PEOPLE, PASSION, AND ARMIES: HISTORICAL RECRUITMENT
METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATION

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General Studies

by

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### ABSTRACT
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ABSTRACT

PEOPLE, PASSION, AND ARMIES: HISTORICAL RECRUITMENT METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATION, by Major Lance B. Brender, 102 pages.

Throughout history, states have used different recruitment methods to raise armies. Some of those methods have been successful—and some have failed disastrously. This study examines four historical cases to explore underlying patterns that help explain what makes different means of recruitment effective, focusing on the key social factors that are pertinent to raising an army. Using the backdrop of RAND researcher Brian Nichiporuk’s “competitively multipolar” world, this study offers analysis on what mix of volunteer recruiting, contractor use, and conscription, is right for America against the RAND study’s near-future threats.
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The 2014 United States Army Operating Concept describes our world as deeply uncertain and complex. Its interactions are fast-paced, competitive, and dangerous. The United States is an important actor on this international stage—and the Army is the decisive force of the United States’ military. The Army Operating Concept considers what dangers America will face as it moves into the future, detailing multiple threats from old adversaries like North Korea and Iran but also acknowledging the existence of as yet unrecognized perils. As those hazards materialize, the Army will have to adapt in many ways, including its size, in order to face them. This study examines what factors will influence how the United States Government and the Army will recruit the force necessary to meet future adversaries by examining a 2005 RAND paper entitled Alternative Futures and Army Force Planning: Implications for the Future Era.

Alternative Futures and Army Force Planning’s author, Brian Nichiporuk, describes six possible futures that could occur by 2025: “United States unipolarity,” “democratic peace,” “major competitor rising,” “transnational web,” “chaos-anarchy,” and “competitive multipolarity.” In United States unipolarity, America is the dominant international power “across the board.” Alternatively, democratic peace envisions a world that has achieved universal liberal democracy and market-based economies. This world has rendered large interstate wars “not a realistic possibility” and all powers,

* The Army Operating Concept is a document that the United States Department of the Army uses to establish strategic goals.
including the United States, have significantly demilitarized. In the major competitor rising scenario, the future is described as one in which a near-peer nation-state or bloc of nation-states, with significant conventional and strategic military capabilities, challenge United States interests globally. Transnational web posits a situation where nation-states have lost a great deal of power to non-state actors, such as international corporations, transnational criminal organizations, and terrorist networks. In his fifth scenario, Nichiporuk describes the world of chaos-anarchy, a scenario where national power has devolved to an even further extent than in transnational web (mostly because of environmental degradation, overpopulation, and ethnic strife).

Finally, Nichiporuk considers competitive multipolarity, a future that requires an American Army 50 percent bigger than it was in 2005 (an increase of 247,000 people). In this hypothetical scenario, two large competitor nations develop the power and will to challenge the United States-led world order. These nations each create their own blocs of satellite states. Nichiporuk envisions that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has become defunct and that the United States now heads the “Rimland Alliance,” which is comprised of many Western European, Pacific Rim, and Western Hemisphere countries. Russia leads the “Central Powers,” which include many Eastern European, African, and Central Asian countries, to include India. China leads the “New Solidarity Alliance,” which includes member states from the Islamic world and those Asian countries not otherwise under the sway of Rimland or the Central Powers. In this scenario, many of the United States’ current friends, to include Saudi Arabia and India, have abandoned relationships with the United States as a result of international maneuvering and internal
revolutions. The effect of all of this is a tense but stable balance of power between these three great blocs, at least for the moment.\textsuperscript{12}

If war were to erupt in this competitive multipolarity scenario, Nichiporuk does not imagine it would be a large, conventional style conflict. Rather, he visualizes leading countries, like the United States, China, or Russia, projecting numerous small elements of military power into non-aligned countries in order to increase the leader’s sphere of influence. Again, for America to do this the future Army will need to be 50 percent larger than the 2005 one, an increase of about 247,000 people.\textsuperscript{13}

This study explores how the United States Army should recruit this force. It will consider to what degree America should continue with its volunteer recruitment model, employ contractors, and use conscription. Though the current voluntary recruitment method resonates deeply with many military stakeholders, including former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, this study will examine what factors make each of these methods appropriate options at different times.\textsuperscript{14}

This study grounds itself in strategist Colin Gray’s assertion that “the American Army at war is American society at war.”\textsuperscript{15} In his monograph “Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy,” Gray proffers that society and culture are inexorably linked to the method that America, or any country, uses to wage its wars. A logical result of Gray’s analysis is that the type of army a country can raise is a direct function of the conditions of its society. Almost any means can succeed at the tactical task of raising troops; however, using a method not suited to the social circumstances can fail at the strategic goal of generating a force capable of furthering the ultimate political ends of the government.\textsuperscript{16}
This study makes several assumptions. One, that no one method of recruitment is intrinsically superior or more American than any other, and two, in chapter five, that for the purposes of this study the social circumstances of 2016 America can partly serve in place of 2025.

Several key terms within this study have particular meanings. The “all volunteer force” refers to the American non-compulsory military service model used since 1973. In that same vein, this study uses the terms volunteer recruiting and volunteerism interchangeably. An opportunity cost, an economic term, is the unavoidable loss of a benefit that one incurs by making a choice (e.g., if you go right, you have lost the opportunity to go left). On the margin, another economic phrase, refers to the additional cost or benefit of the next thing to be acquired or lost. In this study, it refers to soldiers. The term soldier refers to the uniformed member of any country’s ground force. If capitalized, other than at the beginning of a sentence, the term refers specifically to a member of the United States Army. If referring to American and foreign soldiers collectively, the word will not be capitalized. Finally, the initialism US stands for United States.

This study identified no limitations to its research but the author did impose several delimitations on it. First, the intrinsic morality of the three recruitment methods is not examined (this study does not discuss whether a volunteer system is more ethically right than hiring contractors or conscription). Second, the author confines the subject

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† For example, imagine that the cost of recruiting a soldier goes up on the margin. This would mean that the cost of recruiting the last soldier an army acquired was $50,000, but the cost of the next soldier (the one on the margin) is $51,000. This is what the author means by costs increasing on the margin.
matter of this study to personnel recruiting only. This study examines no other aspect of force generation. Lastly, this study does not discuss the accession of Department of the Army civilians.

The significance of this topic relates to understanding possible ways the United States Army can increase troop strength and how those ways are more likely to succeed or fail under different social circumstances. Exploring how the US Army can grow its forces attempts to provide insight into US Army recruiting policy and force management.


2 Ibid.


4 Ibid., 37, 45, 51, 58, 64, 69.

5 Ibid., xiii.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 96.

9 Ibid., 58.

10 Ibid., 59.

11 Ibid., 60.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid, xiii.


16 Ibid.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

This chapter presents an overview of current research into military recruitment. First, it examines United States Naval Admiral Eric Olson, former head of US Special Operations Command. According to Olson in a 2015 Wall Street Journal article, the United States military needs even more of what the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency, needed in the Second World War: a “PhD who could win in a bar fight.”

Olson says that war has been and will increasingly be in the “grey zone,” or far from the relative clarity of state-on-state struggle. Like most conflicts since the end of the Second World War, future fights will be irregular and asymmetric. America’s enemies will use strategies and tactics that negate the United States’ strengths, forcing it to play on levels that deny it its greatest advantages. Should the United States fail to recruit properly, Olson concludes, it risks being “outthought and outfought.”

Another influential thinker on the subject is Dr. Andrew J. Bacevich, Sr. In his book Breach of Trust, Bacevich makes the case that American society is at a particularly dysfunctional period in its civil-military relations. His point of view is colored, as he declares, by his experiences as an Army officer in the Vietnam War. Towards the end of that conflict, much of the United States believed that it was involved in an unjust and needless conflict. Dissent had become a part of American culture, sparking an entire counter-governmental peace movement that came to be iconic of the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, the movement was not merely an interesting cultural footnote.
America’s experiences during the Vietnam War would have lasting implications for US military recruiting.  

During the Vietnam period, the primary method of sustaining the US Army was conscription.  Like in preceding US conflicts (Korea and the World Wars), mass conscription to augment a small, professional Army represented what President Harding once called America’s “traditional military policy,” and it was a method very much in line with the nation’s historic distrust of standing armies.  Drafting forces for Vietnam after 1968, however, was fraught with issues. For one, the widely unpopular college deferment system allowed young men enrolled in higher education to postpone their service commitment until graduation. While this was avowedly to allow these men to contribute more to the country by means of future professional service, critics contended that it had the effect of shifting the burden of war away from the military-aged male population as a whole and towards those who had the least ability to secure a deferment: the poor and the disadvantaged. This perception of unfairness led many draftees to feelings of resentment.

Coming out of the Vietnam conflict, the Army and the American government were desperate to avoid ever repeating the mistakes of the last decade of warfare.  Partially because of this, the Office of the Secretary of Defense researched and instituted an all-volunteer force model. The idea seemed revolutionary at the time, though a completely volunteer military had much older and well-established roots in American history than conscription. Volunteerism was the primary method of recruiting for the professional Army from the beginning of the Revolutionary War through the mid-19th century. The first large-scale use of conscription was during the Civil War, and even
then the belligerents adopted it only in the latter half of the conflict (1863 in the United States and 1862 in the Confederacy). Nevertheless, critics pointed out that the constitution of the United States specifically left out a large, standing army, providing a legal basis only for a permanent navy.

Bacevich describes the 2013 era civil-military environment as a very difficult one. While many people avowedly respect the military (82 percent of respondents in one recent poll said they considered being a military officer prestigious), the nature of the relationship between America’s Army and its citizenry is that only a small percentage will ever serve in uniform. To this Michael Desch, an academic expert on military and political science, stated in 2011 that “I have this deep existential angst about a military organization with a democratic society that’s as isolated from the rest of that society as our military is becoming.” The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, echoed this statement:

I have been struck in my travels at the lack of what I would call in-depth understanding of what we’ve been through. We come from fewer and fewer places—we’ve BRACed² our way out of significant portions of the country. Long term, if the military drifts away from its people in this country, that is a catastrophic outcome we as a country can’t tolerate.

Reinforcing this view was Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who in 2016 said “service in the military—[no] matter how laudable—has become something for other people to do. If true, these sentiments will have appreciable impacts on the ways the US Army raises forces.

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² Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). A US military cost saving initiative that closed and combined a number of military bases nationwide in an effort to reduce operating expenses and improve security.
However, the current military recruitment debate is not confined to volunteer recruiting and conscription. In his 2015 book *Return of the Hired Gun: How Private Armies Will Remake Modern Warfare*, author Sean McFate details how mercenary armies have boomed around the world in the last 25 years. For instance, in 1995 South African private mercenary company Executive Outcomes fought a predominantly conventional war in Sierra Leone against Charles Taylor’s Revolutionary United Front. This same company went on to find work in Kenya, Angola, and elsewhere after the end of the war.¹⁹

American versions of this business model took on new life with the coming of the Global War on Terror. Though US law forbids mercenaries, defined for this study’s purposes as civilians in a military role who have the legal right to fire first, it does not outlaw military contractors, who can essentially do everything other than that.²⁰ American military contractors, such as Triple Canopy and its more infamous contemporary Blackwater, took on a host of roles from logistical support to personal escort of diplomats and even heavily armed convoy security.²¹ According to McFate, this was partly an effort to mask the human cost of war. While the death of a Soldier makes the nightly news, the death of a military contractor attracts far less attention.²²

While the US does not allow its military contractors to take on offensive roles, other regions do not follow such rules. Africa and Asia, McFate notes, are ripe environments for the expansion of true mercenary armies. As US involvement wanes in Afghanistan, for instance, altruistic non-governmental organizations may become new customers for private militaries who are willing to provide security for a price instead of a cause.²³
In his closing remarks, McFate warns that the world may be entering an era of “neomedievalism.”24 If the US loses its monopsony on military contractors, the less structured parts of the world may devolve from areas patrolled by state-sponsored armies to lands under the sway of the highest bidder’s private military.25

Rounding out this overview is an economic study from theorist Thomas Ross entitled “Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment,” which has significant bearing on this study.26 Though relatively little literature exists that proffers recommendations on recruitment theory (Ross states that his own economic recruitment model is the only one that he knows of), many documents do address the macroeconomic factors that make military recruitment successful or not. In 1994, Ross’ work added to that body by conducting a study of 78 market-based countries and the factors that influenced their use of either conscription or volunteer recruiting. He found that correlation between the methods was not as straightforward as it might appear on the surface: countries as dissimilar as the United States and Sudan both exclusively use volunteerism. Conversely, close cultural neighbors to the US, like France and Germany, rely on conscription.27

Ross’ thesis is that “relative costs are important to [the decision between volunteer recruiting and conscription] and that the relative costs of these two systems will vary across countries and over time.”28 In layman’s terms, a country will pursue that system that incurs the least total cost to itself at the moment. The term \textit{cost} includes direct monetary payments and administrative fees but also takes into account the opportunity cost of removing civilians from productive civil work, as well as the loss incurred from any social repercussions of the recruitment method. Ross continues that
every method has costs, many of which will occur with both methods, but some are peculiar to each. Lottery style drafts incur a high social opportunity cost, being just as likely to make an infantryman out of the chief executive officer of a company as a high school dropout. Volunteer recruiting, which counters this by being able to seek out only the people it wants from society, becomes increasing more expensive the larger the army grows (each additional person, who is already working productively, is more expensive to society on the margin). Thoughtful analysis between these two methods is important because “it is to no government’s advantage to choose less efficient means to any particular end.”

Ross references a number of other researchers who have published on the economic theory behind conscription versus volunteer recruiting. Walter Y. Oi estimated opportunity costs in terms of foregone civilian output incurred by the two systems. Others, like J. Ronnie Davis, Neil Palomba, James Miller, and Robert D. Tollison described in detail the implicit taxation that is inherent within the draft. In these authors’ cases, the premise is that impressing a citizen into military service, something that under free market conditions would bear a price tag, imposes a tax on the individual equal to the value of their service, minus whatever compensation they receive. As such, while this saves money for the government in the short term, it transfers that cost to society in the form of lost civilian production and to the soldier in the form of lost wages, both of which ultimately cost the nation. This general argument was one of the key factors in the Gates Commission’s report in favor of volunteer recruitment.

Ross, while acknowledging that culture and history and war all play important parts in this decision, concludes that this is essentially an economic problem and that
countries will use whatever system is least costly at the time. Further conclusions include his belief that conscription puts the “wrong” people into uniform (wrong defined as someone who is more useful to society as a civilian). Volunteer recruiting, on the other hand, puts the right people in uniform, but becomes prohibitively expensive if a country needs to mobilize large portions of its population.

Ross predicates his findings on the belief that people are unequally suited to being soldiers. Some individuals will make good soldiers but poor civilian workers and vice versa. In light of this, Ross notes that the bigger the disparity between “good” and “bad” potential soldiers, the more attractive volunteer recruiting, with its ability to pick the “right” people, is.

Finally, the issue of will, albeit expressed in terms of money, is a concern. More wealthy people are less likely to enter military service willingly, as they have more to lose. However, a war may decrease the “reservation wages,” or the compensation that an individual is willing to accept, “if participation is seen as patriotic.” Restated, people are willing to accept less pay and endure more hardship if they care about the conflict. Ross concludes by saying that the most important factor in whether a country uses conscription or volunteer recruiting is the size of army it needs: if it needs a large force, conscription is preferable; if it only requires a small force, volunteer recruiting is the better choice.

**Case Studies**

**Revolutionary French Conscription**

Revolutionary France was the first to use conscription on a large scale after Europe’s emergence from the Middle Ages. This was prompted by the fall of the
French monarchy in 1792, which brought about a new relationship between French civil government and its military. It was a turning point in the revolution that marked the radicalization of the populace of France and the expansion of its wars to all of Europe’s monarchies, not just its own.37

Prior to the revolution, France’s army, like the rest of Europe, was composed of a mostly nobleman officer corps, an impressed peasant soldiery, and foreign mercenaries.38 To the general population the social stigma of enlistment, a task reserved only for the most unwanted members of society, made service widely undesirable. However, the coming of the populist French revolution tore the old military order down. Revolutionary officials gutted the officer corps and vastly increased its enlisted numbers.

The initial periods of this military expansion were fraught with problems. Contrary to the somewhat romanticized view of revolutionary France’s military recruiting, in 1792 the idea of compulsory military service was widely regarded as a moral injustice.39 As many pointed out, the very first tenet of the revolution’s catchphrase, liberté, égalité, fraternité (liberty, equality, brotherhood), seemed at clear odds with impressed service. Recognizing this on some level, the Republic’s first choice of recruitment was volunteerism.40

As one of its very first acts, the revolutionary French government directed its military departments to dramatically increase their numbers.41 To do this, the departments sent recruitment officers to each township with instructions to allow three days for voluntary enlistment. Should volunteerism fail, though, these officers were furnished with the explicit caveat to make up whatever holes remained by force. Many of those first conscripted were “national guard” soldiers, inactive reservists who had
previously received military training.\textsuperscript{42} But, once those numbers had been depleted recruiters turned to the civilian population, who were not eager to join up. Even with the wave of nationalism that had engulfed the populace, submitting to conscription into the French army was not prominent in many citizens’ minds. Despite the zealotry of revolution, impressment was wildly unpopular and resulted in “thousands [fleeing] from their homes . . . in open revolt.”\textsuperscript{43} Angered, the French government applied draconian methods to impose its will:

The hitherto unknown tyranny of conscription had to be enforced by ferocious penalties. Those failing to report when called were treated like deserters who had voluntarily enlisted and then broken their contract. They were punished by ten years in chains, their property was confiscated and their parents punished with them.\textsuperscript{44}

Besides being a shock to the system, the initial, uncoordinated 1792 draft model failed because it was widely viewed as unfair, landing most heavily on the poor, the unmarried, and the young.\textsuperscript{45} It was not until 1793, when French officer Lazare Carnot drafted the \textit{levée en masse}, that French conscription gained the effectiveness for which history knows it. Carnot’s plan established that all physically able men 18 to 25 would be liable for service, without exception.\textsuperscript{46} The \textit{levée ’s} universality made the process much more palatable and allowed the revolutionary government to harness the populace’s passion.\textsuperscript{47} However, the move to mass conscription still had to account for the dissonance between personal freedom, one of the very reasons for the revolution, and the act of the government forcing individuals into dangerous, unpleasant military life.

The vehicle by which the government accomplished this somewhat radical shift in values was its effective argument that patriotism and republicanism were supreme moral values, trumping even the people’s cherished notion of personal liberty. The primacy of
these beliefs made the anti-liberalism of conscription less obvious, if perhaps not actually accepted.\textsuperscript{48} The government’s obfuscation of personal freedom behind the curtain of duty enabled the further successful argument that, in reality, every conscript \textit{was} a volunteer (a term the French government was always careful to use). The government reasoned successfully to the populace that though the physical method of enlistment was impressment, it only worked because it ultimately reflected the people’s own deeply internalized sense of obligation to the ideal of citizenship.\textsuperscript{49}

Indeed, the French government was able to go one step further, proclaiming that military service was an honor.\textsuperscript{50} Initially, this argument met with much resistance. To the average Frenchman, military service being honorable was a foreign concept. Most viewed soldiering much like the rest of Europe did: an occupation for criminals and undesirables. The notion that military service was an honor was something that, under the Old Regime, had applied only to the officer nobility (if even then). Turning this notion on its head, the revolutionary government said that service, even as a private soldier, was not only a duty but a great mark of distinction.\textsuperscript{51} This in itself was a revolutionary act. Through the dual lines of obligation and desirability, the French government masked the unpleasantness of conscription under the veil of a volunteer army. As researchers Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron put it, “honor . . . [came] to be represented, and to some extent subjectively felt by those concerned, as authentic expressions of individual personality.”\textsuperscript{52} This unique, powerfully motivating factor enabled the public’s acceptance of military service as an endeavor as respectable as any civilian trade—and one that was certainly more patriotic.\textsuperscript{53}
Carnot’s levée revolutionized the recruiting of the French army. For one, it addressed the debilitating issue of indiscipline that was inherent in pre-revolutionary French formations. Prior to 1792, keeping an army was as much an issue of ruthless discipline as of strategy and tactics. Soldiers had to be tightly controlled and pitilessly punished for the slightest infractions because their officers, quite rightly, believed that they would bolt from the ranks at the first opportunity. The levée successfully changed this by combining the revolutionary dedication of the average citizen with the equitability of universal conscription, an amalgam that created the force that Napoleon Bonaparte used to conquer Italy in 1796.

An important issue with universal conscription that French planners ran into as the process wore on, though, was the loss of civilian production. Some French politicians argued that the levée was draining away too many young men from much needed work at home. French conscription methods front-shifted a good deal of the burden of war to society’s least skilled and most expendable (especially considering that a 1798 amendment to the French code allowed for the purchasing of exemptions). Even so, the vast numbers of people that responded to the call to fight France’s foreign wars created a manpower scarcity at home that unquestionably raised the price of labor and threatened the reformed country’s viability. This was somewhat lessened later in the Napoleonic Wars by levying allied civilians in conquered territories, who in some cases were not coerced into service nearly as much as one might think. Exiled Polish General

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§ Napoleon Bonaparte, or Napoleon I, ruled as First Consul of the French Consulate from 1799-1804 and emperor of the First French Empire from 1804-1815, simultaneously serving as commander-in-chief of the French armed forces.
Jeon-Henri Dombrowski, for one, raised his Polish Legion quite voluntarily to assist Bonaparte in securing Lombardy.\textsuperscript{62} However, even taking on foreigners did not much alleviate the pressure at home. By 1812, the Emperor had taken to calling up men two years ahead of the government’s lowest age limits, leaving France all but emptied of its youngest generation of workers.\textsuperscript{63} Finally, Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte was defeated at the Battle of Waterloo in June 1815, soon thereafter abdicating his now vastly reduced empire to his son. He died in exile on the island of Saint Helena in 1821 at the age of 51.\textsuperscript{64}

Viewed in hindsight, the success of the \textit{levée en masse} was made possible by the revolutionary French government’s pitch of military service as an honorable, patriotic obligation becoming reality in the minds of the people.\textsuperscript{65} It effectively tapped into a deep well of personal conviction that the goals of liberty, equality, and brotherhood were worth suffering and dying for.\textsuperscript{66} Additionally, it was effective because the government had the people from which to draw. Not an infinite amount, as French economic planners of the time themselves said, but enough to outnumber France’s enemies.\textsuperscript{67} In short, French conscription worked because France had the people available at a social cost it was willing to pay and the methods used, ultimately, \textit{did} reflect the will of the people.\textsuperscript{68}

Prussian Mercenary Contracting

18th century Prussia was a small country set in the midst of large, powerful kingdoms. On the average, Prussia had roughly one fifth the population of its near neighbors, France and Britain.\textsuperscript{69} It was, however, a powerful and crafty state that marshaled its limited resources into a puissant fighting force.\textsuperscript{70}
During the era of Frederick the Great, most European countries maintained armies based on obsolete knight-based formations, augmented with militia levies. Their soldiery was more or less endogenous, a logical outgrowth of the medieval model. This was a reflection of the opinion of many experts, like Niccolo Machiavelli, author of *The Prince*, who had stated 200 years earlier that native troops were superior and more reliable than foreign mercenaries. However, emerging military thought, particularly in Prussia, was becoming firmly entrenched with the idea that while subjects as soldiers was the great ideal, actually crafting such an army was completely impractical. One reason for this was that few monarchs’ positions were secure enough that they felt safe arming their subjects. An armed peasantry and bourgeoisie might as likely destroy the king as the enemy. Additionally, the common belief among many countries’ senior military officials was that only professional, lifelong soldiers had the technical skills and tactical sense to handle weapons and execute maneuvers. The abysmally poor quality of most militia troops, who were generally of little worth other than for securing their own towns, reinforced this supposition. As such, while Middle Age holdovers were common elsewhere, professional, contracted mercenary armies were on the rise in Prussia.

In parallel development with Frederick’s kingdom, the nearby Netherlands followed a similar mercenary model. One Dutch commander, Michelet, said that he could secure his state’s interests with “not many men, but well chosen, well fed, and very well paid.” In both countries, mercenary armies were by then the backbone of those states’ total military force, capable of providing both soldiers on demand and a force on permanent military retainer, so long as prompt pay and harsh discipline kept those formations from desertion.
Prussian mercenary armies were usually a hodgepodge company. Numerous ethnicities from around Europe and beyond banded together to serve the highest bidder. Often they did not speak the same language. Loyalty was not a trait of these forces, either to monarch or to ideal, and most armies would fight only so long as they thought they had a good chance of living, getting paid, and not having to kill any friends on the other side. Mercenary soldiers were often drawn from the least desirable parts of Europe. Criminals, the extremely poor, and the socially outcast often found employ as mercenaries, in Prussia or somewhere else. Yet, most states hoped to avoid having their own subjects sign up for service, both for humane and business reasons.

Civilians were a precious asset to the state, particularly one like tiny Prussia. Civil production, such as farming, was the responsibility of the peasantry and trade was the business of the burghers. According to the Frederick the Great, “useful, hardworking people should be guarded as the apple of one’s eye, and in wartime recruiters should be levied in one’s own country only when the bitterest necessity compels.” When Prussia’s total population was less than a quarter of many of its economically and militarily potent contemporaries, every subject taken away from work for service in the army was a heavy loss to bear. Additionally, interest in the business of soldiering was not something that the average subject had. Unless he were a noble officer (and often even then), military service was harsh, brutish, and dangerous, all around less desirable than even the manual drudgery of peasant life. Most importantly, though, war was not the realm of the common subject. Kings and foreign armies, not the people, waged war against each other for reasons that were often beyond the ken of the average man and woman. Indeed, the famous Christian philosopher Emmanuel Kant, a contemporary of Carl von Clausewitz,
echoed the people’s general belief that if it were not for kings, the nobility, and mercenaries, there would be no wars at all.\textsuperscript{87}

When Frederick the Great invaded Silesia in 1740, the core of his force was comprised of contracted foreign mercenaries.\textsuperscript{88} Despite a relative lack of wealth, Prussia channeled what it had into its well-formed war machine and harnessed a society whose very existence was predicated on the institution of the army. As that society saw it, Prussia owed its being to its army by virtue of Frederick’s grandfather, the Great Elector, who had carved out order and security on the north German flatlands amid warring mercenary bands.\textsuperscript{89} The historian R. R. Palmer described the country of Prussia as the most “mechanically put together, the most ruled from above, the least animated by the spirit of its people, and the poorest in both material and human resources.”\textsuperscript{90} As such, the practice of maintaining a primarily mercenary army was a direct outgrowth of its need to keep its civilian population sequestered and productive. Frederick the Great’s use of contracted mercenaries continued for many decades after Prussia had successful taken Silesia.\textsuperscript{91} In 1768, Frederick the Great remarked with great pride that only 5,000 of his own subjects were serving in his army.\textsuperscript{92}

In Frederick’s view, a king holds an army both by keeping a firm balance between the commoners and the nobles and between economic production and military power.\textsuperscript{93} All aspects are equally necessary and a sovereign must guard them if his state is to survive. Moreover, none of these elements mix very well. As many civilians had to be kept working as hard as possible or the society the army was protecting would collapse from within. And even if Prussia could spare people, local subjects were never the king’s first choice.\textsuperscript{94} While peasants might make acceptable soldiers, they were more necessary
in fields and factories than in columns. They were not even appropriate to lead military units, though their patriotism was certainly greater than that of any mercenary. Frederick the Great regarded commoners as too stupid to be officers and the bourgeoisie too dainty to lead in battle. Mercenaries, particularly foreign ones, who could fight well and lead themselves were a relatively economic choice. They were cheaper in the long run than the loss of a civilian worker and they needed no intrinsic motivation. They only thing they required was money.

The Prussian government’s prevailing belief was that good subjects need only pay taxes and obey the laws. Military service, provided they were anything above the meanest criminal, was not something the people needed to concern themselves with (outside of possible militia-based or reserve force defense of their homeland). Mercenaries had no stake in society, other than their wish to be paid, and as such were tools that a monarch could control with relative ease.

Frederick the Great died firmly convinced that using foreign mercenaries, rather than one’s productive citizens, was the only sensible way to wage war. Civilians created wealth, stewarded the land, and paid taxes. In return, they lived a relatively comfortable life far from the beat of military drums. Mercenaries, on the other hand, fought, stayed separate from society, and received a hefty fee for their efforts. They, for better or worse, had no loyalty to their employer, his country, or his cause. And it was a winning strategy. To quote Frederick himself, “I perceive that small states can maintain themselves against the greatest monarchies when these states put industry and a great deal of order into their affairs.” In practice, this meant keeping the nobles ruling, the burghers selling, the peasants farming, and the mercenaries fighting.
The earliest American form of military recruitment was a mixed system of volunteerism and conscription. Local and state militias levied by compulsory service made up the majority of the total revolutionary American force. However, revolutionary force commanders, such as General George Washington, commonly relied on the state’s conscripted forces only as augmentation to his all-volunteer Continental Army. This dual recruitment method allowed the Continental Congress to raise a sufficient force to pit greater endurance against the British army’s superior troops long enough to break the crown’s will to fight.

In light of this, it is interesting to note that in America in the early 1970s the arguments against the transition from a conscript-based Army to a volunteer one were vehement. However, as the Gates Commission Report, the document that paved the way for the creation of the modern all-volunteer force in 1973, noted, volunteer based recruitment was the most frequently used method for manning the American Army from the time of the Revolution through the latter half of the Civil War.

An act of Congress established the Continental Army on June 14, 1775, primarily consisting of riflemen from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. Originally, enlistment terms were for one year, though by 1776 General Washington successfully lobbied to have the term increased to three. Part of the reason for this increase was operational necessity, but an equally important reason was Washington’s well-known distrust of conscript militias, which he regarded as best suited for home defense, not offensive campaigns.
General Washington insisted on a European-style professional army, as opposed to a militia-led force, as the centerpiece of the national struggle. He held this opinion chiefly because he did not want the revolution to devolve into guerrilla-style combat, which he believed would lessen his fledgling country’s standing on the international scene. In his 1784 paper *Sentiments of a Peace Establishment*, Washington proposed a small, national, regular Army supported by well-regulated, compulsory state militias. The Continental Congress and the states approved this general model, and set up well-defined demographic requirements that attempted to put the burden of war on the citizenry.

Congressional mandate defined the Continental Army’s force structure as consisting of three divisions, six brigades, and 38 regiments. However, this force structure proved untenable as Soldiers’ one-year enlistments expired mere months before massive British reinforcements landed in 1777. As a result, Congress widened its base of recruitment in demographics, locales, and enlistment terms, eventually resorting to end-of-war contracts.

To put a personal touch on this, there are few better individuals to speak than Private Joseph Plumb Martin, whose memoir is among the best of the era. Reflecting on why he joined, Martin penned “by and by, [veterans] will come swaggering back, thought I, and tell me of their exploits, all their ‘hair-breadth ‘scapes’. . . O, that was too much to be borne with me.” Martin’s story was not uncommon. As is still the case today, the adventure and romanticism of war is a motivating factor for recruitment among many youth.
Free men were unquestionably the target audience of the nation’s recruitment effort. As such, recounts historian Charles Royster, an interesting market for them developed within revolutionary colonies that sometimes crossed cultural sensitivities.

Amid the conscription process, many states had established exemptions for a number of protected classes like the clergy, students, slaves, and free blacks. However, an additional proviso permitted the act of substitution, where one drafted man could replace himself with an undrafted one, for a fee. This resulted in a number of slaves and indentured servants serving in place of their masters. Springing from this recruiting caveat, enterprising businessmen set up trades where

[the government bought] recruits from entrepreneurs. [Businessmen] could pay a willing recruit the official bounty [which varied by state] and then offer him to draftees as a substitute. The high bidder among the draftees sent the recruit to the [Army], and the entrepreneur pocketed the difference between the private payment for a substitute and the public bounty for a recruit.

Popular American history states that a vast percentage of the colonial population served in the war. Abraham Lincoln himself reinforced this notion in a speech given before he became president, remarking that

at the close of the struggle, nearly every adult male had been a participator in some of [the war’s] scenes. The consequence was, that of those scenes, in the form of a husband, a father, a son or a brother, a living history was to be found in every family—a history bearing the indubitable testimonies of its own authenticity, in the limbs mangled, in the scars of wounds received, in the midst of the . . . scenes related—a history, too, that could be read and understood alike by all.”

However, in truth only about seven percent of the non-Indian American population served during the entire conflict. In fact, at any one time the total number of British soldiers deployed into the theater dwarfed the fielded American force. To illustrate, Great Britain dedicated an expeditionary army of 22,000 regulars, 25,000 American
loyalists, and 30,000 Hessian (German) auxiliaries against the revolutionaries, who numbered only 48,000 plus 12,000 French at any one time.** All told, the British held a ratio of .78:1 in their favor at any one time for the majority of the war. However, by war’s end America had committed a total of 217,000 ground troops to the British’s estimated 80-150,000.126

Despite numerical odds and many other hardships, though, American enthusiasm for the conflict was extremely high.127 The key reason for this was that the throes of revolutionary fervor had gripped the colonies, especially in their elite circles. To the American government’s great relief, the zeal of the people covered many ills and raised enough new recruits to keep the Army alive. The enthusiasm of the soldiery overcame poor and delayed pay, scanty gear that always in need of repair, and food that was all too often rotten.128 Discipline was harsh, being based off of American sympathizer Baron von Steuben’s German model of military training.129 Yet, recruiting was successful during this period because of the public’s will, the conviction of military commanders (who were also recruitment officers), and the promise of pay.130 In a personal notice from General Washington to the Virginia Gazette, the commander-in-chief offered 100 acres to all honorably discharged Soldiers, not to mention “all the plunder they shall take from the enemy.”131

Perhaps more importantly, American recruitment during this period was successful because it allowed different methods of entrance into the total force.132 For

** Contrary to popular characterization, the Hessians were not mercenaries. The Hessians that fought in the American Revolutionary War were auxiliaries, a term that refers to soldiers who retain their original national loyalties but whose services another country has secured by treaty.
those who were particularly willing, less gainfully employed, or had less to bind them to their home, volunteer recruitment into Washington’s premier regular Army was the government’s first choice. This afforded the promise of regular pay, good provisioning, and superior training. For those less willing, more gainfully employed, or more tied to their communities, local militia conscription was a viable (indeed, compulsory) option open to the people. This choice allowed citizens either to take the fight to the British or to defend their own homes while maintaining civilian jobs, both of which were vital to the national war effort. Interestingly, this strategy was an example of the revolutionary government offering what economists call “first degree price discrimination,” or the achieving of very similar ends by offering two different costs to a “price-sensitive” populace, in this case the relatively high cost of the Continental Army to the more willing and the relatively lower cost of militia service to the less.

By 1781, the Revolutionary War had raged for five long years. Yet, despite all of the people’s enthusiasm and the government’s cogent recruiting, disaster struck when Congress went bankrupt early that year. Though it was able to squeeze some last few monies out to the Army over the next 12 months, the collapse of America’s central fund set the stage for some of the direst administrative circumstances of the war. Back pay for former Soldiers was a major problem, to say nothing of Congress’ inability to pay current Soldiers or raise funds enough for future ones. In 1782, Congress cut funding to the Army entirely, making the maintenance of the force the responsibility of the states. Time had strained resources and will, bringing the people’s passion for the conflict to an all-time low. America’s only saving grace was that the national will of the United Kingdom was even lower. Over the next two years, propitious American victories and declining
interest at home combined to test Britain’s will to expend blood and treasure on just thirteen of their myriad colonies. With the defeat of British forces at Yorktown and the subsequent surrender of General Cornwallis in 1781, King George III and his parliament, led by Lord North, agreed to peace terms in 1784 after eight years of war.

American Vietnam Era Conscription

The draft was successful at raising troops to sustain the United States Army during Vietnam, just as it had been in the Korean and previous two world wars. The American conscription process, a method that had been in place since 1948, was designed to augment the country’s professional military and replace “combat casualties.” It had raised the number of troops necessary for the conflict in Korea and, in the opinion of President Lyndon B. Johnson, had done so equitably. The US Selective Service System, the government body that administered the draft under Lewis B. Hershey, conscripted 1,728,344 men over the course of the war, about one quarter of the total force that served in Vietnam. However, the unpopularity of that war eventually came to the point where it made conscription politically untenable, prompting its general abandonment in 1973.

The Vietnam era draft supported five separate theaters: the continental United States, the greater Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. In the early years of the Vietnam conflict, 1965 and prior, East Asia represented only a relatively minor portion of the global American force. Indeed, in 1965 the entire East Asian region, of which Vietnam was just one small part, received merely 10 percent of the total military (compared with 14 percent for all other locations outside of the continental US). It was not until 1966, when President Johnson decided to more forcibly oppose North
Vietnamese expansion, that the proportion of forces outside of the continental United States tipped in favor of East Asia (16 percent compared to 11 elsewhere in the non-US world). \(^{146}\)

In Europe from 1965-1975, America maintained an average of 10 percent of its overseas-stationed forces to deter the Warsaw Pact and protect North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interests. Despite the narrative that every draftee of that era went to Vietnam, the average American conscript hazarded only a 22 percent chance of going to East Asia at all (drafted doctors were a notable exception to this and deployed in support of the Vietnam theater at a much higher rate). \(^{147}\)

However, an often-overlooked fact of the war is that the majority of the total US military was stationed inside of the continental United States during the entirety of the conflict. \(^{148}\) According to Dr. Tim Kane, a visiting fellow at the Center for Trade and Economics in 2004, at no point from 1965 to 1975 did the percentage of the total US military that was stationed stateside drop below 51 percent. \(^{††149}\) With the superpower of the Soviet Union still looming threateningly in Europe and the wildcard of a Communist China disturbingly close to many American interests, the US could ill afford to not keep an operational reserve at home in case of trouble in other locations.

Military commanders, particularly General William Westmoreland, commander of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam from 1964-1968, often faced resistance to troop increases from President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. However, no report that the author of this study has been able to find suggested that the

\[‡‡\] A total of 1,787,560 service members from all five branches.
draft ever failed to produce enough troops to man congressionally set troop levels of the US Army or the American military in general.  

On the contrary, the it produced an average of 800,000 to 1,300,000 troops each year of the war, 98 percent of which went to the Army. Indeed, in April 1965 Secretary of Defense McNamara granted General Westmoreland an increased troop ceiling of 75,000, a number that would swell to 543,482 on April 30, 1969. The draft served this need well, ultimately producing 1,728,344 service members, almost all of which were US Army Soldiers, by war’s end.

Again, despite the narrative, many Americans were indeed supportive of the draft and the war it sustained up until 1968. For the majority of Americans, it was not so much a discussion about the root morality of the conflict as it was how best to win and return America’s troops home. This “great silent majority,” as President Richard M. Nixon would describe it on November 3, 1969, was in favor of the American government’s limited war of containment in Vietnam. Relatively speaking, hawks, or those in favor of the war, outnumbered doves, those who opposed it, by many estimates up until the First Tet Offensive of 1968.

After Tet, however, American sentiment began to turn. The general belief during America’s involvement in Vietnam prior to 1968 was that the war was acceptable so long as it was winnable. In the aftermath of Tet, progressively fewer Americans believed that it was. This sentiment hit President Johnson hard on February 27, 1968 when he heard news anchor Walter Cronkite say “it seems now more certain than ever, 

‡‡ Unbeknownst to Americans, the First Tet Offensive was a campaign so costly for the North Vietnamese that its political leaders warned its military leaders not to repeat it.
that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate . . . to say that we are closer to victory today is to believe in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past.”

White House confidants reported that the President’s response to this broadcast was “if I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America.”

Before the First Tet Offensive, the American anti-war movement, though able to demonstrate with large numbers, had represented a comparatively small portion of the population. However, after 1968, the dour outlook of the conflict pooled with the anti-war subculture’s opposition to create a maelstrom of public unease. The popularity of the war further plunged when civil right activist Martin Luther King, Jr. condemned the war as immoral and disproportionately burdening black Americans. King’s remarks were a continuation of other public displays of non-support, to include the famous boxer Muhammad Ali refusing conscription two years earlier on the grounds of being a conscientious objector, for which he earned a three-year prison sentence (which the US Supreme Court later overturned). In November 1969, half of a million people demonstrated in Washington, DC against the war, a roughly fivefold increase from the largest single previous protest.

Increasingly, many within the national dialogue began to question the rationale for the conflict. By 1968, a Gallup poll found that a full fifty percent of those questioned disapproved of the war. However, the public’s unrest came to the boiling point with the 1970 Kent State shootings, which saw Ohio National Guard Soldiers open fire on protestors demonstrating against the US invasion of officially neutral but communist sympathizing Cambodia. H. R. Haldeman, an aide to President Nixon, later suggested that those killings directly impacted national politics, setting the stage for Nixon’s
eventual resignation amid the Watergate Scandal.\textsuperscript{166} Four students died in the incident, creating what \textit{Business Week} called “a dangerous situation [that] threatens the whole economic and social structure of the nation” and what Nixon very candidly called “the darkest days” of his presidency.\textsuperscript{167}

The growing unpopularity of the war presented problems for the draft, which in many ways the American public perceived as synecdoche for the conflict as a whole.\textsuperscript{168} Unfortunately, the Tet Offensive coincided the a request from General Westmoreland for 206,000 additional troops, a move that Undersecretary of Defense for Public Affairs Phil Goulding and Undersecretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes warned would increase draft resistance and foment widespread dissent. Because of the general lack of popular support, the troop increases did not happen nor did newly elected President Nixon’s 1969 Operation Duck Hook, an ambitious plan that he had meant to “unleash the full fury of American power” against the North Vietnamese.\textsuperscript{169}

The issue of public dispassion for the war effected both the military’s efficiency and national policy. For the US Army, one increasingly disturbing issue was “the drug problems . . . [of] people who [didn’t] want to be there,” according to the 2001 Selective Service System Governmental Affairs Chief Richard Flahavan.\textsuperscript{170} Illicit drug use became a seriously detrimental problem to the Army in 1971 and 1972, though substance abuse had certainly been an issue prior to then.\textsuperscript{171} Equally distressing problems included black separatist militancy, rare but disturbing incidents of fragging,\textsuperscript{§§} and malingering.\textsuperscript{172} One issue that is particularly relevant for this study, though, was the growing cost of

\textsuperscript{§§} Fragging is American military slang for murdering one’s superior in war, so named for the use of fragmentary grenades in early incidents.
administrating a draft that had become very unpopular. According to Jessi Kindig of the University of Washington, in 1972 “there were more conscientious objectors than actual draftees, all major cities faced backlogs of induction-refusal legal cases, and the Selective Service later reported that 206,000 persons were reported delinquent during the entire war period.”\textsuperscript{173} Finally, all of these reasons and more prompted the American government and the US military to consider abandoning the draft. According to RAND researcher Bernard Rostker in his study \textit{The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force}, by war’s end, the US Army had simply “lost confidence in the draft” as indiscipline mounted “among draftees . . . in Vietnam.”\textsuperscript{174}

The combination of the Army’s lack of confidence in conscription with the public’s dissatisfaction with the war affected US government policy at its highest levels. During the end of his first term,\textsuperscript{***} Nixon established \textit{The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force}, colloquially known as the Gates Commission, to “[eliminate] conscription and [move] toward an all-volunteer armed force.”\textsuperscript{175} The study’s avowed purpose for considering the abandonment of conscription was to “strengthen our freedoms, remove an inequity now imposed on the expression of the patriotism that has never been lacking among our youth, promote the efficiency of the armed forces, and enhance their dignity.”\textsuperscript{176} However, others have opined that a more salient reason for discontinuing the draft was that it was simply no longer tenable, being hamstrung by the same perception of impracticability as were American hopes of “[winning] a long, protracted war without popular support.”\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{***} President Richard M. Nixon resigned from office on August 9, 1974 amid rumors of impeachment stemming from the Watergate scandal.
According to academic Andrew J. Bacevich, Sr., the Vietnam era Selective Service draft was so poorly managed that it was a key reason for the political failure of the war at home and America’s move to an all-volunteer force. Additionally, he contends that the transition to volunteerism was to tacitly divorce popular dissatisfaction from its ability to affect the outcome of future wars and political careers. However, less anti-establishment sources than Bacevich, like Richard Flahavan, agree that the “abuses of [the] Vietnam [draft],” like “perennial students” and the perceived unfairness of local selection boards (particularly accused of racial prejudice), contributed to the inefficiency of American conscription. Lastly, the decidedly pro-establishment RAND Corporation stated in 2006 that one important reason for the adoption of an all-volunteer force was “the growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War, [which made] the country . . . ripe for a change.”

However, it is perhaps folly to try to guess what President Nixon’s proximate reasons were for ending the draft. Whatever the truth, the President ordered the abandonment of conscription as the military’s primary recruitment method on January 27, 1971 when he signed the all-volunteer force into law just seven months before his resignation.

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††† The 2016 military recruitment model still contains the Gates Commission’s recommended standby draft, which exists to provide American presidents with greater flexibility in times of war.

‡‡‡ This law took effect in 1973.

34
2 Ibid.


4 Gates.

5 Ibid.

6 James F. George, *The Mess Kit: Food for Thought* (Camp Knox, KY: Military Training Camps Association, 1922), 7; Marlyn Pierce, United States Army Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (Lecture, History 202, December 2, 2015).

7 Bacevich, *Breach of Trust*.

8 Ibid.

9 Bacevich, *Breach of Trust*; Gates.

10 Gates.

11 Ibid.


15 Bacevich, *Breach of Trust*.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

20 Sandra Sanchez United States Army Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (Lecture, Force Management, November 2015).

21 Economist.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 110.

29 Ibid.

30 Ross.

31 Ibid., 115.

32 Ibid., 116.

33 Ibid., 119.

34 Ibid.

35 Ross.

36 Pierce.


38 Ibid.

39 Moran and Waldron.

40 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 5.


45 Moran and Waldron.

46 Ibid.

47 Irby.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., 2.

53 Ibid.

54 Nickerson.

55 Ibid.

56 Pierce.

57 Nickerson.

58 Irby.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Irby; Ross.

63 Irby; Ross.


65 Moran and Waldron.

66 Pierce.


68 Nathan; Moran and Waldron.


70 Pierce.

71 Rothenberg, 33.

72 Ibid.

73 Pierce.

74 Rothenberg, 34.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid., 41.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.


83 Ibid., 98.
Ibid.

Ibid.

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Palmer, 96-98.

Ibid.

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

Ibid., 105.


Ibid.

106 Gates.


108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.


112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.


115 Ibid.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.


119 Geist, “A Common American Soldier.”

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.


127 Geist.

128 Ibid.


130 Geist.

131 Ibid.


134 Geist.


136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.

138 Alpha History.

139 Ibid.


145 Ibid.

146 Ibid.


148 Ibid.

149 Ibid.


151 Washington Journal; Kane.

152 VVOF; Washington Journal; Kane.


161 Ibid.


169 Steigerwalt.

170 Washington Journal.

171 VVOF.


178 Bacevich, *Breach of Trust*; Pierce.

179 Bacevich, *Breach of Trust*.

180 Washington Journal.

181 Rostker, 1.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The author conducted this study in four basic steps that guide the reader from the initial problem statement to the research’s ultimate recommendation. These four steps are: one, framing the current state of affairs; two, framing the desired state; three, framing the problem that separates the current state from the desired one; and four, framing the solution to the research problem.¹

Step one is to frame the current state, which for the purposes of this study is Nichiporuk’s competitively multipolarity. The research question this study poses is “how can the United States Army recruit and retain a force able to win against the threats described in a competitively multipolar world?”² To briefly recap the scenario, competitive multipolarity is a possible future world that Brian Nichiporuk of the RAND Corporation postulates in his paper Alternative Futures and Army Force Planning: Implications for the Future Era. In the paper, the year is 2025 and US international standing has devolved from lone superpower to one of three global alliance leaders. This already tense situation becomes worse when the fledgling democratic state of Iraq, a US partner, begins to breakdown amid foreign incursions.

Step two is to frame the desired state: the United States wants a stable, democratic, and pro-western Iraq. The US has key economic and political interests in this Middle Eastern country and is not willing to see them fail. According to Nichiporuk’s scenario, the United States government’s primary instrument to protect Iraq is the United States Army. As such, the US will have to field a force that is capable not only of
countering the immediate threat posed to Iraq, but also of continuing to support its other worldwide commitments.³

Step three is to frame the problem that prevents competitively multipolar Iraq from being a stable, democratic, and pro-western Iraq, the US’ desired state. That problem is armed invasion. Regional neighbors Syria and Iran have conducted low-level border incursions already, which threaten to develop into all-out war.⁴ The United States plans to counter this danger with its Army. The first critical aspect of this solution to Syrian and Iranian invasion is, as the military historian Gunther Rothenberg put it, to “[raise] an effective army, capable of serving as a reliable instrument of state policy.”⁵ The second critical aspect of this problem, for the purposes of this study, is determining how big this force should be. To address this crisis and to continue to meet its other worldwide commitments, Nichiporuk states that the Army will have to be 50 percent bigger, in terms of personnel, than it was in 2005.⁶ This amounts to a net increase of 247,000 Soldiers.⁷⁷ The third critical aspect of this problem is how the US Army should raise that force, which within the confines of this study is restricted to the options of volunteer recruiting, the use of contractors, conscription, or any combination thereof. Finally, this study presents the solution to the research problem.

The word how, which is recurrent in each of the critical aspects of the problem, led the author to use case study methodology. The case study method provides a detailed exploration of what factors will make the three stated recruitment means—volunteer recruiting, the use of contractors, and conscription—viable. This methodology is also

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³ The United States Army had roughly 493,000 Soldiers on its rolls in 2005.
appropriate because two out of the three criteria that academic Robert Yin defines in his book *Case Study Research: Design and Methods (fourth edition)* as characterizing a case study apply to this situation (namely that it answers the question of “how [or] why” and does not require control of behavioral events). Yin’s third criterion of case study methodology is that the research focuses on “current events,” which this study does, albeit with some historical aspects also included. While the research problem and the scenario are current, the case studies that this research examines range from the Renaissance period to modern times. As such, one could consider this study a blended methodology of case study and “history,” which Yin defines the same way as a case study except for not focusing on the present. Finally, case study methodology is appropriate because it provides for, as research author John Creswell describes, in-depth exploration of “a program, event, activity, process, or one or more individuals.”

The case studies examine instances of military recruitment across four different countries and times: France during its 18th century revolution, Frederick the Great’s Prussia, Revolutionary America, and Vietnam era America. In each of these, the study focuses on the method of recruitment that those governments used and how successful it was at “[raising] an effective army capable of serving as a reliable instrument of state policy.” The author presents these case studies in chapter two, with analysis provided in chapter four.

While exploring the cases, this study sought commonalities that would point to underlying patterns in order to explain why some recruitment methods were successful while others were not, and then extrapolate those insights forward into a possible future scenario. In line with Yin’s definition of case study methodology, this portion of the
research explored “what” the key factors were that made different recruitment methods successful.\textsuperscript{12}

This line of questioning resulted in three factors.\textsuperscript{13} First, the research showed that the degree of success for each of the three methods of recruitment is highly dependent on two things: how much people care about a conflict, which the author calls \textit{popular passion}, and how many people are available to support the conflict in question, or \textit{the number of people available}. Across the four case studies, the data indicates that the greater the popular passion for a conflict and the greater the number of people available, the more forceful recruitment methods could feasibly be. Inversely, the lower the passion or support for a conflict and fewer people available, the more governments tended to rely on collaborative methods, like voluntary recruiting and the use of contractors.

Interestingly, the study revealed that any method was capable of raising a force, in the short term, but using a method unsuited to the circumstances failed to “raise a . . . reliable instrument of state policy.”\textsuperscript{14} Instead, it tended to create a force that later resulted in a net loss of wealth or utility to the government (such as during Vietnam, where America was successful at raising and keeping a military force, but encountered many martial discipline and civil disruption problems as the results of an unpopular draft and war).\textsuperscript{15} These two factors, popular passion and the number of people available, serve as this study’s primary criteria for explaining the efficacy of the recruitment methods in each case study.

Additionally, the analysis of the data revealed one secondary factor that had an effect on the success of each recruitment method, albeit to a lesser degree. This factor was \textit{time}, which the author hypothesizes has the progressive effect of lowering popular
passion and increasing a government’s need for troops. The longer a conflict persists over time, the less support can be sustained.

Finally, the fourth frame of this study is the application these three factors to Nichiporuk’s scenario. Using the hypothesized factors of popular passion, number of people available, and time, supplemented by 2016 American social data substituted for 2025 America as needed, this research proposes an answer to its research question of how the United States Army can “recruit and retain a force able to win against the threats described in a ‘competitively multipolar world.’”


2 Nichiporuk.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Rothenberg, 33.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


11 Rothenberg, 33.

12 Yin, 9.

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.


16 Rothenberg, 33; Nichiporuk, 58.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter four will include several layers of analysis. First, it will describe the factors derived from the case studies that are pertinent to military recruitment. Second, it will analyze the four historical cases—Revolutionary France, Prussia, Revolutionary America, and Vietnam Era America—in terms of these factors as an explanation of why volunteer recruiting, contractor (mercenary) use or conscription was or was not successful. Finally, this chapter will return to Brian Nichiporuk’s world of competitive multipolarity, apply the lessons from this chapter to his scenario, and set the stage for the study’s conclusions in chapter five.

Factors on Military Recruitment

In this subsection, this study will define the two primary factors, popular passion and the number of people available, and the secondary factor of time, all of which affect the viability of volunteer recruiting, the use of contractors, and conscription.

Popular Passion

The level of enthusiasm that people have for a conflict is the primary factor that determines which method of recruitment is optimal and when. High popular passion, like what France and America experienced during their revolutions, has the effect of lowering the monetary cost of acquisition (because people can be persuaded to join and support with less effort and less monetary incentive) and reducing the expenditure of effort required from the government. High popular passion contributes to higher retention and to soldiers being willing to endure greater hardship.1
In conflicts for which there is high popular passion, the cost of acquisition is relatively lower that it would otherwise be because people want to fight. In an example from the French Revolution, the recruitment cost of individual soldiers went down because the enthusiasm of the populace made people willing to say \textit{yes} to the call to arms for less money and effort on the French government’s part. The more people want to fight, the less a government needs to use money or any other extrinsic benefit to persuade them.

High popular passion also contributes to increased retention. During the American Revolution, soldiers were relatively expensive, due to the country’s small population, but those who served were comparatively easy to keep. Desertion was not the overriding problem that it was for Europe’s lingering mercenary armies. Colonists serving in Washington’s Army generally believed in the conflict and felt that fulfilling their commitments, despite the poverty of their situation, was worthwhile.

A final benefit of high popular passion is the increased ability of soldiers to deal with hardship. During both the Continental Army’s winter at Valley Forge and Napoleon’s Italian campaign, pay, provisions, equipment, and other forms of soldierly necessities were lacking. However, those soldiers’ high level of personal commitment to their cause sustained them through their enlistment terms, which, consequently enabled those two governments to field forces at significantly lower costs than would have been necessary with less committed troops.

Low popular passion has the opposite effect. In general, lower levels of commitment or passion for a conflict increase the cost of acquisition, increase the costs of retention, and generally coincide with less willingness to endure hardship.
Like in the Vietnam War, as the Gates Commission Report argued in its chapter “Conscription is a Tax,”² while soldiers were certainly paid less than they would have been under a volunteer model, the cost to the government of raising an impressed force was higher than the volunteer alternative because of the unaccounted for costs of conscription.³ The expenses of collecting and screening applicants, the cost of prosecuting draft dodgers, and the increased expenditures involved with training less willing recruits all caused the cost of acquisition to be higher than for a volunteer army of the same size.⁴ In the case of the Prussian contracted armies, the cost of raising mercenary forces was enormous (indeed, it was one of the primary expenditures of the state). The lower the level of enthusiasm for a conflict, the more expensive and difficult it is for a government to raise a force. Conscription is not an effective option when popular passion is low because people will resist the call to arms, raising the costs exorbitantly.⁵ Based on an analysis of the histories of the Prussian experience, combined with the theories of Dr. Thomas Ross, one conclusion is that an effective way to raise an army from an unenthused population is to motivate them by means of some external factor, such as money. Circumstances of low popular passion lend themselves more to the use of a volunteer or contractor based force.⁶

For comparable reasons, the cost of retaining a conscript force is higher and more difficult under such circumstances. The less people care about prevailing in a conflict (the lower the popular passion), the more they are willing to shirk their duties, attempt to desert, or require greater pay to keep them in uniform. The author hypothesizes that low enthusiasm for the cause, as in Prussia’s contracted forces, not only correlates with but in large part causes lower discipline and higher maintenance costs.⁷
Lastly, soldiers who do not exhibit popular passion for a conflict are generally less willing to endure hardship. Prussia again provides such an example: in Frederick the Great’s time, the risk of desertion was so much a factor in generals’ minds that soldiers were not allowed to forage for food on their own for fear that they would not return. Since enthusiasm for the cause was not sufficient to keep them in formation, only the alternative of poverty and the threat of their non-commissioned officers’ bayonets kept them from dispersing rapidly.

In effect, high popular passion enables a government to raise and keep an army more cheaply and with less difficulty. It allows for more forceful means of recruitment, such as conscription. Low popular passion does the opposite, prompting the government to raise a force based on some extrinsic motivation, most commonly money, although prestige, social standing, and other elements may also play a role.

The Number of People Available

The number of people available to a government has an effect, too. The more people there are, the easier it is to raise an army. A nation of any size can raise an army, but the larger a nation’s population is to begin with, the greater the percentage that can be devoted to prosecuting a conflict for a given cost. The populations of Frederick the Great’s Prussia and Napoleon I’s**** France provide good contrasts of this phenomenon. Prussia had roughly one fifth the population of its often hostile neighbors. This encouraged Frederick the Great to obtain soldiers from outside his borders, embrace clearly defined strategic ends (such as the annexation of Silesia), and to seek a qualitative

**** Napoleon Bonaparte.
edge for his army over its opponents by superior training. However, none of this made any difference for Prussia when it faced a much larger country, like France, with an overwhelmingly superior number of combatants. Indeed, just such was the case at the Battles of Jena and Auerstedt 120 years after Frederick the Great’s death. In the wake of the revolution, France was able to leverage the sheer size of its population, among its other advantages, to destroy the combined forces of Prussia and Saxony in 1806. The disparity in populations between the two countries was a key factor to France’s success.

Additionally, population size has a direct effect on which method of recruitment—volunteerism, contractor use, and conscription—is favorable. Referring back to Ross’ article (referenced in chapter two), conscription becomes a more attractive option the larger an army becomes because conscription is capable of lower recruitment costs per capita. Since, as Ross contends, the cost of each additional soldier goes up on the margin (because more soldiers mean less civil workers), the selectiveness offered by volunteerism and contractor use progressively loses its cost utility as a recruitment effort gets larger.

Similarly, larger countries incur less opportunity cost compared to smaller countries for raising the same number of people. To use an example from the competitive multipolarity scenario, a 10 percent mobilization of the United States, a relatively more populous country, and Syria, a less populous one, would both have dramatic costs associated with them. However, America could field that force more easily: Syria’s small population makes a 100,000-man army more costly than the same size force for America. In short, a larger population generally makes it easier and less expensive to raise an army.
Another salient factor is overall employment of a nation’s population. In accordance with the economic law of supply and demand, a country that has more people available for military service, i.e., not productively employed in the work force, will have to pay less for them. As employment rises, the cost of each additional soldier increases on the margin. By the same token, even a country that has many unemployed people, who conceivably would be willing to join the army for some price, will see a rise in the cost of each additional soldier the more dips into its productive civilian population to fill its ranks. This affects which methods of recruitment work best. Under high unemployment, when many people are available, the cost of acquiring soldiers is less and people will generally say yes for lower pay. These same individuals are more likely to respond favorably to mandates to serve, as in conscription, because it presents a viable alternative to unemployment. Though outside of the scope of this research’s case studies, one can find an example of this from the year 1940 when the United States unemployment rate was 14.6 percent. The very next year, America saw its first-ever peacetime draft registration on September 16, 1940. To some extent, the success of that unprecedented registration and subsequent impressment was a result of high unemployment, wherein more people were open to the possibility of military service, if only for the financial security it offered.

As unemployment drops and the number of people available to serve become scarcer, the cost of enticing that next soldier, both in money and in effort, increases. This lends itself to volunteer recruiting and the hiring of contractors. Such a circumstance played out over the course of the Vietnam War. In 1968, for instance, unemployment was 3.6 percent. At that time, America required an approximated average of 15,000 new
recruits per month to maintain its fighting forces. While unquestionably successful at providing the troops necessary for the war, this number increased over time and became such a burden on the American population that the opportunity costs of the US dipping so deeply into its civilian populace began to outweigh even the lower administrative costs of conscription. Eventually, as the Gates Commission Report argued, a more highly paid volunteer force would actually be cheaper than a conscript one.

Time

Time has an effect on the viability of volunteer recruiting, the use of contractors, and conscription. The longer a conflict goes on the more enthusiasm for it wanes and the more the need for people increases, all of which make the war more costly to society. This results from observed human nature, which tends to desire wars to end sooner than later, all things being equal. Of course, if things are unequal (such as country A is winning its war) that country will generally be more tolerant of a longer conflict (and country B would likely be correspondingly less tolerant because it is losing). The American Revolution is a good example of this. Though fervor for the conflict was high at its beginning, people’s commitment to it gradually waned over the eight years of the war until it was at such a low level that only the British’s even lower national will allowed the Americans to win.

†††† It is fair to mention, that Great Britain’s counterinsurgency in the Americas was a limited war, whereas American involvement was total. The popular passion lowering effects of time affected both belligerents, but at differing rates by virtue of their different stakes in the outcome of the war.
Additionally, time increases the number people who are necessary to prosecute a war. The buildup of dead, wounded, captured, and people who just did not want to sign up for an additional term make the number of people necessary to win increase over time. Just such was the case during the Vietnam War when the American Selective Service drafted conscripts for two-year terms.\textsuperscript{21} With enlistments of that length, the Army had to replace a significant proportion of troops at no greater interval than every two years (and perhaps much more quickly if they become casualties or training failures before their terms were up). This number obviously accumulated, generating 2,709,918 total soldiers committed to the conflict by 1973.\textsuperscript{22} In addition to lowering passion, the longer a conflict persists, the more people it will take to prosecute it.

Finally, time has different but related effects on which recruitment method is preferred. In general, people dislike being forced to do things against their will, preferring choice to coercion.\textsuperscript{23} Governments are cognizant of this fact and this self-awareness has in some cases led governments to prefer voluntary or contracted means to conscription, when time permits, particularly if the government portends to highly value individual liberty. One example of this is revolutionary France, whose original 1792 method of increasing troop strength was volunteerism.\textsuperscript{24} It was not until France had endured a full year of this failed system that Carnot, the architect of the \textit{levée en masse}, instituted universal conscription. Even then, the \textit{levée} granted a three-day grace period to every township for volunteers.\textsuperscript{25}

A similar event happened in Revolutionary America, wherein the total American Army initially gained its regular troops by voluntary means but tended more towards conscription as the war drew on.\textsuperscript{26} Governments that value individual liberty more highly
tend to treat volunteerism as the method of choice when time is plentiful and conscription as the expedient option when it is not. An example of this was the rapid Vietnam era troop increase of 1965-1966, when the US Army increased its rolls by 230,000 in a single year. Of course, this is a complicated example, since conscription was already the primary method of recruitment at the time, but among the 230,000 men inducted that year an estimated two thirds of them were true volunteers (individuals who would have joined even if the Army had not conscripted them). In effect, even under the system of conscription, the American system, at least, preferred volunteerism.

It is very arguable that governments that do not value personal liberty as highly would not behave in similar ways. However, that it is outside of the scope of this study. Further research may prove interesting regarding whether governments and cultures that have a stronger group than individual identity, such as the Soviet Union or the Republic of Korea, favor volunteerism over conscription, ceteris paribus. For the case studies examined, though, greater time available tends to encourage governments to embrace contractor use and volunteerism while less time encourages conscription.

Analysis of the Case Studies

In this section, the three factors—popular passion, the number of people available, and time—are applied to the four case studies of Revolutionary France, Prussia, Revolutionary America, and Vietnam Era America. It concludes with analysis of why each conflict’s method of recruitment was successful or not.
Revolutionary France

The passion of the revolutionary French was high. The fervor of anti-royalism and the empowerment of the commoner inflamed the French nation with a deep enthusiasm for change. This passion had several key effects: it made the French more willing to say yes when asked to enlist and it increased the level of hardships that they were willing to bear. French enthusiasm also lowered society’s barriers to recruitment. The levée en masse would not have been successful, no matter how universal or thorough it was, had the French people not been intrinsically motivated to achieve their own nationhood. Additionally, France’s high popular passion increased its soldiers’ willingness to accept hardships. Poor food, shortages of equipment, and even a lack of pay were all things that the revolutionary French army was more willing to accept because they were motivated for their cause. Lowered mental barriers to entry into the military and a higher acceptance of deprivation, functions of high popular passion, made French mass conscription a viable and successful option.

France had two numerical advantages during its revolutionary phase. One, it was the most populous country in Europe and two, its ravaged economy left many people eager to find work. France’s population during the revolutionary period was between 25 and 30,000,000 people, compared with approximately 12,000,000 in Italy, 7,000,000 in Spain, and perhaps as many as 15,000,000 in Germany. In absolute numbers, more Frenchmen were available to put into uniform than Italians, Spaniards, and Germans, unless met at once. More people made massing on the enemy easier, as France simply had more people to field against its enemies at any one time. Additionally, high unemployment made the French population relatively easier to entice into military
service. The lack of civilian job prospects at home meant the opportunity costs to society at large incurred by recruiting civilians was less than it would have been had they already been gainfully employed.

As a result, Revolutionary French conscription was successful and beneficial. It was successful because popular passion was high and the country’s available population was large, which allowed the government to simply mandate that people would serve and, in most cases, soldiers appeared. It was beneficial because it allowed Napoleon Bonaparte to raise an army of tremendous size at a fraction of the cost it would have taken his opponents’ mercenary armies.

However, the passage of time hampered this system, increasing the requirement for troops and partially necessitating its need for foreign conscripts. Additionally, the French had to rely on superior numbers to offset the qualitative deficiencies of their army. Though many considered Napoleon I a military genius, he alone could not make up for his men’s lack of equipment and drilling, only superior numbers were able to do that. Lastly, conscripting defeated enemies allowed the French to draw less of a total percentage of their own nationals than they otherwise would have to field their Grande Armée.

Prussia

The popular passion of the Prussians during the reign of Frederick the Great was low. The lack of interest in service on the part of average Prussians made them a poor choice as soldiers; moreover, Prussia needed productive subjects much more at home than in the army. As a result, contracted foreign mercenaries, who needed no motivation other than remuneration, were an ideal choice.
The number of people available to Prussia was low. Prussia had one fifth the population of its most likely enemies, and within that 20 percent Prussian society deemed only its least employable members expendable enough for military service. This dearth of people caused the opportunity cost of losing civilian labor to outweigh the cost of hiring mercenaries. By contracting out his army, even at the exorbitant prices that mercenaries demanded, Frederick the Great was able to raise an effective army at a lower overall cost than by mobilizing his civilian population.

Time, with its effect of lowering popular passion and increasing the need for troops, was never on Frederick’s side. The escalating cost of replacing soldiers in a protracted war, compounded with all of his other resource constraints, encouraged Prussia to limit its military aims to only its core interests. Upon taking Silesia in 1742, Frederick the Great pointedly stopped his expansion.33

Raising the Prussian army by mercenary contracting was both necessary and successful. Hiring mercenaries, the historical equivalent of contractors, was necessary because popular passion for the king’s wars was very low among the civilian population. Additionally, Prussia had so few subjects that were not already productively employed that it was loath to spare any of them for military service. Hiring mercenaries was the right course of action because it allowed the civilian base to produce taxes that paid for the mercenaries, which in turn won Prussia’s wars. This organization allowed Frederick the Great to raise an army with few people and little public interest.

Revolutionary America

Popular passion during the American Revolutionary War was high. Historians estimate four fifths of the population was in favor of rebellion.34 Recruitment during the
Revolutionary War was successful because it fed off of a direct public interest in the outcome of the conflict, which most people saw as a fight for their homeland. Soldiers endured lapses in pay, poor quality equipment, meager provisions, and great danger for a cause in which they were deeply invested.

However, America had a much smaller population than its former parent country. All 13 colonies only equaled 2,500,000 individuals (not counting Indians), half a million of whom were slaves, while Great Britain had 8,000,000 residents in its home islands alone. At any given time, the Americans were only able to field a force of 48,000, augmented by 12,000 French. By contrast, Great Britain fielded an expeditionary army of 22,000 regulars, 25,000 American loyalists, and 30,000 Hessian (German) auxiliaries, equating to a ratio of .78:1 in Britain’s favor at any one time. This prompted America to maintain a mixed system of volunteerism and conscription because the use of volunteer recruiting or conscription alone would have been prohibitively expensive or indiscriminately detrimental to civilian production, respectively. Either method alone would have incurred a higher opportunity cost to society than necessary and endangered the revolution.

The degrading effects of time took its toll on revolutionary America. The year 1782 saw the collapse of the centrally funded Continental Army as money, will, and people began to wear out. The length of the conflict eventually necessitated approximately 217,000 Americans to serve, though only 48,000 of which were ever in uniform at one time. Additionally, the passage of time caused national will to drop to its lowest point of the conflict in 1782, which would have been disastrous had not British national will failed before that.
American volunteer recruitment was a viable and correct choice because the newborn country enjoyed high popular passion, but had few available people. High popular passion enabled voluntary recruitment by reducing the cost of acquiring each soldier—the greater the popular support or passion, the more the population is willing to do for less money. Another consideration was that to have used conscription would have quickly and indiscriminately eaten into the civilian workforce, which America desperately needed at home.\textsuperscript{38} The passage of time, combined with the Army’s negative qualitative discrepancy \textit{vis a vis} the British, had its expected effect on the American Army, necessitating that it field a total force almost three times as large as the British’s over the course of the war. However, America’s alliance with France, which contributed troops and helped to offset America’s lack of military skill, kept this number from ballooning even larger.

\textbf{Vietnam Era America}

Despite the populist narrative of Vietnam always having been an ill-favored conflict, popular passion for the war started relatively high. Gallup poll data from 1965 through December 1967 showed that more Americans thought “the United States [had not] made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam” than the reverse, often by double-digit margins.\textsuperscript{39} However, after 1967, approval ratings for the conflict dropped precipitously as the perception of the US’ ability to win declined.\textsuperscript{40} Concurrently, the small but vocal anti-war movement gained inordinately greater strength, eventually exerting extreme influence over the American narrative of the conflict.\textsuperscript{41} As popular passion fell within the populace, resistance to the draft increased, as did military indiscipline, which effectively drove up the costs of recruitment.\textsuperscript{42} Eventually, popular
passion fell so low that the costs associated with the conflicts unpopularity began to exceed the inherent cost-saving benefits of conscription.\textsuperscript{43} The administration of President Nixon agreed with this assessment, as stated within chapter two of the Gates Commission Report, abandoning conscription as the primary means of recruitment in 1973.\textsuperscript{44}

Though the draft never failed to produce the raw number of troops that military commanders required, it was only successful at “[raising] an effective army, capable of serving as a reliable instrument of state policy” while popular passion remained high.\textsuperscript{45} This state of affairs ceased to be the case after the First Tet Offensive of 1968, when perceptions of American failure, poor government accountability, and questions about the war’s basic morality amalgamated into a net loss of popular passion. As that trend continued, the conscription became progressively less appropriate or beneficial.

The number of people available fluctuated throughout the conflict and contributed both to the effort’s early success and to its later troubles. Almost trending along the same timelines, American Vietnam era conscription was aided by relatively high unemployment, defined here as five percent or more, from 1958-1964.\textsuperscript{46} An improving economy hampered conscription from 1965-1969. However, relatively high unemployment in 1970, 1971, and 1972 assisted it.\textsuperscript{47} The periods of higher unemployment made military service relatively more attractive to Americans, particularly the poor.\textsuperscript{48} As viable options increased during the period of 1965-1969, people had less incentive to
respond favorably to a draft call or to enlist by draft induction.‡‡‡‡ From 1970-1972, unemployment was again higher than five percent, making conscription more acceptable than in the immediately preceding period, but not enough to offset the negative perception that the American people had accepted of the war.

This case study, perhaps, best displays the effects of the passage of time. As the Vietnam War continued, public perception solidified around the ideas that America’s war effort was not bearing fruit, its military and political officials were disingenuous, and that the conflict itself might be fundamentally wrong. According to Gallup data, the proportion of Americans who thought committing combat troops to Vietnam was a mistake grew every year from 1965-1973 except for the period from November 1966 to April 1967 (which saw a four percentage point increase at its height). The seemingly out of place upward trend during those five months coincided with short-lived hopes of America prevailing in Southeast Asia.

Additionally, what started in 1962 as a small, advisor-led group under General Westmoreland’s Military Assistance Command-Vietnam expanded with the passage of time into a war that in total involved 9,087,000 American service members.49 The increase in the need for men, despite some perceptions, did not come as much from war-related deaths, which numbered only 58,202, but from the need for rapid replacements of discharged Soldiers who were on two-year draft terms.50 The need to constantly replace

‡‡‡‡ Draft induced enlistment is a Vietnam era term that described people who voluntarily joined the military in order to preempt conscription, ostensibly in the hopes of some sort of benefit like better training, pay, or career options.
troops as they finished their enlistments necessitated an average call of nearly 15,000 men every month from 1963-1973.51

In short, for the period of 1958-1968 wherein American popular passion was high, the draft was effective and beneficial at “[raising] an effective army, capable of serving as a reliable instrument of state policy,” being most effective during the times of relatively high unemployment from 1958-1964.52 As unemployment improved from 1965-1970 and popular passion dropped after the First Tet Offensive, the benefits of conscription became outweighed by its social-issue drawbacks.53 By conflict’s end, the political, societal, and monetary costs of conscription had become so inconsistent with what an environment of low popular passion and low unemployment could support that the American government adroitly transitioned to an all-volunteer force, from which circumstances it could more suitably raise an army.

Summary

Recruitment methods are predominantly successful at raising a reliable instrument of national power if they correctly play to two key factors: popular passion and the number of people available. In large part, Revolutionary French conscription was successful because the populace was highly enthused and there were many people available. Likewise, Prussian mercenary contracting was successful because it effectively sidestepped the low passion and numbers of the Prussians to recruit foreigners with monetary enticement. American Revolutionary mixed volunteer recruitment and conscription was successful because it played to the different willingness levels of the people, allowing the government the ability to take only those who wanted to go for regular Army service and leaving those who were most resistant to less strenuous militia
service. Finally, American Vietnam era conscription was ultimately counterproductive because it imposed conscription on an unwilling populace over a protracted period. High unemployment only somewhat ameliorated this, making military service more palatable to the poor, though not enough to offset the people’s resistance to the war and its draft after 1968.

The secondary factor of time influenced recruitment in all of these case, albeit to a lesser extent that popular passion or the number of people available. Some examples of this include France’s army suffering the need for droves of replacements over time as casualties and completed enlistments built up over its decade plus of war. An additional example was the revolutionary America’s need to field 217,000 total Soldiers over the course of its war for independence (despite only fielding 48,000 at any one time).54

Analysis of the World of Competitive Multipolarity

At this point, this study transitions back to RAND researcher Brian Nichiporuk’s world of competitive multipolarity. In chapter five, this paper applies what it has learned from its analysis of the case studies to his future world. To that end, the following two subsections of chapter four, the situation and the assessment, explain Nichiporuk’s scenario in detail and offer pertinent analysis of it in order to support chapter five’s conclusions.

The Situation

Brian Nichiporuk envisions a future where two separate global blocs, the Central Powers and the New Solidarity Alliance, have become capable of challenging US hegemony. However, the heads of these two international orders are as much in
competition with each other as they are with America. All three of these blocs have built an alliance of follower states, whose members encompass most of the nations of the world. By 2025, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has dissolved and America instead leads the Rimland Alliance, a partnership with Japan, Great Britain, and many of its traditional European partners. Russia leads the Central Powers, which is largely comprised of India, Libya, Sub-Saharan African states, and large parts of Eastern Europe. China leads the New Solidarity Alliance, whose sphere of influence includes the majority of the Islamic world and Northern Africa.55

A number of areas around the world threaten to erupt into regional conflict. The three alliances each play a calculated game of enticement and coercion to try to align small but critical free-agent states to themselves. Midway through 2025, America faces three crisis points abroad: Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burma.56

The United States chooses to focus its energies on Iraq, which houses many economic and political interests. Within Iraq, ethnic and religious divides have overcome national aspirations and the country has devolved into essentially autonomous Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish areas. The central government has lost much of its authority to regional strongmen and the US Central Intelligence Agency estimates that Iraq will cease to be a single state in as little as three months. Despite its problems, the high global price of oil makes Iraq and its still abundant crude reserves a prize for whichever of the three alliances controls it. Syria and Iran, which New Solidarity Alliance backing, make armed incursions across Iraqi borders.57

The United States publishes a plan named Operation Fast Hammer, which will attempt to deter further such intrusions into the failing Iraqi state. However, the general
understanding amongst all parties is that US forces are prepared to repel foreign invaders by any means necessary, should they try to enter. In an attempt to calm the situation as much as possible prior to the open committal of troops, Rimland’s covert forces are inserted early in an attempt to sway the regional Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish groups back towards solidarity (and US control). 58

Nichiporuk describes the ground force necessary to meet the US’ needs in this conflict as a “global maneuver Army.” 59 It is comprised of light, lethal, highly self-deployable units that can move into disputed areas quickly. This Army employs an extensive and well-developed communications and military command network. Its combat vehicles emphasize speed over armor and the Army bases all of its plans on the physical and operational constraints of the US Air Force’s C-17 and C-5-heavy air mobility fleet. Most importantly, the US Army must be 50 percent bigger than it is, an addition of 247,000 people. 60

To raise the Army necessary to meet Nichiporuk’s Iraqi problem, this study applies its three factors (popular passion, number of people available, and time) to this scenario. Economically, Nichiporuk describes America as “lagging behind other large states in productivity and gross national product growth.” 61 However, the scenario offers no other details about the country at the time.

The Assessment

This assessment will follow the same order as the conclusion of chapter four. It will consider the people’s popular passion for the conflict, how many people are available, and how time will shape the US Army’s raising of the 247,000 additional troops. Since the culture of 2025 is unknown, of course, this study will substitute
elements of 2016 America and the current Iraqi crisis (with the Islamic State) as necessary.

The first step in this analysis is estimating the enthusiasm the American people have for this conflict. One point of insight into how much people care comes from a December 2015 *Washington Post* article that followed on the heels of the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. According to the article, interest among 60 percent of 18 to 26-year-old American respondents “strongly” or “somewhat” supported the committal of ground troops against the Islamic State.  

Similarly, in a Cable News Network (CNN) article dated December 7, 2015, poll data shows that a “majority of Americans (53 percent) say the U.S. should send ground troops to Iraq or Syria to fight [the Islamic State]. . . and 68 percent say America’s military response to the terrorist group thus far has not been aggressive enough.”

Speaking to the degree that this population is willing to take personal action on these opinions, a September 2015 *Huffington Post* article reported a small but committed number of Americans have already ensconced themselves in the Iraqi crisis. Conglomerating a number of open-source reports, *The Huffington Post* stated that an estimated 108 Americans are fighting within the ranks of the “YPG,” a Syrian Kurdish military, and in the Peshmerga, which is the military arm of the semi-autonomous Kurdish sub-government within Iraq.

However, like most activities that require hardship and sacrifice, personal willingness to commit to war is something different from voicing support or isolated vigilantes. An important aspect of the aforementioned December 2015 *Washington Post* article detailed that while at least 45 percent of Americans less than 30 years of age
would support military action, that group would not be willing to personally fight. 

Reporting on the same source data, National Public Radio (NPR) reported that 62 percent of “millennial” Americans “wouldn’t . . . personally join the fight, even if the U.S. needed additional troops.” Along the same lines, a July 2015 USA Today article stated that the Army was nearly 14 percent short on its annual requirements that year. The article referenced Major General Jeffrey Snow, a ranking US Army recruiting officer, as saying that attracting young men and women to the Army becomes more difficult when the US economy improves. This fear was confirmed in an August 4, 2015 Department of Defense announcement that stated the Army achieved 89.2 percent of its active duty 2015 goal of 43,614, though all other branches of service met or exceeded their goals. Army Reserve and National Guard rates were 100.6 percent of 20,773 and 90.3 percent of 36,181, respectively. The report went on to state that the Army “exhibited strong retention number for the nine month [sic] of fiscal year 2015.”

Based on this brief analysis, the author assesses the popular passion of the American people for this conflict as low. Like Prussia during the time of Frederick the Great, the American people are largely employed and their work is very valuable. Few Americans prize military service enough to join and it would damage the country’s fragile economy to take too many of them away from productive work. As the conflict itself inspires little public fervor, the reason people join will have to be one that is not directly related to the crisis in Iraq. Thankfully, even with the public’s low enthusiasm for the conflict, recent history has shown that money and general political support will be

§§§§ Even into 2016, the United States was still recovering from the 2007 “Great Recession.”
forthcoming (even in the depths of the 2012-2015 sequestrations, the Army received a functional level of funding).

The second step in the assessment is to estimate the number of people available for service. Again, the only economic information available from Nichiporuk’s scenario is that American productivity is somewhat less than other comparable western countries. As such, the author will draw the remainder of the assessment of the situation from 2014, 2015, and 2016 data.

The number of people available for military service is primarily a function of population and economics. In 2016, the US population was nearly 324,000,000, as compared to the scenario’s aggressors Syria, with 18,000,000, and Iran, with 8,000,000.\(^{68}\) Obviously, if the US were to completely mobilize, it could produce significantly more people than its threats could. However, this is not a total war, and as such, American civilian employment is a much more important factor to consider than just overall population.

The more gainfully employed a society is, the greater the opportunity cost individuals and society incur for inducting each subsequent person into military service. As such, perhaps the most telling statistic available to address how many people are available is the unemployment rate. Though an imperfect tool, because it does not describe underemployment nor discouraged workers, it provides useful insight into the availability of people. The January 2016 unemployment rate in the United States was 4.9 percent (seasonally adjusted) for individuals 16 years of age and older.\(^{69}\) This is a reduction from the mid 2015 rate of 5.3 percent and the continuation of a generally positive trend from 2011’s nine percent. To lend some recent historical perspective to
this, America’s 10-year high was nearly 10 percent in late 2009 and the 70-year high was approximately 11 percent during the 1982-84 recession. These numbers, therefore, indicate a relative sparsity of people who are not already employed.

However, current income levels are also an indicator of how reluctant people who already have jobs might be to giving them up (or at least of how much money it will take to entice them away). According to the financial planning company Advisor Perspectives, using data drawn from the US Census Bureau, the mean, income-adjusted incomes of US households (broken into ascending quintiles) in 2014 were $11,676, $31,087, $54,041, $87,834, and $194,053. For the first three quintiles, this represents a decline of 17.1 percent (from the 1999 average), 10.8 percent, and 6.9 percent (both from 2000), respectively.

From this data, two salient points emerge: one, employment is relatively high and two, real incomes have dropped in recent years with no particular indications of an immediate reverse in that trend. Predicating upon the first point, one can consider the current environment as having a low number of a people available for service. This means that drawing people into the military by any involuntary means will incur a relatively higher opportunity cost. Therefore, conscription will meet with more resistance and long-term costs than volunteer recruiting or hiring contractors. However, the second point, declining incomes, can play to the Army’s purposes. Lower incomes mean that the Army needs to offer relatively less money to be competitive with the civilian market’s going wages. Overall, this research’s assessment is that the number of people available is low.
For the purposes of this study, the social conditions that affect this recruitment effort are low popular passion and few people from which to draw. Under these circumstances, voluntary recruitment is the most preferable means of levying a sustainable Army. Volunteerism is more politically acceptable because it shifts the burden of service from the reluctant to the willing, reducing the liability of the government for individual Soldiers’ satisfaction with the conflict. Ultimately, this allows a force to be raised, retained, and employed with markedly less public emotion and interaction. The choice to serve is individual, made with full knowledge of the situation, and no other member of society has to bear any burden other than taxes. Additionally, astute recruiting policy can target potential Soldiers by selling the social benefits of military service: a generally merit-based system of advancement, relatively high pay versus civilians in their twenties, and the social advantage of belonging to a generally well-respected profession. In summation, people should be enticed to serve by extrinsic benefits instead of their excitement for the conflict, which is crucial in this case because the populace’s passion is low.

The liberal use of contractors in this scenario would be both efficient and beneficial. The 2025 Iraqi crisis is not yet a highly lethal war (and may never become one, if deterrence is successful). As such, a wide variety of positions are legally available to civilians. A contracted force may be cheaper than recruiting and keeping 247,000 Soldiers. However, the best utility of contractors in this situation would be from the perspective that society generally feels less ire at the loss of them and that such loss would be only indirectly attributed to the government. While this may appear to be a callous perspective perhaps bordering upon immoral, it is a reality. By the use of
volunteer recruiting and contractors, the US Army can bypass the discussion of enthusiasm for the conflict, of which there is little, and raise its force by economic and social enticement alone.

Under these circumstances, conscription would be a viable but ultimately self-defeating option. The popularity of the conflict is low and the people’s passion is not aroused. While enacting conscription would be effective in the sense that it would generate the troops necessary to meet the need, it would not be effective at raising an “effective army, capable of serving as a reliable instrument of state policy.”72 Low unemployment, combined with the fact that the fraction of Americans who meet qualifications for military service are also among the most employable, means conscription will necessarily dip into a population that has both money to lose and employers to upset. Eventually, the loss of economic productivity and the resentment of the people, particularly if the conflict were unsuccessful, would outweigh the efficiency benefits that conscription offers. However, this is not to say that conscription has no role to play at all. During the Vietnam War, the Gates Commission Report stated that the fear of conscription induced many people to volunteer.73 Public releases that the government may consider the draft to fill is manpower needs could be a powerful, if somewhat manipulative, tool to encourage undecided citizens to enter military service voluntarily.

Like in the American Revolutionary War, time will have an important impact on the prosecution of this conflict. The longer the Iraqi crisis continues to take American troops, ceteris paribus, the lower the enthusiasm of the people will be and the greater the Army’s need for replacements. As interest in the war is already low, the American government cannot allow it to turn into a protracted affair without negative political and
economic repercussions. Fortunately, the American Army is likely to still hold a qualitative edge over its Syrian and Iranian adversaries, which will hopefully aid in a swifter resolution to the conflict.

1 Ross.

2 Gates, 22.

3 Ibid., 22-34.

4 Ibid.


6 Ross; Gates; Palmer.

7 Ross; Palmer.

8 Pierce.


12 Ross.

13 Ross; Lynn.


16 Locke; Ross.

17 Infoplease.com.
18 Gates.

19 Ibid.


21 Gates, 132.


24 Moran and Waldron.

25 Irby; Encyclopedia Britannica; Nickerson.


31 Ross.

32 Howard.

33 Palmer.


37 Totally History, “George III.”

38 Ross.


40 Ibid.


42 Ibid.


44 Gates

45 Rothenberg, 33.


48 Ibid.

49 History, “MACV Established”; VVOF.

51 Ibid.

52 Rothenberg, 33.

53 Ross.

54 American Revolutionary War.

55 Nichiporuk

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid., 91.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., 61.


64 Nick Robins-Early, “American Civilians and Veterans are Fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq,” The Huffington Post, September 4, 2015, accessed February 24, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/american-foreign-fighters-syria-iraq_us_55e76900e4b0c818f61a85f0.


66 Ibid.


72 Rothenberg, 33.

73 Gates.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

This research study sums up by applying the two primary factors, popular passion and number of people available, and the secondary factor of time to the study’s research problem: “how can the US Army recruit and retain a force able to win against the threats described in a ‘competitively multipolar’ world?” Then analysis provides a final recommendation on what mixture of volunteer recruiting, contractor use, and conscription best meet the threats outlined in Brian Nichiporuk’s scenario. Finally, this study concludes with recommendations for future academic study.

Conclusions

This study concludes that any of the three recruitment methods, or any combination thereof, is capable of producing the raw number of people required to meet Nichiporuk’s scenario. If America were to activate its standby draft, it could quickly generate the 247,000 additional Soldiers. Alternatively, it could hire an entirely contracted force for use in the Army’s logistics and support base to free existing Soldiers for combat. Lastly, with proper incentives the Army could recruit the 247,000 people using its current volunteer system. As such, the direct answer to this study’s research question, “how can the US Army recruit and retain a force able to win against the threats described in a ‘competitively multipolar’ world,” is any of the three.

However, this study now addresses how best to raise these 247,000 additional troops. The reader will recall from chapter four that two social factors, popular passion and the number of people available, determine what the best method is. Additionally, the
passage of time affects both of these factors. To briefly recap, popular passion for Nichiporuk’s Iraqi crisis is low, as is the number of people available, and the length of the conflict is, of course, unknown. Based on this study’s analysis from chapter four, these circumstances lend themselves to less forceful, more voluntary methods of recruitment.

The most advantageous method of recruitment for the world of competitive multipolarity is a combination of contracting and volunteer recruiting. The US Army should first fill and retain as many positions as possible with contractors for the following reasons: one, popular passion is low, so enticing civilians with high pay (and easy entry into the force, as contracting involves little if any military style training), sidesteps any need to make the conflict itself an inspiring affair to potential employees. Two, for the same reason, the use of military contractors, versus Soldiers, carries much less political liability. Three, as the number of people available is low, contracting allows for selective recruitment from society of only those individuals who would benefit from the job, which avoids the issue of taking highly productive laborers out of the civilian workforce.

In concert with liberal contractor use, the Army should fill and maintain the remainder of its troop strength requirements by volunteer recruiting. Similar to the rationale for using contractors, the US Army should favor volunteerism because it: one, avoids the political ramifications of conscripting a force for an unpopular conflict. Two, restricts those in service to only those who have chosen to be there, reducing political liability for the conflict. Three, as there are few people available, it is preferable to allow
market forces and personal choice to select who will serve instead of an indiscriminate draft, which would have undue impact on civil production.

Conscription, while very capable of producing the people needed, is the least preferable option under these conditions. Drafting from a society whose popular passion for a conflict is low is least preferable because it: one, increases recruitment costs, obliging the government to expend additional resources activating the draft system, prosecuting draft dodgers, and forcing a relatively small number of people (relative to the total US population) into service. Two, it increases the Army’s operating costs; conscription would necessitate additional time and money to account for its incumbent increase in indiscipline and Soldiers’ lower intrinsic motivation. Three, it increases political resistance. The impressment of unwilling civilians into service for Iraq in 2025 would cycle back to the government in the form of protests and pressure on elected officials. This would result in the political losses of unpopular conscription eventually outweighing its operational benefits. Lastly, conscription is a poor choice in light of the number of people available. As there are few people, the chances that a random draft would draw from productively employed civilians is very high. Should a draft impartially glean society for recruits, it would impart a disproportionately high cost to civil production.

Time will have the effect of lowering popular passion and increasing the Army’s needs for troops. As the conflict continues, passion for the conflict will lessen, particularly if military progress is difficult to see, necessitating an increase in the incentives necessary to entice people to join and stay in the Army. Additionally,
casualties and completed service terms will increase the need for troops over time, further increasing the scarcity of an already small pool of civilians. This will simultaneously increase the costs of the acquisition and retention costs of both the Army and civilian employers.

Furthermore, it is fair to consider other factors that might impact which recruitment method the Army should use. Implicit in the rationale for Nichiporuk’s 50 percent increase in the size of the Army (instead of more) is that it enjoys a qualitative advantage over its anticipated foes, Syria and Iran. Should this assumption prove false, the Army might require more people. Additionally, the lethality of the war can have an effect. If the 2025 Iraqi conflict improves into a tranquil, peacekeeping mission, a relatively greater percentage of the required force could be contracted (as there is less need for people to directly engage the enemy); conversely, if it becomes a more conventional conflict, a relatively larger percentage of the force logically should be Soldiers, who are capable both of support and combat roles. Lastly, should America confront competitive multipolarity as a coalition or alliance, it may be able to adjust its total manpower need or makeup by sharing its burden with partner nations.

**Recommendations for Future Study**

The outcomes of this study pose several questions worthy of further research. For one, how quickly is the US Army’s training base capable of expanding to accommodate 247,000 additional Soldiers and what resources would such an expansion require? Additionally, how many total people would the Army have to recruit, accounting for training and other losses, to end up with a net increase of 247,000? Lastly, a more
expansive series of case studies from multiple times and cultures could be useful to further test the theory that social conditions determine which recruitment method is most advantageous to a society. Exhaustive research on the subject in order to develop an in-depth explanatory model could be beneficial to the US Army.

1 Rothenberg, 33; Nichiporuk, 58.
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