EXAMINE HOW BOTSWANA DEFENSE FORCE IN CONCURRENCE WITH OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER, PROMOTE BOTSWANA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A MULTIFARIOUS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT REGIONALLY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2016

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Lieutenant Colonel Magosi Stephen Moshagane, Botswana Defence Force

National security especially when dealing with the employment of military power to pursue national objectives has been a more complex issue in the post-Cold War era. The issue has drawn animated debates centered on international non-aggressive behavior in international affairs. Botswana, like all other nations, is caught in this dilemma in determining the prudent development and deployment of its national military to achieve foreign policy objectives. Since the collapse of the apartheid epoch in the Republic of South Africa in 1994, the foreign policy of Botswana has witnessed a major paradigm shift with its priorities moving away from the liberation struggle in South Africa to cooperation and development within the region and in the world. This opened an opportunity for a new approach in foreign policy based on mutual respect, common interests, and cordial coexistence while at the same time accepting and appreciating differences in political orientation and ideologies. The approach has always limited the application of military power in pursuing national objectives. This paper advocates for a wider role play by Botswana’s military instrument of national power in the broader sense of national security strategy to achieve national objectives or interests.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

EXAMINE HOW BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE IN CONCURRENCE WITH OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER, PROMOTE BOTSWANA’S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A MULTIFARIOUS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT REGIONALLY, by Lieutenant Colonel Magosi Stephen Moshagane, 143 pages.

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<td>Botswana Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>International System Analysis</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
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<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>RSA</td>
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## ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to determine a nation’s national interests. Once they are identified, they drive a nation’s foreign policy and military strategy; they determine the basic direction that it takes, the types and amounts of resources that it needs, and the manner in which the state must employ them to succeed.


Botswana and the Road to Independence

Botswana is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. The country shares its international borders with Zambia to the north, Zimbabwe to the east, South Africa to the south and Namibia to the west (figure 1). Understanding Botswana’s geographic and geopolitical\(^1\) situation as a landlocked country with no access to the sea is important as this impacts how the country formulates its foreign policy and makes decisions in the international system. The country attained its independence in 1966 from its former colonizers Great Britain, amid political unrest and instability, which was characterized by violent clashes between colonial masters and native Africans. This unrest was exacerbated by the apartheid regime in the Union of South Africa,\(^2\) which controlled

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\(^1\) Martin Jones, Ryhs Jones, and Michael Woods, *An Introduction to Political Geography: Space, Place and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2004), 171. Geopolitics is a sub-field of political geography concerned with political relations between states, the external strategies of states and the global balance of power. According these authors’ arguments, geopolitics deals with concepts such as power, politics, and policy, and space, place, and territory, and embraces an innumerable multitude of interactions within these various fields.

\(^2\) South Africa changed its name to the Union of South Africa following the end of the South African War; Boer and British War of 1899 to 1902, which was largely fought for the control of gold, while the Boers lost the war in many parts of the land, they
much of the southern region including territories in Zimbabwe and Namibia. In fact, the regime had made several unsuccessful requests to Great Britain for the annexation of some territories which fell under the rule of Her Majesty the Queen. Botswana being one of the three territories in Southern Africa which were previously declared protectorates by Great Britain in 1885, was indeed among the targeted countries for the envisaged annexation (figure 2). The incorporation, however, failed in 1961 after the 1948 elections that saw the Union of South Africa formally withdrawing from the Commonwealth membership, subsequently instituting apartheid rule within its territories. The South African Democracy Education Trust observed that, “In 1934, South African Prime Minister JBM Hertzog formerly requested the transfer of the three territories, while the 1956 Tomlinson Commission on socio-economic development proposed that they be incorporated as part of South Africa’s bantustan system. Ironically, however, it was that apartheid that put an end to any possibility of incorporation after South Africa left the Common Wealth in 1961.”

however won the negotiated long term political settlement that put the local white community in charge of a self-governing united South Africa. On 31 May 1910, the Union of South Africa was formerly established as a self-governing state within the British Empire. The laws within the Union legislatively restricted political and property rights to whites at the expense of blacks. This will be noted as the beginning of the apartheid era characterized by continuous and systematic violent classes between the Blacks (anti-apartheid activists) and the Boers. Nations Online Project, “History of South Africa,” accessed 27 November 2015, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/South-Africa-history.htm.

Figure 1. Map Showing the Republic of Botswana and Neighboring Countries

Figure 2. Sketch Map of South Africa Showing the British Possessions

*Source:* University of Texas Libraries, “Sketch Map of South Africa Showing British Possessions,” University of Texas Austin, accessed 4 November 2015, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/south_africa_1885.jpg. Note: Botswana is shown as a British Protectorate in the sketch map. It must be noted that at this time, the country was still called by its colonial name, Bechuana Land. For clarity, the map has been slightly modified. The countries of Lesotho (Basuto Land) and Swaziland are therefore shown in red. The 1908 Act of the Union of South Africa had provisions for the incorporation of the territories into South Africa, however this envisaged incorporation failed in 1961 following the introduction of the apartheid rule in South Africa.

While it may be argued that proposals to annex Botswana to the Union of South Africa (modern day Republic of South Africa or RSA) collapsed due to critical decisions made by the Union following the 1948 elections, especially the decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth and the subsequent introduction of apartheid rule, it is also equally significant to particularly point out that such a repeal of the original agreement
was mainly enthused by the blunt refusal of Batswana⁴ as symbolized by their Chiefs who made representation to the Queen’s government opposing the annexation. History has it that this gave impetus to political protestation inland and ultimately led national tribes to a collective self-determination. Ideally, this gave birth to the desire for self-rule and governance by Batswana tribes acting in unison against what they perceived as an existential threat represented by the envisaged incorporation into the apartheid regime of South Africa. This kick started the movement for the road to independence.

According to Professor Thomas Tlou, “Botswana obtained independence largely through the agitation of mass political parties, while Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe achieved independence through armed struggle against determined white-minority regimes.”⁵ Unlike all her neighbors, Botswana did not fight any liberation wars against her former colonizers to attain independence, instead the country got independence through negotiations and peaceful means. To this end, the nation was built on collaborative mutual understanding characterized by compromises and willingness to give in for the benefit of nation-hood. This approach gave rise to the predominant trait in Setswana culture of peaceful resolutions to conflict whose central mechanism to engagement on inherently held differences would manifestly be through dialogue and the avoidance of armed struggle by all means. This peaceful, negotiated approach to independence, which significantly differs from her neighbors as espoused to

⁴ Batswana is a homogeneous term that encompasses all tribes and ethnic groups living in Botswana. The term symbolizes unity among all the people irrespective of their race or cultural differences. A singular form of the word; representing an individual from Botswana is ‘Motswana.’

by Professor Thomas Tlou, is important in understanding how the country would construct its military and ultimately design its foreign policy after attaining its independence.

Upon attaining independence, Botswana’s foreign policy was deeply engraved on this core national belief. Given the geopolitical situation then and the geographic location of the country, the nation choose a foreign policy direction that remained virtually neutral to all her neighbors avoiding any provocations to all actors and thus being nonaligned. Botswana’s foreign policy is thus a reflection of a non-aggressive, none-expansionist country whose foreign relations emphasizes peaceful coexistence with all neighbors based on mutual respect and rule of law. This position portrays Botswana as a liberal democracy.

**Establishment of the Botswana Defense Force**

Despite the country choosing a liberal system of governance that espoused to almost appease all neighbors, the hostilities in the region and in Africa as a whole continued to spill into the territory of Botswana prompting the decision to establish a standing military. David Sebudubudu and Christopher Ntau succinctly observed:

> Despite this, Botswana functioned in a hostile environment in the Southern African region (and probably in most parts of Africa), where one-party system was the dominant nature. This presented a security challenge/threat to Botswana’s democracy. Such threats consequently influenced Botswana’s security policy thus leading to the establishment of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) in 1977. The minority white and racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia continued to pose a threat, despite the formation of the BDF in 1977. For instance, Botswana was attacked by the Smith regime in 1978. During the 1980s, the South African white regime following the adoption of ‘Total Strategy’ policy continued to attack a
number of Southern African countries (including Botswana) under the pretext that they harbor terrorists or insurgents.\footnote{David Sebubudu and Christopher Ntau, “Democracy and Security in Botswana,” \textit{Icfai Journal of International Relations} 2, no. 2 (2008): 49.}

The espoused observations point to the crucial fact that political turmoil in Southern Africa at the time, especially the liberation struggle in Rhodesia and the political tension in the Union of South Africa, posed major security challenges to Botswana. In appreciating this security dilemma, eleven years after independence, Botswana was suddenly confronted with the inevitable imperative of establishing a standing national defense force to protect and secure national borders and conversely, national interests. Against the backdrop of a struggling national economy that could not convincingly support a standing military, in April 1977, the government of Botswana following an Act of Parliament called the Botswana Defense Force Act No. 13 of 1977 made a conscious decision to form the BDF for the protection of national sovereignty. The BDF was formed from the remnants of the Botswana Police Mobile Unit. Uniquely, when compared with other militaries in the region and elsewhere, the BDF did not inherit any colonial military structures, facilities or expertise at its inception.

It is important to note that the BDF was conceived within the context of Botswana’s foreign policy of being a non-aggressive, non-expansionist country and indeed that the challenges that inspired a deliberate political decision against the establishment of a national military at the time of independence in 1966, were still profoundly in existence. The BDF was therefore conceived in an environment characterized by a myriad of national challenges that the government initially considered critical to achieve at the expense of developing a national military. Therefore, a national
security compromise that later defined the way the BDF was maintained and raised in contemporary times was reached in 1977. Against competing national challenges, particularly developments and poverty alleviation, the BDF was conceived and immediately relegated to the backbench as a peripheral instrument of national power that would only exist as a deterrent against perceived threats. It is highly unlikely that the political leadership of the country at the time ever considered the political turmoil in the region as an existential threat to Botswana’s national interests. Hence less emphasis, both in mission and scope, was placed on the development of the BDF as a visibly active national instrument of power in the formulation and implementation of the country’s foreign policy.

To date, the country still cherishes the ideology of maintaining a small, professional, and accountable national defense force whose security posture is largely inward. This approach deliberately avoids any security sector development that may be perceived as equipping the military to be more robust and giving it an offensive posture that may perhaps be deemed as gravitating the national security strategy (NSS) towards an outward and projectionist ideology. The biggest question that any IR student should contend with at this juncture is; in protecting national interests, how does this ideology limit or enhance Botswana’s military power in the formulation and projection of her foreign policy in the international system? In no doubt, this approach presents numerous challenges that confront the nation’s security and strategic planners in both the balanced development and application of national instruments of power in meeting national objectives.
Research Objectives

The overall objective of this paper is to provide insight to Botswana’s foreign policy makers and in general the nation’s IR practitioners on the vital importance of the military instrument of national power in the formulation and implementation of national security policy and strategy in the pursuit of national objectives and interests. The objective is premised on the assumption that since its establishment in 1977, the nation’s military posture has been largely inward looking. Consequently, the BDF is maintained and resourced to function primarily as a local deterrent force perhaps limiting the nation’s foreign policy practitioners from leveraging its military power to achieve national objectives.

Research Hypothesis

The BDF is not optimally employed as an instrument of national power to play an appropriate role in promoting Botswana’s national interests in a complex security environment.

Research Assumptions

The research assumes that the BDF will continue to play a significant role as custodians of the national defense system in the protection and preservation of Botswana’s national interests both at home and abroad. The research further assumes that, as a symbol of military power, the employment of the BDF in the future will be required more in the international landscape to either protect against or defeat the nation’s existential threats before they can reach home and perhaps escalating the consequence of inability in proactive and preemptive military response. It is thus
assumed that regional and international cooperation will remain integral in meeting the
many varied requirements of complex, irregular, and asymmetric contemporary threats
which require a multiphase integrated participatory approach by all instruments of
national power to solve them. Essentially, an integrated whole of government approach in
achieving national objectives will remain critical in the implementation of national
policy.

Furthermore, the research assumes that the scope and complexity of the 21st
century present and anticipated threats would require a redefinition of the BDF mission
sets and capabilities. The assumption presupposes the requirement for a holistically new
approach in the organization, training, and resourcing of the BDF to enable it to
effectively respond to the demands of national objectives in a complex international
security environment.

Statement of the Problem

Owing to the historical context under which the country gained its independence,
Botswana has always placed the diplomatic instrument of power far ahead of the other
instruments of national power in its IR. While other scholars may argue that there is
nothing drastically wrong with such an approach to IR, the status quo has created an
overdependence on diplomacy as the only option and thus relegating other instruments to
peripheral functions in foreign policy development and implementation to achieve
strategic national interests. The articulated situation has thus denied the government of
Botswana an opportunity to develop the BDF to optimally function as a sound instrument
of national power on a relatively comparative basis with other instruments, perhaps not
maintaining it as an option that may rarely be activated as a last resort in crisis situations.
Research Questions

The research shall endeavor to answer the following overarching question; what is the strategic place and role of military power in the formulation and implementation of Botswana’s foreign policy in pursuing strategic national interests? In addressing this overall question of the study, the paper shall address the following pertinent secondary questions:

1. Is there any correlation between IR theories and Botswana’s national security policy formulation in pursuing national objectives?

2. Does the country have a NSS that clearly articulates the nation’s enduring interests, thus guiding the optimal development of national instruments of power to attain or preserve those interests?

3. Is the BDF adequately resourced and developed to play an appropriate role as the nation’s military power to promote Botswana’s national interests? If not, what opportunities or requirements are not being covered, and if it is resourced, will the current level of support meet future security challenges?

4. In the present structure for civil control of the military in pursuit of national objectives and interests, are there any problems such that there may be need for restructuring or reorganization to improve civil oversight role play?

Significance of the Study

Botswana, like all other countries, retains influence and sovereignty through the use of all instruments of national power; diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME). The military instrument of power allows the state to protect itself against threats both internal and external whether perceived or real. This instrument also gives the nation
the monopoly of the use of force (coercive force) which is critical to justifying claims to legitimacy and sovereignty for international recognition. Most importantly, military capability is a critical enabler that nation states leverage to pursue national interests in a globally competitive environment thus managing or modifying the other actor’s behavior to respond in a certain way that they would not have naturally preferred had the military instrument not been introduced. It thus presents a leveraging platform upon which all other instruments are able to function. Sharing the same sentiments with this viewpoint Peter Paret argued, “[M]ilitary power expresses and implements the power of the state in a variety of ways within and beyond the borders, and is one of the instruments with which political power is originally created and made permanent.”

To this end, the paper is important to national strategy and security planners in Botswana to clearly understand the nexus between foreign policy formulation and implementation inextricably linking this to the contribution by the military instrument of national power. It is further anticipated that the research will provide an important relaying point which shall assist national policy and strategy planners to leverage the unparalleled advantages that can be achieved by exploiting military power to pursue and preserve national interests through foreign policy implementation in a globalized world.

Limitations

Owing to limitations of time, the paper shall restrict the scope of the research to assessing how Botswana can optimally employ military power in concurrence with other instruments of national power to pursue and preserve national interests within a regional

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context. Notwithstanding this, particular and specific reference will be made to certain international actors who have a clear track record of recognizing and employing military power to drive the formulation and implementation of foreign policy to attain their specific strategic national interests.

This exception is made on the appreciation that Botswana’s national interests, especially as a single commodity based economy,\(^8\) do not only end within the regional boundaries, but rather extend far beyond the African continent to nations and economic partners who share an interdependence on this commodity and a host of other strategic interests. However, such reference shall only be made parsimoniously with specific relevance to the context of arguments obtainable in this paper.

**Definition of Key Terms**

To bring synergy and focus to the conceptual understanding of arguments obtainable in this paper, the following terms have been contextualized such that their usage elsewhere in this research shall only be interpreted and understood in the context of the definitions provided below.

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\(^8\) Although major economic strides have been made by the government of Botswana to diversify the economy of the country, Botswana’s economy is still largely based on diamond production and export. The largest consumers of this commodity being the Western economies. This inevitably affects the way the country constructs and projects its foreign policy on an international platform. Currently, the country is considered the second largest producer of diamonds in the world. Its diamond mining exploration has recently been boosted by the discovery of the second largest diamond in the world to have ever been mined. According to *The Wall Street Journal*, the 1,111 carat diamond was recently mined in Karowe mine north of the capital city Gaborone. While euphoria is abound due to the discovery, this only adds to the gloomy reality for a portfolio of an economy that is heavily reliant on diamond mining.
International System: The term international system has been derived from systems analysis. It is used in two contexts in IR. First as a description and second as an explanatory level of analysis. As a descriptive idea, international system is another way of referring to the state-system. At the level of the state, groups and interests within it may be regarded as sub-systems. The second sense in which international system is used is to locate the appropriate level of analysis at which explanations should be pitched. Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin are two authors who have argued that the international system fundamentally determines the behavior of individual state actors within its field. While both usages are applicable to this research, it is the second usage of the analysis level that shows a high propensity of association with the context of arguments presented in this paper. In this regard, the term international system in this paper will mostly be used at the analysis level. To this end foreign policy is made against an external environment to the actor which is the international system.

Foreign Policy: For purposes of this thesis, foreign policy shall mean: “[A] system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own activities to their international environment” in pursuit of national objectives and interests. Policy shall be construed as “[A] guide to an action or a set of actions to realize the goal of an organization that it has set for itself . . . which involves ‘choice’ or choosing actions (making decisions) to achieve one’s

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10 Ibid.

goals.”¹² Foreign shall therefore imply those “[T]erritorially sovereign units that exist beyond the legal boundaries of a particular state.”¹³

**National Power:** In defining national power, the research shall slightly move away from the general and traditional perspective of contextualizing power held mostly by the realists in the realm of Thomas Hobbs.¹⁴ The definition of power therefore, shall adopt the Hans Morgenthau approach that recognizes power as a means to an end rather than as an end unto itself. National power therefore is the “ability to influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with one’s ends.”¹⁵ This definition is inclusive in that it realizes the application of both soft and hard power in the attainment and preservation of national interests. It thus appreciates a foreign policy direction that embraces a balance between the application of soft and hard power to achieve strategic interests.

Accepting as correct the above proposition of contextualizing power in IR and of course also accepting Alexander Vuving’s definition of power as “the ability to affect the

¹² Ghosh, 96.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ For further reading see Vincent R. John, “The Hobbesian Tradition in the Twentieth Century International Thought,” *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 10, no. 2 (1981), accessed 7 March 2016, http://mil.sagepub.com/content/10/2/91.extract. According to Vincent R. John, Thomas Hobbes believed that international politics is a struggle for power, as such, war becomes inevitable in international anarchy. Hobbes believed that in states relations, there is no right and wrong but only competing concepts of right; there is no society beyond the state and thus dismissed international law as an empty phrase. To this end, Hobbes believed that power was an end, and in a traditional realist perspective, security and national power were viewed interchangeably with strong, large military forces. Thus, national power was inextricably linked to military power.

¹⁵ Ghosh, 60.
behavior of others by changing their circumstances,”\textsuperscript{16} which also succinctly captures the essence of the proposed definition to be adopted in this thesis, leads to the understanding of modern discourse in speaking to power relations and categorizing state influence in the international system.

The current 21st century discourse generally defines state power in terms of economic and military power. It has thus been generally accepted that states which yield a lot of power (maintaining some form of a superior balance between economic power and military capability relative to other states) within the international system are referred to as middle powers, regional powers, great powers, superpowers, or hegemons. In the recent past, with a relatively stable and gradually growing economy Botswana has been classified as a middle power. What becomes the subject of interest for this paper therefore, is why Botswana has achieved an economic growth that elevated her position of power to middle power in the international system and yet on the contrary (given the financial and supporting democratic, secure and peaceful environment) did little to develop her military power to perhaps elevate her influence to a regional power.

\textbf{National Interests:} The paper shall assume a more generic definition of national interests. National interests shall be understood as those fundamental and enduring needs of a nation which represents a desirable goal that guides the actor’s behavior in the international system. The preservation of national interests therefore, entails a continuous and systematic approach that manipulate and create an international environment that is

most favorable to the peaceful pursuit of the actor’s most valued wants. “The attainment of this goal is something the identifying state believes will have a positive impact on itself.”  

**Instruments of National Power:** These represent all the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as DIME.  

**Strategy:** A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. The employment of strategy by a state actor happens “[I]n accordance with the policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance national interests relative other states, actors, or circumstances. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success.”  

**Military Strategy:** For purposes of arguments in this paper, the meaning of military strategy is restricted to the military dimension of foreign policy that connects

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18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 8 November 2010, as amended through 15 February 2016).

19 Ibid.

military means with the overall policy ends. In short, the explanation seeks to establish a nexus on how the military instrument of national power can be employed to achieve national objectives. Therefore, military strategy is concerned with “how the threat or use of military force, along with the posture, disposition, and doctrine of the armed forces, can be employed to achieve a state’s foreign policy interests and goals, and meet its international commitments.”

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22 Ibid., 3.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

In research, the purpose of literature review is to expose the writer to what other scholars have observed about the same subject matter in the world of academics. It assists in substantiating facts and allows the writer to make analogies in his work with the existing literature so that he may find gaps that have not been researched or even establish similarities in the existing works that may collaborate his effort and hence make his arguments more relevant to the subject of study. In a nutshell, literature review focuses the work of the researcher into a particular desired path of investigation by enhancing his understanding of the problem being researched by exposing him to an acceptable body of knowledge which he can use as a benchmark to his findings thereby increasing measures of reliability and validity of the results. This chapter is broken into subsections that generally support the three research questions; Theories in IR, National Security Strategy and BDF’s role in this strategic framework.

Despite Botswana having attained independence over four decades ago, there is still very little literature available on the country’s IR. While elsewhere in the world, many scholars have taken a keen interest in writing about the IR of various nations articulating how such nations employ national instruments of power in pursuit of foreign policy objectives, Botswana’s foreign policy has relatively remained an academically unexplored field of study for many decades. It is only in the last two decades that the country’s foreign policy began to make its way into the public domain thus forming part of public debates. It is during this time in history that Botswana’s foreign policy began to
attract the attention of scholars, and most scholarly articles on the subject matter began to
make their way into the academic field. To satisfy the requirements of this chapter, the
researcher relied heavily on a few papers and the electronic media (local and
international) that have mentioned Botswana’s foreign relations in the international
system.

The literature review shall first take a critical look at how the major theories in IR
have helped shape and construct the foreign policy of different states thus giving rise to
different approaches in the construction and implementation of foreign policy by
individual actors while pursuing their national interests. The chapter shall proceed to
make a case on how Botswana as an active actor in the international system is affected by
such theories. The chapter shall conclude by reviewing how Botswana’s strategy applies
military power to project foreign policy objectives in a globalized world. However, first,
the author shall seek to contextualize IR.

Understanding International Relations

During the past decades, there has been a proliferation of studies devoted to the
general theme of IR. The study of IR reveals that there is no universally agreed upon
definition as to what precisely constitutes IR. There is however, a general consensus and
understanding of what should really be included as fields of consideration when dealing
with IR as a field of study. There are numerous definitions that have been suggested or
more precisely adopted by different scholars in pursuit of their study of the IR. Among
the many available definitions of IR for some scholars, it means the diplomatic—strategic
relations of states, and the characteristic focus will be issues of war and peace, conflict
and cooperation. Yet for some IR means cross border transactions of all kinds, political,
economic, and social and IR in this instance is likely to study trade negotiations and the operations of non-state institutions.\textsuperscript{23}

Chris Brown, one of the renowned scholars in the study of IR, argues that with the recent rise in debates and awareness about globalization in the 21st century, some scholars will chose to define IR in relation to globalization studying, for example; world communication, transport and financial systems, global business corporations, and the punitive emergence of a global village. It is no doubt that a closer interrogation of these conceptions will reveal overwhelming interrelated resemblances but nonetheless, in Brown’s view each has quite distinct features. In this regard, Brown argues that, which definition one adopts will have consequences for the rest of one’s study and thus will be more than simply a matter of convenience.\textsuperscript{24}

Brown argues that the reason definitions matter in this way is because:

IR do not have some kind of essential existence in the real world of the sort that could define the academic discipline. Instead there is a continual interplay between the ‘real world’ and the world of knowledge. The latter is, of course, shaped by the former, but this is not a one way relationship. How we understand and interpret the world is partly dependent on how we define the world we are trying to understand and interpret.\textsuperscript{25}


\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 3.
In sharing the same sentiments with Brown, Erwin Schrodinger, in Jeffery Smith’s work stated, “[E]very man’s world is and always remains a construct of his mind and cannot be proved to have any other existence”\textsuperscript{26}

In agreeing with Brown, it is indeed very true as succinctly presented in his arguments that in social sciences the subject matter is not as self-defining as perhaps it would be in natural sciences. Any definition that one adopts is most likely to bring about controversies due in part to its selectiveness which largely arises from the influence of culture which inevitably also carries along the aspect of knowledge. Brown argues that it is thus imperative to a social scientist in the understanding of IR, to be able to consider the import of language in totality as an attribute that has effect in the continuous evolution, creation, and projection of foreign policy. To this effect an in-depth analysis of IR will undeniably require one to deconstruct and de-conflict language (to gain knowledge of speech indicators communication used to express relationships in foreign relations which ultimately shapes policy) so as to get to the allegorical semantics of those speech indicators. This is what Brown calls hidden agendas.

There is no doubt that there are varying definitions of IR as already espoused above, and such definitions are not even limited to the ones presented in this paper. However, as already highlighted in the opening arguments, the adopted operational definition from Chris Brown that this paper shall assume is that IR is the study of relations of states, and that those relations are better understood in the context of

diplomatic, military, and strategic terms. The key unit in this definition of IR, as he observed, is the state and not the nation. In his argument, which also holds for this paper, most states are nowadays aspiring to be nation states, but it is the possession of statehood rather than nationhood that is central to IR.

The Influence of Realism and Liberalism on Foreign Policy Construction and Implementation

Realism and liberalism are perhaps the oldest theories in IR representing the opposing debates that have polarized IR scholars about how states behave and act in the international system. Assuming that IR is a continuum, realism and its proponents will be on one end of the continuum representing interactions in the world as characterized by self-help and anarchy. On the other hand, liberalism and its proponents will be on the opposing end representing a peaceful world that is characterized by cooperation on mutual goals and national objectives.

According to Alexander Went, the debate between realists and liberals has emerged as an axis of contention in IR theory. He argues that in the past the debate revolved around competing theories in human nature, while in the contemporary world of IR the debate is more concerned with the extent to which state action is influenced by structure.27 A general consensus as Wendt will argue, held by most scholars in IR is that the debate between neorealists and neoliberals (both are current schools of thought

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emanating from realism and liberalism respectively) has been by and large based on a shared commitment to rationalism.  

It is important to highlight that rational theory treats the identities and interests of agents as exogenously given and thus focuses on how the behavior of agents generates outcomes in the international system. “As such, rationalism offers a fundamentally behavioral conception of both process and institutions: they change behavior but not identities and interests.” Both realists and liberalists assume that “states are the dominant actors in the system, and they define security in self-interested terms.” This limited scope, Walter Carlsnaes argues, “does not provide an account for the active constraints imposed by institutions but merely for how the rational actor will use all available information to preempt or evade the imposition of exogenous institutional processes.”

Before making an endeavor to distinguish the contribution of the above schools of thought to foreign policy formulation and implementation, is important to give emphasis to the definition of foreign policy. As highlighted earlier in the definition of terms, foreign policy means “a system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own activities to their international

28 Wendt.

29 Ibid., 392.

30 Ibid.

environment”\textsuperscript{32} in pursuit of national objectives and interests. In understanding this definition, it is important to realize that the definition embraces two categories of policies by an actor which may need to be defined away separately and yet understood as mutually inclusive because one subset has the import to affect the other.

The import of saying foreign would inevitably imply that there is domestic. Juliet Kaarbo argues that scholars in foreign policy analysis (FPA) will talk about foreign policy so as to distinguish it from domestic policy. The construction of foreign policy is an attempt through identity formation to distinguish the self from the other and the consequential actions that will be deliberately preferred by the actor in dealing with internal systems constituting self-differentiating those from the actions that will be preferred in dealing with the external system constituting the other which is foreign.

Policy in general has already been defined elsewhere in this paper. Therefore, domestic policy is the accumulation of policy instruments that are formulated by an actor for the sole purpose of applying those to the internal political system. Essentially, domestic policy applies within the sovereign territorial boundaries of the state. For example, taxes, education system and standards and civil rights are all examples of domestic policy.\textsuperscript{33} Foreign policy, therefore, is all policy instruments that are meant to apply to the international world outside the actor’s territorial boundaries. So foreign policy is typically designed toward the external world. For example, waging a war against one country,

\textsuperscript{32} Ghosh, 96.

signing an international treaty on trade, signing a cooperation agreement with a regional or international body are all examples of foreign policy.34

While these superficially seem to be two distinctive categories of policy which may be deemed as mutually exclusive, in practice they are not. In fact, the distinction between the two continues to be so blurred that they have for many scholars and practitioners become synonymous. Expressing the same concern Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Ryan K. Beasley argue, “[W]hen countries make domestic policies that have the effect of changing the interactions between states, the line defining international and domestic policymaking becomes unclear.”35 He further observes that owing to the states’ economic interdependence more often than not, policies that are made to regulate such interdependence in the system have consequences inside and outside the state borders. Despite this blurring of roles, it is nonetheless important for policy practitioners to understand the distinction between the two categories as this will enormously help in guiding the choice and employment of particular instruments of national power in achieving certain policy objectives. The distinction could easily be derived from the effects intended during the formulation and ultimate implementation of a particular policy. Whether that policy objective is intended to bring effects in the domestic or foreign environment will determine if such policy is foreign or domestic.

Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley capture it succinctly when they argue, “If the primary target lies outside the country’s borders, it is considered foreign policy, even if it has secondary consequences for politics inside the country. Similarly, if the primary target is

34 Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley.

35 Ibid., 3.
inside the country, it is considered domestic policy, even if it affects others outside the
country’s borders.” 36 Notwithstanding this argument, it is also important to observe that
there are certain policies that may actually be considered both foreign and domestic due
to their balance in targeting both environments. However, arguments in this thesis will
not go in detail to explain these differences. The purpose of this synoptic overview was to
bring to the attention of policymakers and planners the significance of understanding the
difference between domestic policy and foreign policy, so as to guide understanding on
which instrument[s] of national power may be suited for which environment at a given
time depending on the target of the policy objective in pursuing national interests.

As discussed, the formulation and ultimate implementation of foreign policy by
individual states does not occur in a vacuum, but it is rather a deliberate and conscious
decision that involves choices by an actor to affect the environment both internally and
externally to achieve desired goals in pursuit of national objectives and interests. Before
focusing discussions on the contribution by both realism and liberalism to understanding
foreign policy, it may be important to offer a cursory overview on FPA. Such an
undertaking is crucial because foreign policy formulation and implementation are
inextricably linked to national power. Therefore any inquiry purporting to analyze the
application of instruments of national power by a state actor must fundamentally entrench
their argument on FPA. This is the line of argument that this thesis will embrace.

The starting point in comprehending the analysis of foreign policy is to appreciate
that the formulation and ultimate implementation of foreign policy is affected by both
external and internal factors to the nation’s environment. In appreciating the multiplicity

36 Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, 3.
of factors that influences the actor’s choice on how their foreign policy will be formulated and projected, scholars rely on various theories to explain what factors influence foreign policy. Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley accurately observe, “The analysis of foreign policy begins with theories that identify different factors—various forces that influence a state’s foreign policy.”37 As highlighted earlier, these factors can be categorically placed into two broad groups of external and internal factors. These factors represent the different environments within which the state pursues and protects national interests through the application of instruments of national power.

The first category points to the international environment as the explanation for countries’ foreign policy. In other words, factors external to the state—how the international system is organized, the characteristics of contemporary international relations, and the actions of others—can lead the state to react in certain ways. The second category points to factors internal to the state. In other words, characteristics of the domestic political system—citizens and groups within that system, the government organizations, and the individual leaders—serve as the source of a state’s foreign policy.38

To understand how a state will behave under these environments to secure national interests, analysts use IR theories to predict such actions. True to this cause, this thesis will utilize realism, liberalism, and to a limited but important role constructivism. These theories have been deliberately chosen against a host of other theories because they are more engrained and relatively well developed in IR due to their historical preeminence.

37 Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, 7.

38 Ibid.
International Relations Perspectives

Although this position may cause a lot of animated debates among scholars of IR, for purposes of this paper, the author deliberately chooses to adopt the line of argument that recognizes and embraces that the study of IR is essentially divided into two broad categories. These categories are the FPA perspective and the ISA perspective. While the paper will systematically use both approaches at different parts of the thesis, it is important to observe that for arguments obtainable in this thesis, realism theory falls within the latter category.

The FPA perspective, for example, encompasses theories about the behavior of individual states or categories of states and seeks to classify them as democracies or totalitarian dictatorships etc. depending on their internal politics and system of government. It therefore focuses on domestic politics and decision making factors that affect the nation’s choices and policies in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Corroborating this view point, Kaarbo argues, “This perspective, or approach, stresses the role of the central decision-making unit and the subjective understandings of leaders as funnels for other international and domestic factors. This perspective is not only a distinct ontological orientation to understanding international politics; it can integrate IR theories that currently focus on different aspects of domestic politics and decision making.”

Sharing the same sentiments with Kaarbo, Valerie Hudson states that, FPA is “an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and

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across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.”

Furthermore, FPA perspective “encompasses the complicated communications within
governments and amongst its diverse agents, plus the perceptions and misperceptions, the
images of other countries, and the ideologies and personal dispositions of everyone
involved.”

The import of these arguments is that domestic policy can be pragmatically understood as the product of interactions of systems within the state’s jurisdiction and territory in pursuit of national objectives. Particularly, that leaders in a given state as the representation of government (state in action) are drivers of the state’s domestic and foreign policy. Their decision making therefore on matters of national interests cannot be treated as autonomous from policy pronouncements or representation. The results of these interactions (between government and its agencies) are thus important in predicting and projecting the foreign policy of Botswana as a state actor in the international system.

The ISA perspective on the one side encompasses theories of the interactions between states and how the number of states and their respective capabilities affect their relations with each other. Notwithstanding the adopted definition of the international system for this paper, but rather as a way of giving emphasis to it, Oran Young, in Allen Lynch’s work, contends that the international system is “a group of actors standing in characteristic relationships to each other (structure), interacting on the basis of


41 Kaarbo, 3.
recognizable patterns (processes), and subject to various contextual limitations.”\textsuperscript{42} In both definitions, as earlier espoused in chapter 1 of this thesis, system has been used at an analytical level. This is an attempt to determine approaches that can be applied to IR to analyze and help predict the behavior of states during their interaction. A comprehension of this analytic approach in the ISA by foreign policy practitioners is a critical first step in foreign policy formulation and implementation. How IR and foreign policy practitioners in Botswana cautiously achieve a balance between FPA and ISA perspectives in the development of national power in pursuit of national interests becomes a subject of interest to this study. As highlighted earlier on in the discussions, realism, liberalism (to some limited extent), and a couple of other IR theories fall within this latter perspective.

As a preamble to this sub topic, the author has attempted to explain and categorize the broad perspectives within which IR can be largely divided and offered a cursory overview of their significance to the study and their envisaged importance if understood and correctly applied to Botswana’s national strategy by policy planners. Having briefly made that case, it is now prudent to focus the discussion on one of the major themes under this topic which is the realism school of thought and foreign policy.

**Realism School of Thought and Foreign Policy**

Right from antiquity, perhaps as long as the history of mankind, people have always interacted with one another for many varied reasons. States also have always engaged each other in the international system, through the application of instruments of

national power in their foreign relations to achieve national interests and leverage on national power. Such interaction in the international system is largely characterized by both competing and mutually held national interests. The realism school of thought within the context of ISA perspective seeks to explain how such interactions occur, and particularly account for why states behave towards each other in the manner in which they do given the environment within which such interaction will be conceived.

The central argument of the realist perspective is that, the absence of the overarching world government the leviathan state in the international system is an extremely important factor affecting and determining the interrelationships of state actors and conversely, their foreign policy towards each other too. The realists argue, “[A]narchy is the characteristic of the international environment and that makes international politics so dramatically different form domestic politics.” The profound difference between domestic politics and international politics as a realist will put it is that while in the domestic system there is a government to which people willingly submit themselves for governance and arbitration in return for individual social needs that are provided for by the state, on the contrary, the international system lacks this critical element.

Realists hold a view that global politics is driven by competitive self-interest, and therefore, the ultimate goal for survival in the global system is a struggle for power among countries. Owing to the lack of the leviathan state or a global hegemon entrusted with governing and arbitration among actors, each state remains solely responsible for protecting its existence or survival interests; most of the time at the expense of other

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43 Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, 7.
states. Henning Tewes argues that conflict is most likely because the absence of law and enforcement means that each political actor must look out for itself. Because the world is viewed as an anarchic system, war and the use of force remains in perpetual existence in the interaction of states. As one of the proponents of realism, Thomas Hobbes will argue that international politics is like a jungle dominated by the exercise of power and power politics. Because of this inherent anarchic condition in the realist perspective, the shift in power relations in the global system directly translates into existential threats to actors who have lost such power. To this end, because power is viewed as an end, the realist school of thought encourages state actors to pursue foreign policy objectives that maximize output in state interests (to out play other actors) to increase relative gains in a competitive international system so that they may remain powerful where the end game is self-preservation.

Because realists view world politics as a chaotic state, the constant existence of war remains in proximity to interactions between actors. Nation states therefore, pursue foreign policy objectives that will exhibit them as possessing superior national power as a means of deterrent and indeed as a means of coercive force to induce others to subscribe to their demands. For the realists, IR and world politics are based on a zero sum game. The proposal by realists of world politics that is inherently volatile and anarchic raises the question that; what will be the consequential effect on foreign policy objectives of Botswana as the country endeavors to strategically pursue its national interests within the international system?

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The realist school of thought has and still continues to play a pivotal role in understanding foreign policy in IR. It still continues to a large scale to determine the strategic approach on how instruments of national power can be employed by individual states in pursuing national objectives. According to Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, owing to the realist influence, the foreign policies of states that are quite powerful militarily, such as China, Russia, and the United States focus on preserving their power by maintaining a high profile in world affairs and balancing against other powerful states. To these nations, policies aimed at demonstrating military capabilities and securing spheres of influence are most important.45

Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley argue that in a bipolar system, such as was the case during the Cold War era, “[A] middle power faces strong pressures to become a compliant alliance partner of one of the major powers and ultimately give up autonomy in its foreign policy for the sake of security.”46 This was arguably the case with Japan and Germany during the Cold War as they literally depended on the United States for security. Under such an arrangement, due to compliance with the security provider’s needs middle powers are largely constrained from developing their capabilities to shift the balance of power. On the one side, in a multi polar system, realists contend that middle powers have the most autonomy especially at regional level. Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley argue:

This presents new opportunities for middle powers. Although they are no match for the hegemonic state and must often follow its lead in areas of interest to the hegemon, a middle power may assert its influence regionally. Indeed, we are

45 Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley.

46 Ibid., 8.
currently witnessing a resurgence of regional powers around the globe with states like Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa, playing new, more independent roles in their regions. As hegemony in the international system declines, contenders may adopt foreign policies that challenge the dominance of the hegemon. For example, some may interpret Chinese foreign policy today as focused on rivalling the United States as a world leader.\textsuperscript{47}

Understanding the above argument by Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley is crucial in unravelling Botswana’s foreign policy, particularly relating it to South Africa’s foreign policy as a regional hegemon. It has already been observed through the literature presented that from a realist perspective, powerful states are those countries which possess a comparative economic prowess which, in most instances, is essential for maintaining the military. Furthermore, such countries will necessarily maintain large and sophisticated militaries which are kept both as a deterrent and an actual war making capability to leverage and exploit the opportunities of pursuing national objectives in a global world. Kaarbo argues that if a state does not have much power, it must then enter into an alliance with states that are more powerful so that those states can protect it.

Such alliances are evident in the many security pacts that have been entered into between nations, among the less powerful states and the regional powers and so on. For example, for a very long time, South Africa has been seen as a regional power in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region and Botswana has, since independence, pursued foreign policy objectives that aim at pleasing South Africa and deliberately avoiding any conflict that may be sparked by less affectionate relations owing to Botswana’s behavior. This is despite the fact that South Africa, under the apartheid regime, continued to pose an existential threat to Botswana through persistent

\textsuperscript{47} Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, 9.
and sustained incursions that resulted in many Batswana losing their lives. The situation was not helped by the fact that Botswana, like most African countries, was very poor at that time and literally dependent on South Africa economically and indeed on most of her neighbors (see figure 1). Historical evidence shows, “Almost all African countries had depended on South African trade even during the sanctions era, despite their strong rhetorical condemnation of the apartheid regime. In 1991, South Africa’s trade with the rest of the continent was at least US$3.5 billion, and this figure increased steadily as apartheid was being dismantled.” 48

There is no doubt that South Africa had adopted a realist approach to their foreign policy during the apartheid era as the minority white regime in the country viewed the African population in the region as a potential threat to their country’s national interests. To the minority white government in South Africa, the Africans represented a communist threat. Evidentially, former realist apartheid president of South Africa Pieter Willem Botha in 1968 declared, “If the non-communist world would not support South Africa as a strategic ally, it would have to defend the Cape route alone, for its own and the free world’s sake, whatever the sacrifices.” 49 With such an approach to foreign policy, the development of South Africa’s regional role became a priority for policy makers in Pretoria. As they saw it, South Africa had to stem this threat as far away from its borders as possible, this is because the non-white South African population was considered to be


a fertile ground for communist propaganda and agitation.\textsuperscript{50} The strategy therefore was to establish some form of control between the white minority South Africa and the rest of the African countries.

In accordance with this strategy, South Africa sought from the mid-1960s onward to strengthen relations with other white regimes particularly cooperating with those countries on areas of national security and military defense. The culminating effect of such an endeavor was that as South Africa strengthened its regional role, the country simultaneously began to develop its military power which became a top priority for the white regime to defend itself against the envisaged threats to national security. Fernando Guimaraes observes that around the 1960s, a national defense review noted that the South African National Defense Force was obsolete and a deliberate and concerted effort was again taken to develop its capability and capacity. This consequentially led to successful programs in military modernization which conversely resulted in South Africa possessing one of the largest sophisticated and capable national defense forces unrivalled by any other armed force in the region. This was the turning point in IR in the SADC region as South Africa profoundly asserted her strategic position of a regional hegemon.

The realist perspective to understanding IR and foreign policy would suggest that because South Africa is a regional hegemon, Botswana would really do very little to challenge her which seems to have been the case over the past decades. The question therefore is; since the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa (which represented a profound shift in South Africa’s domestic and foreign policy), has Botswana ever reviewed her foreign policy perspective to determine the suitability of her foreign

\textsuperscript{50} Guimaraes, 125.
relations in the region, and given the current economic status of the country, has Botswana missed on any opportunities of extending her influence and growing her regional powers? From a realist perspective, this question speaks directly to Botswana’s economy and military power. Having enjoyed a sustained period of over 30 years of a stable and steadily growing economy, could the country have simultaneously grown its military power to affect or shift regional power in the SADC region? The question is prompted by the fact that:

The end of Apartheid resulted in the end of the international diplomatic isolation of South Africa. This consequently led to the lifting of economic sanctions that had been placed against the Apartheid regime. South Africa’s government thus found itself in a situation of reinventing South African foreign relations, at least realigning them to new partners and making use of new opportunities, as well as engaging in mitigating new global risks in an increasingly-globalized economy.⁵¹

This represented a major shift in the relations between Botswana and South Africa so far as exploring global economic relations was concerned in pursuit of national interests. Like South Africa at the end of the apartheid regime in the 1990s, could Botswana have explored the international community to seek for new partners and develop a new economic policy to address the current environment and perhaps shift the balance of power in the region?

To a student of IR, these questions are not farfetched because the “realist perspective leads to several expectations about foreign policy based on the power capabilities of a state and the potential threats to it.”⁵² If one was to accept as a truism the

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⁵² Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, 8.
realist perspective that national security which is viewed in terms with military security, and national power, is measured by military power and economic superiority; the ultimate questions to contend with are: is there any correlation between IR theories and the formulation of Botswana’s foreign policy; and how effective is Botswana’s national strategy in developing military power to leverage on national power to affect relations in the region as the nation pursues its national objectives?

The above discussions have deliberated on the effects of the realism school of thought on foreign policy and the employment of instruments of national power from a realist perspective. Particularly, discussions have shown how the realist central argument of an anarchic world that lacks order due to the absence of an international government leads to a struggle for power in the international system. In such world order, military power primarily forms the centerpiece of national power. In a counter argument to the realist perspective, the liberals see the world in different way. The following arguments therefore, shall be dedicated to discussions on the liberalism school of thought.

The Liberalism School of Thought and Foreign Policy

The liberalism school of thought in IR is associated with such founding figures as John Locke, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Giuseppe Mazzini, and John Stuart Miller. According to Bertrand Badie, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlio, “Liberalism resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics—such as individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity—that all liberal democratic societies, by definition, share to some
degree.” The understanding of Badie, Schlosser and Morlio’s views on liberalism brings us to the most central viewpoint of the liberals which has been eloquently and precisely captured by Ronald Chau in his essay, “Liberalism; A Political Philosophy,” when he observed:

Liberalism as a political and moral philosophy is centered on two main principles—these are individualism and liberty. Firstly, liberalism places the individual at the heart of society and argues that the highest value social order is one that is built around the individual. Secondly, the purpose of society is to allow individuals to reach their full potential if they want to, and that the best way to do this is to give the individual as much liberty as possible. These two key principles are the foundations upon which the various elements of liberalism spring forth.

Although also falling within the ISA perspective in IR, this paper will submit that owing to its inclination to place emphasis on the individual (and the institutions that represent them) more than the state in its analysis of IR, liberalism mostly cascades towards the FPA perspective because it is more internally focused on domestic politics as the determinants of the foreign policy construct.

According to Badie, Schlosser, and Morlio, liberalism as a political theory is marked by a shared commitment to four essential institutions. These four institutions are:

1. First, citizens possess juridical equality and other fundamental civic rights such as freedom of religion and the press.

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2. Second, the effective sovereigns of the state are representative legislatures deriving their authority from the consent of the electorate and exercising their representative authority free from all restraint apart from the requirement that basic civic rights be preserved.

3. Third, the economy rests on a recognition of the rights of private property, including the ownership of means of production.

4. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces of supply and demand, domestically and internationally, and are free from strict control by bureaucracies.

In understanding the above institutions or principles, it is also crucial to note that they are conceived on the premise that in pursuing national interests and foreign policy objectives “the state is subject to neither the external authority of other states nor the internal authority of special prerogatives held, for example, by monarchs or military bureaucracies over foreign policy.” 55 It is therefore the purpose of liberalism to attempt to promote these principles and their variations at all levels in the construction of foreign policy and subsequently guide its application in IR. This occurs in sharp contrast with the realist perception right from Thucydides onward who described an international politics as existing in an “international state of war that could be mitigated, but not overcome, short of a Leviathan.” 56 For the liberal perspective, John Locke argues that states have themselves rights derived from individual rights to life and liberty (political

55 Badie, Schlosser, and Morlio, 1434.

56 Ibid.
independence) and property (territorial integrity), thereby providing the liberal foundations of international law.\textsuperscript{57}

To this end, Immanuel Kant and Giuseppe Mazzini observed that liberal republics theorized an internationalism that institutes peace among liberal republics. In other words, liberal republics view an international system as orderly and capable of achieving peace for the common good of actors. Thus liberalism encourages liberal republics to pursue foreign policy objectives that are nonaggressive, and based on collective security cooperation to achieve mutual benefits to national interests. However, it is also important to understand that liberal constitutional states behave differently in their foreign relations. Perhaps as Immanuel Kant and Thomas Paine argued, “liberal states will progressively establish peace among themselves.”\textsuperscript{58} This argument raises questions to what IR scholars have come to define as separate peace among liberal democracies.\textsuperscript{59} This is born out of the fact that liberals appreciate the fact that the potential for war exists in the international system especially with such states that pursue a more realist approach. Kant argues, “Liberal republics cannot simply assume reciprocal peace with all other states; instead, they understand that states subject to international anarchy are potentially aggressive,”\textsuperscript{60} a

\textsuperscript{57} Badie, Schlosser, and Morlio, 1434.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 1435.

\textsuperscript{59} The notion for Separate Peace among Liberal Democracies has been largely sponsored by Michael W. Doyle. Doyle’s primary insight is that relations between liberal democracies tend to be peaceful and that this “separate peace” has provided a foundation for alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other forms of international cooperation. However, Doyle also recognizes that liberal states have not refrained from fighting wars with non-liberal states. For further reading, consult Michael W. Doyle, \textit{Liberal Peace, Selected Essays} (New York: Routledge, 2012).

\textsuperscript{60} Badie, Schlosser, and Morlio, 1436.
foreign relationship that analogically existed between Botswana and South Africa during the apartheid era and perhaps cascading into several more years following the collapse of apartheid South Africa in the region. It is thus important for liberal states to construct a national strategy that projects a foreign policy that adopts a holistic approach which realizes and mitigates the potential threats posed by realist states in the region.

The liberalism school of thought therefore offers a contrasting approach to foreign policy and IR as compared to realism. In a sharp contrast with realism that encourages a foreign policy approach based on large sophisticated militaries and strong economy to support military spending because of the behavior of self-interested states in an anarchic system, liberalism argues that people and the country that represent them are capable of finding mutual interest and cooperating to achieve them at least in part through working in international organizations and through the recognition of international laws. Unlike realism, liberalism out rightly rejects the contention that “politics is inherently and exclusively a struggle for power.” They however, do not dismiss power as an important factor in politics and IR; but they additionally recognize the crucial contribution of other factors such as morality, ideology as factors that influence the behaviour of national leaders and the course of world politics.

According to Rourke, realists hold a strong view that humanity is struggling toward achieving a more orderly and peaceful international system and can and must succeed in that goal. He further observed that classical liberalists believe that just as

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62 Ibid.
human beings learned to form cooperative societies without giving up their individuality, so too can states learn to cooperate without surrendering their independence. In the contemporary world, “liberals are encouraged by recent trends. One of these is the willingness of countries to surrender some of their sovereignty to improve themselves. The European Union (EU) for instance, now exercises considerable economic and even political authority over its member countries.”

From a critical evaluation of the liberal theory, it becomes clear that the contention of an anarchic world that gives rise to competition, struggle for power and hegemony becomes irrelevant and what now takes the centre stage is respect of law in an orderly world and the recognition of individuals and their rights while at the same time placing cooperation as significant for the survival of the nation state. The liberals therefore advocate for ethical dimensions of foreign policy. To this end liberals discourage the admissibility and desirability of military intervention to spread or uphold liberal values abroad.

However, Kant’s moral theory, also argues that where there are significant violations of human rights, then liberal states may militarily intervene for humanitarian reasons. The argument proposed by the liberalists being that if a state is tyrannical and systematically oppresses its own population, it forfeits any respect for its sovereignty for purposes of humanitarian intervention. It is thus important to note that military power even though employed only as a last resort and on the basis of hard power, it continues to play a pivotal role in IR within the liberal context. The pivotal point to conclude with is:

63 Rourke, 24.

64 Badie, Schlosser, and Morlio, 1436.
to what extent does Botswana, operating within the liberal context, leverage on her military power to achieve the fundamentals of liberal principles in international politics?

Social Constructivism, National Identity Formation and National Interests

Arguably, in recent years the discipline of IR has mainly oscillated between two major paradigms: realism and social constructivism. Ideally, constructivism is identified with the work of Alexander Wendt and of those inspired by his work. In the broadest sense, constructivism is applied to all critics of realism, neorealism, and liberal institutionalism.

Generally, most scholars in IR are agreed that:

[T]he end of the Cold War was the central fact for the theoretical demise of the academic domain of IR. The false promise of neo-realism and neoliberal institutionalism to predict, explain and understand this systemic change marked a new era for the prospects of world politics and foreign policy analysis. The effect of the failure of neo-utilitarian theoretical approaches was a sociological turn to the IR academic domain which was best conceptualized by the emergence of the social constructivist project.65

In more recent academic scholarship, it is more common to hear international politics being described as socially constructed. However, what really constitutes social constructivism? Although the term has been previously used elsewhere in the paper to give emphasis to certain arguments to facilitate understanding, little has been done in an effort to contextualize it for the purposes of this study. In this regard, for the benefit of

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giving synergy to the arguments obtainable in this paper, social constructivism shall be understood to refer to what Michael Patton described as “an epistemology with a primary emphasis on interaction and discourse as the vehicles through which self and the world are articulated, understood and created.”

Drawing on a number of social theories which may be too copious to enumerate here, for the above definition of social constructivism, students of IR have increasingly accepted that constructivism has two basic tenets which are fundamental to the theory: (1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces; and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. A consideration of these tenets as presented above inevitably leads to a more profound conclusion that the first precept of constructivism represents an idealist approach to life, but also due to its conspicuous emphasis on shared ideas it significantly embraces the social theory and thus reject in totality the materialist view point of interpreting reality as a given. The second precept on the one hand can be said to be structuralist in approach due to its emphasis on the emergence of social structures that facilitate the construction of identities and interests of actors. The same sentiments as expressed above are shared by Alexander Wendt who also argued that in IR, constructivism draws selectively from social theory and is characterized more specifically by its idealism.

In this regard, the constructivist approach insists that meaning and reality should be determined collectively as components having mutual effect in their interpretive form; a consideration which shall ultimately give one a perspective of what may be perceived

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66 Zacko-Smith, 26.
as the real world or a socially constructed reality. If this is taken to be true as it shall be
argued in this paper, then the foreign policy of any actor will not be a fixation but rather a
construct emanating from the allegorical understanding of the communicative and
discursive practices common to the culture and general beliefs of that actor.

The emphasis on communicative and discursive practices as Michel Foucault will
argue constitutes a definitive characteristic feature of the social constructivist approach.
The argument borne out of this approach is that, to understand and explain social
behavior, there is a need to take words, language, and communicative utterances
seriously. It is through discursive practices that agents make sense of the world and
attribute meaning to their activities. Thomas Risse argues that there are at least two ways
in which the study of communicative practices might contribute to the understanding of
IR. He accurately observes that IR scholars have:

started applying the Habermasian theory of communicative action to IR which
focus on arguing and reason-giving as an agency-centered mode of interaction
which enables actors to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or
normative statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their
understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms
guiding their action, rather than acting purely on the basis of strategic
calculations.67

From this understanding it becomes more apparent that language plays a pivotal role in
shaping the foreign relations of any given state. This is based on the premise that
individual actors do not act in isolation and without influence from the environment and
culture of their societies. Therefore, political discourse takes place within the realm of the
interface of these attributes.

texte/globalization_constructivism.pdf, 7.
In this regard it is easier to comprehend that from a constructivist point of view, the formulation and ultimate projection of foreign policy (normally projected through political discourse) cannot be considered autonomously from discourse analysis. To this end Henrick Larsen has argued that; a general problem in dealing with FPA is how to deal theoretically with general beliefs to which actors adhere.\(^{68}\) In his view, this is not only a problem in relation to what has often been labelled political ideology but also in relation to beliefs about concepts such as the state, the nature of IR.

According to Henrick Larsen, political discourse is one possible source of foreign policy. Though he acknowledges at the onset that political discourse is not the only source of foreign policy due to the level of abstraction which can be too high, he however notes that the concept of political discourse contributes to creating a structure or a framework which can link up these different free floating elements of middle-range theory. Larsen argues that linking these free floating elements, enables policymakers to interpret some middle-range theory from a more abstract point of view, as expressions of the effects of political discourse.

The intersubjective relationship postulated above between meaning and reality as proposed by Larsen has four primary characteristics which will suffice for the purposes of analysis in this paper: (1) it takes a critical stance towards taken for granted knowledge; (2) it involves historical and cultural specificity (advocates that all ways of understanding are historically and culturally relative); (3) it indicates that knowledge is

\(^{68}\) Henrick Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis; France, Britain and Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1997).
sustained by social processes; and (4) it maintains that knowledge and social action go hand in hand.

A holistic interrogation of the presented arguments in this section which succinctly contextualizes constructivism within the framework of policy formulation and projection will be important to the subsequent arguments in this paper regarding Botswana’s foreign policy and its employment of military power to pursue national objectives.

Particularly, the thesis shall focus on determining whether Botswana reevaluated her foreign policy objectives after the major shift in IR in the region following the democratization of the RSA in the early 1990s. The essence being that there was a need for the social reconstruction of the country’s foreign policy in relation to RSA and the region following the collapse of the apartheid era in RSA. Such an inquiry will help to understand whether images of the past that helped to construct identities and interests then remained in force despite the changing environment or if any significant changes in foreign policy have been pursued.

The Strategic Approach in Pursuing National Interests; a Focus on Military Strategy from a U.S. Perspective

Discussions under this subtopic will not focus on presenting a broad perspective to strategy, but will deliberately focus on an understanding of the military strategy as informed by the NSS. However, highlights on components of strategy will be made as they relate to NSS. Linda Robinson has argued that the making of NSS has suffered from lack of understanding and application of strategic art. This is mainly because the making of NSS is the interactive space where both the civilian policy makers and the military
leaders must meet to determine the strategic focus and way ahead guided by national objectives. Sharing the same sentiments with Robinson on the complexity of crafting NSS, Kevin Lim argued that when it comes to understanding a state’s grand strategy, that is, the calibration of intentions and the sum of capabilities to assure its relative position within the international system, the specialist is frequently faced with the challenge of divining intentions—assuming the leaders in question themselves know what they want.  

Lim’s articulation of the desired elements of national strategy is important to understanding the focus of this paper. The calibration of intentions as observed in his caption will translate into the national objectives and national interests which are vital in determining the foreign policy of a state actor in the international system. Capabilities on the one hand are all means of national power that are vital to pursue the foreign policy objectives to influence other actors in the international system. David Jablonsky contend that “strategy at any level consists of ends or objectives, ways or concepts, and means or resources. This three-element framework is nothing more than a reworking of the

69 Note that, in this context, Lim has used the term grand strategy to denote the overall national strategy, which reflects the total employment of instruments of national power in pursuing national objectives. This is a departure from some definitions, which relate grand strategy to military strategy. In this case ‘grand strategy’ will be understood in the context of national strategy; any departure from this definition elsewhere in this thesis will be clarified to the reader. Such definition of grand strategy will be understood in the limited definition, which is the employment of military power to pursue national objectives.

Having this understanding in mind, Harry Yarger cautions that there is a pervasive
tendency to misapply the concept of strategy resulting in an oversimplification of strategy
and at times eroding its meaning and context for any relevant use by national policy
makers. To this, Yarger argues:

We tend to use strategy as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action,
or a “vision” of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational,
and governmental—local, state, or federal—levels. Such casual use of the term to
describe nothing more than “what we would like to do next” is inappropriate and
belie the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. It reduces strategy to
just a good idea without the necessary underlying thought or development. It also
leads to confusion between strategy and planning, confining strategic possibilities
to near-time planning assumptions and details, while limiting the flexibility of
strategic thought and setting inappropriately specific expectations of outcomes.72

It is indeed important that national policy makers are abreast with the impeccable
difference that exists between strategy and the short- or long-term planning objectives
that drive organizational goals. As already explained, adopting definitions from both
Yarger and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, strategy is “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing instruments of
national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national,
and/or multinational objectives.”73 The employment of strategy by a state actor happens
“[I]n accordance with the policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance
national interests relative to other states, actors or circumstances. Strategy seeks a
synergy and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability

71 Bartholomees, 3.
72 Yarger, v.
73 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02 (2016), 112.
of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success.”

Strategy therefore is all about how the national political leadership will employ the available national power to prevail over a set of circumstances both in time and space to achieve national interests. Consequently, the role of national strategy is to translate broad national goals and objectives into workable means of achieving those ends through the cautious, systematic, and coordinated application of a combination of several means of national power. Supporting this viewpoint, Stephen Sklenka argues that strategy is a “complex decision-making process that connects the ends sought (objectives) with the ways and means of achieving those ends.” Many IR scholars are generally agreed that strategy provides direction and environment for the coercive or persuasive use of this national power to achieve specified objectives.

Irrespective of the domestic political structure of an actor the import of specified objectives is important in understanding how strategy will ultimately be conceived, although the ultimate application of national power will either fall in any one of the theoretical perspective of IR discussed earlier in this chapter generally determining whether soft or hard power will be used by an actor while pursuing national objectives.

74 Yarger, 1.


76 In his book titled; Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics published in 2004, Professor Joseph S. Nye of Harvard University, argues that defined against hard power, which often involves threat and coercion, soft power applies attraction, persuasion, and cooperation, finding its sources in culture, political values, and foreign policies. To this end, Nye defines soft power as the power of attraction, the influence of example as opposed to the influence and power derived from military force, economic sanctions and even economic aid. Soft power therefore is the ability to get what
The importance of emphasizing specified objectives here as Sklenka will argue is that “tangible objectives are the target of legitimate strategies, posing a fundamental difference from ideas and dreams.”\(^77\) In this regard, the objectives of a national strategy are represented as national interests. Without clearly articulated national interests the national strategy is most likely to suffer a deficit in deliberate direction that guides the implementation of national resources in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. It is thus prudent to conclude that the starting point for any national strategy should be the identification and definition of national interests.

P. H. Liotta in Sklenka’s work argues that such definition “demands the willingness of a state to uphold its morals and national values with the commitment of its blood, treasure, time, and energy to achieve sometimes specific and sometimes in specific ends.”\(^78\) It is only after an explicit definition of interests that a strategy may be developed relating the means to ends and encompassing the process by which the means, expressed as instruments of national power, are employed to accomplish stated ends that are expressed as the national interests.\(^79\) This argument therefore leads us to how a state actor may identify and classify or categorize national interests to justify the allocation of national resources in pursuit and protection of such interests through the execution or implementation of national strategy.

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\(^77\) Sklenka, 3.

\(^78\) Ibid.

\(^79\) Ibid.
As already explained elsewhere in this paper, national interests are those fundamental and enduring needs of a nation which represents a desirable goal that guides the actor’s behavior in the international system. The preservation of national interests therefore, entails a continuous and systematic approach that manipulate and create an international environment that is most favorable to the peaceful pursuit of the actor’s most valued wants. “The attainment of this goal is something the identifying state believes will have a positive impact on itself.”

Sklenka accurately observes that although national interests provide a broad construct within which political leaders can guide their decisions, they are also representative of the citizenry’s ideals. In agreement with Sklenka, Liotta argues that interests are a starting point, not an end state. They therefore form the basis for the construction of national policy and strategy. He further observes, “[N]ational interests reflect the identity of a people, their geography, culture, political sympathies, social consensus, as well as their levels of economic prosperity and demographic makeup. Thus, national interests are little more than a broad set of often abstract guidelines that allow a nation to function the way it believes it best should function.” Thus national interests help construct the identity of a people or nation state hence their willingness to fight and die for such interests.

Generally, the identification and classification of interests fall into two broad categories. Hans J. Morgenthau, a classic realist theorist, identified two levels of national

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80 Boone, 14.


82 Ibid.
interest being the vital and the secondary interests. He argued that the vital interests “assure a state its security, its freedom and independence, protection of its institutions, and enshrinement of its values.” ⁸³ To preserve the vital interests, “which concerns the very life of the state, there can be no compromise or hesitation about going to war.” ⁸⁴ The preservation of vital interests therefore negates any compromise in dealing with them as they represent the very objective of a nation state’s existence and livelihood. Because of their nature, vital interests are relatively easy to identify. The other category includes secondary interests, which are more difficult to define. Because they are less significant to the actor compared to the vital interests, they usually include negotiations and compromise in dealing with them. However, what is key to note is secondary interests may grow in scope to national policymakers and ultimately transform into vital interests when they now represent a threat to national sovereignty. Liotta succinctly observes, “how a nation identifies with such vital and secondary interests has to do with the kind of national identity--or polity, as Aristotle termed it--a people want to assume for themselves. This identity can also change over time” ⁸⁵ as a nation goes through a process of social construction of reality and identity formation to determine what constitutes threat to their sovereignty and what does not at a given time.

What is important to emphasize here is that national interests are not fixed but will keep changing over time as the nation’s needs and wants are modified by both the

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⁸³ Liotta, 46-57.


⁸⁵ Liotta, 46-57.
internal and external factors in the international system. For example, “what America became committed to in the postwar order were a broader internationalist conception of vital interests that were in many ways antithetical to the isolationist preference favored by the founders of the American Republic.”\(^{86}\) In the contemporary world, Americans changed to reconstruct their identity in relation to prevailing conditions in world order. Liotta argues that the U.S. national interests in the contemporary world are simple to describe. At best they may be summed up as to assure the security and prosperity of the American people in the global environment. The notion of a global environment is a departure from the old view of an isolationist state as initially represented in the post-war era. Liotta’s observations also suggest that the United States may have over the years gravitated from a more realist approach to foreign policy formulation and implementation to a more liberal approach where the benefits of soft power are juxtaposed with the benefits of hard power in the crafting and execution NSS in IR. To this end, he argues, “in the contemporary environment, it seems that a nation’s ‘soft power’ (the ability to attract through cultural and ideological appeal) is at least as important as a nation’s ‘hard power’ (a country’s economic and military ability to buy and to compel).”\(^{87}\)

To guide national policymakers in the identification and classification of national interests, IR scholars have devised a national interests matrix that helps in determining what constitutes an interest and how that interest may be classified to justify the allocation of national resources in protecting or acquiring such interest. The classification and the subsequent allocation of national resources is largely dependent on the severity of

\(^{86}\) Liotta, 46-57.

\(^{87}\) Ibid.
the particular interest. Lack of proper identification of national interests will eventually result in incomplete a less valuable national policy and strategy which may actually result in wasteful employment of national resources on a less prudent adventure in foreign policy. Of particular significance in this regard is political scientist Donald Neuchterlein who is credited with the development of a template that offers four versions of national interest that are based on relative intensity. Although the chart is based on U.S. national interests, it can still be replicated and used elsewhere to fit the interests of a particular state (see figure 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Interest at Stake</th>
<th>Intensity of Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Well-being</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable World Order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. National Interests Matrix Developed by Donald Neuchterlein


According to Neuchterlein in Dennis Drew’s and Donald Snow’s work, the first level of intensity is characterized by survival interests. Neuchterlein states that a survival interest exists when the physical existence of a country is in jeopardy due to attack or threat of attack. To this end, protecting its existence forms the most fundamental interest
the state has to undertake without compromise. In this instance, when the survival interest is threatened, if a state cannot survive, no other interest matters. For example, in the case of the United States. Drew and Snow argue that this has meant avoiding nuclear devastation by the Soviet Union in the Cold War era.88

The second level of intensity is occupied by vital interests. Neuchterlein articulates these as “circumstances where serious harm to the nation would result unless strong measures, including the use of force, are employed to protect the interest.”89 Drew and Snow argue there exists concern in measures of validity when it comes to determining national consensus on what constitutes an intolerable situation by an actor which may inevitable desire an employment of force. However, it is prudent to assume that national policymakers, drawing from their experience and judgement would be more rational to determine the thin boundary between national situations and emergency which threatens national interests at this level and may require the use of force. In the case of the United States. Drew and Snow argue, “[T]he emergence of an aggressive, hostile regime in Mexico (or the collapse of the Mexican political system due to the effects of drug-driven corruption) would clearly violate our interests in a friendly, stable neighbor on our southern border, and we would act forcefully to avoid that intolerable outcome.”90

The third level in the intensity scale of interest is occupied by major interests. Neuchterlein states that these include “situations where a country’s political, economic,


89 Ibid., 33.

90 Ibid.
or social well-being may be adversely affected but where the use of armed force is
deemed excessive to avoid adverse outcomes.”91 According to Drew and Snow, the
fundamental difference in policy articulation and implementation in pursuit of both vital
and major interests is that an adverse outcome on a major interest may be painful but
tolerable. The fourth level of intensity in the analysis of interests is occupied by
peripheral interests. According to Neuchterlein, these “[A]re situations where some
national interest is involved but where the country as a whole is not particularly affected
by any given outcome or the impact is negligible.”92 Though important to the actor,
peripheral interests do not warrant the commitment of national interests on an urgency
basis.

Using this general foundation on how national interests may be identified and
ultimately protected to preserve national identity, it is prudent to now focus arguments on
how national resources (means available as national power) may be employed to achieve
these national objectives (ends). To make a connection between the two (turning the
means into national objectives) there is need for a NSS (ways) to guide the prudent
employment of national resources to achieve national objectives.

Formulating the National Security Strategy

Yarger defines NSS as “The art and science of developing, applying, and
coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and

91 Drew and Snow, 34.

92 Ibid.
informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.” In accordance with Yarger, the true purpose of strategy therefore is to create favorable effects in support of policy goals for the advancement or protection of national interests. Expressing the same sentiments as Yarger, Drew and Snow argue, “The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests.” Yarger maintains, “At the highest level, political leadership uses policy to articulate state interests and guidance in achieving them. Policy provides guidance for strategy. Such guidance may be quite general, as in a vision statement that relates interests to the strategic environment, or a more specific statement of guidance containing elements of ends, ways, and means.”

Accepting Yarger’s line of reasoning as a truism, an inference can be made that in general, the NSS articulates prioritized ends and then links means (resources) and ways (approaches) in a plan of action to achieve those ends in a given context. Drew and Snow, argue that the fundamental requirements of an effective NSS are clear and realistic objectives and a well-coordinated use of the various instruments of national power employed to achieve those objectives. To this they maintain that, “after identifying and assessing national objectives, strategists must determine which instruments of national

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93 Yarger, 11.
94 Drew and Snow, 19.
95 Yarger, 50.
96 Drew and Snow, ix.
power are necessary to achieve the objectives and how those instruments are to be used.”

Thus, NSS provides the direction for the pursuance of national objectives through a deliberate and planned utilization of national resources while simultaneously mitigating risk arising from external pressures to the actor’s environment. Drew and Snow observe, “the making and implementation of strategy at the national level is largely an exercise in risk management and risk reduction. Risk, at that level, is the difference between the threats posed to our security by our adversaries and our capabilities to counter or negate those threats.” In a concise agreement with this viewpoint, Aaron Dilday observes:

for a nation to be successful in protecting its interests and achieving its objectives, a strategy is needed to guide that effort. Without it, a nation is unable to utilize its resources effectively and efficiently to accomplish their objectives. Thus, national strategy is a framework for applying all of the national resources available to achieve large political purposes coherently directed against an opponent through war and peace.

To this end therefore, the NSS represents how the political leadership of a nation intends to use national power to achieve desired political aims in pursuit of national objectives. The NSS therefore serves as a useful national tool that provides policymakers with the desired direction of “coordinating the development and use of the instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives.” The development of national

97 Drew and Snow, 17.


99 Drew and Snow, 17.
resources as espoused to by Drew and Snow entail all instruments of national power which are DIME.

Because the NSS does not occur in a vacuum but rather in a complex national security environment characterized by the interrelationship between national governments and their own people and on an international landscape between states as they each pursue their national interests, there is a need for pillars that guide such a strategic plan. Paul Kennedy, in his book, *Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition in Grand Strategies in War and Peace* called these the Tenets of Strategic Planning. Dilday argues, “[T]hese Tenets of Strategic Planning represent a rubric for evaluating a strategic plan; a rudimentary set of guidelines for establishing what a proper strategic plan should entail.” 100 He further argued that the tenets present an analytical framework that may be applied to the NSSs of the United States during its formulation. It is not the intention of this thesis to elaborate these tenets in detail but rather to offer a cursory overview of them to show their relevance in guiding the formulation of the NSS framework.

In general, scholars in NSS studies identify six tenets of strategic planning that national policymakers must reflect on when formulating the NSS. Although these may be expressed in varying forms by different authors, they however proffer the same strategic planning pillars that national policymakers must take into consideration when formulating the NSS. These tenets are briefly discussed below:

First, beyond the fact that NSS plans are documented national strategies, the first tenet desires that the NSS must be framed to look beyond military power to include the

100 Dilday, 35.
vital utilization of all available national resources. Second, the ends and the means as defined within the NSS must be plausible. The stipulated goals within the NSS must be achievable and the methods to achieve those goals must be clearly articulated. Dilday argues that although this seems the most obvious tenet of strategy, it is perhaps the most crucial tenet of strategic planning. The tenet is largely anchored on Yarner’s model of testing strategy which proposes that, to test the validity of the NSS strategist by consistently have a conversation with themselves on aspects of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the strategic framework they are articulating. To this he maintains that the “Strategist questions suitability—will the strategy’s attainment accomplish the effect desired; he questions feasibility—can the action be accomplished by the means available; and he questions acceptability—are the effects as well as the methods and resources used to achieve those efforts justified and acceptable to the body politic?”

Third, the strategic plan must explicitly state both the objectives and the methods for obtaining them. This pillar is closely associated with the above pillar at bullet 2. The stated objectives must be both short-term and long-term. What is essential to note though is, once the objectives have been unambiguously defined in the NSS, the strategist must then develop the methods (ways) to accomplishing those objectives (ends) by carefully allocating national resources (means) to each role. This also involves determining the adequacy of the resource (means) to accomplish the assigned role and determining the interrelationships between the means to support the lead role resource in achieving the national objective.

101 Yarger, 63.
Fourth, strategy is essentially a human enterprise. Without the Will of the people or Public opinion which is expressed as popular national support, the NSS is more likely to fail. Dilday observed, “In the case of the United States, the will of the people is important because public opinion determines leadership, which in turn dictates strategic direction. Public opinion is essential to any leader (military or civilian) of a democracy.”

Dilday observed, “In the case of the United States, the will of the people is important because public opinion determines leadership, which in turn dictates strategic direction. Public opinion is essential to any leader (military or civilian) of a democracy.”

This is crucially important especially on the understanding that political leaders are the custodians of national policy which ultimately directs the NSS focus. Yarger argues that ideology and culture are powerful influences on the shaping of strategy and strategic success. The strategist must therefore take into consideration (during planning time) both internal domestic political constraints and external political constraints to measure the effects of the strategy proposed. Strategy therefore, “must be consistent with national values and acceptable to international norms.”

Fifth, since strategy can be formulated at different levels within the political system, the strategist should therefore be clear in regards to the level at which he/she is working even as they remain holistic in their outlook. At the national level, strategy is concerned with maintaining internal systems in balance with one another, while creating effects in the external environment that favor the state over time.

Sixth, the six tenet proffers that because of the complexity of the strategic environment, the strategists must be able to swim in complexity to fully understand the

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102 Dilday, 31.
103 Yarger, 41.
104 Ibid., 44.
strategic environment and remain open to all its possibilities.\textsuperscript{105} Dilday argues that the strategy must “acknowledges that other actors, such as an enemy or ally, continue to act and react to the evolving circumstances as they unfold. Many strategic plans fail to consider actions of external actors. In strategic planning, strategists must understand that other actors – directly targeted by the initial actions or not – will react to the changing situation.”\textsuperscript{106}

These tenets of strategy provide national policymakers with a yardstick to measure the validity of the NSS they are articulating to ensure that it remains relevant in the articulation and direction of other subsidiary strategy documents as the nation projects its foreign policy in pursuit of national interests. It is also important at this juncture to note that, to give the NSS legitimacy, it must be recognized and regulated by law. Subsequently all the political structures or its architecture must be a matter of law rather than being left open to the political decision of the government of the day. Although it shall still remain naturally (and legally so) susceptible to political direction and alterations as governments change in a democratic institution, the law legitimizes those changes or influences and ensures constancy in the preservation and protection of national interests.

For example, in the case of the United States, the NSS was initially conceived through the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequently refined to give it more relevance in an ever-changing and complex security environment by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1987. The National Security Act of 1947 particularly created the National

\textsuperscript{105} Yarger, 44.

\textsuperscript{106} Dilday, 32.
Security Council, which serves as an advisory body under the direction of the president. Through the act, the National Security Council was given a clear mandate which is “[T]he function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.”

Membership to the council was also articulated to avoid potential inconsistency in fulfilling the mandate of the council and meeting the requirements of the NSS.

Furthermore, the act created important organs vital to fulfilling the requirements of the NSS such as “[A]n independent Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; a Secretary of Defense to oversee the new Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the National Security Council. Establishing this new structure facilitated an organized budgeting process and cooperation in the strategy-making process.” On the one hand, the Goldwater-Nichols Act “[E]stablished a streamlined system of advisement to better serve the needs of the president, but more importantly it required that the president continually reevaluate national security objectives and delineate how to achieve them in an annually-prepared National Security Strategy report, or NSS.” It is therefore evidentially clear that because the NSS and its requirements are regulated by law, the public then has a legitimate expectation on the political leaders of the nation to fully execute such requirements hence ensuring accountability on issues of national security. Most importantly, the law provides guidance on what constitutes the

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107 Dilday, 14.

108 Ibid., 13.
NSS and how it shall be undertaken (defining the process) which is vital to formulation and implementation. The arguments obtainable under this section have laid a foundation on how the NSS is formulated. Particularly, the section has showed the relationship between national interests which after being clearly identified will form national policy as national objectives that will be pursued through the implementation of the NSS. It is now prudent to focus arguments on the NDS.

**Formulating the National Defense Strategy**

In according with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Secretary of Defense is directed to include in the annual report to Congress the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS is further articulated as inclusive of three distinctive functions which are:

1. A description of major military missions and of military force structure of the United States for the next fiscal year.
2. An explanation of the relationship of those military missions to that force structure.
3. The justification for those military missions and that force structure.

The act further directs that, during promulgation of the NDS, the Secretary of Defense shall take into consideration the contend of the annual NSS report of the president to inform the crafting of the NDS. To this end, the NDS serves as a vehicle that translates and conveys the overall national strategic framework into manageable objectives that could be attained through military power. It therefore articulates how those objectives will be pursued and what capabilities are needed by the military instrument of power to successfully execute its mandate within the larger framework of NSS. James Joyner argues, in focusing the efforts of the military instrument of power
towards the achievement of the NSS requirements, the NDS serves to articulate the
foreign policy objectives, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of
the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the NSS of the United
States.\textsuperscript{109}

The NDS serves as the Department of Defense’s capstone document in describing
the overarching goals and strategy of the National Defense System. It outlines how the
Department of Defense will support the objectives outlined in the NSS.\textsuperscript{110} In this regard
as earlier argued, it flows from the NSS and informs the National Military Strategy
(NMS). It also provides a framework for other Department of Defense strategic guidance,
specifically on campaign and contingency planning, force development, and intelligence.

The NDS serves this function by evaluating the U.S. strategic environment,
challenges, and risks the nation must consider in achieving them, and maps the way
forward for the military instrument of power. Most importantly, the NDS provides
national policymakers with a very crucial instrument that is used in the planning phase of
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System to establish the objectives
for the plans for military force structure, force modernization, business processes,
supporting infrastructure, and required resources (funding and manpower).\textsuperscript{111} It further

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{109} James Joyner, “National Security Strategy to National Defense Strategy,” Real
    articles/2015/02/11/national_security_strategy_to_national_defense_strategy_107619.
    html.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} U.S. President, \textit{Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
provides direction on Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Process. The NDS is a direct product of the *Quadrennial Defense Review*.\textsuperscript{112} The NDS therefore plays a key role in identifying the capabilities required by the warfighters to support the NSS.

In the end, the NDS is a vital tool that logically flows from the NSS and informs the NMS. It clearly stipulates all key national strategic objectives that must be achieved by the military power. Joyner accurately observes that if the NDS is flawed, it will create ripple effects throughout this articulate chain and even misinform inform the programming, budgeting, and execution phases which will conversely result in a flawed NMS because of a mismatch in national strategic objectives, threats to those objectives and capabilities developed.

Having discussed how the NDS is formulated and how it links the NSS to the NMS by clearly articulating the national strategic objectives that should be achieved by military power and the capabilities needed to achieve them, it is now prudent to deliberate on the NMS at this juncture.

**Formulating the National Military Strategy**

As already argued elsewhere in this thesis, the NSS employs any of the available instruments of national power to achieve the strategic protection or pursuit of national objectives. The selection of which instrument will be employed under which

\textsuperscript{112} Quadrennial defense reviews, as required by law, are internal Department of Defense processes designed to formulate national defense strategy, and to determine the policies, approaches, and organization required to achieve that strategy, in broad support of national security strategy. For further reading refer to Catherine Dale, *National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 6 August 2014).
circumstances is by and large a choice of the desired strategic effects and how such effects will be conducive in attaining the national objectives. Drew and Snow accurately observe, “After selecting the appropriate instruments of national power and assigning their roles and missions, the process becomes somewhat fragmented as different governmental organizations focus on their specialized strategies in support of the overall effort.”

Military power is one of the instruments of national power that remains at the disposal of the NSS in pursuing national interests or national policy objectives.

NMS as already stated earlier in this paper seeks to establish “[H]ow the threat or use of military force, along with the posture, disposition, and doctrine of the armed forces, can be employed to achieve a state’s foreign policy interests and goals, and meet its international commitments.” It is defined as the “The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.” In this context, the NMS aims to support the objectives of the NSS by implementing the requirements of the NDS. It should be clearly understood that although these documents are prepared by separate entities of the national government, there is however collaboration in what they all seek to achieve. There is that much needed interagency coordination and planning to ensure the synchronization of the required inputs to drive the NSS in pursuit of national objectives. As an overarching national policy document, the NSS represents the coordinated whole of government

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113 Drew and Snow, 19.
114 Hamilton, 3.
approach in pursuing foreign policy objectives and national interests within the international system. To this end, it is therefore crucial to highlight that the NSS does not happen within a vacuum but rather happens with the realm of national policy guidance and direction as prescribed by the requirements of both the NSS and the NDS.

The NMS is a result of the 1986 Goldwater Nicholas Act which directed that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for advising the President of the United States, and the Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction for the U.S. Armed Forces. In this regard, the NMS serves as the strategic guidance by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff articulating how military power will be employed (within the broader policy framework) to achieve the overall objectives of the NSS. Such guidance therefore issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a representation of the president’s approval of how the military instrument of national power (in consent with other instruments of national power) will be employed to achieve broad national policy objectives. As a national strategic document articulating how military power will be employed to pursue national policy objectives to address complex security challenges through the identification of trends in the ever-changing security environment and determining capabilities to address those challenges, the NMS serves two distinct and yet inextricably linked purposes:

1. It describes the armed forces’ plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future.
2. It provides strategic direction on how the joint force should align the military ends, ways, means, and risks.
Sharing the same sentiments with the observations made above, Drew and Snow maintain it is an embodiment of the “Art and science of coordinating the development, deployment, and employment of military forces to achieve national security objectives.” They further argue that the development within the strategic framework relates to those factors of tailoring armed forces in terms of structure and size, equipment and armament to include training for specific mission sets as required to fully perform the mandate of the overall national policy. Thus, this ensures that there are no pitfalls in capability mismatch and threats to be tackled in the security environment.

It is also important to note that the NMS as a strategic document is not cast on a rock. It should remain feasible and susceptible to change as national objectives change too. Where the NMS fails to change and embrace the direction of the NSS as influenced by both FPA perspective and the ISA perspective internal and external factors, then the development and employment of military power will be fundamentally flawed. In a concise agreement with this viewpoint, Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. succinctly argues, “[I]n summary, military strategy consists of the establishment of military objectives, the formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objectives, and the use of military resources to implement the concepts. When any of these basic elements is incompatible with the others, our national security may be in danger.”

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116 Drew and Snow, 20.

clearly stated by Lykke are derived from the overall policy documents such as the NSS and the NDS which the NMS is ultimately created to support.

It the end, it is important to highlight that strategy is hierarchical and it represents national consensus and the direction the nation will take in pursuing its national interests. The NMS therefore flows from the NDS which intron is derived from the NSS. The NSS represents the overall national consensus and direction in protecting and pursuing national interests (see figure 4).

Figure 4. Planning Phase of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System Process (PPBE)

Source: AcqNotes, “PPBE Process,” accessed 25 March 2016, http://www.acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/ppbe-overview. Note: Although the model depicts the PPBE planning process, it is however useful for this research to depict the inextricable linkage between NSS, NDS, and the NMS. The model further shows how the NMS is useful in determining military capabilities desirable to fulfil the implementation of the NDS thus conversely satisfying the requirements of the NSS. For further clarity in depicting this interrelationship see figure 4.
Figure 5. Strategic Flow from NSS through NDS to NMS

*Source: J. Boone Bartholomess, Jr., ed., *US Army War College; Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2004), 89. accessed 17 March 2016, https://books.google.com/books?id=co9TJrTjqrIC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false. Note: Shows a detailed and comprehensive strategic flow from the NSS through the NDS to the NMS, particularly being more elaborate on how the NMS if properly conceived will affect all matters of military power planning and development to enhance military capability. Such capability planning and development to achieve national objectives is undertaken within the national security environment that has been clearly articulated by the NSS. The model shows the hierarchical nature of the strategic framework.*
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Methodology

For purposes of this thesis, the researcher adopted the definition of research by Robert Kitchin and Nick Tate, who from a social scientist perspective accurately observed that for the human geographer (social scientist), research is the process of attempting to gain a better understanding of the relationships between humans, space, place, and the environment. This thesis has been conceived from a social scientist perspective with the focus of understanding the relationship of military power to NSS as Botswana interacts with many other state actors in the international system while pursuing her national interests.

It is clear that the above definition by Kitchin and Tate places more emphasis on relationships which needs to be substantiated through systematic measurement. It is in no doubt that, where such measurements are applied to the research procedure judiciously, they will actually justify and verify the outcomes of the study and make logical the inference that may be made to the real world. As already highlighted above, this paper is largely about determining relationships and answering the questions of how and why to the problem statement.

To fulfill the requirements of this research design, there is a need for a research methodology to guide data collection and analysis. Research methodology refers to the consideration of all concepts and theories which underlie the research methods chosen for

a particular study. To this, S. Rajasekar, P. Philominathan and V. Chinnathambi argue, “Research methodology is a systematic way to solve a problem. It is a science of studying how research is to be carried out. Essentially, the procedures by which researchers go about their work of describing, explaining and predicting phenomena are called research methodology. It is also defined as the study of methods by which knowledge is gained. Its aim is to give the work plan of research.”119 Because research methodology is about choosing the right methods and techniques to address the research problem, it is important that these methods remain measurable, reliable, and valid.

This thesis has therefore adopted a qualitative comparative approach to investigate the problem. To efficiently comprehend the subject understudy, the United States has been purposely selected as a prototype for effective development and employment of the military instrument of national power in pursuit of national interests in the international system within the broad perspective of NSS.

Christopher Hahn argues, “[T]he qualitative researcher discovers the quality and character of lived up experiences by collecting data that are not bound by the constraints of quantitative methods . . . data may be gathered from interviews, observations, participants observations, filed notes, public documents etc.”120 Data used in this study was largely collected from secondary sources of literature relevant to the subject matter. Online material was accessed and reviewed. Library research also proved to be very vital


to the study as numerous textbooks relating to the study were reviewed to give the researcher a much wider perspective of the topic.

**Research Design**

The research design refers to the overall strategy chosen to integrate the different components of the study in a coherent and logical way, thereby, ensuring the research problem will be effectively addressed. Thus, the thesis has been organized as described.

In chapter 1, the research largely presented the background information of the subject under review. Particularly focusing on pre-colonial and post-colonial Botswana with the specific intent of focusing on the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Botswana and how such affects the construction of the country’s foreign policy and the ultimate development of instruments of national power within the framework of NSS. The chapter also highlighted how the political situation in the region led to the establishment of the BDF as an instrument of national power.

Chapter 2 presented the literature review. As already highlighted elsewhere in this paper, the purpose of literature review is to establish a theoretical framework for the topic or subject being investigated by contextualizing key terms, definitions and terminology and further identifying studies, models and case studies supporting the topic.121 The literature review in this chapter was guided by the primary research question; what is the strategic place and role of military power in the formulation and implementation of

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Botswana’s foreign policy in pursuing strategic national interests? The secondary questions listed below also guided the literature review.

1. Is there any correlation between IR theories and National Security Policy formulation?
2. Does the country have a NSS that clearly articulates the nation’s enduring interests and thus guiding the optimal development of national instruments of power to attain or preserve those interest?
3. Is the BDF adequately resourced and developed to play an appropriate role as the nation’s military power to promote Botswana’s national interests? If not, what opportunities or requirements are not being covered and if it is resourced, will the current level of support meet future security challenges?
4. In the present structure for civil control of the military in pursuit of national objectives and interests, are there any problems such that there may be need for restructuring or reorganization to improve civil oversight role play?

To answer the above questions posed by the research, the review of literature included the following:

1. Theories in IR; Realism, Liberalism and Social Constructivism
2. FPA Perspective and ISA Perspective

The review of literature followed the above pattern and flow. It is particularly important to emphasize the pattern in number 3. The review of literature here deliberately followed a liner pattern to reflect and embrace the hierarchical nature of the strategic
framework which national policymakers must adhere to in the formulation of the national policy instruments and structures desirable to support foreign policy objectives in the pursuit of national interests. Data collection has largely been through desktop and library research using secondary sources of literature. Informal telephone interviews with a deliberately selected audience were seldom used to discuss certain issues pertinent to the research. Although these were to a limited extent, they however played an essential role in determining the outcomes of this study.

In chapter 4, data analysis, the researcher critically analyzed and interpreted the data collected at chapter 3. This was achieved by using analytical and logical reasoning to develop answers to the research questions. While the research was very aware of cognitive bias and applied every logical step as checks and balances to avoid the same, it must however be acknowledged that intuitive reasoning may have played a role influencing the outcomes. Nonetheless, the research heavily relied on both analytical reasoning and judgement to evaluate the data collected. As already noted, the research adopted a qualitative comparative analysis of data collected. To effectively do this, the data collected was divided into three categories (which also followed the pattern of analysis):

1. Theories in IR
2. Foreign Policy formulation and implementation; national power
3. The Strategic Framework; National Interests → NSS → NDS → NMS formulation and implementation in pursuit of foreign policy objectives and national interests.
The above categorization of data assisted in ensuring that data analysis and interpretation remain relevant and focused on answering the research questions. While all data sets focus on answering the overall primary question, the first and second set of data analysis focuses on answering the question; is there any correlation between IR theories and national security policy formulation? To answer this primary question, the International Systems: Realism vs. Liberalism a View on International Relations Model will be used. Furthermore, the researcher shall use Foreign Policy: Formulation and Implementation. The Interaction between Domestic and International Politics with Instruments of National Power in the Construction of Foreign Policy Model to show how domestic and international politics affect the development of national power and ultimately foreign policy formulation and implementation. Both models are designed to show the interface between IR theories and NSS formulation in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

The third subset of data analysis focuses on answering primary questions 2 to 4 of the research. To answer these questions, a comprehensive national strategic flow that should guide formulation and implementation of NSS will be used. The analysis will be inclusive of the political and national security reforms that may be needed to stand up a viable military instrument of power capable of achieving the nation’s interests on an international landscape, particularly within the region.

In chapter 5, the researcher concluded the arguments obtainable in the thesis and provided recommendations extrapolated from chapter 4 on how Botswana may develop her military power and enhance her viability as an active contributor to the formulation
and implementation of the country’s foreign policy in pursuing strategic national interests.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

Why should policy makers and practitioners care about the scholarly study of international affairs? Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academic theorists (frequently, one must admit, with good reason), but there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy. We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily. Even policymakers who are contemptuous of “theory” must rely on their own (often unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do. It is hard to make good policy if one’s basic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses theories—whether he or she knows it or not—and disagreements about policy usually rest on more fundamental disagreements about the basic forces that shape international outcomes.

— Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations Theory: One World Many Theories”

Introduction

Stephen Walt offers the basis for the discussions in this chapter, which centers on the effective development of instruments of national power to ensure meaningful contribution to the NSS as Botswana pursues foreign policy objectives. Botswana has a long and proud record of an independent democratic nation with its government fundamentally based on respect for the rule of law. This long profound tradition has more often than not, undoubtedly earned the country the status of being described, by many observers, as the beacon of democracy in the SADC region and Africa as a whole. Since attaining independence in the mid-1960s, Botswana’s strategic objective is to create an efficient public policy that seeks to advance the social needs of its people locally while at the same time satisfying the requirements for the attainment of national objectives (or interests through foreign policy development) in the region and abroad.
The fundamental purpose of Botswana’s NSS is principally based on a subset of key national strategic objectives which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation articulated as inclusive of, but not limited to, good governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace; and effective participation in new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and challenges relating to environmental change. It is these key national strategic objectives that drive the architecture of the country’s foreign policy, and quite importantly, the development and employment of national instruments of power for their ultimate employment in the international system as the country pursues its national interests.

As already espoused elsewhere in this paper, many observers in the international landscape will agree that, since the collapse of the apartheid epoch in the RSA in 1994, the foreign policy of Botswana has witnessed a major paradigm shift with its priorities moving away from the liberation struggle in South Africa to cooperation and development in Africa, especially within the region of SADC. With the decline of the South African apartheid regime as a potential existential threat in the region, Botswana went on a fast track to intensify her strategic relations to increase the potential to foster regional cooperation with key African countries. Especially, (being a landlocked country) with those countries that immediately share its national borders, and indeed with other African states and other external partners, in support of strategic objectives to attain national interests.

This external focus in foreign relations opened the door to the projection of Botswana’s domestic policy on foreign land conceived on bilateral relations and based on
mutual respect, common interests and cordial coexistence while at the same time accepting and appreciating differences on political orientation and ideologies. It is on the basis of this interaction that Botswana began to formulate foreign policy objectives (in some instances articulated in writing and obtained in fragmented instruments of various government departments representing public policy and in some instances undocumented but accepted as norms that have been created through tradition and practice) that have the ability to positively influence the pace of regional cooperation and development to enhance the attainment of Botswana’s national interests.

It may be inferred that the national strategic focus of Botswana is founded upon a foreign policy based on bilateral relations. This is further underpinned by each state showing mutual respect, common interests and cordial coexistence and the acceptance of differences on political orientation and ideologies. Within this context, the focus of this thesis is to establish the strategic place and role of military power in the formulation and implementation of the country’s foreign policy in pursuing strategic national interests.

There is in no doubt that, like all other actors in the international system, Botswana employs available national resources, which in IR are expressed as instruments of national power to pursue national interests or objectives. In this chapter, the author endeavors to show how Botswana perceives relations in the international system, especially in the region through the comparative understanding and analysis of liberalism and realism theories of IR. Further revealing how the adoption of either one of these theories affects Botswana’s NSS and ultimately dictates to the policymakers how instruments of national power may be developed and ultimately employed in pursuit of national objectives. This will be crucial in appreciating the linkage between IR theories
that an actor may choose to adopt in both domestic and international politics and how such a theory or theories will ultimately affect the development of national policy conversely setting the left and right boundaries of foreign policy.

Furthermore, discussions will focus on how Botswana achieves a strategic balance in the development, distribution, and employment of national power to achieve the ends to national policy. Precisely, this expresses how scarce national resources are developed and assigned roles within the strategic framework to achieve national objectives. Discussions will focus on how the country develops and optimizes the utilization of military power pursuing national interests. While taking into account the friction points an actor will encounter from an FPA and ISA perspective in developing and employing military instruments of national power in pursuit of foreign policy objectives the paper shall determine if there are any structural political and security sector reforms to achieve optimal development and engagement of military power on an international basis to attain national interests.

Botswana’s Perception of Relations in the International System

Analysis of data in this section focuses on determining the correlation between IR theories and national security policy formulation. Particularly using IR theories of realism and liberalism which have been discussed in chapter 2. The focus being to determine how Botswana views IR in the international system with emphasis on the region. This is particularly important because such a perception of world relations will conversely determine how the country formulates and projects its foreign policy to pursue national interests. Ideally, the position the country chooses to adopt in terms of theoretical
perspectives in IR will in the long run have significant implications on how the country constructs its identity towards other actors in the region and the world at large, how it promulgates the NSS, and ultimately how it develops and assigns roles to instruments of national power to effectively pursue or preserve strategic national interests.

As already argued elsewhere in this paper, it is critically important to remember that the construction of foreign policy is an attempt, through identity formation’ to distinguish the self from the other. The consequential actions that will be deliberately preferred by the actor in dealing with internal systems constituting self-differentiating those from the actions that will be preferred in dealing with the external system constituting the other which is foreign. In comprehending the import of this argument, one must realize that such identity formation for ultimate policy ends, does not occur in a vacuum. In fact, this occurs within the actor geopolitical environment and where attitudes of actors towards each other are determined by their theoretical perceptions of the international system. In this manner, placing Botswana in the continuum of IR theories as inclined towards realism or liberalism will therefore help explain how the country develops and assigns its national resources to pursue national objectives. In a clear agreement with this proposition, Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley argue that the international environment offers an explanation for the formulation of actors’ foreign policy. This suggestion is not however made to the exclusion of domestic politics which also have a significant impact on how actors formulate their national polices.

To determine how Botswana views IR in the region and the world at large, there is a need to first locate the country within the International System Model where realism has been contrasted with liberalism to determine how actors view international politics.
Of particular importance in the model are the tenets of both theories which help construct national identities and perceptions in IR (see figure 6).

**Figure 6. International System: Realism vs. Liberalism, a View on International Politics**

*Source: Created by author. Note: Shows that for the realists, because the world is an anarchic system characterized by a constant state of war, the objective in IR is to possess significant national power to protect the self-interest. Therefore, politics is inherently and exclusively a struggle for power. The implication of such power relations in the international system is to possess a huge, sophisticated, and capable army that is supported by a strong economic base. The military can therefore be employed coercively in pursuit of national objectives. On the contrary, liberalism argues that people and the country that represent them are capable of finding mutual interests and cooperating to achieve them at least in part through working in international organizations and the recognition of international laws. Liberalists prohibit the use of force in pursuit of national objectives with a limited exception on the responsibility to protect (United Nations Charter) when grave violations of basic human rights and untold sufferings are committed by the authorities of one state. Most countries of the world are divided between the two theories with most (if not all) superpowers and regional powers pursuing foreign policy objectives that are inclined towards realism.*

In applying the model to Botswana’s national security environment, it is important to first remember that unlike many countries the region and in Africa as a
whole, the country attained its independence through a negotiated deal ending in an amicable transfer of power from the colonizers to the indigenous people. Such a significant achievement is important to emphasize, especially in that it served to reinforce and reaffirm the long standing Tswana cultural belief of that differences among people and the communities they represent can and should always be solved through peaceful means and negotiated settlements. The endeavor being to avoid any violent encounters at all costs. This has always remained the guiding principle in Setswana culture where engagement with other actors on differences was necessary. Essentially, the Setswana culture emphasizes cooperation and peaceful means to deal with differences rather than violence and disintegration among communities based on selfish personal interests. This is the foundation upon which the country was founded. It is this fundamental principle that forms the core of Botswana’s foreign policy that drives one to argue that since independence the country has always chosen a more liberal approach to IR, precisely owing to its profound culture of cooperation, mutual understanding, and reconciliatory approaches to international affairs.

Thus, it is not surprising that although the country attained independence in 1966 through what Professor Thomas Tlou termed as the agitation of political parties essentially suggesting a peaceful and negotiated road map to independence as opposed to other African states in the region. The country nonetheless existed in a hostile environment characterized by the dominance of the hegemon apartheid regime of the RSA. Despite this seemingly obvious existential threat posed by the realist apartheid regime of RSA as evidenced by numerous cross border attacks by the RSA white supremacist military; a situation the realist would define as an anarchic system of states
driven by competitive self-interests in a self-help system, Botswana still maintained cordial relations with RSA. This therefore is a reflection a clear rejection of the tenets of realism (refer to the International Systems Model above) and all what realism stands to represent in IR while making a conscious choice to embrace the principles (and the ideology) of liberalism.

Despite this liberal approach to IR by Botswana, RSA continued to threaten the country’s sovereignty by sustained incursions on the premise that Botswana was “a spy center for Soviet efforts to assist in the subversion of its regime via support for Umkonto we Sizwe—the military wing of the ANC - and also the PAC.”122 Despite these accusations and the escalation of attacks, the founding president of the Republic of Botswana maintained an overly tolerant attitude towards RSA and Rhodesia leading some observers to comment that perhaps Botswana’s foreign policies towards the neighboring countries were largely determined by the country’s geographic location but not preference.123

Considering the arguments proposed by Graham Evans and Jeffery Newman, that the international system fundamentally determines the behavior of state actors, the observation made by James J. Zaffiro is, in totality, true that geopolitical relations play a pivotal role in the determination of a country’s foreign policy. The same sentiments have


123 Ibid.
been expressed by Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley when they observed that in the intricate relationship between low or middle income states with hegemons, a low or middle power state “faces strong pressures to become a compliant alliance partner of one of the major powers and ultimately give up autonomy in its foreign policy for the sake of security.” Some observers may argue that the complex relationship between Botswana and RSA has some elements of this notion. This will also be shown in subsequent arguments when discussing the Foreign Policy; Formulation and Implementation Model. But it is equally important to realize that much of the decisions on foreign policy are in fact a direct result on conscious decisions pertaining to the interpretation of IR and world order. Thus depending on the actors’ ideological belief, policymakers will make deliberate decisions on national security policy intended, as George Modelski argued, to influence the behavior and attitude of external actors to create a favorable environment for the attainment of national interests. It is upon the ideological believe in liberalism that Botswana made such national policy decisions to affect her relations with neighboring countries.

Dan Henk accurately argues, “At the time of independence Botswana’s new leaders deliberately rejected the opportunity to establish a national army, opting instead for a small para military capability in a Police Mobile Unit.” Even after its inauguration in 1997, 11 years after the country attained independence, the military was only maintained as an internal instrument of defense with no ambitions of aggressive

124 Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, 8.

tendencies or its envisaged utility as an instrument of national power in pursuit of national interests in foreign lands. It was barely kept at minimal as a deterrent measure. To this, Henk observes that the “Botswana military is all the more remarkable in that it is maintained by a government noted for moderate and conciliatory foreign policies and is drawn from a society that emphasizes consultation and consensus rather than military power.”

This clearly shows a country that existed in an international environment befitting all notions of realism but still rejected the philosophy of realism; which prescribes for an actor to raise and maintain a strong and sophisticated military to protect its national interests in a self-help system of state relationships. A question may arise challenging whether Botswana may have afforded a large and strong military at the time of independence. While in truism the country could not have by any measure afforded a strong military then, in the following years up to the present times, the country could have easily raised a very strong and capable defense force if it desired to do that. However, because of the nation’s belief in liberalism which advocates for ethical dimensions to foreign policy, which discourages the admissibility and desirability of military intervention to spread or uphold values of liberal democracies abroad, Botswana never found any preeminent need to raise a strong and capable force to repel and even intervene in the dire situation in RSA. Instead the country settled for a small police mobile unit as a deterrent measure and the use of diplomacy to engage RSA.

It can logically be inferred that despite the distrust, competition, and conflict in the region, this did not become the driving force behind Botswana’s foreign policy.
which could have forced the country to acquire military power as safeguard to its security and power in the region. In fact, the country viewed the turmoil as a transitional treat that could be addressed through other means of national power rather than military power. Many observers argue, “Concerned with the phenomenon of military intervention in politics, Botswana deliberately deferred the creation of the military despite the fact that at independence the constitution provided for its existence.” This was a deliberate choice to avoid any responsibility to militarily intervene in the region’s turmoil as leaders then found it to be inconsistent with the nations’ ideological believe.

To justify the rejection of realism by deliberately choosing to denounce the establishment and subsequent development of military power as a viable instrument of national power that could effectively contribute to the attainment of national objectives on geopolitical and geostrategic relations in the region, the founding president of the Republic of Botswana often argued:

“Although Botswana abhorred apartheid and racial discrimination, the country did not have the means or muscle to exert any physical pressure on its powerful neighbors. Khama was often quick to state that even to attempt such moves would be suicidal. His vision was to create a multiparty democratic state in Botswana that would serve as a model of interracial harmony, thus proving to the racists that blacks and whites could indeed co-exist in a peaceful environment.”

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128 Sharp and Fisher, 48.
Furthermore, other members of the administration and policymakers also expressed skepticism and resentment at any plans to establish the military. They argued that government should instead guard against “[G]reedy, self-seeking leaders of the military who might undermine Botswana’s democracy with a coup.”129

Using a typical liberalist approach, soft power as articulated in President Khama’s arguments and the diplomatic instrument of national power inherent to Setswana culture and belief were the preferred options for addressing regional conflicts. It is on the basis of the advanced arguments that the thesis concludes that Botswana has adopted a liberalist approach in perceiving IR in the region and the international system as a whole. To this end, owing to the background upon which the military was founded, the country naturally continues to exhibit skepticism in the development and employment of military power in pursuit of national interests or foreign policy objectives within the larger framework of NSS.

While the author profoundly subscribes to liberalism and in totality supports the country’s position to vigorously oppose the use of military power for purposes of promoting liberty and democracy more generally,130 the author also advocates for Botswana to cautiously observe the liberalist viewpoint that the country cannot simply assume reciprocal peace with all other states in the region. It is thus an expected reality that some states which subscribe to realism and the international anarchical system will remain potentially aggressive131 thus threatening Botswana’s national security environment.

129 Sharp and Fisher, 48.
130 Badie, Schlosser, and Morlio, 1438.
131 Ibid.
Furthermore, while the country continues to realize the ostensible benefits of “[T]o solve disputes peacefully and avoid policies that would lead others to break mutually advantageous economic ties,” given its economic status in the region, that can substantially support a regionally visible force, Botswana as an old and seasoned democracy (which continues to be a shining reference point to most African states) in the region must assume a leadership role in dealing with national and international security challenges in the region. Perhaps the time has come when the BDF can be significantly developed and resourced to become a more regionally engaged instrument of national power in pursuing the country’s national objectives within the framework of NSS. In an endeavor to achieve this, Kant’s moral theory within the liberalism school of thought serves as reference point. Kant’s moral theory advocates that a nation that has “[T]he ability to intervene militarily in the face of systematic human rights violations also has a moral duty to do so, subject to criteria of effectiveness and/or proportionality.”

Notwithstanding the above argument, military intervention as suggested elsewhere must be used as the last resort. However, it is undeniably a capability that an old democracy like Botswana that has earned international recognition in the region and abroad, must have so that it may contribute significantly to peace and democracy in the region. The development of military power here should not be viewed in the context of total war making capability, but rather as an instrument of power that can be prudently used within the means of soft power. This paper therefore rejects as false the notion that the employment of military power under all circumstances in the pursuit of national

132 Badie, Schlosser, and Morlio, 1436.

133 Ibid., 1438.
interests constitutes hard power and therefore perpetuates a realist perspective in IR. Instead the paper argues that military power depending on the context of its employment (strategy) and the objectives for which it has been employed (ends to strategic focus) can be used as soft power. This could be achieved in regional security cooperation where the BDF can be actively involved in the reconstruction and the rebuilding of other militaries in the region where security challenges have rendered such militaries as ineffective to continue with their respective national mandates.

It is a key argument of this paper that Botswana’s shining democracy may have very little legacy in contributing to regional stability if its professional military could not be actively used to play a leading role (by exporting its professionalism to regional partners) in contributing to peace and stability in the region. It is only logical to suggest that as the country continues to advocate for peace and democracy in the region, sometimes such endeavors pitting it against other regional actors, the country must equally have a visible capability that could be employed to demand compliance where other instruments of national power have failed. It is only with such a commitment that other actors may not be dismissive of Botswana’s efforts in advocating for peace and strong democratic institutions in the region.

Achieving the Strategic Balance in the Development of Instruments of National Power

A discussion on Botswana’s development of instruments of national power cannot be divorced from the country’s geopolitical and geographic location in Southern Africa. To fully comprehend the development of the country’s instruments of national power, particularly the evolution of military power, it is important to bring into focus the
geopolitical situation and geographic location of Botswana. Essentially, this helps to understand how aspects of FPA and ISA have all acted in conjunction to help shape or construct Botswana’s NSS and ultimately the development and employment of instruments of national power to pursue national policy objectives.

Bringing synergy to the arguments in this section, it must be noted as already addressed in chapter 2 that FPA focuses on domestic politics and decision making factors that affect the actors’ choices and policies in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Kaarbo clearly captures this as a perspective, or approach, that stresses the role of the central decision-making unit (governments as representation of the state in action) and the subjective understandings of leaders as funnels for other international and domestic factors. In other words, FPA takes a critical look at how leaders mitigate the internal constraints within domestic politics and creates a balance against such constraints with what the actor aspires to achieve as codified in national interests.

While in the end it is the decision of the actor’s political leadership that determines the extent to which national resources will be developed and assigned national roles; public opinion, interest groups and pressure groups also play a crucial role in determining the development of an actor’s national power. Refer to the Foreign Policy; Formulation and Implementation Model. The author embraces Hudson’s argument that primarily FPA focuses on understanding and unraveling the complicated communication within national governments and their diverse agents. This further includes a

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134 Kaarbo, 189-216.
consideration of the perceptions and misperceptions, the images of other countries, and the ideologies and personal dispositions of everyone involved.135

Ideally, Hudson’s observations fall squarely within a constructivist approach in understanding domestic politics. That the socially constructed perceptions by the public, interest and pressure groups to include the international community relating to how they view the actors foreign policy projection will determine whether such behavior will be accepted and encouraged or whether it will be rejected thus drawing criticism. While the former will encourage or leverage the leadership’s ability to develop national resources and harness the potential development of national power for its subsequent employment to pursue national policy objectives, the latter will invariably limit the actions of the political leadership in achieving such development of instruments of national power. In corroborating this view, Joseph S. Nye argues that the constructivist approach suggests that “most systems exist in a cultural context that involves some basic rules and practices that define appropriate behavior.”136

This is true because governments exists and remain responsible to carry out the will of the people. The president of the constitutionally elected government is thus viewed by the public and all interested parties as the principal policy maker and the ultimate representative of the country. His actions therefore, and that of his government remain a subject of public approval both in domestic and international politics. To achieve checks and balances in accountability and responsibility, while simultaneously

135 Kaarbo, 189-216.

aspiring to mitigate internal constraints emanating from a process of domestic politics, governments articulate their mandate through the expression of foreign policy which remains subject to public scrutiny and interest groups under democratic institutions.

James Druckman and Lawrence Jacobs argued that the relationship between a chief executive (the executive arm of government) and his or her public can significantly affect the ways in which formal institutions operate in practice within a political system.\textsuperscript{137} This therefore has an influence on the extent to which national governments can go in the development and coordination of national instruments of power to ascertain national power and the prudent pursuance of national objectives (see figure 7).

Figure 7. Foreign Policy: Formulation and Implementation

*Source:* Created by author. The model shows that foreign policy formulation occurs within the inextricably linked realm of domestic politics and international politics. Each of these spheres of influence on national policymaking processes has constraints that the policymaker or actor within the international system must take into consideration when developing national instruments of power for their ultimate employment as a means in achieving the ends, be it foreign policy objectives or national interests. The national political leadership centrally positioned between the means, ways, and ends play a pivotal role in determining the national strategic focus by articulating national policy and driving national will to support such policy implementation both within the domestic and international landscape. Note that foreign policy is developed in domestic politics to effect desirable national outcomes in international politics.

Corroborating this view, Botswana provides a classic example of how FPA perspective contributes in either limiting or encouraging the powers of national governments in the development of national power. When attaining independence from British rule on 30 September 1966, Botswana did not inherit any military infrastructure to provide for national defense and security needs. While there were such debates that the
country should establish its own military force following its independence, there was however a substantial resentment of any idea that proposed the formation of a standing military from the general public, particularly the political elite of the country. The political elite generally feared that military leaders may undermine a young and perhaps ill prepared democracy with a coup. This negative perception of the inherent power of the military and its envisaged misuse ensured that Botswana remained for 11 years without a standing military. This is despite the fact that the country existed in a relatively perpetual state of regional instability characterized by organized and systematic cross border incursions form both South Africa and Zimbabwe (Union of South Africa and Rhodesia respectively around 1966).

While such a misgiving about the military was not farfetched given the prevalence of military coups in Africa at that time, within the context of FPA perspective, it denied the country the development of military power and essentially helped to perpetuate the mistrust or skepticism that would continue to define the nation’s civil military relations for decades. Such a perception ensured that 11 years later when the BDF was ultimately formed (within an environment where the populace was much concerned about the military’s potential intervention in domestic politics), it will be deliberately kept at a small strength and minimally resourced only to act as a deterrent force to national threats.

A clear indication of this could be drawn from Prime Minister Seretse Khama’s discourse during the transition to independence when he rejected as ridiculous the opposition’s calls for the creation of an army arguing that the country was faced with numerous more pressing matters such as economic development and poverty.
Louis Fisher and Paul Sharp argue that the same rhetoric was expressed elsewhere when scholars argued that creating an army at independence brought with it the intractable budgetary, political, ethnic, and other problems associated with colonial armies. The purpose of the paper is not to question the rationality of the decisions made then, nor to establish their moral correctness of such decisions during the material time, but rather to show that internal politics and the general response of the government to public opinion have effects on the actor’s ability to develop instruments of national power for their subsequent employment in pursuit of national objectives.

On one hand, the ISA perspective encompasses theories of the interactions between states and how the number of states and their respective capabilities affect their relations with each other. As already noted, the online Encyclopedia Britannica defines the ISA perspective as, “concerned with the structure of the system, the interactions between its units, and the implications for peace and war, or cooperation and conflict, of the existence of different types of states.”¹³⁹ The Oxford Dictionary defines a system as “a set of things or parts forming a complex whole, in particular.”¹⁴⁰ An understanding of this explanation therefore suggests that the international system is a conglomeration of different states all coming together to form a collective that systematically works within a


certain regulatory mechanism to achieve each actor’s national objectives. Hedley Bull argues that the international system is formed when “two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions to cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of the whole.”\footnote{Richard Little, \textit{The Balance of Power in International Relations} (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 128-166, accessed 1 February 2016, \url{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511816635.005}.} The proposition of impact in this definition suggests that there will be friction points limiting the freedoms of actors in their interactions within the system. Consequential to the interaction, there will be certain restrictions and freedoms to the actions of the actor which will change the actor’s approach in the projection of foreign policy.

For instance, following a sustained period of tumultuous instability in the region around the 1980s through the 1990s, which saw several cross border incursions by RSA forces and the increase in cross border poaching activities, national policymakers decided to expand the mission set of the BDF. It is at the same time that the BDF also became actively involved in external operations particularly in peacekeeping missions. Dan Henk observed, “[T]he 1990s were a period of substantial growth for the Botswana Defense Force. By the end of the decade, the force had surpassed a size of 10 000 personnel. It had also seen substantial increases in its firepower and mobility.”\footnote{Hank.} It can thus be argued that the increase in capacity and efficiency of the BDF was a direct response to the existential threats of the country’s interests in the region and Africa as a whole. It is thus reasonable to argue that from an ISA perspective, unstable relations in the region led to a
positive development of military power for Botswana in an endeavor to protect national interests.

However, there was also significant opposition to such development of military power which also significantly limited the extent to which Botswana could acquire military capability to assert visible military prowess in the region. Mpho G. Molomo observed:

The strengthening of the BDF drew strong reaction from the region. Namibia opposed Botswana’s purchase of Leopard tanks from the Netherlands and F5 fighter-bombers from Canada. In response to Botswana’s military buildup the Namibian Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, criticized the purchase of the Leopard tanks as “provocative and unnecessary.” The uneasy relations between Botswana and Namibia over Sedudu, even though the two countries took the matter to the International Court in The Hague for arbitration and was amicably resolved, was a source of potential conflict.¹⁴³

Clearly, the move by the region to oppose Botswana’s acquisition of military hardware to build military capability is a clear example of how international actors continue to affect the country’s foreign policy and eventually affect the extent to which instruments of national power may be ultimately developed to pursue foreign policy objectives.

Therefore, this becomes the function of theories under the ISA perspective to explain how actors will react under certain circumstances to deal with such friction points in their pursuit of national objectives within the system. It can therefore infer that the ISA perspective is more externally focused as opposed to the FPA perspective which tends to focus on the internal arrangement and functioning of the political system of an actor (domestic politics). It therefore specifically addresses its concerns on foreign policy and

how the implantation of such policy affects international order or the balance of power in the international system.

**Coordinating National Power to Attain National Interests**

In typical realist fashion, Nye observes that the realists contend “[S]ecurity dilemmas are related to the essential characteristics of international politics; anarchic organization, the absence of a higher government.”¹⁴⁴ Nye further argues that, under the realist perspective in an anarchic system of states, independent action taken by one state to significantly increase its security may make all other states (especially those within its immediate proximity though the effects will not be limited to regional boundaries) insecure. Essentially, “[W]hen one state its strength to make sure that another cannot threaten it, the other, seeing the first getting stronger, may build its strength to protect itself against the first. The result is that the independent efforts of each to build its own strength and security makes both more insecure.”¹⁴⁵ The result of this security dilemma is that it makes war in international politics more probable because of the general structure of the anarchic system that discourages cooperation among actors in the international system. To this end, realists argue for the development of large sophisticated and modernized armies, which can be employed to pursue national objectives.

On one hand, the liberalist perspective views the world in a different way, arguing instead for cooperation among actors to achieve mutual benefits in the pursuit of national interests. They argue that cooperation can be achieved and conflicting interests can be

¹⁴⁴ Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 16.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
solved amicably between actors if they all subscribe to the same principles of liberalism. This is important to emphasize because at the end of it all, liberalist through the democratic peace theory contend that liberal democracies cannot go to war against each other but will go to war with realists states that do not subscribe to liberal ideals. Without necessarily arguing for moral correctness of any of the above theories, what becomes apparent is that military power will always remain an essential component of national power in the pursuit of national objectives. What therefore varies is how and for what ends is military power employed which could then justify the questions of ethics and morality in the use of military power to attain national objectives. Botswana like all actors in the international system employs her instruments of national power to attain or preserve national interests.

Like many other nations of the world, for Botswana to answer these complex national security questions, and to optimally develop its military power for subsequent employment in a complex contemporary security environment, there is an urgent need for the country to develop NSS to guide the prudent employment of all instruments of national power including military power. To arrive at this point, the country should undertake deliberate steps to reform the security sector from a national policy perspective. This will ensure that the country’s military power is well developed in accordance with national policy guidelines. Furthermore, this will ensure accountability in shared role play as the military is assigned tasks to meet within the large framework of NSS to pursue or protect national interests.

Discussed later in this chapter are suggested strategic guidelines that the country should undertake. Such policy guidelines to improve the geostrategic employment of the
BDF and other instruments of national power have to be cautiously developed using the U.S. approach to national strategy. This should not be misunderstood as advocating for Botswana to parallel the United States in its strategic use of the military to pursue national interests. Rather, this should be understood in the context of guiding the prudent development and utilization of the BDF for foreign policy objectives within the economical capability of the country. Figure 5 in chapter 2 will be used to provide a basis for the guideline to develop Botswana’s NSS and subsequent employment of national power to pursue foreign policy objectives. Clearly, the model is more inclined to the development of military power. This is a deliberate choice to bring emphasis to the arguments obtainable in this paper.

**Defining National Interests**

It has already been argued elsewhere in this paper that national interests form the basis of national policy formulation. It is only when a nation has clearly identified its enduring interests that policymakers can then begin the intractable work of constructing the NSS. Essentially, the NSS is constructed to attain the identified national interests through the employment of national resources or instruments of national power as represented by DIME. It is therefore necessary for Botswana to clearly articulate her enduring national interests to guide the prudent distribution of national power to pursue such interests. Those interests must be crafted into a document and their intensity determined to ensure that the distribution of national resources to pursue them is done in accordance with their importance for the survival of the country.

Since attaining independence, the country’s national interests have largely been determined by its geopolitical situation which in turn influenced the country’s national
security and foreign policy structure. Particularly, Botswana’s national security and foreign policy posture have largely been influenced by the apartheid regime of RSA until very recently when the regime collapsed giving rise to a democratic RSA. It is in view of this fact that Botswana now finds herself at a crossroads in having to redefine its national interests and the NSS as the threat posed by RSA has suddenly faded away giving rise to new challenges to the national security environment of Botswana.

In support of this view point, Zaffiro observes, “The Republic of Botswana, along with South Africa and nearly all the states of Southern Africa, finds itself at a foreign policy crossroads, and the country is faced with the prospect of change such as it has not experienced since the onset of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Cold War and anti-apartheid-inspired calculations of national interest and geopolitical constraints, which have driven Botswana’s foreign policy since independence.”\(^{146}\) Zaffiro correctly argues that RSA can no longer object to Botswana’s unencumbered pursuit relations with the new international actors. Zaffiro advises that as the country enters transformed regional and international arenas, Botswana must diversify its diplomatic and economic partners. This he contends will allow the country to gain leverage with traditional friends and allies, like Britain and the United States, by demonstrating to them that it can go elsewhere for what it needs.\(^{147}\) All this can be achieved if the country clearly states in national priorities as it pursues foreign policy objectives. Presently, Botswana’s national interests though not documented can be found in various policy documents within different departments of the national government.

\(^{146}\) Zaffiro, 96.

\(^{147}\) Ibid.
Particularly, National Vision 2016 provides in some way the consolidated national interests of Botswana but falls short of equitably distributing national resources to achieve those interests. Several other national documents to include presidential speeches and directives on certain national events continue to resound in some way the country’s national interests. Generally, most national documents identify Botswana’s national interests as; peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries, protection of life, protection of property, and the preservation of national sovereignty and integrity. It is the argument of this paper that it will serve the country well if national policymakers could review all national documents that contain the country’s national interests and consolidate those into one manageable document that can remain a guiding point on what the country represents. This will clearly articulate our national identity and the enduring set of beliefs that represents our ideals as a nation. Once these national objectives and interests are identified, then national power may be prudently employed to pursue them. Thus, it is important to suggest that the country needs to adopt the national interests matrix developed by Neuchterlein to clearly articulate its national interests to guide policy development (see figure 3 in chapter 2).

**Developing Policy Instruments to Support the Attainment of National Interests**

It is only when a clear list of national objectives has been achieved that the country can then start to articulate its NSS. NSS refers to “the requirement of governments and their civilian and military leaders to maintain and ensure the sovereignty and survival of the (their) nation-state through the use of economic, military
and political power and the exercise of diplomacy.”148 His Excellency the President of
the Republic of Botswana, Lieutenant General Ian Khama Seretse Khama, defined
national security as the “maintenance, safeguard and protection of a country’s national
interests (understood to mean protection of life, protection of property and territorial
integrity) from either internal or external threats.”149 It can therefore be inferred that
generally, the term collectively includes the conduct and coordination of national defense
systems and the projection of foreign policy through the employment of national power.
At its simplest, Botswana’s national security is the use of national power, which is all of
the means that are available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives in peace
and war to further a strategic vision of Botswana’s role in the world that will best achieve
the nation’s core interests: protection of life, protection of property, territorial integrity
(the three may be summed up as physical and social security), promotion of values, and
economic prosperity.

An undertaking to achieve this intractable job of formulating the NSS to ensure a
safe and secure environment that is favorable to Botswana’s national interests, the
country needs to develop critical policy documents to support such an endeavor. At the
first instance, data collected has shown that, countries which have been successful at the
prudent employment of their national power in pursuit of national interests have done so
because they have developed and clearly articulated their NSS. In view of this, the

148 Craig W. Mastapeter, “The Instruments Of National Power: Achieving The
Strategic Advantage in a Changing World” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, 2008), 1, accessed 7 May 2016, calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/
10945/3756/08Dec_Mastapeter.pdf?.

149 Molomo, 46.
National Strategy Model presented in figure 5 comes in handy to guide Botswana’s policymakers in the development of the NSS and subsequent policy documents desirable for the successful conduct of foreign policy issues through the employment of national power. Presently, though the country interestingly continues to manage the employment of national power through different policy documents available at different government departments with some admirable success, it is still a concern that there is no NSS to precisely guide this important national endeavor. Why should Botswana’s national policymakers care about developing the NSS?

Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan, in Dilday’s work, argue that it is important for a nation to clearly articulate its NSS as an overarching national policy to guide the prudent utilization of scarce national resources in pursuing national objectives. They maintain that evidentially NSS:

Is important because history teaches that a state will be more capable of accomplishing its national objectives if those objectives are balanced against external threats and the type and quantity of available national resources. This conclusion appears to be valid over time and across cultures. States that failed to reconcile means and ends adequately ultimately had difficulty accomplishing their national objectives. Conversely, states that consciously attempted to match means and ends were generally more successful in the pursuit of national interests.\(^{150}\)

Following the above observation, Botswana may learn a critical lesson from the United States. The United States at its initial formulation of the NSS following the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1987 during the Cold War era established that, the NSS primarily serves three major purposes as captured by Paul B. Eberhart:

\(^{150}\) Dilday, 28.
There are three primary reasons why adopting a process for a grand strategy is important at this time. The first is the need for clear guidance to reduce inefficiencies. The second is the need to employ the instruments of national power more effectively. Third, the government needs capstone guidance outlining the process, and then it needs a clear example in the form of the GSUS to inform lesser strategic documents.\footnote{Paul B. Eberhart, “Grand Strategy of the United States: A Study of the Process” (Master’s thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advance Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA, 2009), 2, accessed 12 April 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235149975_Grand_Strategy_of_the_United_States_A_Study_of_the_Pro cess.}

Pursuant to Kaufman, Clark, and Sheehan, and Eberhart, Botswana should revisit its national policy structures and redefine them to meet the challenges of the current national security environment; particularly, those structures that deal with the development, coordination and employment of national military power to enhance the role of military diplomacy in pursuing the country’s foreign policy objectives. It must be pointed out at this juncture that most of the relevant structures are already in existence but lack the overall legal support established constitutionally to fully perform their envisaged roles in accordance with international norms and standards.

A review of these structures should include their reorganization to fully support their functionality as coordinators and monitors of the NSS. The review should include the creation of new structures both at the national parliamentary level (to improve oversight role play) and at the executive level to fully advise the president on matters of national security. Of critical importance will be a fundamental move to establish an independent Ministry of Defense (MoD) that will be given the overall coordination, monitoring and implementation of the NMS to achieve the nation’s interests through military power. The function of the ministry will be to deal with aspects of national
security as they relate to the BDF. The ministry will also ensure that the government achieves the most important aspect in civil military relations within democratic institutions of civil control of the military. Samuel Huntington defines civilian control as the distribution of political power between the military and civilian groups that is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among members of the officer corps.\footnote{152} Fisher and Sharp contend that in modern discourse, civilian control of the military has been termed as, democratic control of the armed forces, and is thus generally understood to mean subordination of the armed forces to democratically elected civilians. This is done to achieve oversight role play but most importantly for development, direction, and employment of military power in achieving national policy objectives.

The above argument should not be assumed to preclude the NSS from holistically addressing all instruments of national power. The argument is only just made as an emphasis to the core theme portrayed in this paper. Botswana’s NSS, just like that of the U.S. government could theoretically serve several distinct purposes which are enumerated as;

1. Offering prioritized objectives and indicating which elements of national power (ways and means) are to be used to meet them, it can provide guidance to departments and agencies to use in their internal processes for budgeting, planning and executing, and organizing, training, and equipping personnel.

2. Clearly linking goals and the approaches designed to meet them, NSS can provide the executive branch a key tool for justifying requested resources to Congress.

3. Laying out a detailed strategic vision, it can help inform public audiences both at home and abroad about U.S. government intent.

The actual formulation of Botswana’s NSS should take form within the context of the strategic tenets discussed in chapter 2. In the end, as previously stated elsewhere in this paper, a successful calibration of the NSS will ensure that all other subsidiary policy documents such as the NDS and the NMS (narrowing down to military diplomacy) are well informed and developed.

**Botswana and Military Diplomacy**

In its approach of pursuing a reconciliatory foreign policy characterized by mutual understanding and respect of political differences, Botswana has naturally resented the employment of the military instrument of national power for purposes of pursuing foreign policy objectives. This is understandable because the evolution of the BDF reveals that from the onset, national policymakers never wanted the BDF to be an active contributor to national policy objectives. In fact, the BDF was conceived in an environment of skepticism that vehemently opposed military power as a viable contributor to national power. Fisher and Sharp argue, “The BDF was thus conceived as a response to the then prevailing political and military situation in the region. In a nutshell, the BDF is a product of a reluctant but inevitable response.”[^153] The unintended

[^153]: Sharp and Fisher, 46.
consequence of this mistrust is that the BDF’s development pattern has missed the systematic and strategic steps of conventional military development. Therefore, efforts to develop the BDF have been, if anything, reactive.\textsuperscript{154} Although with resistance from some sectors of the society, the nation has consciously started moving towards modernizing the BDF to make it more competent in dealing with the complex threats and challenges to the national security environment. For instance, amid the protests from around 4,300 people comprising the general public and some interest groups during the National Development Plan VII of 1991-1996,\textsuperscript{155} the government argued for increased spending in military expenditure to develop the BDF.

Under this section the thesis will argue against this traditional conservatism that cherishes the narrative that militaries historically are associated with achieving national aims and objectives in IR through the use of force. Such a narrative encourages national leadership and policy makers to view military power only within the limited context of hard power gunboat diplomacy which has no place in Botswana’s foreign policy. “In the 18th and 19th centuries the coercive use of militaries (and navies) by colonial powers led to coining of the term gunboat diplomacy which refers to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives with the aid of conspicuous displays of military power, implying or constituting a direct threat of warfare.”\textsuperscript{156}

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\textsuperscript{154} Sharp and Fisher, 46.

\textsuperscript{155} Zaffiro, 96.

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The thesis shall therefore argue for the development of military power for the ultimate employment of the same in pursuit of national objectives within the context of soft power. Essentially arguing that the BDF can be developed and equipped to meet the requirements of a modern force which can be strategically used peacefully to pursue the country’s foreign policy objectives in IR. This is what IR scholars in the study of military power call military diplomacy. Military diplomacy is defined as the peaceful use of military power in diplomacy, as a tool of national foreign policy. Colonel K. A. Muthanna argues, “It is axiomatic that military diplomacy has to be dovetailed and integrated with the national diplomatic efforts.”\textsuperscript{157} On an international landscape, many countries have been able to achieve this by clearly articulating their NSS which ultimately guides how all instruments of national power will be employed to attain national interests. This is inclusive of military power which is conspicuously guided by the NMS derived from the NSS.

For instance, Muthanna observes that the United Kingdom’s defense diplomacy is defined in a narrow sense, “as the use of military personnel, including service attaches, in support of conflict prevention and resolution. Among a great variety of activities, it includes providing assistance in the development of democratically accountable armed forces.”\textsuperscript{158} The policy goes further to explain that military diplomacy is “the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their trained expertise and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad.”\textsuperscript{159} It is in this sense that military power

\textsuperscript{157} Muthanna, 2.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 3.
should not only be selfishly viewed from a narrow perspective of the realist approach that advocates for understanding of the use of military power only as a war making capability thus exclusively existing in IR as hard power or coercive force.

The approach adopted by this thesis which advocates for the BDF to be developed and employed for strategic policy objectives regionally and to a limited extent internationally is supported by historical evidence. From antiquity, force and threats of force have always been vital instruments of diplomacy and have continued to play a pivotal role in foreign policy developments by various nations. It is evidentially true that the diplomatic instrument of national power though playing a crucial role in international affairs, does not always succeed. Sometimes when the diplomatic instrument fails and an actor is reluctant to employ military power (whether through gunboat or military diplomacy) to meet foreign policy requirements, the consequences are often far reaching and detrimental.

Furthermore, the careful study of contemporary threats in a globalized world which has trans-border effects supports the necessity of resorting to military power to solve these threats often before they reach an actor’s territorial borders. This must however be a calculated move that takes into account the risks of doing so as weighed against the risks of inability to act militarily. Alexander George argues that within this security dilemma nations are left with a central question in the theory and practice of foreign policy; that is, under what conditions and how can military force and threats of force be used effectively to accomplish different types of foreign policy objectives at an acceptable level of cost and risk? Most importantly and quite relevant to this paper is, how can military power be used peacefully to pursue foreign policy objectives?
The above questions point to the central argument of this paper that the BDF can be used as military power within peaceful means to achieve Botswana’s foreign policy objectives (as military diplomacy). To achieve this, the BDF must first be developed to meet certain standards and efficiency that could be set within the MoD within the requirements of national security policy framework. The argument to improve the levels of development in the BDF is born out of government’s own admission that the BDF is not ready to meet all national security concerns. This was observed by the late Minister of Presidential Affairs Lieutenant General Mompati Merafhe. During the parliamentary debate on the 1991/1992 security budget, the then Minister of Presidential Affairs Lieutenant General Mompati Merafhe, indicated that the BDF was being built into an organization which would be able to cater for “the type of situation faced in the past and those which may be even worse in the future.” He ruled out early budget cuts in military spending because “we have not yet reached a position where it could be said the potential for conflict has been (sufficiently) reduced (and) there is confidence that most threats to the sovereignty of the country could be met.”

Although this is well over two decade ago, much has not been achieved since then in terms of developing and modernizing the BDF to make it more relevant and suitable to operate in the current complex security environment. Proposed development and modernization within the parameters of NSS framework, is driven by the fact that contemporary threats have increased in scope and complexity. Furthermore, the traditional military threats that desired conventional methods of warfare for the BDF to

\(^{160}\) Zaffiro, 99.

\(^{161}\) Ibid., 98.
win or solve, have significantly been reduced and replaced with more complex, irregular, and asymmetric threats that are cross border in nature such as the Islamic State group and cyber warfare. Although most of these threats in the near future will continue to occur beyond the territorial boundaries of Botswana, they will nonetheless have profound trickle down effects that will continue to threaten the country’s national interests, perhaps even the survival interests.

It is in the context of this complex and dynamic 21st century national security environment that this thesis argues for the BDF of today that is well developed and modernized to have a regional reach. This will leverage the country’s ability to employ military diplomacy to shape the international security environment and provide for the successful pursuance of national interests in a conducive environment. Furthermore, within the framework of the NMS as derived from the BDF could be employed for foreign policy ends to defeat national threats before they reach national borders, perhaps escalating the cost of military inactivity in the face of threats to national interests. A cautious consideration of these arguments, obviously advocates for an expanded role of military power in the formulation and implementation of the country’s foreign policy. Perhaps also an expansion of the BDF’s mission sets and roles to strategically position it within the limitations of the NSS and NMS to protect and preserve Botswana’s national interests abroad (particularly within the region) through the use of military diplomacy.

Military diplomacy serves specific national foreign and security policy objectives. “In the context of global and regional strategic engagement, it creates sustainable cooperative relationships, thereby building trust and facilitating conflict prevention, introducing transparency into defense relations; building and reinforcing perceptions of
common interests; changing the mind-set of partners; and inducing cooperation in other areas.”

Military diplomacy therefore can further Botswana’s specific foreign policy objectives by managing defense foreign relations and supporting the other diplomatic initiatives of government in international affairs.

Evidentially, there are many instances where the government of Botswana has used military diplomacy to pursue national interests. Typically, like most nations, Botswana continues to maintain defense attaches in many countries as a symbol of military-to-military cooperation with those nations. Similarly, the country has been involved in a few peacekeeping missions in the African continent and has militarily intervened in some countries in the region under the direction of SADC. While some of these form part of military diplomacy, it might be argued that they were undertaken as reactive measures when conflicts had reached escalating levels desiring desperate international measures. They were therefore not taken as deliberate national government activities designed to meet specific national policy objectives within a defined NSS/NMS framework in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

The paper therefore argues that these military activities that are designed to meet foreign policy objectives, must be deliberately planned. Furthermore, they should be guided by a clearly articulated NMS designed to meet the overall objectives of the long-term NSS. Broadly, instances where the BDF may be employed to pursue foreign policy objectives within the direction of NMS and the overarching policy requirements of the NSS include but are not limited to the following:

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162 Muthanna, 2.
1. To promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in the field of defense and security. “Defense cooperation activities comprise of strategic security dialogues that enable understanding of the participant concerns and establishing areas of common interest.”

2. To promote mutual understanding on defense and security challenges as well as to enhance transparency and openness through defense cooperation.

3. Assistance in the maintenance of lawful governments in the region. This may include military training of host nation’s armed forces and advice on military matters to ensure professionalism, such as in Lesotho and Mozambique.

4. Continued unreserved participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions and SDAC missions even if such contribution to those missions may at minimum entail support only without boots on the ground.

The overall effects of military diplomacy in the above articulation is that this enhances national influence over such countries and creates a conducive security environment for Botswana to pursue national interests. Furthermore, it allows for cooperation in the defeat of common threats in the shared security environment, further increasing Botswana’s national influence.

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163 Muthanna, 3.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis has demonstrated that Botswana as an actor in the international system has always had regional and global responsibilities and ambitions. For the past five decades since attaining independence, the country has always had a proud history of standing up for the values Batswana believe. Going forward there should be no less ambition for the country as it navigates through an ambiguous, unpredictable, and complex 21st century international security environment. Such an endeavor requires that the country be more thoughtful, more strategic, and more coordinated in the way it advances its interests and pursues national security policy objectives in a world polarized between realist and liberalists states. Botswana must find a middle ground (a hybrid approach between liberalism and realism) to allow for the pursuance of national interests without potentially swinging to the far right or far left.

Furthermore, the thesis has demonstrated that to meet national security requirements while simultaneously satisfying the ends to foreign policy objectives, the country needs a clearly defined national security policy and its associated strategic policy documents to guide the prudent application of national power in pursuing national interests. At the bare minimum, the country needs a clearly articulated NSS which can be reviewed regularly to ensure its relevance in shaping the international security environment to create favorable conditions for the pursuit of Botswana’s foreign policy objectives.

The NSS will provide direction for the pursuance of national objectives through a deliberate and planned utilization of national resources while simultaneously mitigating
risk arising from external pressures to Botswana’s national security. Understood as the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security as Yarger put it, Botswana’s NSS will articulate prioritized ends and then links means (resources) and ways (approaches) in a plan of action to achieve those ends in a given context.

Furthermore, it has become evidentially clear from the research that Botswana’s national security depends on the economic security of the nation and vice versa. Thus bringing up a small, accountable and professional national defense force which is capable of reacting to a diversity of threats without crippling the national budget is a vital part of how the nation should construct its national security policy. Botswana must continuously find more effective ways to tackle risks to the national security environment taking an integrated approach, both across government (interagency) and internationally. Identify risks early and treat the causes, rather than having to deal with the consequences when threats are now knocking at the border. The goal is to avoid escalating the cost of military inactivity at a crucial time when national interests are severely threatened. To achieve this, the thesis has proven that there is a need for systems transformation in the national defense.

There is a need for reorganization of the nation’s military to expand its roles and mission sets to give it a regional reach thus optimizing its contribution to Botswana’s foreign policy in the conduct of international affairs through military diplomacy. Over the past years there has been a transformation in Botswana’s economy and wider society. There is no doubt that global competition for resources and their markets, international
conflicts, and instability have all placed a premium on the country’s national security. Harnessing new technology, developing new, high-value skills and embracing change have all enabled the country’s economy to respond to these challenges, but only because companies, communities, and individuals have had to learn to adapt to rapid change.

Just as these trends have required a major change in the behavior of all parts of the society, the challenges also require a response from government specifically in the security sector. Security sector reforms are necessary to enable Botswana to thrive over the decades to come, with a more flexible and adaptable force that has qualities in expertise and professionalism. The requirements for these security sector transformations relating to the BDF come in two ways. At the grand strategic level, there is need for structural organization, particularly in the superintendence of the BDF from the civil control perspective to improve both oversight role play and strategic guidance in the development and employment of military power for foreign policy objectives.

To this end, there is an urgent need to establish an autonomous MoD to draw this entire effort of military power together. The approach recognizes that the country needs to expand its ability to deploy military and civilian experts together to support stabilization efforts and build capacity both locally and in other states, as a long-term investment to achieve a more stable world. Such a condition is a prerequisite to the projection of foreign policy objectives in a conducive regional and international security environment. This thesis therefore argues that, the establishment of the MoD is the first most important steppingstone towards a more effective NSS and defense management of the BDF. Politically, this is important to allow the central government departments to play their pivotal role in enabling Botswana to meet considerable national defense
challenges. These roles will equally be coordinated at that level thus creating an important interface between the military and the civilian principals who will be entrusted with the strategic guidance of the military within the framework of overall national policy.

Today, this function exists as a fusion between old ministries and the recently established Ministry of Defense, Security and Justice. Because this function exists as an amalgamation of different Ministries, with the less resourced Ministry of Defense, Security and Justice, the explicit issues of defining the force capabilities are presently ignored for lack of direction and coordination. Clearly this creates a disparity between capabilities and threats which the military is desired to fight and defeat or deter. The shortfall is in no doubt a result of Botswana’s inability to adjust the NDS—probably define the NDS because presently such policy does not exist—to face the realities of the ever-changing regional dynamics and world conflicts. Most countries the world over, achieve this through the coordinated effort of their defense ministries which are tasked with the development of their militaries to ensure that they are be better adapted to face current and future threats, with the type of equipment they need to prevail in today’s complex security environment. To this end, the MoD among other things will be entrusted with the development and implementation of the NDS. The NDS will serve as a vital link that translates the NSS requirements into actionable national objectives that should be met by the NMS.

Existing under the MoD, the NDS will serve this function by evaluating Botswana’s strategic environment, challenges, and risks the nation must consider in achieving national objectives, and maps the way forward for the military instrument of
national power. Most importantly, the NDS provides national policymakers with a very
crucial policy instrument that is used in the planning for military force structure, force
modernization, business processes, supporting infrastructure, and required resources
(funding and manpower requirements) to meet the requirements of NSS. It will clearly
stipulates all key national strategic objectives that must be achieved by the military
power.

At the military strategic level, transformation is needed from a policy perspective
in the form of formal NMS. The NMS will inform the organization and distribution of
military forces to achieve national security objectives. Particularly the NMS will identify
the tasks of the military, prioritize them, determine capability match to meet threats and
inform the ultimate employment of forces to defeat or deter such threats to shape the
international security environment. NMS as already stated earlier in this paper seeks to
establish “[H]ow the threat or use of military force, along with the posture, disposition,
and doctrine of the armed forces, can be employed to achieve a state’s foreign policy
interests and goals, and meet its international commitments.”\textsuperscript{164} It is defined as the “The
art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of
national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force.”\textsuperscript{165} In this context, the
BDF’s NMS (which should be the prerogative of the Commander BDF as the Chief
National Security advisor to the President on matters of strategic employment of the
military power) aims to support the objectives of the NSS by implementing the
requirements of the NDS.

\textsuperscript{164} Hamilton, 3.

\textsuperscript{165} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02 (1987), 232.
It has already been argued that as a national strategic document articulating how military power will be employed to pursue Botswana’s national policy objectives to address complex security challenges, the NMS shall serve two distinct and yet inextricably linked purposes:

1. It shall describe how the BDF plan to achieve military objectives (within the overall policy requirements of NSS) in the near term and provide the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future.

2. It shall provide strategic direction on how the BDF should align the military ends, ways, means, and risks to achieve national policy objectives.

Lastly, in accordance with Robert Art, the thesis proved that the most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to first determine a nation’s national interests. It is in line with this argument that it is recommended that any effort to develop Botswana’s national security policy (and its supporting policy documents) must first start with the identification of national interests. Once they are identified, as Art argued, they will drive Botswana’s foreign policy and military strategy; they determine the basic direction that it takes, the types and amounts of resources that it needs, and the manner in which the state must employ them to succeed.

The paper has shown that for these interests to be better protected and thus the country well served in aspects of national security there is need for security sector reforms which should take into account the establishment of an autonomous MoD which will be charged with maintaining a balance between the short-term responsiveness to military, humanitarian and, sometimes, domestic civil requirements, with the need to
maintain readiness and deterrence, and to plan for the force structures and equipment that will be needed in the long term.

Also significantly important, the paper has argued for the expansion of the BDF’s roles and mission sets to give it a regional perspective thus significantly improving its potential contribution to the formulation and implementation of Botswana’s foreign policy. The paper advocates for this to be achieved through the employment of the BDF to achieve foreign policy objectives in a peaceful way; through military diplomacy. To this end, the paper has confidently shown that presently, the BDF as an instrument of military power, is not strategically placed to play a meaningful role in the implementation of Botswana’s foreign policy as the country pursues its national interests. However, the author notes that an implementation of all or part of the observations made in this paper may help improve the strategic role play of military power in pursuing Botswana’s national interests in the international system.
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