APPROACHES JAPAN CAN ADOPT TO DETER CHINA’S ASSERTIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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B.A., Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan, 2002

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2016

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# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</th>
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<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
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<td>Approaches Japan Can Adopt to Deter China’s Assertive Behavior in the International Arena</td>
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<thead>
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<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Advocating its peaceful development to realize the “great national rejuvenation,” China continues its rapid economic growth and the military buildup to secure its interests. China conducts assertive actions like the establishment of Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Japanese territory in the East China Sea. This thesis examines if China’s assertive behavior continues, whether Japan’s current strategy is adequate to ensure its strategic goals for the future by applying an international relation theory and Strategic Estimate. China’s strategic problem to Japan is how Japan can offset China’s threats, such as “salami slicing” tactics and an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. The thesis concludes Japan should make the more proactive strategic approach to restoring the balance of power between Japan and China. Japan must maximize its military power by self-help and simultaneously strengthen the Alliance with the U.S. and the security cooperation with Asian countries. The improved relationship with Russia will also be important to offset the Chinese threats. The main means are the boosted defense budget beyond 2 percent of GDP, the amendment to 9th article of the constitution, the increased host nation support (HNS) spending, and the continuation of its economic growth by social reforms and technological innovation.</td>
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<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
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<tr>
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<td>b. ABSTRACT (U)</td>
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Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

ii
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___________________________________________, Member
LCDR Charles G. Birchfield, M.A.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2016 by:

___________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

APPROACHES JAPAN CAN ADOPT TO DETER CHINA’S ASSERTIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA, by MAJ Hiroshi Kamata, 84 pages.

Advocating its peaceful development to realize the “great national rejuvenation,” China continues its rapid economic growth and the military buildup to secure its interests. China conducts assertive actions like the establishment of Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Japanese territory in the East China Sea. This thesis examines if China’s assertive behavior continues, whether Japan’s current strategy is adequate to ensure its strategic goals for the future by applying an international relation theory and Strategic Estimate. China’s strategic problem to Japan is how Japan can offset China’s threats, such as “salami slicing” tactics and an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. The thesis concludes Japan should make the more proactive strategic approach to restoring the balance of power between Japan and China. Japan must maximize its military power by self-help and simultaneously strengthen the Alliance with the U.S. and the security cooperation with Asian countries. The improved relationship with Russia will also be important to offset the Chinese threats. The main means are the boosted defense budget beyond 2 percent of GDP, the amendment to 9th article of the constitution, the increased host nation support (HNS) spending, and the continuation of its economic growth by social reforms and technological innovation.
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I also owe Dr. Joseph G. D. Babb and LCDR Charles G. Birchfield for their invaluable feedback.

I would like to thank my wife, Haruko, my son, Shin, and my daughter, Rei, for their support, too.

Finally, I would like to pray for the Japan-U.S. alliance and friendship lasting.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .......... iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................... v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................................... x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES ........................................................................................................................... xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background ................................................................................................................. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions .................................................................................................... 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions .............................................................................................................. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining Terms .......................................................................................................... 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope .......................................................................................................................... 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations ............................................................................................................... 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study ......................................................................................... 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .............. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of International Relations and UNCLOS ................................................. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s Strategy and its Strategic Context ............................................................... 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Strategy and Sino-American Relations ............................................................ 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan’s Current Strategy and Sino-Japanese Relations ............................................ 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Methodology ............................................................................................. 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 ANALYSIS PART I: THE THREAT POSED BY CHINA TO JAPAN ........ 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China’s Strategic Strengths ...................................................................................... 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Intention-Oriented ................................................................................... 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability-Oriented ................................................................................................. 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Strategic Weaknesses ................................................................................. 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary ................................................................................................................... 42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS PART II: STRATEGIC COURSES OF ACTION ..................43

Japan’s Strategic End State .................................................................................................................. 43
Japan-U.S. Alliance Goals .................................................................................................................... 43
COA 1 Development ............................................................................................................................... 45
  Amend the Constitution of Japan to Allow for Offensive Capability .............................................. 45
  Increase the National Defense Budget beyond 2 Percent of GDP ................................................. 47
  Develop Proactive Capability for Deterrence .................................................................................... 48
  Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance .................................................................................................. 49
  Enhance Cooperation with Asian Neighbors ................................................................................... 49
  Improve Relationship with Russia .................................................................................................. 50
  Stem Japan’s Population Decline .................................................................................................... 51
  Continue Technological and Industrial Innovation ......................................................................... 52
COA 2 Development ............................................................................................................................... 52
  Increase the National Defense Budget to 2 Percent of GDP .......................................................... 53
  Maintain the Japan-U.S. Alliance ..................................................................................................... 53
  Support the ASEAN Members ........................................................................................................ 53
  Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) ................................................................... 54
  Improve Security Cooperation with China ....................................................................................... 55
  Mitigate Issues Regarding History with China ................................................................................ 55

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................57

COA Comparison .................................................................................................................................. 57
  Feasibility ........................................................................................................................................ 57
  Suitability ........................................................................................................................................ 58
  Acceptability .................................................................................................................................... 61
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 63
Recommendation for Further Study ..................................................................................................... 64
Final Thoughts ....................................................................................................................................... 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................66
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>anti-access/area denial</td>
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<td>ADIZ</td>
<td>Air Defense Identification Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASM</td>
<td>anti-ship missile</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>ballistic missile defense</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>JASDF</td>
<td>Japan Air Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>JGSDF</td>
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<td>JMSDF</td>
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<td>JSDF</td>
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<td>MRBM</td>
<td>medium-range ballistic missile</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
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<td>national security strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>SLBM</td>
<td>submarine/sea-launched ballistic missile</td>
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<td>United States Forces Japan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>The ADIZ and EEZ in the East China Sea</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Scramble against Chinese Aircraft</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Change in China’s Announced Defense Budget</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>The China’s Island Chains Concept</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>The Proposed Locations for Land-Based ASMs and MRBM on the Ryukyu Islands and the Estimated Ranges of MRBMs</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>GDP, Military Expenditure, and the Share of GDP by Country (in Constant (2014) US $ billion)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Compare/Contrast COA Matrix</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.¹

— Henry John Temple Palmerston, Remarks in the House of Commons, 1 March 1848

Background

The history of Sino-Japanese relations is long and complicated. China is a geopolitically important state to Japan because of its vast land area, its enormous population of more than 1.3 billion, and the earlier origin of the Chinese civilization.² However, Japan started its modernization earlier than China in the nineteenth century and adopted an imperialistic expansionist policy on the Asian Continent. Imperial Japan invaded the Republic of China before and during WWII. After the Nationalist-Communist Civil War in China, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949. PRC succeeded in its nuclear test in 1964 and became a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 1971. PRC has continued its rapid economic growth since the 1980s as a great power. Since the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Japan and PRC in 1972, Japan has a very important economic relationship with


PRC. However, Japan is a free democratic state, and China an authoritarian Communist one-party state. Political tensions between them are still pronounced due to the great difference in history, geography, political systems, and national security policies.

Today, China is the second strongest economic power in the world. China surpassed Japan in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010.\textsuperscript{3} China has also been also increasing its national defense budget at a rapid pace for more than twenty years. According to the Annual Report to the Congress in 2015, the officially-announced national defense budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 is approximately $136.3 billion. This is the second highest in the world with the military budget growing on average 9.5 percent per year from 2005 through 2014.\textsuperscript{4} The modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) emphasizes asymmetric military capabilities embedded in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter other military forces from approaching China’s shores.\textsuperscript{5} The PLA is also improving joint operational capabilities, especially its Navy (PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF). Furthermore, China is not transparent on the organization, equipment, and its contracting.

China has changed the status quo in the Asia-Pacific region. An example is China’s unilateral establishment of “the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone


\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., 33.
(ADIZ)” in November 2013. According to the announcement issued by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, aircraft flying in the ADIZ must obey China’s domestic procedures. If the aircraft does not follow China’s rules, the PLAAF will take “defensive emergency measures.” The Japanese government has demanded China revoke the announcement that could infringe upon the freedom of flight in international airspace. Moreover, China’s ADIZ of the East China Sea describes the airspace over the Senkaku Islands, which belong to Japan, as if the airspace belonged to China’s “territorial airspace.”


7 Ibid., Paragraph 3.

8 Ibid., Paragraph 4 and 5.
China has increased its assertive activities in airspace and sea areas surrounding Japan. The number of scrambles by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) against Chinese military aircraft approaching or intruding Japanese airspace has rapidly increased.
since 2010.\textsuperscript{9} (See figure 2.) The number of scrambles during FY 2015 was 571 times.\textsuperscript{10} The PLAAF and PLAN have approximately 2,620 combat aircraft in total; in contrast, the JASDF and Japan Maritime Self-Defense-Force (JMSDF) have approximately 410.\textsuperscript{11} Although there is a difference in population and geography between China and Japan, the gap of the relative combat power is a strategic concern of Japan. Additionally, PLAN vessels routinely appear and conduct operations in the East China Sea. In January 2013, a Chinese frigate directed re-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer, and another frigate is suspected to have directed re-control radar at a JMSDF helicopter.\textsuperscript{12} Those assertive air and maritime actions by the Chinese military have increased tensions in the region.


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 43.
Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS) advocates and supports how Japan will continue to prosper and contribute to the regional and global peace and stability by securing its national interests.\textsuperscript{13} They are three; maintenance of its peace and security with its sovereignty and independence; achievement of the economic prosperity of Japan and its nationals; protection of the international order following rules and values.\textsuperscript{14} To safeguard the interests, the NSS establishes three national security objectives; to

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\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 4.
\end{flushright}
strengthen deterrence toward threats for Japan’s security and to defeat the threat if it fails; to improve the Asia-Pacific security environment by strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and other partnerships; to improve the global security environment by reinforcing the international order.  

Being supported by its continuous economic growth and military buildup, if China continues its assertive actions in the region, Japan is concerned whether Japan will be able to achieve its strategic goals.

The U.S. has been Japan’s only ally since 1951. Japan and the U.S. share some of the same values, such as freedom, democracy, free trade, fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. The Obama Administration officially announced “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” in the Defense Strategic Guidance in January 2012 while continuing to the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The U.S. has conducted the freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) with sending missile destroyers to the South China Sea since October 2015 to advance the rule of law in the Asia-Pacific region and to show U.S. presence. However, the U.S. has decreased its military budget and strength of the

15 Ibid., 5.
military forces.\textsuperscript{18} The U.S. will strengthen its Alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand in the region, and will also enhance its partnership with other countries.\textsuperscript{19} To deal with China’s assertive actions in the region, Japan should take a major role as an ally of the U.S., which has executed its rebalance policy and military consolidation.

\textbf{Research Questions}

The primary research question of this thesis is: If China’s assertive behavior continues, Japan’s current strategy is inadequate to ensure its strategic goals for the future. The rise of China is natural and inevitable because China has the third largest land area, the highest population, and the second strongest economy. Considering the long Chinese history, the rise of China is the resurgence of China; therefore, how China rises is important. China’s peacefully rising could be favorable to Japan and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. However, China has repeated its assertive behavior in the Asia-Pacific region and seems China is challenging to the current international order the U.S. led. At least, China has continued its rapid military buildup without enough transparency and raised tensions with its controversial action in territorial disputes between other countries in the East and South China Sea. Accordingly, it is important to examine why China behaves assertively and whether Japan will be able to deal with China’s behavior


by its current strategy. Consequently, the following three secondary questions will be answered.

1. What is China’s national security strategy?
2. What are Japan’s current strategy and the goal of the Japan-U.S. alliance?
3. What is Japan’s strategic approach for the future?

Assumptions

The thesis accepts following assumptions as true to undertake the research. First, as the Chinese get economically stronger, their military will also grow. 20 Second, Japan’s current strategy is not working if China continues assertive actions. Third, the U.S. will remain engaged in the Asia-Pacific region. Fourth, the treaty of mutual cooperation and security between Japan and the United States of America (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) will remain important for U.S. strategy in the region.

Defining Terms

The thesis defines the Asia-Pacific region as the part of the world near the Western Pacific Ocean which includes East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, Russia, and the U.S. It does not include Central Asia and West Asia.

Scope

with other nations such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN),
Australia, India, North Korea, South Korea, and Russia.

Limitations
The thesis is based on unclassified open sources.

Significance of the Study
The Sino-Japanese relationship involves the second and third largest economies in
the world in a region marked by sometimes tragic history, brutal wars, and ongoing
tension. The potential for serious conflict and global ramifications warrants our attention.
Thus, Japan’s future strategic approach is significant in terms of its contribution (or lack
thereof) to stability in the region.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter reviews existing literature to provide information, perspectives, and insights on this thesis and subsequently explains the research methodology to establish a logical approach to the research. The literature review consists of four key areas; first, theories of international relations and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); second, China’s strategy and its strategic context in the Asia-Pacific region; third, U.S. strategy and Sino-American relations; finally, Japan’s current strategy in the region and Sino-Japanese relations. The research methodology clarifies methods and criteria which the thesis will use to analyze and interpret information or grounds.

Theories of International Relations and UNCLOS

This section quickly reviews theories of IR to provide a basis for the following analysis. Nye and Welch emphasize international politics involves an anarchic system to arbitrate disputes: there is no government above sovereign states; therefore, international politics is a “self-help system.”21 They discuss two traditional views of international politics and a relatively new one. Realism argues the central problem of international relations is power, and the main actors are states. Liberalism emphasizes an international society alongside sovereign states, and international institutions can mitigate severe characteristics of the harsh aspects of anarchic world politics. Constructivism stresses social structures and cultural context, such as ideas, practice, norms, rules, and logics of

legitimacy, produce national identities and interests. \(^{22}\) Also, they argue the security dilemma always exists in international relations because of the absence of communication, trust, and credibility among states. \(^{23}\) Therefore, although cooperation is essential for each state to pursue mutual interests in the international society, “cooperation does not normally come naturally” because a higher authority than states does not exist in anarchic international politics. \(^{24}\) International institutions and laws are not like domestic ones; therefore, some great powers sometimes provide enforcement of the international law, and when survival matters to states, international law can take second place. \(^{25}\)

They conclude the real world lies somewhere between realism and liberal interdependence and it is simultaneously important to consider the impact of constructivists’ social and cultural changes; because the globalization and interdependence have made international politics more complex and neither realism nor liberalism has its pure form in the real world. \(^{26}\)

The researcher prioritizes realism rather than liberalism in this thesis because China has continued its military buildup and increased its assertive actions in the region as China economically grows. However, a liberalist approach balancing competition with

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 11-12.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 26-27.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 203, 205.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 206-207, 209.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 273, 285-286, 360.
cooperation can mitigate the security dilemma between Japan and China. Therefore, the thesis will develop two courses of action (COA) for Japan’s strategy in chapter 4 applying each theory to a distinct COA.

UNCLOS importantly addresses the right of passage in territorial sea, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the definition of an island (a “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”) Japan and China have enforced UNCLOS. China defends its claims islands by reference to its so-called nine-dash line. The nine-dash line encloses an area covering approximately 90 percent of the South China Sea. Insisting everything inside of the nine-dash line is China’s territorial water, China continues its ambiguous interpretation of UNCLOS to preserve flexibility for China’s assertive behavior on maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Ambiguity facilitates “salami slicing” tactics which aim to change the status quo in China’s favor which, in turn, make it difficult for other countries to pursue legal challenges to Chinese claims. For instance, China has already established offshore gas facilities in the East China Sea even before the EEZ between Japan and China is delimitated.


29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 23.

31 Ibid.
Always judging the legality of China’s ongoing extensive reclamation and construction on several reefs can be problematic, but there is not doubt the moves are highly contentious and destabilizing.32 In some cases, original features did not extend above water at high tide so UNCLOS does not recognize any Chinese sovereignty claim to those features.33 Even if the reefs extend above water at all times, China cannot claim broader 200-nautical-maile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the reclaimed features under UNCLOS, and the most China could claim is territorial waters extending 12 nautical miles from the feature.34

Additionally, China has arbitrarily claimed it is a coastal state with the right to regulate activities of foreign military forces in the EEZ as well as economic activities.35 Pedrozo points out a coastal state does not have sovereignty over the EEZ although the state exercises sovereign rights for “exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing” natural resources within the EEZ under UNCLOS.36 Accordingly, any states can lawfully

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33 UNCLOS Article 121.


conduct military activities, such as intelligence collection and oceanographic surveys, in and over the EEZ without the consent of coastal states.\textsuperscript{37} China does not accept UNCLOS ruling on these matters. Instead, China has employed strategic ambiguity in conjunction with developing its A2/AD strategy, positioning missiles and radars on several artificially-enhanced islands, while trying to restrict other countries military activities within “China’s EEZ.”

**China’s Strategy and its Strategic Context**

China’s Military Strategy of 2015 (White Paper) is one component understanding China’s strategy. China’s military strategy seeks “the Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation” emphasizing China’s peaceful development and opposition to “hegemonism.”\textsuperscript{38} Its military strategy envisions threats from hegemonism, neo-interventionism, a redistribution of power, and terrorism.\textsuperscript{39} The strategy is concerned about the U.S. “rebalancing” strategy and reform of Japan’s policy.\textsuperscript{40} China believes building a strong military will help “the Chinese Dream” come to fruition while emphasizing the absolute primacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 528.


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., I National Security Situation.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
The dominant strategic concept of “active defense.” The “active defense” concept mainly focuses on its nuclear and missile force to achieve the strategic deterrence based on the Chinese peaceful strategic stance that “we will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.” This concept uniting strategic defense with operational and tactical offense is also called an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy which would employ “post-emptive” strikes against enemies if the deterrence fails. The “peaceful” strategic concept specifically means China will avoid conflict against the U.S. unless the U.S. attacks China. Paradoxically speaking, so war as there is not a growing possibility of war against the U.S., China can continue its assertive, “peaceful” actions to ensure its national interests in the region in pursuit of “the Chinese Dream.” From a Japanese perspective, “peacefully” means “by the current international order based on the international law.” The gap between what China says and what China does concerns Japan.

China’s real intention behind the “great national rejuvenation” is ambiguous. The strategy mentions the reunification of Taiwan as a clear goal, but it fails not explain the relationship between the “great rejuvenation” and China’s maritime activities including its reclamation in the South China Sea. The CCP’s command over the PLA concerns Japan because the decision-making process is unclear.

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41 Ibid., II Missions and Strategic Tasks of China’s Armed Forces and III Strategic Guideline of Active Defense.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., I National Security Situation.
Kissinger’s emphasizes traditional Sino-centrism puts China at the center of the world supposedly because Heaven gave the emperor a mandate to rule the Earth.\textsuperscript{45} The Chinese world order of the day involved a tributary system. The empire provided states around China with autonomy, protection, and economic benefits. In exchange, the states accepted Chinese civilization and Confucian culture as their own in return. The Chinese political system repeated a cycle of division, war, and unification for more than two thousand years. The new leader would overthrow the existing empire and become the new emperor when the existing emperor lost his mandate to govern.\textsuperscript{46} China’s tumultuous history created Chinese authoritarianism to cope, both in imperial times and contemporary ones. Not surprisingly, current CCP regime has adopted this authoritarian characteristic.

The original goal of the founding of the CCP and China was the liberation of Chinese people suffering from the Western imperialism and Japan’s continuous militarism.\textsuperscript{47} China has developed under the one-party dictatorship of the CCP since Deng’s economic reform takes off after the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s death in 1976, but China showed its posture China would not accept a Western-style democracy.\textsuperscript{48} China has fostered strong nationalism to bolster its vanguard role.\textsuperscript{49}


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 6, 17.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 54-55, 88-89.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 396, 410-411.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 499, 504-505.
Kissinger argues Sino-American competition will be more economic and social than military, and neither U.S. containment of China nor China’s attempt to exclude U.S. influence from the Western Pacific is realistic.\(^{50}\) He contends the Sino-American relationship needs to evolve with a significant compromise over security issues to minimize diplomatic tension and conflict.\(^{51}\) Kissinger’s conclusion is more pragmatic than traditional realism, emphasizing more cooperation with China and compromise. It could work for a Sino-American relationship because the U.S. militarily and economically stronger than China for the present. However, in a Sino-Japanese relationship, it would be more repugnant for China to make a compromise with Japan over issues because China has the larger military including nuclear weapons versus the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ (JSDF). Moreover, Japan is geographically much closer to China than the U.S. As such, Japan would suffer greater pressure from any Chinese unilateral actions and have more strategic distrust of China.

Mearsheimer insists China can not rise peacefully under his \textit{Offensive Realism} theory because China’s natural fear is based on the self-help system, and the most reliable way for China to increase its possibility of survival is to pursue regional hegemony, maximizing its distribution of world power and changing the balance of power to favor China.\(^{52}\) Mearsheimer contends if China continues its rapid economic growth for the next two decades, China will attempt to marginalize the U.S. in the region and maximize its

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item Ibid., 525-526.
  \item Ibid., 526, 544.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
power gap with the neighboring countries as the U.S. declared the European powers *persona non grata* in the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century.\(^{53}\) Mearsheimer insists containment is the best strategy for the U.S. to deal with China. Accordingly, the U.S. and China can maintain their economic interdependence and cooperate on common issues while the U.S. executes a containment strategy because containment is a defensive strategy.\(^{54}\) He further believes India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and even Russia will join a balancing coalition which the U.S. leads to mitigate an assertive rise of China.\(^{55}\) Although China denies it is pursuing hegemony, given the facts, it is certain China is trying to maximize its strategic advantage by building up and employing its military power.\(^{56}\) Per Mearsheimer, its military buildup and assertive actions to reduce U.S. military influence in the region will continue. Consequently, if Japan adopts a containment strategy, an arms race will be an expected tradeoff.

Pillsbury warns China has a strategic ambition to “reclaim its rightful place” on the top of the global hierarchy by winning the long-term strategic competition with the U.S.\(^{57}\) He discusses the Chinese strategy is clandestine, based on careful study on historical case studies of the rise and fall of Western great powers and the demise of

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 367-368, 371.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 384-385.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., 361, 384-385.


ancient Chinese empires.\textsuperscript{58} To aid such plans, he points to vigorous development of asymmetric warfare capabilities. The emphasis on asymmetric options stems from a belief this will enable China to take advantage of a U.S. weak point; namely, its military and economic “reliance on high-tech information system.” Additionally, asymmetric weapons are less expensive than conventional weapons.\textsuperscript{59} He concludes the U.S. has no choice but to continue the competition with China in diplomacy, information, military (but no wars), and economy (DIME) as long as China’s strategic goal is to achieve hegemony and create a different world order.\textsuperscript{60} Pillsbury’s discussion is similar to Mearsheimer’s Chinese pursuit of hegemony. Pillsbury argues China will try to achieve the strategic goal by avoiding arms races with the U.S., unlike the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{61} This explains why China focuses on its asymmetric warfare strategy such as missile warfare and information warfare supported by cyberspace and space capabilities.

Luttwak claims the military and economic rise of China will not occur in the foreseeable future because the China’s assertive rise would collide with security dilemma, which he calls “paradoxical logic of strategy” in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{62} If China were a democratic state with more strategic transparency, the reemergence would

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 233.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 147-148.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 214.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 41.

not concern neighbor states so much, and they would not strongly resist. Additionally, China’s domestic issues based on the lack of democratic or ideological legitimacy would prevent China’s rapid resurgence. He asserts China suffers from “Great-state Autism” or “acquired strategic deficiency syndrome (ASDS)” with a distinct tendency to emphasize deception and hierarchical thinking. This displaces common sense and ordinary awareness of strategic environments. In other words, the China’s emphasis on ancient strategic approaches like Sun Tzu’s Art of War and “Neo-Confucianism,” will impede China’s strategic goals because Chinese traditional approaches cannot work in the current geopolitical environment. The resistance of neighboring countries will continue to hinder the China’s rise in an interdependent world. Therefore, the U.S. should apply a containment strategy in cooperation with other Asia-Pacific countries, to even include Russia, if possible.

An improved Russo-Japanese relationship could serve the national interests of both countries because Russia has concerns about the influence of an exploding Chinese

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63 Ibid. 4-5.
64 Ibid., 20, 23.
65 Ibid., 100, 105.
66 Ibid., 33, 77.
67 Ibid., 233, 248, 261, 266.
population on its border and Japan can reduce its oil dependence on the Middle East by enhancing trade with Russia.68

Finally, Ikenberry, representing the liberalist, the tradition says China's increasing influence means active engagement within the U.S. led international order is not an ambitious attempt to achieve hegemony; indeed, it is natural. If China wants to continue the power transition, China will have no choice but to integrate into the existing international order because of the significant superiority of the existing order versus a Chinese alternative. He concludes a liberalist world order is in place. Although the U.S. influence could relatively decrease because of the rise of China, all the U.S. and other countries must do is to reinforce and reinvigorate the existing order.69 Liberalist idea is palatable for Japan even if China attempts to remain non-democratic because Japan and China have highly economic interdependence. Moreover, China does not have the alternative world order to the existing international order. Applying a liberalist theory like Ikenberry’s one to this thesis, the goal of Japan’s strategy is to persuade China to stop its assertive behavior against the international order by enhancing trust and transparency between Japan and China through more security cooperation on not only

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economic issues but also military ones. This point will support the COA 2 development.⁷⁰

**U.S. Strategy and Sino-American Relations**

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2015 advocates four strategic objectives.⁷¹ Supporting these objectives involves a “rebalance to Asia and the Pacific” whereby the U.S. strengthens cooperation on maritime security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region with the allies and partners.⁷² The NSS states the U.S. welcomes the “rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China.”⁷³ The U.S. will continue to enhance security cooperation with China on global issues.⁷⁴ A strength of the American NSS is its emphasis on the alliances and partnerships. From a U.S. perspective, Japan’s role in the region is important because it extends U.S. influence in the region via military bases in Japan and direct Japanese support.

Haddick argues the U.S. goal must be to prevent conflict and preserve the existing international order, recognizing the critical role the U.S. plays as a strategic balancer in

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⁷⁰ Chapter 4 will develop two COAs; COA 1 is realism-based and COA 2 is liberalism-based.


⁷² Ibid., 7, 24.

⁷³ Ibid., 24.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 9, 11-12.
the region. A forward U.S. presence in the region is the best approach to maintain stability and persuade China to abide the status quo, based on the rule of law, and deter China from continuing assertive behavior. China frequently employs “salami slicing” tactics to change the status quo gradually in favor of China. Haddick believes a Sino-American relationship should revolve around peacetime competition for influence in the region rather than classical containment (i.e. Nye’s “soft” power versus Mearsheimer’s “hard” power). Emphasizing security cooperation and collective resistance to China’s territorial claims via legal venues (like UNCLOS), enhanced maritime presence, information operations toward the international community, development of a coalition framework for information sharing, and a buildup of partners’ military capabilities. Haddick also advocates enhanced long-range air power, missile capability, and reconnaissance and communication networks to counter China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. Haddick’s idea on enhancing military cooperation in missile defense and air and maritime security is also important for Japan, but that is not enough because China emphasizes its asymmetric warfare capabilities for the A2/AD strategy which Japan does not have due to the current strategy. Japan’s realist approach for its future strategy should consider the constraint of “1 percent or GDP” defense budget, an


76 Ibid., 23, 140-145.

77 Ibid., 83, 160-175.
offensive missile capability, and the possession of nuclear weapons to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance and reduce the power gap between Japan and China.\textsuperscript{78}

Shambaugh says the Sino-American relationship is defined by a combination of competition and cooperation while avoiding conflict. However, Shambaugh argues the balance between competition and cooperation has been leaning toward competition, and he calls it “coopetition and competitive coexistence” because the divergence of interests and policies is significant despite their many linkages.\textsuperscript{79} A key challenge is the management of competition by keeping relations away from conflict and by enhancing cooperation.

A liberalist perspective from Glaser notes that the Nixon Administration, the strategic objectives of U.S. diplomacy are to encourage China to accept Western standards and international systems, to persuade China to be more “responsible stakeholder,” and to enhance mutual understanding and decrease strategic distrust.\textsuperscript{80} Glaser concludes the most effective strategic approach for the U.S. is convincing China a


more cooperative policy based on the international system will be in China’s national interests.\textsuperscript{81}

In the same vein, Twomey argues the U.S. is pursuing “strategic stability” with the “pivot to Asia” approach, while arguing the Sino-American military relationship is not a zero-sum competition.\textsuperscript{82} He is concerned the PLA has not participated in regional multinational military exercises led by the U.S. despite China’s participation in military dialogues, which may speak to China’s sincerity with regard to transparency.\textsuperscript{83}

To “manage” competition with China, as Shambaugh and others advocate, even COA 2 will need to maintain the Japan-U.S. alliance because the alliance ensures Japan’s nuclear deterrence to China, North Korea, and Russia. COA 2 will also support enhancing economic cooperation with China to persuade it to be a more responsible player. Twomey’s idea of enhancing military cooperation with China will be of limited value for Japan because Japan cannot reciprocally enhance security cooperation with China under the current constitution at prohibitions regarding using force abroad.

\textbf{Japan’s Current Strategy and Sino-Japanese Relations}

According to \textit{Defense of Japan 2015} (Annual White Paper), Japan is concerned about continuous increases in China’s military budget, its A2/AD strategy, insufficient military transparency, intensification of its assertive air and maritime activities, and

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 172-74.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 252.
\end{itemize}
attempts at changing the status quo by force.\textsuperscript{84} Japan aims to improve the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ (JSDF) capabilities by improving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), joint transport, command and control (C2), “response to an attack on remote islands,” and ballistic missile defense capabilities.\textsuperscript{85} Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance by enhancing their military cooperation in maritime security, cyberspace and space, counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping and by promoting bilateral and multilateral joint training and exercises.\textsuperscript{86} Additionally, Japan and the U.S. have been executing reforms of the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) such as relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Camp Schwab and relocation of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa to Guam in the future.\textsuperscript{87} However, if China continues its rapid military buildup and assertive actions in the region, the researcher questions Japan’s current military strategy would work in the future under the traditional frameworks such as its modest defense budget and exclusively defense-oriented policy.\textsuperscript{88} Especially, the Roadmap (Japanese White Paper) says approximately nine thousand personnel of MAGTAF in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam in the future.\textsuperscript{89} This will cause degrading deterrence of the Japan-U.S. alliance.


\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 159-160.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 158.

\textsuperscript{87} Ministry of Defense of Japan, \textit{Defense of Japan 2015}, 204.


\textsuperscript{89} Ministry of Defense of Japan, \textit{Defense of Japan 2015}, 204.
The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) discusses Chinese experts do not see Japan as a major competitor to China because China has already surpassed Japan in national power. If Sino-American relationships remain stable, Japan cannot be a critical factor which disturbs China’s strategy. However, it is invalid from a realist perspective because Japan is a proxy for the U.S. in the region with the third largest economy and modernized military. China has a “limited war” plan against Japan in the East China Sea, based on China’s political goal. NIDS analyzes that a core factor for Japan’s strategy is the U.S.-Japan alliance and security cooperation with other U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region. NIDS suggests Japan’s strategy take three-pronged approach against China; first, synchronization with U.S. military strategy; second, increase in the national defense budget to a maximum of 2 percent of GDP; third, a quick resolution of Futenma Air Base issue in Okinawa. Strengthening the alliance with the U.S is important for Japan to counter the Chinese A2/AD strategy in the East China Sea. From a realist perspective, increasing its military expenditure is reasonable to achieve its


91 Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon, 203-205.

92 Ibid., 82.


94 Asano, “Japan-China Relations in a gray Zone: Search for Stability through Coercion and Deterrence,” 121-123.
strategic political goals. The current relocation plan is not adequate for deterrence purposes vis-à-vis to China because the strength of the USFJ will decrease. The main purpose of the relocation is to mitigate negative public opinion against U.S. bases in Okinawa, but this only weakens the deterrence. Therefore, COA 1 will embody fairly aggressive solutions to include increasing its military budget and creating new JSDF units.

Swanström and Kokubun insist the lack of Sino-Japanese security cooperation structures and crisis communication mechanisms (bilateral and multilateral), impede efforts to forge more cooperative relationships. There are other issues, the resolution of which (or at least cooperation on) would be mutually beneficial. For instance, cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue preventing North Korea from threatening, thus is a critical common interest.

Research Methodology

The research methodology applies Strategic Estimate (JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, Appendix B) to the analysis of viable Japanese strategic choices. The Strategic Estimate consists of five parts: strategic direction; strategic environment; assessment of the major strategic and operational challenges; potential opportunities; and assessment of risks. Based on the format, the analysis part of the thesis will be divided into two chapters.

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Chapter 3 will analyze Chinese threats (adversary forces) to Japan’s current strategy, considering the current strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region to define the strategic problem for Japan. Chapter 3 will analyze impacts on Japan’s national interests and the current strategic objectives (strategic direction) by focusing on China’s military strategy of 2015. Chapter 4 will analyze potential strategic courses of action (COA) for Japan to resolve the strategic problem. The chapter will develop two COAs, applying the international relations theory, specifically realism and liberalism, respectively, to COA 1 and COA 2. The COA development and analysis will include concepts, ends, ways, and means. Chapter 5 will compare the COAs in three criteria: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability while also assessing risks, and weighing which has the highest probability of the success against the strategic problem.
CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS PART I: THE THREAT POSED BY CHINA TO JAPAN

China’s Strategic Strengths

China’s Military Strategy 2015 (White Paper) officially advocates its national security goal be to achieve “the Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation” which means establishing a prosperous and powerful nation and achieving a “great revival of the Chinese people.”96 It emphasizes peaceful development and opposes “hegemonism.”97 It celebrates multipolarity and globalization, while determined to confront threats from hegemonism, neo-interventionism, a flawed distribution of power, and terrorism.98 The strategy decries the U.S. “pivot to Asia” and Japan’s more proactive security policy.99 It emphasizes strengthening and modernizing the PLA under “active defense” doctrine, controlled by the CCP.100 The active defense aims to deter and defeat enemies by an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy focusing on long-range


98 Ibid., I National Security Situation.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid., II Missions and Strategic Tasks of China’s Armed Forces and III Strategic Guideline of Active Defense.
The Chinese strategy threatens Japan in three ways: first, divergent political ideologies; second, a disconnect between stated intention and observed behavior; and third, a noticeable growth in its capabilities that outstrips its stated intentions.

China’s authoritarian leadership concerns the Japanese because the CCP’s command over the military takes place entirely behind closed doors. To execute the strategy, the CCP will vigorously maintain its legitimacy by maintaining the anti-Japanese nationalism, which Mearsheimer calls “hypernationalism,” with the organized censorship. Violent protests and demonstrations, which the Chinese government encourages, demonize Japan and divert criticism from the CCP. The violent protests against Japan are the result of current and historical security issues.

China will not welcome a Western-style democratization because China’s military strategy advocates “developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Attempts to influence China to enhance its transparency through strategic dialogues are still worthwhile, but will probably be a limited fruit for some time, at best. In the meantime, realists will have to strengthen deterrence with more military power to prepare for possible conflict against China in the worst case.

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101 Ibid.


103 Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon, 204-205.


Strategic Intention-Oriented

The worry for Japan stems from the disconnect between stated intention and rapidly expanding capability that does not appear to align with said intentions. This ambiguity fuels distrust. The Chinese strategy does not say what completes the rejuvenation. Although the Chinese military strategy never advocates hegemony or military expansion, the strategy simultaneously says “the Chinese Dream is to make the country strong” and “China's armed forces take their dream of making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream.”

China has rapidly increased its national military expenditure for more than twenty years, consistently more than 10 percent per annum since FY 1989. (See figure 3.) Moreover, U.S. Department of Defense finds it is hard to estimate China’s actual military expenditure due to its insufficient transparency and China’s announced military expenditure does not include all the procurement costs of foreign weapons and equipment, and research and development expenses. Although China has not changed the military budget’s percentage of GDP, the absolute gap between military budgets of Japan and China has increased every year in U.S. dollars spend. (See table 1.) Therefore, all China should do is to continue its economic growth and military buildup because Japan’s economy will gradually decline due to its population decrease in a long term.

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106 Ibid., Preface and II Missions and Strategic Tasks of China’s Armed Forces.

Figure 3. Change in China’s Announced Defense Budget

Table 1. GDP, Military Expenditure, and the Share of GDP by Country (in Constant (2014) US $ billion)

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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>16125.5/757.9</td>
<td>16273.9/748.6</td>
<td>16809.5/706.0</td>
<td>17105.2/650.0</td>
<td>17425.7/609.9</td>
<td>18042.4/595.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of GDP (%)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7594.7/144.3</td>
<td>8200.0/155.8</td>
<td>8916.6/169.3</td>
<td>9626.3/182.9</td>
<td>10450.2/199.6</td>
<td>11284.2/214.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of GDP (%)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4650.0/46.5</td>
<td>4710.0/47.1</td>
<td>4650.0/46.5</td>
<td>4630.0/46.3</td>
<td>4580.0/45.8</td>
<td>4630.0/46.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of GDP (%)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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* Figures are in US $bn. at constant 2014 prices and exchange rates, except for the last figure, which is in US $bn. at 2015 prices and exchange rates.
** All Chinese figures are SIPRI estimates.


Furthermore, exploiting its economic influence, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in December 2015. The aim is to create a great economic sphere connecting Southeast Asia, China, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe with a transport network by boosting investment in infrastructure in the region.

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Time is not on Japan’s side. Japan needs some rather drastic, if graduated, measures to satisfactorily deal with the issue.

The Chinese military strategy does not mention the “international order” or the “international law” even once, although the strategy uses “international responsibilities” twice to express its participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.110 Furthermore, China has continued its assertive behavior toward neighboring countries regarding territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, all the while advocating China’s peaceful development.111 China continues to emphasize bilateral relationships toward regional neighbors when negotiating the issues. This advantageous affords China an position while seeking to avoid U.S. interference on the issues and undermining the collective bargaining power of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). China is also engaged in very contentious actions which have come to be known as “salami slicing” with regard to territorial disputes, which aim to accumulate small, slow changes in the status of islands or reefs gradually to settle Chinese claims in the region with military and/or non-military measures.112 China’s land reclamation projects to establish runways and facilities on islands in the South China Sea are more recent


112 Haddick, Fire on the Water, 77.
manifestation of these so-called “salami slicing” tactics.\textsuperscript{113} In the East China Sea, China has also built sixteen natural gas offshore platforms on the Chinese side of the geographical equidistance line of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between Japan and China without the agreement on the delimitation.\textsuperscript{114} The possibilities of China’s diversion of the offshore platforms and artificial islands to its military utilization for missiles and radar threaten Japan’s national interests such as security, freedom of navigation, and the rules-based international order.\textsuperscript{115}

Judging from facts of the military buildup and “salami slicing” activities, China’s strategic intention is becoming less ambiguous. Kaplan likens what he see as China’s future intention of controlling the South China Sea to U.S. control of the Caribbean Sea. Control of the Caribbean Sea and the Panama Canal enabled the U.S. to prosper in the Western Hemisphere. Kaplan suggests China’s intention is to maximize its influence over Southeast Asia and interests in the South China Sea, such as seabed natural resources and the vital Malacca Strait.\textsuperscript{116} Although the thesis cannot conclude China’s strategic goal is a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Robert D. Kaplan, \textit{The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate} (New York: Random House, 2012), 220.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
regional hegemony, the thesis can say China does not positively adhere to the international order because China’s strategy avoids mentioning the international order while advocating peaceful development. Therefore, China’s rapid military buildup is an attempt to change the status quo so long as China does not see following the international order as conducive to its interests.

Capability-Oriented

The PLA is honing its active defense capability to seize the strategic initiative when necessary. This will primarily take the form of an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) approach.117

China continues to modernize the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). According to a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) report, a long-term goal of the Chinese leadership is to create a true “Blue Water” navy able to project power across the greater Asia-Pacific region including the Indian Ocean for several months to protect the strategic sea lines of communications (SLOC).118 The modernization and expansionism are well underway. As of 2015, the PLAN numbers approximately 870 ships (1,470,000 tons); in contrast, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has 137 vessels

117 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, 33-35. China’s military strategy says A2/AD capabilities consist of modernized naval forces to protect its strategic sea lines of communications (SLOC), informationized long-range precision strikes and ballistic missile defense (BMD), and system-centric information warfare in outerspace and cyberspace domains, in addition to nuclear counterattack.

(approximately 467,000 tons). Gompert, a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, contends the PLAN has graduated from coastal defense to “green water” and an increased “blue water” operational capability. Judging from the upward trend in China’s military budget, this researcher estimates the PLAN will surpass the JMSDF in “far sea” operational capability in the not-too-distant future. Gompert estimates the PLA does not have the joint operational capability in maritime areas to deter and defeat U.S. military intervention such as a Taiwan contingency. To supplement the current deficit in its joint operational capability, the PLA has heavily emphasized developing its surface-to-surface missile capability in accord with its A2/AD approach, because reliance on missiles requires less time for training and exercises than a joint operational capability would require. Wortzel indicates the PLAN has already established two amphibious brigades and some infantry divisions which are stationed in coastal areas and designates to conduct amphibious operations against Taiwan. The PLAN has also been designing a modern type of landing ship which enables a battalion to conduct assaults with mechanized and armored vehicles. Judging from its current status of preparation, China will continue to enhance its joint amphibious capability to occupy expeditiously. It is


122 Ibid., 57-58.
worth mentioning that development of such an amphibious capability is also a potential threat to Japan’s Senkaku Islands.

The Chinese concept of active defense emphasizes employment of missiles as a form of offset attack and the missiles enable Chinese pre-emptive attacks if an enemy force appears prepared for military action in the Asia-Pacific region.\(^{123}\) The PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) can target all areas of Japan with a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the DF-21, within the range of approximately seventeen hundred kilometers.\(^{124}\) The DF-21 ensures regional nuclear deterrence against the U.S. by targeting the JSDF and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). Moreover, China has positioned air defense missile systems on Woody Island in the Paracels in the South China Sea.\(^{125}\) China’s militarization of islands enhances its A2/AD capabilities which can threaten Japan’s interests.

**Chinese Strategic Weaknesses**

First, China has no true allies in the region. Second, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) may someday become a real threat, but for now, it largely represents potential.\(^{126}\) Third, the dispersed regional geography impedes China’s advance to the Western Pacific. The maritime routes are vulnerabilities the PLAN must address, but

\(^{123}\) Wortzel, *The Dragon Extends its Reach*, 104.

\(^{124}\) Ibid., 106.


\(^{126}\) Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography*, 212.
their current logistical capabilities severely limit their ability to sustain projected power, though this deficit will improve with time. Therefore, China has established the “Island Chains” concept to push the U.S. Navy beyond the lines.¹²⁷ (See Figure 4.) Simultaneously, this means China has a fear to be surrounded.

Figure 4. The China’s Island Chains Concept


Summary

China’s military strategy of 2015 seeks to realize the “great national rejuvenation” through peaceful development but, at the same time, China continues its rapid military buildup and unilateral maritime and aerial activities in the East and South China Sea with its insufficient political and military transparency. The strategic problem for Japan is how to deal with China’s assertive maritime activity in the East China Sea based on a “salami slicing” tactics and the A2/AD approach China has embraced to level the advantages the American and Japanese forces enjoy.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS PART II: STRATEGIC COURSES OF ACTION

This chapter develops two strategic courses of action (COA) to deal with the problems discussed in chapter 3. Each COA is predicated on a predominant lens: realism for COA 1, and liberalism for COA 2. The COAs will have similar ends, but the ways and means will differ significantly. However, first, the chapter identifies Japan’s strategic end states and the goals of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Japan’s Strategic End State

Japan’s current National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies four end states. First, no war between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands should occur. An unexpected war would jeopardize the Japan’s national interests of security and economic prosperity. Second, China’s assertive activities in the East China Sea must be deterred, to include no more unilateral establishment of offshore gas facilities. Third, maintain sovereignty and independence, to include territorial integrity and SLOC security. Finally, work for the protection of the international order in concert with other countries.

Japan-U.S. Alliance Goals

The treaty of mutual cooperation and security provides for collective defense while encouraging economic cooperation in pursuit of common interests. In March 2016, the Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People was ratified so that now Japan can truly exercise the right of collective defense with the
U.S. Strengthening capabilities with the U.S. is essential to resolve the strategic problems. COA 1 based on one of two dominant international relations theories (realism), will seek to accomplish Japan’s stated strategic objectives through a combination of approach, but with substantial emphasis on deterrence. One challenge to the alliance is a Japanese intransigence, on specific issues. Additionally, other issues could potentially complicate closer synchronization. Those issues include one: the future relocation of approximately nine thousand personnel from Okinawa to Guam. To mitigate the decline in deterrence, the realist COA should embody a drastic reinforcement of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and its location to Okinawa; tow, difficulties reforming the Constitution restricts the JSDF to conducting security operations with the U.S. overseas in a support role. Current restrictions give Japan fewer options and impede Japan from cooperating with the U.S. and other partners to a greater degree; third, the current/projected defense outlays will only allow the current force to full further behind China, thereby weakening efforts aimed at deterrence. In short, COA 1 is likely to fail without a significant change in one or more of these areas.

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COA 1 Development

Under COA 1 Japan should attempt to restore the balance of power between Japan and China by making some difficult domestic choices and greater cooperation with the U.S., cause China to seriously re-think its current, assertive, and controversial approach toward divisive regional territorial disputes and pervasive security concerns regarding China’s galloping militarization. This can be accomplished by maximizing its military power; strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and partnerships with other countries; and continuing its economic prosperity through social and fiscal reforms to deter China from conducting its assertive actions in the East China Sea. The principal aim of this COA is to achieve the end states by becoming a more proactive regional power.

COA 1 will take approximately thirty years for Japan to achieve its strategic end states. The nationals supporting this duration is based on the fact China took approximately thirty years to change the balance of power; likewise, Japan will need the equivalent time to restore it. Japan must balance the military buildup with economic reforms to ensure economic prosperity going forward.

Amend the Constitution of Japan to Allow for Offensive Capability

The amendment of the ninth article of the Constitution is necessary for Japan to possess offensive capabilities to cope with and reorient the Chinese missile strikes and enhance ISR capability to assertive Chinese maritime activities. It will enable Japan to shoulder more responsibility for the global security. Japan has received ample international criticism for its passive posture on overseas security. During the Gulf War in 1991, Japan was only able to contribute financially. Moreover, in Iraq, from 2004 to
2006, it had to rely on the local security during the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities.\textsuperscript{130}

Opposition to any change in the Constitution is likely to be met by cries from not only China but others ravaged by Japan in WWII. The challenge to the amendment is it is likely China will oppose the amendment Japan for its “revival of militarism,” and South Korea will be concerned about the amendment due to their security fear and discontent about the historical issue based on WWII. However, with China’s growing strength and assertiveness, it is likely others will be more understanding and, indeed, may even welcome the added balance in the regional equation. Certain measures would help facilitate an opinion change among certain neighbor states; namely, stopping governmental officials’ visits to the Yasukuni shrine: separating war criminals from the Shrine; and resolving the history textbook issue on military Comfort Women during WWII with compensation, for instance.\textsuperscript{131}


Under COA 1, Japan’s national defense budget will need to quickly increase to 2 percent of GDP to bolster deterrence. The military power gap between Japan and China needs to contract to reflect serious intention and, ultimately, be evidenced by capability. (See table 1.) However, given China’s sustained due to the Chinese positive economic growth, the absolute military power gap will likely continue widening. It is worth noting the rates of other regional countries’ defense budgets for 2015 are more than 2 percent: India—2.3 percent; Singapore—3.2 percent; South Korea—2.6 percent; Vietnam—2.3 percent. The increase in Japanese military spending is not enough for COA 1 despite the fact the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of Japan also suggested 2 percent of GDP. To achieve Japanese strategic goals, COA 1 will propose an initial defense budget increase to 2 percent of GDP as a good starting point, but it is not the end. It will be necessary for Japan to increase its military budget more in the future because, theoretically, 4.6 percent of Japan’s GDP for 2015 would be almost equal to the Chinese military budget for 2015. Although it would depend on Japan’s future financial state and its political judgment, COA 1 suggests approximately 4 percent of GDP would be appropriate for its future military budget at its maximum to counter-balance China. Even the share of the U.S. military budget is 3.3 percent of GDP in 2015 so that more than 5

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133 Asano, “Japan-China Relations in a gray Zone: Search for Stability through Coercion and Deterrence,” 121-123.
percent of GDP is not acceptable to the Japanese and other countries. This approach may cause arms races with China. The increasing cost is a risk for COA 1.

Develop Proactive Capability for Deterrence

Supported by constitutional reforms and a much greater defense budget, Japan can develop the proactive capabilities to effectively deal with the strategic problems highlighted in chapter 3. First, to deter China’s assertive actions near the Senkaku Islands and its penchant for “salami slicing” tactics, more ISR assets, ships, aircraft, and amphibious units are necessary to confront Chinese assertive maritime activities more proactively. Second, Japan will need to locate land-based anti-ship missiles (ASM) on the Ryukyu Islands dispersing between Japan mainland and Taiwan. In the worst case scenario, the PLA would conduct an amphibious assault on the Senkaku Islands. To mitigate China’s A2/AD capability, Japan will need to possess a range of systems able to negate their evolving approach.134 The decision to develop a nuclear retaliation capability is clearly feasible for Japan, but it is not acceptable as it would be difficult to achieve at home and have numerous negative impacts for Japan internationally. However, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) should be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to enhance the deterrence to China by showing a potential for its nuclearization, at some later point, should Japan feel ultimately compelled to do so.

134 Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach, 106.
Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Despite the realists that there are no eternal allies, Japan and its strategic partners share several interests to include a stable regional balance of power, and freedom of navigation.\(^{135}\) COA 1 must strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance because the alliance is one of Japan’s strategic advantages regarding China, which does not have any true allies in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the current relocation will cause a significant decline in Japan’s deterrence, due to the halving of the U.S. presence and what it says about Japan’s commitment, i.e. its symbolic impact.\(^{136}\) As an offset to that unfortunate development, Japan must increase its host nation support (HSN). The amount of its HNS spending peaked in FY 1999 and has been decreasing due to its restricted fiscal state.\(^{137}\) The expense sharing for the stationing of USFJ was approximately ¥189.9 billion in FY 2015, and it must quickly double, with funds coming from an expanded Japanese military budget.\(^{138}\)

Enhance Cooperation with Asian Neighbors

The COA should also emphasize cooperation with as many regional partners as possible in terms of cooperative agreements, arms sales, and many of the hallmarks of the Japan-U.S. relationship, tailored to the relations of those bilateral capacities; but it must be more than mere talk; there must be clear signaling to China and the capacity to further

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\(^{136}\) Ministry of Defense of Japan, "Defense of Japan 2015, 204.

\(^{137}\) Ibid., 194.

\(^{138}\) Ibid., 195.
expand and invigorate the ties, should China’s behavior continue—i.e. “escalation dominance” can/should be built into the arrangements. For instance, Japan-Australia security cooperation has been reinforced since 2007 to include an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 2010.\textsuperscript{139} Additionally, COA 1 emphasizes cooperation with India and the Philippines. Both countries are rapidly developing countries with a high priority on employment. Japan has a need for workers to offset demographic changes, which result in Japan being less productive; hence, COA 1 suggests a win-win solution that increases immigration from both countries to stem Japan’s population decline. Japan and India signed the Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation in 2008, the third country with which Japan has signed such a joint declaration regarding security.\textsuperscript{140} Japan can expedite more immigration from India and the Philippines by adopting English as an official language and easing visa requirements.

**Improve Relationship with Russia**

To maintain a favorable balance of power with respect to China, Japan must bolster its relationship with Russia partially to counter-balance the Sino-Russian cooperative relationship and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). A Russo-Japanese relationship has the potential to be mutually beneficial for the balance of power long-term because Russia also has concerns about the rapid rise of China and its compelling need for resources, many just a border away.\textsuperscript{141} As a first step, it is required

\textsuperscript{139} Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Defense of Japan 2015*, 279.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 283.

\textsuperscript{141} Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography*, 203.
to enhance economic cooperation. Japan and Russia also have several shared interests such as their fixed and stable borders, petroleum trade from Russia to Japan, economic investment in the Far East Russia, and potential development of the North Pole Route.\footnote{Brad Plumer, “Climate change will open up surprising new Arctic shipping route,” \textit{The Washington Post}, 5 March 2013, accessed 10 April 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/03/05/climate-change-will-open-up-surprising-new-arctic-shipping-routes/.

A goal of this approach is to conclude the Russo-Japanese peace treaty.\footnote{Ryan Faith, “Here’s Why Japan and Russia Might sign a Peace Treaty-70 Years After the War,” \textit{Vice News}, 5 January 2016, accessed 10 April 2016, https://news.vice.com/article/heres-why-japan-and-russia-might-sign-a-peace-treaty-70-years-after-the-war.} Even if they could not conclude the treaty, enhancing the petroleum trade with Russia would enhance the flexibility of Japan’s energy strategy with reducing dependence on the Middle East and securing another short energy supply route at least.\footnote{Luttwak, \textit{The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy}, 140-141.}

Stem Japan’s Population Decline

Due to its low birth rate, low immigration, and the aged society, Japan is headed toward economic stagnation, then decline, unless significant changes are put in place to reverse these trends.\footnote{PwC, “The World in 2050,” 35-36.} To expand its working age population, the COA suggests more liberal immigration policies together with the adoption of English as an official language, the extension of retirement age to sixty-five-year-old, and empowerment of women by equalizing their payment, promoting maternity leave, improving a nursery system, and enhancing subsidies for children. Although adopting English as an official language is
controversial, learning English is already a compulsory class from the fifth grade in Japan so that the social opposition to this approach from the conservatives will be manageable.

Continue Technological and Industrial Innovation

To succeed innovating, advanced high technology is essential for the military and economic strategies. COA 1 would increase the number of Japanese students studying abroad through an increase in national scholarship fund. In 2013, less than 1 percent of Japanese tertiary students studied abroad.\textsuperscript{146} Japan must also enhance joint educational and research programs with the U.S. to foster international competitiveness.\textsuperscript{147}

COA 2 Development

The essential aim of both COAs is to achieve the same end states by becoming a “high-middle” power focused on GDP per capita while supporting the international order based on the rule of law. Under COA 2 Japan should attempt to engage China in more economic interdependence and conformance with the international order while balancing military competition and economic cooperation to influence China to restrain its assertive behavior in the Asia-Pacific region. This can be accomplished by: prudently increasing its military power; maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance; enhancing partnerships with China and other countries; and furthering economic integration with China. COA 2 seeks to convey to China that adhering to the international order is more profitable than


\textsuperscript{147} Terry Lautz, “The Cultural Relationship,” \textit{Tangled Titans}, 229.
continuing its controversial behavior to achieve its strategic goals; COA 2 will take more than thirty years for Japan to achieve its strategic end states because it requires China changing its political posture over the long term. Japan must pragmatically balance deterrence with economic and social cooperation with China.

Increase the National Defense Budget to 2 Percent of GDP

To achieve said balance, Japan must increase its defense budget to 2 percent of GDP soon. Japan cannot maintain its minimum deterrence toward China under the current, modest budget. COA 2’s military buildup takes more time than the time COA 1’s since it aims to avoid antagonizing the Chinese despite its bigger defense budget.

Maintain the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Like COA 1, COA 2 must increase HNS spending as much as possible to ensure the efficient implementation of the Japan-U.S. alliance and mitigate the decline in Japan’s deterrence due to the forced relocation of USFJ forces from Okinawa. Japan also needs to increase ships, aircraft, and amphibious units in Okinawa to enhance its interoperabilities with the USFJ.

Support the ASEAN Members

To promote the unity of the ASEAN members and mitigate China’s attempts to engage in bilateral negotiations, Japan must support smaller and weaker ASEAN states in terms of cooperative agreements, arms sales, and bilateral/multilateral military exercises to enhance their military capabilities. In 2014, Japan and Vietnam concluded the “Extensive Strategic Partnership” to enhance cooperation such as economic cooperation,
strategic dialogue, and personnel exchange.\textsuperscript{148} COA 2 also emphasizes arms sales and capacity building for Vietnam.

Japan must also continue supporting some countries, such as Myanmar and Cambodia, to protect their democracy by official development assistance (ODA) and commercial investment because China tries to degrade the unity of the ASEAN by influencing politically unstable countries in China’s favor. It is necessary for COA 2 to support the ASEAN members in promoting democracy to enhance regional stability.

Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

COA 2 suggests Japan should join the AIIB to maximize economic interdependence with China and promote a rules-based system to the AIIB. Although AIIB’s less transparency concerns Japan, AIIB has a potential because fifty-seven countries, including the whole ASEAN members, Australia, and India, have already signed it.\textsuperscript{149} Especially, it is estimated many Asian countries will rapidly continue their economic growth for the next decades so that their demands for constructing infrastructure will be enormous.\textsuperscript{150} While advancing the free trade and rules-based international economic system through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in concert with the U.S., Japan will need to participate in the AIIB to directly change AIIB’s


\textsuperscript{150} PwC, “The World in 2050,” 3.
organizational culture of insufficient transparency in decision-making for investment by leveraging its power as the third largest economy in the world. The risk of this approach is to undercut the international order led by the U.S.

**Improve Security Cooperation with China**

To reduce tensions between Japan and China in the region and improve the mutual trust and transparency, Japan should enhance its strategic dialogue with China at all levels, establish a maritime and air communication mechanism between the JSDF and the PLA, and conduct more bilateral or multinational military exercises. The risk associated with this approach is Japanese (and American) military secrets may leak out through Chinese espionage. Japan must select exercise programs carefully and reinforce the state secrecy law to punish persons for espionage more strictly because the current law mandates the maximum punishment for espionage is less than ten years.\(^{151}\)

**Mitigate Issues Regarding History with China**

Japan’s historical issues China (and much of Asia), such as the history textbook issue and Yasukuni Shrine issue have, to some extent, resulted in diplomatic stalemate between Japan and China. COA 2 suggests the Japanese government should consider and adopt descriptions of non-Chinese history textbooks on the background of the Pacific War to reduce the perception gap between Japan and other countries in history.\(^{152}\)

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will also need to cease visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which includes convicted war criminals in WWII.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

COA Comparison

Feasibility

This section compares COAs in feasibility concerning time and resources established. First, COA 1 is feasible because it aims to maximize self-defense, strengthen the already robust Japan-U.S. alliance, partners with Asian countries sharing common interests such as restoration of a balance of power to engage China in comprehensive ways emphasizing the rule of law. As long as China continues its assertive behavior, weaker regional players will seek to enhance ties and cooperation with each other to hedge against China’s assertiveness.

A prerequisite for success in COA 1 is Japan continues its positive economic growth. It is necessary for Japan, the population of which has been declining, to execute social and fiscal reforms to promote immigration from India, the Philippines, and elsewhere; increase retirement age; and improve women’s working conditions. The economic growth supported by those reforms will enable Japan to achieve its strategic goals via COA 1. The timeline of its military buildup for thirty years is also achievable because Japan will be able to quickly increase the military budget to 2 percent of GDP like other Asian countries; then, Japan will gradually boost it to 4 percent of GDP at its maximum in the next two decades. However, COA 1 rests on the assumption of effective constitutional change.153

153 Reiji Yoshida, “Amending Constitution emerges as poll issue: High-riding nationalists say timing ripe for breaking postwar taboo,” The Japan Times, 3 May 2013,
Second, COA 2 is more feasible in the sense it is low-cost; however, in the longer run, it may actually be more expensive. Under COA 2, Japan will only adopt a doubling in defense spending, but avoid development of offensive capabilities such as ballistic missiles. Under COA 2, Japan will also join the AIIB, providing sufficient financial contribution and enhancing cooperation with China to mitigate tensions between Japan and China; moreover, supporting the enhancement of ASEAN’s unity will also be feasible with fewer resources than COA 1 requires for Japan’s military buildup.

Suitability

As chapter 3 analyzed, the strategic problem of the thesis is how Japan can deal with China’s activities, be it maritime, territorial, the rule of law, conventional, et cetera, to change the status quo gradually in the East China Sea. However, according to Japan Ministry of Defense, China could potentially land fishermen on the Senkaku Islands as its next “slice.” This would presumably be followed by occupying the islands by force under the pretext of protecting the Chinese civilians.

Following that logic, the most suitable COA must deal with the worst case possibilities, including success because China’s actual strategic intention is unknown. The essential advantage of COA 1 is Japan will be able to better ensure its security by maximizing self-help while also strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance. A constitutional amendment and increased defense spending can improve necessary capabilities to deter


China’s possible intent to invade the Senkaku Islands and install its missile-centered A2/AD capability that much further out in the Pacific. Japan’s development of a reliable and effective missile strike capability will be important. Japan need to possess the corresponding missile capability to match China. COA 1 will position land-based anti-ship missiles (ASM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) on some of the Ryukyu Islands. (See Figure 5.) Japan has already stationed a garrison company and a radar outpost on the Yonaguni Island, one of the Ryukyu Islands.\textsuperscript{155} The RAND Corporation estimates Japan will need 100-km to 200-km range land-based ASMs to defeat the Chinese warships in any scenario involving invasion of the Senkaku Islands or the Ryukyu Islands.\textsuperscript{156}


\textsuperscript{156} Kelly, Atler, and Nichols, Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific, 11-13.
Figure 5. The Proposed Locations for Land-Based ASMs and MRBMs on the Ryukyu Islands and the Estimated Ranges of MRBMs


COA 1 would also enable the JSDF to actively conduct ISR with more unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and even military satellites which the Constitution prohibits today. The JSDF can also conduct the multinational operations with the USFJ in a much more robust and complimentary fashion. By contrast, COA 2 is quite limited in terms of response options. COA 2 could not quickly react to the high-intensity conflict as
forcefully or for as long a duration without greater ISR capability, changes to the Constitution, and a greatly increased defense budget.

China’s strategic weakness is an absence of allies and feeling surrounded by American allies, to include Japan. In COA 1, Japan strengthens the alliance with the U.S.; the U.S.-centered alliance “net” will be reinforced and restrain the Chinese assertive maritime activities inside the “First Island Chain.” By contrast, COA 2 would not aggressively change the growing military imbalance; hence, over time, should relations with China sour, this would lessen Japan’s ability to protect its critical SLOCs. Therefore, COA 1 is the most suitable COA.

Acceptability

Acceptability means balancing the dangers with the advantage to be gained. COA 1 has a risk for an arms race against China. If China’s active economic growth continues, China will also be able to continue its military buildup for the foreseeable future so that the arms race between Japan and China will be inevitable. The mitigation of the risk is Japan can enhance economic growth by via initiatives (previously discussed) to enhance technological innovation. Longer term, Japan must address clear deficiencies in its educational system that hamper critical thinking and innovation. Therefore, to improve the creativity of the Japanese, Japan must improve teaching technique of teachers for critical and creative thinking; enhance discussion/debating practice for its elementary school education and essay and research practice for its secondary education; adopt more essay and oral tests into entrance examinations; and encourage grade-skipping college
entrance. If the Japanese get more aware of the importance of creativity, they will accept the progressive educational reforms.\textsuperscript{157}

The other risk is the potential of a U.S. retreat from the Asia-Pacific region in the decades to come. Although an essential objective of COA 1 is to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, nobody can precisely predict what the security environment will look like in coming decades. Should the U.S. “retreat” for any number of reasons, Japan will have to possess nuclear weapons by itself because there will be a vacuum, of sorts, and Japan would likely feel compelled to develop its own nuclear deterrent, rather than rely on the promises of a “retreating” U.S. and its nuclear shield, which has protected Japan’s security for decades. As a contingency for the situation, COA 1 will make an MRBM capable of carrying a nuclear warhead in order that Japan will be able to attain the nuclear capability as quickly as possible. Even if the U.S. retreats from the region, the advantages of COA 1 will be able the basis for an actual self-help defense posture.

Conversely, COA 2 has two risks; further exploitation by China and the potential of the U.S. retreat from the region sooner than COA 1. First, if China does not restrain itself from the assertive behavior despite enhancing economic cooperation with Japan, Japan will have been exploited by China resulting in a substantial net loss for Japan. Second, the U.S. may retrench in the Pacific sooner than the case of COA 1 due to the

Japan-U.S. alliance being degraded. The other partnerships with neighboring countries will also be degraded. This case will be the severest challenge to Japan.

**Conclusion**

COA 1 is the most acceptable COA for Japan. (See Table 2.) Although COA 1 will force Japan to accept much greater defense spending, it allows Japan to deal with any scenario. China’s stated strategic goal is to realize the “great national rejuvenation” while pursuing its economic growth “peacefully.” This goal is no different from Japan’s strategic goal in essence. However, we must not judge China on what it says, but what it actually does. Actions speak louder than words. For the foreseeable future, it is likely China will continue its rapid economic growth. Japan is concerned China’s assertive behavior may continue; hence, Japan’s current strategy is inadequate to ensure its strategic goals for the future. Based on the strategic estimate of this research, the strategic problem for Japan is how it can offset China’s aggressive and continuous military buildup; its assertive activities in the East China Sea utilizing “salami slicing” tactics while attempting to change the status quo. On the other hand, Japan’s current strategy, while contributing to its security and economic prosperity, is inadequate to the demands posed by China’s growing ambitions — stated, and unstated. Japan must become far more proactive in order to protect the international order in concert with the U.S. and other partners. However, due to the constitutional restriction on employing the JSDF overseas and its relatively passive posture, the defense expenditure has remained just 1 percent of GDP. This trend will allow the national power gap with China to widen. Consequently, the current strategy is inappropriate to deal with the Chinese threat.
Table 2. Compare/Contrast COA Matrix

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Source: Created by the Author.

The thesis concludes Japan should opt for COA 1 to restore the balance of power between Japan and China, albeit somewhat slowly. Then again, the problem developed slowly. This will involve reinforcing the JSDF, eventually increasing the defense budget to 4 percent of GDP, and amending the ninth article of the constitution to enhance deterrence, by giving Japanese the capacity to conduct true, offensive operations. Simultaneously, Japan should strengthen the alliance with the U.S. by increasing its HNS spending to ensure the effective implementation of the alliance and enhance the security cooperation with Asian neighbors also concerned about China. Improving the relationship with Russia will also be important to offset China’s threat from a long-term perspective. Japan must achieve sustained, healthy, positive economic growth by reforming immigration and fiscal policies, and technological and industrial innovation via more robust approaches.

Recommendation for Further Study

This thesis only suggests two COAs. There are a multitude of more/less extreme options that could be contemplated and hypothesized. Unfortunately, the time constraints at CGSC make an expensive study impossible.
Final Thoughts

Through this research program, the researcher recognizes a bias against a Sino-Japanese relationship in his thinking, which has to be guarded against. Based on this research project, it is apparent that China is very different from Japan in its view of the world and history, and its way of strategic thinking. China is still a developing country, but its power will eventually outstrip most, if not all, developed countries. After long hardship, China is enjoying “rejuvenation.” However, the international world has also changed dramatically so that Chinese assertive behavior, based on outdated hierarchical thinking, or “Great-state Autism,” causes significant regional frictions.158 Japan, as a developed country, needs to maintain a rational, prudent, graduated, and pragmatic stance on China without excessive fear while enhancing deterrence through self-help and strengthening the alliance with the U.S. to contribute to regional and global security and stability.

158 Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, 100.
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