AMERICAN COLONY IN AFRICA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER FORMER COLONIAL POWERS IN WEST AFRICA THAT CAN BE APPLIED TO THE UNITED STATES’ RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBERIA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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American Colony in Africa: Lessons Learned from Other Former Colonial Powers in West Africa That Can Be Applied to the United States’ Relationship with Liberia

Philip J. Boldt, Major

Most Americans know little to nothing about Liberia or the African continent. If Americans knows anything about Liberia they would probably recall a brief passage in their grade school textbooks that explained how Liberia is an African country founded by former American slaves. A more recent memory involving Liberia could be the 2014 Ebola crisis. The actual relationship between Liberia and the United States is more complicated than these two events. The United States serves in the critical role of the former colonial power of Liberia and continues to be instrumental in the ultimate success or failure of Liberia in post-colonial Africa. Liberia’s three neighboring countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea all have unique relationships with their former colonial powers which shape their internal and external affairs. This research paper investigates these relationships and attempts to identify elements of these relationships that can be included in, or excluded from the US relationship with Liberia.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
Most Americans know little to nothing about Liberia or the African continent. If Americans knows anything about Liberia they would probably recall a brief passage in their grade school textbooks that explained how Liberia is an African country founded by former American slaves. A more recent memory involving Liberia could be the 2014 Ebola crisis. The actual relationship between Liberia and the United States is more complicated than these two events. The United States serves in the critical role of the former colonial power of Liberia and continues to be instrumental in the ultimate success or failure of Liberia in post-colonial Africa. Liberia’s three neighboring countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea all have unique relationships with their former colonial powers that shape their internal and external affairs. This research paper investigates these relationships and attempts to identify elements of these relationships that can be included in, or excluded from the US relationship with Liberia.
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<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISWAP</td>
<td>Islamic State- West Africa Province</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
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<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Countries that once depended on us still ask us for help today. But why should we help these countries if it isn’t worth it for us?

— General Charles de Gaulle

Background

In 1816, the American Colonization Society (ACS) was founded in the United States (US) (PBS 2016). This society would probably have been of little significance in the annals of history, except that within its ranks, were many prominent members of American society. Founded as a private organization, the purpose of this society was to help free blacks residing in the US return to Africa as colonists (PBS 2016). The society had two groups of supporters with vastly different motives. The main group of supporters truly believed that free blacks would only have an opportunity for better conditions in Africa. This main group of supporters believed that creating a colony of free US blacks in Africa would ultimately help end slavery in the US (PBS 2016). Whereas the second group of ACS supporters had vastly different aims. This second group believed that sending free blacks back to Africa as colonists would rid the US of free blacks, leaving the only blacks in the US as slaves, and ultimately strengthen the institution of slavery in the US (PBS 2016). In the end, no matter what the motivation, the ACS facilitated the return of approximately 12,000 blacks back to Africa (PBS 2016). The ancestors of these colonists form the present day Americo-Liberian ethnic group found in Liberia.

Almost immediately after it facilitated the colonization of Liberia, the ACS faded away into the background, and the US government slowly crept into a formal relationship.
with Liberia. On July 26, 1847, Liberia declared independence and began trying to figure out its place in the world. On February 5, 1862, the US officially recognized Liberia’s independence. Unlike other African countries, this independence was not a separation from a former colonial power but in actuality the opposite. In recognizing Liberia’s independence this moment became the point when the US government formally recognized the legitimacy of Liberia and effectively declared that the ACS no longer had a role with Liberia. The US now had its first and only colony on the African continent. The European powers recognized this unique relationship between the US and Liberia and made no attempts to encroach on this relationship. Because of this unique history, the US has a unique responsibility for Liberia’s security, development, and ultimate success or failure.

During the majority of the relationship timeline between Liberia and the US, both countries have had significant issues defining their post-colonial relationship with each other. Though the US has many interests in Africa, the average American citizen cannot articulate why Africa as a whole is important to the US, or even to begin to discuss the significance of Liberia. The concept of the US serving in a hybrid role somewhere between colonial power and former colonial power in Africa during different points in history is a difficult and unpalatable concept for the average American to grasp. The complicated hybrid role of the US as a colonial power and former colonial power effectively began on February 5, 1862 and continues through present day. This complicated relationship still has ramifications that reverberate today in US policy towards Liberia.
In addition to Liberia’s relationship with the US, Liberia’s three neighboring countries (Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea) play a critical role in the stability or instability of Liberia and West Africa as a whole. To predict successes or failures in Liberia, it is important to understand the relationships between Liberia’s neighboring countries and their former colonial powers. When civil wars or coups d’état occur in any of these countries, there is usually an impact in Liberia. The same goes for when there is instability in Liberia, it usually translates into problems in Liberia’s neighboring countries. Because of the historic limited US involvement in Africa, it is important for the US to capitalize on lessons learned from the post-colonial period in Africa so the US can avoid some of the same mistakes and benefit from the successes of the other former colonial powers. These lessons learned can be translated into a more effective and mature relationship between the US and Liberia.

Liberia’s three neighboring countries were all former colonies of European powers. Sierra Leone was a former British colony. Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire were both former French colonies but took significantly different paths from each other in the post-colonial period. The post-colonial relationship between Guinea, Ivory Coast, and France clearly demonstrate how the relationship between a former colonial power and a former colony can drastically affect the stability and success of the former colony. In addition, this variance in relationship also demonstrates why it is so important for the former colony to diversify its economy and capitalize on periods of support for the former colonial power. Effective use of the support can allow a former colony to stand on its own and phase out the former colonial powers influence if desired.
The post-colonial relationship between Great Britain and Sierra Leone also provides many lessons learned for the US relationship with Liberia. Both Sierra Leone and Liberia were founded in much the same manner by private organizations attempting to provide opportunities for free blacks. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the role of the private organizations phased out and the governments associated with the private organizations, the US and UK, took on a formal role. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone also suffered similar devastating civil wars. The UK intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil war also provides a case study for that can be used to compare with US interventions in Liberia. Could each of the former colonial powers have intervened at a different point in the civil wars in their former colonies to minimize the devastating effects of these civil wars? If so, then what is the responsibility to help rebuild? Now, whose responsibility is it to rebuild these countries? How much of an active role is appropriate?

The 2015 US National Security Strategy clearly articulates that investing in Africa is vital to African regional security, as well as US national security (White House 2015, 26). One of the specific opportunities for investing into Africa’s future is Liberia. Ahead of other countries in Africa, the US should focus on Liberia since this is America’s only former African colony, and success or failure directly reflects on the US to other African countries as well as the other former colonial powers. A stable and successful Liberia could serve as an anchor for stabilization in Western Africa. If Liberia becomes strong enough, it could also prevent the United States from having to intervene in West African problems and Liberia could be a regional leader and set the example for other African countries. The US however does not need to figure out its relationship with Liberia all on its own. Great Britain and France have a long colonial history in Africa and have
struggled to figure out post-colonial relationships. Figuring out how to support stabilizing Liberia, rebuild the infrastructure, economy, and society could prove to be a model that could be used throughout the world that other countries can emulate.

**Primary Research Question**

The primary research question is, “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia?” This primary question can help the United States focus its long-term policy towards Liberia and help the US learn from the both positive and negative aspects of the relationships between the former colonial powers and their former colonies. The framing of this research question helps the US view its relationship with Liberia more as of a former colonial power, rather than Liberia just as another country in Africa. Liberia does have a special relationship with the US and this relationship must be recognized.

**Secondary Research Questions**

In order to answer the primary research question, “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia?,” the answers to some secondary questions must be explored and have a relationship with the primary research question.

The secondary questions to be answered are:

1. Would it be feasible for the United States to become more involved with the success of Liberia?
2. How would Liberians view increased US involvement in Liberia?
3. Are there any elements of the relationships between Liberia’s neighboring countries and their former colonial powers that should not be adopted into the future US-Liberian relationship or that the US should be wary of adopting?

4. If the United States does not increase overall support to Liberia will there be increased unrest in Liberia or its neighboring countries?

These secondary research questions attempt to answer many of the questions that come from the premise behind the primary research question. The premise being that the US has a unique responsibility to facilitate Liberia’s future success. It is not just important to identify lessons that can be incorporated into the relationship between Liberia and the US but to determine if incorporation of these lessons is desirable to both US and Liberian interests.

Assumptions

There are a number of assumptions relating to the primary research question, “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia?” One major assumption is that increasing support for Liberia would be palatable to the US public. In the time of decreasing resources, the necessity for supporting Liberia must be clearly articulated and additional support included under congressional authorizations. One method would be to keep the topic of support to Liberia relatively quiet since in the grand scheme of the US budget, assistance to Liberia is extremely minimal. The other method would be to significantly increase US public awareness of Liberia, capitalizing on the successful aspects of the Ebola virus eradication mission of 2014. An even more acceptable option for the US public would be tying US support to Liberia to the fight against worldwide
terrorism. Highlighting the US relationship with Liberia too much however could lead to support to Liberia becoming entangled in partisan US politics. Overall, most Americans probably are neutral on assistance to Liberia but could be convinced that additional aid is a requirement when reminded of the special US relationship with Liberia and associated US National Security interests.

Definitions and Terms

There will be some degree of disagreement on the definition of the colony. Some will argue that Liberia was not actually a colony of the United States. The definition of a colony is “a group of emigrants or their descendants who settle in a distant land but remain subject to or closely connected with the parent country” (Soukhanov 1984, 282). The post-colonial period in Africa is also an ill-defined term. Each country has its own date of independence and own transition period to independence. In terms of Liberia, it was not a colony is all the same respects as its neighbors. The independence date for Liberia is not the point that Liberia separated from the US, but more the point that the US government assumed a formal relationship with Liberia.

There is a general grouping of countries that are considered to be in West Africa. One way the best ways to identify countries in West Africa is to use the 15 member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as a guide to what is widely accepted as a definition for West Africa. It is important to make this distinction because countries in West Africa have a shared identity. Within West Africa, there is also a subgrouping of countries that are Francophone, or the French speaking, countries of Africa. These countries have a shared identity and all have different individual and group relationships with their former colonial power, France.
Limitations and Delimitations

This research paper is limited to Liberia and its three neighboring countries. The research only goes into the colonial periods in Western Africa where it is required for background context. Though there would be many more lessons learned from other African countries, especially in West Africa, the scope was limited to provide ample background understanding of Liberia and its three neighbors. One limitation of this study is that the author was not able to travel to Liberia or its three neighboring countries before publishing this research. First-hand experiences would have greatly helped expand the perspective of the author and confirmed or denied many of the elements covered in this research. Gaining additional perspective on West Africa would have allowed the author to more accurately determine the ramifications of implementing lessons learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa into the US relationship with Liberia.

Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced to the primary research question, “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia?”

In order to answer the primary research question, this chapter also introduced the secondary questions:

1. Would it be feasible for the United States to become more involved with the success of Liberia?
2. How would Liberians view increased US involvement in Liberia?
3. Are there any elements of the relationships between Liberia’s neighboring countries and their former colonial powers that should not be adopted into the future US-Liberian relationship or that the US should be wary of?

4. If the United States does not increase overall support to Liberia will there be increased unrest in Liberia or its neighboring countries?

The next chapter, chapter 2, will present a summary of the significant amount of literature available that covers all four of the countries in this research. None of the literature in their current form answers the primary or secondary research questions thoroughly. The aggregation of data from multiple sources provides adequate data to answer the primary and secondary research questions.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Chapter Introduction

This study gathers the relevant data that describes the characteristics unique to the post-colonial relationships that exist in West Africa. Additionally, the study analyzes the post-colonial relationship between four countries and their former colonial powers.

The primary research question is “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia?”

The secondary research questions are:

1. Would it be feasible for the United States to become more involved with the success of Liberia?
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3. Are there any elements of the relationships between Liberia’s neighboring countries and their former colonial powers that should not be adopted into the future US-Liberian relationship or that the US should be wary of?
4. If the United States does not increase overall support to Liberia will there be increased unrest in Liberia or its neighboring countries?

This chapter reviews a sampling of the current literature that describes the relationships between the four former colonies and their associated former colonial powers. There are a significant number of journals as well as other literature on Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia. There is, however, not much scholarly discussion on the relationships between these countries or on how their individual post-
colonial relationships affect one another. To lay the groundwork for the rest of this research this chapter also provides an overview of colonialism and background on US National Security interests in Africa, and specifically West Africa.

**Overview of Colonialism**

Colonialism is one of the many components that facilitate researchers’ understandings of the internal dynamics of individual countries within West Africa. Additionally, colonialism facilitates researchers’ understanding of the dynamics of West Africa as a region, and how these West African countries interact with countries outside the region of West African. During the 1700s and 1800s, colonization was on the rise in Western Africa (Ham et al. 2009, 33). In the early 1900s, there were calls for independence but no real progress towards West African colonies becoming independent from their colonial powers (Ham et al. 2009, 33). World War II significantly affected all of the European countries with colonies in Africa. At the end of World War II, many of these colonial powers were forced to reorganize their governments to adapt to a post-World War II world. Part of this reorganization was for these colonial powers to determine what relationship to have with their colonies and whether to retain colonies or not. After World War II, the calls for independence from colonies in West Africa grew louder (Ham et al. 2009, 33). Great Britain and France were both rebuilding their countries in a physical sense as well as defining their roles in the post-World War II era. For France, the reorganization of the French government from the French Fourth Republic into the French Fifth Republic required a reevaluation of the status of French colonies throughout the world. In 1957, Ghana gained its independence from Britain (Ham et al. 2009, 33). In 1958, the French government held a referendum that allowed its
African colonies to gain immediate independence or remain French colonies and continue an enduring relationship with France (Ham et al. 2009, 33). This was a complicated decision point for West African colonies, and each colony would have to make decisions that hopefully would be best for its own future. Most colonies chose to maintain some type of relationship with France. This decision was made easier for most of the French colonies because of the level of involvement the French government had in the technical and administrative functions of most of its African colonies. An immediate severance of ties with France would possibly lead to failings in the technical and administrative sectors of governance for French colonies choosing to end their relationships with France.

One of the key reference materials for this research is *The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence* by Martin Meredith. This book is a critical source because it covers Africa from the point that each of the former colonies began severing ties with their former colonial powers. This source is also extremely useful because it covers from the same perspective all of the four of the countries being examined in this study. It however only provides limited discussion on the relationships of the four countries covered in this research. The source also provides additional perspective on Western Africa and the African continent as a whole during the same post colonization period. In this source, Liberia is covered as if its post-colonial period was on a similar timeline to the former colonies of France and the United Kingdom.

An additional source used for this research is *Lonely Planet: West Africa*. Though a travel guide is an unlikely source for a research paper, it provides some of the best modern day descriptions of each of the four countries in support of this research. This source provides the researcher a unique first person perspective since the researcher has
not physically been to any of the four countries studied. This travel guide provides unique perspectives on how locals view foreigners. In this source, each country is covered in unique categories such as history, culture, religion, arts, and environment.

A great source of information for facts on each country is the countrywatch.com website. This website provides critical facts about each country and is significantly less opinion-based than the *Lonely Planet* guide described above. This website provides information that is broken down in categories such as political, economic, social, investment, and environmental. With the separate investment section, this website provides good insight on which countries, and for what reason, would invest the respective country. The economic section of country watch provides unique insight into how the US and Liberia are intertwined economically and demonstrate the economic sectors of Liberia that have remained resilient during turmoil in the country.

Howard W French’s *China’s Second Continent* provides a unique perspective to answer many of the questions coming up in the research such as “who fills the void when the former colonial powers in the countries included in this research fail to fulfill their responsibilities as former colonial powers?” This work demonstrates how the Chinese government views its role in Africa. Up to this point, China’s interests in Africa have been primarily economic, but China may have the intent of shifting its role in the future. This source also shows how China may attempt to redefine its role in West Africa into a similar style role like the one the US has in West Africa. In this yet to be determined role, China would fill voids that have been left by European former colonial powers or the US. This new role would probably be based on the US relationship with Africa. This is not saying that China and the US have the same goals in Africa, but China wants to be
viewed as a world power and do some of the same things that the US does, such as distributing aid and rebuilding infrastructure. One of the primary differences in how the Chinese operate in Africa compared with actual former colonial powers in Africa is that China tends to import much of its own labor from China.

**US National Security Interests in West Africa**

Historically, US engagement with Africa has been defined by aid to help Africans (White House 2015, 27). Presently, US interests are shifting to investing in the future of Africa, as well as expanding security partnerships (White House 2015, 27). The two broad concepts in the US National Security Strategy (NSS) that span the continent of Africa are reducing hunger and increasing public health capacity. However, the NSS does not specifically discuss West Africa and instead focuses on other hotspot countries in Africa. Specifically, the NSS discusses that in Somalia and Nigeria violent extremists pose a threat to innocent civilians, regional stability, and US National Security (White House 2015, 26). The focus on these countries is important because these violent extremists have the potential to spread to other parts of Africa including the four countries in West Africa included in this research.

The 2016 United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Commander’s posture statement, in contrast to the NSS, more clearly defines why the US cares about West Africa. In West Africa, Boko Haram, also known as Islamic State- West Africa Province (ISWAP), is capitalizing on the instability of governments in the region (Rodriguez 2016, 8). This issue has forced the African Union, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the European Union, and individual African countries to all work together to counter this threat (Rodriguez 2016, 8). Each of these countries and entities has similar
yet slightly different interests and histories within the West African region. Understanding current and potential future problems within the West African region is important because this understanding will allow each of these countries and entities to best leverage their assets, influence within a specific situation, or make the informed decision not to become involved.

One additional area highlighted by the USAFRICOM commander for concern is the development potential for the Gulf of Guinea. This area has unique potential to provide great economic revenue to West Africa through energy, shipping, transportation, food, and tourism (Rodriguez 2016, 10). However, this area is rife with piracy, armed robbery, illegal fishing, and kidnap-for-ransom (Rodriguez 2016, 10). These serious issues are a threat to international security as well as US national security. West Africa, unable to capitalize on these resources, continues to have instability within the region which is counter to US interests, as well as the interests of other former colonial powers within the West African region.

Chapter Summary

There is adequate literature available to answer the primary and secondary research questions. This literature provides unique insight into all four of the countries that are being examined in this research. Because of the significant amount of literature available, this research will follow an established format to ensure that all intended areas are covered by the research as well as to ensure equitable research is conducted on all four of the countries. This chapter also provided additional background, which adds to the background found in chapter 1. This foundation will facilitate the understanding of the research methodology found in chapter 3.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter Introduction

The researcher will adopt various approaches to answer the primary research question, “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia?,” as well as the secondary research questions that have been identified in this study. Some of the methods being used are a review of the literature, development of an operational approach, and application of evaluation criteria. The literature review established that adequate data was available to conduct this research and provided a background of colonialism as well as defining US National Security interests in Africa, specifically in West Africa.

Evaluation Criteria

The chart below shows the four countries being considered in this study, as well as the four criteria that will be used to evaluate the relationships among the countries and their former colonial powers. The chart will allow for comparison of the former colonial powers’ relationships with Liberia’s neighboring countries in the post-colonial period. In the first category (external support/intervention), this is when the former colonial power intervenes on behalf of the former colony to protect it from an external threat. In the second category (economic intervention), the former colonial power significantly intervenes economically to stabilize the former colony’s economy. In the third category (internal support/intervention), the former colonial power intervenes to maintain the
internal stability of the government or protect the former colony from internal threats. The internal threat/intervention category also involves instances where the former colonial power intervenes not in support of the government, but as a neutral power attempting to stabilize the former colony. This support may not be in support of the government of the former colony. In the fourth category (diplomatic advocacy), the former colonial power intervenes diplomatically on behalf of the former colony and uses the former colonial power’s diplomatic influence on behalf of the former colony. This amount of diplomatic influence may not be available to the former colony because of its size or stature or position in international organizations such as the United Nations.

Table 1. Type of Intervention by Country Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Colony (Former Colonial Power)</th>
<th>Type of intervention by the former colonial power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External support/ intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (United Kingdom)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea (France)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire (France)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (United States)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by author

Within each box of the table, a ranking of none, minimal, moderate, or significant, will be applied to each country to characterize the effect of each of the categories on each country. There can also by hybrid ranking such as “moderate to significant” to denote a ranking between the four primary categories. The ranking is a subjective assessment by the author but will explained within the text of chapter 4.
Research Methodology

The following is the step-by-step approach for the research in this thesis:

Step 1: The first step in the research design will be the literature review. This step will include an overview of colonialism in broad terms, as well as a discussion of US national security interests in Africa and West Africa. This context will facilitate the further discussion of each of the four countries covered in this research.

Step 2: Research will be conducted on the colonial history of the country of Sierra Leone. The author will present a brief outline of the highpoints of the colonial period, followed with analysis of the end of colonialism in Sierra Leone and how this shaped the initial relationship with the former colonial power, the United Kingdom. Analysis will also be conducted on any significant interventions by the former colonial power. The interventions will be divided into four categories. The first category will be external support. This is when the former colonial power intervenes to help the former colony with an external threat. The second category is economic intervention. This category will discuss long-term intervention, as well as interventions for a specific event. The third category will be internal support/ intervention. This is when the former colonial power intervenes because of a primarily internal threat. The fourth category is diplomatic advocacy. This is when the former colonial power, the United Kingdom, acts of behalf of Sierra Leone in the international arena. Within each box of the table, a ranking of none, minimal, moderate, or significant, will be applied to characterize the effect of each of the categories on Sierra Leone.
Step 3: The third step of the research will be on the colonial history of the country of Guinea. The author will present a brief outline of the highpoints of the colonial period, followed by analysis of the end of colonialism in Guinea and how this shaped the initial relationship with the former colonial power (France). Analysis will also be conducted on any significant interventions by the former colonial power. The interventions will be divided into four categories. The first category will be external support. This is when the former colonial power intervenes to help the former colony with an external threat. The second category is economic intervention. This category will discuss long-term intervention as well as for a specific event. The third category will be internal support/intervention. This is when the former colonial power intervenes because of a primarily internal threat. The fourth category is diplomatic advocacy. This is when the former colonial power acts of behalf of Guinea in the international arena. Within each box of the table, a ranking of none, minimal, moderate, or significant, will be applied to characterize the effect of each of the categories on Guinea.
Table 3. Guinea Type of Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Colony (Former Colonial Power)</th>
<th>Type of intervention by the former colonial power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External support/ intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (United Kingdom)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire (France)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (United States)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Developed by author

Step 4: The fourth step of research will be conducted on the colonial history of the country of Côte d’Ivoire. A brief outline of the highpoints of the colonial period will be discussed, followed by analysis of the end of colonialism in Côte d’Ivoire and how this shaped the initial relationship with the former colonial power, France. Analysis will also be conducted on any significant interventions of the former colonial power. The interventions will be divided into four categories. The first category will be external support. This category is when the former colonial power intervenes to help the former colony with an external threat. The second category is economic intervention. This category will discuss long-term intervention, as well as for a specific event. The third category will be internal support/ intervention. This category is when the former colonial power intervenes because of a primarily internal threat. The fourth category is diplomatic advocacy. This is when the former colonial power acts on behalf of Côte d’Ivoire in the international arena. Within each box of the table, a ranking of none, minimal, moderate, or significant, will be applied to characterize the effect of each of the categories on Côte d’Ivoire.
Table 4. Côte d'Ivoire Type of Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Colony (Former Colonial Power)</th>
<th>Type of intervention by the former colonial power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External support/ intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>Guinea (France)</td>
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<td>Côte d'Ivoire (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia (United States)</td>
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Source: Developed by author

Step 5: The fifth step of research will be on the colonial history of the country of Liberia. Though Liberia was not a colony in the same manner as the other three countries, research will be conducted in a very similar format. A brief outline of the highpoints of the colonial period through 1980 will be discussed, followed by a discussion of Liberian history after 1980. The significance of 1980 is that this was the first point in Liberian history when an Americo-Liberian was not in charge of the country. Though the US involvement was very sporadic through Liberian history, the author will demonstrate how US policy towards Liberia has actually helped exacerbate and accentuate problems and instability within the country.

Analysis will also be conducted on any significant interventions of the former colonial power, the United States. The interventions will be divided into four categories. The first category will be external support. This is when the former colonial power intervenes to help the former colony with an external threat. The second category is economic intervention. This second category will discuss long-term intervention as well as intervention for a specific event. The third category will be internal support/intervention. This third category is when the former colonial power intervenes because of
a primarily internal threat. The fourth category is diplomatic advocacy. This is when the former colonial power acts on behalf of Liberia in the international arena. Within each box of the table, a ranking of none, minimal, moderate, or significant, will be applied to characterize the effect of each of the categories on Liberia.

Table 5. Liberia Type of Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Colony (Former Colonial Power)</th>
<th>Type of intervention by the former colonial power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External support/ intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia (United States)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Developed by author

Step 6: The sixth step in the research design is to aggregate the findings once the evaluation criteria have been applied. This aggregation is critical to this research. The aggregation of data helps emphasize areas where the US could focus future research. Within each box of the table, a ranking of none, minimal, moderate, or significant, will be applied to characterize the effect of each of the categories on each of the countries as established by the previous analysis.
Step 7: The seventh and final step in the research design is to analyze the results of the aggregate data to answer the primary research question. Based upon this answer, the author will develop conclusions and recommendations.

**Threats to Validity and Biases**

There are several potential issues that pose a threat to validity and bias to the research. Though the author has travelled to the continent of Africa, as of publication of this article, he has not actually travelled to any of the four countries reviewed in this study. This allows for increased objectivity but does not allow the author the ability to apply a first person sanity check to the findings of this research.

Validity criteria were used to assess the validity of this research. For example, one criteria is “External Validity” where there could be a potential bias from generalizing about a population from a limited sample and applying this to other populations or time-periods (Garson 2016). In this study, the researcher attempts to compare like periods throughout the research and additionally attempts not to apply generalizations made about one country to another. One way the researcher will accomplish this is by clearly
explaining the differences in the relationships between the former colonial powers and each individual country.

Another issue of validity raised by Garson is “content validity”, where items may not fall in the domain of their labels (Garson 2016). One area where the researcher may have strayed close to this validity issue is by effectively classifying Liberia as a former US colony. Africans are aware of the complex relationship between Liberia and the United States and how in many regards Liberia could be construed as a colony, while at the same time a valid argument could be made how it was not a colony in the same sense as the other countries discussed in this research. The author’s opinion is that Americans are generally averse to classifying Liberia as a colony because many Americans draw a negative opinion of the term “colonization” because of the US’ history as a former British colony.

**Chapter Summary**

The goal of this research methodology is to provide a framework to answer the primary research question “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia?” At the same time research is conducted on the primary research question, this methodology will also facilitate answering the secondary research questions. With the significant amount of information available on the four countries covered in this research, using the research methodology will keep the research focused and the specific areas identified. The next chapter, chapter 4, will present an analysis of the data collected within this study using the previously mentioned methodology.
CHAPTER 4
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Chapter Introduction

In this chapter, data are presented using the methodology described in the previous chapter. The presentation of this data will allow for the comparison of the four countries covered in this research and analysis of these countries relationships’ with their former colonial powers. This comparison will answer the primary research question, which is “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia”? During the course of answering the primary research question, the secondary research questions will also be answered.

Step One: Literature Review

The first step in the research design is a literature review, which is found in chapter 2. The literature review has two main areas that provide context for the subsequent research steps within chapter 4. The first area is a history and overview of colonialism. The second area is a discussion of US national security interests in West Africa. US national security interests are the reason that the US cares what happens in West Africa even though the US only has direct historic ties to one country in West Africa, Liberia. If the US abdicates its responsibility in West Africa, security issues from other parts of Africa will probably migrate into West Africa and increase overall instability in an already volatile region.
Literature Review: History of Colonialism

The literature review provides a background on each of the four countries studied in this research, as well as the relationships of these countries with their former colonial powers. The literature review provides background on the sources of data used for this research. Data points demonstrating relationships between former colonial powers and their former colonies are primarily available when a positive or negative incident has occurred. These incidents highlight components of the relationship, which can serve as lessons learned for the US. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, French government involvement in the post-colonial period is very evident. France helped Côte d’Ivoire prosper from decolonization in 1960, for a period of about 20 years, making Côte d’Ivoire one of the most prosperous countries in Africa (Ham et al. 2009, 257). At almost the same time, the deterioration of the French relationship with Guinea highlighted how detrimental the rapid withdrawal of former colonial power support could be on a former colony. Even today, Guinea continues to feel the ramifications of its non-existent relationship with its former colonial power, France. The literature review also provided a broad overview of colonialism, facilitating the individual discussions of colonialism in the following steps of research. The literature review provides background on US national security interests in West Africa that helps tie the research back into the primary research question.

Literature Review: US National Security Interests

The US has significant national security interests in West Africa. For example, the criticality of the Gulf of Guinea or stopping the spread of ISWAP is clearly defined in the NSS, as well as the USAFRICOM commander’s posture statement, such as. Overall, the
US National Security interests will be met if the West Africa region is stable and capacity of countries within this region are increased to prevent or limit interventions by all of the former colonial powers including the US.

**Step Two: Sierra Leone**

**Colonialism in Sierra Leone**

In the late 1700’s there were multiple paths for British slaves to gain their freedom. One of these paths was for slaves to support the British during the American War of Independence (Ham et al. 2009, 741). After the war, over 15,000 ex-slaves were in London (Ham et al. 2009, 741). The ex-slaves found themselves with very little opportunity and lived in poverty, much the same as many of the free blacks in the US during the 1800’s. In 1787, a group of British philanthropists purchased land, in what is present day Sierra Leone (Ham et al. 2009, 741). The idea of the philanthropists was to re-settle some of the ex-slaves from London to West Africa, specifically to Sierra Leone. This would give the slaves an opportunity that was not available to the slaves in London at the time. The philanthropists sent ex-slaves to Sierra Leone and attempted to start a settlement. After multiple unsuccessful attempts, the settlement caught on and the ex-slaves began to flourish. In 1808, the British government, recognizing the success and potential, took over the settlement from the philanthropists and made it a colony (Ham et al. 2009, 742). The British decision to make Sierra Leone a colony began the official involvement of the British government. This recognition began the formal colonial period between the United Kingdom and Sierra Leone.

During Sierra Leone’s colonial period, the primary exports were timber, ivory, and slaves (CIA 2016d). In the early 1800’s, the British banned slavery and began
actively intercepting slave ships off of the coast of West Africa (CIA 2016d). When these slave ships were captured, regardless of the origin slaves, the primary location the British took these freed slaves was to Sierra Leone. It was an easy location for the British to move the slaves because Sierra Leone was a British Colony. The people freed from slave ships added to the population of ex-slaves that had previously been sent to Sierra Leone by the philanthropists in London. The community of these freed slaves would become their own ethnic group in Sierra Leone and would compete against the indigenous inhabitants of Sierra Leone for control of the government. This group has many of the same dynamics and struggles of the free blacks from the US who colonized Liberia and struggled versus the indigenous inhabitants of Liberia. Both of these non-indigenous groups struggled to find their place in society with the indigenous populations. By the mid 19th century, there were almost 100 ethnic groups within the Sierra Leone (Ham et al. 2009, 742). The nonindigenous blacks in Sierra Leone were collectively known as “Krios.” Under British rule, the Krios were initially favored. Many of the Krios were appointed to senior civil service posts by the British even though they were outnumbered nearly 50 to 1 by the indigenous inhabitants of Sierra Leone (Ham et al. 2009, 742).

During World War II, Freetown, Sierra Leone served as an assembly point for Allied maritime convoys before they before they transitioned into the North Atlantic and ultimately to the UK (Fowler 2010, 4). This was an example of how the British used their colonies to support the war effort and stretch the resources of the Axis powers. During World War II, the British focused on the maritime significance of Sierra Leone, especially the ports.
End of Colonialism in Sierra Leone

On 27 April 1961, Sierra Leone ended its status as a colony of Great Britain (Fowler 2010, 5). This independence occurred at a time when many of the French colonies in West Africa were establishing their post-colonial relationships with France. The entirety of West Africa was figuring out its post-colonial future. For a time after independence, the rule of law flourished in Sierra Leone (Fowler 2010, 5). A significant portion of the middle class benefited from the robust educational system in Sierra Leone during the British colonial period (Fowler 2010, 5). This education system should have helped Sierra Leone navigate the post-colonial period.

In 1967, however, after less than ten years of independence Sierra Leone had its first major stumble. The military overthrew the civilian government in a coup d’état (Fowler 2010, 5). In 1971, Sierra Leone declared itself a republic (Fowler 2010, 5). This declaration would not be enough to stop the downward slide of Sierra Leone.

External support / Intervention in Sierra Leone

The United Kingdom (UK) maintained ties with Sierra Leone but drew the line where they would support their former colony only when it directly risked British citizens or persons. For example, in 1991, a group of fighters formed in Liberia and was funded by the future Liberian President, Charles Taylor (Meredith 2011, 562). The fighters called themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). This incident was the primary example of an internal threat forming across an international border but in actuality being an internal threat when it came to Sierra Leone. This provides an example of why it is not just possible for the British, as the former colonial power for Sierra Leone, to deal with a threat to Sierra Leone. The British must also coordinate with the US, the former colonial
power for Liberia to stop a hybrid internal/external threat crossing an international border.

Economic Intervention in Sierra Leone

Economic intervention in Sierra Leone by the former colonial power, Britain, was minimal. Part of the issue with British intervention was that the Krios, nonindigenous blacks, were favored during part of Sierra Leone’s colonial period. This led to unequal opportunities, which translated into divisions in the post-colonial society of Sierra Leone.

Internal Support/ Intervention in Sierra Leone

One of the significant issues for Sierra Leone, which was directly tied to dysfunction in the government as well as negative external interest in Sierra Leone, was massive quantities of gems and industrial quality diamonds. These significant resources fueled corruption and instability in a relatively poor country.

In 1971, only 10 years after independence, at the same time that Sierra Leone was becoming a republic, soldiers from neighboring Guinea came to Sierra Leone for almost two years to help stabilize the government of Sierra Leone after a coup attempt (Fowler 2010, 5). This external support temporarily helped stabilize the government but also demonstrated situations where the former colonial power, Britain, chose to let other African countries intervene rather than intervene itself.

Both 1994 and 1995 were critical years in Sierra Leone. The RUF, described above in the external intervention section of this research, increased their guerilla war, and were able to capture a critical rutile mine (Fowler 2010, 5). Rutile is a mineral that is used in the production of titanium. Though the rutile itself did not offer the RUF a
significant military advantage, it did give the RUF significant resources expanding their area of influence. At the same time the RUF gained ground, the government of Sierra Leone became more and more dysfunctional. In 1997, another of many military coups destabilized the government (Fowler 2010, 6). In 1998, a Nigerian-led peacekeeping force under the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervened in the deteriorating situation (Fowler 2010, 6). Unfortunately, this force had significant issues with corruption primarily because of the diamonds that were easily acquired in Sierra Leone (Fowler 2010, 6).

In October 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 1270, which mandated 6,000 peacekeeping troops (Fowler 2010, 6). In February 2000, the number of troops was increased to 11,000 total troops (Fowler 2010, 7).

In May 2000, the situation in Sierra Leone rapidly began deteriorating. The former colonial power, the British became worried about a complete collapse of the UNAMSIL and were concerned for UK citizens (Fowler 2010, 7). The British decided to intervene.

The 2000 British intervention was not planned out as well as the British would have preferred. Because of the rapid deterioration of the situation in Sierra Leone the British felt they had to immediately act to protect British interests. Although this intervention was successful, it also showed how complicated it was for the British to enter a former colony while attempting to maintain neutrality.

**Diplomatic Intervention in Sierra Leone**

The primary threats to Sierra Leone since the end of the colonial period have been primarily internal. In the instances where the threats were external, it was usually anti-
government forces re-organizing in neighboring countries and then coming across the border to try to take over the government. In reality, this cross border incursion would probably fall into a hybrid internal/external threat. These types of threats require coordination with other former colonial powers as well as regional and international organizations.

Sierra Leone Analysis

After the colonial period, British interests in Sierra Leone primarily seem to be when UK citizens or persons are threatened. As with the US in Liberia, the UK does not want to intervene unless it is absolutely necessary. The UK first prefers to utilize neighboring countries, regional organizations, and international organizations before intervening unilaterally. At the point of unilateral intervention, even if under another organizational banner such as the UN, the situation usually has deteriorated significantly. It can be extremely hard for the former colonial power to maintain control and have a clean (not protracted) intervention.

Table 7.  Sierra Leone Type of Intervention Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formed Colony (Former Colonial Power)</th>
<th>Type of Intervention by the former colonial power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External support/ intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (United Kingdom)</td>
<td>minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea (France)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cote D’Ivoire (France)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia (United States)</td>
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Source: Developed by author
Step Three: Guinea

Colonialism in Guinea

Guinea is a West African country that shares its Southwestern border with Liberia. Prior to 1958, Guinea was known as French Guinea. Initially, the former colonial powers that having interests in Guinea were Portugal and Great Britain. Later as influence of these two countries declined in West Africa, France incorporated Guinea into French West Africa (Ham et al. 2009, 397). Guinea is recognized as a former French colony. In 1958, with the collapse of the French Fourth Republic, French colonies in West Africa were given the chance to vote on whether to immediately become completely independent or to retain ties to France. Guinea was the only colony that voted to become completely independent and sever ties with France. Though it seemed appealing at the time, after so many decades as a colony, this decision was an initial step towards the decline and downward spiral of Guinea. The French government was heavily involved in almost all government functions of Guinea prior to Guinea independence in 1958. Severing ties with France would leave Guinea adrift.

End of Colonialism in Guinea

One historical event in Guinea, which soured Guinea-French relations just prior to the 1958 independence vote, was a visit to Guinea from French President Charles de Gaulle. Prior to the independence vote in West Africa, de Gaulle was making rounds through the French colonies in West Africa attempting to convince the colonies to keep a relationship with France into the newly established French Fifth Republic (Meredith 2011, 67). When de Gaulle arrived in Guinean capital of Conakry, he was met with crowds of Guineans who cheered for independence from France. The future president of
Guinea, Ahmed Sekou Touré, made it clear that he was not appreciative of the French support and was more focused on unions with other African countries rather than a relationship with France (Meredith 2011, 68). Ahmed Sekou Touré also publicly tried to embarrass de Gaulle and highlight negative events in the colonial past. De Gaulle and France would not forget this slight. Immediately after the 1958 independence vote, France removed all their civil servants and military personnel from Guinea. These were over 3000 individuals serving in key roles within the government such as engineers, technicians and businessmen (Meredith 2011, 68). This huge void left by the former colonial power was almost immediately filled by the Soviet Union. Immediately after independence, even with the removal of French technical and administrative support, Guinea had the potential to be a very economically stable country. The country had plentiful water resources for agriculture, bauxite, and iron ore (Meredith 2011, 273). However, because very few Guineans were trained to operate the various components of the economy and most sectors began failing almost immediately upon independence. A by-product of decolonization was that the Guinea government did not want foreign economic influence in most areas of the economy. This however was not realistic because of the amount of foreign support, primarily French, prior to 1958.

Instead of allowing the development of free enterprise to increase, or even just maintain the economy after independence, the Guinea president, Ahmed Sekou Touré decided that the state should control the economy. One prominent example highlighting the downward slide of Guinea is the fact that the country was almost self-sufficient in food production in 1958 at the point of its independence (Meredith 2011, 273). In the first years after its independence, many crops failed and the country became reliant on
importing food (Meredith 2011, 273). The only Guinean economic helping to keep the country’s economy afloat in the post-colonial period was the Bauxite mining industry. In 1960, just two years after independence, Bauxite accounted for 75 percent of the total Guinea exports, and by 1975, Bauxite combined with other mining made up over 95 percent of exports (Meredith 2011, 274). This situation is very similar to the Firestone Rubber Plantation in Liberia, which for many years provided a significant portion of the Liberian economy. The problem with Liberia being reliant on rubber and Guinea being reliant on bauxite was that the respective economies were so narrow that if this one industry failed in either country, there was no diversification to serve as a buffer and an economic disaster would occur.

The similarity to this event is if the US takes a passive role in Liberia, China will step in to fill the void. One area that draws the closest correlation is natural resources. Both Guinea and Liberia are rich in natural resources. If the economies are not significantly expanded and diversified before the natural resources are depleted the countries will once again probably spiral into chaos. A key difference between the US-Liberian relationship and the Guinea-French relationship is that in the case of Guinea and France the relationship effectively terminated in 1958. With the US and Liberia, there has always been a relationship, but it has experienced significant difficulties depending on what the US interests at a specific time are.

Much like Liberia, Guinea has significant natural sources but needs a stable government to attract international investment. Additionally, Guinea, with a large number of rivers, has the potential to be a significant exporter of hydroelectric power to its neighboring countries if this sector becomes developed (CIA 2016b).
Since 1958, France has had very little interaction with Guinea. The country is now very poor and has a crumbling infrastructure. The US Liberian relationship is much more complex than the current, non-existent, relationship between France and Guinea. At points where the US is not very involved in supporting Liberia, there are significant similarities to the period immediately following Guinean independence.

External support--Intervention in Guinea

At the end of the colonial period, the ties between Guinea and its former colonial power, France, were irreparably severed. Most former colonial interventions occur because citizens, or protected persons, of the former colonial power are threatened. In the case of Guinea, the French had such limited interests in Guinea after the severance of ties that they have not intervened in Guinea. The external threat situations where France would have probably intervened in Guinea occurred after 2000 and involved Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Burkina Faso (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 229).

Economic Intervention in Guinea

In the Guinean post-colonial period, economic intervention by the former colonial power, France, has been extremely limited. Economic intervention, like internal support, external support, and diplomatic intervention, economic intervention by France is not a reality because of the post-colonial relationship of the two countries. Instead of receiving economic assistance from its former colonial power while it figured out how to manage its own economy, Guinea found itself in the precarious situation where it alternated to both the West and the Soviet Union for financial assistance, increasing instability. However, in the future, Guinea may not need any financial assistance or economic
intervention. In addition to having significant mineral resources, Guinea has the potential to have a robust agricultural sector (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 230). The soil and climate in Guinea are ideal for farming and over 80 percent of Guineans are involved in farming (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 230). The Guinean government however has ineffectively managed the agricultural sector and only three percent of the available land is used for farming (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 230).

Internal Support--Intervention in Guinea

After the colonial period, France no longer provided internal support to Guinea. The Guinean snub to the French at the end of the colonial period led to the French rapidly pulling out internal support as well as the associated infrastructure. The Guinean government, unable to effectively run their government by themselves desperately needed external aid. The internal support void left by France was filled by the Soviet Union for a period, and additionally by Western countries other than France. All of these countries, however, had no historical relationship with Guinea, and were not as effective in supporting Guinea, as the French would have been supporting Guinea during a slow transition to independence.

Diplomatic Intervention in Guinea

As with internal support, external support, and economic support, diplomatic intervention for Guinea was not conducted by France on behalf of Guinea in the post-colonial period. Any type of diplomatic intervention would also have been made more difficult by Guinea deciding to align itself with the Soviet Union for a portion of its post-
colonial existence. The former colonial power, France, is able to exert some diplomatic pressure on behalf of Guinea because of France’s significant influence in Francophone, French speaking, Africa.

Guinea Analysis

The severance of ties between France and Guinea at the end of the colonial period were deep. The below chart shows how the severance of relations between the former colonial power and colony spanned all four categories in this research. The lesson learned for both the former colonial power as well as the former colony is to not cross the line where a future relationship is not possible with the former colonial power or has been irreparably damaged. Even a strained relationship is better than no relationship, at least in the case of Guinea. At the same time, the former colonial power is much stronger than the colony so rapidly removing resources is not in the best interest in the stability of the West African region. France still has significant interests in the West Africa region and this spiteful decision potentially made relationships between France and its other former colonies more difficult and contributed to regional instability in the post colonial period.

Table 8. Guinea Type of Intervention Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Colony (Former Colonial Power)</th>
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<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cote D’Ivoire (France)</td>
<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia (United States)</td>
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*Source: Developed by author*
Step Four: Côte d’Ivoire

Colonialism in Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire shares the Southern part of its Western border with Liberia. This border spans in the North from Mount Nimba Southward to the Gulf of Guinea. Côte d’Ivoire shares the same basic colonial timeline with the other French West African colonies. During the colonial period, Côte d’Ivoire was one of the most productive and stable African colonies of France. The primary concern for Côte d’Ivoire during the colonial period was not friction between itself and France. Instead, the main point of friction was how much support Côte d’Ivoire would have to provide to the other French colonies that were not as successful as it was.

End of Colonialism in Côte d’Ivoire

In 1958, Côte d’Ivoire was faced with the same choice as other African French colonies, immediate independence, or a continued relationship with France. Côte d’Ivoire, unlike Guinea, decided to continue a relationship with France and not sever ties. The arrangement between France and Côte d’Ivoire in the post-colonial period was that the countries would have a close relationship. Côte d’Ivoire would have more internal autonomy, while France would have significant influence on foreign affairs, defense, and economic policy (Meredith 2011, 66). Immediately after the colonial period, there was significant French investment into Côte d’Ivoire. In addition to French investment, the French residents in Côte d’Ivoire rose from 10,000 at independence to over 50,000 at the high point in the post-colonial period (Meredith 2011, 286). This close relationship allowed the government of Côte d’Ivoire to become one of the most successful countries in Africa. The main looming issue was that the political system in Côte d’Ivoire was set
up for long-term failure. The government was autocratic and did not allow for any type of meaningful elections. There was no good mechanism to transfer power in the government during the post-colonial period.

In the post-colonial period, two industries were very successful, cocoa and coffee. These industries continued to go well until late 1970s and early 1980s until these industries collapsed. During this time, there was also significant population expansion and the reduction of useable farmland. The significant impact of the collapse of the coffee and cocoa industries collapsing showed how important it was to diversify the economy and not be too reliant on limited sectors of the economy. The collapse of these two industries led to overall economic downturn, increased political instability, and turmoil.

External support--Intervention in Côte d'Ivoire

External threats to Côte d'Ivoire have not been a major concern requiring the involvement of France or requiring the commitment of French forces or assets. Just as with the other West African countries, unrest in the countries neighboring countries leads to the potential for instability in Côte d'Ivoire. The major emerging external threat that could require the involvement of the former colonial power is the potential spread of terrorism in West Africa. This is an incredibly critical area of focus because of the already present historic Muslim-Christian tensions within the Côte d'Ivoire will only be exacerbated by the spread of terrorism through Côte d’Ivoire.
Economic Intervention in Côte d'Ivoire

In Côte d’Ivoire, economic intervention is not in the traditional sense as it would be for the rest of Africa. Economic intervention in Côte d'Ivoire is not measured in how much aid the former colonial power, France, gives Côte d'Ivoire. Instead, the economic intervention was measured in how much support Côte d’Ivoire was required to give other French colonies or former French, colonies depending on the timeframe of decolonization. During the colonial period, Côte d'Ivoire was extremely successful and at times provided more than 40 percent of the West Africa regions exports (Ham et al. 2009, 257). The prosperity of Côte d'Ivoire did not cease after the end of the colonial period, in fact for almost 20 years after the colonial period, the Ivorian economy maintained an annual growth rate of almost 10 percent (Ham et al. 2009, 257). Economic intervention by the former colonial power is more regarding whether Côte d'Ivoire should assist other French former colonies in the region than in the former colonial power, France, providing direct support itself to these former colonies.

Internal Support--Intervention in Côte d'Ivoire

From 1958, the end of the colonial period of Côte d'Ivoire, through 1993, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny held together Côte d'Ivoire. He kept relations close with France and facilitated economic development within the country. Houphouet-Boigny’s rule was reminiscent of Josip Broz Tito, the former president of Yugoslavia who also was able to keep together many different political factions and ethnic groups in a manner that proved challenging to anyone else. In both situations, after the death of the leaders, the previously separated political factions and ethnic groups began to spar and both countries devolved into civil war.
After Félix Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993, his successor was Henri Konan Bédié, an Ivorian politician. Instead of continuing to unite different political and ethnic factions as his predecessor had done, Konan Bédié exacerbated divisions between the Christian south of the country and the Muslim north. The Christian south became the government side of the conflict and the Muslim north became the rebel side of the conflict. Konan Bédié also enacted laws to discriminate against immigrants and their families. This exacerbated economic problems in the country because immigrants helped Côte d'Ivoire prosper in the post-colonial period. In 2002, Côte d'Ivoire separated along sectarian lines (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 218). France, in an attempt to keep the two sides separate, deployed a peacekeeping force. This force was initially successful, but there were too many complex factors for the former colonial power to keep the peace. For the former colonial power, France, maintaining neutrality in the conflict was extremely difficult.

In 2004, the French involvement in Côte d'Ivoire took a dramatic turn. Though the French forces were deployed as part of an UN stabilization force, the Ivorian Air Force, attacked a French position and nine French Soldiers were killed (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 218). The Ivorians said the incident was a mistake, and not intentional, but the French believed that the air strike was intentional and decided to destroy the Ivorian Air Force in retaliation (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 218). This decision led to anti-French protests, and a deterioration of French-Ivorian relations. The former colonial power had become a combatant in the civil war, even though it was initially trying to maintain neutrality. Both sides of the conflict blamed France for
incidents that were beyond the control of the former colonial power. This incident caused
anti-French sentiment that persists today.

After this incident, the mission of French peacekeepers became increasingly
difficult. The French peacekeepers expended additional energy to ensure that both sides
of the conflict understood that France was neutral in the conflict. In 2007, the French
peacekeepers began transitioning out of a military buffer zone dividing the North and the
South. Ivorian brigades of mixed north and south soldiers replaced these peacekeepers
(Ham et al. 2009, 258). These new tactics demonstrated the French learning lessons from
their 2004 peacekeeping mission and a maturation of the relationship between France and
Côte d’Ivoire in the post-colonial period.

Diplomatic Intervention in Côte d'Ivoire

The primary method that the former colonial power, France, diplomatically
intervenes for Côte d'Ivoire is with the UN. Instead of just advocating for UN
intervention during times of unrest in Côte d'Ivoire, France has routinely offered its own
forces as part of the UN forces. Offering French forces as part of a peacekeeping force
demonstrates French commitment to Côte d'Ivoire, but also adds an element of risk for
France.

Côte d'Ivoire Analysis

The greatest threats to Côte d'Ivoire do not come from outside. The greatest threat
is exacerbating tensions between the Muslim north and the Christian south of Côte
d'Ivoire. With the rapid expansion of terrorism in Africa, it is important for the
government of Côte d'Ivoire to ensure inclusion and reconciliation with the Muslim
north, as well as embracing the many immigrants in Côte d'Ivoire. The immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire should be given equal rights and opportunities commensurate with the other citizens of Côte d’Ivoire. The immigrants cannot be alienated from the government of Côte d’Ivoire. Though France had some stumbles in its relationship with Côte d'Ivoire, it still has significant influence within Côte d’Ivoire because of historic close ties between the two countries. France is in a very good position to facilitate a stable and prosperous Côte d’Ivoire. The relationship between France and Côte d’Ivoire has matured in the post-colonial period.

Table 9. Côte d'Ivoire Type of Intervention Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>minimal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia (United States)</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Developed by author

Step Five: Liberia

Colonialism in Liberia

Humans have populated Liberia for a couple thousand years, though its first contact with Europeans was not until the mid-1400s. This contact was primarily with the Portuguese, but did not have a lasting influence on the country. In the early 1800’s, the American Colonization Society (ACS), a private organization in the United States, chose the current city of Monrovia, Liberia, as a location to move former American free blacks
back to Africa. These free blacks became the Americo-Liberian ethnic group of Liberia. The Americo-Liberians created a form of government where they subjugated the indigenous Liberian inhabitants. This subjugation would be a significant contributing factor to future unrest. The Americo-Liberians actually ruled Liberia until 1980 when the first non Americo-Liberian descendant became the President of Liberia through a coup d’état. Post 1980, Liberia continued on a downward spiral and has suffered through multiple devastating civil wars.

End of Colonialism in Liberia

The United States’ relationship with Liberia has been very long and complex. Unlike European powers, the US did not take on a formal colonial power role but more a de facto role beginning immediately upon the United States recognizing Liberian independence in 1862. It is almost as if Liberia had two former colonial masters. One former colonial master was the United States. The other colonial master was the Americo-Liberians, themselves. The decolonization period was not just about Liberia figuring out a relationship with the US, but also about the indigenous Liberians figuring out a relationship with the Americo-Liberians.

External support--Intervention in Liberia

External intervention comes in three main varieties. The first is by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS forces are usually coupled with some type of US force or at minimum, US support. The second is an intervention by the United Nations (UN). The third is more unilateral intervention by the US. All of these three types of external intervention usually involve a component of the other varieties.
Economic Intervention in Liberia

Presently and historically, the US contributes a significant amount of aid to Liberia. This US economic support seems that it should have helped impoverished Liberia prosper. Instead, due to corruption and civil war there is little to show in Liberia for the significant amount of long-term aid provided by the US. For example, in 1985, Samuel Doe, the president of Liberia, conducted a sham election to appease the American appetite for democracy and to retain the US aid (Ham et al. 2009, 457). After the struggles within Liberia, there has not been a lack of donors willing to provide aid. The main issue is how the aid is used. After the UN launched a major disarmament operation in 2003, international donors pledged over $500m in reconstruction aid (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 235). The other major struggle with aid in Africa is competition with the Chinese. Whereas the US tries to funnel aid through the Liberian government, the Chinese do many of their aid project directly. This method allows China to effectively control the particulars of their aid, and in addition, control the messaging associated with the aid.

Internal Support--Intervention in Liberia

Internal support is the primary category where other countries or international organizations become involved in Liberia. In 2003, the UN executed a major peacekeeping operation in Liberia with the goal of disarming former combatants (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 235). This peacekeeping operation led to the president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, going into exile, but started Liberia on a path of improvement (Ham et al. 2009, 458).
Diplomatic Intervention in Liberia

Diplomatic intervention for Liberia is not normally to protect Liberia from external threats, but usually involves the United Nations (UN) becoming involved in Liberia’s internal affairs. For example, in 2001, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) re-imposed an arms embargo on Liberia because Charles Taylor was trading weapons for diamonds with rebels he was supporting in Sierra Leone (Krabacher, Kalipeni, and Layachi 2009, 235). Diplomatic interventions usually involve regional organizations such as ECOWAS and international organizations such as the UN.

Liberia Analysis

Liberia does not require much support to protect itself from external threats. The one main exception to this however is that Liberia must be able to maintain its external borders and have the ability to protect itself from the spread of terrorism in Africa. Liberia however does need significant support internally to build governmental capacity.

Because of the significant US investments and aid to Liberia since 1862, the US must weigh unilateral intervention versus the more protracted intervention process involving the UN and ECOWAS. When interventions have come too slowly for Liberia, the infrastructure of the Liberia has historically been devastated.
Table 10. Liberia Type of Intervention Analysis

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia (United States)</td>
<td>minimal</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Developed by author

Step Six: Aggregate Findings

The below aggregated data demonstrates the similarities and differences of how three former colonial powers have conducted intervention and advocacy for their four former colonies during the post-colonial period. None of the former colonies in this research required intervention by their former colonial power to protect them from external threats. The exception, however, is that all four former colonies may need future assistance to protect them from the spread of terrorism through West Africa. Guinea, because of the severance of ties with France at the end of the colonial period, does not receive support from its former colonial power in any of the categories.

The economic support/intervention provided by the former colonial powers varied, but the unifying take away was that all of the former colonial powers needed to find methods for protecting their investments for the future. In the internal support category, with the exception of Guinea, the former colonial powers all struggled with balancing unilateral intervention by the former colonial power with interventions by ECOWAS or the UN. The diplomatic advocacy category significantly bled over into the internal intervention category and had many similarities.
Table 11. Type of Intervention by Country Aggregate Analysis

<table>
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</tr>
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</table>

*Source: Developed by author*

**Step Seven: Answer to Primary Question**

The research has provided the answer to the primary research question, “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia?” The answer is yes -- there are many lessons learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the US can apply to its relationship with Liberia. The US can learn significantly from other West African countries relationships with their former colonial powers. Instead of learning from other former colonial powers, the US routinely makes mistakes that have already been made by other former colonial powers.

**Chapter Summary**

The research methodology used in this chapter allowed for a comparison of the four countries included in the research, as well as analysis of these countries relationships with their former colonial powers. This comparison and analysis provides context the next chapter, chapter 5, which is the conclusions and recommendations sections of this research.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter Introduction

As the analysis has shown, the answer to the primary research question “Are there lessons that can be learned from other former colonial powers in West Africa that the United States can apply to its relationship with Liberia?” is, yes, the US should incorporate some elements of these relationships and disregard other elements. The US should not attempt to develop all of its policy related to West Africa and Liberia on its own because it has no former colonies in Africa, other than Liberia. France and the UK have significant colonial and post-colonial histories in Africa and can provide many lessons learned to the US.

Conclusions: Key Lessons

There are ten key lessons discovered in this research that the US should apply to its relationship with Liberia. These key lessons were derived from researching Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone’s relationships with their former colonial powers. These key lessons lead to recommendations for decisions makers and also future researchers.

1. Filling the void: Voids left by former colonial powers are filled by something. In the case of Guinea, the void of French administrative and technical support for the country in the post-colonial period was filled by the Soviet Union. An additional void occurred when Guinea withdrew from the French economic system. This void was initially filled by a Soviet style economic system and then filled by a Chinese style
economic system. The primary future concern associated by voids is the spread of terrorism through Western Africa. Extremist groups can fill voids left by former colonial powers, especially if they harness the vast natural resources in West Africa.

2. Not being spiteful: Sometimes former colonies do things that anger the former colonial power. At these points, the former colonial power must keep in mind long-term strategic goals and regional stability over teaching the former colony a lesson. The historical example of this was after the Guinean independence in 1958 when the French rapidly withdrew support from Guinea. This rapid withdrawal was primarily because the French were unhappy with the Guinean vote for independence as well as Guinean disrespect towards France and the French president. This rapid withdrawal seemed like an appropriate action at the time, but was a critical blow to the long-term stability of Guinea or a potential future relationship between Guinea and France. This rapid withdrawal of support by France also led to regional instability.

3. Identifying ethnic divisions early: When the government of a former colony begins creating or exacerbating ethnic divisions, the former colonial power must begin paying immediate attention and formulating a plan. Serious ethnic divisions seem to be an indicator that a country is on the verge of civil war that will force the former colonial power to make decision on intervention. The primary example of government sponsored ethnic divisions precipitating a civil war was in Côte d'Ivoire. The government of Côte d'Ivoire began discriminating against the Muslims in the northern part of the country as well as discriminating against immigrants prior to the civil war.

4. Diversification of the economy is key to stability: There is an example of this key lesson in three of the four former colonies in this research. In Guinea, government
controls on farming crippled this key industry and limited economic growth or stability in this key sector resulting in a downward spiral of the entire economy. In Côte d’Ivoire, the economy focused too heavily on cocoa and coffee. When the global price of these two sectors declined, the entire economy suffered. In Sierra Leone, the country focused too narrowly on mineral resources and, at the same time, did not control these key resources. The immense value of these mineral resources fueled corruption and provided a source of revenue for rebel groups attempting to destabilize the country. In Liberia, significant portions of the economy are US aid related. When US aid ebbed and flowed, this caused significant issues in the Liberian economy. This is the key sector of the Liberian economy that the US has control and influence to effect.

5. Intervening before everything is out of control: The UK and the US have much the same type of intervention style in West Africa. When UK or US citizens are threatened, both countries are willing to act unilaterally. Other than in situations where UK or US citizens are threatened, both countries prefer for regional and international coalitions to intervene. The issue with this style of intervention is that by the time the US or UK intervene with their own forces, the situation is usually out of control and all these two former colonial powers can, or choose to deal with is their own citizens. The infrastructure and previous investments are disregarded and rebuilding the country will have to happen in the future and start from scratch.

6. Ensuring former colonial power peacekeepers do not add to the dysfunction: When former colonial power peacekeepers are committed, they must have clear goals and determine which side of the conflict they support. This is true even if the ultimate determination is that the former colonial power will take no side of a conflict. In the case
the former colonial power forces are not going to take a side, it is even more important that their goals of the intervention and peacekeeping force are clear. When France intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004, it attempted to maintain a neutral position separating the Muslim rebels in the North of the country and the Christian government in the South of the country. This neutral position put French forces in an awkward position. This awkward position was further exacerbated when government Forces bombed French positions and killed nine French Soldiers.

7. Regional stability sometimes has to take precedence over a former colonial power’s interests or goals within a specific country: Sometimes regional stability is a goal in itself and should take precedence over a colonial power’s goals within a specific country. Many of the specific national security threats listed in the NSS as well as the USAFRICOM Commander’s posture statement would solve themselves if the entire region was stable and only a limited number of countries in West Africa had problems. This requires former colonial powers to work together towards shared goals and synchronize their actions with regional and international organizations such as ECOWAS and the UN.

8. Invest in education: Former colonial powers can build up their former colonies over the long-term by investing in the education systems of the former colonies. For example, if the former colonial power has been forced to intervene because of limited medical care within the colony, maybe the former colonial power could find ways to support medical schools within the former colony or train health care workers. This could just be through partnerships with medical schools in the former colonial power. In Sierra
Leone, when British supported the education system in Sierra Leone prior to the end of colonization, the number of people who were educated in Sierra Leone expanded.

9. Building capacity: Former colonial powers must build capacity in their former colonies. This capacity is not just in security forces but also in effective governance. Effectively building capacity will help the former colony not require interventional support from the former colonial power. This will allow for a continued maturation of the relationship between the former colonial power and the former colony.

10. Addressing corruption: This is a significant problem in West Africa. Figuring out methods to identify and reduce corruption is important. In Sierra Leone, mineral resources fueled corruption. Support provided by the former colonial power should not fuel corruption.

**Recommendations**

**Overview**

The ten key lessons suggest a number of recommendations. These recommendations apply to two different groups: decision makers and future researchers. The recommendations for decision makers are not just limited to US decision makers but also apply to decisions makers of other former colonial powers, former colonies, ECOWAS, UN, and other organizations.

The US should ensure that it keeps close ties with Liberia and ensures there are no voids that can be filled with terrorism. US emphasis must not only be on immediate US interests but with a broader eye to policies that will lead to long-term stability in Liberia and West Africa. The US should embrace its role as the former colonial power of Liberia. The US should not act as a former colonial power in a predatory sense on the resources of...
Liberia, but in the sense that the US has a responsibility to help Liberia prosper and become stable and self-sufficient. The US must focus on developing a relationship with Liberia that will endure though both Liberian and American political change. This is critical because fluctuations in US financial support to Liberia in the past have led to instability.

The United States should examine the voids that it leaves unfilled which are being filled by China. Not in an aggressive manner, but the US must actively monitor the Chinese in Liberia to make sure that they are not slowly attempting to turn Liberia into some form of colony or push out US influence.

One significant hurdle, which the US must overcome, is the fact that even though the United States and Liberia have a historical relationship since 1847, the country is in ruin. From the perspective of an everyday Liberian though the US is a very strong country it has not done all it had the potential to do to help Liberia. The United States must immediately increase its overall support to Liberia. This support cannot be in just the traditional ways that America provides support to countries throughout the world. The American support must be tied to actual projects that have measurable goals. The US must do a better job educating its citizens why Liberia and West Africa are critical to US interests and making Africa prosperous and stable.

Recommendations for Decision Makers

There are a number of recommendations that can be derived from these conclusions. Intervention in Liberia should not only come when the situation becomes extremely critical. Constant maintenance of the US-Liberian relationship will hopefully
ensure that the US does not have to intervene in a drastic manner and the Liberian government will be able function with less and less US support over time.

The US relationship with Liberia must become more constant. Fluctuation of this relationship and associated aid creates turmoil in Liberia and Western Africa. To establish a more constant relationship, the US Government and the Liberian government should establish a longer-term plan, potentially 30 years, which outlines which areas the US will assist Liberia. To maintain this support through fluctuating US budgets, the areas of support must be in line with US national interests. Some of the areas that should be considered for inclusion in this long-term plan are:

1. Establishment of a United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) forward headquarters in Monrovia, Liberia.

2. US Partnership in Education with Liberia to increase overall education

3. Focus on medical education with the intent of having Liberia provide its own medical care as well as becoming an exporter of medical care to other West African countries.

Decisions makers should immediately begin a formal assessment on the potential establishment of a United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) forward headquarters in Monrovia, Liberia. This forward headquarters would allow the United States to demonstrate a long-term commitment to Liberia and West Africa. The United States should put safeguards in place to ensure this headquarters does not meddle in the internal affairs of Liberia or undermine the Liberian government. The United States should use this forward headquarters as a testing ground for a new method of US involvement in countries where the US facilitates certain projects with more long-term objectives. For
example, one of the long-term objectives of the United States could be to expand the number of physicians being produced as well as the medical capability of Liberia. If this forward headquarters was established in Monrovia, it could demonstrate to China and the rest of the world the future US commitment to Africa and specifically West Africa.

The United States should try to help Guinea diversify its economy. Though a poor country, if Guinea is able to harness its natural resources effectively, it has the potential to improve the lives of its citizens and become more stable. Diversification of the economy is especially critical in Guinea because of the potential for terrorism in this country. With the spread of radical Islam in West Africa, it is extremely important to ensure that citizens have opportunities and voids are not filled by terrorism.

The United States government must find ways to leverage the almost 100,000 people of Liberian ancestry who currently reside in the United States. After the Liberian Civil wars, Liberians fled all over the world. Many of these Liberians were educated and had resources. One major issue in Liberia is land ownership. On the one hand, land ownership slows the Chinese expansion in Liberia; however, on the other hand it also hinders Liberian economic diversification.

Recommendations for Future Research

During the course of this research, multiple areas were identified that merit further study. These areas were outside the scope of this research paper yet are of importance. Research in these areas will help implement recommendations found in this research.

The long-term intentions of China in Africa will have significant implications on West Africa. Currently, China is clearly focused on natural resources and commerce, but
does China have more complex intentions? Is the Chinese ultimate intention to fill the void of former colonial powers in Africa and insert themselves some type economic controller of the continent. Will this new role be facilitated through the large number of Chinese immigrants moving to Africa? Is China also capitalizing on some of the same techniques of how the US exports its image worldwide as a leader to improve how it is viewed in Africa? Is West Africa one of the first areas where China wants to push out US influence and gain a significant foothold since the US has such a minimal presence and a limited understanding of Africa? This whole are of research could has implications worldwide where the US is trying to figure out some of the same issues with China in other parts of the world.

A second area that needs additional research is the feasibility of placing a USAFRICOM forward HQ in Liberia. There is some research available on this topic, but it is unclear why the general sentiment seems to be that no place on the African continent would be suitable for a USAFRICOM forward HQ, let alone the actual USAFRICOM HQ. Because of the long-term US shared history with Liberia, it seems that Liberia would be the ideal location for the USAFRICOM forward HQ. Even with minimal manning, this would help the US convey the impression that the US is invested in Africa. Placing a headquarters in Liberia could facilitate better understanding of Africa while at the same time would be an ideal location because the former colonial power associated with Liberia was the US.

A third area that needs further research is how to ensure that US government investments into Liberia have tangible results that are lasting. Many of the past US investments into Liberia have nothing to show for today. This is not just in the physical
sense but also in terms of education and other types of investments, which could leave the geographic borders of Liberia. This also goes for the Liberian education system. If the US is able to significantly increase the level of education of Liberians there must also be opportunity within the country.

A fourth area that could use additional research is how to leverage the support of a significant number of Liberians who do not live within the borders of Liberia. For example, a large number of Liberians live in not only in the US, but also in other countries throughout the world. Can these individuals assist the US government to facilitate a more stable Liberia? Many of these individuals are educated and know how to make things work in Liberia. A topic tied to this research area is the issue of Liberians not within the borders of Liberia owning land. Throughout Africa, individuals not residing within the country owning land cause significant issues, especially when the land is farmland.

**Final Thoughts**

At the beginning of this study, it was unclear if the US relationship with Liberia was similar to the relationships between Liberia’s neighbors and their former colonial powers or it was truly a unique relationship and in its own distinct category. During the course of the research, it became clear that the relationship does have many aspects that are similar to the relationships between Liberia’s neighbors and their former colonial powers yet it still has many unique aspects. Many of the successes are the same and many of the failures and challenges are also in common. As the US establishes a more long-term and constant strategy towards Liberia, each aspect of this relationship should be compared with historic actions by other former colonial powers in West Africa. This will
provide significant indication if these policies will be successful or not. The US should not attempt to figure out everything on its own. The other former colonial powers have already created a roadmap with the good roads and the bad roads already highlighted. Now it is the US and Liberia’s choice of which roads to take.

Liberia just needs to go through this one political transition and it can really take off. Everything’s in place now. We cannot afford to put the country in the hands of someone that lacks the experience.

— Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the President of Liberia, 2006-Present


