A HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY CONCEPTUAL SOLUTIONS TO THE UNCERTAINTY OF EXPEDITIONS

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Military History

by

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A History of U.S. Military Conceptual Solutions to the Uncertainty of Expeditions

Noah A. Emery-Morris, MAJ

Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* dated December 21, 2010 requires that the Army provide forces with expeditionary and campaign qualities. The guidance it provides regarding those forces indicate that they must be tailorable, scalable, and timely in the execution of their missions. In order to fully understand this demand, a careful examination of historical precedent enables the Army to prepare forces for this mission. The historical examples of the U.S. Army Armored Forces’ combat command structure, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, and the 82nd Airborne Division’s ready forces provide critical insight into how to develop expeditionary Army forces for the future. In this period of fiscal constraints, the Army must prepare itself to flexibly execute expeditionary operations in the future. It can only do so with a firm appreciation of the tradeoffs required to build expeditionary qualities into the force.

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ABSTRACT


Department of Defense Directive 5100.01 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components dated December 21, 2010 requires that the Army provide forces with expeditionary and campaign qualities. The guidance it provides regarding those forces indicate that they must be tailorable, scalable, and timely in the execution of their missions. In order to fully understand this demand, a careful examination of historical precedent enables the Army to prepare forces for this mission. The historical examples of the U.S. Army Armored Forces’ combat command structure, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, and the 82nd Airborne Division’s ready forces provide critical insight into how to develop expeditionary Army forces for the future. In this period of fiscal constraints, the Army must prepare itself to flexibly execute expeditionary operations in the future. It can only do so with a firm appreciation of the tradeoffs required to build expeditionary qualities into the force.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

What is at Stake in Expeditionary Operations

In 1950, a small, lightly equipped task force huddled on a hill near the town of Osan, South Korea. Having only six rounds of anti-tank artillery ammunition and six obsolete 2.36-inch bazookas, two companies of light infantry and an artillery battery stood in the path of a North Korean tank regiment and the infantry division that it supported. Many assumptions went into the deployment of Task Force Smith to that hill. Unfortunately for TF Smith, those assumptions reflected neither the environment nor the enemy. These assumptions proved wrong on a number of counts.

A flawed understanding led to force packaging compromises setting it up for failure. In the haste to commit forces quickly, this small force proved too lightly armed to defeat the threat it faced and reflected a confused U.S. strategy that sought to both demonstrate U.S. military capabilities as well as rally the South Korean defense. This force reflected a specific compromise of qualities to meet its mission. Due to the situation’s urgency, it traded the firepower, protection, and sustainment capabilities of more heavily equipped units for the timely deployability made possible by its infantry base and small unit size. However, such a lightly equipped force could not adequately demonstrate U.S. military capabilities, nor could such a small force rally significant numbers of South Koreans. Unfortunately, these disparities between available means and desired ends resulted in Task Force Smith suffering a dramatic defeat.1

Fundamentally, the Army prepares forces for more than winning the nation’s wars; it does so in fulfillment of a grand strategy, itself a product of American policy.
The U.S. Army provides forces across the spectrum of conflict including for diplomatic arenas both encouraging allies as well as deterring adversaries. Because the ends and objectives set out for the military come from policymakers, their attitudes shape the environment the Army must prepare to confront in addition to the adversary, the terrain, and the weather. Therefore, the relationship between Army leaders and civilian policymakers place a further demand for flexibility on expeditionary Army forces. Furthermore, it requires a delicate balance of qualities within the force to achieve this flexibility.

In some cases, the nation knows its enemy and the terrain on which it will fight; in others cases it does not. Rarely, if ever, has the nation known in advance when conflict would require U.S. forces, and the strategic ends expected by policymakers often do not crystallize until well into the conflict. These unknowns form the crux of the Army’s problem in force design. Since the structure, type, and qualities of Army forces play such a critical role in the execution of foreign policy, the Army must understand the nature of expeditionary operations and the balance of qualities it must incorporate into its expeditionary forces. To achieve this understanding, the Army requires analysis both of the qualities themselves to understand them and of the circumstances where forces have balanced them before. An assessment of historical cases where the U.S. military addressed these unknowns of expeditionary operations can enable future Army leaders to better navigate the pitfalls and trade-offs associated with expeditionary force design.

**Definitions**

Merriam-Webster defines an expedition as “a journey or excursion undertaken for a specific purpose.” This definition supports that of the adjective ‘expeditionary’: “sent to
fight in a foreign country.” These two definitions, simple on the surface, involve a host of subjective meanings, particularly in a military context. Some may argue that forces not explicitly designed to operate in an expeditionary fashion are not expeditionary. That assumption proves unsupported, however, when applied to constabulary forces deployed overseas, precisely the situation that Task Force Smith represents. In that context, a constabulary force has been “sent to fight in a foreign country,” the very definition of expeditionary; whether intended that way or not. All forces, then, regardless of their intended missions, possess the capability to operate in an expeditionary fashion to one degree or another. Some force designs and training paradigms work very well when employed overseas, while others do not. Effective expeditionary forces, however, have qualities that make them more ideally suited to operations in foreign countries and in less familiar territory.

While all forces can conduct expeditions, then, forces tailor-made to operate overseas represent a different kind of force than those tailored for defensive operations. Expeditionary forces cannot expect to find the same infrastructure overseas as at home, nor can they count on the support of the local population. If a primarily defensive force is employed at home-station it can usually count on its people’s support because the use of a defensive force implies an existential threat to the nation or secured population. Similarly, a defensive force, fighting on its home ground, knows the infrastructure, the terrain, and the population, all of which can prove beneficial to the defense. By contrast, an expeditionary force has none of these advantages. It goes into places with largely unfamiliar terrain and people to accomplish political objectives and must overcome whatever austere conditions it finds. Expeditionary forces, therefore, represent a different
breed of force, one capable of deploying from home station to a distant place in crisis, sustaining itself, and accomplishing whatever objectives the policymakers set. Each of these conditions represents unknowns. The expeditionary force cannot know ahead of time where or when such a crisis may occur. They will not know how long the crisis will require forces. Most importantly, they will not know in advance what the policy will demand in terms of actions on the ground. These uncertainties reflect unique force design challenges to the creation of a force capable of deploying to these unknown environments and achieving the objective.

Current diplomatic, political, and budgetary pressures make the subject of expeditionary military capabilities particularly timely. Army budgets today have forced senior leaders to choose between readiness activities and modernization efforts. The Army expected end strength is lower than at any time since before World War II. Moreover, today’s operational environment includes a resurgent Russia that has seized the Crimea and occupied large parts of Ukraine as well as a China newly assertive in the South China Sea. Added to these near-peer threats, the Islamic State and international criminal and terrorist organizations pose threats not only to the United States but also to European allies and other partners all over the world.⁴

The Doctrine

This environment presents a conceptual dilemma to the Army: not only must it respond to a complex international environment, but it must do so with very limited resources. Doctrine offers the military a response to conceptual problems, and the Department of Defense (DoD) and Army have responded to this dilemma with DoD Directive 5100.01 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components
and the Army with TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 *The Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World.*

For the DoD, Directive 5100.01 speaks specifically to the requirements of Army expeditionary forces. It uses phrases like “war and military operations short of war,” “prompt and sustained,” and “in all environments” to describe an Army mission fraught with unknowns. This wording indicates Army forces may operate along the full spectrum of conflict, in every environment, and respond to urgent crises rapidly and remain in action for as long as necessary. The combination of “all environments” and “war and operations short of war” indicates a broad array of possible threats. This broad array of threats and the uncertain tactical environment demands a tactical force able to reorganize itself while in combat and to employ the right force at the right time, a notion of tailorability. Preparation for the full spectrum of conflict requires force packaging for several scales of conflict, which indicates the scalability of the force. Moreover, the phrase “prompt and sustained” includes two time references, the first for how quickly the force must arrive and the second for when sustainment-related culmination might force its withdrawal. While from the military’s point of view, these two concepts reflect wildly divergent ideas, from the policymaker’s point of view these two remain inextricably linked. After all, if a force arrives quickly but lacks both the assets to achieve the desired results as well as the ability to sustain itself, it cannot be truly considered ‘timely’ action. In that context, the first timely action consists of the arrival of the correct force package with the correct sustainment assets to maintain it for the duration of the mission. As a result, these two requirements together reflect a concept of timeliness and responsiveness to the time-related needs of the policymaker. For this work then, these broad and ill-
defined requirements break down into three essential qualities: tailorability, scalability, and timeliness.\textsuperscript{5}

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 \textit{The Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World} mirrors these qualities in its description of how the Army intends to fight. Its essential problem statement “how does the Army conduct joint operations promptly, in sufficient scale, and for ample duration to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars?” speaks to precisely these requirements. The Army Operating Concept (AOC) references three very different mission sets, which require different combinations of force types requiring tailorability. It specifically mentions Army operations of “sufficient scale” implying a demand for forces designed for a range of contingency sizes. Finally, it requires that the Army conduct its operations both “promptly” and for “ample duration”, which refers both to speed of deployment as well as the sustainability of the force the same criteria outlined above for timeliness.\textsuperscript{6} Ideally, the Army would shape itself to maximize all three of these qualities to meet the policy demand.

However, these expeditionary force qualities must be balanced. Strength in one of these three qualities, demands a tradeoff in one or more other areas. Tailorability requires the presence of many force types, some of which need greater transportation resources and more time to arrive in theater, which constrains timeliness. Having deployable force packages at several scales imposes a cost in the sustainment arena that can detract from timeliness as well. Timeliness, conversely, imposes limits on force size and type as well as demanding limited strategic air transportation constraining the scale of deployable forces. So, to provide the forces demanded by DoD Directive 5100.01 and reinforced by TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, the Army must understand how these qualities affect each
other and the costs and risks associated with that balance. While these qualities provide specific benefits, emphasis on one quality means assuming risk in other areas. Analyzing the qualities demonstrates that their disparate domains result in significantly different priorities.

**Expeditionary Force Qualities in Detail**

Tailorability speaks to the Army force’s ability to provide the necessary tactical formations to address each crisis’ unique combination of the threat environment, physical environment, and policy environment. Threat environments range from high-end adversaries with advanced armored vehicles, artillery, and air support to low-end adversaries or failed states that have only small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and the like. The force must have an appropriate amount of lethality, mobility, and protection to address those threats. Similarly, environmental conditions constrain the deployed force. Not only must the force address issues like temperature and humidity, but it must also contend with varying levels of infrastructure, road networks, and elevation changes. Additionally, the policy objectives will demand certain kinds of Army forces more than others; tanks do not support an evacuation as effectively as infantry, for example.

Tailorability, then, refers to the Army’s ability to deploy the right tactical capabilities to respond to the crisis’ specific conditions with an emphasis on force protection and mission accomplishment.

Scalability allows for Army force packages ranging from small forces for theater security cooperation training all the way up to major deployments in support of Congressionally declared war. This quality of expeditionary forces speaks to its ability to react to the policy demand. A policy with a narrow and limited end, like the evacuation of
non-combatants from a small area for example, may require only a small force package. Conversely, a policy requiring regime change for a powerful regional actor may demand substantially more forces. Scalability, then, refers to the Army’s ability to commit the right force package size to enable operational planners to connect tactical actions to the strategic policy requirement. This planning process balances the minimum number of required troops and capabilities against the required policy and may risk providing too few troops to accomplish the mission or so many that it detracts both from the policy ends as well as readiness at home.

Timeliness refers both to the ability to arrive quickly in the crisis theater as well as to continue operations for as long as strategic policy requires. These strategic considerations, i.e., how quickly U.S. forces respond to a contingency and how much staying power they must have in the face of a determined enemy, directly correspond to the strategic policy itself. A policy demanding immediate action can only take shape if the force supports rapid interventions. Conversely, a policy of occupation demands significantly different force design parameters. In some respects, a rapidly deployable force is easier to sustain, leading to some advantages in campaign quality. Light infantry forces, after all, require little in the way of mechanical parts, fuels, and lubricants in order to continue fighting, particularly compared to heavy armored forces. On the other hand, if this force does not meet other critical requirements regarding the threat environment or the policy goals, such a force may be at a significant disadvantage against a more heavily armed adversary.
Constraints and Compromise

Ultimately, these three qualities must find a balance. All forces possess them to one degree or another, and all vary with respect to the compromise between them. Some forces emphasize one quality while others seek a middle ground among them. However, there is no perfect answer, no optimal solution. A force can only strive for the best fit between policy demand and the best possible force within the constraints of the budget, technology, and available human material. These constraints serve to limit even a deliberately focused force from maximizing one quality. The balances achieved in force design, then, reflect not only a balance between qualities but also a balance within the force between competing resource limitations and requirements.

Each such compromise represents a set of force design decisions with far-reaching consequences that often go unforeseen. Force design and development takes time. Choices made early in the development process will not come to fruition for years but they commit limited resources towards a specifically balanced objective expeditionary force. The balance selected reflects the policy that demanded the force design, but that demand originated years before the design came into effect. International relations change much more rapidly than the forces designed to respond to them resulting in significant differences between the expected environment and the force’s balance of expeditionary qualities. This time delay further complicates finding an effective balance between these qualities and demands deep understanding of international relations, the context of the development of force designs, and the outcome of previous force development experiments.
The Case Studies

With the U.S. Army expected to conduct expeditionary operations in support of national interests overseas, historical examples of force design compromises made in force design provide insight into future Army doctrine and force development. One example of each quality will help to clearly articulate how each quality requires tradeoffs from the other two. While force designs prior to World War I also required these qualities in order to conduct operations in support of policy overseas, the limited familiarity of the modern force with those examples limits their utility. Of the many times and ways in which U.S. forces deployed abroad, the combat command structure of the Armored Force of World War II, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and the ready forces of the 82nd Airborne Division provide both applicable and relevant insight into expeditionary forces for the Army today. Few U.S. force designs better reflect tailorability than the World War II Armored Force’s combat command structure. Similarly, among U.S. military force designs, the MAGTF represents a unique capacity for scalability. Finally today, the ready forces of the 82nd Airborne Division today fulfill a niche unparalleled for its global responsiveness. These three examples demonstrate the delicate nature of the balance between expeditionary qualities.

The combat command structure of the Armored Force of World War II dramatically improved tailorability within Army forces, both during the war and through its legacy, impacts the brigade combat team. The U.S. armored community in the Interwar Period struggled to understand the nature of mechanized warfare and how combat worked in the context of the added mobility mechanization provided. An argument ensued between competing branches within the Army regarding how best to
employ this new force. This unresolved argument resulted in significant challenges to the creation of an effective armored force. In response to this challenging environment, prior to the commitment of U.S. Army forces to North Africa and Europe, MG Jacob Devers reorganized the armored division to incorporate three empty headquarters units. These formations had no organic troops but rather controlled combinations of battalions assigned to it for the mission at hand. Rather than offering a specific solution to the unresolved question regarding the nature of mechanized warfare, the combat command negated the problem by allowing units on the ground to solve it themselves. The ability to redistribute three battalions of tanks, mechanized infantry, and artillery from their respective regiments among the combat commands not only resolved the argument, but it also gave the U.S. armored divisions tremendous tailorability.7

Similarly, the Marines developed the MAGTF specifically to provide a range of policy options. In the advent of the nuclear age, the Marine Corps struggled to justify its amphibious assault role. The new threat of nuclear strikes seemed to suggest the eclipse of the Corps’ hallmark amphibious assaults. As a result of this need to re-invent itself, the Marine Corps sought a role for a small, infantry-focused force in the context of the complex world of international relations. This search for identity resulted in the development of a structure that provided a ratio of Marine Corps forces that applies regardless of the scale of mission required. This ratio enabled them to produce three similarly capable task forces at significantly different scales; the Marine Expeditionary Force at the division level, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade at the regiment level, and the Marine Expeditionary Unit at the battalion level. Each combines a command element, a ground combat element, an air combat element, and a logistics element. By preparing
these packages in advance, the Marines avoid the painstaking process of building the correct combination of units anew to respond to a given tactical environment. These three levels of force packaging, therefore, allow the Marines to respond quickly regardless of the demand providing an unprecedented level of scalability in the U.S. military.⁸

Lastly, the ready forces of the 82nd Airborne Division demonstrate the ability to arrive promptly into a contested theater and sustain operations in austere conditions. Following the Korean War, the nation realized it needed a force capable of rapidly responding to conventional threats, especially short of near-peer adversaries. In response to this demand, the nation gradually developed in the 82nd Airborne Division a rapid deployment capability through the combination of their airborne legacy and a long history of working with the Air Force.⁹ The process did not occur all at once and did not reflect a single, long-term decision but rather evolved out of existing strengths within the airborne community and incremental changes made both to force structure and to employment plans. Their airborne status, often the subject of debate, allows a large number of troops to get to a crisis area quickly. Not only can this force get to a crisis area quickly, but its troops train constantly to operate in conditions of austerity. Perhaps more importantly, their long working relationship with the Air Force has resulted in the 82nd displaying a culture of readiness and institutionalizing standard procedures that allow for rapid deployment. Their light infantry structure ensures that their supply demands remain low enough that they can operate in the limited logistical conditions common to immature theaters. Most capabilities and qualities of the 82nd Airborne’s ready forces came into being to meet immediate tactical needs rather than reflecting an overarching intention to produce rapidly deployable forces. While much less the result of a single
deliberate decision than either of the other two examples, the force structure now clearly reflects the greatest timeliness of any U.S. Army force its size. This combination of capabilities provided the 82nd Airborne Division with a unique degree of timeliness in responding to policy demands for Army forces globally.

In searching for clear examples for the three expeditionary qualities, three significant considerations drive the selection of these specific cases. Firstly the selected cases must provide as stark a contrast as possible between the qualities in question. Each of these three represent clear choices made to emphasize one of the expeditionary qualities over the others. Second, the cases ought to reside far enough in the past to offer a rich historical perspective, but not so far in the distance that the decisions made have no relevance to the contemporary environment. Each example came into being more than forty years ago but less than seventy years ago. As such, many military historians have written about each organization providing a rich secondary source environment to better understand the force design decisions. At the same time, the examples selected demonstrate enough modernity to resonate with an Army familiar with automatic weapons, technological sophistication, and combined arms. Finally, the examples selected have sufficient direct ties to modern Army force structures that currently serving officers recognize the examples within their own experience. These examples all have ties to the contemporary Army structure. Many currently serving Army officers have direct experience with the 82nd Airborne Division’s ready forces and with the MAGTF. The combat command, while more perhaps more obscure than the other two examples, has served as a foundational construct for the development of the brigade in its current form. Having met the selection criteria, the combat command, MAGTF, and the ready
forces of the 82nd Airborne serve as the framework for understanding the balance between expeditionary qualities.

**The Application of this Balance in Force Design**

Force design discussions often evolve out of overly simplistic conceptions of the military, its purpose, and ideal ways to pursue that purpose. Young, energetic Army officers develop conceptually elegant recommendations for force design. Their ideas reflect their own specific experience, however. Where their perspective often fails is in its appreciation of the nuanced balance between the competing expeditionary qualities and the policymaker’s role in the decision-making process. Optimization in force design only exists within the context of its design parameters and constraints. Even when successful, force redesigns reflect tremendous investments of both money and talent. Whenever the Army expends resources such expenditures become a matter of policy and therefore, the purview of policymakers. The decision to expend those resources involves policymakers at all stages of force development from the decision that a redesign is necessary, through the process of force design itself, and beyond into the consequences of the decisions themselves. Before eager officers develop force designs in a vacuum, they would do well to carefully analyze the way these qualities interact and how accepted risks may affect policy. A careful evaluation of historical force design supporting expeditionary operations will empower these inspired officers. Once armed with an understanding of the tradeoffs inherent in designing expeditionary forces, these officers can go on to shape an Army that can accomplish the DoD Directive’s mandates.

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3 Constabulary in this context referring to forces employed for civil security as in the forces that secured Japan following World War II. These forces, while armed like most Army elements at the time, had not trained to fight against conventional enemies and their primary mission consisted more of policing than fighting. In general, since constabulary forces are more used to operating in a civil capacity than a military one, they tend to perform poorly outside of their assigned areas and missions.


6 Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Army Operating Concept, 16.

7 Robert Cameron, Mobility, Shock, and Firepower: The Emergence of the U.S. Army’s Armor Branch, 1917-1945 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2008), 375.


CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Logic of the Analysis

In the current operational environment, the United States faces strategic challenges that require the capability to execute overseas deployments. Under the right circumstances, expeditionary conventional forces can deter near-peer adversaries like Russia and even defeat smaller regional threats to international stability. However, developing a force for expeditionary operations demands an understanding of the requirements for such a force. Dictionary definitions and doctrine help to outline these requirements, but doctrine falls short of the clear, unequivocal statements needed during force development. Historical case studies allow force developers to examine how different balances of expeditionary qualities have played out in the past.

This work, then, follows a logical line from the dictionary definition, through doctrine, to the case studies themselves. The definitions serve to orient the audience on the subject itself: expeditionary forces and force development. The doctrine guides the study to several key qualities and critically provides definitions for those qualities. The case studies exemplify these qualities and allow the reader to compare and contrast the examples in terms of the compromises made to fit their unique strategic circumstances.

Selection of Case Studies

The case study method offers specific advantages to furthering understanding of expeditionary requirements. Each of the three case studies’ unique conditions required trade-offs and therefore offers insight into the balance of these qualities, an important
force at work in the organization of U.S. Army expeditionary elements. Additionally, rather than speculating about possible outcomes between force designs or running simulations to prove one design superior over another, historical case studies describe actual outcomes. The forces developed in the past have known traits that others have studied. The fact that others have studied these cases allows for a more robust examination of the sometimes-unintended results of force development. Case study methods also have disadvantages in this context because the selection of applicable cases reflects the bias of the author. In the context of the military, this kind of bias could lead the research to provide one oversimplified answer to a complex problem. In this case, however, two things help to mitigate this risk. First, this particular work does not attempt to provide any specific answer to the problems associated with expeditionary operations and therefore does not steer the reader towards one answer through the particular selection of case studies. Second, the use of criteria to select the cases in question mitigates the risk of arbitrarily selecting cases that speak to a specific narrative. The cases selected need only align with the qualities outlined in doctrine, represent relatable experiences for the contemporary Army audience, and offer sufficient contrast between the qualities to provide examples of the compromises and trade-offs required.

The three case studies reflect a number of criteria that best exemplify the expeditionary qualities described above. First, the case study needed to clearly demonstrate one of the qualities of expeditionary forces outlined in DoD Directive 5100.01 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.\textsuperscript{1} Second, the force redesign needed to have taken place far enough in the past for historians to study it and recently enough for existing records to describe how the reform took place.
Finally, the case study needed to reflect sufficient emphasis on a single quality as to require compromises in other qualities. Each criterion contributed to the selection of the three case studies discussed further in this work.

As outlined in more detail below, the DoD directive provides guidance regarding what the Army must provide in terms of expeditionary forces to meet the nation’s need. As the first component of the selection criteria, this framework ruled out cases that did not demonstrate a clear connection with one or more of these expeditionary qualities. Any such case would distract from the discussion of the trade-offs and risks assumed in developing a force towards expeditionary operations.

Next, the cases needed to sit in a particular place in history: far enough to have been studied and close enough for contemporary readers to find it relevant. Cases too far in the past risk obscuring the connection between the expeditionary qualities identified in the DoD directive and their applicability in the context of the case itself. Cases that are too recent will have insufficient depth and breadth of research and therefore too little understanding of the consequences of the decisions made. Historians have not had enough time to study very recent examples of force design like the brigade combat team in detail. That lack of detail prohibits a clear understanding of the consequences of choices made in force development. Understanding the compromises between desired qualities reflects a deeper appreciation for the specific circumstances of that particular force design. This understanding, then, can describe hypothetical future contexts and allow force developers to draw parallels and inform needed changes to force design.

Most importantly, the redesign needed to require enough specialization to force the organization to compromise among the three qualities to achieve noticeable gains in
any one direction. Some force designs seek a strict balance between all three qualities. In those instances, the general forces created lack specific advantages in an expeditionary environment. While this generalization may allow policymakers to employ such a force in many contexts, its very neutrality obscures the costs involved in increasing any one of the qualities. Avoiding sacrifices among the expeditionary qualities may mitigate risk, but it also limits a force’s utility in terms of the case studies employed for this work because such a force makes few compromises to achieve the expeditionary qualities it employs. By seeking out very dramatic examples of each quality, this work attempts to demonstrate the cost of moving a more neutrally balanced force towards one of the extremes. Through the analysis of the compromises required, the priorities of the developing agency come into focus. In smaller or more balanced cases, forces can avoid sacrificing expeditionary qualities. However, a more complete force redesign requires the Army to understand the costs involved in focusing on one strong quality. The compromises made in the past offer insight into how to make better compromises in the future.

These criteria narrowed the field of available force redesigns to a few examples. Along with the options selected, the development of amphibious warfare capabilities within the Marine Corps, the cavalry force built to campaign against Pancho Villa, and the development of the Army Air Corps used in the strategic bombing campaign in Europe could all have spoken to elements of this discussion. Each reflected a unique set of strategic circumstances, but their distance from the contemporary Army experience limited their use. The example of amphibious warfare developed out of Plan Orange for possible war with Japan in the Interwar Period. Useful in its simplicity in that it reflected
a deliberate attempt to build the Marine Corps into a force for a specific mission, that
same advantage rules it out given the broader mission for Army forces. The expedition
against Mexico rests too far back in time with many of the lessons involved in the
creation of the primarily cavalry force lost to military obsolescence. Finally, the Army
Air Corps example lacked sufficient focus in any of the expeditionary qualities to offer
discreet comparative advantage. Each examples lacks in one of the criteria mentioned
earlier: the Marine Corps’ amphibious warfare doctrine did not reflect a broad enough
mission to compare its compromises to those of the contemporary Army, the incursion
into Mexico occurred so far in the past that it lacks technological relevance, and the
Army Air Corps example does not resonate as clearly with any of three expeditionary
qualities.

From within the broader list, the three cases selected reflect one quality each to a
contemporary Army audience. Many currently serving Army officers will have direct
experience working with the ready forces of the 82nd Airborne Division and the various
Marine Air-Ground Task Forces employed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the
combat command served as an origin point for many capabilities extant in the current
Army brigade structure. Therefore the case studies selected represent both cases with
relevance to the expected audience of currently serving Army officers as well as
reflecting the expeditionary qualities outlined in the DoD directive.

The Role of Doctrine

When developing this concept, several doctrinal sources stand out as options for
framing the concept of expeditionary forces. Training and Doctrine Command’s
(TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1 U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World
offers insight into how the Army intends to conduct its operations, but both of these documents speak to service-specific methods. In the process, they describe the forces demanded by the Army, but these requirements do not originate in those documents. Ultimately, DoD Directive 5100.01 *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* provides the authoritative statement of requirements from the Defense Department to the three service departments regarding the forces required of them.

DoD Directive 5100.01 *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* provides the framework for this discussion in the qualities it demands of expeditionary forces to support policy. The document directs that the Army prepare land forces for “war and military operations short of war.” This establishes a requirement for forces with the flexibility to alter its capabilities as the policy environment changes. It goes on to talk about the many national interests the Army must support including “military engagement and security cooperation, deterring aggression and violence, and should deterrence fail, compelling enemy behavioral change or compliance.” These two statements frame a force capable of conducting operations all along the spectrum of conflict and with a tailored force mix to support the policy requirement. This speaks to both a concept of tailorability meaning the ability to mix the right force for the right mission, and scalability meaning meeting the right size of force with the mission at hand. Finally, in the next subparagraph, it demands the ability to “conduct prompt and sustained combined arms combat operations.” This sets a condition of timeliness both in terms of promptly arriving at the required area as well as the ability to remain in combat for as long as the policy requires. These three qualities: tailorability, scalability, and
timeliness; set the framework for the following discussion regarding expeditionary operations.4

Once articulated this way, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 serves to augment and clarify the discussion regarding the qualities outlined above. *The Army Operating Concept* goes into detail regarding what qualities future Army forces need. That document articulates the need to conduct expeditionary maneuver through rapid deployment and transition to operations. Further, it outlines the need for mobility, adaptability, simultaneity, depth, and endurance.5 These qualities serve to describe in detail how the Army will conduct operations and refine to Soldiers executing the tasks the mechanisms needed to achieve battlefield successes which can translate into ‘winning.’ Mobility, adaptability, simultaneity, and depth all refer to bringing the right tactical tools to the right places at the right time. Endurance serves to translate the second half of the timeliness requirement partially addressed through the statement about “rapid deployment.” From the policymaker’s point of view, having forces in place from the right time and until the right time fulfill their time-related needs. From the Soldier’s point of view, however, those are two discreet needs.

This distinction bears careful consideration. The policymaker has a distinctly different perspective than those who must execute the policy. The DoD directive requires Army forces to “conduct prompt and sustained combined arms combat operations.”6 In an Army context, that sounds like “get there quickly and then resupply those operations.” In part this stems from the Army’s use of the root word ‘sustain’ as its Army Warfighting Function ‘sustainment.’ Indeed, the DoD directive may deliberately imply this usage, but its literal meaning in this context is closer to ‘keep up’ or ‘prolong’ than it is to ‘supply
with sustenance.' This nuanced difference directly affects the balance demanded of the forces in question. Inclusion as a fourth quality under discussion would demand understanding the relationship between endurance and tailorability for example, a much weaker conceptual connection than between tailorability and the broader concept of timeliness. Endurance does not independently relate to the other qualities in part because of the way it relates to promptness. Swiftly deploying units must expect isolation from Army logistics for a time which impacts how long the force can operate. Building force designs for rapid deployment impacts scalability and tailorability more than building an organization for endurance. This frames the lesson of balancing the expeditionary qualities in terms of how much timeliness the force can sacrifice to achieve scalability and tailorability, both as a function of how quickly the force can arrive as well as how long the force can operate.

**Literature Review**

The preponderance of existing literature on U.S. expeditionary warfare does not address this issue of the balance between expeditionary qualities directly. Most works in this field focus either on the development of a specific force design or on some unique facet of expeditionary operations. The first group, broadly speaking, develops a specific force design idea or change with the intent to generate discussion about force design itself. The other category examines a narrow historical aspect of expeditionary warfare in detail. As differentiated from those approaches, this work examines the qualities of an expeditionary force and the balance between those qualities. The force design-focused works may attempt to achieve a new balance between expeditionary qualities, but do not explicitly examine the required qualities in sufficient breadth or depth to evaluate the
trade-offs demanded. The other category of works builds on an historical example of a specific element or incident in expeditionary warfare that may educate about the impact of the specified field, but fails to address the broader force design and balance issue. By contrast, this work deliberately examines the trade-offs and risks assumed when a force emphasizes one quality over the others but does not examine any one historical detail in depth, nor does it offer a specific force design recommendation.

This work does not recommend a specific force design which differentiates it from a number of sources. COL (Ret.) Douglas Macgregor’s *Breaking the Phalanx* and his later work *Transformation Under Fire* epitomize this approach to the subject matter. These works do not employ case studies in the same way, but rather explicitly outline a number of failings in the existing force structure and go on to recommend specific organizational designs to resolve these failings. Both works do make reference to specific historical military actions, but more to reinforce specific changes in force design rather than understanding the broad qualities demanded of the force and the way those qualities balance each other. Another work along this line, the RAND Arroyo Study *Lightning Over Water: Sharpening America’s Light Forces for Rapid Reaction Missions* likewise identifies capability shortfalls in existing light infantry forces through historical analysis of combat actions and makes specific recommendations for change. Again, these examples represent specific shortfalls in equipment, manning, or doctrine more than an understanding of the way any changes may impact another critical quality of the force. A number of unpublished academic works by various military authors likewise propose specific changes to the force structure.
However, these projects provide an answer before fully addressing the question. They offer one solution to balancing the desired force qualities without providing a firm analysis about what risks a force assumes when it makes a given kind of compromise. Any force design has the potential to conduct expeditionary operations as defined by the conduct of operations outside of the nation’s borders. This work intends to examine how the qualities of expeditionary forces balance to allow for a more complete understanding of expeditionary warfare.

The common alternative method for examining expeditionary warfare follows one or more specific components of that kind of war. A number of unpublished academic works explore valuable aspects logistics or leadership traits. These works select one concern regarding expeditionary warfare and expound upon it using historical examples. While valuable, this approach does not set expeditionary warfare into a context provided by policy nor does it speak to the broad compromises necessary to trade one advantageous expeditionary quality against another. As a result, they often promote a parochial concern within the subject matter rather than offer a balanced perspective of the compromises needed to achieve success within their identified arena.

Both of these styles of work offer positive and negative traits in evaluating expeditionary warfare. The force design style stimulates conversation and promotes healthy debate both within the force as well as from outside interested parties. Similarly, the narrowly focused historical studies offer deep insight into one or more aspects of effective expeditions which itself can serve to generate discussion and evaluate expeditionary processes and methods. Conversely, however, neither method offers a clear
evaluation of the compromises required to achieve increases in their given field of argument.

**Selection of Sources**

The critical reader will note that each case study depends heavily on sources either created by the force in question or by individuals with an agenda in favor of that force. Dependence on those sources with an obvious bias in some ways limits the argument’s effectiveness, but the intent in using these sources is to see through the eyes of the organizations at the heart of the case studies. It reflects a deliberate decision to see the compromise as they themselves saw it. This approach intends to demonstrate that the authors of the various force structures to one extent or another knowingly made these compromises based on their unique circumstances.

Each case study relies upon secondary sources drawn from the histories of their parent organizations. The sources offer a limited range of broad perspectives on the organization, but offer different discreet details allowing for a deep understanding of the specific circumstances of each case. In employing this depth of detail, this work builds context with regard to the decisions made in the force development process. Each case study relied upon a small handful of insider sources and relied on outside sources for details not available from the main sources.

In the study of the armored division of World War II, this work owes the majority of its rigor to a small handful of sources associated with armored force development in the United States. Two sources predominate in the discussion regarding the development of U.S. armored forces prior to World War II: Mildred Gillie’s *Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the Development of the Armored Force* and Robert Cameron’s *Mobility,*
Shock, and Firepower: The Emergence of the U.S. Army’s Armor Branch, 1917-1945. Jonathan M. House’s Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization, although not mentioned directly in the narrative, proved critical to understanding the context of the development of U.S. armored forces and theory. Between them, these three sources provided the preponderance of understanding necessary to effectively evaluate how the 1943 armored division force structure came to include the combat command structure.

Likewise, in assessing the MAGTF, this work makes extensive use of common Marine Corps historical works. John A. De Chant’s The Modern United States Marine Corps provides critical understanding regarding how the Marine Corps looked in 1966, shortly after the Hogaboom Board established the MAGTF concept. Aaron B. O’Connell’s insightful Underdogs: the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, by contrast, offers a deep look into the Congressional politics and struggles that nearly resulted in the dissolution of the Marine Corps. And James A. Warren’s American Spartans: The U.S. Marines: A Combat History from Iwo Jima to Iraq provides a more contemporary view of the details surrounding the transformation process itself. These three works provided the majority of source material for the analysis of the MAGTF.

Finally, while significant source material regarding the history of the 82nd Airborne Division allows for broad historical study about the unit, significantly less historical work focuses on the ready force concept and its application. This case study drew heavily from the background work done in Leroy Thomson’s The All Americans: The 82nd Airborne and Edwin Hoy’s Airborne: The History of American Parachute Forces. Additional discussion regarding the development of the ready forces comes
from Frank Harvey’s *Strike Command: America’s Elite New Combat Team* and its description of the growing relationship between American airborne forces and the Air Force that delivered them. In an exception within this piece, Marc R. DeVore’s *When Failure Thrives: Institutions and the Evolution of Postwar Airborne Forces* serves as a counterpoint and allows for an understanding of the value of airborne training in understanding the ready force concept.

While this work has made extensive use of secondary historical works with an obvious bias in favor of the forces discussed here, this work also intends to see the compromises made from the point of view of the agencies creating the new force design. The sacrifices knowingly made by force developers tell a different story than the perspective of outside criticism of the same force. This work intends to describe deliberate choices made to balance force needs against circumstances. Criticism from the outside may highlight missteps in force development but that does not take into account the knowing compromises made to provide a force empowered with a specific expeditionary quality. Those decisions reflect the logical core of these force designs.

**Logical Outcome**

In conclusion, this work logically traces the definition of expeditionary through descriptive qualities outlined in doctrine to specific historical examples of forces that emphasize each quality. The chain of logic outlines a need for circumspection in prioritizing the qualities demanded of Army forces and to carefully weigh the intended outcomes against both intended and unintended consequences. Each component along this journey supports the conclusion that developing a more expeditionary force relies on a delicate balance of force qualities and competing requirements. An understanding of
this balance allows force developers to carefully evaluate the significance of constraints imposed on one quality to make advances within another. This understanding empowers force developers with a greater awareness of the impacts and consequences associated with a narrowly focused force design and to achieve a better compromise to support the needs of policymakers.

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1 The primary work used to convey the purpose and key tasks for each service within the Department of Defense.


3 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 serves as the Army’s vision for how the future force will conduct operations.


5 Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, iii.


17 Harvey, *Strike Command*, 1, 150-151.

CHAPTER 3
WORLD WAR II ARMORED DIVISION COMBAT COMMAND

The Challenge of Budgets and Bureaucracy

DoD Directive 5100.01 01 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components directs that the United States Army provide forces capable of operating “in all environments.” The ability to face a range of threats and adversaries remains inherent in this demand.¹ But the United States Army often has difficulty mixing forces that depend upon deep bureaucratic roots for their development and sustainment. This problem of parochialism becomes more acute in times of budgetary distress and decreased domestic interest in international crises. As the nation once more enters a period of fiscal restraint in military spending, an historical perspective on the development of tailorability in a similarly constrained environment can provide keen insight into overcoming parochialism. As the case of the combat command will demonstrate, incubating a new capability within the Army requires patience, protection of the new idea’s budget-share, and significant compromise. Without all three ingredients, parochial concerns may trump futuristic thinking. In the end, the Armored Force had to separate from all existing branches in order to achieve the tailorability of the combat command.

The U.S. armored force going into World War II suffered from this particular problem more so than most. Not only did they face the unknown of war in general, they did so within the context of mechanized warfare, at the time a new phenomenon. Their organizational response to this uncertainty, and to the parochial budgetary strife it engendered, was the combat command. This divisional design incorporated three empty
brigade-level headquarters between which the division commander flexibly reassigned subordinate battalions depending upon the mission and situation.

The combat command came about as a result of an unresolved argument about the future of armored warfare between the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery Branches. MG Jacob Devers took over the Armored Force in 1941 and needed to cement the Armored Force in preparation for its deployment to war. He incorporated this combat command structure in part to avoid the branch-driven parochialism that had hurt the force from its inception. This process by which the armored force arrived at this solution has implications for future U.S. force design to meet DoD Directive 5100.01’s requirement.

The combat command may have allowed the armored force to tailor itself to the threat and terrain it found in combat, but it did not make the U.S. armored forces of World War II expeditionary in the modern sense of the term. To achieve this tailorability, the armored force made implicit sacrifices among the other qualities outlined in the DoD Directive. The U.S. Army in that moment had no expectation it needed the ability to respond to range of possible policy requirements, the experience of World War I seemed to indicate war as the binary opposite of peace and not one place along a spectrum of options. Nor did Army planners foresee a need to deploy any armored forces quickly; campaign quality took precedence over rapid deployment. Nonetheless, the combat command compromise between these expeditionary qualities offers insight into achieving tailorability for Army forces.

After the Great War

The development of the combat command structure dates back to the drawdown of the Tank Corps following World War One. Postwar military budget decreases proved
steeper than expected causing Army branches to argue over which should receive the deepest cuts. The Great War seemed to prove that the infantry required the lion’s share of funding, but the cavalry made the counter-argument that their force would prove more difficult to raise in time of war. Each Army branch found itself defending its ratio of troops and organizations as well as its technical funding. This argument seemed to doom the concept of a mechanized force since it had neither the history of the other branches, nor the relevance outside of a major continental war. Indeed, “caught in the maelstrom of such inter-branch bickering, exponents of a mechanized force despaired of its accomplishment.” Inter-branch conflict surrounded the Tank Corps, its role, and its extraordinary costs, both in the near term with thousands of troops and tanks in the force and in the long term with new equipment and the unknown future. Within this environment, decisions made by the Army with respect to the Tank Corps took on more significance in the face of the overall shrinking budget. Arguing for a costly and unproven capability before Congress may have resulted in the Army losing that budget share to more certain capabilities for others.

Following World War I, the Army appointed COL Samuel D. Rockenbach as commandant of the Tank School in Camp Meade, Maryland. In this role, COL Rockenbach intended to integrate the disparate British and French tank employment concepts. The British envisioned employing tanks as a separate arm conducting deep attacks into the enemy’s rear areas. Along with this, they tended to employ heavier tanks with a broader array of armament. The French saw the tank as a mobile pillbox providing fire support and limited mobile cover for advancing infantry. This more integrated
approach resulted in lighter tanks that emphasized light cannon and machine gun armaments capable of suppressing enemy machine gun fire.

American tank forces established two schools during the war, one in Britain and the other in France. The one in Great Britain came with the caveat that the American 301st Heavy Tank Battalion trained there would operate only on the British sector of the front and under British control, which ensured that few American units worked with the 301st and the U.S. Army developed little institutional memory regarding their methods. This contrasted significantly with the American armor school in France, led by Captain George S. Patton, Jr., which proved prolific both in the extent to which it influenced American thinking regarding tanks and their employment. While American heavy tank crews operated only with British units, American light tanks operated with both French and American units allowing American infantry to gain respect for the light tank and what it brought to their fight.

In the aftermath of the Great War, however, few officers and writers agreed about the employment of armor. Patton postulated using tanks to maintain colonial possessions, employing their protected firepower to defeat rebel machine guns and allowing small, colonial Army forces to exploit success across open terrain without the massive force concentrations of Europe. Rockenbach’s opinions differed in that he argued that the tank’s shock effect had proven decisive to victory. Indeed, both these men, contemporaries of JFC Fuller, had examined the ideas included in “Plan 1919” for the employment of tanks in deep strikes into enemy rear areas to cause dislocation. Rockenbach and Patton, in line with the rest of the American armored force, rejected Fuller’s ideas as impractical and remained wedded to the infantry support concept.
adopted by the French school. Abolition of the Tank Corps by the 1920 National Defense Act, however, paused the progress of the infantry’s tank employment concept, despite its early strength of position and the recent memory of the trenches. This nascent belief in the combination of tanks with infantry, however, left a lasting impression on the American officer corps.

A New Start for the Tank

In 1928, Secretary of War Dwight Davis directed the Army to establish an experimental armored force at Camp Meade, Maryland. This experimental force conducted exercises from 1 July to 20 September 1928. After the experiment’s conclusion, the War Department determined that the concept of mechanized and tank-equipped forces required more study and assigned it to the G-3 Training Section. As fate would have it, a young cavalry officer named Adna Chaffee served within the G-3 Training Section at that time. Chaffee’s own conception of cavalry’s role began to influence the future of the armored force.

Chaffee, one of the premier cavalrymen in the Army at the time, envisioned mechanization returning mobility to the battlefield. The recent experience in the Great War had proven how rarely attacks broke through into operational depth. However, Chaffee’s cavalry background led him to see the tank as the horse of a new generation. Cavalry so equipped could conduct its deep raids behind enemy lines and return the cavalry to a prominent role, disrupting enemy lines of communication, destroying supply depots, and allowing mobility to triumph over static firepower. Major Chaffee’s position, in the War Department’s G-3 Training Section, distanced him and his ideas from the congressional budget politics that doomed the proposals of Rockenbach and Patton as
COL Parsons recommended a large armored force of six divisions including all combat arms. This recommendation clearly could not come to fruition in the interwar period of fiscal constraint without the rest of the Army losing resources. Moreover, Congress had to approve this diversion of funds to a project that, in 1928, seemed fanciful. Vehicle engines did not have the reliability to compete with the horse. So not only did the suggestion fly in the face of congressional disapproval for the added expenditure, but it also had little Army support because it threatened other Army projects. A longer-term vision proved necessary to bring the idea of an armored force to fruition.

Major Chaffee’s place as the deputy to the Assistant Chief of Staff, put him in a position to more gradually influence the direction the Army chose with respect to mechanization. Brigadier General Parker submitted a memorandum dated 20 March 1928 to the Chief of Staff recommending the development of an experimental mechanized organization to develop the tactical and strategic purpose and function of the future mechanized force. This modest proposal suffered under the same scrutiny imposed by the conditions of fiscal constraint and jealously guarded budgets as that of COL Parsons. MG Stephen O. Fuqua, the Chief of Infantry, affirmed as much through his opposition to the development of a separate mechanized force. He did so on the grounds that only infantry could seize and hold ground as well as on the basis that such a mechanized force
threatened the infantry’s influence on tank design. Similarly, George Patton Jr., now promoted the rank of Major, waxed pessimistically regarding a large consolidated armored force from his position as a spokesman for the cavalry branch in his position as Head of Plans and Training Division within the Office of the Chief of Cavalry. Patton’s career depended “on the continuing relevance of the Cavalry as a separate arm.” These two threats, both of losing branch identity to the growth of a mechanized force and that of losing appropriated funds to a competing branch composed of a separate mechanized force, challenged all efforts to establish a new mechanized formation.

Adna Chaffee and the Cavalry Take Over the Tank

Nevertheless, Congress authorized a Mechanized Board to study the effects of the experimental mechanized force in 1928, to which the War Department appointed Major Adna Chaffee. A relative latecomer to mechanized warfare, Major Chaffee pursued an intensive self-study of developments in the field during the post-war period. Once again set apart from the inter-branch rivalries, Chaffee and the experimental mechanized force owed little to the existing separate arms and had the opportunity to pursue ideas different than those held by the Army establishment. This freedom also set the stage for the Cavalry Branch’s increasing influence on the development of the mechanized force.

In 1930, Chief of Staff General Charles P. Summerall encouraged Congress to authorize the establishment of the mechanized force. When Congress did so, the War Department appointed cavalry officers COL Daniel Van Voorhis and now Lieutenant Colonel Chaffee as the new force’s leadership. Given the shortage of tanks and experienced crews in the Army, the experimental armored force drew tanks and crews from the infantry tank force as well as the budding mechanized cavalry force. This new
force, mixing infantry and cavalry troops and officers interested in the development of mechanized warfare, incubated a new cavalry mind-set both in the mechanized force as well as in the Army-at-large. This experiment reflected an incubation period for the Armored Force where the Cavalry Branch and the Army G-3 protected the idea from the budgetary pressures that might have ended it.

The experience and lessons learned from this experiment would lead toward a mixing of cavalry and infantry tank concepts in Army parlance and doctrine. Rather than simply disbanding the mechanized force, however, the War Department renamed the mechanized force the Detachment for Mechanized Cavalry effectively handing the reins for mechanized force development over to the cavalry. Mechanized force development stayed in the hands of the cavalry throughout the early 1930s where it grew gradually without fear of the budgetary ax.

Leslie McNair and Artillery Come to the Table

One final contributor entered the scene in 1936: the antitank gun. The Spanish Civil War saw the first operational employment of armored forces in combat and the first wholesale defeat of such a force at the hands of infantry and antitank weapons. The Battle of Guadalajara proved exactly such an example as, in March of 1937, the 200 tanks of the Italian Soria Division charged ahead of their supporting infantry only to be shot to pieces by communist antitank guns. This story, often repeated over the course of the war, compelled many military observers to believe that antitank defense had triumphed in development over the tank.

Influenced by this reporting, Brigadier General Leslie McNair, the Commandant at Fort Leavenworth, wrote the study *Antimechanized Defense (Tentative)*, *May 22, 1939.*
This text served as a culmination of the antitank gun discussion and McNair continued to influence the discussion along its lines throughout the war.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, McNair, who went on to command Army Ground Forces and shape the Army that fought World War II, maintained a consistent message regarding the significance of the antitank gun in mechanized warfare.

Not only did this development add fuel to the ongoing branch rivalries and debate, but it also called into question the efficacy of having a light, cavalry-focused mechanized force. It also added the artillery branch to the debate about mechanized warfare where it had previously operated as a silent partner with the infantry. In the discussion about whether tanks could better support wide-ranging mobile operations or slow-moving infantry assaults, artillery now had a discreet role in tank warfare: the trump card. While the notion that antitank firepower could reliably counter tanks proved disastrously wrong in most cases during World War II, at the time the Spanish Civil War appeared to prove its validity. Most unfortunately, perhaps, this trend lent itself to another key consensus that tanks would not directly engage enemy tanks, a task that belonged to the antitank gun.

\textbf{An Increasingly Combined Arms Force}

This muddled argument between the three branches ensured that Army leaders could not voice clear roles for tanks. As this stalemate continued, the mechanized force increasingly blended all three conceptions of mechanized warfare. Some cavalry expediencies like the flexible redistribution of troops between regiments significantly influenced the mechanized force as demonstrated by the \textit{U.S. Army Cavalry Doctrine and Mechanization} dated 1938.\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, the infantry influenced the growth of the force by
incorporating dismounted troops to secure laager sites and maintenance activities.\textsuperscript{16} Along with merging concepts, the leadership of the mechanized force increasingly saw the need to separate from existing branches.\textsuperscript{17} But until a centralized authority could force change, the branch proponents legitimately feared that any gain by a new branch would result in budgetary losses to their own. As a result, the branches remained hopelessly deadlocked in the debate over mechanization.

In the meantime, aided by years of developmental practice, the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) demonstrated effectiveness in exercise after exercise. On 22 August 1936, for example, during maneuvers with a National Guard unit, the 7th Cavalry Brigade achieved its objectives “at an unprecedented rate” in part due to the cavalry approach used by the brigade including its unusual command structure.\textsuperscript{18} Later in 1936, 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) participated in maneuvers with V and VI Corps, playing the part of Red Force against two dismounted divisions labeled Blue Force. Under COL Bruce Palmer, the regiment consistently maneuvered against the rear and flanks of Blue Forces, often assuming these positions early in the exercise. These good showings built a reputation for the mechanized force that made it increasingly difficult to deny their value to the Army.

In early 1940, the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) prepared for its deployment to Army maneuvers in Louisiana in the middle of that year. The scale of the maneuvers and the backdrop of the 1940 German invasion of France spurred the Army to action. As a result of this newfound interest and the war in Europe, the infantry tank brigade would operate with the 7th Cavalry throughout the maneuvers resulting, for the first time in U.S. Army history, in the employment of a division-sized armored force. The maneuvers
began on 9 May and consisted of four separate scenarios. Of particular note, the fourth and final scenario consisted of the Provisional Tank Brigade conducting a deliberate combined arms attack including air power, artillery, and infantry.19

The exercise focused more on the Provisional Tank Brigade than on the 7th Cavalry Brigade and, as a result, infantry tanks and infantry tank tactics received greater scrutiny than did the cavalry. Unfortunately for the force, the focus on the infantry tank resulted in no decisive answer on the direction of the armored force and, if anything, confused matters more. The infantry regarded the 1940 Louisiana Maneuvers as a success, a validation of their theory of tank employment.20 The cavalry also came out of the exercise believing the same thing regarding their own theory of employment. Taken together, however, the success of the armored force in 1940 combined with earlier successes and the long game played by Chaffee allowed the force to erupt from obscurity.

The Motivation for a Decision and the Birth of the Armored Force

Other events in 1940 also played a role in the development of the armored force, specifically the fall of France. The rapid defeat of the French army, upon which the U.S. had based its own forces during the Interwar Period, highlighted the significance of modernizing the U.S. Army and, specifically, its mechanized components. Not only did the events overseas encourage military leaders to make changes, but it also encouraged Congressional leaders to authorize the funds necessary to make that change possible. This increase in military funding would, in turn, decrease the budget-induced branch rivalries that had, up to that moment, paralyzed armored force development.
Concurrently, the War Department increasingly centralized to affect the rapid change that the growing war in Europe demanded. The Chief of Staff’s position had grown in importance throughout the preceding decade; the increased power improved significantly with the appointment of General George C. Marshall to the post. President Roosevelt’s support of General Marshall and Marshall’s voice as military advisor to the President ensured that the War Department attained the power and influence to affect whatever changes Marshall and his team deemed necessary. This centralization allowed reformers like Chaffee and his successor, Jacob L. Devers, to make the change towards combined arms that proved critical in defeating Nazi Germany. Having incubated the concept of the Armored Force for thirteen years within the Cavalry Branch, it now came into its own with a decidedly cavalry flair- including the concept of flexibly tailoring the force to the mission.

At the end of the Third Army maneuvers, leaders in the development of the mechanized force held a clandestine meeting wherein they codified the need for a separate armor force. In response, the Chief of Staff ordered the G-3 to organize at least two armored divisions, the precise result desired by the leaders who had been present at that meeting at Alexandria High School. What followed in the formal 10 June meeting that included the branch chiefs, G-4, G-1, and all effected proponents proved a bitter, recrimination-filled argument wherein accusations of power-grabbing abounded but no successful counter could defeat the Chief’s directive. The Armored Force was born as was the Armor Board led by Chaffee. The separation from existing branches and centralization of armored force development made possible the inclusion of force design
concepts like the combat command that did not conform to existing infantry or cavalry structures.

The formation of these organizations, for the first time in U.S. Army history, created a singular voice capable of expressing one conception of tank employment. Having articulated clearly that the existing branches could not control the future development of the armored community and force, the Army further centralized force modernization into the hands of the Chief and his designees. On 10 July 1940, the Army Adjutant General formally authorized the establishment of the I U.S. Armored Corps. The new formation included the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions as well as the independent 70th Tank Battalion. The armored division, as authorized, included a tank brigade and an infantry regiment with attached reconnaissance battalion, maintenance battalion, supply battalion, and signal company. The tank brigade included two light tank regiments, a medium tank regiment, an engineer battalion, and an artillery regiment. This tank-heavy force, reminiscent of the British armored divisions, reflected Chaffee’s cavalry point of view about the employment of armor and served as the point of departure for the U.S. Armored Force.23

Jacob Devers Takes Command

General Marshall, on the advice of Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, selected COL Devers over 474 of his peers to the rank of brigadier general. This selection took place over other legends of Great War fame including George Patton and Robert Eichelberger. Even future five-star general Dwight Eisenhower remained a relatively lowly lieutenant colonel.24 A cerebral and self-involved artillery officer, Devers had previously impressed Lieutenant General McNair when they had served together at Fort
Sill and in the 4th Artillery Regiment. Marshall appointed Devers to the board identifying bases for U.S. occupation in accordance with the “Destroyers for Bases” lend-lease deal. From this position back and forth from the Washington, DC area, Brigadier General Devers impressed General Marshall and soon became a fireman of sorts, sent anywhere Marshall saw trouble or the need for a firm hand. Soon the armored force would need such a hand.

Adna Chaffee’s death left an opening in the armor community, which antitank voices soon filled. The new Armored Force’s deep, ranging maneuvers indicated they had no need for the heavier armor and firepower offered by a medium tank. While initial reports from the fighting in Europe and North Africa indicated tanks would have to face other tanks, artillery officers within the U.S. Army saw this as an opportunity for firepower to triumph over shock and maneuver. Lieutenant General McNair, in particular, saw an opportunity to advance the artillery branch and the new maneuvers in Louisiana in 1941 offered McNair the pulpit he needed. McNair’s concept for the employment of antitank fires described the massing of antitank weapons and capabilities into dedicated organizations that could mass effects against enemy armored and mechanized breakthroughs. This pooling, he argued, would allow the Army to meet any breakthrough with a maximum of antitank fire. MG George Lynch, the Chief of Infantry, disagreed strongly with this and firmly believed that tanks had a role to play in the antitank fight. But with General Marshall having already subsumed the branches to his newly centralized offices and designated representatives like the now Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, McNair had firm control over the Army’s direction on the matter. This resulted in the tank destroyer program.
In the second Louisiana maneuvers, the Second U.S. Army faced the Third U.S. Army in an area of western Louisiana near Shreveport. Second Army consisted of five infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and the I Armored Corps. It would face the Third Army’s nine infantry divisions, one cavalry division, one tank group, and three provisional antitank groups. Between the two forces, Third Army’s “Blue Army” had significantly more troops and combat power but faced the much more mobile “Red Army” of the Second Army. Between 18 and 28 September 1941, the two forces tangled according to rules laid out by McNair, rules that favored antitank weapons. While the judges ruled many tanks knocked out by antitank fire, the degree to which it reflected poor tactics on the part of tank units and the degree to which it reflected rules that encouraged them to stop within range of the antitank guns for adjudication will probably never be known. Critical to the development of the combat command, however, this triumph of the antitank community renewed debate about the employment of tanks and set the stage for Devers’ compromise solution.

After the death of Chaffee, MG Devers took command of the Armored Force and he faced a daunting task. The force remained beset by detractors within the U.S. Army and continued to prepare itself to face the most lethal armored force deployed to date. The Armored Force’s expected employment remained in doubt: would it range deep into the enemy’s operational rear or support the infantry assault. Additionally, the force had suffered some neglect, as Chaffee had grown weaker with his illness. But Jacob Devers had become something of an expert at changing an unfavorable situation into a favorable one.
The Combat Command

He and his staff did serious analysis of the Louisiana Maneuvers and concluded that armored battles would not follow anyone’s rules. They would be brutal, unforgiving, confusing, complex, and above all, fast moving. The existing force structure would not support the flexibility necessary to respond to that environment. In fact, they came to the conclusion that “It was impossible to plan one in detail. Better, Devers thought, to be ready to adapt to conditions than to try to guess what they would be.”29 This conclusion, more than any other, led to the development of the combat command. Rather than decide ahead of time how the armored division of the future had to solve the problem of this fast-moving, complex, and violent method of war, he concluded that commanders on the ground had to make that decision.

Because of this requirement, MG Devers directed the reorganization of the 4th Armored Division into combat commands. They established the empty headquarters that would receive battalions from among the subordinate regiments of the division and employ them flexibly in combined arms teams. So organized, the division began training to employ its forces by internally swapping companies of dissimilar troops to create battalion task forces with some tanks and some infantry in them along with artillery batteries and scouts. This approach mirrored the German capability to employ Kampfgruppen of mixed arms, if, in a uniquely American way.30

Additionally, Devers’ staff concluded that the maneuvers to date had proven the need for combined arms at the lowest level possible. They also concluded that the whole division needed off-road capability, something none of the other combatants, even Germany, could boast.31 This mixture of decisions led to codified doctrine that included
the task force structure of building combined arms battalions within the combat command as well as the broad motorization of the American Army. These capabilities, when mixed with the combat command, created an incredibly flexible instrument able to reorganize within hours and deploy to meet new threats on new terrain.

Rather than attempting to decide which role the tank would play in future combat, the combat command enabled it to play any of those roles depending on the circumstances. If the combat situation demanded a tank force capable of a direct assault, the associated combat commands could be organized to support it. If the situation demanded rapid and flexible pursuit, the combat commands could be organized to support that as well. Finally, if, while exploiting a breakthrough, the armored division expected to receive a counterattack by German panzer units, it could employ its M4 Sherman tanks to outmaneuver and defeat such a force. The 4th Armored Division, pioneers of the combat command structure, altered its combat command structures sometimes as often as every three days in its race across France. At Arracourt, the 4th Armored Division demonstrated the U.S. Army’s ability to adapt and respond flexibly to the strength of the German panzer forces, not merely blunting a German attack, but decisively defeating a substantial panzer force through superior mobility, maneuverability, and flexibility.32

Caveats to the Combat Command

While the U.S. armored division of World War II did not reflect an expeditionary unit in the newer military sense of the term referring to a rapid-deployment force, it did reflect a unique compromise between expeditionary qualities. In fact, in terms of the timeliness of the armored division, the Army Reduction Board had to cut deeply into the
armored divisions to allow them to fit into the existing available shipping. The resulting triangular armored division lacked regimental headquarters and relied entirely on the combat commands for control between the division and the battalion.33 While this seems like necessity drove the move away from the regiment, it also reflected a genuine streamlining of the command relationships and dramatically improved the flexibility of the division. Additionally, nowhere did the force consider scaling for conflicts short of the growing global conflict for which they prepared. From the outset, the United States approached this war much like the last in terms of policy. However, while they neither reflected a rapidly deployable force capable of independent operations nor a force capable of scaling up or down to meet different policy requirements, they marked a radical step towards tailorable forces. This ability to tailor the force to meet the tactical need reflected something that transcended the partisan branch bickering.

How the Combat Command Achieved Tailorability

The Armored Force needed time, protection, and compromise to come to fruition. Adna Chaffee worked diligently for over a decade to provide the time and protection. But Jacob Devers provided the compromise in the form of the combat command. It reconciled the branch conflict that had confounded the Armored Force’s development since World War I. And while the separation of the Armored Force from existing branches played a significant role in detaching it from the branch-budget politics, the combat command solved the conceptual dilemma in the employment of the tank. This ensured the Armored Force maintained its independence from the branch parochialism. While General Marshall’s centralized organizational design proved key to the success of Lieutenant
General Devers’ reforms, the compromise of the combat command structure itself allowed the Armored Force to separate cleanly from branch politics.

In conclusion, tailorability marked the U.S. Armored Force of World War II. This tailorability came about as a result of a critical compromise necessary to the development of the force. This compromise, the combat command, allowed the force to transcend the parochial concerns of the branches with respect to mechanized war. This tailorability reflected a unique demand for the Armored Force given the uncertainty inherent in dealing with new technology on the battlefield. The process by which the Armored Force arrived at the combat command reflected the deep bureaucratic politics that had stultified the Army up until then. Bureaucratic inter-branch rivalries limit the options of senior leaders. To achieve significantly greater tailorability of forces within the U.S. Army today, force designers will have to contend with the same politics, particularly in the face of increased budget tensions.


2 Described elsewhere in this work as scalability and timeliness, these refer to the need for expeditionary forces to react across the spectrum of conflict as well as both rapidly and with sufficient sustainment capability to pursue the policy goal to its completion.

3 Gillie, *Forging the Thunderbolt*, 35.


5 Ibid., 3.


8 Gillie, *Forging the Thunderbolt*, 20-23.


10 Ibid., 95.


12 Ibid., 40-49.


18 Ibid., 75.

19 Ibid., 243-250.

20 Ibid., 248.

21 Ibid., 251.


29 Perret, *There’s a War to be Won*, 99.

30 Cameron, *Mobility, Shock, and Firepower*, 375.

31 Ibid.


CHAPTER 4

THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

The Marine Corps and Policy Options

The Marine Corps today, through three Marine Air-Ground Task Force or MAGTF echelons, the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Brigade, and Force, provides American policymakers options to respond to global crises. It has scaled these force packages to respond to small contingencies quickly and to large wars with as much combat power as they can muster. The Corps’ capability to respond to contingencies along the spectrum of conflict includes “war and military operations short of war,” which describes the function of military force as responding to a political demand, one that may or may not include full-scale war. If policy requires a small-scale intervention, a force designed solely for large-scale war may be unable to support it. The evolution of the Marine Corps into its current form reflects the scalability demanded of expeditionary forces in DoD Directive 5100.01 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.¹

This case study describes how the Marine Corps, in the face of possible dissolution following World War II, dramatically reorganized to better support national policymakers. In doing so, it is hard to overestimate the value of the Corps’ existential crisis and the motivation it imparted towards genuine reform. Moreover, it shows that the decision to support policymakers with multiple options in force packaging requires tradeoffs in other critical qualities demanded of expeditionary forces. Any future force will demand similar tradeoffs and require compromise to achieve the maximum possible
scalability to support policy. To achieve scalability, however, the future force developers may not have the unifying threat of dissolution to encourage change.

Following World War II, the Marine Corps appreciated that nuclear proliferation cast doubt on their ability to mass forces as they had during the Island Hopping Campaign. They needed to define to U.S. policymakers a discrete role for the Corps in meeting the nation’s needs. A public relations campaign, Congressional lobbying, and internal reorganization combined to save the Marine Corps from dissolution. The result created a model for reorganization to support foreign policy that responded to the uncertainty inherent in predicting the future. The process the Marine Corps employed and the risks they assumed in making these sweeping changes offer insight into how the Army can approach organizational change to better reflect the DoD directive.

The scalability they developed, however, required trade-offs in other key expeditionary qualities. Organized to respond to policy demands, the Marine Corps assumed their actions would produce positive results and thereby have an offensive character. This idea coincided with the Corps’ cultural inclination towards the attack and helped to foster a strong esprit de corps. However, this same desire to produce strategic results also constrained the Corps’ development into offensive, combined-arms task forces. They attack to change the existing strategic situation and every piece of the Marine Corps serves this offensive mindset. They tend to avoid occupation duties after this reform, seeing themselves as shock troops that hand over a successful assault to Army forces. This approach saved the Marine Corps from irrelevance following World War II and the advent of the nuclear age, but it also established limitations for the Marine Corps that endure today.
In the period following World War II, distinct camps emerged regarding the future of warfare. The predominant view indicated that future war would consist mainly of the use of nuclear weapons and would only occur in the event of a threat to vital national interests. The opposing opinion held that future war would prove more ambiguous and would reflect a broader range of threats, including large and powerful enemies like the Soviet Union as well as smaller threats and insurgencies with a variety of national interests at stake. The Army and Air Force largely fell into the first camp and the Navy and Marine Corps largely the second. The Marine Corps, in particular, hedged for the second, more ambiguous interpretation of the security environment. This study will show how their response to the predicted uncertainty provided a blueprint for the Corps that remains valid today.

The Marine Corps acted deliberately developing the MAGTF concept. Often in history, military organizations fail to recognize the urgent need to change when the moment has arrived. In the period following World War II, however, many believed the nation no longer needed the Marine Corps. This situation led them to a reappraisal of the Corps.¹ Budgetary pressures and inter-service rivalries during the post-war drawdown added to the technical and tactical challenges posed by the nuclear world. However, through those challenges the Corps transformed into a force capable of responding to nearly any crisis. This flexibility did not come cheaply, nor did it come easily – change never does.

The Situation after World War II

Several factors created the conditions that required the Marine Corps to change following World War II. The use of nuclear weapons against Japan combined with the
Soviet Union’s detonation of a nuclear weapon radically altered the strategic environment. Amphibious assaults, based upon Marine Corps doctrine coming out of World War II, depended on massing troops, ships, and aircraft against a narrow beachhead to project combat power rapidly from ship to shore. However, massing troops for an amphibious assault now risked having one nuclear attack destroying all of that combat power simultaneously. Tactically, Marine Corps doctrine had proven sound in the Pacific Theater, as had their operational employment in rapid, far-reaching naval actions supporting strategic objectives. However, the fiscal environment coming out of World War II required immediate attention by the national command authorities to avoid a return to the economic recession that had preceded U.S. involvement in the war. Individually, these conditions might not have driven change, but taken together, the situation demanded that the Marine Corps evolve.

During World War II, successful amphibious attacks demanded a high concentration of troops on a narrow set of beachheads to allow the deepest possible lodgment. However, this troop concentration provided viable targets for Soviet nuclear strikes, a new factor in war that some argued rendered existing forces obsolete. Later, Soviet nuclear force growth pushed the Truman administration likewise to focus on the development of more and better nuclear weapons. Falling behind in that race presented significant risk. One overwhelming nuclear attack might end a future conflict so decisively that it allowed no American response. Given budgetary constraints, no gain in the nuclear arsenal could occur without loss to conventional forces. Strategic theorists supportive of the new nuclear force saw it as a simple solution to the world’s strategic
problems: more and better bombs. Nuclear strikes, they argued, took the place of the Marine Corps’ ‘force-in-readiness’ capability.⁴

In response, the Marines began developing doctrine to counter this argument.⁵ Senior leaders within the Corps did not believe future war consisted solely of nuclear attacks. They saw a broader spectrum of contingencies and in those contingencies a requirement for a ‘force-in-readiness.’ That force, trained to conduct difficult, complex amphibious assaults against prepared defenses needed change to meet the challenges posed by this broader spectrum of conflict. The existing Marine Corps force structure, based around Marine Divisions and Air Wings, fulfilled its World War II need for ground and air components during amphibious assaults. But this force structure did not appear to offer smaller options of force employment. The divisions and wings concentrated sustainment assets and critical fire support capabilities at a high echelon. At the time, no Marine Corps doctrine covered establishing smaller organizations that packaged the necessary force elements to respond to small-scale contingencies, evacuations, and policy options short of war.

In response to the tactical demands of Pacific Theater amphibious operations, the Marine Corps developed a practical set of doctrine and organizations that evolved into a deadly team over the course of the war. By war’s end, Marine rifle regiments had transformed into capable landing teams. Well-organized and synchronized with their naval counterparts, Marine regiments unloaded directly off landing ships into combat. These capabilities, while demonstrably effective, also came with a high sustainment price tag regarding the costs associated with duplicating the training, facilities, and organizational work of the Army and the Air Force. These costs further aggravated the
already tense budget discussion by creating observable overlaps in the capabilities of the other services and the Marine Corps. With President Harry Truman already looking for places to cut defense spending, these overlaps represented low-hanging fruit, particularly given the need to focus on building the nuclear force.

These conditions cast doubt on the need for a Marine Corps capable of the amphibious assaults that made them successful. Marine Corps leaders understood how conditions had changed; they had observed it firsthand. Having witnessed the Bikini Atoll nuclear test, Lieutenant General Roy Geiger urged CMC Vandegrift to reexamine the doctrine the Corps had employed during World War II. This requirement to rethink amphibious operations did not come from above, the Marines decided to rethink their role within the military services. Having recognized that their existing doctrine and employment plan no longer met the needs of policymakers; the Marine Corps rethought what policymakers needed from the Corps.

The Threat of Dissolution

President Truman saw opportunity in these doubts, both to save funds as well as to rationalize the DoD. This notion of ‘rationalization’ meant collating capabilities and mitigating overlaps, a code for dissolution of the Marine Corps. An impartial observer seeing the DoD coming out of World War II saw a joint force with multiple duplications of effort, overlapping costs and force capabilities, and a distinct inability to mass critical enabling forces. Air assets in particular, with their existing dispersal across the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps wasted effort and decreased the concentration of aircraft against any particular mission. The costs associated with separate services employing expensive
assets resulted in intense competition. This combination of environmental factors resulted in a distinctly hostile political situation for the Marine Corps:

[The Marine Corps] felt surrounded by enemies and untrustworthy allies, both in the military and in the White House. The Army was openly hostile; the Navy was more preoccupied with protecting naval aviation than with supporting the Marines. Without a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Marines had no direct line to President Truman, who himself was eager to reduce the Corps’ size, its funding, and the scope of the missions it would perform. Consequently, the Marine officers who managed the Corps’ political relations after the war viewed themselves as alone, outnumbered, and facing a President bent on their destruction.7

These threats appeared to reflect an environment openly hostile to the Corps. These pressures encouraged senior Corps leaders to seek allies in Congress to help neutralize the threat of Presidentially directed dissolution. Nevertheless, this hostile political environment could not have come at a worse time for the Marine Corps.

Not only did the Corps have these political battles to fight, but it also faced trainee abuse scandals coming out of Parris Island, South Carolina. Six trainees died during a training accident in 1956, which resulted in an investigation finding that the non-commissioned officer, Staff Sergeant Matthew C. McKeon, had been drinking on duty.8 This loss and the investigation and court martial that followed represented a small but significant window into the culture of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps proved its culture of combativeness both at home and abroad. While a benefit in a world war, the violence of the Marine Corps no longer seemed beneficial to the nation’s interests. Popular opinion may not have directly affected Marine Corps funding, but it played a role in presidential dissolution. On the one hand, if public opinion of the Marine Corps indicated their violence threatened the fabric of American society, this could not help but
support the idea of presidential dissolution. On the other, if the Corps appeared to reflect core American values, it could make dissolution a politically unattractive option.

Simultaneously, the other three services appeared to have a niche untouchable by the other services. The Air Force in particular had successfully argued that air power only worked when aircraft operated under one, unified command. The Marines, in contrast appeared vulnerable because their capabilities were the most duplicated by the other services. As soon as it became feasible, the DoD began cutting the Marine Corps end strength and budget dollars.

Corps leadership and the headquarters staffs wrestled with these reductions at the same time that they were fighting behind the scenes in Congress for the very survival of the Corps. Even in the anti-Marine atmosphere of the Truman administration, there had been a faint conciliatory reference to a Marine role in a time of war, which would include seizing and holding Iceland, the Azores, and especially protecting the oil refineries in the Persian Gulf. While the Marines would be assigned these important but peripheral tasks, the Army and Air Force would run the show and concentrate on confronting the Soviet threat in Europe, thus keeping the Marines and its aviation from encroaching on the Army’s and Air Force’s jealously guarded larger roles. Inter-service rivalry would function as a critical driver of change, once the Corps’ survival was no longer at stake.

**Defeating Dissolution**

The Marine Corps needed to define for itself a unique role, ideally one that differentiated it from the other services and that the other services could not duplicate with their own capabilities. With amphibious assault no longer an option due to the threat of nuclear weapons, and the other services seeming to provide something unique to
policymakers, a further examination of what policymakers needed must have appeared an attractive approach. Having already identified a spectrum of possible crises, the ability to respond across that spectrum logically followed.

In traditional Marine fashion, the Corps responded by attacking the situation directly finding Congressional support in opposition to the President’s agenda. This attack occurred along two key lines of effort: a public relations line and a Congressional legal line. Both proved necessary to extricate the Corps from the noose of dissolution. Not only would they need to stave off this existential threat, but they also needed to protect the Corps against future threats by cementing public opinion in favor of Marines. Luckily, the Corps had already laid effective foundations for this work throughout World War II.

The Marines’ public relations successes in the 1940s were due to two principal factors. An effective coalition with civilian news organizations brought experienced newsmen into their ranks and allowed the Corps to adapt to different audiences on the World War II home front. A messaging strategy that privileged intimate narratives of community and the experience of the junior Marines differentiated the Corps from the other services. As a result, the Marines’ cultural capital increased dramatically during World War II and remained high during the difficult years of demobilization. Speaking the “language of American family life” helped them establish a public relations infrastructure that would endure through the 1950s. This carefully planned media strategy allowed the Marines to build political capital within the U.S. that prohibited the kind of dissolution proposed by the Truman administration. Public opinion would have quickly turned against any political party that supported the dissolution of a service that
had performed so admirably during World War II and whose legends were manifest among the American people. This public-relations success also allowed Truman’s Congressional opponents to latch onto a political weapon and further encouraged the Marines to see policy options as their method of salvation.

President Truman, among others, attempted to change tack and reduce the role and mission of the Corps to such a minor position that it no longer served a war fighting function. Having aligned the Army and Air Force to the primary front in Europe the administration and senior military officials had by default aligned the Marines and Navy to the Pacific as well as any peripheral portions of the European front. None of the planners involved could logically argue that a significant drawdown of the Marine Corps would not affect these fronts. The Army and Air Force needed the Marine Corps to keep the flanks of their primary front secure. If the administration dissolved the Marine Corps and a contingency required the deployment of Army forces away from preparing for a Central European clash, that represented a significant risk. Clearly the nation would need the Marine Corps should anything happen along these other fronts requiring military force.

When it became clear that Truman’s handling of the Marine Corps represented a political vulnerability, his Congressional opponents began giving the Corps increasing access into Congressional policymaking. Thereafter, a series of significant laws established protections for the Marine Corps not afforded to the other services. The 1947 National Security Act set the roles and mission of the Marine Corps preventing the President from reassigning those responsibilities and associated funding. Two years later, Congress further constrained the President with regard to how he funded the Marines.
Finally, in the most sweeping intervention in the executive branch, the 1952 Douglas-Mansfield Act reaffirmed the Corps’ independence as a separate service, set its size and force structure, and provided them a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{12}

Not only did these protections turn the Marine Corps around and end its gradual decline, but they also encouraged Marine Corps leaders to envision the Corps as a tool of policy in a broader context than simply making war. As a result, Marine Corps end-strength doubled through the 1950s, and its percentage of total active-duty armed forces grew from 4 percent in 1945 to 7 percent in 1960.\textsuperscript{13} Their missions were now codified in law, and the Marine Corps saw the fulfillment of those missions in the context of broader policy and the area of the world assigned to them. Asia and Middle East did not suffer under the same threat of global war, but did require a force capable of smaller scale interventions.

**The Spectrum of Conflict and Marine Corps Doctrine**

The Corps leadership codified doctrine to address the issues endemic to its assigned areas of the world. Those areas would not likely see a large-scale war, but they would likely require small interventions, evacuations, and demonstrations of force. Based on this demand, the Marine Corps had to prepare for everything from a small brushfire to a full-scale war.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, the Marine Corps established the goal for its reorganization: the ability to respond to every echelon of contingency from a small evacuation to fighting a full-scale war.

Having established the goal, the Marines invested in the process of reinventing themselves again. What followed represents one of the most remarkable periods of doctrinal and organizational reform undertaken by a U.S. military organization. First, the
Existence of a spectrum of conflict and the need for U.S. forces along that spectrum placed a premium on the presence of a force-in-readiness. At no time before had the dearly held notion of readiness been as critical to the defense of national interests as the early Cold War. In a period wherein no U.S. force had experience in operations across the spectrum of conflict, “the Cold War of the mid-1950s held out the possibility of simultaneous Marine deployments in brushfire conflicts, peacekeeping operations, and rescue missions.”\(^{15}\) Having identified a need for a range of military force options, the Marines also needed to deal with the other criticisms of their existing operational methods including the threat of nuclear attack.

Based on observation of the Bikini Atoll test, Lieutenant General Roy Geiger offered his assessment of the effects of nuclear weapons on the Marines’ doctrine to General Shepherd. General Shepherd identified that Marine forced-entry operations required new techniques for getting troops to shore, so the Marine Corps established a board of generals to imagine a way to attack the enemy without offering an attractive nuclear target. They brought together generals with combat experience and quickly arrived at the conclusion that ship-to-shore movement required a different approach. The transports used during the Pacific campaign had moved slowly to shore, a dangerous prospect in the face of conventional or nuclear weapons. They needed to deliver troops quickly, behind the enemy’s coastal defenses so that any nuclear attack against the Marines must hit the enemy’s defenders. Therefore, the new approach relied upon air movement and vertical envelopment using the new helicopter.\(^{16}\) This requirement to integrate the helicopter into the maneuver of Marines demanded a much tighter
integration of air and ground elements and ensured that any Marine Corps force must be a combined arms force.

Understanding how Marines would be exposed to the enemy they then began building the force that would use this new technique. They needed many innovative methods to allow an infantry force to position themselves behind an enemy’s coastal defenses. “Most dramatic of the new techniques was the doctrine of ‘vertical envelopment’ which radically changed modern warfare... Using the Navy’s fast carrier task forces, well dispersed to limit damage from atomic attack, the Marines could strike any enemy head-on, on the flanks and now- far behind their front lines.”17 This mixture of options created by vertical envelopment allowed small forces to operate across greater distances and to act without long land lines of communication and supply. From this greater palette of options, the Marines began building the doctrine for employing vertical envelopment. This doctrine needed to integrate air elements, ground elements, command elements and the necessary sustainment to make them work. Available technology would set the ratio of these resources, as helicopters improved in lift capability and reliability, fewer aircraft could transport more troops. However, the need for each element: air, ground, command, and sustainment; was set once vertical envelopment became the goal.

The Hogaboom Board

In 1956, MG Robert Hogaboom led a select team of senior Marines in developing this new doctrinal framework for the Marine Corps. The new board’s ambitious task was “to reevaluate the structure and organization of the entire [Fleet Marine Force]. The board’s work set in motion monumental changes in force structure and organization. Indeed, their work provided the underlying rationale for the Marine Corps structure that
remains in place today.” Rather than build a long-range plan requiring decades to implement, MG Hogaboom’s board provided realistic, if radical changes for the Marine division structure. Most critically, the division needed to create ad hoc air-ground teams at the battalion, regiment, and division levels. Regardless of the size, the teams required the flexibility to respond to the threat by integrating specialists like intelligence, engineers, and logistics elements. This simple and fundamental concept of air-ground teams ranging from battalion to regiment to division formed the crux of the MAGTF in use today.

The report of the Hogaboom Board outlined three different force packages: the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The Marine Corps tailored each organization to fit a niche within the spectrum of conflict. The MEU best suits small-scale interventions and evacuation operations, the MEB medium-scale interventions and police actions, and the MEF large-scale support to regional contingencies and wars. The fact that this framework remains in use today makes the Hogaboom Board one of the critical events in the development of the modern Marine Corps.

The MAGTF Itself

The organization centers on the Marine Corps’ critical components of combat power: command, ground combat, air combat, and logistics elements. Every echelon has these four elements and draws its component units from the three legally mandated Marine divisions. Having framed the proportions of air, ground, command, and logistics necessary for any combat unit, the new doctrine provided a framework for conducting future interventions regardless of size or scale. The existing structures established
yardsticks for scaling Marine contributions to the joint war fighting force rather than serving to constrain Marine Corps planners. They expected for each task force to have a unique crisis niche it to which it best applied. Other forces had the ability to task organize up or down to meet a specific mission requirement, but these standing scaled structures responded to options other than war, a unique idea at the time. At the time of their inception this radical concept revolutionized how the Marines approached their role.

The MEU incorporated a provisional aircraft group consisting of a helicopter squadron and an attack aviation squadron, an infantry battalion landing team, and a logistical battalion all commanded by an O-6. This formation, supported both by naval gunfire and the machine guns, bombs, and rockets of its attack squadron could seize a beachhead for a larger force or simply move on shore to reestablish civil control in an area in crisis. In future generations, the Navy procured dedicated amphibious assault ships that accompany fleets with an onboard MEU specifically to provide those fleets with land power in the event of a crisis.

When the crisis requires a larger land force than a battalion, the Marine Corps can deploy a MEB to reinforce a MEU already on the ground. An infantry regiment, reinforced with a variety of vehicles and equipment, forms the core regimental landing team. Added to that, a Marine aircraft group and tailored logistics regiment form a MEB under a brigadier general and staff drawn from one of the Marine divisions. While a MEU could conduct a small evacuation of an embassy or small American enclave, a larger evacuation would require a MEB, but not a MEF. Similarly, an intervention to conduct peacekeeping in an African country might need more ground strength than a MEU, but less than a three regiment division while still requiring heavy weapons,
armored vehicles, and air support. Falling short of full-scale war, such commitments would overwhelm the smaller MEU in short order.

When the situation exceeds an MEB, the Marines can call on a MEF. Combining the ground strength of three infantry regiments and divisional troops including anti-tank units, artillery, and reconnaissance capabilities, the Marine division forms the core of a MEF. Added to this organization, a Marine air wing provides an offset for a relative lack of artillery and tanks possessed by equivalent Army units. Including approximately 43,000 Marines, such a formation can credibly threaten most third world nations’ militaries on its own and can feasibly seize and retain a bridgehead for follow-on Army units. At the time, the Marine Corps considered the MEF the preferred organization for Marines in sustained combat operations as it includes substantial combat service support elements capable of sustaining high intensity combat over the long term, a factor absent from the other two echelons. This last point would serve as a critique of the system in later years, with the Marines occasionally receiving scrutiny for their lack of logistical staying power.

**Critical Caveats with the MAGTF**

A more nuanced critique of the organization, however, involves the command and control relationships required for the joint force handling the Marines and their admittedly powerful mix of ground, air, and sea assets. While potent and much better tailored to the contingency operations that characterized military activities other than war during the Cold War, the mix of capabilities presents challenges to a joint force’s unity of command. Some commanders might think to subordinate the separate Marine components to their respective domains’ primary agent; ground combat to the Army, air
combat to the Air Force, and sustainment assets to the Navy. However, such an 
organization would result in significant problems of command and control to the Marine 
air-ground teams.27 This concern has since resolved in part due to the Key West 
Agreement and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, both of which further framed the Marine 
Corps mission and distinguished it from its sister services. Beyond these challenges, the 
MAGTF has served as a model of jointness, showing senior Congressional officials and 
military leaders that a task force including air power and land power can work together, 
allowing for greater integration of the other services over time.

The Balance and Costs of Scalability

In conclusion, the threat of dissolution demanded that the Marine Corps evolve to 
support policymakers better. While very motivating, not all services can count on such a 
threat to unify the organization towards change. The more bureaucratically entrenched 
the service, the less likely such a threat will materialize to force this kind of 
responsiveness to policymaker needs. Not only are the conditions of the MAGTF’s 
establishment difficult to replicate, but the trade-offs made in the establishment of their 
unique system do not resolve the other quality demands made on the Army by DoD 
Directive 5100.01.

While the Marine Corps revolutionized scalability through the MAGTF, they 
sacrificed tailorability in the force. The MAGTF reflects one ratio of ground combat 
forces to air forces to logistics to command elements. This ratio remains consistent across 
all three MAGTF echelons and limits the MAGTF’s ability to significantly tailor itself to 
a new mission. While MAGTFs at every echelon employ limited numbers of heavier 
weapons like tanks and artillery, they remain primarily a light infantry organization
militating against the possibility of building large, deep-maneuver elements out of existing MAGTFs. The Marine Corps accepted this on the basis of the Corps’ mission. By focusing on short-duration assaults, they mitigate the risk that shortfalls in tailorability will prove a significant disadvantage.

More significantly, the Marine Corps only achieved this force structure by relying upon the sustainment infrastructure of the Navy and the Army. That reliance significantly affected the force’s campaign endurance. The much better tooth-to-tail ratio of the Marine Corps depends on large-scale logistics agencies outside of the Corps. Again hedged by reliance upon their stated mission, the Marine Corps’ dependence upon sister-service sustainment capabilities does not detract from its offensive role.

The Marine Corps specialized in a short-term offensive role and assumed risk with their large-scale sustainment systems and the tailorability of Marine forces. While that specialization imposed risk, their capability to provide scaled forces to respond to policy demands ensured they remained relevant. They do not need to tailor their forces significantly if they only ever conduct offensive operations. Understanding this, then, if the Army intends to change to increase scalability, it must appreciate the attendant compromises needed to achieve it.

2 De Chant, The Modern United States Marine Corps, 113.
3 Warren, American Spartans, 188.
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 188.
10 O’Connell, *Underdogs*, 96-97
11 Chenoweth, *Semper Fi*, 289.
13 Ibid., 100.
16 Chenoweth, *Semper Fi*, 289.
18 Warren, *American Spartans*, 185
19 MG Hogaboom’s reorganization took into account all of the preceding technical discussions. He presupposed the requirement to integrate a contingent of aircraft directly with every infantry force, a unique feature at the time. He also indicated a requirement to integrate both command enablers and sustainment enablers. This framework formed the basis of the existing structure that demands a Ground Combat Element, an Air Combat Element, a Logistics Combat Element, and a Command Element. These four pieces form every MAGTF regardless of size.
21 Ibid., 186.
23 Ibid., 105-106
24 Ibid., 103.
25 Ibid., 103-104.
26 Ibid., 104.

27 Ibid., 107.
CHAPTER 5
THE 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION READY FORCES

The 82nd Airborne Division and Timeliness

Today, the 82nd Airborne Division can deploy a reinforced brigade anywhere in the world on a moment’s notice. Further, but in the right environment and against the right enemy it can sustain that presence until theater opening sustainment forces and reinforcements arrive. This capability to deploy combat power in a “prompt and sustained” way epitomizes the timeliness demanded of Army expeditionary forces by DoD Directive 5100.01 *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*. This capability did not come out of the blue, however, nor does it come without trade-offs. The way that the Army made the decisions to bring about these ready forces and the compromises the Army accepted in the evolution of the ready brigade concept offer insight into how the Army can navigate these challenges as it fulfills the DoD directive in the future.¹

The Army did not originally intend the 82nd Airborne Division to conduct this kind of rapid response mission. The 82nd Airborne Division’s current employment in its Global Response Force role reflects an accumulation of responses to the operational environment rather than a single, deliberate, far-reaching organizational design. Having decided that forces like the 82nd reflected the greatest opportunity to put American boots on the ground quickly, the United States Army has built it into a formation deliberately organized for speed of deployment. That opportunity did not develop over night but instead came about because of a number of independent decisions. Each of the decisions that contributed to the readiness of the 82nd’s elements occurred as a result of unrelated
events. Taken together, however, they accumulate into the ready forces prepared to deploy anywhere in the world on a moment’s notice.

The Airborne Birth and World War II

The story of this process began in the summer of 1942. In response to growing British interest in the airborne and parachute concept, the U.S. Army resolved to form two divisions along those lines: the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. Commanded by MG Matthew Ridgway, the 82nd initially included two glider regiments and a parachute regiment complemented by airborne artillery, air defense, and engineer assets. This formation depended on specific tactical and operational environmental considerations. The U.S. Army created airborne forces to respond to these specific tactical requirements of demanded by the harsh crucible of World War II.²

During the war, the United States required the ability to project blocking positions to the rear of coastal defenders. This operational and tactical requirement reflected several battlefield expectations drawn from experience as far back as the Battle of Gallipoli. If an amphibious invader successfully seized a beachhead, the defender’s more rapid counter-concentration allowed them to seal off the breach and defeat the forces in the beachhead. American amphibious doctrine developers built their plans upon the need to isolate the beachhead and prevent the enemy from massing against the assault.³ U.S. Army planners identified that the experimental parachute forces developed by the British, Soviets, and the Germans offered just such a capability. Employment of the 82nd Airborne Division throughout World War II reflected this practice.

In the 1943 invasion of Sicily, paratroopers landed in a roughly 60-mile area, most well outside their established drop zones. Although dispersed across a broader area
than expected, the paratroopers conducted small-scale attacks and seized key terrain that allowed follow-on forces to move rapidly inland. Specifically, the case of G Company, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment reflected this experience. Attacking Ponte Dirillo, the paratroopers seized a key bridge from German elements dug into pillboxes and, despite the fact that the company’s objective was not the bridge, its seizure proved helpful nonetheless. COL Gavin, the commander of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment that took part in the assault in Sicily, found himself with elements of 3rd Battalion in an attack against positions held by the Hermann Goering Fallschirmpanzer Division. Later counterattacked by Tiger tanks, the battalion held its position only due to the diffuse nature of the counterattack and the presence of a lone 75mm pack howitzer that fired against the tanks in a direct fire role. General Kurt Student, the commander of the German parachute forces, believed that the 82nd’s blocking positions had proven instrumental in the defense of the beachheads.4 Given the extent to which airborne forces featured prominently in the later D-Day Invasion of Normandy, U.S. planners also clearly felt that these actions justified the further use of airborne elements to secure bridgeheads.

Technology significantly limited the combat power of the 82nd Airborne Division of World War II fame. The primary weapons available to them included the .30 caliber machine gun, the bazooka, 60mm mortars, and the 75mm pack howitzer. Compared to the .50 caliber machine guns, 81mm and 120mm mortars, and 105mm howitzers commonly employed by the conventional force, these small weapons significantly limited the killing power of the paratroopers. The weight limitations imposed by the gliders and parachutes of the airborne force’s delivery mechanism imposed these smaller weapons on the force.5 This limited firepower further affected the airborne force’s expectations
regarding their fight behind enemy lines. They knew that enemy rear echelon units and reserve forces had greater firepower than the airborne force and therefore that initiative and speed of action were the only traits that mitigated the threat those forces posed.

U.S. Army planners, then, expected the 82nd Airborne Division to deploy using unreliable aircraft and parachute systems into drop zones the aircraft frequently missed, establish blocking positions against superior enemy forces, and employ inferior weapons to do it. This expectation set the parameters of the combat environment the 82nd expected to face. Their engagements consisted of small infantry unit actions, far behind enemy lines, dispersed and without clear lines. With no way to avoid or alter the expected circumstances, the 82nd planned to fight within them. They prepared airborne forces through detailed rehearsals, practiced actions upon arrival at their drop zone, and made sure that units knew their neighbors’ missions in the event of a mixed up drop zone. This training prepared the paratroopers to operate in the environment they expected to face. As the events unfolded, this training and more could not have fully prepared them, but what they lacked in preparation, the force made up for in morale and determination. This determination, perhaps, more than their equipment and preparation, enabled airborne forces to survive behind enemy lines in Normandy.

Having developed a force designed to operate behind enemy lines and in the face of expected superior enemy forces, Army planners employed it throughout World War II. They jumped into Sicily and Normandy and participated in the ill-fated Arnhem attack. These operations proved the validity of the concept as well as the risks attendant with airborne operations. The Battle of Arnhem, in particular, demonstrated the dangers associated with airborne warfare in the face of an enemy well equipped and prepared to
attack. At Nijmegen in particular, the 82nd found that the Germans had reinforced their objectives with 1,000 additional troops significantly delaying the seizure of the key bridge. The fact that the force retained its objectives long enough for British armor to arrive remains a testament to the valor of the 82nd Airborne Division. However, given the broader cost and lack of success, this outcome served as the cautionary tale regarding airborne insertion.

As designed, then, the airborne force occupied a vertical envelopment niche. That niche did not, at the time of its development, serve a perceived need for a rapid deployment force. While undoubtedly considered by early airborne pioneers, the situation had not allowed the Army to explore this aspect of the airborne community’s potential. All of those critical advantages offered by the airborne community in preparing an effective early-response and early-entry force remained untapped possibilities, then, as the force reorganized and downsized following World War II.

**A New Niche for the Airborne**

After the war, the Cold War demanded that the U.S. have a strategic reserve available for an expected war in Central Europe to defend the West from international communism. While the 82nd served this role, before the 1950 invasion of South Korea by the Communist North, the U.S. Army had turned airborne forces into regular infantry elements. This decision reflected primarily the high cost of maintaining forces trained to conduct airborne insertion. On the other hand, the rapid deployment of an airborne corps might have significantly altered the outcome of the surprising invasion of South Korean by its neighbor to the north. However, even though the 82nd remained in the strategic reserve, for many reasons including the shortage of transport aircraft, they could not
deploy any faster than the closer 24th Infantry Division that suffered so many defeats early in the Korean War.\(^8\)

In 1958, the Army designated the re-established XVIII Airborne Corps as the Strategic Army Corps or STRAC. Within the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 101st Airborne Division served as the spearhead with the 82nd following behind. These forces, much more timely in their deployment than the heavy, ship-bound mechanized force that made up the majority of the Army, for the first time gave the nation the capability to respond to crises globally. During 1959, they underwent a test of readiness through an exercise entitled “Banyan Tree” wherein a reinforced regiment deployed to Panama for jungle training. This test and another larger one later in the year demonstrated the capability of the combination of American air power and the light infantry of the STRAC to leave from American airfields and arrive on distant battlefields within hours.\(^9\)

This effort, perhaps the only one dedicated to the establishment of a rapidly deployable force, reflects an oddity within this story. The establishment of the airborne force reflected the tactical needs of the Army during World War II and not a need for rapidly deployed forces. Later force redesigns enabled the airborne community to do its job better, but were not developed to that purpose. This decision, however, established the close working relationships with the Air Force that have since served the 82nd so well.

Over the next three years, the Air Force and Army worked together to weld the air power delivering the force to those troops that depended upon that delivery. In 1961, this effort resulted in a joint command, called Strike Command, STRICOM, or more simply Strike, that employed a range of air power in support of the deployable ground forces in
STRAC. Within the context of nuclear deterrence, this organization reflected the capability to fight so-called ‘brush-fire wars’ without resorting to nuclear weapons. The combination of airborne infantry and strategic aviation assets further defined the 82nd’s operational environment, outlining as it did the nature of the expected crisis requiring their deployment.10

**Limited Wars, Austerity, and the U.S. Army**

Such limited wars would not take place in the heart of Europe nor at home in the United States. Wars that demanded conventional forces and for which nuclear deterrence failed would likely take place in the ‘third world’. In the 1960s, these countries did not have sophisticated power grids or road networks. They lacked common services and the powerful security apparatus that Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States enjoyed. STRAC knew that if it deployed under conditions short of nuclear war, it would do so into austere conditions much more like those of Korea than those of World War II Europe.

These conditions limited the value of a number of America’s greatest military strengths. During World War II, the U.S. Army had demonstrated the ability to concentrate enormous volumes of artillery fire against enemy positions. That volume of artillery fire, however, depended on getting heavy artillery pieces into position to fire, a feat that often depended on whether the roads allowed such a movement. Additionally, such a volume of fire depended upon the logistics to deliver the needed rounds to the guns. Such a logistics effort likewise depended upon the road network.

These limited environments fundamentally changed the logistical environment as well. The majority of the Army relied on vehicles that needed consistent fuel supply as
well as other oils and lubricants. In Europe, where the motorization of military affairs took place, gas stations, fuel depots, and the like proved rare enough to limit operations along specific logistical lines. In Korea, the logistical effort had to support not only front line combat units, tanks and all, but also itself a demanding task given the number of trucks ferrying supplies and equipment to the front line. This logistical demand changed when the force employed had fewer vehicles and depended more on ammunition and foot power than it did on gasoline.

In that context, the paratroopers’ familiarity with austere conditions proved critical. Once behind enemy lines, airborne forces expected to do without resupply for days and to fight through to their objectives despite their lack of logistics, firepower, and protection. This comfort with austerity established of necessity during World War II, came to typify the training of airborne units. In exercises, paratroopers arrived at the drop zone without the heavy equipment, weapons, and sustainment tail that typified regular Army operations. They expected to do without the large-scale mobile Army surgical hospitals, the heavy artillery units, and the tanks. Of course, this lack also dictated what enemies that STRAC could face without suffering unacceptable casualties. The paratroopers could not fight a heavily armed conventional force without significant support from heavy conventional forces or nuclear fires. That said, the capability to put the paratroopers of the STRAC into places that lacked infrastructure and resources made possible an array of strategic options otherwise unavailable to American forces.

The Air Force and the Airborne

A related capability increase resulted from STRICOM’s close working relationship between the Air Force deployment assets and the STRAC troops they
deployed. This relationship allowed airborne troops to grow accustomed to doing business in ways that made the pilots’ jobs easier and vice versa, which included developing load plans and equipment rigging procedures as a specialty of the 82nd Airborne Division. Routine training also enabled the 82nd to understand the requirements associated with deploying via parachute much more so than units that deploy via ship. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the paratroopers and aircrews of the transport aircraft developed mutual respect. This respect allowed the two organizations to work to make their shared mission more feasible.

STRAC and Air Force assets organized into STRICOM in response to the expected nuclear battlefield. On this hypothetical nuclear battlefield, concentrations of ground combat power attracted nuclear strikes. The diffusion common on the drop zones of Europe during World War II minimized that concentration and, far from the detriment to mission accomplishment it had been during the World War, it improved survivability. Similarly, the lack of heavy weapons did not detract as much from the combat power of an organization that intended to use nuclear-armed air strikes to defeat massed enemy forces. This nuclear force, organized along the lines of the ‘Pentomic’ divisional structure, made maximum use of the benefits of the airborne force while turning its relative weaknesses into strengths.

While conceptually elegant, this approach missed the most significant paradox inherent in the reliance on nuclear deterrence. Fundamentally, any war that required nuclear weapons would preclude the deployment of ground troops through massive retaliation. Moreover, any conventional war against strong regional powers or near-peer adversaries would have demanded more combat power than STRICOM alone could offer.
This situation established a gray zone wherein conflicts may prove too internationally sensitive to employ nuclear fires but too violent for Army forces to win handily. The Chinese intervention into the Korean War exemplified this condition with non-nuclear forces proving insufficient to defeat the Communist Chinese Forces decisively but nuclear strikes proving too politically sensitive. Had the U.S. employed nuclear weapons, as MacArthur had suggested, the conflict may have escalated into another world war. However, without nuclear fires, the Army as it had evolved lacked the combat power to win decisively against the weight of Chinese manpower. This lack of combat power continued despite reorganizations including the ‘Pentomic’ and ‘Reorganization Objective Army Division’ plans.

**Pentomic Reorganization and Readiness**

The so-called ‘Pentomic’ division reorganization sought to make the best use of the benefits of the airborne force. Doing away with the old regimental structures that had histories back to the American Revolution, the ‘Pentomic’ system built combined arms battle groups. Each of five battle groups in the division included five infantry companies, hence the ‘pent’, the Greek prefix referring to groups of five, in ‘Pentomic’. The second half of the term referred to the expectation of an atomic battlefield, the second key consideration driving the organizational structure. Each battle group lacked the integral firepower of the regimental combat teams employed during the Korean War – the massed artillery battalions and attached tank battalions having fallen out of favor because of the nuclear threat. Each battle group contained a single field artillery battery intended to support the battle group’s five infantry companies.12 This dispersal of artillery and other

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support assets reflected the expectation that the force could call upon nuclear strikes to destroy significant concentrations of enemy combat power.

A secondary benefit of the ‘Pentomic’ reorganization, the five battle groups allowed STRAC divisions to employ a rotational readiness model. STRICOM provided ready ground combat forces to react to crises anywhere in the world, but it could not do so without planning for rest. They responded by establishing a cycle within STRAC wherein units rotated through periods of rest and refit, training, and maximum preparedness for deployment. With five battle groups to rotate through, ‘Pentomic’ divisions maintained combat readiness while still having ready combat power to jump into a crisis. This possibility developed into the 82nd Airborne Division’s ‘Division Ready Force’ concept. Using rotational readiness, the battle groups rotated into periods of highest readiness, prepared to parachute into combat at a moment’s notice, followed by periods of rest and training.

ROAD Reforms and the 82nd

Dissatisfied with overstretched command structure of the ‘Pentomic’ structure, the Army pursued another reorganization in 1964 entitled Reorganization Objective Army Division, or ‘ROAD’. This reorganization established three brigades under the division to which subordinate battalions could be reassigned. In practice, however, this concept functioned much like the old regimental model with each brigade routinely working with the same three subordinate battalions. Although each battalion retained significantly more autonomy than they had had under the old regimental system, they exhibited less autonomy than the battle groups had displayed under the ‘Pentomic’ organization. In part this reflected the changed hierarchy. In the ‘Pentomic’ system the
battle groups, based around battalions, reported directly to the division command. By comparison, the ‘ROAD’ system’s reimplementation of the brigade increased oversight over the activities of the battalions. Most significantly for the 82nd however, the new nine-battalion airborne division model offered more battalions to rotate through the readiness model compared to the five battle groups of the ‘Pentomic’ structure.\textsuperscript{14}

These structural changes, however, reflected much broader changes to the Army than their effect on the 82nd. These changes intended to respond to changing technological and strategic situations for the whole Army, not just the airborne community. They offered an unintended benefit in that they incrementally allowed for more effective rotational readiness and therefore more timely rapid deployment forces.

\textbf{Origins of Rotational Readiness}

To better understand the implementation of rotational readiness in the 82nd, a brief review of the method demonstrates that the idea was not new in the 1960s. The Romans developed the idea as a way to maintain a fresh front line of fighters in an era when physical stamina determined which side’s soldiers lived and which died. By rotating lines of soldiers consistently, they ensured that rested Roman troops faced the exhausted front lines of their enemies. At the time, against their largely less-sophisticated enemies, this gave the Romans an immense tactical advantage. The side that exhausted its enemies first won. Rotating its soldiers through combat ensured that they distributed the tiring work of sword-and-shield fighting between long periods of rest. This concept minimized the number of lethally wounded Roman legionnaires and maximized the number of battles they could fight and win at the lowest feasible cost.\textsuperscript{15}
Carried forward into the gunpowder age, lines of smoothbore muskets began conducting volley fire to make the most effective use of the inaccurate weapons available and the time required to reload them. The armies of Europe rotated these lines with clockwork precision to enable lines to reload, advance, fire, and reload again. Rotation in this context depended less on the concept of exhaustion and more on the technical demands of gunpowder weapons. Imprecise at lethal ranges, the forces that employed smoothbore muskets needed to put many shots into the space occupied by the enemy to have an effect. Combined with long reload times, the need to fire many shots simultaneously ensured that groups of soldiers rotated through volley and reloading.\textsuperscript{16}

In the modern era, both the Allies and the Central Powers had begun using a rotational model during the Great War on the Western Front. In the deadlock of the trenches, the Germans in particular found that minimizing the number of troops on the front line had important advantages. Retaining large amounts of their force in reserve allowed the forces to rear to rest and train for upcoming operations.\textsuperscript{17} This experience directly influenced the gradual adoption of the rotational models employed in the West after World War II.

**Operation Power Pack: the Dominican Republic, 1965**

Having incorporated the idea of rotational readiness, the 82nd Airborne Division stood ready for the conditions they faced in April 1965. President Lyndon Johnson committed the 82nd Airborne Division to the Dominican Republic in an operation code-named ‘Power Pack’ to prevent the Dominican Republic from suffering a communist take over like Cuba. In May 1962, Dominican gunmen shot and killed the strongman of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina or Trujillo. Over the next three
years a series of coups and civil wars made the situation in the Dominican Republic so politically unstable that no force within the country could contain the growing violence. In April 1965, the 6th Marine Expeditionary Unit began evacuating American citizens from Santo Domingo, the capital city. On April 26th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an order placing two airborne battalion combat teams, tactical Air Force units, and other support elements onto a ‘combat ready status’. In the early morning of the 30th of April 1965, two battalions of the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division arrived at Santo Domingo airport delivered by a fleet of 144 C-130 transport aircraft. What followed consisted of a textbook application of stabilization forces. U.S. paratroopers secured the city first, received reinforcements, and then incrementally secured the entire country. Operation Power Pack demonstrated the efficacy and necessity of ready forces as small-scale units overseas as in the case of the revolution in the Dominican Republic.18

The 82nd’s unique capability set tailor-fit the situation for Operation Power Pack. The Dominican Republic did not have the sophisticated defenses or weapons like tanks that significantly threatened the paratroopers. The island’s separation from traditional lines of communication and supply meant that air delivery offered an ideal method of insertion. Further, the unit’s relative comfort operating in a dispersed and dismounted mode, a legacy of its airborne culture, provided the maximum possible security presence amidst the chaos of Santo Domingo. In this way, the 82nd Airborne Division, by happenstance more than design, stood prepared for the circumstances unique to this kind of conflict.
The Birth of Contemporary Conventional Deterrence Theory

In 1967, the division deployed 3rd Brigade to put down anti-war protests in Detroit. Over the next year, the division policed ghettos in Detroit and Washington, DC quelling riots. In fact, during the Tet Offensive in February 1968, only one brigade of the 82nd remained available in reserve and on 13 February, that brigade deployed to Vietnam to defeat the offensive. However, this commitment could not last, as the nation still needed a strategic reserve. By 1970, the division had reconstituted into the Army’s strategic reserve, prepared to deploy anywhere at a moment’s notice. In doing so, the division began employing its brigades as coherent organizations rather than collections of disparate battalion combat teams. This initiative allowed the division to begin employing a ‘Division Ready Brigade’ construct, the framework that stood until re-envisioned as the Global Response Force after 2001. In the meantime, however, the Army had a long road ahead as it came out of the Vietnam War.19

The 1973 Steadfast Reform began, for the Army, the long road back from Vietnam. The reform established the Training and Doctrine Command or TRADOC as well as Forces Command or FORSCOM. These reforms helped to mitigate some of the more byzantine bureaucracy the Army had developed during the Vietnam War and decreased the span of control for the old CONARC that had previously been so taxed performing elements of both roles. The complicated mechanisms employed by the Army before these reforms had, as the Parker Report published the preceding year indicated, complicated the process of identifying systemic problems in the Army. Moreover, while Army leaders had long believed in the value of conventional deterrence for the nation, they had lacked the vocabulary to articulate the need in the face of America’s nuclear
arsenal and presumed threats. These reforms gave senior Army leaders the machine required to bring their belief in conventional deterrence to fruition.20

The Astarita Report combined this capability with a clear definition of the value of conventional forces in deterrence both in support of ally confidence as well as against situations short of the nuclear threshold. This report set the framework for conventional deterrence and helped to identify the uses and limits of conventional troops in it, both for Army planners as well as for strategic leaders. This framework, based on an acceptance of a world with several poles wherein every global power has a vested interest in maintaining that world set a standard for the expectations of the deployment of U.S. forces abroad. Rather than preventing any action on the part of adversaries, the key to American strategy revolved around the price for that change. When the change did not negatively impact American interests, the U.S. could choose to accept it.21 When the change ran contrary to U.S. national interests, “It is the role of American military forces to demonstrate that the price is indeed unacceptable.”22 Light, airborne forces, in conjunction with American air power, can accomplish this limited goal.

The employment of the 82nd Airborne Division, then, would take advantage of these ideas of conventional deterrence. The 82nd, with its rotational readiness model, culture of operating in isolation, familiarity with its deployment mechanism and close ties with the Air Force could reliably deploy into a threatened area and defend itself against a lightly armed enemy force. It may not have the necessary combat power to defeat a determined attacker armed with advanced Soviet weaponry, but it may raise the price of any attempted military adventure beyond acceptable levels. This factor implies a strategy of denial more than outright victory. Rather than attempting to totally defeat an
adversary’s attacks, rapidly deployed forces could make the cost of that kind of action so prohibitive to that adversary that any expected gain did not outweigh the expected costs. This capability, then, speaks more about the perspective of the adversary than it does friendly forces. Does the adversary think that it can defeat the ready force deployed decisively enough to make military action worthwhile?

**Application of the Conventional Deterrence Role**

Operation Desert Shield in particular reflected this critical question inherent to conventional deterrence when the 82nd Airborne Division deployed to the area to deter Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia. Given the operational conditions, it would have helped Saddam Hussein mitigate the risk of intervention if Iraqi forces had eliminated Saudi Arabia as a staging area for Allied forces. Knowing as he did the risk imposed by the ports available in Saudi Arabia and the strident U.S. diplomatic response to the invasion, Hussein should have immediately launched his forces into the Saud Kingdom rather than allowing the U.S.-led alliance to build forces there. Whether or not the presence of the 82nd deterred Saddam Hussein is hard to prove. Believers in the concept of the conventional deterrence argue that while Hussein’s armored forces might have overrun the paratroopers, the cost of defeating them would have rendered Saddam’s forces incapable of future offensive action. The capability to deny Saddam Hussein an easy victory for many proved the validity of the concept of conventional deterrence. However, the demand for conventional deterrence based upon this concept required a force trained to deploy at a moment’s notice and whose very presence achieved strategic goals – the 82nd Airborne Division.23
Dissenting Voices

Marc DeVore’s work *When Failure Thrives* provides a valuable counterpoint: he notes that the ready force mission does not require parachute training. He extrapolates a broader argument about the way in which military institutions evolve and survive in the face of technical obsolescence. While technically valid, his argument misses two key aspects of parachutist training that have critical impacts on readiness: the routine training for deployment itself and the regular working relationships established with the Air Force transport fleet that deploys them. These two aspects of the parachutist training program result in a ready force much better adapted to immediate deployment than a force more focused on conducting missions after arrival. While perhaps a nuanced point, it bears further discussion in that it speaks to the specialization of the 82nd as a rapid response force. As a specialized force, the 82nd accepts risk in some training areas to perform its rapid deployment and forced entry missions better. While this does not refute DeVore’s argument, it does provide a good reason for the continued parachute training conducted by the division. The continuous demand for parachute training maintains the skill of both the aircrews and the infantry while simultaneously maintaining a healthy relationship between the Air Force community and the airborne, an absolute necessity for rapid deployment.24

Tradeoffs for Timeliness

In conclusion, the ready forces of the 82nd Airborne Division reflect a path towards a timely expeditionary force based on force design decisions made in support of the total force more than the specific needs associated with a rapid deployment unit. In hindsight, the value of each to the concept of a rapidly deployable force becomes clear.
However, at the time, each decision reflected a logical extension of existing policy, strategic, or tactical demands and not an overarching desire for immediate, globally responsive forces. This result, itself, indicates that the proper training can allow disciplined forces to overcome the challenges to operations imposed by austere environments. Nevertheless, beyond that insight, it demonstrates that when leaders understand and accept the requirements to build a specialized capability, a force can excel at that specific mission.

Compared to other U.S. Army forces, the 82nd Airborne Division’s Global Response Force and its predecessors excel at global responsiveness. However, while they stand out in speed of deployment and can sustain their relatively light footprint for as long as needed in most cases; they lack the breadth of capability to tailor themselves to varied threats and the size to scale beyond a brigade-level fight. Their light equipment and emphasis on strategic mobility over tactical mobility entail significant risk to the mission and to the force should a better-equipped enemy find them near the drop zone. These issues constrain the conventional deterrence mission in that they place conditions on the employment of the 82nd. Planners must take care to use the 82nd carefully for fear of worsening a strategic predicament through the loss of American lives. The emphasis on timeliness has imposed limits in tailorability and scalability for the 82nd that they mitigate through operations as part of a joint force and careful operational-level planning.

The 82nd can and does reorganize the combat power they have into teams with varied specialties, but their lack of mobile firepower mitigates the extent to which they can create teams capable of shock action. That lack of mobile shock capability means that the 82nd accepts significant risk when engaging a more heavily armored threat force.
While Javelin and TOW anti-tank guided missiles can inflict significant damage on an enemy armored force, the return fire is just as likely to prove effective against the unarmored infantrymen and HMMWVs of the airborne force.

Similarly, the more heavily armored force does not have to engage the 82nd directly. The superior mobility of an armored force may allow the enemy force to bypass the 82nd if they know where the paratroopers have established their defense. The light infantry force cannot rapidly displace and move to alternate or subsequent battle positions like a more heavily equipped mechanized force can. This combination of threat-related and equipment-related shortfalls results in a distinct lack of tailorability within the ready forces. The list of tools the airborne forces bring to the fight does not include heavily armored and armed vehicles. This shortcoming significantly decreases the degree to which the 82nd can tailor itself to defeat different circumstances in the tactical environment.

In a related way, the 82nd lacks the ability to scale its force packaging smaller than the brigade level and greater than the division level. Deploying the division’s brigades would require significant effort in bringing together paratroopers on leave or otherwise occupied with training and are not then serving as the Global Response Force. Furthermore, the 82nd only has itself to offer, and the U.S. Army has not felt the need for more than one division to support this role since the Vietnam era. Deploying forces larger than a single brigade in this rapid response role would require significant effort, let alone a force greater than the division.

Additionally, deploying forces smaller than the brigade proves problematic given the structure of the division and brigades. Force developers tailored enablers like the
sustainment battalions to support a brigade-sized force and employed economies of scale to make that possible with the least resources expended on the enabling effort. This means that splitting away portions of those enablers results in the detachments not equaling the sum; three or four squads of engineers, for example, have significantly less capability than a platoon despite the fact that the same number of troops are involved. This fact has to do with the massing of appropriate tools and equipment at higher echelons to allow small enabling elements to serve larger maneuver forces. While in theory, the brigade can detach three battalion task forces equally supported with enablers, in reality, those task forces will lack substantial sustainment, fire support, and other enabling capabilities that only a brigade can offer. This combination of limiting factors ensures that the 82nd’s ready forces rarely deploy outside of the brigade scale, limiting the scalability of the force.

While the Army may not have intended to make this compromise when it developed the 82nd Airborne Division during World War II, the choices it made early in the development of airborne forces led it down this path. Indeed, the long-term development of the Army’s rapid response forces did not stem from a deliberate process at all, much less one focused on this unique set of compromises. That said, the compromise achieved its intent: the 82nd Airborne Division can deploy rapidly and sustain operations for long enough to achieve its strategic objective in most cases. While some may argue that the 82nd’s lack of tactical mobility significantly decrease its value outside of a forced-entry scenario, that same lack of equipment makes it easier to sustain than more heavily equipped armored or motorized units. The trade-offs that force developers made in the creation of the existing rapidly deploying 82nd Airborne Division
reflect a specific set of strategic considerations ranging from the idea of conventional
deterrence through rotational readiness concepts. This conceptual framework created the
ready forces now available to the United States Army and balanced tactical requirements
against strategic and political considerations. The road that led to the 82nd’s current form
reflects incremental changes that balanced capabilities against needs rather than a single
momentous decision. Seemingly small decisions made early, even before the selection of
a force for an expeditionary role, significantly affected the final balance between
tailorability, scalability, and timeliness.

2 Thompson, The All Americans, 22-23.
4 Thompson, The All Americans, 33-36.
5 Ibid., 26-27.
6 Hoyt, Airborne, 29; Maurice Tugwell, Airborne to Battle: A History of Airborne
7 Hoyt, Airborne, 89-114.
8 Hoyt, Airborne, 182; Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: Korea, 126-151.
9 Thompson, The All Americans, 95.
10 Harvey, Strike Command, 1.
11 Ibid., 150-151.
12 Thompson, The All Americans, 94-95.
13 In 1965, at the outset of their intervention in the Dominican Republic, the 82nd
Airborne demonstrated the ability to deploy ‘ready battalions’ from within a rotational
readiness structure. The transition towards a rotational model seems to have occurred
prior to their 1964 conversion from the Pentomic structure to the ROAD format, although no reference is made to the change in the secondary sources.

14 Ibid., 96-97.


19 Thompson, The All Americans, 97-99.


22 Ibid., 43.


24 DeVore, When Failure Thrives, 72-76.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The Demand for Expeditionary Army Forces

As a superpower, the United States intends to lead coalitions in enforcing an international order beneficial to its own prosperity; an order based on a free-trade, open market perspective. Furthermore, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, South Korea, as well as other friends and partners around the world depend on U.S. expeditionary forces to reign in rogue states and threats to global prosperity. A continental constabulary force will not reassure those friends and allies overseas, nor will it provide the United States with the power to enforce the nation’s will on adversaries. “A rules-based international system” led by the United States, and friends and allies overseas that help to enforce that international system serve as critical elements of U.S. national power, both as aspirational goals as well as tools in their own right.¹ The U.S. requires an Army that can support those strategic goals. Furthermore, to support those goals, the Army must have an expeditionary character to reassure friends and allies as well as to enforce the nation’s will when required. This expeditionary character depends on the right balance of qualities to allow the force to accomplish strategic objectives.

DoD Directive 5100.01 *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* directs the Army to “provide forces with expeditionary and campaign qualities.” The directive outlines the specific functions demanded of Army forces regarding the many possible conditions and environments within which the force must operate. The primary passage directs that Army forces conduct “war and military operations short of war,” in a “prompt and sustained” fashion, “in all environments.”
Therefore, the forces it demands must have three qualities: tailorability, scalability, and timeliness. While a critical eye may see sustainability as a separate quality, it completes the policymakers’ time-related requirements by providing a conceptual end bracket for the deployment therefore more accurately describing an aspect of timeliness than serving as a separate quality itself. As all missions have beginnings and endings, swiftness in this context does not equate with timeliness. A force that arrives rapidly but cannot achieve the mission risks wasting valuable time and resources. So while a different analysis may distill other qualities from the passage, the three identified qualities speak most succinctly to the total force requirements. Tailorability, defined as the ability to combine the right kind of forces to support the required mission, enables Army forces to respond appropriately to the threat or adversary as well as to operate within the required environments. Scalability, defined as the ability to respond with appropriate amounts of force across the spectrum of conflict, allows Army forces to support the necessary range of policy measures. Finally, timeliness refers to the ability to respond promptly to the policy demand as well as the capacity to sustain the necessary force for the campaign’s duration. These three qualities synergistically represent the “expeditionary and campaign qualities” demanded of Army forces.²

The History of Achieving “Expeditionary”

These three qualities, however, must exist in balance. Too much emphasis on any one quality detracts from the other two. Tailorability demands a full range of tactical elements like tanks and artillery, some of which require significant transport space and weight, which decreases the ability to rapidly deploy, detracting from timeliness. Similarly, timeliness relies on air transport and minimized sustainment. This force mix
makes high-end fights against well-equipped opponents difficult to win, and takes away some scales of conflict decreasing scalability. The more a force emphasizes any of these areas, the more they must sacrifice critical elements from another quality. The three historical case studies in this work provide insights that illustrate the inherent compromises between these expeditionary qualities. The World War II U.S. armored division’s combat command, the MAGTF, and the ready forces of the 82nd Airborne Division each reflect a unique set of compromises that responded to the uncertainties and ambiguities faced by each force. While each force developed out of unique circumstances, insights from the logic of each example can inform future Army force developers to respond to the requirements in the DoD directive.

Each case study reflects a different balance among the three qualities. The Armored Forces in 1943 focused on tailorability but almost entirely ignored scalability and compromised in some areas of timeliness. The MAGTF enabled scalability but has severe limitations in tailorability and made significant compromises in timeliness. Finally, the ready forces of the 82nd Airborne Division mastered important aspects of timeliness but accepted significant risk in scalability and tailorability. Each design reflects the priorities of their developers and demonstrates a niche within the nation’s list of strategic capabilities, balancing these qualities within the context of their own strategic situations and constraints.

The models developed in a specific set of circumstances that differ from the current operational environment and will likely differ from future operating environments, as well. However, all three examples stemmed from uncertainties that do have similarities to the modern experience. They reflect a need to respond to the
unknowns of an expeditionary situation: the combat command to the specific combination of troop-types needed overseas, the MAGTF to the scale of forces needed overseas, and the 82nd’s ready forces to when an emerging overseas crisis would require them. As outlined in the DoD directive, Army forces today face a broad and poorly defined requirement for expeditionary forces. That requirement applies across the spectrum of conflict in any possible environment and on an unknown timeline. Due to the similar uncertainties, the Army can use insight from the study of previous responses to uncertainty in its future force development.

The Combat Command: Tailorability

At the time of the combat command’s development, the future of armored warfare had stagnated within a muddle of conflicting parochial interests and arguments. In 1941, all sides of the debate agreed that the U.S. Army needed forces to fight in Europe against a capable German Army with strong mechanized forces. No one, however, knew with certainty the optimum mix of tactical unit types the Army needed in this new, mechanized world. Did the new mechanized Army need more infantry, more tanks, or more guns? Each Army branch involved in the discussion held a position regarding the optimum force mix and the purpose of those mechanized forces. The infantry argued that tanks should support infantry assaults through enemy positions and, as a secondary role, attack and destroy enemy tanks. The cavalry maintained that tanks enabled deep raids into the enemy’s rear areas destroying soft targets and not fighting enemy tanks, a counterpoint to the infantry concept. Finally, the artillery described a middle position in which massed direct-fire artillery destroyed enemy armored vehicles, making tank-on-tank fighting unlikely, and simultaneously made any such raids into the enemy rear a
dangerous proposition. At the time, those positions seemed mutually exclusive and deliberately reflected inter-branch parochial budgetary concerns. While the positions theoretically answered doctrinal employment questions, they primarily articulated each branch’s argument for additional funding. This argument could only end with the increased funding made available by the war and a centralizing presence in the force development process.

By 1941, the United States had begun rearmament and the funding flow had increased dramatically. Similarly, General George C. Marshall’s selection of Lieutenant General Lesley McNair and MG Jacob Devers to critical positions in the force development process ensured that the Army had the necessary centralization to push through needed reforms. Resolving the inter-branch debate in the doctrinal employment of armored forces proved one of the first challenges in creating the armored division that raced across France in 1944. Upon assuming command of the Armored Force in 1941, MG Jacob Devers and his staff modified the way the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) employed its regimental headquarters and created the combat command. Commanded by a brigadier general, the combat command had no permanent subordinate units but rather received battalions from among the armored division’s three regiments: one tank regiment, one mechanized infantry regiment, and one self-propelled artillery regiment. The armored division included three combat commands: Combat Command A, Combat Command B, and a reserve combat command called Combat Command R or occasionally Combat Command C. A division that required a force capable of exploitation deep into the enemy’s rear areas had the ability to tailor one combat command specifically to that mission. Likewise, if a division needed to breach an enemy’s trench lines, it had the
ability to fashion a combat command to that mission. In fact, the combat command
enabled the armored force to tailor itself to fight in any of the ways outlined by the
branch proponents and therefore made the parochial branch arguments irrelevant.

The combat command did not solve all of the U.S. Army’s problems and the U.S.
armored division of World War II cannot claim the term ‘expeditionary’ given all of the
qualities discussed earlier. U.S. armored divisions required enormous amounts of ship
space and consumed prodigious amounts of fuel and supplies taxing a strained logistical
infrastructure. After 1943, the Armed Forces Board eliminated the regimental
headquarters to save space on transport ships leaving the combat command the only
headquarters between the division and the battalion. Replacing the regiment, however,
impacted not only unit heraldries but training systems as well. Before the development of
the combat command, the regimental staff coordinated battalion gunnery training and
established standard operating procedures and systems. Eliminating that echelon in the
chain of command streamlined the orders process in combat and decreased the ever-
critical shipping requirements. However, after the war, it decreased the sustainability of
the force design by over-burdening the battalion with training tasks and decreasing
commonality between like-type battalions due to the lack of regimental standards. Later,
the Army applied the brigade concept to the armored force in part to make permanent the
temporary relationships between the battalions of the combat command.

Additionally, effective employment of the combat command depended greatly on
the personality of the commanders involved. Some commanders, like 4th Armored
Division’s MG John S. Wood adopted the concept whole-heartedly and frequently
changed the division’s task organization between combat commands. Others found the
system overly complex and consistently maintained each combat command with the same combination of battalions of tanks, mechanized infantry, and artillery. This disparity limited the application of the increased tailorability offered by the combat command as some leaders found it more helpful to provide consistency to their subordinates than to tailor their force.6 While this factor of personality may have made combat command implementation uneven, that does not take away from the fact that the combat command drastically increased the potential tailorability of the force, particularly when compared to the rigid design prior to the combat command. In point of fact, that older design had many similarities to the British system predicated on set-piece battles using a specific and limited set of tactics used to great effect at the Battle of El Alamein.7 The combat command structure provided a much greater array of options as demonstrated by the example of commanders like MG Woods, and emulated in some respects the flexibility achieved by the panzer divisions’ use of kampfgruppen.8

Within the constraints imposed by command personalities and the operational environment, the combat command provided the World War II armored force with tailorability. However, tailorability often came at the expense of the armored force’s timeliness, which suffered dramatically from the complications to training and the heavy logistics tail required for the mechanized force. Additionally, the armored divisions of World War II had no provision for scalability. Recalling that scalability indicates a requirement to deploy a range of force sizes to meet the policy need, the combat command did not support this ability. To function as designed, the commander needed the entire division within the tactical engagement area to make possible the flexible reassignment of forces. This requirement to have the entire division in the tactical area
limited the effectiveness of deploying one combat command while still simultaneously making use of the combat command’s tailorability. The armored division, then, could not respond to national security demands with any appropriately sized force; it needed to deploy as a whole unit to make the most use of its tailorability. However, at that moment the nation required tailorability more than scalability and timeliness for World War II. In responding to the unique uncertainty regarding the nature of armored warfare during the Interwar Period, the U.S. armored division’s combat command ably provided tailorability to a force that needed it. After World War II, however, the nation required a force with scalability as it found the variety of crises demanded more than a one-size-fits-all approach.

**The MAGTF: Scalability**

In contrast to the combat command, the Marine Corps created the MAGTF in the aftermath of the advent of nuclear war. World War II’s dramatic ending in Japan and the nuclear test on Bikini Atoll indelibly changed the face of war. As American policymakers developed doctrines to respond to the new strategic environment, they suspected that the massed forces the Marines made famous in amphibious assaults in the Pacific were problematic and would attract nuclear strikes. Some senior military officials went so far as to say that the war of the future depended solely on air power and did not require Army or Marine Corps forces. The conceptual eclipse of the Marine Corps’ amphibious experience, therefore, presented a direct threat to the Marine Corps’ budget and place within the defense establishment. While the Marine Corps dealt with this existential threat, it also had to overcome the conceptual challenge to the value of conventional forces posed by the new nuclear force.
A common theme of nuclear deterrence theorists early in the Cold War indicated that the United States no longer needed conventional forces because it could threaten the annihilation of an adversary with nuclear weapons. Given the capability of totally destroying an adversary, theorists suggested that most would capitulate rather than risk nuclear destruction. This belief reinforced a binary conception of war: either total nuclear war or no war at all. The Marine Corps, however, saw a spectrum of conflict that ranged from nuclear war on one end to small-scale military support to evacuations on the other. This conception of conflict served their parochial service interests by establishing a continued demand for Navy and Marine Corps forces. Nuclear deterrence theorists argued that nuclear weapons precluded these smaller conflicts as effectively as they did war between great powers. Unfortunately for them, the concept of a spectrum of conflict ultimately proved a more accurate description of war’s range than nuclear deterrence theorists had anticipated. The United States’ choice not to employ nuclear weapons after China’s entry into the Korean War exemplified this broader range of possible conflict for which Marine Corps planners developed the MAGTF.

Throughout the 1950s, the Marine Corps deliberately reformed its doctrine and organization to operate across the spectrum of conflict. It developed vertical envelopment using helicopters and further integrated Marine Corps aircraft into its tactics. Most significantly, however, it provided a common ratio of combat elements for combined teams of ground, air, logistics, and command elements: the MAGTF. Experience in World War II and then refined in Korea taught this common effective ratio in the many assaults Marines had conducted and the senior Corps leadership intended to create an assault force, a task for which this experience had prepared them. Each task
force included one of each combat element scaled appropriately to the task force’s total size. For example, a Marine Expeditionary Unit or MEU employs a Marine infantry battalion as its ground element, a composite air squadron as its air element, and a logistics battalion for sustainment. The Marine Expeditionary Force, the largest Marine force, employs a Marine division as its ground force, an air wing as its air element, and a multi-regiment logistics group. Between the two echelons, the Marine Corps developed the Marine Expeditionary Brigade employing a Marine infantry regiment as its ground element, a Marine aircraft group, and a logistics regiment. Having three separate MAGTF force packages enabled the Corps to provide both senior military officials and policymakers a guide for the Corps’ employment both in terms of the scale of response and within the range of military operations.

While the MAGTF force packaging enabled the Corps to scale to the level of conflict demanded by policymakers, the Corps sacrificed elements of timeliness and tailorability. To meet the requirements of the DoD directive, a force must arrive rapidly and have the capability to continue operations as long as required. While the MEU can arrive in theaters rapidly, the MAGTF writ large simply cannot sustain itself over long campaigns. Despite having a sustainment apparatus on average three times the size of its Army equivalent, the MAGTF must rely on the Navy logistics system and Army theater-opening sustainment forces for large-scale contingencies. Each task force has a specific window of time, based upon scale, where it operates using internal sustainment only, but even a limited window like this depends on having large quantities of bulk items like fuel on hand in vehicles and containers. The limited quantities of those bulk goods limit the MAGTF’s ability to sustain itself and also has an impact on the deployment timeline for
the larger MAGTFs as their large sustainment demands require more time and resources to deploy.15

In a similar way, the MAGTF’s consistency in maintaining the same ratio of basic combat capabilities detracts from its tailorability. MAGTFs, even the largest ones, have relatively few heavily armored vehicles and limitations in artillery that the Marines make up for with fixed-wing air support. Those fixed-wing fighter-bombers, however, bring with them a significant logistics tail, and do not provide the same protection as the tanks of an armored brigade. On the other hand, this limit regarding the types of forces applies to many light forces designed for rapid deployment and is not a unique shortfall of the Marine Corps. Taken together, however, this combination of light forces that lack armor and a reliance on air-based firepower significantly limits the ability of the MAGTF to tailor itself to respond to demands for different kinds of forces, it simply does not have that many different kinds of force.

The 82nd Airborne Division: Timeliness

Unlike the preceding examples of tailorability and scalability where the respective service attempted to solve a specific problem, the 82nd Airborne Division did not originally set out to provide the nation with strategic timeliness. The ready forces that made the 82nd Airborne Division famous evolved over time from a number of unrelated requirements. Indeed, the pieces of the strategic timeliness puzzle did not fall into place until the late 1970s when the concept of conventional deterrence doctrine combined with rotational readiness to produce the Division Ready Brigade. The confluence of capabilities demanded to provide timely force deployment, however, worked easily into the culture of the 82nd because of its history of deploying under less-than-ideal
conditions. That aggressive attitude in the face of austerity stemmed from their World War II mission which demanded the airborne force attack directly from their landing zone despite being mixed up after their parachute landings and having divorced themselves from the Army’s logistics system.

The American Army established the airborne force after the German Army demonstrated its effectiveness in Belgium and on the island of Crete. The concept proved costly but effective in both of its initial applications and convinced British and American military planners that they needed an equivalent capability. Development continued, and the first large-scale American airborne assaults supported the invasion of Sicily, albeit with mixed opinions about the efficacy of the deployment method itself. In developing the airborne force, American planners had anticipated some complications imposed by airborne operations, but the force had to experience other problems first hand. 16

Experience during the war indicated that airborne attacks mixed up the attacking infantry, which detracted from unit cohesion, and broke up the sustainment connection to the rest of the Army. In addition, the environments airborne elements usually contested included the enemy’s reserves as well as their critical lines of communications and supply. The fighting from the landing zone to the airborne objective took place behind enemy lines without the fire support the rest of the Army enjoyed. Airborne units often suffered disproportionate casualties as a result and risked annihilation from enemy armored counterattacks as was the case at the Battle of Arnhem.17 But despite these risks, airborne forces remained in the Army inventory to this day.

These traits make airborne forces a natural fit with regards to the role of rapid-response forces. The strategic mobility provided by the Air Force enables airborne
elements to arrive in any theater around the world in a matter of hours, assuming an uncontested air environment. And since the preponderance of such an organization is light infantrymen, they require smaller sustainment organizations for the maintenance and supply of heavy equipment and vehicles. Airborne elements, then, provide the ideal base for a timely force based on the definition of the quality as arriving in the theater rapidly and having the ability to remain in theater for as long as necessary.

This strategic timeliness, however, came at a significant cost in tailorability and scalability. The Army retired the M551 Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance / Airborne Assault Vehicle in 1997. The loss of this armored vehicle resulted in a significant decrease in protection and firepower for the 82nd Airborne Division. However, even before its retirement, the airborne force lacked the mobility and firepower of the majority of Army forces. When deployed to Iraq in 1991, the 82nd jokingly referred to themselves as a ‘speedbump.’ While morbidly humorous, this notion held some startling truth in that the Iraqi Army’s heavier T-72s and BMPs had the potential to overrun the 82nd’s positions in short order. In part, this problem stems from the strategic aircraft necessary to move heavy tanks. This lack of mobile, protected firepower significantly detracts from the breadth of capability available to the Army’s Global Response Force. Without a broad array of capabilities to reorganize into new teams as needed, the ready forces lack the tailorability of more heavily equipped units.

Similarly, the 82nd’s rotational readiness model ensures that one brigade remains in reset at any given time. While this provides one brigade immediately ready and another on stand-by, it does not offer scalable alternatives. The 82nd does not have pre-organized structures in place to deploy battalions separately nor can it deploy the entire
division without significantly impacting mission readiness for the future. Additionally, the division remains the smallest echelon that includes Army air and theater opening sustainment elements. These factors significantly limit the scalability of the 82nd’s ready forces.

**Expeditionary as a Reflection of Compromise**

While the three examples reflect forces designed to operate outside of the United States, the degree to which they reflect an ‘expeditionary’ mindset varies greatly. Each force made compromises that sacrificed some capabilities to master one particular problem-set. To one extent or another, those problems all stemmed from some uncertainty or ambiguity in either their mission or their expected deployment environment. In the case of the combat command the uncertainty regarding the future of armored warfare stifled development. For the MAGTF, ambiguity about the Marine Corps mission along the spectrum of conflict complicated their relationship with policymakers. In the case of the 82nd Airborne Division’s ready forces the uncertainty over when the nation needed conventional forces in support of strategic deterrence significantly constrained their planning. The solutions they developed resolved, to one extent or another, their immediate problem, but at a cost of capability or capacity in the broad sense of expeditionary force qualities.

In conclusion, these examples provide critical insight into how the Army of the future can achieve the necessary compromise between tailorability, scalability, and timeliness. The Army of the future must weigh these qualities against each other in developing a future force and carefully gauge which demands have primacy. The force writ large cannot do all of these things well. Priorities within the force can enable it to do
some of them well with acceptable trade-offs and under the proper conditions. Whether policymakers and Army culture can accept those trade-offs will dictate how readily future expeditionary force structures come to fruition.

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3 Cameron, *Mobility, Shock, and Firepower*, 23, 200-202, 408.


5 Ibid., 108-110.

6 Cameron, *Mobility, Shock, and Firepower*, 452-453.


8 The panzer division achieved tailorability by reassigning elements within the division under existing battalion, regiment, and even division headquarters. Often named after the commander of the kampfgruppe, these elements included whatever force mixes the unit required for success although late in the war these groups more often reflected necessity than design.


11 Chenoweth, *Semper Fi*, 289.


15 Chenoweth, *Semper Fi*, 399.

16 Thompson, *The All Americans*, 22-23.
17 Hoyt, *Airborne*, 89-114.


19 Ibid., 230.
GLOSSARY

Expeditionary. Sent on military service abroad. See also, Expeditionary Force.

Expeditionary Force. Unit or element committed to military operations abroad.

Scalability. Ability of a force to provide differently-sized force packages applicable to a range of military and diplomatic purposes.

Sustain. In Army parlance to meet the sustainment needs of an organization or provide minimum-required material support. Notably not usually a time-related term, in the context of DoD Directive 5100.01 this term has clear time-related application as in to keep up or continue operations over time.

Tailorability. Ability of a military force to reconfigure assigned tactical units into new groupings to meet unexpected or emerging tactical requirements.

Timeliness. Ability of a force to meet the time-related needs of policymakers with regards to the application of military forces.


Gillem, Alvin C. “Lessons Drawn from a Concentration of the Provisional Tank Brigade.” Alvin C. Gillem Papers, MHI, 1940.


