and growth of governance. The limited negative effects of BH on the government of Nigeria are due to three primary reasons. First, BH’s targeting of schools reignited the desire and thirst for education amongst many Nigerians. Secondly, as seen in figure 1, the majority of BH’s attacks were isolated in Borno state and not near Nigeria’s larger economic cities. Finally, the brazen terrorist attacks drew international attention and assistance from numerous NGOs—all of which greatly assisted Nigeria in countering the negative effects of BH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.
The Republic of Niger

The Republic of Niger gained its independence from France in 1960. Today, it is ranked twenty-second in the world in population size with approximately 18 million people. The capital and largest city is Niamey with approximately one million people. Administratively, it consists of seven regions. The official language is French and the most common religion is Islam; which is 80 percent of the country. President Mahamadou Issoufou, elected in 2011, is the current chief of state. He is 65 years-old and is eligible for re-election in 2016.

Niger’s Social Aspect of Governance

Reference table 7, Niger withstood the effects of BH from 2000 to 2014. Although BH was active in the recruitment of teenagers and conducted scores of attacks along the Nigerian border, Niger still scored six out of a possible six points. The primary school completion rate and average life expectancy increased each sample year. It was not until 2015, however, that BH conducted attacks and began significantly affecting the social aspects of governance. In 2015, the Agence France-Press reported approximately 150 schools closed in Diffa, located along the border of northern Nigeria, due to the growing violence. Additionally, it is remarkable the social aspect of governance was unaffected by the roughly 50,000 Nigerian refuges that entered Niger from 2009 to 2014.

152 Yahoo News, “Boko Haram Attacks Force 12,000 Pupils from Niger Schools: UN.”
Table 7. Niger’s Social Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>School Completion (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>Avg. Life Expectancy (age)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>49.6&lt;sup&gt;153&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>60.8&lt;sup&gt;154&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Niger’s Economic Aspect of Governance

Reference table 8, BH negatively affected Niger’s economic growth. Specifically, Niger scored negative two out of a possible six points. Although BH did not conduct their first attack in Niger until 2015, BH’s activity along the southern border prior to 2015 substantially affected economic growth. In an attempt to prevent spillover, the government closed its border in 2012. Although the closing was effective in preventing

<sup>153</sup> Data from year 2013 because none available in 2014.

<sup>154</sup> Data from year 2013 because none available in 2014.
the spread of BH, it consequently blocked the commercial trade pipeline from Diffa to Nigeria. Overall, the rate of employment was generally stagnant and annual GDP growth steadily declined since BH became an insurgency in 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employment (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>GDP Growth (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Niger’s Military Aspect of Governance

BH negatively affected the military aspect of governance (table 9). Although no data was available regarding Niger’s military budget in 2014, there was a decrease in military spending from 2010 to 2012 as well as from 2000 to 2008. The only increase in military spending was in 2010, one year after BH announced themselves an insurgency. The 2012 decrease comes as a surprise considering BH steadily increased attacks along the border since 2009. Of note, the first U.S. phase zero operation conducted in support of Africa’s fight against BH was to Niger. Specifically, the U.S. deployed 100 military
personnel to Niamey in 2013 to assist in intelligence collection. However, two years later, in February 2015, BH conducted their first reported attack into Niger. Niger’s military successfully repelled the attack; however, the cross-border attack subsequently forced Niger to take more of an active role. Shortly thereafter, in February 2015, Niger joined the West African Allied Forces, led by Nigeria and supported by Chad and Cameroon, and conducted their first cross-border offensive against BH in Nigeria’s Sambisa Forest. Overall, military growth scored negative one point out of a possible three.

———

Taylor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Budget (% of GDP)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.0(^{157})</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL          | -                | -1          | -     |
| TOTAL AGG      | -                | -           | -1    |


**Summary**

Reference table 10, although BH negatively affected multiple aspects of governance, they minimally affected it holistically. In particular, the strong and growing social aspect of governance mitigated the negative economic and military growths. Niger scored three out of a possible 15 points regarding effectiveness and growth of governance. In 2014, however, Niger neither increased nor decreased its governance effectiveness. Accordingly, it is probable Niger’s governance will see a more dramatic decline in effectiveness following 2014.

\(^{157}\) Data from year 2012 because none available in 2014 or 2013.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.
CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL AFRICA

Central Africa consists of nine countries: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Principe. This chapter analyzes the two Central African countries most affected by BH: Chad and Cameroon.

The Republic of Chad

The Republic of Chad gained its independence from France in 1960. Notably, it is the largest land-locked country in Africa and currently ranks seventy-seventh in the world in population size with approximately 12 million people. The capital and largest city is N’Djamena, which has approximately one million people. Administratively, it consists of 23 regions. The official language is French and the two most common religions are Islam (53 percent) and Catholicism (20 percent).\textsuperscript{158} The current elected chief of state is 64-year-old President Idriss Deby Itno. President Itno has served as president since 1990 and won his last five-year election term in 2013.

Chad’s Social Aspect of Governance

BH marginally affected overall social growth, reference table 11. In fact, Chad increased social growth by a factor of four points since the inception of BH. Only in 2010 was there a decrease, which was only less than one percentage point regarding primary

school completion rates. In 2013, the primary school completion rate rose by eight percent—the largest growth in one year.

Chad’s ability to grow socially is due largely to their advantageous geographical location in relation to BH’s stronghold in northern Nigeria. Although Chad borders Nigeria’s northeast, Lake Chad is on their southern border. Due to the natural barrier of Lake Chad, BH had more difficulty spreading to Chad as compared to Niger and Cameroon. The most significant social effect was the increase of displaced people from Nigeria and Niger. Today, there are approximately 75,000 displaced people within Chad. The government, however, succeeded in managing the peripheral effects of BH, such as displaced people, by increasing security along their southern border. Additionally, because of the increase in displaced people, the number of NGOs grew. These NGOs, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, assisted the Chadian Ministry of Health with mobile clinics in some of the most affected areas, like the city of Baga Sola.¹⁵⁹

Table 11. Chad’s Social Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>School Completion</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>Avg. Life Expectancy</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>Point Value</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>(age)</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>31.5(^{160})</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>38.8(^{161})</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>52.4(^{162})</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Chad’s Economic Aspect of Governance

Reference table 12, BH did not prevent Chad from increasing economic growth.

Economic growth increased one out of six possible points. The economy grew by percentage of employment as well as annual GDP growth. In 2014, however, percentage of employment marginally decreased and annual GDP growth sharply decreased.

\(^{160}\) Data from 2009 because none available in 2008.

\(^{161}\) Data from 2013 because none available in 2014.

\(^{162}\) Data from 2013 because none available in 2014.
The 2014 economic decrease is directly related to the effects of BH. Chad increased the amount of security along the southern border to quell spillover violence from Nigeria—essentially establishing an active defense. The uptick in security consisted of more patrolling and tighter border crossing restrictions. As a result, this negatively affected trade and exports. Oil, their main export, fell in price and the cost of trade increased. Interestingly, any advantage Lake Chad provided in security consequently hindered economics. In particular, tighter security in Lake Chad resulted in a decrease in commercial boat traffic—thus affecting the only direct trade route to Nigeria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employment (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>GDP Growth (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Chad’s Military Aspect of Governance**

Reference table 13, BH negatively affected military growth. They scored a negative one out of three possible points. The military budget increased from 2000 to
2008 but decreased in 2010 and 2014. The 2008 increase coincided with the growth of BH but the decreases in 2010 and 2014 did not.

Although BH steadily increased attacks each year since 2002, they did not conduct their first attack in Chad until February 2015. From 2002 to 2014, Chad was primarily using a defensive strategy. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was a decrease in military spending from 2010 and 2014—after the establishment of defenses along its borders. In May 2014, Chad announced it would go to war against BH.\textsuperscript{163} Their first offensive was in January 2015, when a large contingent of troops deployed to Cameroon to assist recapturing the town of Michika, Nigeria, which was lost to BH in September 2014.\textsuperscript{164} One month after this offensive, BH crossed Lake Chad via motorboats and conducted their first attack within Chad.\textsuperscript{165} In response, The West African Allied Forces, led by Nigeria and supported by Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, conducted attacks against BH in Nigeria’s Sambisa Forest.\textsuperscript{166} Based on the current back


\textsuperscript{165} BBC News, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Militants Attack Chad for First Time.”

\textsuperscript{166} Channel’s Television, “Operations in Northeast Nigeria Yielding Results—Military.”
and forth between Chad and BH, it is likely their military budget will increase in 2015 in an attempt to regain control of its southern border.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13. Chad’s Military Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget (%) of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 5.0 (^{167})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Summary

Chad’s governance increased from 2000 to 2014 (table 14). Their largest governmental growth was in 2008, one year prior to BH announcing themselves an insurgency. However, as BH’s attacks continued to increase since 2008, governmental growth decreased. Specifically, in 2014, economic and military growth substantially

\(^{167}\) Data from year 2011 because no more recent was available.
decreased because of BH’s increased presence along their southern border. Overall, Chad scored four out of 15 points regarding effectiveness of governance during the BH conflict.

Although Lake Chad insulated against BH violence, it also encumbered Chad’s ability to maintain open trade routes with Nigeria—Africa’s largest economy. Chad was presented a dilemma, either maintain security along its border or lessen it to facilitate economic growth. Additionally, due to change from defensive to offensive strategy in 2015, BH is now conducting reprisal attacks within Chad. BH’s first attack was only a month after Chad deployed troops to Cameroon. Chad’s government will probably see a more dramatic decline in effectiveness post 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

The Republic of Cameroon

The Republic of Cameroon gained its independence from France in 1960. It is ranked nineteenth in the world in population size with approximately 24 million people.
The capital and largest city is Yaoundé, which has approximately three million people. Administratively, it consists of 10 regions. The official languages are French and English and the most common religions are indigenous beliefs (40 percent), Christianity (40 percent), and Islam (20 percent). The “elected” chief of state is 82-year-old President Paul Biya. President Biya served since 1982 and won his last seven-year presidential election term in 2011.

Cameroon’s Social Aspect of Governance

Reference table 15, Cameroon was socially unaffected by BH. They scored six out of a possible six points regarding social growth. Most notably, primary school completion rates substantially increased by 24 points since 2000. The ability to withstand the negative social effects of conflict is due primarily to the timing of BH’s first attack, which occurred December 2014. Following the attack there was a sharp increase in the number of school closings, forcing approximately 33,000 students out of school.169


169 United Nation Children’s Fund.
Table 15. Cameroon’s Social Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>School Completion (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>Avg. Life Expectancy (age)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>69.8</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>+2</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Cameroon’s Economic Aspect of Governance

BH had minimal economic affect (table 16). The percentage of employment increased each year, with the exception of 2014, which experienced two tenths of a percentage decline. GDP growth increased annually with the exception of 2008, one year prior to the BH insurgency. Only in 2010 was there an increase in both percentage of employment and annual GDP growth. As a result, Cameroon scored two of six possible economic points.

Beginning in 2012, BH commenced operations along the northeastern border of Nigeria. The close proximity of these attacks to Cameroon forced the government to

<sup>170</sup> Data from year 2013 was used due to none available in 2014.
close its border at the northeastern city of Lamine. The closing directly affected the northern region’s economy. However, it was not enough to dramatically decrease overall GDP growth. In fact, GDP growth recorded its largest annual growth after the border closing.

Geography played an important role in Cameroon’s ability to grow economically while dealing with an insurgency in its north. The Bight of Biafra, part of the Atlantic Ocean, is located on their southern coast and is significantly important to secure to ensure economic growth. Because of the far distance from Borno, BH was unable to expand its operational reach there. The ability to maintain unimpeded access to the Atlantic allowed Cameroon to continue trade and exports while simultaneously contending with BH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employment (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>GDP Growth (%)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>+1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<td>-1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cameroon’s Military Aspect of Governance

Reference table 17, BH negatively affected Cameroon’s military growth. The only increase in military spending occurred in 2008, one year prior to BH becoming an insurgency. As a result, Cameroon scored zero out of a possible three points.

The 2014 decrease in military spending is surprising considering Cameroon announced they went to war against BH in May 2014. After the announcement, they deployed 2,000 soldiers to the northwestern border as well as to Lake Chad to prevent BH infiltration. In response to the increase in security, BH conducted their first Cameroon attack. The attack occurred in December 2014 and consisted of over 1,000 BH insurgents killing innocent civilians in five separate towns around Yaoundé. The attack resulted in approximately 30 civilians killed. Two months later, The West African Allied Forces, led by Nigeria and supported by Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, conducted attacks against BH training camps in Nigeria’s Sambisa Forest. Accordingly, it is very likely, due to a more active role in combatting BH, military spending will increase from 2014 to 2015.

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171 Kindzeka.
172 Ibid.
Table 17. Cameroon’s Military Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget (% of GDP)</th>
<th>Point Value</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Summary

Cameroon’s governance increased its effectiveness (table 18). Their strongest and most resilient aspect of governance was social. BH affected both economic and military aspects of governance at certain points. Most notable was the decrease in military spending from 2010 to 2014. Overall, Cameroon scored eight out of a possible fifteen points regarding effectiveness and growth of governance.

The timing and location of BH attacks is the primary reason for the increase in effectiveness of governance. BH did not conduct their first attack within Cameroon until December 2014. Military, Cameroon struggled growing their forces compared to the rapid growth of BH. In 2015, the United States deployed 300 military personnel to assist
with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance missions. Expect Cameroon’s governance to sharply decline if BH continues to increase attacks and or spreads to the southern region.

Table 18. Cameroon’s Analysis Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>+4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>+2</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AGG</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

\(^{176}\) Fishel.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This study analyzed the effects of insurgency on governance. As recent twenty-first century conflicts demonstrate, insurgencies effect the social, economic, and military aspects of governance. These effects, in turn, can inhibit a nation’s ability to combat insurgency. As seen in West and Central Africa, when combatted ineffectively, insurgency invites international military intervention.

First, this study provides the U.S. military important insight into why West and Central African countries were alone incapable of combatting BH. Secondly, this study provides information in support of planning future U.S. phase zero operations.

In 2002, a Nigerian man from poverty-stricken Borno state in northern Nigeria created BH. The initial aim was to establish a relatively small Islamic state in Borno and remove Western influence—primarily education and religion. From 2002 to 2009, BH was limited in resources and rarely conducted violent acts of terrorism. During this time, the Nigerian government did not view BH as a serious threat and thus minimally tried to prevent its growth. The dynamics would considerably change in 2009. Following a significant street war between BH and the Nigerian Police Force, where the violence killed Mohammed Yusuf, the founder, and 700 other BH members, BH increased the number and ferocity of attacks throughout Nigeria—eventually resulting in today’s campaign of violence.
Findings

From 2002 to 2014, BH negatively affected the governance of West and Central Africa. Of the four case countries, Cameroon was the least affected and Niger the most affected by the BH conflict. The least affected aspect of governance was social and the most affected aspect was military.

Socially, BH had minimal negative affects regarding governance in West and Central Africa. Specifically, Cameroon and Niger were unaffected and Nigeria and Chad only marginally affected. These findings are surprising since BH’s principal means of establishing an Islamist caliphate was to remove Western education. Interestingly, BH’s violent targeting of schools and religious centers actually re-galvanized the thirst for education across Africa. Although all the case countries experienced countless school closings and civilian casualties, their ability to withstand the effects of BH demonstrates strong and resilient social governance. This resiliency, however, was primarily possible due to support of NGOs. Since the beginning of the BH conflict, the number of NGOs substantially increased to assist the affected governments in managing the thousands of displaced personnel and casualties.

Economically, BH adversely affected West and Central African governance. Niger and Chad were the most affected and Nigeria and Cameroon the least. The findings demonstrate geography plays an important role in an insurgency’s ability to affect economics. Niger and Chad both heavily depend on open trade routes with Nigeria’s northern region to grow GDP. Due to BH’s center-point being in northern Nigeria, Niger and Chad subsequently traded less. Conversely, BH minimally affected Nigeria and
Cameroon because of the preponderance of attacks occurred in areas away from the largest and most prosperous cities.

The most adversely affected aspect of governance was military. No case country experienced growth in military spending from 2000 to 2014. Nigeria decreased the most. Only Cameroon did not experience decline. This is surprising considering each case country increased military activity against BH during this period. The governmental strategy employed against BH, however, explains why a decrease occurred. From 2002 to 2014, governments used a defensive strategy. Often, a defensive strategy requires fewer resources compared to offensive strategy. The prioritizing of governmental resources, thus, favored ensuring social stability versus growing militaries. This explains why the social aspect of governance was the least affected. It was not until the middle of 2014 that West and Central Africa changed their strategy in combatting BH from defensive to offensive.

The lack of military spending denied the governments of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon the ability to combat and prevent the spread of BH. The Nigerian government generally ignored BH from 2002 to 2009. Consequently, BH was able to grow in influence and effectiveness. Due to ineffective containment, each of the four case countries now require U.S. military intervention.

Implications

As demonstrated in Iraq from 2003 to 2014, the U.S. military was unprepared for unconventional warfare. Upon realizing the need, the U.S. military rewrote its strategy on counterinsurgency. Today, this strategy requires the military to consider all aspects of
governance in the planning and conduct of war. BH’s ability to affect all aspects of governance validates this strategy.

Successful intervention against BH will only occur if the U.S. military continues phase zero operations. To date, five phase zero operations have occurred in West and Central Africa. Each focused on building the independent military capacity of the four case countries. In the future, the U.S. military should improve the broad military capacity of The West African Allied Forces versus only that of individual countries. Defeating BH requires a joint effort from all four of the affected countries. BH is too large, mobile, and widespread for a single country to defeat.

Although BH most adversely affected the military aspect of governance, U.S. intervention should include the social and economic aspects of governance. Specifically, the U.S. military should assist The West African Allied Forces with the securing of Nigeria’s northern borders. Having secure borders would significantly limit BH’s ability to affect the social and economic aspects of governance. In particular, secure borders would reestablish vital trade routes as well as inhibit BH’s ability to continue cross-border recruiting.

Finally, the BH conflict demonstrates the importance of combatting insurgencies quickly and decisively. Slow and ineffective response, as in Nigeria, allows insurgency to grow in size and influence. When an insurgency’s influence becomes global, they often gain additional support. For example, ISIL currently supports BH. International metastasis requires Western military intervention.
Areas for Future Research

The U.S. military possesses sound doctrinal strategy. Phase zero, shaping, is useful in both preventing as well as preparing for war. Shaping should involve all three aspects of governance. Primarily, as in the case of BH, the United States focuses its phase zero activities mainly on the military aspect of governance. It is unclear if the phase zero activities in West and Central Africa achieved the desired effects. BH has only grown in numbers and influence since the beginning of phase zero operations. Assuming the U.S. military continues to conduct shaping activities against BH, determining what effects previous activities accomplished would be beneficial. Understanding these effects will signal when phase one, deter, activities should occur.

The proliferation of Islamic terrorist groups, such as ISIL, reveals a gap in Western military strategy and/or its associated effectiveness. Adding to the complexity, insurgent groups now support one another under the umbrella of establishing an Islamic caliphate. BH, for example, pledged their loyalty to ISIL, and Al Shabaab, an Islamic insurgent group in eastern Africa, is sharing tactics with BH. As insurgencies continue to grow and coalesce with one another, defeating them becomes exponentially more difficult. Understanding the relationships between BH and other insurgent groups would substantially assist the U.S. military in creating the proper strategy.

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