PREPARING TO WIN IN A COMPLEX WORLD: INSTITUTIONALIZING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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MPP, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2015

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**Preparation to Win in a Complex World: Institutionalizing Interagency Cooperation at the Tactical Level**

**Authors**: William J. Denn III, Major

**United States National Security Strategy and Department of Defense (DoD) joint doctrine recognizes that the complexity of the contemporary operational environment requires the United States to pursue whole-of-government solutions that integrate civil-military interagency cooperation. In particular, the military requires the expertise of interagency partners in stability operations. Army doctrine recognizes that interagency synchronization occurs at all echelons, although it has yet to fully institutionalize interagency integration at tactical levels. This thesis examines four historical case studies where interagency integration was essential to tactical mission success: The DoD–State Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Program during the Vietnam War, DoD–State Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, DoD–Interagency response to Ebola in West Africa, and DoD–Interagency coordination for Africa Command (AFRICOM) Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). The conditions that led to successful implementation of these programs are highlighted with an analysis across a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership -Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF) framework on how the United States Army may better integrate interagency at the tactical level of stability operations.

**Subject Terms**: Interagency, Interorganizational, Cooperation, RAF, AFRICOM, Ebola, PRT, CORDS, CMOC, JIACG
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

PREPARING TO WIN IN A COMPLEX WORLD: INSTITUTIONALIZING INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL, by Major William J. Denn III, 132 pages.

United States National Security Strategy and Department of Defense (DoD) joint doctrine recognizes that the complexity of the contemporary operational environment requires the United States to pursue whole-of-government solutions that integrate civil-military interagency cooperation. In particular, the military requires the expertise of interagency partners in stability operations. Army doctrine recognizes that interagency synchronization occurs at all echelons, although it has yet to fully institutionalize interagency integration at tactical levels. This thesis examines four historical case studies where interagency integration was essential to tactical mission success: The DoD—State Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Program during the Vietnam War, DoD—State Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, DoD—Interagency response to Ebola in West Africa, and DoD—Interagency coordination for Africa Command (AFRICOM) Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). The conditions that led to successful implementation of these programs are highlighted with an analysis across a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership-Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF) framework on how the United States Army may better integrate interagency at the tactical level of stability operations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank my parents for teaching me the value of perseverance and hard work, while cliché it truly is an important characteristic that I have carried with me since childhood and continues to serve me well throughout my career.

Second, this project is primarily dedicated to the brave men of 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment. I spent over two years leading these men, including fifteen months in heavy combat in Mosul, Iraq. Through good days and bad we gave everything we had, including our own blood, on the streets of Mosul trying to build a secure peace for its population. Our deployment in Iraq was very much characterized by a “figure it out” mentality. This project aims to build better conditions for success in the next major military endeavor our country embarks on.

Third, I’d like to thank the faculty at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government who provided an initial sounding board for my ideas and helped craft some of my early thoughts on this topic, Dr. Graham Allison, Ambassador Nick Burns, General (Retired) David Petraeus, and Dr. Lauren Brodsky.

Finally, I would like to thank the perseverance, mentorship, advice and guidance of my thesis committee. I have a habit of writing only when the stress of deadlines compels me to, it has worked for me in the past on smaller projects, not so well on this project, and surely gave my thesis advisors a few gray hairs. Thank you to Dr. Derek Reveron, Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Lt. Col. Paul Oh, Ms. Heather Karambelas, and most especially Dr. Jack Kem. Without your mentorship this thesis would have remained just a good idea in my notebook.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Army of 2025 and Beyond will effectively employ lethal and non-lethal overmatch against any adversary to prevent, shape, and win conflicts and achieve national interests. It will leverage cross-cultural and regional experts to operate among populations, promote regional security, and be interoperable with the other Military Services, United States Government agencies and allied and partner nations. (Combined Arms Center 2015)

— Combined Arms Center, The Army Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex World

Chapter Introduction

Over a decade ago, the stability and reconstruction missions of Iraq and Afghanistan revealed critical capability gaps within the United States (U.S.) Military. The military, while conducting combat operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, were also simultaneously conducting stability operations—development, governance, rule-of-law, and conflict-resolution—at the local level with little guidance and oversight. While young leaders at the tactical and local level admirably sought to conduct these stability operations, the reality showed that the military was untrained, unequipped, and lacked the expertise to effectively manage governance, development, rule-of-law, and conflict resolution on the battlefield.

At the tactical level, the frustration was common among young lieutenants and captains, who as nominal mayors of villages and towns were expected to restore vital civil services and negotiate and resolve conflicts among feuding factions. The result was a “bi-polar disorder” of sorts as leaders planned high-value targeting raids one day; negotiated contracting issues with local firms the next day; conducted sewage, water, and
educational assessments the next; and then ran micro-credit grant programs the next. Our military training system mostly taught conventional “kinetic” operations; much of the “non-kinetic” stability requirements were on-the-job or “figure-it-out” learning in theater.

At the operational level, (Department of Defense) DoD’s failure in stability operations was recently highlighted by the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction who noted that DoD’s efforts to spark the country’s economic development, which cost between $700 million and $800 million, “accomplished nothing.” The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, a Defense Department unit aimed at developing war zone mining, industrial development, and fostering private investments, was considered by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction as “an abysmal failure,” lacking leadership, any clear strategy or accountability (Gould 2014).

These failures at both the tactical and operational level are an indicator that the U.S. Military lacked capacity and expertise to accomplish inherently non-military tasks related to stability and nation-building. Assuming that the expertise to do some of these tasks existed within the United States Government (USG), or could have been contracted by the USG, why could the military not better leverage that expertise to more effectively guide the accomplishment of the stability tasks associated with our nation-building and counterinsurgency operations?

Despite the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan being national priorities, requiring a comprehensive whole-of-government civil-military strategy, the U.S. Military was required to do more than the lion’s share of lifting precisely because they were the only USG organization with the manpower and capacity to deploy in an expeditionary manner.
With a lack of large-scale interagency presence and with limited means to coordinate with the interagency, military battlefield commanders were often in the lead to plan and execute stability operations within their area of operations. These non-military tasks inherently became military tasks—and despite a “can-do attitude” many of these objectives failed due to a lack of expertise. But despite recognition from the military that they were often ill-equipped for this type of mission, the problem continued because of a civilian interagency apparatus that was simply ill-prepared and ill-resourced to manage or coordinate with the military for these nation-building tasks, in relation to the scope and magnitude necessary.

**Purpose**

To be clear, the purpose of this thesis is not to re-examine the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. The real aim of this project is to look towards the future in examining how to structure tactical formations to be better equipped in handling the types of complicated and complex environments that we anticipate. However, this discussion highlights three fundamental observations critical to this thesis and analysis, namely:

1. There exists a tremendous capability gap in U.S. Military formations to execute stability tasks, traditionally non-military operations.

2. The USG civilian agencies (to include state and local level) may have valuable expertise and capacity that could be leveraged in future stability operations to enhance the military’s understanding of the environment, as well as accomplish stability tasks and objectives.
3. The future of military operations will still have a large component of stability operations requiring: local and regional knowledge, cultural understanding, and technical and specialized expertise.

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* articulates several of these observations as well as why interagency cooperation with the U.S. Military is so critical:

Army forces operate as part of a larger national effort characterized as unified action. Army leaders must integrate their actions and operations within this larger framework, collaborating with entities outside their direct control. All echelons are required to incorporate such integration. . . . Effective unified action requires Army leaders who can understand, influence, and cooperate with unified action partners. The Army depends on its joint partners for capabilities that do not reside within the Army, and it cannot operate effectively without their support. Likewise, government agencies outside the Department of Defense possess knowledge, skills, and capabilities necessary for success. The active cooperation of partners often allows Army leaders to capitalize on organizational strengths while offsetting weaknesses. Only by creating a shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force—a key element of mission command—can Army leaders integrate their actions within unified action and synchronize their own operations. (HQ, Department of the Army 2011, 3)

Inherent in this statement from Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 is a doctrinal recognition that Unified Land Operations (Army Operations) are part of a broader national effort–Unified Action–which requires the expertise of our interagency partners. Without the collaboration, integration, and synchronization at “all” echelons with our interagency partners, the Army cannot operate effectively. An initial observation is, despite doctrine, specifically Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, indicating that this synchronization occurs at all echelons, from an organizational, training, and policy perspective the Army has yet to institutionalize interagency integration and coordination to its full extent.
Primary and Secondary Research Questions

The primary research question of this thesis is: In past cases in which the U.S. has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? Secondary research questions are as follows:

1. In past cases where interagency integration had been essential to tactical mission success, what were the required characteristics for the integration?
2. Should the Army organize and train tactical formations (Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and below) to incorporate interagency partners in their training and operations?

As an initial research hypothesis the author proposes that: interagency integration and cooperation has been essential for tactical mission success.

Limitations

There are a number of limitations to this research. First, this analysis, except for a few exceptions, will primarily examine the tactical level of operations. While Army doctrine classifies the tactical level at the division echelon and below, current operations are deploying BCTs independently of their Division Headquarters (HQ). Subsequently, the BCT level is a better echelon to understand implications for tactical operations. In this thesis’ case studies, the BCT level usually occurs at a provincial level of government for stability operations. Additionally, it is the author’s contention that interagency expertise at the point of tactical mission planning and execution are not occurring, yet have a huge potential advantage to the force. Interagency integration at higher echelons, at the military’s operational and strategic levels of war, are certainly important and at some
extent currently occurring, but scholars typically look at the operational level rather than tactical, subsequently providing a unique analytical opportunity for this study.

From a current operations perspective, if BCTs continue to deploy independently, especially under the Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) construct, then it is worthwhile to examine the impacts on BCTs as an appropriate inject point for interagency integration in chapter 5 of this thesis’ conclusions and recommendations. Moreover, current Army force structure designs modularity at the BCT level, which from an organizational perspective allows flexibility in adding potential interagency components to a BCT’s force structure. From a training perspective, deployment training primarily is conducted at the BCT level through combat training center certifications. Finally, the BCT level (compared with smaller echelons) are the first echelon that is built to have a robust staff structure which could potentially incorporate interagency partners.

Second, this analysis focuses on interagency rather than full cooperation across joint, interagency, interorganizational, multinational (JIIM) cooperation. Doctrinally, “Unified Action,” involves partners from the entire JIIM spectrum, however, each element of JIIM requires a different analysis on the best way to integrate. Joint cooperation was largely resourced within DoD after the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Interagency, the focus of this paper, may be a similarly manageable task because it is still within the organization and auspices of the USG. Interorganizational and multinational integration and coordination, however, especially at a tactical level, requires a whole host of different solutions from a policy perspective that are outside the scope of this project.

Third, in order to find solutions to identified capability gaps, DoD uses the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership/Education, Personnel, Facilities,
and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) framework. In the case of this analysis the author primarily examines doctrine, organization, training, and policy. It is assessed that these factors would have the greatest immediate impact for increased interagency coordination and cooperation in operations at the tactical level (BCT and below).

Education and personnel policies are an extremely important facet of this problem—recruiting the right people to work in an interagency environment and educating them to be able to operate and think in a whole-of-government environment. However, the education and personnel solutions to the Army’s interagency integration capability gap is of sufficient nature to warrant its own study outside the context of this project—in addition to the fact that reforms in this arena would take substantial time to implement and realize improvements.

Solutions within the policy aspect also become inherently more complicated for DoD requiring executive and congressional reform. While it is worthwhile to examine a potential “Goldwater-Nichols Part II” that incorporates interagency like Goldwater-Nichols incorporated “jointness,” the topic is large enough to be outside the confines of this thesis. However, in this thesis’ supporting case studies and overarching conclusion the author will briefly address where tactical integration of interagency may nest within the greater Goldwater-Nichols Part II policy debate with potential for future reforms.

A fourth limitation relates to an inherent assumption that the USG has the expertise that the U.S. Military needs for stability operations. The reality is often the USG contracts expertise from the private sector, or the required expertise is found at the state or local government. For the sake of this project the author will not examine
building capacity in USG, if none exist for what the U.S. Military needs for stability operations.

A fifth limitation is that the Army’s ability to be an effective partner will be contingent on other department and agencies being directed to contribute and have the capability, resources, and capacity to do so. This limitation relates to the difficulties of analyzing this problem from a policy perspective. Logically if USG agencies cooperate and integrate more than they are doing currently with Army tactical formations then they will need additional manpower and resources. These reforms requiring additional resources would certainly need legislation and potential Goldwater-Nichols II reforms.

For the scope of this paper, any interagency cooperation should be envisioned with a “coalition of the willing” interagency partners that see benefits in participating. Again, the intention of this paper is examining how the Army can best structure itself to integrate interagency partners, assuming that interagency partners want to participate and cooperate.

Finally, in this paper the author was purposefully selective in the case studies presented due to time constraints and availability of research material. There are many other excellent case studies for examination, such as the State Partnership Program, or the many instances of close tactical interagency integration within the counterterrorism field, which are certainly ripe for further research.

**Army Warfighting Challenges**

The Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs) are enduring first order problems, the solutions to which will improve current and future force combat effectiveness (Army
Capabilities Integration Center 2016). This thesis seeks to address some of the AWFC by seeking solutions affecting:

Warfighting Challenge #1: Develop Situation Understanding. Integration of interagency cooperation at the tactical level has the potential to aid commanders in developing and sustaining a high degree of situational understanding, while operating in complex environments by providing unique local, cultural, and technical expertise to difficult stability operational challenges.

Warfighting Challenge #2: Shape the Security Environment. Further integration of interagency potentially at the BCT level has the ability to dramatically enhance the capabilities of Regionally Aligned Forces. RAF is a key component for geographic combatant commands to shape and influence the security environments, engage key actors, and consolidate gains to achieve sustainable security outcomes.

Warfighting Challenge #4: Adapt the Institutional Army and Innovate. Despite the constraints imposed by a shrinking Army from sequestration, operational demands are only increasing. The Army is faced with a situation to do more with less. In order to continue mission effectiveness, the Army must innovate and adapt, incorporating interagency expertise at the lowest levels is a way to more effectively harness whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches to stability operations.

Warfighting Challenge #10: Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders. The Army requires agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos and are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations in complex environments and against adaptive enemies. As wartime deployments decrease for our young leaders and soldiers we lose institutional knowledge.
Incorporating interagency expertise is a way to maintain expertise in our formations and allows our leaders to think in ways outside of traditional military ways of thinking.

Warfighting Challenge #14: Ensure Interoperability and Operate in a Joint, Interorganizational and Multinational Environment. This thesis directly seeks to answer this AWFC, specifically how to conduct operations, efficiently share information, train effectively for, and integrate operations in a JIIM environment.

Chapter Summary

Examined in this thesis is the primary research question: In past cases in which the U.S. has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? Secondary research questions are as follows:

1. In past cases where interagency integration had been essential to tactical mission success, what were the required characteristics of the integration?
2. Should the Army organize and train tactical formations (BCT and below) to incorporate interagency partners in their training and operations?

As an initial research hypothesis the author proposes that: interagency integration and cooperation has been essential for tactical mission success.

Chapter 2 will review the literature on this topic and provide an assessment of its significance to this project. It will be followed by an explanation of the methodology, and the subsequent chapters examining each issue, specifically four case studies of tactical-interagency integration, in detail.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The quest for coordination is in many respects the twentieth-century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher’s stone. If only we can find the right formula for coordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will dissent. (Seidman 1970, 164)

— Harold Seidman

Chapter Introduction

The primary research question of this project is: In past cases in which the U.S. has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? Secondary research questions are as follows:

1. In past cases where interagency integration had been essential to tactical mission success, what were the required characteristics for integration?
2. Should the Army organize and train tactical formations (BCT and below) to incorporate interagency partners in their training and operations?

In this literature review several important aspects and questions of interagency integration will be addressed to give the reader an important baseline understanding before addressing the case studies. First, the literature review will address why interagency integration is important, exploring what future Army operations may look like. Second, in order to understand interagency integration, the reader must understand how bureaucratic organizations interact with each other, this will be accomplished through a review of some of the seminal works on bureaucracies. Third, examining current U.S. Military doctrine, the reader will understand what types of interagency
cooperation currently exist and at what levels does the military embed interagency integration. Fourth, from the interagency perspective, it is important to consider how the interagency, specifically the Department of State, currently manages interagency personnel in support to stability operations. Finally, this literature review will address some existing ideas on the necessary characteristics of interagency integration as well as competing ideas aside from interagency integration to address insufficient expertise in the military for stability operations.

The Case for Interagency Integration

Is it possible to anticipate what future military operations will look like? No state, except perhaps aggressors, have ever predicted with certainty where future conflict will occur or what it will look like. Even for nations that chose their battles, they found that very quickly, conflicts evolved and adapted in ways they could not predict. Despite history’s poor record of conflict prescience, there is still value in understanding trends in warfare in order to best maximize chances of getting the next conflict right. The “Army Operating Concept 2020-2040” attempts to do this. The Army Operating Concept (AOC) explains that by understanding continuities in the nature of war, as well as appreciating changes in the character of armed conflict, we may anticipate the demands of future armed conflict (Training and Doctrine Command 2014, 8).

Of particular concern for this project is how the AOC views the human dimension of future battlefields. One characteristic that the AOC notes is the “increased velocity and momentum of human interactions and events” (Training and Doctrine Command 2014, 11). In short, the spread and diffusion of ideas from information technology and globalization has: “amplified and accelerated interactions” between human beings and
organizations. In a very short amount of time people across nations and borders can be mobilized for single causes and purposes. The result is not only an operational environment that is more complex and difficult to manage, but also time is less forgiving for mistakes. Whereas in the past military forces could potentially survive information operations blunders, or at least control messaging and information operations response—today with the wide availability of information technology globally, our forces must be much more socially, culturally, and strategic communications savvy. As the U.S. Military saw in Iraq and Afghanistan, an incident like a soldier using a Quran as a rifle-range target can quickly spiral out of control. The complexity that the “acceleration of human interactions” brings to the battlefield, illustrates the need for a military capable and adaptable to think not just in military terms, but across an entire spectrum of socio-political human interactions.

On a similar vein, the AOC notes that by 2030 the percentage of the world’s population living in urban areas will rise to 60 percent (Training and Doctrine Command 2014, 12). Threats and adversaries will continue to operate among population centers; with increased urbanization and population growth, warfare will remain increasingly a human endeavor. As the world watches groups like ISIS in the Middle East, threats will exploit failed states with weak governance. Some military proponents would like to focus on specializing on the “conventional” expertise of the military—hoping for future conflicts to be more similar to the U.S. Military’s decisive advantages and overmatch in First Gulf War. However, the likelihood of such conflicts, according to the AOC is low. Wars in the future will require a tremendous understanding of socio-political, cultural, geographic and region specific challenges in urban population centric environments. The military
must have innovative and adaptive leaders who can “thrive” in these complex and uncertain environments. A step further, to be successful in this environment, the AOC recognizes that “operating in urban environments will require decentralized combined arms and joint capabilities” (Training and Doctrine Command 2014, 12). In essence, the Army cannot operate or understand the environment by itself, it needs assistance from partners–joint, inter-organizational, interagency, and multinational teams–moreover, these operations will occur at its lowest decentralized levels conducted by young officers and soldiers.

While the Army has made a strong case for civil-military integration in future conflicts, civil-military coordination and integration is incorporated into current national strategy through the National Defense Strategy. The National Defense Strategy, serves as a “vital link” between the DoD and the Department of State (DoS) in the conduct of operations underscored by stability tasks (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-10). The National Defense Strategy recognizes that the military task to bring security to an area is necessary to the success of other instruments of national power, however, if the security environment is not supportive for using civilian agencies and organizations, military forces should prepare to perform those nonmilitary tasks (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-10). Similarly, the National Military Strategy, echoes the National Defense Strategy in the necessity of interagency coordination and integration, recognizing that interagency partners and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are essential in achieving lasting success in stability operations (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-10).
How do Bureaucracies Work Together?

The challenges of interagency integration are not new, there is a large body of research addressing how bureaucracies can better integrate. It is beyond the scope of this project to analyze from a systems or bureaucratic politics perspective the intricacies of interagency politics and integration; however, there are several factors and principles that are worth examining as we examine how to integrate partners of different agencies in a tactical environment.

Congressional staffer Jon Rosenwasser and historian Michael Warner, propose one framework to consider the interagency system comprising of two dimensions: dynamics and levels. The dynamics they propose are the function of the underlying structural factors: the nature of the threat environment; a state’s geostrategic position; constitutional frameworks; leadership proclivities; technology; and prevailing public management paradigms (Rosenwasser and Warner 2011, 12). The levels to examine the interagency are at the strategic, operational, and the tactical—field level (Rosenwasser and Warner 2011, 12). While this framework is especially useful at the strategic and operational levels, it becomes less useful at the tactical with its policy and geostrategic focus in examining the effectiveness of the system at its lowest level of execution.

A more useful framework may be one articulated by Harvard’s James Q. Wilson, author of *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. In his work, Wilson argues that government inefficiency is not due to unqualified bureaucrats or red tape but rather inherent systemic issues. These issues are related to bureaucracies not operating like private businesses, but also include incentive structures for performance, and authority for decision making, among other organizational and structural reasons. In
order to analyze these factors Wilson uses a variety of lens, for example, organization, beliefs, culture, interests, and autonomy. Likewise, these concepts and the lexicon they bring are valuable in understanding more distinct levels of analysis in interagency behavior. For example, executives may be more concerned about autonomy (turf) and interests, while managers and operators more influenced over culture. These are useful concepts, even at the tactical level, for examining more specific case studies of interagency integration.

As Wilson indicates, organization matters, “the key difference been more and less successful bureaucracies has less to do with finances, client populations, or legal arrangements than with organizational systems” (Wilson 1989, 23). The importance of organization is codified in whether or not these systems are defined and institutionalized. “If Congress wants an agency to tend to the needs of a group, it usually makes that preference clear. If it seems not to care, or some parts of Congress want an interest helped and others do not, the agency is likely to be given a lot of discretion that will then be used in a (usually vain) effort to stay out of trouble” (Wilson 1989, 88). If a bureaucratic task is important then we should see the organization and systems clearly defined, if not then the ambiguity may lead to future inefficiency, ineffectiveness, or irrelevance.

Wilson also explains that organizational beliefs are critical to understand, especially when tasks are ill-defined. “Experience, professionalism, and ideology are likely to have their greatest influence when laws, rules, and circumstances do not precisely define operator tasks” (Wilson 1989, 70). In a similar vein, organizational culture also influences bureaucratic and interagency performance, “Even short of occasions for major organizational change, the perceptions supplied an organizational
culture sometimes can lean an official to behave not as the situation requires but as the culture expects” (Wilson 1989, 110). In both cases of beliefs and culture, in complex and ambiguous environments with ill-defined mission tasks, organizational beliefs and cultures can dramatically affect performance. This fact is further complicated when multiple agencies with differing beliefs and cultures are involved.

Wilson also highlights bureaucratic interests in bureaucratic performance, “When bureaucrats are free to choose a course of action their choices will reflect the full array of incentives operating on them: some will reflect the need to manage a workload; others will reflect the expectations of workplace peers and professional colleagues elsewhere; still others may reflect their own convictions” (Wilson 1989, 88). While we may expect an attitude of mission-first, human nature very much affects bureaucratic nature; interests of both the individual and organization may affect organizational effectiveness.

Finally, Wilson uses the lens of autonomy in examining bureaucratic performance. “The chief result of the concern for turf and autonomy is that it is extraordinarily difficult to coordinate the work of different agencies” (Wilson 1989, 192). Specifically recognizing interagency coordination, “Government agencies . . . view any interagency agreement as a threat to their autonomy” (Wilson 1989, 192). The problem of autonomy is especially prevalent in the foreign policy realm. Unlike environmental policy under the Environmental Protection Agency there are many masters of the foreign policy portfolio. As Wilson highlights, “Turf problems are large, and largely insoluble, when the government has within it dozens of agencies that make foreign policy, scores that make or affect economic policy, and countless ones that regulate business activity and enforce criminal laws” (Wilson 1989, 195). The result is inherent and systemic
bureaucratic infighting, rather than incentivized cooperation, “Autonomy is valued at least as much as resources, because autonomy determines the degree to which it is costly to acquire and use resources” (Wilson 1989, 195). While this is especially true at the strategic and operational level, the repercussions of these turf wars are always felt at the lowest levels of agencies’ respective organizations. The salient point is that interagency cooperation in the foreign policy realm is not easy and faces inherent obstacles within a greater structural turf war.

What Wilson’s seminal work ultimately provides us in this analysis is insight into how bureaucratic organizations operate. Specifically, we need to understand how organizational structure, beliefs and culture, interests, and desire for autonomy will affect interagency integration into Army units. These concepts provide us a common lexicon to better understand the dynamics at play, as we look at further case studies for analysis.

Types of Interagency Cooperation
Embedded in Current Doctrine

Recognizing the importance of operating in a joint, interagency, interorganizational, and multinational environment, U.S. Military Doctrine codifies operations within such a diverse environment as “unified action.” Defined, “unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and-or integrates joint, single-service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, Intergovernmental Organizations, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort (U.S. Department of Defense 2013, II-7). Key to the definition of unified action is “achieving unity of effort.” Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or
organization (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-3). In military operations unity of command is an important principle, however in civil-military operations the challenge is how to create unity of effort among diverse actors in stability operations.

Army doctrine describes unified action operations focused on stability operations using two approaches, whole-of-government approach and comprehensive approach. Both approaches seek to achieve unity of effort, differing depending on the nature of the partnerships (HQ, Department of the Army 2014a, 3-1).

A whole-of-government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort towards a shared goal (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-4). Accordingly, success in a whole-of-government approach depends on the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively through an integrated interagency approach, to a fundamentally dynamic situation (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-4). A key component of a whole-of-government approach is an integrated military-interagency effort. Whole-of-government planning refers to National Security Council (NSC) sponsored processes by which multiple USG departments and agencies come together, to develop plans that address critical challenges to national interests (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, II-2). According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, whole-of-government planning is distinct, from the contributions of USG departments and agencies to DoD planning, which remains a DoD responsibility (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, II-2).

Joint Publication 3-08 recognizes that a primary challenge for integrating civilian and military planning into a whole-of-government process is addressing the different planning capacity and culture in civilian agencies, in contrast to DoD (U.S. Department
of Defense 2011, II-2). Both joint and Army doctrine recognizes the challenges of the whole-of-government approach and recommends that a successful whole-of-government approach requires that all actors:

1. Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process.
2. Develop and maintain a shared understanding of the situation and problem.
3. Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.
4. Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities.
5. Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goals.
6. Allocate resources to ensure continuation of information sharing, common understanding, and integrated efforts (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-4).
7. Require a designated lead or primary agency with all USG instruments of national power represented, actively participating, and integrated into the process (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, II-2).

These insights will be particularly useful later in the thesis as we evaluate the usefulness of other programs in integrating whole-of-government approaches.

The second approach in achieving unity of effort stability operations is a comprehensive approach. A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, and to the extent possible, intergovernmental and NGOs, multinational partners, and private sector entities, to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-4). A comprehensive approach is different than a whole-of-government approach in that integration and collaboration are often missing among the diverse actors involved. A
comprehensive approach rather, achieves unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination, to forge a shared understanding of a common goal (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-4). Figure 1 illustrates the differing levels of military-interagency-interorganizational unity of effort as framed by Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07.

Achieving unity of effort in a comprehensive approach requires leaders to utilize coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, consultation, and de-confliction among all stakeholders (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-5).

Interestingly, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07 notes that the comprehensive approach is often more appropriate than a focused military approach because taking an authoritative, military approach often counters effective interorganizational relationships,
impedes unified action, and compromises mission accomplishment (HQ, Department of the Army 2012, 1-5). This will be of particular interest in ascertaining whether the case studies presented in this research, where there was close military-interagency integration, actually impeded mission accomplishment rather than improved efforts.

For the comprehensive approach, Field Manual 3-07 recommends establishing mechanisms such as civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) to aid in facilitating coordination. Specifically, a CMOC can facilitate information sharing and coordination between Army units and other partners, including the host nation population and its institutions (HQ, Department of the Army 2014a, 3-25). The CMOC is a responsibility of Army Civil Affairs units to establish. As articulated as part of a comprehensive approach, the CMOC is used to primarily coordinate stability activities among a wide range of partners, to include the host nation civilian population, rather than an integrated DoD-interagency institution found within a whole-of-government approach.

At what Level does Interagency Integration Currently Occur?

One of the limiting criteria that currently prevents more integrated interagency involvement is the capacity of USG departments and agencies to support DoD planning (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, II-6). Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with the result that military personnel interface with interagency personnel, who are coordinating activities on behalf of their organization at multiple levels of war (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, II-19). The military coordinates at the national-strategic level through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff; at the theater-
strategic level through the Combatant Command (COCOM); the operational level through COCOMs, Joint Task Forces (JTFs), and Corps; and the tactical level through Division and below. Most USG agencies operate at the national-strategic level with their home agencies in Washington DC, and the field level through their country teams (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, D-4). As a result, USG policy currently has the COCOM level as the primary embed point for institutionalized and integrated interagency cooperation and coordination, which is at a strategic and operational level of war. At each COCOM is a type of joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) which is composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, II-10).

The JIACGs provide the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, II-10). JIACGs support the entire range of military operations and provide a two-way link back to interagency partners’ parent organizations to help synchronize operations with the efforts of USG agencies, departments, and the NSC (see figure 2) (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, D-3). Combatant Commanders utilize JIACGs as their lead organization for interagency coordination, providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency activities (see figure 3) (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, D-4).
Figure 2. Relationship of JIACG with the NSC

On an *ad hoc* basis, USG agencies will also support JTFs. Within the U.S. Army, JTFs are usually built around a Corps HQ, which functions at the operational level of war, rather than the tactical. If a JTF is formed for a contingency operation, the
Combatant Commander may integrate selected members of the JIACG into the JTF (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, D-9). Additionally, according to JP 3-08, depending on the type of operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and NGO involvement, the focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian agencies occurs at the JTF HQ, the joint field office, the CMOC, or the humanitarian operations center.

In the case of the CMOC, Field Manual 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations 2014* indicates that CMOCs are supported by civil affairs brigades that are under operational control under a JTF or Corps (HQ, Department of the Army 2014b, 3-7). Civil affairs battalions from the civil affairs brigades are usually task organized to divisions, and can also set up a CMOC within a division’s area of operations, with the Division G-9 providing direction and oversight (HQ, Department of the Army 2014b, 6-11). CMOCs serve as the primary coordination interface and provide operational and tactical level coordination between military forces and other stakeholders (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, IV-26).

Field Manual 3-96: *Brigade Combat Team* makes no mention of supporting a CMOC; in fact, the S-9 or Civil Affairs Operations Staff Officer is normally authorized only at division and corps—once deployed, units below division level may be authorized an S-9 (HQ, Department of the Army 2015, 3-18).

Also at the tactical and operational level are provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). A PRT is an interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area, by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of the host nation local government (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, IV-32). PRTs tend to be *ad hoc*, varying
in structure, size, charter, and mission sets designed around the capabilities of participating USG agencies and host nation needs and capabilities. PRTs operate by combining security forces for protection with other interagency personnel for support, development, and governance, integrated together into one team (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, IV-33). The integration and reporting structure of PRTs with military battlespace owning units is dependent on the theater. According to JP 3-08, USG PRTs objectives are tactical with a strategic focus and exemplify the nature of a true joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operational environment (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, F-1).

Interagency can also be formed around a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), when the mission requires close integration of two or more USG agencies (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, II-20). JIATFs typically are formed for a specific task and purpose as a formal organization, chartered by DoD and one or more civilian agencies, guided by memorandum of agreement, memorandum of understanding, and other founding documents that define roles, responsibilities, and relationships of JIATF members (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, E-1). According to JP 3-08, JIATFs may be separate elements under a JTF or they may be subordinate to a functional component command, a joint special operations task force, or a staff section such as the J-3 (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, E-1). The examples provided by JP 3-08 of JIATFs to include JIATF West, JIATF South, National Counterterrorism Center, National Joint Terrorism Task Force, among others, are all examples of JIATFs formed around strategic and operational mission sets.
Interagency Personnel Management in Support of Stability Operations

According to JP 3-08, the Secretary of State may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities, including ensuring harmonization with any planned or ongoing military operations, and by convoking an interagency management system response to a crisis (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, G-1). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2004 directed that the State Department create the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Office, comprised of about a hundred predominantly non-State Department Personnel, in order to strike a new balance in the interagency relationship between Departments of State and Defense (Rosenwasser and Warner 2011, 25). The Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was provided the authority and set reconstruction and stabilization strategy, to develop policy and manage program execution, and to coordinate with foreign and NGO partners (Rosenwasser and Warner 2011, 25).

Specifically, the interagency management system is designed for the interagency and military commanders to manage reconstruction and stabilization operations by ensuring coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical—field levels (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, G-1). The Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which has since 2011 been integrated into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations maintains a roster of potential team members and develops supporting memorandums of understanding with appropriate DoS bureaus and other federal agencies, in order to quickly coordinate and support COCOM HQ or JIACGs (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, G-9).
The Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization or Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations also has the authority to field advanced civilian teams to support embassy chief of missions. The size, structure, and composition of the advanced civilian teams are flexible, to meet particular requirements of each contingency situation (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, G-2). Advanced civilian teams are intended to quickly set up, coordinate, and conduct field level reconstruction and stability operations; this includes performing assessments and coordinating USG operations in uncertain and hostile environments, with or without military deployment (U.S. Department of Defense 2011, G-11).

Necessary Characteristics of Interagency Cooperation

The body of literature is unclear as to the necessary characteristics of interagency cooperation at the tactical level. However, one potential source for insight is a draft document that has been circulated amongst the diplomacy, defense, and development communities. The Diplomacy, Defense, and Development Planning Group was chartered to develop products and processes to improve collaboration in planning among the DoS, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the DoD (U.S. Agency for International Development 2012, 4). The Diplomacy, Defense, and Development Planning Guide is a reference tool to help identify opportunities for coordination among the three organizations and helps articulate reforms and institutions that are being considered outside of Joint Doctrine. While the majority of the document is focused on the strategic and operational levels of operations for diplomacy, defense, and development interagency planning integration, there are still certain concepts and principles that are useful to consider for tactical interagency cooperation and integration.
Accordingly, integrated interagency planning is intended to create unity of purpose and effort and is based on three key concepts:

1. Unity of effort, based upon four principles:
   a. A common understanding of the situation;
   b. A common vision or goals for the mission;
   c. Coordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency; and
   d. Common measures of progress and ability to change course if necessary;

2. Integrated interagency decision-making; and

3. Engaging with the host nation and international partners (U.S. Agency for International Development 2012, 38).

The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations applies these principles specifically to de-conflict transformation planning with interagency partners in support of integrated USG efforts or integrated approaches, normally at the request of a Chief of Mission or State Department bureau (U.S. Agency for International Development 2012, 38). While these concepts and principles are applied at the Chief of Mission level, they provide us another framework of characteristics, of what successful tactical interagency cooperation looks like.

**Competing Ideas Addressing Insufficient Stability Expertise**

This research would be remiss if it did not highlight some alternative proposed solutions, to addressing the problem of a lack of stability and reconstruction operations expertise in tactical military formations. In *Exporting Security: International Engagement Security Cooperation and the Changing Face of the Military*, Naval War College Professor Derek Reveron succinctly articulates; that security cooperation and stability operations are a new norm and reality for postmodern conflicts and U.S. Military operations. Recognizing previous failures of the U.S. Military to sufficiently train,
organize, and resource these new mission sets like in Iraq, Reveron discusses how to transform the military itself, to better address security cooperation and stability operations. For example, the DoD and Congress have examined a variety of policy proposals in order to address this expertise gap in military formations. Since 9/11, the U.S. Military has dramatically increased the amount of culture and language training that soldiers receive (Reveron 2010, 154).

However, as discussed previously, interagency integration is another solution to addressing expertise gaps, but as Reveron highlights in his work, DoD is attempting to reform at a pace much faster than many interagency partners like DoS can catch up to. The result is various proposals where others have looked at simply building organic capacity within DoD, to independently conduct stability and reconstruction operations without major interagency assistance. For example, Andrew Krepinevich proposed creating forward liaison and assistance groups composed of forty-five brigades (approximately 200,000 personnel); military assistance group headquarters of 300 to 3,000 personnel; security training and equipping groups of 2,000 to 3,000 personnel; and civil operations, reconstruction, and development support groups of 4,000 to 5,000 troops (Reveron 2010, 159). On a similar model, the Congressional Research Service listed an option to create five divisions specifically tasked with and organized around stability and reconstruction operations (Reveron 2010, 159). Retired Lieutenant Colonel, counterinsurgency expert, and former President of the Center for a New American Security, John Nagl, proposed a permanent 20,000-member advisory corps (Reveron 2010, 159).
While these proposals may seem unrealistic in today’s resource constrained environment, the Army is currently looking at smaller scale versions of them. The *Army Times*, recently reported on a January 2016 speech hosted by the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark Milley, who indicated that the Army was examining proposals to stand up new brigades, built specifically to conduct advise-and-assist missions (a form of security cooperation operations). These units would be smaller than regular BCTs, and they would be primarily manned by officers and senior noncommissioned officers trained specifically for advise-and-assist missions.

Building independent capacity within DoD is certainly a solution to the military’s stability operations capability gap. However, the problem with these proposals are the cost, the difficulty in building expertise in young officers and noncommissioned officers that is built over a lengthy career in the interagency, the longevity and stability of these soldiers in these units, the time required for these units to be available, as well as the loss of traditional conventional combat operations expertise of these new units. For these reasons the ideas presented within this thesis exist, that a more realistic solution may be found in incorporating already existing interagency expertise into tactical military formations.

**Chapter Summary**

This chapter attempts to examine the current literature surrounding military-interagency cooperation in order to answer the primary research question: In past cases, in which the U.S. has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? This discussion has highlighted why military-interagency cooperation is important for today and tomorrow’s ever growing complex
battlefields which are centered around the human dimension of war. Also discussed was where interagency integration is embedded within current military doctrine: primarily at the operational level of war through JIACGs in COCOMs or CMOCs in JTF Corps HQ; and CMOCs at the tactical level of Divisions, though it is unclear whether those capabilities exist for BCTs. In the literature review we have also grounded the lexicon of bureaucratic cooperation through James Wilson’s concepts of organizational structure, beliefs and culture, interests, and bureaucratic desire for autonomy.

In chapter 3: Methodologies, I will explain how the primary research question will be answered through the lens of four relevant case studies, and the analytical framework to judge whether interagency integration was vital to tactical mission success.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter Introduction

This chapter serves to outline how the author proposes answering: In past cases, in which the U.S. has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? Various forms of civil-military interagency cooperation at the tactical level have occurred throughout history and provide unique insights across a doctrine, organization and training, and policy framework. Four case studies will be examined, focusing on tactical level interagency coordination in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and on the African Continent.

Why These Case Studies?

The Vietnam and Afghanistan cases are of useful value because in Vietnam, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Program, and in Afghanistan, the PRT programs represent some of the closest integration of large scale State and DoD cooperation at the tactical level. While all interagency cooperation is valuable, the relationship between military action and diplomacy presents some of the most unique challenges. Additionally, programs like PRT were also criticized for being tremendously flawed; a rich case study like this provides plenty of observational value to glean data on what worked well and what did not.

For the Africa case studies, the 2014 Ebola response and the recent Africa Command (AFRICOM) RAF provide useful lessons primarily because they represent most likely what future Army interagency integration will look like. RAF in the near and
mid-term is how the Army intends to support COCOMs for security cooperation activities. Likewise, the Ebola mission represents a significant stability mission, requiring tremendous interagency expertise. It is these types of contingency stability missions, where institutionalized interagency integration mechanisms are most useful.

CORDS and PRT

In Vietnam, in conjunction with the State Department, DoD established the CORDS Program from 1967 to 1973. CORDS was an integrated civil-military program designed to pacify Viet Cong (VC) influence and gain support for the government of South Vietnam from its rural population. Civil-military integration occurred at the Provincial level (forty-four provinces) led by an Army Colonel (O-6).

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support eventually would be an inspiration for the State Department’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts over a quarter century later. PRTs starting in 2002 were inherently interagency teams who supported reconstruction efforts for unstable provinces in both conflicts. For the purposes of this study, the author will primarily examine the PRT concept in Afghanistan; due to its unique nature of being under the command of the military and in support of military objectives (determined by battlespace owners).

In both cases, CORDS and PRTs, each organization served an *ad hoc* purpose created specifically for the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Due to their *ad hoc* nature, when each conflict terminated so did the need for these organizations. Said another way, the interagency cooperation established was not institutionalized within the military. The reasons why these organizations did not outlast their conflicts provides a useful lens for future interagency integration and cooperation.
Regionally Aligned Forces in Africa

In 2013 AFRICOM became the first COCOM to be allocated an Army regionally aligned BCT. According to the Army:

Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) is the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army’s vision for providing combatant commanders with versatile, responsive, and consistently available Army forces. Regionally Aligned Forces will meet combatant commanders’ requirements for units and capabilities to support operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities. (U.S. Army 2012)

The RAF entailed sending small teams, often platoon or squad size elements across the entire African Continent in a variety of multilateral, non-kinetic, security cooperation activities. This case study is an excellent example of where closer interagency cooperation and coordination at the tactical level would be most useful for military leaders. This thesis will analyze the extent that AFRICOM’s RAF BCT sought to train and integrate with interagency partners. Tellingly, a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Study from August of 2015 highlights how the BCT’s efforts were compromised because they lacked effective coordination with interagency partners (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015).

Ebola Crisis

The 2014 to 2015 Ebola Crisis under AFRICOM also provides another useful case study. Early during the Ebola response, the White House directed U.S. AFRICOM to set up a Joint Forces Command (JFC) to provide regional command and control to support U.S. Military activities and facilitate coordination with USG and international relief efforts (The White House 2014). Eventually, the JFC was led by the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division and comprised an over 3,000 military member force. In this
case, a civilian medical response was coordinated by a U.S. Army Division Headquarters. Was this military organization trained and organized to seamless integrate with a civilian response? Did the JIACG or CMOC construct effectively manage from a planning and response perspective, the necessary actions for military and interagency coordination?

As discussed, the Corps HQ doctrinally is the lowest echelon for injecting interagency integration without additional civil affairs enablers of a CMOC. The Ebola crisis represents a case study where the inject suddenly was at an echelon lower than what doctrinally the Army has trained for, this provides for insights in the testing of processes that were inherently *ad hoc* and not institutionalized.

**Analytical Model**

In order to answer the primary research question and assess whether interagency integration was essential to tactical mission success, each case study conducts a qualitative analysis of three variables:

1. internal interagency assessments;
2. third-party academic assessments; and
3. stability operations outputs at the tactical level, or measures of effectiveness (i.e. villages secured, local governments established, new Ebola patients, etc.).

While all three variables are not present in all case studies, a subjective qualitative assessment will be made on each case study and be presented in at the conclusion of chapter 4 (table 1).
Table 1. Program—Primary Research Question Analysis

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*Source:* Created by author.

In order to answer the secondary research question, (in cases where interagency integration was essential for tactical mission success, what were its primary characteristics?) after the conclusion of each case study analyses in chapter 4, a cross-sectional analysis (table 2) will be utilized to engender conclusions on “how” or “how not” interagency integration was applied in each case study across doctrine, organizational, training and policy. These will be used in chapter 5 to determine characteristics for better interagency integration in future recommendations.

Table 2. Program—Analytical Lens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program—Analytic Lens</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ebola</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author
The resulting analysis from these historical cases will subsequently aid me in chapter 5 to answer whether interagency cooperation “should” be institutionalized at a more integrated and effective level in tactical level stability operations. Additionally, if so, how should we amend our doctrine, organization, training, and policy in order to facilitate this change?

**Threats to Validity**

There are several biases the author brings to this research. His experiences as a platoon leader in Iraq, leading Infantry and Armor soldiers in counterinsurgency operations, creates biases and threats to “internal validity” in this research.

The selection of the four specific case studies to be described in chapter 3, Methodologies, also engenders some bias. These case studies were selected based on relevancy, availability of research resources, as well as the author’s historical interest. In totality they serve to generate certain conclusions regarding the usefulness of interagency integration for tactical mission success. There is value in understanding their contributions to this issue however; their usefulness poses a threat to “predictive validity” based on their value to extrapolate use for the future, and “external validity” based on generalizing conclusions from a sample of potential case studies. Likewise, there is a threat to “discriminant validity” in that each case study has differing context, different echelons of units, and different measures of success. There is difficulty in comparing these cases to each other; however, the DOTMLPF-P framework attempts to normalize the conclusions for comparison.

The final threat to validity is in certain source documents themselves, specifically a threat to “content validity.” For the more recent case studies of RAF in Africa and the
U.S. response to Ebola, due to the recent nature of these missions, the majority of the research material was unit after action reports (AARs) through the Center for Army Lessons Learned. These studies are self-reported AARs and always there exists bias in self-reported information. It is human nature to minimize reporting of failure and over-report success, this research attempts to cross reference some of the lessons learned with individuals who have worked with or in these units, as well as other sources to maintain fairness, impartiality, and objectivity to the analysis.

Chapter Summary

This chapter outlines four major case studies to answer the research question: In past cases, in which the U.S. has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? The case studies used are the Vietnam-era CORDS program, PRTs in Afghanistan, AFRICOM’s RAF construct, and the U.S. response to the West Africa Ebola epidemic. These case studies will be analyzed to answer the research question and to determine conditions that led to either mission success or failure. A DOTMLPF-P framework, specifically doctrine, organization, training and policy will likewise be used to frame these conditions and characteristics for further analysis of future recommendations for interagency integration.

In order to answer the primary research question and assess whether interagency integration was essential to tactical mission success, each case study will analyze variables of:

1. interagency assessment studies;

2. third party academic assessments; and
3. tactical level outputs, or measures of effectiveness (i.e. villages secured, local
governments established, new Ebola patients, etc.).

Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Analysis, will serve to examine these case
studies in-depth, followed by chapter 5: Conclusions, where final recommendations will
be presented.
CHAPTER 4
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Chapter Introduction

The primary research question for the following four case studies is: In past cases in which the U.S. has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? Secondary research questions that will be considered for these cases are:

1. In past cases where interagency integration had been essential to tactical mission success, what were the required characteristics for integration?
2. Should the Army organize and train tactical formations (BCT and below) to incorporate interagency partners in their training and operations?

At the conclusion of each case study will be a DOTMLPF-P analysis, specifically looking at doctrine, organization, training, and policy to understand the conditions that were essential for tactical mission success (or failure). This analysis will be aggregated at the end of the chapter in order to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

Case Study 1: CORDS in Vietnam

The U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War from 1955 to 1975 faced unique challenges across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, predominantly because U.S. Troops under the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) by 1965 faced a dual threat of an insurgency (300,000 guerrillas and Communist Party members in South Vietnam) and a conventional enemy force (230,000 in North Vietnam) (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 9). General William Westmoreland particularly understood this
challenge, and struggled with the decision whether to structure his forces for a counterinsurgency effort or to fight a war aimed at destroying the enemy’s main conventional forces. Ultimately Westmoreland believed the main enemy forces were the most immediate problem for MACV to focus on (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 10).

Since MACV was primarily focused on the conventional threat, several civilian agencies to include DoS, USAID, U.S. information service, and the Central Intelligence Agency each developed their own pacification program, coordinated through the U.S. Embassy, in order to assist the counterinsurgency efforts.

According to the MACV 1968 Handbook, pacification was defined:

> [A]s it applies in the Republic of Vietnam is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy’s underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity. The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. Territorial security is security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main force units, if any are in or threatening the area. It also includes the protection of the people within a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies. (Headquarters MACV 1968, 1)

To the frustration of the White House, for years prior to 1968, civilian agencies attempting to support pacification efforts under the authorities of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon did not accomplish much. While these programs aimed to improve the life of the Vietnamese population to decrease their support of insurgents, it was difficult to improve development and governance without security in place. Since these programs were rarely coordinated with the military, their effects were disjointed, piecemeal, and ultimately reversed. Part of this problem was that USG civilian agencies were in direct competition
with the U.S. Army for resources and Vietnamese manpower throughout the country. By 1966, military advisory teams were also working in all of South Vietnam’s forty-four provinces and most of its 243 districts (which included 2,553 villages and over 10,000 hamlets), making it difficult for the civilian-run pacification programs to be effective (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 12). After a trip to Vietnam in 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said to Westmoreland, the MACV Commander, “I don’t think we have done a thing we can point to that has been effective in five years. I ask you to show me one area in this country . . . that we have pacified” (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 12).

President Lyndon B. Johnson took special concern of McNamara’s observations by early 1966. Johnson directed Robert Komer, a member of the NSC, with the task of improving U.S. pacification efforts in Vietnam (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13). Komer concluded by August of 1966 that pacification required the large scale integration of security efforts with development, governance, and anti-Communist programs. Without security tied with “anti-infrastructure operations” (weakening communist infrastructure in the population), pacification programs could not take root and become successful (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13). The question remained, however, who would lead such an effort?

Komer pitched his ideas for a large scale integrated pacification effort to Westmoreland, who agreed with Komer’s conclusions. Westmoreland concluded that MACV, specifically the U.S. Army, could do a better job at managing the integration and coordination of the pacification program rather than the U.S. Embassy or civilian agencies. Moreover, 90 percent of the in-country resources were coming from the military anyway. Komer agreed, commenting that DoD was “far stronger behind
pacification” than DoS, and was “infinitely more dynamic and influential” as well (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13).

On May 9th, 1967, National Security Action Memorandum 362 “Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development),” established the program called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; in it the military was placed unequivocally in charge of all pacification and Komer would be Westmoreland’s first Deputy for CORDS (The White House 1967).

CORDS: First True Civil-Military Integration

For the first time, civilians and their civilian agencies were integrated into a military hierarchy for the pacification mission within Vietnam. According to MACV HQ in 1968, the Commander of MACV, General Westmoreland, had the responsibility to provide single manager direction of all U.S. civil—military pacification activities in Vietnam, while his deputy, Komer, was responsible for discharging those duties. Specifically, Komer was charged with supervising the formulation and execution of all policies and programs, military and civilian, which supported Vietnam’s pacification program (Headquarters, MACV 1968, 27). Komer, who was given the title of Ambassador and a three-star-equivalent rank for the effort, reported directly to Westmoreland at MACV HQ in Saigon. An assistant chief of staff for CORDS was also created alongside the traditional military staff at MACV HQ (see figure 4) (Andrade and Willbanks 14).
Below MACV HQ were four U.S. Army Corps HQ, led by three-star generals that divided the country into four regions, partnered with four Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Corps. The U.S. Army Corps commanders served as the senior advisor to their Vietnamese Army Corps commander counterparts. The dual role of commander of U.S. Troops and senior advisor was not repeated at the division or brigade level.

Figure 5 shows how the Corps HQ aligned their CORDS staff, which was similar to that of MACV HQ. The Deputy for CORDS to the Corps Commander was always a civilian, charged with supervising the formulation and execution of all military and civil plans, policies, and programs which supported the pacification program, to include civic action.
performed by U.S. units (Headquarters, MACV 1968, 30). The Corps Commander also
had a deputy senior advisor (military) which assisted the deputy for CORDS in all
matters relating to ARVN military support for pacification (Headquarters, MACV 1968,
30). The assistant chief of staff for CORDS at the corps level was also a civilian who
headed the integrated civil—military staff, a copy of the MACV HQ (Headquarters,
MACV 1968, 30).

Figure 5. Regional CORDS Organization at Corps Level

Reporting directly to the Corps HQ (regional level) were the provincial senior advisors (figure 6). Curiously, the CORDS Program skipped the division senior advisors (who were separate from U.S. Army division commanders) and went directly to provincial advisors. Komer, in a 1970 interview with Rand Corporation, indicated that division advisors were simply getting in the way. “We were never going to emphasize ‘clear and hold’ as long as we had a bunch of gung-ho, big-unit war guys fussing around telling the province advisors how to function. The division senior advisor’s job was to get the ARVN divisions off their butts and out fighting the big-unit war, a job which most big-unit advisors did miserably” (Komer 1970, 62). Colonel Robert Montague, Executive Officer to Komer, added that the division advisors, “became the worst group of U.S. colonels, because the best guys went to U.S. units and they got clods down as advisors. They weren’t oriented towards pacification one little bit. So they were getting in the way” (Komer 1970, 62). The result was a CORDS chain of command that simply bypassed the division senior advisor by linking corps directly to the province teams.
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support assumed the responsibility for reports, evaluations, and field inspections from all agencies in Vietnam (Hunt 1995, 93). Komer specifically discussed the importance of aligning efficiency evaluations under an integrated structure, “It is very important who writes the efficiency reports. If you’re going to write a guy’s efficiency report that helps determine his promotability, then he is going to be loyal. We put in explicitly that the civilians would write the efficiency reports of the military under them and vice versa” (Komer 1970, 61).
The forty-four provinces all had integrated military-civilian teams. The senior province advisor was also the team chief and could be either military or civilian dependent on the security situation. The deputy was usually a civilian if the team leader was military and vice versa. The provincial teams received their administrative and logistical support from the ARVN division advisory teams (Headquarters, MACV 1968, 30). Figure 7 shows the robust organization of the CORDS provincial teams structured around the many aspects and functions of the pacification program.

Civilians made up only 15 percent of the total advisors, but the civilians they did have were quality. CORDS made a concerted effort to recruit the best and brightest civilians, a higher caliber group than the overall U.S. civilian agency population in Vietnam. Furthermore, CORDS advisors usually stayed longer to build local expertise: military advisors were offered special incentives to stay longer than the typical twelve-month tour and civilians usually stayed 18 to 24 months (Komer 1970, 248).

Previously, many of the programs under the pacification umbrella were run by individual agencies: for example, USAID ran:

1. the new life development program, which sought to improve government responsiveness to villagers’ needs,
2. a refugee program,
3. the National Police program, and
4. the Chieu Hoi program, which created reconciliation for Communist defectors.

The Central Intelligence Agency ran the rural development cadre program. MACV ran the civic action and civil affairs program. The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office ran the field psychological operations program. At the tactical (provincial) level, all these programs, previously run by multiple advisors, were now integrated under a single provincial advisor who worked for a Vietnamese province chief (usually a Vietnamese Army or Marine Colonel) (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 15).

How did the U.S. parent agencies react to this realignment? James Wilson’s framework predicts bureaucratic pushback, based on a desire to maintain autonomy. According to Komer, however, the parent agencies provided surprisingly few problems. Komer developed good working relationships with the parent agencies while he was on
the NSC in Washington and knew all the agency heads and deputies. For the most part, the agencies supported the realignment and generally provided people and most of the things that CORDS requested (Komer 1970, 209).

At the lowest level, the provincial advisor exercised his authority through district teams and managed a staff through senior advisors. From 1966 to 1969, the highpoint of pacification, the advisor program grew from 1,000 advisors to 7,601 advisors (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 16). Of those advisors, 6,464 were military (95 percent from the Army) and 1,137 were civilian (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 16). The districts were about 90 percent military because they simply did not have enough civilian capacity at the lowest district level. HQ managed their limited civilian pool by holding civilians, for the most part, at the provincial level to centralize expertise and to aid in planning (Komer 1970, 215).

According to Komer, the province, or the tactical level, was the key planning level. The province was where the majority of civilian-military expertise needed to be integrated:

> province was the key planning level. We didn’t do detailed planning for them in Saigon but rather laid down guidelines and called for detailed province plans that the Saigon level then reviewed and modified, often in a set of meetings at corps or even province. In this process, CORDS expected every district and province advisors to get his licks in with his counterpart, and we usually sent down separate U.S. guidance on what we wanted the U.S. advisors to get into the [Government of Vietnam] plans. (Komer 1970, 194)

Measuring the Effectiveness of CORDS

The purpose of this case study is ultimately to measure the effects of interagency integration at the tactical level. While it is difficult to segregate the effects of CORDS there are two primary data points that will be analyzed: first, the positive effects
integrating civilians had on a provincial team’s understanding of their region, and second, the effectiveness of pacification pre- and post-CORDS. Through these two data points we can better isolate the effects that greater interagency integration had on tactical mission success.

In January 1967, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Mission Council in Vietnam initiated the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), a new reporting device for evaluating the state of pacification throughout Vietnam. The procedure required every district advisor each month to evaluate each hamlet in his district according to standardized criteria covering its military, political, economic, and social features (Department of the Army 1968, 9). In May of 1968, the Army Concept Team in Vietnam conducted a study in order to assess the trustworthiness of the input that went into the HES. Using a cadre of U.S. and Vietnamese observers, the team conducted their own assessments of hamlets to evaluate how the advisors’ pacification assessment corresponded to their assessment (Department of the Army 1968, 1).

The overall study indicated that the HES was a sound reporting device for the entire country. The study also provides some interesting findings of particular use to this case study’s interagency evaluation. The HES study was able to isolate the effect of having the presence of civilian advisors at the district level. It found that in 61.5 percent of those districts where a civilian advisor was present on the district team, the team had an above average awareness of non-military problems in their districts–meaning they were aware of the true issues related to pacification of the district. In contrast, an above average awareness of non-military problems was found in only 33.3 percent of those districts where a civilian advisor was not present (see table 3) (Department of the Army
1968, 26). As a result, the HES study strongly urged the placing of a civilian advisor in as many districts as was feasible (Department of the Army 1968, 3). Due to a lack of civilian advisors, districts only received approximately 10 percent of their personnel as civilians. What these statistics ultimately show, however, is that if a team’s understanding of the non-military pacification issues is correlated to successfully accomplishing pacification, then integrating civilian advisors on military teams did have an impact on mission success.

Table 3. CORDS Civilian Advisor Present and Awareness of Non-Military Problems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Awareness of Non-Military Problems</th>
<th>Civilian Advisor Present</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
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</table>


The second measure of mission effectiveness can be determined by comparing the effectiveness of pacification pre- and post-CORDS since pre-CORDS was not an integrated interagency organization, while post-CORDS was integrated. Previously articulated was the failure of pacification efforts pre-CORDS, resulting in the creation of the CORDS program itself; but by what measures can we subsequently gauge the
effectiveness of CORDS in accomplishing pacification after it was instituted? Metrics like size of the program, manpower, and budgets can indicate importance to the U.S., but are not always the best indicator of mission effectiveness. A better source of metrics are reports like the HES, even better are perceptions by the VC, the population the programs were targeting effects against.

By 1970, historian Lewis Sorley showed that CORDS pacification efforts succeeded by:

1. increasing the village (hamlet) security force to 2 to 3 million;
2. had 93 percent of the population in secure areas (an increase of almost 20 percent from 1968);
3. re-settled a large numbers of war refugees; and
4. had elected officials in every village (Howell 2009, 24; Andrade and, Willbanks 2006, 21).

The results of these successes clearly impacted the VC. From 1968 to 1971 the VC changed their strategies to counter the pacification campaign (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 11). Communist plans directed VC insurgents to attack the CORDS pacification program, especially a sub-component called “Phoenix,” which were the efforts to target VC infrastructure–communist shadow governments operating in local villages (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 21). The former VC minister of Justice, Truong Nhu Tang, wrote in his memoirs that “Phoenix was dangerously effective” (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 21). Likewise, the communist history of the war noted that “[b]ecause we did not fully appreciate the new enemy [allied] schemes and the changes the enemy made in the conduct of the war and because we underestimated the enemy’s capabilities and the strength of his counterattack, when the U.S. and its puppets [the South Vietnamese]
began to carry out their ‘clear and hold’ strategy our battlefronts were too slow in shifting over to attacking the ‘pacification’ program” (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 11). Based on the reaction of the VC we can conclude that the changes CORDS made, which were mostly focused at the tactical provincial level, did have an impact on pacification and ultimately forced the VC to respond.

As Komer stated in 1970, “CORDS facilitated our ability to pull together and plan centrally on the U.S. side all facets of pacification, and equally important to tie them into the military planning at all levels” (Komer 1970, 193). “I don’t think we came up with any concept that was bright, new, and original in Vietnam—in pacification of anything else. Other people had long since thought of those things, in many cases back to the French period. You could find intellectual progenitors of almost anything that we came up with. The striking difference between us and our predecessors was that we were action-oriented and management minded” (Komer 1970, 64). What Komer highlights is the importance of organizational structure and management of integration of interagency and military. To Komer this made the difference between mission accomplishment and failure when it came to pacification efforts. Counterinsurgency principles were simply not enough. But when civil-military operations were integrated at the tactical level it made the difference for the success of the pacification program.

Commentary on the Failure of the Vietnam War

It would be remiss to not comment on the ultimate failure of U.S. efforts in Vietnam. By the end of 1971 the U.S withdrew almost all combat forces and between 1972 and 1975 North Vietnam launched three conventional military invasions into South Vietnam. As General Westmoreland understood early on in the conflict, Vietnam was
unique in that they faced a dual threat of an external conventional adversary and an internal insurgency. Despite South Vietnam’s ultimate downfall to the North, it is telling of the success of CORDS and the pacification program that what ultimately brought South Vietnam’s downfall in 1975 was not an effective insurgency but rather the conventional army divisions that North Vietnam invaded with.
Summary Analysis of CORDS Case Study

Table 4. DOTMLPF-P Analysis of CORDS Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program—Analytical Lens</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>(neutral) doctrine remained unaffected by CORDS program, CORDS reforms was more of an organizational and management restructuring of MACV.</td>
<td>(+) CORDS was the first fully integrated civil-military effort where at the tactical level civilians and military worked side by side on the same staffs to synchronize objectives.</td>
<td>(+) CORDS attempted to seek a balance in the length of training so that advisors could receive sufficient regional and cultural expertise and still maximize time in the field.</td>
<td>(+) CORDS created through executive action of NSAM 362; realigned MACV staff to incorporate CORDS deputy and subordinate integrated staffs at Corps, Province and District level.</td>
<td>(+) CORDS is considered a successful stability operation program that had positive effects in pacification in S. Vietnam.</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Created by author.

Case Study 2: PRTs in Afghanistan

The U.S. war in Afghanistan that began in September 2001 quickly transitioned to a new phase by early 2002 as the USG sought to aid the fledgling Kabul Government of
Hamid Karzai to improve governance across the country. Initially the U.S. Military utilized small teams called Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells, consisting of ten to twelve U.S. Military Personnel, to provide information to units and planners on humanitarian needs throughout the country (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2008, 3). These teams also implemented small DoD-funded projects in order to build trust and confidence among the local population (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2008, 3).

By late 2002, the U.S. Military sought a more comprehensive interagency approach. Although U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams provided expertise for development and humanitarian missions, the expanding scope of the assistance to the Afghan Government required more than just a civil affairs perspective. A new concept, Provincial Reconstruction Teams would replace the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells; PRTs would integrate teams across various agencies and incorporate other technical specialists, like development and humanitarian advisors, police advisors, information operators, civil engineers, and explosive ordnance disposal experts (Honoré and Boslego 2007, 85). The Army would also resource PRTs with organic force protection, allowing them unfettered movement and access to population centers in their respective provinces. The first PRT was established in the eastern Afghan city of Gardez in November, 2002 (Honoré and Boslego 2007, 85). Later, the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council Guidance would formalize guidance on the structure and functions of U.S. led PRTs in June, 2003 (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 8).

The USG primarily designed PRTs to meet three objectives:

1. improve security through international military presence;
2. extend the reach of the Afghan government; and
3. facilitate reconstruction and establishment of basic services in priority provinces (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 8; Matwiczak 2009, 6).

The NSC guidance envisioned the civilian agency representatives and their military counterparts would work as a team to assess the environment, develop strategies, and oversee projects and initiatives in their respective provinces (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 8). DoD was assigned the responsibility for force protection of the team, improving local security, and all logistical support for the team. USAID was the lead for reconstruction efforts and DoS was responsible for political oversight, coordination, governance initiatives, and reporting (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 8). Beyond the specified basic guidance, the essential tasks of the PRTs were left open to allow for flexibility, to adapt to local conditions.

The nation resourcing the PRT evaluated local conditions to determine the appropriate size and characteristics of each PRT. Most PRTs ranged from several dozens to one hundred members; the German PRT in the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif staffed approximately four-hundred members (Matwiczak 2009, 9-61). The non-U.S. led PRTs reported directly to their respective regional commands (Division HQ), while the U.S. led PRTs reported to the BCT in charge of their province (see figure 8).
Figure 8. PRT Chain of Command in Afghanistan


PRT and CORDS: Similar Roots but Major Differences

A major difference between PRT and CORDS, often described as PRT’s progenitor, was in their rating chains. On PRTs, DoS, USAID, and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) all reported to their respective agencies for
administrative matters. For example, a DoS official at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul would conduct the performance ratings for DoS officials assigned to PRTs (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2008, 6). Members’ performance evaluations under CORDS were kept within the rating chain of the CORDS Program; military provincial team leaders could rate civilians underneath them and vice versa so that subordinates engendered loyalty, cohesion, and unity of effort within the advisory team. The U.S. led PRT in Afghanistan in contrast was structured quite differently than a CORDS provincial advisory team. The leadership team of the PRT consisted of the military commander, the DoS, USAID, and USDA representative (rarely would a PRT have all three civilian representatives). Rather than a senior—subordinate command relationship the PRT leadership team is more of a group of equals, with the PRT commander having “more equal” say due to security interests of the team (figure 9).
Another major difference was that most U.S. led PRTs only had one to three civilian agency representatives (in the leadership team), whereas the rest of the team was all military personnel. In contrast, provincial teams in CORDS had between 10 to 15 percent of the entire team as integrated civilian members; table 5, shows the percentage of actual civilian advisors in PRTs by number of provinces. The majority of PRTs (57.7 percent) actually had 3 percent or fewer civilians. For most PRTs this percentage translated to two to three civilians for a team of around one hundred. Only one team had greater than 10 percent: PRT Wardak, which was a Turkish PRT and the only PRT led by a civilian, had approximately thirty civilians (Matwiczak 2009, 61). Across all of
Afghanistan from 2007 to 2008 civilian personnel assigned to PRTs averaged approximately 4 to 4.5 percent (see table 6), a strong contrast to the 15 percent in CORDS by 1968 (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2008, 9). Whereas CORDS was sending 100 to 150 per year of their best young foreign service officers, in Afghanistan the DoS total was 18 for 2007 and 2008 (table 6) (Komer 1970, 214).

Table 5. Percentage of Civilians on PRTs (Afghanistan 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Civilians on PRT (Afghanistan 2009)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3% or less</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%-6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%-10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater than 10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of PRTs</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author, data from Kenneth Matwiczak “A Comprehensive Database of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan” (Research, The LBJ School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin, 2009), 9-61.
Table 6. U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel Assigned to PRTs in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DoD</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>USDA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. led PRTs</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td><strong>1055</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other PRTs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td><strong>1070</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. led PRTs</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>1023</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other PRTs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>994</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>1039</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The differences of program size between CORDS and PRTs also merit some comparison. As mentioned during the CORDS case study, from 1966 to 1969, the pacification program grew from 1,000 advisors to 7,601 advisors (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 16). The Afghanistan PRT program in 2008 employed 1,070 advisors, to put in perspective, the PRT Program was more equivalent to the size of the pacification advisory program pre-CORDS (1966) rather than post-CORDS (1968 and 1969). In 1968 Vietnam’s population was approximately 41 million people; in 2008 Afghanistan’s population was approximately 26 million (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). Vietnam, a country approximately 50 percent larger than Afghanistan, had over seven times the number of advisors as PRT during CORDS’ height.
Measuring the Effectiveness of PRTs

As of March 2009, there were approximately twenty-six PRTs under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-International Security Assistance Force Command (Matwiczak 2009, 6). The U.S. led twelve PRTs while the remaining fourteen were led by the following partner countries: Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (Matwiczak 2009, 6). Figure 10 shows how the PRTs were distributed across Afghanistan by province (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2008, 4).
The literature measuring the effectiveness of PRTs in Afghanistan is considerably more conflicted compared to the CORDS Program in Vietnam. A study sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute in 2009, authored by Dr. Carter Malkasian and Dr. Gerald Meyerle of the Center for Naval Analyses, argued that PRTs were effective in Afghanistan because they brought an interagency solution to areas that civilian reconstruction agencies could not operate in (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009, iii).
The Malkasian and Meyerle study primarily examined where PRT projects were conducted and their funding amounts compared to potential alternative reconstruction and development sources like USAID, the Afghan Government’s National Solidarity Program (NSP), the United Nations (UN), NGOs, and U.S. Army battalions and BCTs. Results showed that PRTs operate in contested and hostile areas (labeled Red Districts) that USAID, NGOs, and the UN would not operate in (see table 7). PRTs were also better at managing large scale projects, especially ones that required hands on monitoring, that the NSP, and U.S. Military units could not match (see table 8) (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009, 32-34).

Table 7. Projects in Afghan Red Districts (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Red Districts Where Projects are Conducted</th>
<th>Districts with PRT Projects</th>
<th>Districts with Maneuver Projects</th>
<th>Districts with NSP Projects</th>
<th>Districts with USAID Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khost</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuristan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?” (Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2009), 28.
Table 8. Average PRT, NSP, and Maneuver Cost per Project ($USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>PRT</th>
<th>NSP</th>
<th>Maneuver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khost</td>
<td>$218,000</td>
<td>$14,900</td>
<td>$17,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>$387,000</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>$72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>$362,700</td>
<td>$12,700</td>
<td>$22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuristan</td>
<td>$38,400</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$44,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?” (Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2009), 32.

Malkasian and Meyerle concluded that the PRT’s integrated interagency approach was the only effective means to bring quick and large scale projects to denied areas which other development means could not reach. A 2006 USAID interagency assessment reached similar conclusions: “PRTs are most appropriate where there is a mid-range of violence, i.e., where instability still precludes heavy NGO involvement, but where it is not so acute that combat operations predominate” (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 6).

Based on these conclusions it may be easy to assume that PRTs were a successful case study where interagency cooperation had an impact at the tactical level.

Unfortunately, there are several problems with both Malkasian and Meyerle’s and the USAID’s conclusions. As highlighted in chapter 1, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction noted that DoD’s efforts to spark the country’s economic development, which cost between $700 million and $800 million, “accomplished nothing” (Gould 2014). The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s observations, similar to other criticisms were among many instances
where months or years later the PRT projects were not sustained by the Afghan Government or population. Short term local wins do not always translate to long term progress and sustainable wins.

Unlike PRTs, the CORDS pacification program had buy-in from the national, regional, and local officials. Pacification tasks and objectives were meticulously synchronized and integrated with the Vietnamese at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Buy-in and synchronization at all of these levels ensured that the Vietnamese developed only that which they could sustain. PRTs in Afghanistan did not have this level of synchronization, coordination, and long term plans to sustain development projects.

The NGOs and USAID, who tended to take exception to the primarily military staffed PRTs, have leveled the criticism of PRTs lacking sustainable development. Supporting their claims, an observation by the 2009 assessment showed that many on the PRTs were inexperienced and knew little about development, reconstruction, or Afghan culture (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009, 1). Even civilian representation on PRTs were often criticized for being young and inexperienced, not knowing how their own agencies operated (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 15). As a result of PRT inexperience, physical infrastructure development often ignored the human component of development. Malkasian and Meyerle highlight situations where schools were built without teachers and clinics without doctors (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009, 1). Examples like these undermine whether the number of projects in contested areas and dollars spent, are appropriate measures of effectiveness.
Malkasian and Meyerle also examined if PRTs had an effect on bringing down violence in Afghanistan. They found that there is no evidence that PRTs on their own have quelled violence. During 2007 and 2008 when they examined the impact in each province with a U.S. led PRT, attacks in general increased (nationwide as well), despite a dramatic increase in PRT spending (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009, 11). In contrast to CORDS, during its expansion, villages that had pacification programs, generally all decreased internal violence and increased measures of security. By these measures, PRTs were ineffective in linking development and governance to security objectives.

Malkasian and Merle’s conclusion, that PRTs played a helpful role in counteracting violence in their respective provinces, is based on a perspective that without PRTs no other organization could perform a comparably adequate role in the same areas. Likewise, though hard to support, their conclusion is that violence would be worse without PRTs. This analysis shows that these conclusions may be weak.

The 2006 interagency study by USAID, DoS, and DoD also examined the PRTs and made some important observations that indicated their ineffectiveness. First, the study believed that a major downside of the broad guidance given to PRTs was that it unnecessarily led to confusion on what a PRT is, supposed to do and what its limits should be (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 9). Resulting problems included the previously mentioned schools without teachers and clinics without doctors that Afghans could not maintain; but similar to the observations by Malkasian and Meyerle, the study found that local efforts would sometimes conflict with national objectives. For example, if the Afghan Ministry of Education was trying to establish national education standards, a PRT developing their own schools and curriculum could
often undermine these standards (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 9). Since PRTs reported through BCTs, followed by Regional Commands, and finally through the NATO-International Security Assistance Force, national objectives often were not synchronized with the tactical level.

The USAID study also found poor civil-military cooperation and integration within the PRT. Individual experience, skills, leadership style, and personality often played a disproportionate role in determining the direction of PRT activities (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 10). A disproportionate role of individual leaders had two effects. The first effect, without explicit guidance PRTs were acting too independently, unsynchronized with regional or national campaign plans. The second effect, as the USAID study highlights, “while initial guidance gave civilians decision making leadership on reconstruction and governance issues, many military officers viewed civilians as more advisory and believed the commander had final authority over all PRT activities, especially when security challenges seemed paramount” (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 13). Personality conflicts and clashes of organizational culture were common among PRTs. In an organization where all PRT team leaders were military, there clearly was a perception by the civilians, of military dominance of the PRT mission. If the military commander of the U.S. led PRT did not proactively incorporate non-DoD representatives into PRT, leadership decisions the goals of the PRT suffered (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 10).

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, in contrast, lacked reporting of similar levels of conflict. This may be due to the pervasiveness of civilians up and down the CORDS chain of command. Team leaders could be civilian and all
advisors were rated by their civilian or military team leaders in CORDS. In order to avoid the overt militarization and security focus of the pacification campaign, division advisors were removed from the CORDS chain of command (albeit also because of a lack of quality among division advisors).

The USAID assessment also observed that training suffered challenges. U.S. led PRTs were formed in theater and tours were not synchronized, often leading to a lack of civil-military coordination and standard operating procedures (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 11). In contrast, several of the NATO partner-nation PRTs would form whole PRTs months before deployments and train cohesively together, both military and civilian (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 11). The U.S. Military developed their own forty-five day PRT training program but it suffered from a “serious lack” of civilian trainers as well as the civilian representatives who would also serve on the team (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 17).

Finally, the USAID assessment also confirmed that PRTs suffered poor synchronization with national programs. The NATO-International Security Assistance Force often had no authority over lead-nation civilian efforts within the PRT. Moreover, many of the Government of Afghanistan’s programs were poorly coordinated with the PRTs (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 11). Without a common political vision and strategy between NATO, lead nations, and the Government of Afghanistan, individual PRT tasks were established independently by each lead nation not necessarily nested within larger national strategies (U.S. Agency for International Development 2006, 17).
Overall this discussion has highlighted that there are valid criticisms in whether the PRT was effective in integrating interagency partners on advisory teams, whether the mass of civilians and the expertise they brought was enough to make a difference, whether projects really supported national and regional objectives, and whether the projects themselves were sustainable and effective. The following DOTMLPF-P analysis (table 9) will isolate where those difficulties originated in the integration of interagency partners at the tactical level.
### Summary Analysis of PRT Case Study

Table 9. DOTMLPF-P Analysis of PRT Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program—Analytical Lens</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>(+) Joint and Army doctrine were updated to reflect the use of PRTs for tactical interagency integration.</td>
<td>(-) PRT teams lacked civilian and military integrated training prior to deployment.</td>
<td>(-) military resourced training was weak in development training and sufficient regional-cultural expertise.</td>
<td>(-) broad ambiguous guidelines from NSC left PRT mission ambiguous to supporting agencies, NGOs, and to PRT leaders resulting in flaws in execution.</td>
<td>(-) PRT projects criticized as unsustainable for Afghans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-) PRTs overwhelmingly military, civilian expertise did not reach a critical mass.</td>
<td>(-) PRT teams lacked civilian and military integrated training prior to deployment.</td>
<td>(-) military resourced training was weak in development training and sufficient regional-cultural expertise.</td>
<td>(-) broad ambiguous guidelines from NSC left PRT mission ambiguous to supporting agencies, NGOs, and to PRT leaders resulting in flaws in execution.</td>
<td>(-) PRT projects criticized as unsustainable for Afghans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-) PRTs not appropriately synchronized into regional and national objectives.</td>
<td>(-) development was physical infrastructure focused without understanding human development and sustainable projects.</td>
<td>(-) development was physical infrastructure focused without understanding human development and sustainable projects.</td>
<td>(-) development was physical infrastructure focused without understanding human development and sustainable projects.</td>
<td>(-) interagency conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+/-) unclear whether alignment under BCTs in each province allowed for better tactical support or if objectives became too security focused.</td>
<td>(-) development was physical infrastructure focused without understanding human development and sustainable projects.</td>
<td>(-) development was physical infrastructure focused without understanding human development and sustainable projects.</td>
<td>(-) development was physical infrastructure focused without understanding human development and sustainable projects.</td>
<td>(+) PRT role and successful projects could not have been performed by any other agency-org.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*

### Case Study 3: Africa Command Regionally Aligned Forces

The U.S. AFRICOM and its subordinate command, United States Army Africa (USARAF) partners with nations throughout the African Continent through a variety of joint security cooperation efforts. Security cooperation covers a broad set of activities that promote U.S. interests, build partner nations’ capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provides U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to
host nations (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 4). Some examples of security cooperation activities include sending military liaison teams, conducting seminars and conferences, and training and equipping partner nations’ security forces (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 4).

In order to prioritize security cooperation activities throughout the continent, AFRICOM develops a campaign plan, which is a joint, multi-year plan that reflects a strategy to achieve the commander’s desired end states for the region. The majority of Army security cooperation activities, in line with the campaign plan, are planned by AFRICOM HQ in Stuttgart, Germany and USARAF in Vicenza, Italy (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 8). Planning for security cooperation involves multiple stakeholders, including each of the service component commands, AFRICOM’s special operations component, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, program managers responsible for identifying resources to support security cooperation activities, and the Offices of Security Cooperation at U.S. Embassies in Africa (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 13).

Both AFRICOM and USARAF generate security cooperation activities through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. AFRICOM leads interagency conferences, which brings together planners from a variety of stakeholders, to discuss theater- and country-level objectives, resources, and supporting activities (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 13). AFRICOM also hosts country-level meetings in order to further develop country plans, especially those countries with a large number of engagements (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 14). Unfortunately, due to the sheer number of countries in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility, logistically it is
difficult to hold these individual country meetings annually, but it is the responsibility for each embassy to review their country plan to ensure that DoD objectives and activities are aligned with and in support of DoS objectives and plans (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 14). Ultimately, the Office of Security Cooperation aligned with each individual embassy (approximately thirty-eight nations) generates many of the initial concepts for security cooperation activities that are subsequently tasked by USARAF to tactical units (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 6, 14).

In 2013, AFRICOM became the first geographic COCOM to receive an Army RAF, specifically, a BCT to primarily support theater security cooperation (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 1). Previous to the RAF concept, AFRICOM and its subordinate command, USARAF, would allocate units to support approved security cooperation activities through DoD’s standard processes for requesting forces. This process required USARAF to separately request forces for each individual activity, a lengthy bureaucratic process that was slow and unpredictable, because each request would compete with requests from other geographic combatant commands and other strategic priorities (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 6-7). The RAF concept, conversely, sought to allocate an entire BCT to AFRICOM untied to individual specific security cooperation activities. The RAF construct allowed AFRICOM to more efficiently and predictably access Army Brigade capabilities for the duration of a RAF deployment to support multiple (and last minute emerging) security cooperation activities without having to submit new requests (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 2). At its most fundamental level, RAF is a troop delivery platform, designed to provide habitually aligned forces quickly to Combatant Commanders (Morse 2015, 1). The hope
is over time regional and cultural expertise will be built within these units through habitual relationships with their respective regions.

Since 2013, four BCTs have been allocated to AFRICOM:

2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from April 2013 to June 2014;
4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from June 2014 to February 2015;
4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division from February 2015 to October 2015;
2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division from October 2015 to Present (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 8).

These units primarily conduct security cooperation activities in five categories: (1) security assistance, (2) combined exercises, (3) military contacts, (4) information sharing—intelligence cooperation, and (5) humanitarian assistance (U.S. Government Accountability Office O 2015, 8). Figure 11 shows some examples of the different security cooperation activities that 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry, 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry, and 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division conducted during their RAF rotations.
Each of the allocated brigades has also been tasked with a security and crisis response mission under the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, which required each brigade to deploy a battalion task force to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti for the
duration of its alignment (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 9). These battalion task forces will also conduct some security cooperation activities in support of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa and other peacekeeping support operations (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 9).

Regionally Aligned Forces
Interagency Problems

As highlighted in chapter 2, Army doctrine currently does not integrate interagency cooperation at the BCT level. Interagency coordination primarily occurs within CMOCs at the Division, Corps, or JTF HQ. In the specific case of the RAF BCT, there is no parent Division or Corps HQ that helps support day to day operations. The RAF BCT reports to USARAF, the Army Service Component Command, under AFRICOM with their corresponding JIACG. The impact is an interagency apparatus unaccustomed to managing and supporting the day-to-day operations of tactical units in an area of operations.

In 2015, the National Defense Authorization Act directed the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess DoD’s efforts to plan for and employ these brigades to Africa (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 1). In August, 2015 the GAO released their findings and it concluded there was much room for improvement, especially in interagency coordination. The report highlighted:

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) identifies and synchronizes security cooperation activities through various planning processes, but the brigades allocated to AFRICOM sometimes lack key information about these activities. The brigades are tasked to conduct many of these activities, but they sometimes lack timely and complete information about the activities, such as activity objectives, which can compromise their effectiveness. While personnel from USARAF and the Offices of Security Cooperation coordinate informally, they do not always have a shared understanding of the activity objectives or involve the
brigades in planning. Furthermore, USARAF does not have a formal mechanism that includes both the Offices of Security Cooperation and the brigades to shape activities and address information gaps. As a result, the brigades’ ability to conduct activities may be challenged, and the resources invested may not have the anticipated effect. (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 1)

The communication issues that the report illustrates are a direct result of either ineffective or non-existent mechanisms to coordinate between U.S Embassies, Defense Attachés, Offices of Security Cooperation at each country, USARAF, and ultimately to the RAF BCT itself. For example, according to the GAO, USARAF officials try to provide task orders to the BCT ninety days in advance of each activity in order to guide their preparation and training (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 17). Task orders identify each security activity’s key details, task, purpose, and desired end states (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 17). The brigades reported that often the task orders were provided late and sometimes not at all—one brigade reported receiving their task order from a third party channel, five days after arriving in country (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 17).

The result of these communication problems and lack of synchronization are RAF soldiers who are unprepared or untrained to meet the activity objectives, wasted USG resources—or worse, DoD and DoS not achieving their regional objectives and end states. An example of unprepared U.S. Soldiers was one unit who were tasked with sending mechanics to teach a mechanic course, however, USARAF did not communicate what type of equipment they would train on. The result was U.S. Soldiers arrived in country and canceled training, because they were unfamiliar with the equipment the host nation country expected them to be educated on (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 18).
Another example involved incomplete key information about host nation security force’s capabilities. The U.S. Unit expected that the host nation forces already had a basic competency and familiarization with their artillery systems. The RAF brigade planned and prepared for a training course in advanced artillery techniques. Upon arrival they instead assessed that basic level instruction for all the host nation soldiers was needed which completely undermined their planned exercises for the host nation army (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 19).

The common complaint of untimely or incomplete information is certainly not the sole responsibility of the USARAF staff, which are planning multiple activities at any one time. The information the RAF units need is being held often within the dozens of Offices of Security Cooperation and Embassies across the continent. However, while Offices and Security Cooperation and USARAF do informally contact one other, they do not consistently and formally meet to discuss upcoming activities—furthermore the brigades are rarely involved in these informal conversations (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 21).

The brigades themselves also bear some responsibility, but often they may be unaware they have incomplete information before deploying. Likewise, they are ill-equipped or disempowered to contact their applicable Office of Security Cooperation, Embassy, or even USARAF because they do not have approval for direct liaison (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 18). Figure 12 shows a graphical depiction of the fragmented coordination between the RAF BCT, USARAF, and the Offices of Security Cooperation.
Interagency confusion and inefficiencies have even escalated to cases where soldiers in the brigades experienced challenges and delays in obtaining official passports. Despite USARAF and RAF BCTs supporting DoS coordinated and approved security cooperation activities, DoS passport procedures have denied many soldiers from deploying (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 38). The concept of RAF was always to provide a flexible pool of soldiers for the COCOM to draw from, in order to support sometimes late notice security cooperation activities. As a result, brigades often
put in blanket official passport requests for anyone with the potential to deploy in support of RAF activities, with the understanding that some soldiers may not use these official passports depending on the COCOM needs. This practice runs counter to DoS procedures and subsequently DoS have more stringent vetting procedures for RAF passport requests. Due to these coordination problems, AFRICOM RAF Brigades have reported that several of their activities were cancelled or delayed because some personnel could not obtain an official passport or visa; similarly, in some instances the soldier best suited for an activity did not deploy, forcing personnel that only met the basic skill and capability requirements to deploy in their stead because they had a passport (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 38).

Measuring the Effectiveness of Regionally Aligned Forces

There are many points of failure for the RAF and USARAF’s communication problems. Certainly USARAF could have devoted more time to clearly understanding each country’s security cooperation activity objectives and training plans. This information could have also been communicated to the RAF Brigade. Likewise, the individual embassies and Security Cooperation Offices could have more clearly ensured their security cooperation activities were more fully articulated to USARAF. The RAF BCT itself could submit requests for information through USARAF, but that was conditioned on the RAF BCT knowing in the first place that they lacked complete or accurate information.

Acknowledging the geographic dispersion of these units and the many other planning and mission requirements that the USARAF staff is responsible for, it is
understandable that a complete and detailed awareness of each security cooperation activity was not communicated to the RAF planners. The results, however, are clear, wherever the responsibility for the ineffective coordination falls, a lack of interagency synchronization, cooperation, and potentially integration, led to a less than optimal outcome for AFRICOM, DoD, and DoS’ security cooperation objectives within the region.

Utilizing James Wilson’s framework of analysis for the RAF case, we see that organizational structure and a desire for autonomy all played an effect in undermining interagency coordination and mission success. Organizational structure and a lack of authority (caused by USARAF’s desire for autonomy) of the RAF BCT, which prevented any interagency liaison officers (LNOs) at the BCT level, resulted in the RAF BCT from directly coordinating with their embassy counterparts. Likewise, USARAF’s own organization structure of an overburdened staff (who logistically did not have time to regularly coordinate with each embassy), as well as relying on informal rather than formal mechanisms of coordination, resulted in insufficient coordination. All these challenges can similarly be analyzed through the DOTMLPF-P lens of Doctrine, Organization, Training and Policy (see table 10).

The 2015 GAO report recommends that AFRICOM develop formal mechanisms, such as regularly scheduled, country-specific meetings between all parties involved to review and discuss upcoming security cooperation activities—the GAO proposes increasing the number of LNOs embedded at USARAF in order to achieve this (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2015, 27). However, another potential recommendation could be allowing and empowering the RAF BCT itself to synchronize
and coordinate across the interagency. What would the result be if each RAF BCT
(currently aligned with each geographic command), had a DoS Embed in its staff, or the
authorities and mechanisms in order to reach out to each embassy or security cooperation
itself to establish a direct line of communication? A DoS Embed or authority for direct liaison would serve several functions: reduce communication and staff channels, improve timeliness of information flows, allow the RAF to better tailor and craft their training and operations to the unique need of each security cooperation activity. Likewise, a DoS specific embed could assist the RAF Commander in tailoring his regional and cultural training to the unique area of operations that the RAF was deploying to. Finally, a DoS Embed could also better validate and expedite RAF passport requests through the DoS.
## Summary Analysis of Regionally Aligned Forces Case Study

### Table 10. DOTMLPF-P Analysis of RAF Interagency Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Analytical Lens</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>(-) Army doctrine did not support interagency coordination for unit.</td>
<td>(-) No formalized mechanisms in place for coordination-synchronization to occur at BCT level with interagency partners-embassies.</td>
<td>(+) familiarization of interagency partners conducted which added value once in country.</td>
<td>(-) BCT not empowered to directly liaison with embassy and interagency partners.</td>
<td>(-) security cooperation goals not efficiently met in many cases or were cancelled in several circumstances due to lack of interagency coordination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*

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### Case Study 4: United States Response to Ebola in West Africa

International Community Rallies for Action

On March 13, 2014 the Guinean Ministry of Health issued an alert concerning an unidentified disease with symptoms of hemorrhagic fever, later to be confirmed as Ebola (USAID et al. 2015, 1). On March 23rd, the World Health Organization (WHO)
announced the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, and days later Sierra Leone and Liberia also confirmed possible cases of the disease (USAID et al. 2015, 1). Previously, no cases of Ebola had ever been recorded in West Africa; all three governments had limited to no experience in identifying or containing the disease (USAID et al. 2015, 1). Communities were quarantined, schools shut down, and military forces were deployed to contain the virus’ spread. Table 11 shows the cumulative rapid spread of the Ebola disease in all three countries during this time period. Figure 13 shows these cases geographically around the time period of U.S. intervention.

Table 11. Cumulative Reported Ebola Cases: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone

![Graph showing cumulative Ebola cases](http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/cumulative-cases-graphs.html)

On August 8, 2014 the WHO had declared the Ebola epidemic in West Africa a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 2016). By September 18, 2014, the UN Security Council called for assistance and declared the Ebola outbreak a “threat to international security and peace” (USAID et al. 2015, 36-37). The USG declared that it would take the lead role in Liberia, the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone, and France in Guinea (USAID et al. 2015, 37).
The USG applied a whole-of-government approach to the Liberian Ebola response. The USAID was designated as the lead federal agency to manage and coordinate the U.S. effort, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention led the medical and public health component, DoS had responsibility for advancing related diplomatic efforts, and DoD, under Operation United Assistance, began direct support to civilian led response efforts (USAID et al. 2015, 3). These federal agencies sought to advance four primary goals outlined in the U.S. Global Ebola Strategy:

1. controlling the outbreak;
2. mitigating second order impacts;
3. establishing coherent leadership and operations; and
4. advancing global health security (USAID et al. 2015, 70-71).

Ebola: A Model for Interagency

As soon as President Barack Obama authorized a U.S. response, from the start it was a whole-of-government operation. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance is the office within USAID responsible for providing emergency, non-food humanitarian assistance, in response to international crises and disasters (USAID et al. 2015, 73). The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance is responsible for international disaster risk reduction, resilience, and coordination efforts, and also for devising, coordinating, and implementing strategies for responding to disasters (USAID et al. 2015, 73). When the size or scope of the disaster warrants it, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance has the capability to deploy a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) globally (USAID et al. 2015, 73). The 28-man DART consisted of humanitarian experts and technical advisors, from USAID, Centers for Disease Control, DoD, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services and the U.S. Forest Service who were to assess the situation firsthand, identify the most urgent needs, and coordinate the USG response (White House 2014). The DART was the first U.S. entity on the ground in Liberia coordinating the response prior to the arrival of follow-on forces and agencies.

Operations and coordination centers were key to coordinating the interagency, interorganizational, and intergovernmental response. The Centers for Disease Control and USAID utilized a model called the Incident Command System, which is designed to provide effective and efficient incident management by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications command efforts within a common organizational structure (USAID et al. 2015, 39). Interim National Ebola Operations Centers were initially set up in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Mali to establish national emergency management programs for the Ebola response (USAID et al. 2015, 39). The DART, USAID, and Centers for Disease Control served a vital role in facilitating the creation of these coordination centers. Eventually, the Government of Liberia designated the Liberian Ministry of Health (MoH) to run and coordinate a national center called the National Ebola Coordination Center (NECC). Other coordination centers would also take root to manage more specific efforts such as the UN mission.

The NECC would serve a critical function of coordinating the Ebola response from the wide ranging agencies, organizations, and governments responding to the crisis in Liberia. As Lieutenant Colonel Ross Lightsey, the Operation United Assistance J-9, or Civil-Military Operations section, indicated in a recent article, “Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the center of gravity where collective and collaborative decisions were made was
within the NECC. . . . It cannot be stressed enough that the NECC was the most central location and source of information and was where major cooperation and decision making occurred. If it had not been developed and implemented by the Liberian Ministry of Health (MoH), the opportunity for organizational collaboration would have been hard pressed for success” (Lightsey 2016).

Measuring the Effectiveness of Interagency Integration during the Ebola Crisis

In the September 16, 2014 opening order, USARAF was designated as a JFC HQ to oversee the military mission and the 3,000 soldiers dedicated to the Ebola response. In direct support of USAID and its DART, the JFC was given the mission to construct seventeen Ebola treatment units (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, iv, 7). USARAF would conduct the initial planning and theater opening (facilitating the logistics of moving troops into the region), but the JFC role would eventually be turned over to the 101st Airborne Division, by October 25, 2014 (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015a, 5).

Unfortunately, not everything went smoothly for the 101st Airborne Division as they assumed the JFC role. As Major General Gary Volesky, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division notes in a Center for Army Lessons Learned interview, “Few of the 101st Division staff members possessed experience in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. . . . Fortunately, the alert to prepare to deploy occurred before the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) were conducted. The program was flexible and adapted academics to meet the division’s requirements by focusing on Unified Action Partners (UAPs) and HA/DR” (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015c,
MCTP is a staff training program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for brigade, division and corps staffs where they are tested in their processes and systems in a simulated operational environment. Lightsey, the J-9, was able to develop a two-day Interagency Academics Seminar in conjunction with MCTP to bring together USAID, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Centers for Disease Control, DoS, the UN, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. National Institutes of Health (Lightsey 2016). Had it not been for this MCTP training opportunity immediately prior to the 101st’s deployment, their staff would have gone into Liberia with a tremendous capability gap in understanding the nuances of the HA/DR operation among interagency partners. These gaps would have required more on-the-job learning rather than being ready to immediately execute their tasks once in country.

When the 101st Airborne Division arrived, the J-9 and the commander made a conscious decision to not establish a CMOC. It was the belief of the 101st Airborne, that the NECC served as a type of national level CMOC and if the 101st had established their own, it would have only added to coordination confusion (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015c, 40-41). It was clear to the 101st Airborne, however, that the NECC had room for improvement. “Although more than 120 multinational organizations worked within the NECC, the lack of managerial oversight and prioritization was apparent (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015c, 23). In order to better facilitate coordination, cooperation, and synchronization, the 101st, J-2, intelligence section, embedded analysts to work with the international organizations and utilized their skills of pattern and trend analysis, to help the NECC and partner organizations better understand the situation and
spread of the Ebola virus. Similarly, the J-9 section emplaced several LNOs within the NECC and other coordination centers to better synchronize their operations and situational understanding. As a later AAR indicated, “The synergy created by the constant monitoring and sharing of information by the LNOs was essential to successful mission command in Liberia” (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015a, 34).

The need for interagency, interorganizational, and intergovernmental cooperation would prove critical throughout the operation. As the logistics officers for the JFC quickly realized, in an immature theater (one where U.S. Forces have not been operating for an extended period), it is very difficult to quickly move in, large amounts of personnel and equipment. “A majority of nations worldwide are very similar to Liberia in that these nations have limited infrastructure (airports, seaports, and road networks) and less than robust governmental assets (law enforcement, healthcare, informational/educational workforces) to cope with large scale HA/DR events. HA/DR events tend to overwhelm the infrastructures and systems necessary to combat those very events. Logistic support is central to HA/DR. Planning, anticipating, forecasting, coordinating, and integrating within ASCCs [Army Service Component Command] must include the whole of the strategic community; the DLA, USTRANSCOM, DoS, U.S. Embassies, USAID, UN, international participants, non-governmental organizations, and others within the JOA are essential to progress and success” (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015a, 18).

A similar realization of the critical importance of interagency cooperation was realized by the officers tasked to establish an Ebola Training Center in the capital of Monrovia. The military was required to build a training center capable of training up to 500 healthcare workers per week. Staffed by the USARAF G-3 Training Team, the team
consisted of one U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel, one Major, and one Sergeant Major. At a loss in where to start they coordinated with the USARAF surgeon cell to better understand the requirement. The command surgeon began interacting with the MoH, USAID, and WHO, and discovered that there was an existing training center providing the training capability requested by DoD. The problem, however, was that the center did not have the resources to expand the training or export it to another location (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015a, 22). The G-3 team had sufficient time to rewrite their plan to incorporate the WHO training facility and simply provide the WHO with the needed resources to adapt their curriculum and additional staff to meet the larger training center requirement. In this case, coordinating with NGOs and civil authorities to develop a civic assistance plan proved critical to mission success. Without the expertise of the WHO and MoH, the G-3 Training Team most likely would have created a suboptimal, redundant, and less efficient solution.

One particular question from this case is, what if the command surgeon in this previous example did not have the time or ability to informally network with USAID, the MoH and the WHO? The whole intent of a functioning CMOC or similar coordination center is to rely less on informal networking and instead institutionalize systems that can help fill these critical coordination gaps with other non-military partners. In the AAR, the G-3 Training Team recommended that in the short term the staff should request NGO LNO representation to participate in staff humanitarian assistance planning, and in the long term the USARAF staff should include NGO representation or a USAID LNO to aid in early stages of force projection operations (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015a,
Embedded partners on staffs are the types of interagency integration reforms that can dramatically improve mission effectiveness in the future.

Another problem the 101st Airborne Division faced in interagency cooperation was on what systems they were communicating on. The USARAF Commander, Major General Darryl Williams, quickly grasped the reality that unity of effort among the many different partners on the ground could only happen if USARAF shared information on unclassified networks, rather than the classified networks their staff was accustomed to (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015a, 33). The transition to unclassified networks became a severe challenge for a staff dependent on their classified army command and intelligence information systems. The 101st Airborne was simply unprepared, especially in the austere environment of Liberia, to establish an effective knowledge management process to not only give network access to interagency and interorganizational partners but to share information across the network (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015a, 38).

One work-around for the 101st Airborne Division was to take over AFRICOM’s All Partner Access Network, originally intended to provide information on exercises and HA/DR conferences (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015c, 7). AFRICOM’s All Partner Access Network suddenly became a real-time collaboration tool to share information and increase situational awareness. If the AFRICOM All Partner Access Network solution had not existed, the 101st Airborne Division would have had to piece together another solution quickly. The need to share information primarily across unclassified networks will continue to be a challenge for future HA/DR missions that are whole-of-government operations. Future JFCs, divisions, and even brigades will need to
train and have available the technology to quickly switch from classified military systems to an unclassified information environment conducive to greater interagency, interorganizational, and intergovernmental information sharing.

The final challenge for the 101st Airborne was that of organizational culture. According to the AARs, “the U.S. Army has developed a Warfighter mentality that did not serve USARAF personnel well in a permissive environment (i.e. sovereign nation). This caused friction and put into motion unnecessary assets, units, and capabilities” (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015b, 4). The AAR is referring to an Army unaccustomed to being subordinate to civilian organizations, other governments, and other government agencies in an area of operations. These other organizations often do not have clearly defined decision making processes which can be challenging to military organizations that are accustomed to making decisions and acting quickly (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015b, 7). Rather than having these differing organizational cultures as points of friction, the military should learn how to support civilian leadership utilizing their planning and logistical strengths, without taking over the process (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015b, 7). These cultural friction points were a challenge for the 101st, accustomed to quickly solving problems but eased with time through greater interagency exposure and coordination.

As we look at the Ebola case study, by most accounts a successful example of whole-of-government interagency coordination, there are a few key questions that are drawn out. Would it have been as successful if the DART element and USAID had not helped the Government of Liberia develop the NECC? The NECC was critical to the success, and the USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division made an excellent decision to
utilize it as its primary CMOC. But in the absence of the NECC, was the 101st Airborne Division prepared or equipped to run or facilitate its own CMOC that could serve as an adequate coordination center for the entire region or country? Based on the level of experience of the staff and the organizational culture of the 101st Airborne Division, it is likely that their CMOC would have been less effective. In future HA/DR mission sets the host nation, international organizations, and interagency partners may not have the capabilities to develop such a robust coordination structure, especially in a war zone with limited access.

From a doctrinal perspective, both USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division were empowered to host or integrate into a CMOC structure. The J-9 and J-2 both had adequate personnel to provide LNOs to make the system work. However, a second question is, if a BCT is required (on a much smaller scale) to integrate with interagency partners in say a province or city, would they have the expertise or capacity to coordinate such an effort? Most likely a BCT would not have the capacity to integrate interagency at their level, however the scenario is certainly plausible that a BCT would have to serve a similar function of integrating interagency cooperation at a provincial rather than national level.
### Summary Analysis of Ebola Case Study

**Table 12. DOTMLPF-P Analysis of Ebola Case Study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program—Analytical Lens</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ebola</td>
<td>(+) Both JFC and Division level doctrine supports interagency coordination through a CMOC function.</td>
<td>(+) Both JFC and Division level doctrine supports interagency coordination through a CMOC function.</td>
<td>(-) Staff had lack of expertise in HA/DR mission set and lack of interagency experience; MCTP program helped to alleviate this problem but if had not been scheduled in advance the Division would have been at a disadvantage.</td>
<td>(+) From the onset the Ebola response was a whole-of-government operation. DoD and the JFC was a supporting command to USAID. This led to better understanding of support relationships and strengthened interagency cooperation.</td>
<td>(+) While there were initial issues that were resolved, effective interagency cooperation was a critical factor in mission success halting the spread of Ebola in Liberia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*
Table 13. Rollup of DOTMLPF-P Analysis of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program—Analytical Lens</th>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CORDS</strong></td>
<td>(+) CORDS was the first fully integrated civil-military effort where at the tactical level civilians and military worked side by side on the same staffs to synchronize objectives.</td>
<td>(+) In order to better de-conflict pacification efforts with warfighting efforts, ARVN division advisors were consciously removed from the chain of command; Province teams reported directly to Corps HQ.</td>
<td>(+) CORDS attempted to seek a balance in the length of training so that advisors could receive sufficient regional and cultural expertise and still maximize time in the field.</td>
<td>(+) CORDS created through executive action of NSAM 362; realigned MACV staff to incorporate CORDS deputy and subordinate integrated staffs at Corps, Province and District level.</td>
<td>(+) CORDS is considered a successful stability operation program that had positive effects in pacification in S. Vietnam. (+) integration of civil-military at the tactical level directly led to pacification success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRT</strong></td>
<td>(+) Joint and Army doctrine were updated to reflect the use of PRTs for tactical interagency integration.</td>
<td>(-) PRTs overwhelmingly military, civilian expertise did not reach a critical mass.</td>
<td>(-) PRT teams lacked civilian and military integrated training prior to deployment.</td>
<td>(-) broad ambiguous guidelines from NSC left PRT mission ambiguous to supporting agencies, NGOs, and to PRT leaders resulting in flaws in execution.</td>
<td>(-) PRT projects criticized as unsustainable for Afghans. (-) criticisms for lack of support to national-regional objectives. (-) interagency conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program—Analytical Lens</td>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>(-) Army doctrine did not support interagency coordination for unit.</td>
<td>(-) No formalized mechanisms in place for coordination-synchronization to occur at BCT level with interagency partners-embassies.</td>
<td>(+) Familiarization of interagency partners conducted which added value once in country.</td>
<td>(-) BCT not empowered to directly liaison with embassy and interagency partners.</td>
<td>(-) Security cooperation goals not efficiently met in many cases or was cancelled in several circumstances due to lack of interagency coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebola</td>
<td>(+) Both JFC and Division level doctrine supports interagency coordination through a CMOC function.</td>
<td>(+) Sufficient personnel in the J-9 and J-2 sections to provide sufficient LNOs at coordination centers throughout region.</td>
<td>(-) Staff had lack of expertise in HA/DR mission set and lack of interagency experience; MCTP program helped to alleviate this problem but if had not been scheduled in</td>
<td>(+) From the onset the Ebola response was a whole-of-government operation. DoD and the JFC was a supporting command to USAID. This led to better understanding of</td>
<td>(+) While there were initial issues that were resolved, effective interagency cooperation was a critical factor in mission success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>technological solutions; lack of planning on how to conduct operations primarily on unclassified networks; difficulty to provide other partners with network access.</td>
<td>advance the Division would have been at a disadvantage.</td>
<td>support relationships and strengthened interagency cooperation.</td>
<td>halting the spread of Ebola in Liberia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

**Chapter Summary**

In this chapter we have looked at the primary research question of: In past cases in which the U.S. has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? In order to answer this question, we analyzed four case studies: (1) CORDS in Vietnam; (2) PRTs in Afghanistan; (3) RAF in Africa; and (4) Ebola Response in West Africa.

Using the variables of interagency assessments, third party academic assessments, and operational measures of effectiveness, table 14, highlights the results of each case study in answering our primary research question.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Interagency Integration Present?</th>
<th>Failure or Success?</th>
<th>Results linked to Interagency Integration?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Unclear, major difficulties present</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebola</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*

In the case of CORDS, interagency integration unequivocally and directly led to tactical mission success of the pacification program. In fact, studies showed that the more interagency integration that occurred at the district level, the greater chance teams could achieve their mission.

With Afghan PRTs, the answer is less conclusive. Some PRTs certainly integrated interagency well and achieved noteworthy accomplishments in their local regions, but many PRTs did not integrate well, and more importantly many PRTs did not support regional and national objectives. The Afghan PRT Case Study shows that interagency integration is necessary but not always sufficient for tactical mission success, especially when tactical units are not nested with higher campaign plans.

The RAF case study showed that U.S. Army brigades had difficulty accomplishing their mission because of a lack of interagency integration. This observation leads us to believe that interagency integration very likely is essential to RAF mission success. Due to interagency communication problems between DoD and State, RAF soldiers often were unprepared, sometimes untrained, and some could not deploy.
Finally, in the case of Ebola, while initial integration difficulties arose, interagency integration proved critical to the 101st Airborne’s success in halting the spread of Ebola in Liberia. The Ebola case study is of particular value because the interagency integration that occurred happened outside of U.S. Army interagency organizations. The 101st made a conscious decision to forgo a CMOC and instead utilize the DARTs and Liberia’s NECC constructs.

In chapter 5, Conclusions and Recommendations, the observations and answers to the primary research question will be used to propose recommendations for the U.S. Army, DoD, and the interagency, as well as suggest areas for further research and development.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter Introduction

The primary research question of this thesis was: In past cases, in which the U.S. has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? The initial hypothesis proposed was: yes, interagency integration and cooperation was essential for tactical mission success. In order to answer this question, four case studies were examined:

1. the CORDS program in Vietnam from 1967 to 1973;
2. PRTs in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2009;
3. RAF in Africa from 2013 to Present; and

Each case study utilized a qualitative analysis of three variables: internal interagency assessments, third-party academic assessments, and measures of operational effectiveness in order to ascertain whether interagency integration was essential for tactical mission success (or failure) (see table 15).
Table 15. Summary of Case Studies and Primary Research Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Interagency Integration Present?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ebola</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

Additionally, a DOTMLPF-P framework focusing on Doctrine, Organization, Training, and Policy was used in chapter 4 to identify characteristics essential for success (or failure).

Conclusions

Prior to beginning this research project, the initial hypothesis, that interagency integration was essential for tactical mission success, was based on observations that tactical level Army units (BCTs and below) were required to conduct complex stability operations without the needed subject matter expertise that interagency partners could provide to military formations. While this remains true, through the analysis of the four case studies, a more complicated and nuanced picture emerges.

The first observation, as shown in the CORDS case study, is that there are real challenges to managing both tactical conventional operations and stability operations. In Vietnam, Corps HQ chose to remove ARVN division advisors completely from the chain of command. Albeit, part of this decision had to do with the quality of advisors, but it is
an important observation that tactical staffs are often better equipped to focus either on warfighting tasks and stability tasks separately. This observation on the limits of staff capacity is especially true for a BCT staff, compared to higher staffs at Corps and Division which may have the manpower and resources to manage both. An observation from Iraq and Afghanistan, however, is sometimes Corps and Division also arguably struggle, managing both warfighting and stability simultaneously.

The impact of this observation lends to a conclusion that instead of building a BCT staff to manage both, it may be better to augment a more robust PRT/CMOC structure to manage interagency coordination and synchronization separately from BCT warfighting tasks. In Vietnam these provincial advisors reported directly to Corps HQ. In Afghanistan, in an effort to nest the PRTs with brigade commanders’ plans, PRTs reported directly to BCTs. However, in Afghanistan the impact of this reporting structure was PRTs that were not well synchronized or aligned with national objectives. In future operations it may be better to rely on PRT/CMOC structures but include them under Division or Corps staffs, so that commanders can still integrate interagency expertise but align their interagency teams with larger national objectives while still allowing tactical BCTs to focus more on security tasks.

The second major observation is that integrated interagency organizations must not ignore the challenge of finding civilian agency capacity to fill billets. PRTs, despite being integrated, only provided about 4 percent civilian representatives nationwide. Most PRTs only had 2 to 3 percent civilians. Likewise, as we observed in CORDS, even in a fully integrated structure, 85 percent of the advisors were still military. Moreover, especially in the PRT case study, the civilians on the teams struggled with an experience
and expertise problem. Many were junior Foreign Service officers still learning their own organizations and certainly were not development experts. This challenge will not change in the future, especially because of a lack of capacity and funding in civilian departments and agencies relative to what DoD invests in education and training. The military must continue to manage stability tasks independently if necessary, however, through reforms, tactical formations can better utilize a CMOC or PRT structure to deploy needed civilian advice and expertise quickly, where it is needed most and can be more effective.

The third major observation is that interagency integration can occur outside of DoD managing the process. An early idea during this research was how to reform DoD from a more comprehensive approach of interagency integration to a joint approach (see figure 14). Command relationships of interagency integration, akin to what was seen in CORDS, has benefits by streamlining and synchronizing interagency objectives with a commander’s objectives. However, this thesis’ research shows that DoD attempting to exercise command of interagency integration can also have the potential to make matters worse, through an overt militarization of the interagency dynamics.
As the Ebola case study highlights, if the 101st Airborne Division chose to build a CMOC, it would only confuse the already complicated interagency structure in Liberia. The 101st Airborne made an important and excellent decision to utilize the NECC which the USAID DART helped to build prior to the 101st Airborne and JFC’s arrival. The interagency community, resourced under the DART, had the capacity and expertise to build institutionalized mechanisms for DoD to incorporate itself into. Commanders need to have an awareness of when to utilize these other mechanisms rather than duplicating them on their own, simply because DoD may be resourced to and doctrine may call for it.

Finally, interagency integration is not a panacea. CORDS was successful because the provincial and district advisory teams were strongly integrated into the regional (Corps HQ) and national (MACV HQ) strategies. The tactical level pacification plans were routinely evaluated and synchronized not only with higher, but in support of the
Vietnamese Government. Due to the PRTs’ ambiguous mission and tasks driven mostly by individual PRT commanders, they did not achieve objectives synchronized with larger campaign plans. On occasion PRTs even took action that undermined national objectives. Interagency integration is necessary but not sufficient for tactical mission success in stability operations. An integrated interagency element must also have talent, capacity, and the organizational and reporting structures to nest and synchronize with operational and strategic objectives.

In summary, this thesis’ primary conclusions are that:

1. there are real challenges to managing both conventional operations and stability operations for tactical staffs;
2. integrated interagency organizations must also plan for civilian agency capacity to provide for talented subject matter experts;
3. interagency integration can still occur without DoD managing the process; and
4. that interagency is not a panacea for stability operations.

These conclusions all have clear implications for future operations, the Army, and the role of BCTs in tactical operations involving stability tasks.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Decision Makers

The following recommendations are based from an analysis of the case study DOTMLPF-P characteristics for successful integration. Specifically, recommendations will focus on the Doctrine, Organization, Training, and Policy variables.
Doctrine: Update Military Doctrine on Interagency Tools

The JIACGs, CMOCs, and PRTs may be the primary interagency tools for DoD as a lead agency, but as the military response to the Ebola epidemic has shown, DoD needs to be adaptable to other interagency integration systems. Commanders need guidance on when to appropriately apply DoD interagency coordination tools like a CMOC, when to utilize existing civilian systems, or how to best apply their own J-9/S-9 civil affairs assets to augment existing civilian assets. For RAF units and future large scale stability responses like the Ebola response, it is more likely that DoD will utilize other interagency integration means like the DART and NECC coordination systems, UN coordination centers, or ad hoc groups. Current joint doctrine like JP 3-08 and Army doctrine like Field Manual 3-07 do not reflect these other means of non-DoD focused interagency coordination, nor give guidance in the variables and principles commanders should utilize in understanding how to choose which system is more appropriate or how to augment existing interagency coordination systems.

Organization: Reform the Civil-Military Operations Center

When BCTs, divisions, and corps are required to lead or facilitate interagency integration, the CMOC is not sufficiently equipped. As shown during the 101st Airborne Division’s experiences with the Ebola epidemic, they were not prepared to provide internet access or knowledge management tools for the range of interagency and NGO partners in the Ebola Response. The DART and MoH’s NECC provided the necessary institutions, but in a more denied environment where DoD is the lead agency the CMOC may need to provide the needed unclassified infrastructure, to run a full coordination center. An immature theater of operations does not have the network and technology...
architecture that the military is accustomed to, which they utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the CMOC is the primary interagency coordination tool, then its needs to be resourced with the technology packages to serve this function.

Commanders should train at combat training centers with the J-9/S-9s augmented with civil affairs soldiers, and utilize their CMOCs. A tactical commander will be unaccustomed to using their CMOC properly, comfortably coordinating with interagency through it, and utilizing interagency partners in the staff planning processes, if the first time they use a CMOC is while deployed. This is especially the case for BCT commanders who do not regularly interact with CMOCs or S-9s in their home station organic task organization.

Likewise, in the case of the PRTs in Afghanistan, BCT level CMOCs were not adequately equipped, trained or prepared to synchronize their provincial level civilian stability operations with overall national and regional objectives. CMOCs that are viewed as more of “meeting places” for civilian partners will struggle to integrate interagency partners into larger campaign plans and operational planning systems. The J-9/S-9 and supporting staff officers should be empowered to integrate their civilian partners into other staff sections if necessary to ensure unity of effort with other military and strategic efforts.

Training: Improve Interagency Training Within the Military

As illustrated in the Ebola, RAF, and PRT case studies, the Army has a deficiency in training leaders and soldiers to operate in an interagency environment despite currently offered JIIM training. Operating in an interagency environment should be a required training task for all deployable soldiers, especially those in RAF units, those involved in
stability missions, or those in a Headquarters Staff. Interagency partners like DoS, USAID, USDA, and the intelligence and law enforcement communities should be invited to participate in training (especially at the combat training centers) and should help craft training objectives and training scenarios. Ideally, those interagency partners supporting organizations like USARAF, would benefit from participating in training with RAF BCT HQ to ensure proper face to face coordination prior to security cooperation activities.

Staffs and headquarters should also become more familiar with including interagency partners in their planning processes. The 101st Airborne Division was able to quickly change their MCTP training objectives, however if made to deploy prior or after a conventional MCTP they would have been at a serious disadvantage. Likewise, the 101st Airborne Division was unaccustomed to operating in a mostly unclassified environment, on programs designed to share information with interagency partners and NGOs (for example Google Earth rather than the Command Post of the Future). RAF units, Division HQ, and those conducting stability operations should train their staffs to perform their functions on toolsets designed for information sharing with non-DoD partners.

Military officials should train on being in a support role to the interagency (similar to the Ebola case) rather than a lead role–this will help address the military’s culture tendencies of trying to run or manage the interagency rather than support and contribute to the interagency.
Policy: Build Greater Capacity for Deployable Civilians in DoS and USAID

This recommendation requires authorities outside of DoD channels. As shown in the case studies, deployable civilian interagency capacity for contingency crises continues to be a problem in stability operations. If the U.S. conducted another large scale integrated interagency endeavor like CORDS, DoS, and USAID could not support it. DoS and USAID sustained problems providing sufficient experienced manpower to PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, both programs nowhere near the size of CORDS. Stability operations will only continue to have a perception of “militarization” as long as the USG does not invest in building greater capacity within DoS and USAID to deploy civilians for stability operations. It is in the interest of DoD to seek greater funding for deployable civilian capacity in DoS and USAID, otherwise the USG will continue to rely heavily on DoD as the only organization capable of stability operations, with or without development expertise.

Impact to Army Warfighting Challenges

In chapter 1 this research highlighted the following AWFCs, which are enduring first order problems, the solutions to which will improve current and future force combat effectiveness (Army Capabilities Integration Center 2016):

AWFC #1: Develop Situation Understanding;
AWFC #2: Shape the Security Environment;
AWFC #4: Adapt the Institutional Army and Innovate;
AWFC #10: Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders;
AWFC #14: Ensure Interoperability and Operate in a JIIM Environment.
Recommendations to Decision Makers #1 through 4 all affect these warfighting challenges. Interagency integration is not a panacea for stability operations, however, when properly integrated and synchronized with higher campaign plans and U.S. national objectives, interagency integration can become a dramatic and powerful enabler for tactical mission success. Currently preventing the U.S. from achieving the synergistic effects of integration are people and leaders unaccustomed to operating in such an environment, organizations not fitted to incorporate partners, and institutions in the Army not resolving these integration problems. These problems are all reflected in the above AWFCs and the proposed recommendations can help alleviate some of these difficulties.

Recommendations for Future Research

This research was limited by its case studies; interagency integration certainly is not limited to these four cases presented. The State Partnership Program, interagency cooperation within the counterterrorism community, PRTs in Iraq, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, intelligence cooperation initiatives, all provide good lenses for other observations on characteristics needed in interagency integration and cooperation at the tactical level.

Additionally, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to reform DoD to better integrate “jointness” across the military. Many policy experts advocate for 21st century reforms that legislate a similar restructuring of DoD to incorporate the interagency. Examining proposals for “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” reforms were outside the scope of this research; however, these cases provide an interesting analysis of principles to consider if larger Beyond Goldwater-Nichols types of reforms become a political reality.
Finally, this thesis did not examine the impacts of education of personnel in the DOTMLPF-P characteristics for more effective integration of interagency cooperation. Education at the many professional military education schools such as Officer Basic Courses, Captains Career Course, Intermediate Level Education, and Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Courses, represents an incredible amount of time and interface with the force to influence greater interagency familiarization and coordination. Affecting the military education system to address interagency integration challenges is worthy of its own independent study to understand how and where education changes can best impact interagency integration.

Closing Thoughts

Chapter 2 began with a quote from Harold Seidman, an American political scientist, famous for his classic work in government and public administration called *Politics, Position and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization*. In it he described the quest for government coordination as the 20th century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher’s stone (Seidman 1970, 164). His point was that the inherent nature of bureaucracies runs counter to effective coordination. There is a lot of truth to this observation, but it should not prevent us from seeking to improve the current environment, especially when integration of interagency and DoD is not just an exercise of public administration interest, but rather a means to prevent the loss of lives overseas and accomplish vital American national interests and objectives.

The U.S. Military is coming out of more than a decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that reached unprecedented levels of interagency integration for modern operations. An entire generation of young military officers and their Foreign Service
Officer peers understand the need, but this expertise and desire for reform can quickly be lost as a new generation of soldiers and public servants, unaccustomed to working in an integrated interagency environment, fills its ranks. The time for reform is now, while the lessons are still fresh in our collective memory. Building military and civilian formations capable of integrating is best during peace rather than in the stresses of conflict.


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