FROM STRATEGIC TO TACTICAL AND NOWHERE IN BETWEEN:

The USAF at the Operational Level

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Major Joseph M. Vanoni graduated from the USAF Reserve Officer Training Corps Detachment 045, San Jose State University, California in 1998. After remaining at Detachment 045 as an At Detachment Delay Officer, he graduated from Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training at Laughlin AFB, Texas in 2000. He completed C-17 training at Altus AFB, Oklahoma as a Distinguished Graduate in 2000. His flying assignments began at Charleston AFB, SC. In June 2005, he graduated from the United States Air Force Mobility Weapons School at McGuire, New Jersey. His flying assignments in the C-17 included Charleston AFB, South Carolina, and McGuire AFB, New Jersey. While at McGuire AFB, Major Vanoni was an instructor at the United States Air Force Weapons School. Major Vanoni has flown combat missions in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. In addition to his flying assignments, Major Vanoni served on the US Air Forces Central A3 staff as the Force Management Branch Chief and as an Operational Planning Team Lead. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree in Mathematics from San Jose State University, a Master of Science degree in Military Arts and Science from Air Command and Staff College – Distance Learning, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and a Master of Philosophy in Military Strategy from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Upon graduation from SAASS, Maj Smith will be assigned as the Director of Operations at the 6th Airlift Squadron at McGuire AFB, New Jersey.
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ABSTRACT

In 2001, based on the lessons from Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen John Jumper directed the United States Air Force to develop a new Component Command structure. The goal of the new Concept was to provide the Unified Combatant Commands dedicated, timely, operational-level air and space support across the full range of military operations. Over the next seven years, the United States Air Force worked through the Air Force Forces Command and Control Enabling Concept, creating six different documents. Throughout the development, the teams focused on three central elements: a standardized organizational structure, manned with a cross-functionally balance staff to support the full range of military operations, and able to seamlessly transition from day-to-day operations to contingency operations in a timely fashion. In 2010, the Air Force put the results to the test when Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) responded to the Haiti earthquake. Based on the inefficiencies with the Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) response, it is clear the United States Air Force and the Concept failed to fix the operational-level command and control issues identified ten years prior.
Introduction

On June 6, 2002 then Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) General John Jumper approved the Air Force Forces (AFFOR) Command and Control (C2) Enabling Concept of Operations (CONOP). After further consideration, Gen Jumper determined the CONOP was not “revolutionary” enough. This drove the Air Staff to develop a more comprehensive AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. The intent of the concept was to provide the Unified Combatant Commanders (UCC) dedicated operational-level air and space support across the range of military operations (ROMO) to the UCC. At its core, the concept standardized the United States Air Force (USAF) Component Command structure to the UCC. This standard structure in its original format, known as the Warfighting Headquarters (WFHQ), served as the Air Force Component to each UCC.

The WFHQ, commanded by a two- or three-star General, consists of an AFFOR Staff and the Air Operations Center (AOC). The AFFOR Staff, led by a Chief of Staff (O-6), served as the WFHQ Commander’s planning staff. The AFFOR staff organized into nine separate directorates replicating key Air Force functional areas. The AFFOR staff’s primary responsibility was the long range planning and support of air operations within the UCC’s area of responsibility (AOR). The AOC

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1 At the operational level of war campaigns and major operations are designed, planned, conducted, sustained, assessed, and adapted to accomplish strategic goals within theaters or areas of operations. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Basic Doctrine, 14 Oct 2011, 25.
3 The directorates are A1-Manpower, Personnel and Services, A2-Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, A3-Air, Space, and Cyberspace Operations, A4-Logistics, A5-Plans and Requirements, A6-Communications, A7-Installations and Mission Support, A8-Strategic
was the Component Commanders C2 execution element. The AOC, led by a one-star general, encompassed five divisions. The AOC focused on the 72-hour strategy, planning execution, and assessment cycle. Each of these staffs were to be manned with a cross-functional team of Air Force personnel in order to conduct day-to-day operations in support of the UCC and when needed make a seamless transition to execute a contingency operation.

In the ten years since the 2002 AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOPs approval, the USAF has made five significant changes. It is important to note that while the changes were significant, they did not alter the core intent of providing dedicated air and space support to the UCC. The first change occurred with the shift from the 2002 CONOP to the 2005 Concept. This change represents the largest change of the five, providing the “revolutionary” leap Gen Jumper directed. The second and third changes evolved around the inclusion of the Major Command (MAJCOM) Commander into the overall Component structure. The fourth and fifth changes developed through the implementation process. These changes center on naming convention and the dual-hatted relationship between the traditional USAF unit and the Component command relationships.

Throughout the evolution, the Air Force Components supported day-to-day operations and conducted operational and contingency planning, theater and host nation exercises, and theater security cooperation (TSC) engagements. In addition, the Components were called on several times to transition from day-to-day operations to

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contingency operations in support of their perspective geographic UCC.\textsuperscript{5} Utilizing the AFFOR Staff and the AOC, the Components have supported major combat operations and conducted Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) around the world.

**Research Question / Thesis**

When examining the contingency operations above, there is no doubt the Components provided the critical C2 functions at the operational-level of air and space execution. However, this does not automatically imply the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept is perfect. In today’s resource limited and fiscally constrained environment, the Air Force must continue to find ways to improve the system. Therefore, the question to ask is, “Does the current Air Force Component Structure provide optimal Air Force operational-level planning and execution for the Combatant Commander?”

In 2013, the Air Force will be the smallest force since 1947; however, the current security environment requires the force to be more agile and responsive across the full ROMO. To meet this challenge the Air Force must find ways to streamline headquarters and consolidate field-level activities. In order to streamline and consolidate, the Air Force must ask these types of tough questions.\textsuperscript{6} More importantly, even if the answer is not politically correct the USAF must be willing to break from the traditional structures to create the right organizational construct. The right organization is exactly what Gen Jumper set out to establish with the Concept in the first place.

\textsuperscript{5} JP 3-0 distinguishes the UCCs as geographic or functional. Geographic UCCs include Pacific Command, South Command, North Command, Europe Command, Africa Command and Central Command and are responsible for operations in a specific region of the world. Functional UCCs include Strategic Command and Transportation Command and are responsible for developing functional global support. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 11 Aug 2011, I-7.

\textsuperscript{6} *Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy and Constrained Budget*, 1 February 2012, 1-4.
To answer the research question, this paper will use a case study methodology. This method allows for an in-depth examination of a single event in order to collect data, analyze information, and find results. For this paper, the Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (12AF (AFSOUTH)) response to Operation Unified Response (OpUR), the US reaction to the earthquake in Haiti, serves as the primary case study. In addition, the paper uses examples from other Components responding to contingency operations to provide additional data points.

In order to evaluate the case study and the examples, the thesis uses the three elements Gen Jumper directed the Air Staff to fix. The first element is to determine whether there is a standardized Component Construct for both the elements within the Component staff and how the Component supports the UCC. The second element is to evaluate whether there is a cross-functional staff balance with operational experience to support the full range of operational requirements. The final element is to determine whether the staff possesses the ability to seamlessly transition to provide timely execution of contingency operations across the ROMO. For the purposes of this paper, the primary focus will be on the AFFOR staff to include the command leadership and not on the AOC.

**Preview**

Chapter 1 provides the historical review of the USAF’s development of the Numbered Air Forces (NAF) and the Component Command. The chapter starts by detailing the structural build-up of the Air Corps from 1935 through the end of World War II (WWII). This section focuses on

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7 John T. Ackerman, Matthew C. Stafford, and Lt Col Thomas Williams, *Six Research Frameworks* (Published for Air Command and Staff College – Distance Learning), 6-7.
8 Based on the inherent design of the AOC, the divisions organize in a standardized manner, the USAF fills the divisions with operators that meet the mission requirements, and the organizations are capable of immediately shifting to 24-hour operations.
the development of the AAF organizational structure throughout WWII, specifically demonstrating the AAF focus on standardized structures, balanced with a cross section of functions, to the rapidly expanding Army Air Forces (AAF). Next, the chapter examines the reorganization of AAF immediately following WWII. This section demonstrates the USAF’s first shift away from standardized and balanced organizations to functionally aligned organizations.

Shifting forward ten years, the chapter examines the Tactical Air Command’s (TAC) Nineteenth Air Force (19AF) and its mission from 1953-1972. This vignette provides a view of an organization built on the ideals of a balanced cross-functional staff and the need for timely transition to contingency operations. Finally, the chapter explores the period following the Cold War. This section starts with the USAF reorganization under General Merrill McPeak and its impact on the overall USAF organizational structure. Additionally, it introduces the concept of the Component Command. Combined, the two events set the foundation for the dual-hatted NAF that lacked standardization, balance, and the ability to seamlessly transition in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF).

Chapter 2 chronicles the development and evolution of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept from the original CONOP developed in 2002 through to the 2008 implementation Program Action Directive (PAD). In this period, the chapter breaks down the evolution into six separate periods: the 2002 CONOP, the 2005 Concept, Change 1, Change 2, PAD 06-09, and PAD 07-13. Each of these periods is further broken down to examine the major document of the time, the effects of the coordination process, and the impact the process had on the overall concept. When examining the documents, the three criteria of standardization, balance, and timely execution, provides the framework to understand the
intricacies of each document. The coordination process between the development team, the CSAF, and the MAJCOMs provides insight into the reasons behind each change. Finally, each section discusses the impact the changes had on the overall AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept with respect to Gen Jumper’s original guidance.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 provide the case study and analysis of the actions taken by 12AF (AFSOUTH) in their role as the Component Command during OpUR. Chapter 3 begins with an overview of the organizational structure and operational functionality of the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff. Next, the chapter provides insight to the OpUR background and organizational structure above 12AF (AFSOUTH) and their impact on OpUR. Then the chapter describes the response of the USAF organizations outside of 12AF (AFSOUTH) control and their impact on OpUR. Finally, the chapter details the actual response by 12AF (AFSOUTH). This section focuses on the creation of the 12th Air Expeditionary Task Force (12 AETF), the development, deployment, and utilization of the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE), and issues evolving around the Global Force Management (GFM) Process.

Chapter 4 combines the information from the 12AF (AFSOUTH) case study with short vignettes from other Component Commands. Combined the examples are used to evaluate the three criteria. The first section analyses the effectiveness of the Concept to standardize the Component Command structure. In doing so, the section examines both the internal structure of the Component and the external structure of the Component with respect to their UCC. The second section examines the Concepts ability to develop a balanced Component staff with a cross function of operators to support the ROMO. This section examines the impact the lack of mobility and ISR personnel within 12AF (AFSOUTH) has on OpUR. Additionally, the section examines Ninth Air Force (Air
Forces Central) (9AF (AFCENT)) overcoming of their mobility shortfall and the impact it had on the 9AF (AFCENT) staff. The final section looks at the ability of 12 AF (AFSOUTH) to transition from their day-to-day mission to the contingency response. This section compares the 12AF (AFSOUTH) actions to the 9AF (AFCENT) actions during the Manas Air Base (AB) crisis in 2009. With the central ideas and arguments of the paper described, the stage is set for an examination of the history of the NAF.
Chapter 1: History of the Numbered Air Forces

In order to evaluate the Component structure created by the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept it is important to understand how the USAF developed the NAF over time. From the earliest stages of the Air Corps, the service has constantly adjusted the organizational structure to meet the operational requirements and constraints of the day. In this time, the Air Force has grown from a single provisional aero squadron in 1913, to the large multi-layered organization during World War II (WWII) and the Cold War, to today’s Air Force will soon be the smallest force since before 1947.1

The historical review in this chapter aims to trace the path of the NAF from its inception through the late 1990s. Along this journey, there have been times the USAF focused on standardizing the operational structure. There have been times the USAF emphasized the importance of maintaining a cross-functional balance.2 Finally, there have been times the USAF needed the ability to seamlessly transition to contingency operations. Unfortunately, there have also been times each one of these elements have fallen out of favor and not been emphasized.

Interwar - World War II

In the just over twenty years between the end of World War I (WWI) and the beginnings of WWII, the Army Air Service went through several major changes. The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 and the 1926 Air Corps Act set the foundation for the Air Force’s early development. However, the first change pertinent to this discussion occurred in 1935 with the creation of the General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF). The

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1 Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy and Constrained Budget, 1 February 2012, 1.
2 Cross-functional balance implies an organization with personnel from multiple functional specialties (fighter, bomber, mobility, space) working together.
GHQAF assumed C2 of all tactical air units previously organized under the Army Air Corps. The new GHQAF organized the air units into three wings located across the US. Similar to the Chief of the Air Corps, the commander of the GHQAF reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff. In this structure, the Air Corps was responsible for “procurement, supply, training schools, and doctrine development” while the GHQAF “[directed] tactical training and operations” of the air units.

In 1939, in response to the aggression of Germany in Europe and Japan in the Pacific, Congress passed an emergency Army Air Defense Bill. The bill significantly increased the number of personnel and aircraft under the Air Corps control. As a result, the Army Chief of Staff aligned the GHQAF to be subordinate to the Chief of the Air Corps. This shift created a structure of Air Corps-GHQAF-Wing, which for the first time in the Air Corps history enabled centralized command of all air assets under one Air Corps leader. In June of 1941 then Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall created the Army Air Forces (AAF). The new organization, commanded by General “Hap” Arnold, oversaw both the Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command (previously GHQAF). General Marshall’s unification of the air assets into one organization under General Arnold is the first example of “unity of command” for the AAF.

As the Air Corps and later the AAF began receiving the assets and personnel from the air defense bill, they needed a means to maintain C2

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6 In today’s terms, this organization is comparable to the MAJCOM-NAF-Wing construct. The MAJCOM focuses on OT&E, while the NAF provides tactical oversight and execution support, and the Wing executes.
of the new forces. In response, they established both Named Air Forces
and Numbered Air Forces (NAF). As the new organizations began to
grow in size and number, the War Department ordered each NAF to
create subordinate bomber and interceptor commands. The purpose of
this directive was to standardize the operational structure of forces
across the AAF. This structure also provided a cross-functional balance
between the offensive and defensive capabilities within each NAF.

The new NAFs were located both overseas and stateside. Overseas,
the AAF established four Named Air Forces. The AAF established the
Hawaiian Air Force in 1940 to defend Hawaii and manage the forces
moving from the US to the Pacific. The Caribbean Air Force conducted
patrols and antisubmarine operations throughout the Caribbean and
Panama Canal region. The Philippine Department Air Forces, later
designated Far East Air Force, supported the defense of the Philippines
Islands. Finally, the Alaska Command defended Alaska and later
conducted offensive operations against the northern Japanese Islands.

Within the Continental United States (CONUS), there were four
Named Air Forces. Broken down regionally, the AAF established the
Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, and Southwest Commands in 1940.

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8 In 1940, the USAF labeled organizations by geographic location. In 1942, the AAF
changed to numeric designation. As the Army Air Force continued to grow during
WWII, Named Air Forces returned as a command to oversee multiple Numbered Air
9 Placing the NAFs of 1939 in today’s terms, they would resemble a MAJCOM more than
a NAF.
10 Established in 1940, later designated Seventh Air Force. Ravenstein, The
11 Established in 1941, later designated Sixth Air Force. Sixth Air Force History
12 Established in 1941, later designated 5AF. The Far East Air Force differs from the
Far East Air Forces developed during WWI to manage the 5AF, 7AF, and 13AF.
Ravenstein, The Organization and Lineage of the United States Air Force, 19; Thomas E.
Griffith, Jr., MacArthur’s Airman (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 175.
13 Established in 1942, later designated Eleventh Air Force. Ravenstein, The
Organization and Lineage of the United States Air Force, 16; Eleventh Air Force History
As the war grew closer, the AAF re-designated these NAFs the First Air Force (1AF), Second Air Force (2AF), Third Air Force (3AF), and Fourth Air Force (4AF) respectively. These four organizations performed two essential roles. First, they provided regional air defense over the US and key shipping lanes. Second, they conducted combat training for new units preparing to deploy to Europe and the Pacific.14

As preparations for war continued, so did the development of the AAF. In the European and Mediterranean Theater, the Eighth Air Force (8AF) was the first NAF to arrive in Feb 1942. Following the 8AF to Europe were the Twelfth Air Force (12AF), Ninth Air Force (9AF), and Fifteenth Air Force (15AF).

By this point in the Pacific, the AAF had already established the Alaskan, Hawaiian, and Philippines Named Air Forces. By September 1942, the AAF redesignated these Named Air Forces the Eleventh Air Force (11AF), the Seventh Air Force (7AF), and the Far East Air Force respectively. In addition to the original three, the Pacific added the Tenth Air Force (10AF), the Thirteenth Air Force (13AF), and the Fourteenth Air Force (14AF).15

As the AAF continued to grow in preparation for war, they remained focused on maintaining a standardized and balanced NAF structure. The increased number of personnel and assets in a NAF drove the AAF to add an Air Service Command to each.16 With the addition of the Air Service Command, every NAF in the AAF structure contained a subordinate Bomber, Fighter (previously Interceptor), and Air Service Command. In addition to the standard three subordinate commands, a

NAF might also contain an Air Support Command, a Troop Carrier Command, or a Tactical Command. Continuing with the standard structuring, each of the subordinate commands contained the same number of wings, groups, and squadrons. (See Figure 1)

As the campaigns in the European and Pacific theaters matured, the need for more effective planning and command oversight developed. In Europe, this requirement became apparent as the Allies began preparing for OVERLORD, while simultaneously maintaining operations in the Mediterranean. To fill the command void, the Allies worked to establish two new commands.

In the Mediterranean, the Allies established the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) in December 1943. The command combined the air assets from the Mediterranean Air Command and the Northwest African and Middle East Air Forces. The MAAF controlled the British Air Forces in the region, the 12AF, and the Air Service Command from 15AF. In Europe, the US developed the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF) in January 1944. In addition to the Headquarters staff, the USSTAF maintained Operational Control (OPCON) over the 8AF and the 15AF. Additionally, USSTAF maintained Administrative Control (ADCON) over the 9AF.

16 The Air Service Command was responsible for logistics, maintenance, supply, training and personnel matters. Craven and Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 1, *Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942*, 747.
19 The USSTAF Headquarters included a Deputy Commanding General for Operations providing planning, weather, intelligence and planning functions; very similar to the elements of an A3 staff in today’s Component Command. It also included a Deputy Commanding General for Administration overseeing the elements found in the Air Support Command. Ninth Air Force was OPCON to the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Craven and Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Pointblank August 1942 to December 1943*, 753.
Meanwhile in the Pacific, the AAF began to consolidate the NAFs due to the shrinking theater of operations. Starting in June 1944, the Fifth Air Force (5AF) began assuming control of the 13AF units. Recognizing the difficulty of controlling both organizations, Lt Gen George Kenney gained approval to create the Far East Air Forces (FEAF). The FEAF possessed a headquarters element that provided operational and administrative support and OPCON of both the 5AF and 13AF.\textsuperscript{20} In July of the following year, the FEAF obtained OPCON of 7AF. This last consolidation aligned the three major Pacific NAFs under one commander. This standardized structure lasted until July 1945 when the AAF established the Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific (USASTAF) to control the theater’s B-29 bombers.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20} Griffith, \textit{MacArthur’s Airman}, 174-176.
\textsuperscript{21} Griffith, \textit{MacArthur’s Airman}, 226-229.
Through the build-up of the AAF and for most of WWII, the AAF emphasized the need for a standardized and balanced operational structure. Starting with the original NAFs, each organization contained
three core subordinate commands. When required, the AAF could assign additional mission appropriate commands into any NAF. This core standardization and mission flexibility provided the NAF Commander the cross-functional balance to support a variety of missions. As the AAF created new Named Air Forces to provide C2 over multiple NAFs, the AAF retained the focus on operational standardization and balance.

It was not until late in WWII with the creation of the USASTAF that the focus began to change. For the first time in either theater, the AAF introduced a non-standardized and non-balanced combat organization. The USASTAF did not contain the core subordinate commands to support multiple operations. Instead, they maintained control of the B-29s in theater focused on the single purpose of bombing Japan.\textsuperscript{22} The USASTAF marks the creation of the first organization aligned solely within a functional structure. As the AAF began to transition to the post-WWII era, these functional organizations became the norm vice the exception.

**Post-World War II – Cold War**

The period from the end of WWII through the Cold War represents a period of constant conflict and change for the USAF. For the purposes of this paper, this section focuses on two periods. The first period focuses on the years immediately following WWII. At this time, the AAF reorganized the service beginning the transition away from a standardized and balanced organizational structure. In its place, the USAF shifted to functional MAJCOMs with subordinate NAFs and Air Divisions. The second period includes 1953 to 1972, focusing on TAC’s development of Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) and the 19AF. 19AF was a non-standard NAF designed with the ability to provide C2 for

\textsuperscript{22} Griffith, *MacArthur’s Airman*, 227.
contingency operations anywhere in the world within 72 hours.

The organizational successes of WWII led the AAF to retain its hierarchical organization structure. Specifically, the success of organizations such as the USSTAF, the FEAF, and the Continental Air Forces provided ideal models. These organizations reported directly to the Commanding General of the Air Corps, while simultaneously providing oversight to multiple NAFs. The organizations represented an intermediate layer of oversight focused on a specific geographical area.

During the reorganization after WWII, the AAF used this concept to develop the MAJCOMs that provided oversight to a large segment of the AAF forces. At their inception MAJCOMs could be broken down into two groups, support and operational. Support MAJCOMs were organizations that were not operational in nature but provided critical services to the operational forces.

Operational forces were, “MAJCOMs composed in whole or in part of strategic, operational, tactical or defense forces, or else charged with flying directly in support of such forces.” In 1946, the Operational MAJCOMs included the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), Air Defense Command (ADC), Air Transportation Command (ATC), Seventh Air Force (later Pacific Air Command), and US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). Unlike the Named and Numbered Air Forces that preceded them, these organizations did not possess a cross functional balance of forces. Instead, these commands maintained oversight of a specific operational function; for example, tactical strike or air mobility forces grouped by common function versus operational mission. Organizing the forces in this manner makes logical sense as a

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means to consolidate expertise in a single command, placing efficiency over effectiveness. However, when examined in relation to today’s Air Force, the functional grouping marks the point in history the Air Force began to stovepipe its combat forces.

The creation of the MAJCOM as the top functional organization resulted in the NAFs developing into intermediate commands functionally aligned with a specific MAJCOM.\textsuperscript{26} This restructuring eliminated the NAFs’ standard wartime structure of Bomber, Fighter, and Air Service Commands. As an intermediate command, the NAFs had operational and administrative authority over assigned operational units to include divisions, wings, groups and squadrons.\textsuperscript{27} As part of the reorganization, many divisions and wings shifted from one NAF to another to better align them functionally with their parent MAJCOM.

For the purpose of later discussion, it is important to describe the Air Division, as it existed in the early Air Force. The Air Division was an intermediate echelon of command assigned to a MAJCOM or a NAF. It was typically composed of two or more wings and possessed a staff of 14-35 people. The staff primarily focused on operational and administrative matters as an extension of the MAJCOM or NAF.\textsuperscript{28}

On July 26, 1947, the AAF gained its independence from the US Army. To the forces, the transition was transparent as the new USAF maintained the organizational construct developed after WWII.\textsuperscript{29} In the three years that followed, the USAF continued to tweak the MAJCOM

\textsuperscript{25} Ravenstein, \textit{The Organization and Lineage of the United States Air Force}, 44.
\textsuperscript{26} 8AF and 15AF aligned under SAC. 3AF, 9AF, and 12AF aligned under TAC. The USAF created Pacific Air Command from the 7AF, then aligned 5AF and 13AF under them. The USAF did not assign a USAFE a NAF until 1951 when it received 3AF. ATC received the transport wings that later became 20AF and 21AF. ADC retained 1AF, 2AF, and 4AF and obtained 10AF, 11AF, and 14AF. Ravenstein, \textit{The Organization and Lineage of the United States Air Force}, 27-38.
\textsuperscript{27} Ravenstein, \textit{The Organization and Lineage of the United States Air Force}, 46.
\textsuperscript{28} Ravenstein, \textit{The Organization and Lineage of the United States Air Force}, 48.
\textsuperscript{29} MAJCOM – NAF – Divisions – Wings – Groups – Squadrons.
arrangements. Through the tweaks, TAC moved from a MAJCOM, to a training organization, to a Named Air Force under the Continental Air Command (CONAC), and back to a MAJCOM in late 1950.\(^{30}\)

Due to this constant shifting, when the Korean Conflict began TAC found it was ill prepared to conduct its core mission.\(^{31}\) The command alignment shuffleboard resulted in a lack of funding priority for TAC. This means TAC lacked the organization, training, and equipment to rapidly deploy and conduct operations overseas. For example, shortcomings in air refueling capability, contingency plans, and trained staff delayed effective tactical combat operations in Korea for weeks.\(^{32}\)

In 1953, because of its poor performance at the beginning of the Korean War, TAC developed the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF). TAC designed CASF to plan for and rapidly deploy to conduct contingency operations. During employment, the CASF maintained the capability to conduct fighter, air refueling, and airlift operations. To enable the mission, the CASF could command “a small tactical air force to include a command element and fighter, reconnaissance, tanker, troop carrier, and communications support units.”\(^{33}\) Initially, the CASF focused on rapid deployment to the Middle East, Far East, and Latin America while maintaining the capability to self-sustain for up to 30 days. After two years of testing, TAC implemented the concept in July 1955.\(^{34}\)

Once the CASF achieved operational status, it officially became the

\(^{30}\) In 1948, the USAF aligned TAC and ADC under the Continental Air Command (CONAC). In December 1950, the USAF re-established TAC as a MAJCOM and inactivated ADC leaving CONAC to take over the air defense mission. Ravenstein, *The Organization and Lineage of the United States Air Force*, 16.

\(^{31}\) The mission of the Tactical Air Command is to have a fast reacting, combat ready tactical airpower for employment anywhere in world on short notice to operate unilaterally or in concert with other forces. Air Force Magazine Vol 45, No.9, (September 1962), 130.


19AF, joining 9AF and 12AF as NAFs under TAC. Unlike the other NAFs in TAC, 19AF did not have assigned units, aircraft, or bases. The 19AF contained approximately 90 personnel, representing a cross function of TAC’s employment capabilities. During day-to-day operations, the 19AF conducted both exercise and contingency plans development, provided C2 capability to exercises, and trained for worldwide operations. When a contingency occurred, the CASF transitioned to provide the core command element over assigned forces deployed from within TAC. This combination enabled TAC to deploy its forces worldwide within 72 hours; far better than in the early days of the Korean War.\(^{35}\)

After several successful deployments in its first five years of activity, the 19AF mission began to expand in 1963. In addition to their CASF responsibilities, 19AF became TAC’s planning lead for the Western Hemisphere and Africa/Middle East.\(^ {36}\) The staff split into two teams, one for each area of responsibility. The split allowed specific staff members to become regional and cultural experts, “collecting and maintaining military, political and to a lesser extent economic situations relative to the area.”\(^ {37}\) In addition, 19AF was responsible to plan and conduct flag-level exercises within their area of responsibility.\(^ {38}\)

In 1967, the TAC Regulation 23-3 once again expanded 19AFs roles and missions. As it had been before, 19AF was capable of establishing two Air Force Component Command headquarters. 19AF was responsible to create and maintain Air Force Component plans for

\(^{34}\) Davis, *Anatomy of a Reform*, 4.

\(^{35}\) To support the CASF, TAC had forces on alert 24-hours a day able to begin deployment within 4-hours. Davis, *Anatomy of a Reform*, 5.

\(^{36}\) In July 1963, the United States Air Forces Southern Command as activated to assume planning and execution function in Latin America. Ravenstein, *The Organization and Lineage of the United States Air Force*, 21.


\(^{38}\) Flag-Level exercises are those exercises endorsed by a General Officer, typically at a MAJCOM level or higher. Davis, *Anatomy of a Reform*, 7.
COMTAC, CINCAFSTRIKE and CINCAFLANT. Finally, 19AF provided the commander and staff for the Air Force Component Headquarters and personnel augmentation to the Joint Task Force (JTF) in support of COMTAC, CINCAFSTRIKE and CINCAFLANT.\(^{39}\)

As the US began to drawdown from Vietnam, the USAF once again reorganized. In a time of shrinking budgets and resource limitations, the USAF looked to reduce headquarters and find efficiencies throughout the service. In response, TAC deactivated 19AF in 1973.\(^{40}\) TAC distributed 19AF’s personnel and missions throughout the command. Major contingency planning moved to TAC Headquarters while contingency and exercise planning shifted to 9AF and 12AF.\(^{41}\)

Looking at the history of the 19AF and the CASF concept provides an incredibly accurate preview into Chapter 2. In 1953, TAC initiated the development of the CASF concept based on TAC’s shortcomings from Korea. With the concept, TAC’s desire was to create an organization containing a cross-functionally balanced staff able to support the full range of TAC’s operations. The balanced staff would be required to seamlessly transition from day-to-day operations to support contingency operations anywhere in the world within 72 hours. In execution, 19AF provided OPCON and ADCON over the assigned forces provided by TAC. The only element missing was TAC’s desire to use the concept to standardize the other NAFs within the TAC. In the end, it is safe to say


\(^{40}\) 19AF operated for 20-years and had a tremendous impact on USAF operations then and now. While active the 19AF supported operations in Lebanon, Quemoy, Honduras, Vietnam and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The initial concept of the CASF, with its cross function of tactical assets under one command, is an early example of the Composite Wing Construct of the early 1990s. The mission of the 19AF to be on alert to deploy and open an airfield for follow-on operations is exactly the mission conducted today by Air Mobility Command’s Contingency Response Wings. Davis, *Anatomy of A Reform*, 4-8.

the 19AF and the CASF concept served as the USAF’s first true Component Command.

In the period after the closure of the 19AF and the end of the Vietnam War, the USAF began another decade of transition. As the USAF transitioned out of Vietnam, a leadership shift emerged with the transition from the Bomber Generals to the Fighter Generals. Simultaneously, while the US remained tied to Nuclear Deterrence, the military focus shifted to the AirLand Battle and the protection of the NATO allies. Combined, the two new focuses shifted the USAF focus towards TAC and fighter-centric operations.

In the Joint Community, major changes occurred with the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. In an effort to improve joint operations, each service was now required to provide the UCC a service Component. The new component was responsible for the planning and C2 of the services assigned forces to the UCC. To meet the new requirement, the USAF designated five MAJCOMs and three NAFs as Component Commands. The new organizational focus guided the USAF through the remainder of the Cold War and shaped the service that fought Operation DESERT STORM (OpDS).

Post-Cold War

In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell paving the way for the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, ending the Cold War. Just as occurred after WW II and Vietnam, a period of fiscal constraints and resource limitations ensued. These restrictions, the new US strategic focus, and the lessons derived

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43 Davis, Anatomy of A Reform, 8
44 TAC, MAC, USAFE, PACAF, and AFSPC were dual-hatted as MAJCOMs and Component Commands. Additionally, 9AF, 12AF, and 23AF were dual-hatted as NAFs and Component Commands.
from OpDS, led to the largest USAF reorganization since the end of WWII. This section will describe the reorganization, focusing on the changes to the MAJCOM, NAF, and Air Divisions. Then the section will briefly discuss how the changes affected the USAF response to OAF.

The collapse of the Soviet Union provided the means for the US to adjust its military spending and the National Security Strategy. Prior to the collapse, the USAF spent over $90 billion a year on the defense budget. However, with a growing federal budget deficit and the lack of a near peer military competitor, the purse strings began to tighten. Over the next four years, the President cut the defense budget by 20%.45

In addition to the shrinking budget, the Department of Defense (DOD) began to evaluate the force needed to meet the President’s new National Security Strategy. The new strategy focused on regional contingencies vice major operations against the Soviet Union. Additionally, due to the closing of several overseas bases, the DOD primarily conducted the operations with forces assigned to units in the CONUS.46 Regardless of their location, the new force structure remained combat-ready, able to deploy to support the nation’s worldwide mission.

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Iraqi military launched an assault on Kuwait. The US response, led by US Central Command (USCENTCOM), established a coalition to protect Saudi Arabia and later to liberate Kuwait.47 As the Air Component to USCENTCOM, US Central Air Forces (USCENTAF), led by Lt Gen Chuck Horner, assumed the role of both the AFFOR and Joint Force Air Component

47 Titled Operations DESERT SHIELD and OpDS respectively
Commander (JFACC) staffs. On a day-to-day basis, Commander USCENTAF was dual-hatted as TAC’s 9AF staff. When they transitioned to support operations, they also became the JFACC staff responsible for the planning and C2 of all theater air assets through the Theater Air Control Center (TACC).

This action marked the first time a Combatant Commander (CCDR) employed a JFACC in a contingency operation. The use of the new system resulted in three lessons relevant to this paper. First, the staff was not organized or trained to quickly transition from the day-to-day ops of a NAF staff to the contingency operations of a JFACC staff. Second, the concept of the TACC was not fully developed, requiring Lt Gen Horner to make several adjustments prior to execution. Finally, the USAF MAJCOM functional stovepiping prevented Lt Gen Horner from obtaining ADCON of all the USAF forces in the theater and obtaining OPCON of SAC’s air refueling assets. In the end, the first two lessons did not have a major operational impact. USCENTAF was able to find solutions to the issues throughout the six months of build-up, thereby mitigating their impact. The JFACC overcame the third lesson through good command relations and the drive to succeed. These lessons played a significant role in the next reorganization and the USAF would rediscover them during OAF.

In 1991, then CSAF General Merrill A. McPeak directed the USAF to conduct a top-to-bottom reorganization. The reasons behind the reorganization included the end of the Cold War, the fiscal limitations,
and the lessons from OpDS. The reorganization revolved around five core themes: decentralization, strengthening the commander’s authority, streamlining and flattening the service, consolidating resources, and clarifying functional responsibilities. The push towards decentralization derived from the CSAF’s desire to push the power down from the headquarters to the actual units executing the mission. Tied to decentralization is the strengthening of commanders. As commanders gain more power, they must also gain more authority in order to ensure mission results. Third, and most significant to this study, there were too many links in the organizational chain of command. Therefore, they looked to streamline and flatten the command functions that hindered effective operations. Along the same lines, consolidation of resources under a single commander for a specific mission provided better efficiencies. Finally, the need to clarify functional responsibilities focused on untangling and eliminating the redundant staff functions.\(^{53}\)

The reorganization began at the highest levels of the USAF and transitioned all the way to the bottom. In line with the five core themes, the Air Staff, responsible for the overall administrative control of the USAF, was the first organization evaluated. The Secretary of Defense had already directed the USAF to cut 400 Air Staff positions. Going above the required quota, the Air Staff eventually cut over 700 staff positions or 21% of its total personnel.\(^{54}\)

At the MAJCOM level, the reorganization eliminated three MAJCOMs from the USAF.\(^{55}\) The most influential change merged SAC,
TAC, and the Mobility Airlift Command (MAC) into two new MAJCOMs.\textsuperscript{56} The new MAJCOMs, the Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) consolidated the forces around the idea of integrated employment of airpower vice functional alignment.\textsuperscript{57} As a result, ACC emerged from the reorganization as the lead command for the tactical employment of combat assets. ACC retained control over fighter and C2 assets, while gaining control over bomber, ICBMs, and some tactical airlift. Outside of the air refueling assets, ACC now possessed the assets to provide balanced support to respond to the full range of tactical operations. AMC retained all of the strategic airlift assets and the remaining tactical C-130 assets, while gaining all of the CONUS-based air-refueling assets from SAC. This consolidation provided AMC the ability to support the immediate deployment of the CONUS-based combat forces in ACC. Outside of the CONUS, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and USAFE maintained their mix of fighter, bomber, C2, tactical airlift, and air refueling assets. This enabled the two geographically focused MAJCOMs the cross-functional capability to support a range of operations within their area of responsibility immediately.\textsuperscript{58}

Continuing to the next level of command, the reorganization significantly changed the NAFs. The USAF retained the NAF, one of the oldest command structures in the USAF, to maintain the historical heritage. While the NAFs stayed, their purpose and make-up changed. The USAF no longer considered the NAF a management headquarters. Instead, they transitioned to a tactically focused operational echelon.\textsuperscript{59} During peacetime, the commander and staff provided oversight for

\textsuperscript{56} In 1982, the USAF created the Mobility Airlift Command from the previously designated Air Transportation Command. Ravenstein, \textit{The Organization and Lineage of the United States Air Force}, 19.


standardization, safety, and logistics to their assigned wings.

Additionally, most of the NAFs were dual-purposed as the Air Component Headquarters to a UCC. The dual hatting of the commander required the NAF to transition from day-to-day functions to an AFFOR staff and TACC focused on planning and monitoring 24-hour operations. To meet the AFFOR staff and TACC requirements, the USAF allocated the NAF a 100-person staff to maintain a “small nucleus around which to build a combat staff.” This new, smaller C2 staff resembled the previously discussed 19AF staff utilized by TAC from 1953-1973.

The final element of the reorganization discussed is the disposition of the Air Divisions. The reorganization created MAJCOM staffs able to provide better support to the subordinate organizations. The new tactical focus of the NAFs allowed them to provide specific command oversight, standardization, and safety support directly to the wings. The simple fact was the Air Divisions had become redundant, layered organizations that provided no real purpose. As such, with no significant heritage to save it and the need to reduce the overall force, the USAF eliminated the Air Divisions. The elimination of the Air Division serves as an example for possible USAF organizational reductions in the future.

Over the next few years, the USAF continued its implementation of the reorganization. All the while, the budget continued to shrink and the military continued to support the full range of contingency operations around the world. The USAF operated the no-fly zones over Iraq, supported combat operations in Bosnia and Haiti, and supported humanitarian assistance efforts in Bosnia and Somalia.

In 1996, the previous AMC Commander General Ronald Fogelman

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60 Prior to the reorganization, the USAF provided a typical NAF 200 billets to support operations. Due to the reduced workload the USAF cut the manning in half. McPeak, Selected Works 1990-1994, 101.
became the CSAF. In one of his first actions, General Fogelman returned the C2 of the CONUS-based tactical airlift to AMC. While he moved the CONUS assets, General Fogelman chose to leave the tactical airlift and air refueling assets in USAFE and PACAF alone. The move to put the tactical airlift back to AMC pushed the two MAJCOMs back to pure functional alignment vice the integrated alignment desired by General McPeak. This would not be the last time one CSAF made a decision that significantly changed the work of the previous CSAF.63

In 1999, the USAF participated in OAF, the 78-day air campaign in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The senior USAF officer supporting OAF was Lt Gen Michael Short. During the operation, Lt Gen Short served as the Sixteenth Air Force (16AF) Commander and the Southern Air Component Command for US European Command (USEUCOM). As the 16AF Commander, Lt Gen Short and his staff focused on the organizing, training, and equipping functions to ensure their assigned forces were prepared for tactical operations. As the Component Command, the 16AF staff was responsible to conduct the planning and provide the C2 for the combat and mobility forces in the theater.64

Unfortunately, the USAF had never properly organized or trained the 100+ person staff to support the mission. First, there was no specific structure in 16AF to guide the staff from day-to-day operations to contingency operations. Even if there had been structure, the staff lacked enough personnel, from a cross-section of the USAF, to support the operation. These shortcomings led to the 16AF’s early struggles in planning, organizing, commanding, and monitoring their assigned forces.

63 General Fogelman explained his action by saying, “when we split the CONUS-based theater forces, we created seams in our training and deployment capabilities by spreading aerial port, tanker airlift control elements, and operations among two commands.” Air Force Realigns Airlift, Air Force News Service, 23 Oct 96, n.p.
Eventually, Lt Gen Short received augmentation from USAFE and was able to support the mission effectively.65

Summary

This chapter provided a historical review of how the NAF developed from the early days of the Air Corps to the 1990s dual-hatted Component Commands. During the time from 1935 to the end of WWII, the AAF transitioned from an organization with one Air Force (GHQAF) to a multilayered organization with fourteen NAFs. Throughout this period, the AAF focused on standardized organizations that provided operational balance. Each NAF contained bomber, fighter, and air service capabilities to enable the commander to support a variety of operations.

Immediately after WII, the AAF began the first major reorganization in Air Force history. Breaking away from the WWII structure, the AAF organized the MAJCOMs and their subordinate NAFs and Air Divisions along functional capabilities. Doing so aligned the forces within strategic, tactical, air defense, and mobility stovepipes. This reorganization marked the beginning of the USAF structure that exists today.

While most organizations in the period fell within the normal framework, the 19AF demonstrated the USAF’s ability to adapt. Designed to fill a void discovered in Korea, 19AF provided TAC an organization to conduct day-to-day component responsibilities such as planning, cultural engagements, and exercise development. Then, within 72 hours, the staff could transition to provide C2 for worldwide

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64 Lt Gen Michael Short, USAF (Ret.) (Short Answers, LLC), interview by the author, 7 April 2012.
65 At the time, 16AF lacked the A-Staff construct to support the operations. The 16AF did not contain an AOC, instead they shared the 32 Air Operations Group with USAFE. The staff did not contain any mobility officers to help coordinate the airflow, logistics, or support. This led AMC to deploy the first-ever Director of Mobility Forces. Short Interview.
contingency operations. 19AF provides an excellent example of what proper organizational structure and a cross-functionally balanced staff can provide.

As the Cold War ended, the US entered into another period of change. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a new national strategy and fiscal constraints. These changes led to the second major reorganization in USAF history. In an effort to provide an integrated force, Gen McPeak worked to breakdown the organizational stovepipes of the day. To accomplish this, the USAF merged MAC, TAC, and SAC into AMC and ACC. The new MAJCOMs grouped the USAF CONUS-based assets along tactical and mobility capabilities. In reality, the reorganization combined with General Fogelman’s change did nothing but replace the SAC and TAC stovepipes of the Cold War with new Combat Air Forces and Mobility Air Forces stovepipes.

At the NAF level, the focus shifted from a headquarters staff to a tactically focused operational level organization. In addition to their NAF duties, several of the NAFs were dual-purposed as Component Commands. As such, when a contingency occurred, the NAF staff transitioned to the component command staff responsible for AFFOR and TACC functions.

When the 16AF executed their dual-hatted mission in support of OAF, the new concept fell far short of its design. The lack of training and guidance affected the structure, balance, and timeliness of the staff. As the USAFE Commander, Gen John Jumper had a front row seat to witness the 16AF shortfalls during OAF. This view helped drive Gen Jumper towards his 2001 decision to create the AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP.
Chapter 2: AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept

In the last three years, the USAF has participated in seven worldwide contingency operations. In each of these operations, a single staff served as both the traditional MAJCOM/NAF and as the Component Command staff. This single staff walked the line between their day-to-day responsibilities and their now active AFFOR staff and AOC roles supporting the contingency. The staffs transitioned from providing tactical oversight, operational planning, and exercise support to execution of deployment, beddown, sustainment, and C2 of the assigned forces. Prior to 2005, no standardized staff structure existed to ensure a balanced staff could transition in a timely manner to meet such a challenge. To alleviate the issue, then CSAF Gen John Jumper directed the HAF staff to find a solution. In response, the HAF staff developed the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept to create a standard staff structure, manned with a balanced staff to enable support across the ROMO, and provide guidance to enable a seamless transition.

This chapter examines the development of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept initiated by Gen Jumper in 2001. The chapter starts by detailing the development of the concept originating with the creation of the 2002 AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP. Unsatisfied with the initial effort, Gen Jumper tasked his staff to develop something more revolutionary. The new direction led to the development of the 2005 AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. Since the 2005 Concept, there have been four significant changes; the 2005 AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 1

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1 Operations NOBLE EAGLE, URGENT RESPONSE, UNIFIED RESPONSE, ODYSSEY DAWN, NEW DAWN, ENDURING FREEDOM, AND IRAQI FREEDOM.
2 Discussed later in this chapter, the USAF has both MAJCOMs and NAFs that are dual-hatted a Component Commands.
including the Draft Program Action Directive (PAD) 05-03, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2, PAD 06-09 implementing Change 2, and finally PAD 07-13.\(^4\)

Of the four changes listed, two have the largest impact on the overall effectiveness of the concept. First, in PAD 06-09, CSAF Gen T. Michael Moseley retained the historical relationship between the MAJCOM/NAF and the new Component-MAJCOM (C-MAJCOM)/Component-NAF (C-NAF) instead of creating of a completely new organization. Second, in PAD 07-03, the C-MAJCOM obtained a greater role in supporting the UCC, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the subordinate C-NAF. Combined, the two changes, coupled with the budgetary pressures, have essentially returned the USAF to the Component Command structure in place prior to 2002. The background of the development of the concept provides the understanding and backdrop needed to analyze the case studies in the proceeding chapters.

**The Initial Concept**

In early 2001, Gen Jumper received multiple briefings on the inability of the 9AF and 16AF to quickly transition to the AFFOR/AOC functions in OpDS and OAF respectively. Believing the USAF should support the CCDR with an integrated staff under one commander, Gen Jumper directed HAF to develop a concept to solve the issues. With no more direction than “fix the problem”, HAF/XOXS organized a multifunctional team to develop a solution.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) Gilbert Braun, Senior Policy Analyst, document, subject: Timeline of Event for AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept, 28 March 2012

\(^4\) PAD 10-02, approved on 2 June 2010, does effect some elements of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept, but these changes address subjects already covered or not pertinent to this paper.

\(^5\) The concept team leader was Mr. Gil Braun, a retired USAF O-6. Mr. Braun was a F-16 pilot and previously served as a Support Group Commander. HAF/XOXS later
The HAF team initially focused on identifying the root cause of the problem. The team started by examining the organizations dual-purposed as both the MAJCOM/NAF and a Component Command. The team recognized no standardization existed among these staffs. Each had a C2 organizational structure spread across a variety of groups and squadrons. However, as demonstrated by the 16AF in OAF, there was no real standardization in either organizational structure or training requirements. Additionally, the dual-hatted staffs lacked an A-Staff construct and an identifiable AOC, the two elements required to transition to the Component Command mission. As the team dug deeper, it appeared the lack of standardization was only a symptom of a larger problem. The true problem was the absence of an effective organizational structure, adequate training, and proper guidance from the USAF to the staffs. To fix the true problem, the development team needed to create a concept with a standard organizational structure, manned with a balanced staff able to provide C2 functions across the ROMO, and with the ability to smoothly transition from peacetime to contingency operations in a timely manner.

Creating the concept became the mission of the development team and led to the creation of the 2002 AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP.

With the purpose defined, the team began laying out the overall operational concept. Per the 2002 AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP, “The USAF must be ready to deploy forces quickly and employ forces globally in support of joint/combined operations.” Upon arriving at an operation, the AFFOR staff must provide the initial integrated C2
capability and prepare to accept augmentation to support sustained operations. To support the operational concept, the development team determined the staffs must be capable of deploying to their specific AOR within 48 hours.

The 2002 CONOP detailed six primary areas of focus within its operational concept. This paper takes the six areas and groups them around the three evaluation criteria, establishing the framework for analysis. To address the issue of a standardized organization the concept focused on the roles and responsibilities of the AFFOR staff and the AOC. To ensure the staffs contained the balance to support the ROMO, the concept focused on the manpower, training requirements, and the concept of dual hatting. Finally, to ensure a timely transition the concept focused on how the staffs transitioned from peacetime to contingency operations within 48 hours.

In order to provide the Component Commanders with a standardized organization, the 2002 CONOP focused on the AFFOR staff and the AOC. The first focus area to examine was the AFFOR Staff. In the 2002 CONOP, the purpose of the AFFOR staffs was to conduct both deliberate and crisis action planning. The staff enabled the beddown, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of assigned forces within the AOR. Finally, the staff provided the administrative oversight of all USAF forces while assigned in the theater. The personnel in the AFFOR staff, derived from pre-determined personnel assigned throughout the engaged MAJCOM/NAF. Trained to support their specific wartime function, the identified staff maintained worldwide mobility status.

9 The COMAFFOR, AFFOR staff, and AOC provide the C2 capability in the area of responsibility. The COMAFFOR is the USAF designated commander of the Air Forces in an assigned theater; typically, the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the Component Commander. Therefore, with the COMAFFOR dual-hatted as the JFACC, the COMAFFOR provides unity of command (OPCON, TACON, and ADCON) for all USAF forces. HAF/XOXS, AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP, 2.
When deployed, the staff organized into a functional A-Staff construct and the Commander’s special staff.\(^\text{10}\)

The second area of focus was the AOC staff. In the 2002 CONOP, the purpose of the AOC was “to plan, task, execute, monitor and assess Air, Space and Information operations.”\(^\text{11}\) Similar to the AFFOR staff, the initial AOC derived from airmen assigned to the Air and Space Operations Group within the engaged MAJCOM/NAF. When the contingency required a larger AOC staff, other AOC-trained personnel from within the engaged MAJCOM/NAF provided augmentation.\(^\text{12}\) When required to support mobility operation, AMC provided trained personnel to operate the Air Mobility Division (AMD), completing the AOC structure.\(^\text{13}\)

Next, in order to ensure the staffs had the balance to support the full ROMO, the 2002 CONOP focused on the manpower, training requirements, and the premise of no dual hatting. When it came to the manpower requirements, the development team realized not all theaters and contingencies were alike. Therefore, it was impossible to create one staff template for all contingencies. However, in an effort to provide consistency the development team determined a standard baseline for the AFFOR staff and the AOC. From the baseline, the commands could add or subtract tailorable elements to provide the required level of support.\(^\text{14}\) For the AFFOR staff, the baseline of 165 personnel provided

\(^{10}\) At the time, the A-Staff consisted of A1-A6 (See Chapter 1, Pg. 1) HAF/XOXS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP}, 2-3, 8-16.\(^\text{11}\) The AOC organizes into five divisions; the Strategy Division, the Combat Plans Division, the Combat Plans Division, the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division, and the Air Mobility Division. The AOC Director reports directly to the JFACC. HAF/XOXS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP}, 17.\(^\text{12}\) HAF/XOXS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP}, 17-20.\(^\text{13}\) In response AMC created the Air Mobility Operations Squadron (AMOS) under the control of the Expeditionary Mobility Task Forces. The AMOS deploys to establish or augment an Air Mobility Division.\(^\text{14}\) HAF/XOXS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP}, 6.
support to conduct “global limited strike options.”\textsuperscript{15} For the AOC staff, a baseline of 377, not including the Air Mobility Division, provided the same limited strike options.\textsuperscript{16} In addition to the baseline, the 2002 CONOP mandated the AFFOR and AOC staff positions must originate from within the existing staff structures. The intent of the mandate was to prevent the MAJCOMs and NAFs from using the 2002 CONOP as justification for additional staff positions.

Simply identifying the manpower requirements is not enough; the next focus area observed that staffs lacked the training to execute their mission. Prior to the 2002 CONOP, there was no pre-existing training program for the AFFOR staff. In response, the concept team mandated training to include “unit-level training on doctrine and operational-level roles (provided by AETC) and realistic multi-dimensional joint exercises.”\textsuperscript{17} In contrast, the AOC had a robust training program as specified in Air Force Instruction 13-1AOC Volume 1. The AOC training included Initial Qualification, Mission Qualification, Continuation, Advanced Level, and Senior Level Training programs. In addition to the AFFOR and AOC formal programs, the concept required the COMAFFOR to conduct both cultural and theater specific training to provide a better regional understanding for both staffs.\textsuperscript{18}

The fifth focus area centered on the premise of no dual hatting. Specifically, the concept stated MAJCOM/NAFs should not dual hat personnel to perform both AFFOR staff and AOC duties. Gen Jumper himself directed the development team to emphasize the no dual hatting rule.\textsuperscript{19} He believed that during contingency operations it was important the staff had the ability to focus on their primary duties only. The dual

\textsuperscript{15} HAF/XOXS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP}, 16-17.  
\textsuperscript{17} HAF/XOXS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP}, 16.  
\textsuperscript{18} HAF/XOXS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP}, 23-25.
hatting policy did not apply to the Commander, Vice Commander, or Command Chief. Nor did it prevent AFFOR staff members from continuing to perform their normally assigned MAJCOM/NAF staff duties.\textsuperscript{20}

Finally, to address the need for a timely transition, the operational concept in the 2002 CONOP focused on the ability to support contingency operations within 48 hours. In order to ensure success, each MAJCOM/NAF pre-identified, trained, and when needed employed members from their existing staff. The identified personnel and leadership established critical relationship with each other serving as the backbone for a seamless transition. This is not to say the development team expected the MAJCOM/NAFs to maintain all of the required staff billets. There simply was not enough manpower to provide each organization with a complete and separate AFFOR and AOC staff. Therefore, after the initial deployment both staffs required augmentation from outside the organization to support sustained operations. The augmentation came from other organizations within the engaged MAJCOM/NAF first and then from other trained personnel throughout the USAF.\textsuperscript{21}

Based on the six focus areas, the development team successfully created a product to address the core problems of a lack of effective organizational structure, adequate training, and proper guidance. The concept addressed the structure issue by creating a common language, standard staff organizations, and defined manpower requirements for both staffs. With training already existing for the AOC, the development team filled a gap by creating sufficient training guidelines for the AFFOR staff. Finally, by simply thinking about the issue, developing a solution,

\textsuperscript{19} Braun, Interview.
\textsuperscript{20} HAF/XOXS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP}, 4-6.
\textsuperscript{21} HAF/XOXS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP}, 3-4.
and drafting a concept, the team provided much needed guidance.\textsuperscript{22}

With respect to the overall operational concept, the team had mixed success. On the positive side, the team addressed the need for rapid deployment capability. By pre-identifying the initial staff members and developing structured training programs, both staffs possessed the ability to deploy and begin operations within 48 hours. On the negative side, the development team did not adequately address the AFFOR staff and AOC need for a balanced staff to support a demand for integrated operations immediately. Without mobility and space personnel on the MAJCOM/NAF staffs and without a dedicated AMD that lived and trained with the rest of the AOC staff, the concept maintained a stovepiped command structure. A command structure clearly focused on kinetic operations lacked the balance to react to non-kinetic operations. In the end, the 2002 AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP development team created an acceptable concept to move the USAF in the right direction.

\textbf{The Re-Attack}

On 11 June 2002, Gen Jumper signed the original CONOP despite not being satisfied completely. He was pleased with the progress made by the development team, but he believed the concept’s scope was too narrow. Therefore, in July he directed HAF/XOXS and the development team to create an expanded Concept. Gen Jumper wanted something revolutionary not just evolutionary. The exact reason behind the desire is unclear; Mr. Braun believed Gen Jumper wanted to “provide a more robust, dedicated capability to each CCDR, presenting a single USAF voice.”\textsuperscript{23}

In the fall of 2003, nearly a year after Gen Jumper’s last guidance,

\textsuperscript{22} It was not until 2005 that the USAF developed formal AFFOR training. Braun, Interview.
\textsuperscript{23} Braun, Timeline Document.
Gen Jumper personally briefed an updated version of the Concept at the 2003 Corona Conference. In response to the new version of the Concept, Gen Jumper directed the MAJCOM Commanders (MAJCOM/CC) to develop an implementation plan in 60 days. Over the next two months, the MAJCOM/CCs worked directly with the CSAF to develop a standardized, robust, and dedicated capability to the CCDRs. As the MAJCOM/CCs presented their implementation plans Gen Jumper began to recognize they were not standardized.\textsuperscript{24}

To help focus the MAJCOMs and the Air Staff, Gen Jumper released an article in \textit{Inside the Pentagon} on 29 April 2004. In the article, Gen Jumper provided insight into his thoughts on how the USAF should support the CCDRs. First, Gen Jumper wanted the “Air Force’s warfighting commanders and their air operations centers” aligned under the CCDR. Putting this alignment in terms of command relationship, Gen Jumper advocated for the CCDR to have OPCON over the USAF Components. Additionally, Gen Jumper wanted the aligned air Component to be collocated with the Unified Combatant Command (UCC) to ensure the Component staff could work directly with the respective UCC staff. Finally, when engaged in actual operations, Gen Jumper wanted the warfighting air commander to “retain a second hat as a NAF Commander, but only for the forces he would gain during war or contingency operations.”\textsuperscript{25} Once again placing this statement in terms of a command relationship, Gen Jumper wanted the warfighting commander to have ADCON over the assigned USAF forces.\textsuperscript{26}

The article provided the Air Staff, and most importantly the MAJCOMs, a good outline of what the CSAF wanted in the next version

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\textsuperscript{24} At this point, the concept was simply a PowerPoint briefing presented at the Fall 2003 Corona conference. Braun, Timeline Document.  
\textsuperscript{25} Braun, Interview.  
\textsuperscript{26} Briefing, Brig Gen Rick Rosborg, subject: WFHQ Update, August 2004.
of the concept. As the implementation progressed, it became clear to Gen Jumper the MAJCOM/CCs were unable to meet his vision of developing a standardized construct. In response, Gen Jumper once again turned to HAF/XOXS with the direction to work through the MAJCOM issues and implement the concept.

Once HAF/XOXS regained control, they maneuvered quickly to create a CSAF-level organization that reported to the CSAF directly. When HAF/XOXS presented the idea at the fall 2004 Corona Conference Gen Jumper approved the creation of the Warfighting Headquarter Implementation Team (CC-WFHQ). Brig Gen Eric Rosborg led the 15-person team chartered for 15 months or until implementation completion. The team’s primary goals were to resolve the MAJCOM standardization issues, publish a revised AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept, and develop the implementation PAD. The revised concept was to include a standard Warfighting Headquarters (WFHQ) template, an AFFOR staff and AOC manning template, and a WFHQ augmentation template.

With the establishment of the CC-WFHQ, one would assume the organization gained full control over the process in order to fix the issues. However this did not occur. Shortly after its creation, the CC-WFHQ learned Gen Jumper would not direct the MAJCOM/CCs to conform to the concept as presented. Instead, CC-WFHQ had to work to achieve a consensus among the MAJCOMs. This changed the team’s focus from simply directing change to developing change through

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27 Rosborg, WFHQ Update Brief.
consolidation and coordination.\textsuperscript{30}

Over the next six months, the CC-WFHQ worked with the MAJCOMs, Air Staff, and other interested parties to develop the 2005 AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. The new concept provided a blend of both the core elements of the 2002 CONOP and new elements to revolutionize the USAF support to the CCDR. The 2005 Concept’s purpose was to “define how the USAF provides command and control of its forces to enable the application of air and space power across the full range of military operations in support of the JFC.”\textsuperscript{31}

To meet the purpose, the CC-WFHQ developed a detailed operational concept. The CC-WFHQ designed the WFHQ to serve as the USAF Component Commander and perform the duties of the Commander Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) and the JFACC in support of the CCDR. The WFHQs had to be able to deploy, sustain, and redeploy air, space, and information operation forces worldwide. The staffs had to be able to establish C2 functions to support operations from peacetime support to major combat operations. Finally, the WFHQ had to be able to perform these tasks quickly, with the ability to immediately transition from day-to-day operations to mission execution.\textsuperscript{32}

To remain consistent between the concepts, this section will analyze the 2005 Concept through the lens of the three evaluation criteria. Addressing the issue of a standardized structure, the 2005 Concept developed a new WFHQ organization that included the Command section, the AFFOR staff, and the AOC. To ensure the WFHQ contained the balance to support the ROMO, the concept discussed the

\textsuperscript{29} Additionally, CC-WFHQ worked to restructure the Air Staff and MAJCOM staffs along the A-Staff construct. Rosborg, 2004 WFHQ Update Briefing.
\textsuperscript{30} At this point, the CC-WFHQ had not developed a written draft. Tat the time, the Concept was simply a PowerPoint presentation. Braun, Interview.
\textsuperscript{31} Warfighting Headquarters Implementation Team (CC-WFHQ), \textit{Air Force Forces Command and Control (AFFOR C2 Enabling) Concept}, 10 February 2005, 1.
new manpower requirements to fill the structure, re-emphasized the importance of no dual hatting, and modified the training requirements. Finally, based on the new structure, the concept detailed how the staffs transitioned from peacetime to contingency operations.

To address the need for a standardized structure, the CC-WFHQ advocated for the creation of an entirely new organization, dedicated to the role of Component Command, called the WFHQ.\(^{33}\) The WFHQ mission stated, “Effective C2 of air, space and information operations forces requires headquarters that are properly structured, equipped, manned and trained...properly focused on the full range of military operations.”\(^{34}\) To enable this mission, the CC-WFHQ split the dual-hatted staffs that already existed in the USAF by developing the new WFHQ staff separate from the MAJCOM/NAF staffs already in existence. The MAJCOM/NAF continued to provide their traditional organize, train and equip (OT&E) functions through the USAF operational lines. Meanwhile, the Command Section, the AFFOR staff, and the AOC, the three core elements of the WFHQ, performed the Component Command functions.\(^{35}\) In addition to these core elements, when required the CCDR provided the WFHQ fielded forces to support contingency operations.\(^{36}\)

As the Component Commander, the WFHQ/CC served as the COMAFFOR, most likely as the JFACC, and if tasked as the JTF/CC.\(^{37}\) Simplifying the role of the organization, “the WFHQ becomes the USAF’s

\(^{32}\) CC-WFHQ, *AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept*, 3.
\(^{33}\) The title Warfighting Headquarters was as a placeholder until the team developed a more original name. Braun, Interview.
\(^{34}\) CC-WFHQ, *AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept*, 6.
\(^{35}\) In the 2005 Concept, the three core elements remain relatively unchanged. The only significant difference is in the 2005 Concept the AFFOR staff contains the full A-1 through A-9 staff construct.
\(^{37}\) Despite being dual-hatted at the Component Level, the 2005 Concept states the WFHQ Commander should not be dual-hatted as a MAJCOM or NAF Commander, segregating WFHQ from the USAF C2 structure. Gilbert Braun, Point Paper, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept, 4 January 05.
operational-level C2 organization and the primary operational warfighter.”

Under the new WFHQ construct, the USAF looked to provide dedicated support to the CCDR through one organization focused on the operational and tactical levels of war.

To solidify the new Component Command’s role further, the CC-WFHQ adjusted the operational alignment of the WFHQ. To ensure the WFHQ focused their efforts on supporting the CCDR, the CC-WFHQ aligned the WFHQ directly under the UCC. (See Figure 2) This alignment standardized the Component structure with the UCC providing better C2 across the ROMO. The WFHQ maintained an ADCON line to the appropriate MAJCOM to provide the administrative support such as promotions, awards, and military justice actions for the USAF personnel under the CCDR.

To help standardize the organizations across the USAF, the CC-WFHQ established a new notional naming convention. The 2005 Concept named each WFHQ after the UCC it represented. As an example, the Component Command to Central Command was Air Forces Central (AFCENT). The only anomaly occurred in the US Pacific Command (USPACOM). Due to its size and the existence of four NAFs, PACOM retained PACAF as its specific Component Command without an AOC. Additionally, CC-WFHQ established Air Forces Pacific (AFPAC) and Air Forces North East Asia (AFNEA) as full WFHQs to provide operational-level support throughout the PACOM Theater. Based on the naming convention, the 2005 Concept advocated the creation of nine full WFHQs and PACAF as a WFHQ (minus). (See Figure 3)

38 CC-WFHQ, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept, 6.
39 CC-WFHQ, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept, 7
In order to address the need for balance across the staff, the 2005 Concept addressed manpower and training less directly than the 2002
CONOP. Unlike the 2002 CONOP, the 2005 Concept did not specify the exact number of personnel needed for the AFFOR staff and the AOC. Instead, it stated, “each WFHQ is sized to the specific mission or theater of operations...sized to optimize mission capability.”\textsuperscript{40} By not specifying exact numbers, the CC-WFHQ enabled the WFHQ/CC to determine the exact number and functional representation needed in each AFFOR directorate and AOC division. Similar to the 2002 CONOP, the 2005 Concept stated that other than the key leadership positions, there should be no dual hatting between the AFFOR and AOC staffs. To emphasize this idea further, the 2005 Concept stated, “No dual hatting is a fundamental premise of this concept.”\textsuperscript{41} The creation of the new staff structure combined with the premise of no dual hatting led the CC-WFHQ to admit the 2005 Concept created an additional manpower requirement for the USAF. This was a change from the 2002 CONOP, which emphasized no additional manning should be requested to enable the concept.

To ensure the balanced staff was properly trained the 2005 Concept designated the WFHQ/CC responsible to ensure both staffs were capable of planning and executing across the full ROMO. To support the WFHQ/CC the 2005 Concept detailed three separate training programs. The initial qualification training varied between the two staffs. For the AFFOR staff no courseware or training program existed, leading to the development of a computer based training program to provide a basic knowledge level. The initial training for the AOC staff occurred through the AOC formal training unit. Once a staff member arrived at the unit, the 2005 Concept required them to complete mission qualification training. Mission qualification ensured staffs qualified in the theater.

\textsuperscript{40} CC-WFHQ, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept}, 7.
\textsuperscript{41} CC-WFHQ, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept}, 2.
specific WFHQ operations, procedures and processes needed to conduct ops. Finally, the 2005 Concept explained continuation training as needed to provide qualified staff personnel the means to maintain effectiveness through exercises and theater specific studies.\textsuperscript{42}

The last area of focus in the 2005 Concept is the timely transition from peacetime to contingency operations. With the creation of a separate dedicated staff for both the AFFOR staff and AOC, the CC-WFHQ eliminated the issue of a rapid transition from day-to-day operations to contingency operations. The new Concept allowed the AFFOR staff and the AOC to maintain a constant focus on operations within their theater. Outside of the possible delay needed to deploy from home station forward to their AOR, there was no delay in the initial support to operations. Recognizing the possible need to support major operations, the Concept directed the WFHQ/CC to maintain two-phased augmentation plans. Phase 1 utilized trained AFFOR/AOC personnel with experience in the AOR. Phase 2 utilized trained AFFOR/AOC personnel without theater specific training.\textsuperscript{43}

In the end, the CC-WFHQ did an exceptional job developing the 2005 AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. They created a truly revolutionary concept that fell within the specifications outlined by Gen Jumper in his 2004 Pentagon letter. The creation of a standalone WFHQ, OPCON to the CCDR and away from the traditional USAF command structure, provided a standard template for USAF support to the CCDRs. The structure allows the WFHQ/CC to focus solely on operations and C2 of attached forces eliminating the management functions normally handled by a MAJCOM or NAF. One of the best features of the new structure was the elimination of the transition from day-to-day operations to

\textsuperscript{42} CC-WFHQ, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept}, 10.
\textsuperscript{43} CC-WFHQ, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept}, 11-12.
contingency operations. Finally, the staff's sole focus on supporting the CCDR demonstrated the USAF's commitment to support the CCDR across the ROMO at the operational-level of war. On 10 February 2005, two and a half years after signing the original concept, Gen Jumper approved the 2005 AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept.

**Change 1 and PAD 05-03**

Gen Jumper's signature allowed the CC-WFHQ to transition to the next phase of developing an implementation PAD. Unfortunately, it was not as simple as it seems, as the CC-WFHQ sustained two coordinated attacks from the MAJCOMs. The first attack occurred during the 2005 Corona South Conference leading to the 2005 AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 1. The second attack occurred during the coordination of PAD 05-03, which implemented the 2005 Concept Change 1, leading to further implementation delays.

At the 2005 Corona South Conference, Brig Gen Rosborg briefed the attendees on the recently approved 2005 AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. Originally scheduled for a 30-minute overview, the brief turned contentious, finally ending 3.5 hours later. Despite months of coordination with the MAJCOMs, to include concurrence from all MAJCOM Vice Commanders, several MAJCOM/CCs rejected certain aspects of the new Concept. There were two relevant issues presented by the MAJCOM/CCs: dual hatting the AFFOR staff and the designation of the Component Commanders.

The Air Mobility Command (AMC) led the attack on dual hatting

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44 Braun, Interview.
45 Braun, Timeline Document.
46 A third concern existed over the exactly where to place specific staff functions i.e. finance, plans, mission support, in the AFFOR structure. While important, these discussions are not pertinent to his paper. Gilbert Braun, Point Paper, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept - Critical Issues, 4 January 2005.
the AFFOR staff. Already designated Air Forces Transportation (AFTRANS) as the USAF Component Command to US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), AMC believed there was no need for a separate AFFOR staff within the WFHQ construct. They maintained they could achieve efficiencies by dual hatting the current AMC staff as both AMC and AFTRANS. In response, CC-WFHQ maintained that no dual hatting remained a fundamental premise of the concept. On this issue, Gen Jumper agreed with the CC-WFHQ and he directed AMC to continue implementing the concept.

The second and more significant attack was from the MAJCOM/CCs concerned over the designation of the Component Command. Of the four MAJCOM/CCs dual hatted as both the MAJCOM and the Component Commander, three expressed their concerns over losing their Component Command status. The MAJCOM/CCs believed the change affected their relationship with and the support they provided to the CCDR. CC-WFHQ countered the MAJCOMs’ argument, believing it was more important to emphasize the dedicated focus the WFHQ provided the CCDR vice the split focus they currently received. Despite Gen Jumper’s guidance on creating one system and one voice to the CCDR, he relented to the MAJCOM/CCs. As part of the decision, Gen Jumper approved moving only the MAJCOM/CC into the WFHQ’s chain of command, specifically leaving the MAJCOM staff out. The decisions added the MAJCOM/CC into the command structure between the UCC and the WFHQ while leaving the C2 of the AFFOR and AOC staffs under the WFHQ/CC. The decision would “keep the component and traditional MAJCOM functions separate, so the component could remain the single

47 Braun, Point Paper – Critical Issues.
48 Despite the initial loss, AMC would eventually win the battle after Gen Moseley took over as the CSAF. Braun, Interview.
USAF voice, dedicated to supporting the UCC.”

To formalize the new relationship, Gen Jumper directed CC-WFHQ to develop a second WFHQ structure to add the dual-hatted MAJCOMs between the UCC and the WFHQ. Altering the initial structure (Figure 2) by sliding the MAJCOM/CC into a position between the UCC and the WFHQ, a second structure was born. (Figure 4) Now, instead of maintaining one standard structure, as originally directed by Gen Jumper, the USAF had two possible structures to support the CCDR. One structure for WFHQ/CCs designated as the Component Commanders and one structure for MAJCOM/CC designated as the Component Commanders. With that, the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 1 was complete. Aside from the new chart and a short description, there were no other changes made to the 2005 Concept.

Figure 4. Change 1 Warfighting Headquarters Command Relationship. (Reprinted from CC-WFHQ, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 1, 7 March 2005, 9.)

49 AMC, USAFE, and PACAF disputed the point, while AFSOC chose otherwise. Braun, Talking Paper—Critical Issues.
50 Braun, Timeline; Braun, Interview.
51 Warfighting Headquarters Implementation Team (CC-WFHQ), Air Force Forces Command and Control (AFFOR C2) Enabling Concept Change 1, 7 March 2005, 9; Braun, Interview.
Gen Jumper signed Change 1 on 7 March 2005 paving the way for CC-WFHQ to create PAD 05-03. PAD 05-03 served as the USAF implementation directive, providing the basic plan for the MAJCOMs and NAFs to stand-up the new WFHQ staffs. As part of PAD 05-03, CC-WFHQ provided standardization by detailing the exact roles and responsibilities of the WFHQs. As an everyday mission, the WFHQ provided theater engagement through exercises, military-to-military engagements, and support foreign military sales. Additionally, they ensured their staff and assigned forces received mission-ready training focused on the needs of the CCDR. During contingency operations, the WFHQ organized their assigned forces; planned, executed, and sustained operations; and advocated for required USAF combat capabilities.52

Once CC-WFHQ added the final touches to PAD 05-03, the document entered into the coordination process. Despite taking over three years to approve Change 1, the coordination for PAD 05-03 did not go smoothly. To start, having retained their role as the Component Commanders, PACAF and USAFE shifted their efforts to retain their MAJCOM staff as part of the Component Command structure. They reasoned that the historical relationship between the UCC and the MAJCOM was critical to the Component’s success. Additionally, they argued both MAJCOMs should maintain OPCON of their assigned forces currently under their control vice shifting OPCON to the WFHQ. In reality, the forces were OPCON to the CCDR and only the CCDR retained the ability to delegate OPCON down to a subordinate command. If approved, the two MAJCOM requests would leave the Pacific and European WFHQs to focus on planning and execution via Tactical Control (TACON) only.

52 These WFHQ roles were very similar to those TAC directed 19AF to conduct operations from 1953-1973. Briefing, Brig Gen Rick Rosborg, subject: WFHQ Update, July 2005.
Not happy with the first CSAF answer, AMC continued their quest to dual-hat the AMC and AFTRANS staffs. AMC argued the MAJCOM staff had performed the component functions every day with no issue. Therefore, there was no reason to change the relationship. While their argument was the same, AMC did change their approach requesting HAF/A1 (Personnel) conduct a manpower study. Their intent was to demonstrate the efficiencies gained by dual hatting vice adding more personnel.

ACC was the newest MAJCOM to argue against the WFHQ construct. Similar to AMC’s previous argument, ACC pushed to retain the dual-hatted relationship between 9AF, 12AF, and 8AF and their assigned role as Component Commands. ACC argued they could achieve manning efficiencies by not creating three completely new organizations. Despite the attacks from the four MAJCOMS, CC-WFHQ maintained these changes undermined the intent of the WFHQ as specified by Gen Jumper.

In the end, CC-WFHQ could not obtain a consensus with the four MAJCOMs. In early August 2005, CC-WFHQ provided Gen Jumper with a decision brief for PAD 05-03. The brief highlighted the key implementation issues and presented the significant non-concurs for his adjudication. Expecting a quick decision on the key issues, the CC-WFHQ was surprised when Gen Jumper decided not to approve PAD 05-05. On 12 August 2005, CC-WFHQ received an email stating Gen Jumper would not sign the PAD. Instead, he returned it to the VCSAF Gen T. Michael Moseley with a handwritten note.

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54 No one is sure what the note said or the reason behind it. Mr. Gilbert Braun, Senior Strategy and Policy Analyst, Headquarters Air Force Plans Directorate, to Commander CC-WFHQ, e-mail, 12 August 2005.
While only Gen Jumper and Gen Moseley know what Gen Jumper wrote on the note, there are three possibilities. First, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had already announced Gen Jumper would retire in September 2005 and Gen Moseley would replace him as CSAF. It is logical that Gen Jumper did not want to make such a significant decision, retire, and leave Gen Moseley to implement the concept. On the other hand, it is possible Gen Jumper simply changed his mind on the concept and did not want to go against his MAJCOM/CCs. Finally, maybe Gen Jumper was not overly concerned which staff performed the AFFOR functions. Instead, the real intent behind the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept was to solidify the role of the AOC.\footnote{Lt Gen Michael Short, USAF (Ret.) (Short Answers, LLC), interview by the author, 7} Regardless of the actual reason, by not signing PAD 05-03 Gen Jumper ensured the vision he presented in the 2004 Pentagon Letter would never come to fruition.

**Change 2**

On 2 September 2005, Gen T. Michael Moseley became the next CSAF. Hoping to gain a quick resolution to PAD 05-03, CC-WFHQ updated the PAD Decision Brief and presented it to Gen Moseley on 29 September 2005. Unfortunately, just as Gen Jumper had done, Gen Moseley did not sign PAD 05-03. Following the 29 September meeting, Gen Moseley directed CC-WFHQ to draft a memorandum directing the MAJCOMs to implement the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept using Change 1 and PAD 05-03 as guidelines.

The memo took nearly two months to coordinate before its final release on 10 November 2005. The final version of the memo directed the MAJCOMS to implement Change 1 and PAD 05-03 without more coordination. Additionally, the memo called for the Air Staff, MAJCOMs, and the WFHQs to adopt the A1-A9 construct. The purpose of both
changes was to implement what CC-WFHQ and HAF/A1 developed with the understanding that in the end, “The objective is to eventually achieve a standard look.”

The creation of the memo was the last official function of the CC-WFHQ. With their charter revoked, the CSAF replaced CC-WFHQ with a development team led by HAF/A5XS.

In February 2006, Gen Moseley announced PBD 720 ordering the elimination of nearly 40,000 USAF personnel. The USAF planned the cuts to obtain additional funds to recapitalize its aging fleet of aircraft. To enable the reductions, Gen Moseley released the Air Force Headquarters Reorganization Memorandum on 22 March 2006. The memo outlined a three-pronged approach to restructure the USAF while retaining the warfighting capability. First, the 2006 memo directed HAF/A1 to lead the consolidation of the MAJCOMs and their non-warfighting functions into the appropriate commands, agencies and centers. Second, the memo directed HAF/A3/5 to update the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept and create a subsequent implementation PAD. Finally, it directed the USAF to consolidate the Field Operating Agencies (FOA) and Direct Reporting Units (DRU).

Of the three prongs, only the first two are relevant to this paper.

The first prong called for the consolidation of the MAJCOM function into the appropriate commands, centers, and agencies. The intent was for the USAF to reduce headquarters staffs by approximately 4,400 personnel. To accomplish the reduction, Gen Moseley directed

April 2012.

57 When the Air Staff transitioned to the A-Staff construct HAF/XOXS became AF/A5XS XOXO. Braun, Interview.
59 HAF/A1 never accomplished the task of assessing the ability to consolidate or eliminate DRUs and FOAs. Instead, A1 focused on how to eliminate the nearly 40,000 personnel from the USAF. Braun, Timeline.
HAF/A1 to work to merge redundant functions throughout the USAF structure to an appropriate MAJCOM, center, or agency. As an example, Yakota Air Base, 13AF, PACAF and AMC all maintained staff functions to support C-130 tactics. The reorganization would eliminate the tactics responsibility from 13AF and PACAF, allowing the Yakota tactics to skip-echelon directly to AMC tactics for support. This would allow 13AF and PACAF to either free up the personnel to focus solely on their component role or eliminate billets all together.

While addressing the second prong, Gen Moseley stated the most important need was to “ensure we [USAF] fully support the UCC with the required USAF capabilities.” In order to meet his vision, Gen Moseley directed HAF/A3/5 to develop the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2 and a new implementation PAD. As the development team worked to create the new document, the overall purpose, the AFFOR staff, and AOC concepts did not significantly change.

With regard to the balance needed to support the full ROMO, PBD 720 considerably influenced the concept’s ability to man the new organizations fully. Additionally, dual hatting and training received only minor attention in the updated concept. There was no effect on the component’s ability to make a timely transition to contingency operations, as the WFHQs remained separate organizations.

In an effort to standardize the organizational structure further, Change 2 provided two changes to the naming convention of the component structure. The first change established a new name for the strategic-level element of the component commands led by the MAJCOM/CCs. The second adjusted the naming convention of the

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61 Moseley, 2006 Memorandum.
62 Chandler, Air Force 21 Briefing.
overall component organizations established in the original concept.

In 2005, Gen Jumper allowed the MAJCOM/CCs to retain their role as the Component Commander. In response to the MAJCOM/CCs’ new role, in Change 2 the development team added a small support staff to assist the commander with their component duties.⁶⁴ To help delineate this new staff from the WFHQ, the development team created the Air Force Component Headquarters (AFCHQ). The AFCHQ was the senior component headquarters providing strategic-level support to the UCC and strategic-level guidance to the WFHQ.⁶⁵

The development of the AFCHQ along with the previously established WFHQ solidified the two possible component command structures found in Change 2. In Case 1, the AFCHQ and WFHQ existed as two separate organizations run by two separate commanders. This case allowed the AFCHQ to conduct the strategic-level coordination while the WFHQ conducted the operational and tactical-level coordination. In this model, OPCON authority flowed from CCDR-AFCHQ-WFHQ-Fielded Forces; while the ADCON flowed from HAF-AFCHQ-WFHQ; and the management functions, installation, and BOS functions flowed to the yet developed consolidated organization or agency.⁶⁶ (See Figure 5) In Case 2, the AFCHQ and the WFHQ existed as one organization with a single commander. In this case, the AFFOR staff performed duties at all three levels of war. In this model, OPCON authority ran directly from CCDR-AFCHQ/WFHQ-Fielded Forces. In Case 2 ADCON flowed from HAF-MAJCOM-WFHQ. The management, installation, and BOS functions

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⁶⁴ The staff included protocol, public affairs, strategic-level theater security cooperation, and legal. HAF/A5XS, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2, 6.
⁶⁵ HAF/A5XS, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2, 6.
⁶⁶ As part of the USAF consolidation, the intent was to create DRUs or FOAs to oversee management, installation, and BOS functions to provide USAF level service instead of each MAJCOM conducting the service.
again flowed through the yet developed consolidated organization or agency.⁶⁷ (See Figure 6)

**Figure 5.** Change 2 Case 1 Warfighting Headquarters Command Relationships. (Reprinted from CC-WFHQ, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept CH2, 25 May 2006, 10.)

**Figure 6.** Change 2 Case 2 Warfighting Headquarters Command Relationships. (Reprinted from CC-WFHQ, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept CH2, 25 May 2006, 10.)

⁶⁷ Except for the new AFCHQ name and the “planned” changes to the MAJCOM structure, the cases are essentially the same as Ch 1. HAF/A5XS, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2, 10.
In an effort to maintain the historical ties to the NAF heritage, the development team created a new overall naming convention. The new names included the addition of a NAF designation that followed the previously established Component Command title. To keep the appropriate lineage, the team used the designation of the NAF, which had previously performed the Component Command role to a specific UCC. As an example, 9AF operated as the Component Command to USCENTCOM; therefore, the new designation for the Central Command WFHQ was AFCENT (9AF). Per Gen Moseley’s direction, the development team added the NAF tie despite the fact that the WFHQs were new stand-alone organizations distinctly separate from the historic NAF.

To summarize the changes created in Change 2, figure 7 provides a visual depiction. Based on the new naming convention for the MAJCOM/CCs, there were four new AFCHQs (AMC, AFSOC, PACAF, and USAFE) and 10 WFHQs organizations. (See Figure 7) Of the ten Component Headquarters, four operated as Case 1 models with separate AFCHQ and WFHQ staffs. The remaining six Component Headquarters were Case 2 models with one staff performing both the AFCHQ and WFHQ responsibilities. Due to changes in US Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) structure, Air Forces Strategic Command (AFSTRAT) was broken into two separate Component Headquarters, one supporting space operations and one supporting Global Strike operations. Finally, Change 2 refocused AFNEA to the Republic of Korea and renamed AFNEA to Air Forces Korea (7AF) (AFKOR(7AF)) in support of US Forces Korea. In addition, 5AF remained the component to US Forces Japan without an AOC, 11AF remained a NAF and the component to Alaska

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68 AMC/AFTRANS (18AF), USAFE/AFEUR (3AF), AFSOC/AFSOF (23AF), and PACAF/FPAC (13AF).
69 AFSTRAT-SP (14AF) and AFSTRAT-GS (8AF) respectively.
70 US Forces Korea is a sub-unified command under PACOM.
Command with a small AOC, and 20AF remained the component to USSTRATCOM, overseeing missile operations without an AOC.\textsuperscript{71}

\textbf{Figure 7.} Change 2 Air Force Component Headquarters Construct. (Reprinted from CC-WFHQ, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2, 25 May, 2006, 9)

In Change 2, the importance of maintaining a balanced staff to enable operations across the ROMO remained a central focus. However, the personnel realities of PBD 720 forced the development team to re-examine how the USAF provided the manpower. In response, Change 2 emphasized the need to tailor the new AFCHQ structures to be “manned at the minimum core capabilities necessary to meet the unique demands of the theater’s steady state operations as well as their most likely contingency scenarios.”\textsuperscript{72} By adding the words “minimum” and “most likely”, the development team enabled each staff to create their unit manning to fit the operational realities in their respective UCC. The minimalist ideas led the development team to emphasize the importance

\textsuperscript{71} Without a full Falconer AOC, the USAF did not designate the three organizations as C-NAFs. HAF/A5XS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2}, 8-9.

\textsuperscript{72} HAF/A5XS, \textit{AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2}, 11.
of pre-established reachback agreements to provide augmentation to support major or long-term operations. Ideally, these relationships allowed the augmentees to establish relationships with the existing component staffs through training and exercises.

Even with the concern over PBD 720, the development team continued to emphasize the premise of no dual hatting and the importance of training. Change 2 maintained that members assigned to one staff should not perform duties on another staff. The only exception to this rule remained the senior leadership positions. As an example, the AFFOR A2 could double as the ISR Division Chief to provide continuity in the AOR. Exceptions of this nature provided the commander the flexibility to place the right personnel into key leadership roles. In the training realm, the only significant difference in Change 2 from Change 1 was the creation of a distance learning initial training program for the AFFOR staff. While this is a step in the right direction, the emphasis on AFFOR training remained far behind that of the AOC.

The development team created Change 2 because the USAF planned to cut 40,000 personnel and restructure the MAJCOMs. In response, the team made two critical changes to the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. The first critical change occurred when the development team created the AFCHQ and changed the overall naming convention. While the naming convention seems insignificant, maintaining the NAF historical lineage was the first step in the degradation of the overall AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept.

The second critical change was the addition of the AFCHQ into the overall Component Command structure. By combining the new AFCHQ with the WFHQ, the new Component structure in Change 2 provided the
CCDR support from the strategic through the tactical level. Despite the changes, the development team maintained the core concept of standardized organizations, preserving a balance among the staff to conduct operations across the ROMO, and retaining the ability to respond immediately to the needs of the CCDR.

In the end, the goal of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2 was to standardize the organizational component structure. However, as presented in Figure 7, among the thirteen NAFs there were four different structures. There were four Case 1 organizations providing separate AFCHQ and WFHQ support to a UCC. There were the six Case 2 organizations providing combined AFCHQ and WFHQ to a UCC. Then there was 11AF, which was a WFHQ only. Finally, there are Twentieth Air Force (20AF) and 5AF that were WFHQs without an AOC. The four NAF staff structures diluted the overall concept and made it difficult for both the USAF and the joint community to comprehend. With regard to maintaining balance, the continued focus on not dual hatting staffs and maintaining focused training provided the commander a staff prepared to support a variety of operations.

Overall Change 2 was another step in the wrong direction for the overall AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. By further solidifying the role the MAJCOM/CCs played in the Case 1 model, Change 2 degraded the emphasis placed on the actual WFHQs itself. Placing a 4-star in the command structure, provided the WFHQ 3-star another layer of oversight and coordination, disturbing the critical relationship between CCDR and the WFHQ/CC. Regardless, Gen Moseley signed Change 2 on 25 May 2006, leading to the development of the implementation PAD 06-09.

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73 The AFCHQ focused on the strategic-level while the WFHQ focused on the operational and tactical-level.
In November 2006, Gen Moseley released PAD 06-09, providing the USAF with the implementation instructions for the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2. In the six months it took HAF/A5XS to draft and coordinate the PAD, there were two significant changes made to Change 2 that affected the overall employment of the concept. First, there were two additional name changes with the development team renaming the AFCHQs and WFHQs and changing the overall concept naming convention. Second, instead of creating completely new organizations as described in Changes 1 and 2, Gen Moseley allowed the MAJCOM and NAF staffs to retain both their traditional organize, train, and equip responsibilities and their new WFHQs functions as one integrated organization.

When analyzing PAD 06-09 in regards to the ideal of providing a standardized organization, there were two significant changes. First, the development team replaced the terms AFCHQ and WFHQ with C-MAJCOM and C-NAF. In Change 2, the development team used AFCHQ and WFHQ as notional means to identify what each staff represented and to delineate the staffs as separate and distinct organizations. However, Gen Moseley wanted to retain the historical ties of the MAJCOM and the NAF within the component structure. As such, he directed the organization be renamed C-MAJCOM and C-NAF.

Next, to emphasize the heritage aspect further, Gen Moseley also directed the team to change the overall naming convention of the organizations. Within Change 2, the development team labeled the organizations with the component first and then the historical NAF second. However, within PAD 06-09, the naming convention changed,

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placing the historical NAF first and then the functional component title second. As an example, Change 2 designated AFCENT (9AF) but in PAD 06-09 this became 9AF (AFCENT).\textsuperscript{76}

Continuing along the path of historical ties, Gen Moseley went one-step further and decided against creating completely new staffs for the component construct. Instead, he retained the structure already in-place by having a MAJCOM or NAF dual purposed as a Component Command.\textsuperscript{77} As described in the last chapter, the USAF had conducted operations in this manner since the establishment of the Component Command requirements in the mid-1980s.

This observation is not to say the development team abandoned everything from Change 2. The primary ideals of the C-MAJCOM and C-NAF remained intact. However, rather than defining the principles of how the USAF would create the new organizations, PAD 06-09 provided the means to modify an old structure.\textsuperscript{78} The old structures had retained their historic MAJCOM ties and had received years of neglect due to their place in the USAF hierarchy. These were the same old structures produced the staffs for OpDS and OAF that had motivated Gen Jumper to call for the change in the first place. While the constraints caused by PBD 720 are understandable, by making this decision, Gen Moseley began the devolution of the concept towards the original 2002 CONOP. In doing so, Gen Moseley created the root cause for the issues the USAF has today with the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept.

The effects of the name and dual hatting changes also forced the development team to adjust the requirements for a balanced staff and timely response to conduct operations. As the old MAJCOM and NAF

\textsuperscript{75} Braun, Interview.
\textsuperscript{76} HQ USAF PAD 06-09, 1.
\textsuperscript{77} HQ USAF PAD 06-09, 3.
staffs needed to transform to the new mission, PAD 06-09 provided specific details on the type of manning the AFFOR staff needed to achieve balance. As previously mentioned, the staff used the A1-A9 structure. Of the nine divisions, the preponderance of the rated manning resided in the A3 and A5 staffs. To ensure the two staffs were capable of conducting operations across the ROMO, PAD 06-09 states, “will be staffed with a cross-function of AFSCs as needed for mission accomplishment. Manning numbers will be sized for the scale of mission activity in the Component NAF’s AOR.” This direction provided each staff with the flexibility to tailor its organizations. Ideally, this would have driven the staffs to include rated manning from the fighter, bomber, mobility, space, and now cyber operations. Unfortunately, the MAJCOM and NAFs mostly retained manning similar to their host-MAJCOMs, something that would affect their ability to support operations.

The last element to discuss is the effects on the timely execution of contingency operations. With the proper mix of AFSCs that are trained and deployable, the staffs maintain a core capability at all times. However, because the staffs were once again dual-hatted, the development team reinserted a specified period to transition from day-to-day organize, train, and equip operations to contingency operations. As a result, the development team stated the transition should take no more than 72 hours, up from the 48 hours provided in the 2002 CONOP.

With the implementation direction provided in PAD 06-09, the MAJCOMs began developing their Program Plans. At the same time, HAF/A1 continued working through the solutions for PBD 720 and the 2006 CSAF memo calling for the reorganization of the MAJCOMs.

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78 Mr. Gilbert Braun, Senior Strategy and Policy Analyst HAF/A5XS, to the author, e-mail, 20 Apr 2012.
79 HQ USAF PAD 06-09, A-II-7, 8.
80 HQ USAF PAD 06-09, 6.
Combined, these efforts should have restructured the Air Force in order to “become more efficient in the management structures and procedures.” However, by the spring of 2007, it became clear that HAF/A1 and the MAJCOMs were failing to meet the expectations of Gen Moseley. HAF/A1 focused their attention on eliminating the 40,000 personnel required in PBD 720 and did very little to consolidate the MAJCOMs. The MAJCOMs worked diligently to implement the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept as detailed in PAD 06-09; however, their plans did not integrate with the greater consolidation plans of the Air Force.

In response to the unfocused efforts, then Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force (VCSAF) Gen John Corley directed three staffing requirements through a Jun 2007 memorandum. First, the VCSAF directed PACAF and USAFE to conduct a study to determine all non-component related functions their staff performed. Once identified, the memorandum directed HAF/A1 to distribute these functions and the associated staff billets to either the appropriate lead command or FOAs. The MAJCOMs could use any additional positions not needed at the lead command/FOA to fill the new positions required to execute PAD 06-09. The goal of these staffing requirements was to drive PACAF and USAFE away from duplicating oversight functions of specific programs, e.g. C-130 tactics issues already worked by AMC. These actions would eliminate USAFE and PACAF as MAJCOMs, freeing the organizations to focus solely on their new roles and responsibilities as the C-MAJCOM with their subordinate C-NAF.

Simultaneously, the VCSAF memo directed the Air Staff and the other MAJCOMs to identify the additional manpower and staff requirements needed to assume the role of a Lead-MAJCOM (L-

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82 Corley, Memorandum.
MAJCOM). A L-MAJCOM was later be defined as an organization serving as the focal point for all organize, train, equip and management functions for a specific USAF functional area. As an example, AMC was the L-MAJCOM for all functions relating to mobility forces. Additionally, the memo directed the Air Staff and MAJCOMs to identify all the elements within the MAJCOM that performed BOS functions. Once the staffs accomplished both actions, the VCSAF directed the staffs to identify which functions and positions to retain for the new L-MAJCOMs responsibilities and which functions to transfer to the new FOAs overseeing the BOS functions. These efforts allowed L-MAJCOMs, to focus on their organize, train, equip, and management responsibilities for their functional areas. Unfortunately, the Air Force designated the five L-MAJCOMS as C-MAJCOMs. Therefore, the role of the L-MAJCOM added another layer of responsibility that degraded the C-MAJCOMs’ ability to focus on the needs of the CCDR.

The final task directed the Air Staff and the functional experts to take all of the inputs for the BOS functions and create appropriate FOAs. The VCSAF directed the creation of new FOAs to enable the USAF to consolidate as many BOS responsibilities as needed under a single organization. Once consolidated the FOA became the single voice, providing guidance and oversight, to the entire USAF with respect to a specific functional area. Once the staffs determined the new organizations needed, they would produce a new PAD and update the appropriate Air Force Instructions to create the organizations.

If executed properly, these three tasks would lead to the third major USAF reorganization since its inception. Streamlining the USAF

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84 Corley, Memorandum.
85 Corley, Memorandum.
would allow the appropriate expertise to focus on one specific function and provide USAF-level wide guidance. The staffs would be smaller and more focused on their one area of expertise, vice spread throughout the USAF providing conflicting guidance. To manage the new consolidation program, the CSAF once again leaned on HAF/A5XS, charging them to lead the AFFOR C2 Enabling Task Force. Over the next six months the task force created, staffed, and finalized PAD 07-13.86

**PAD 07-13**

On 25 January 2008, Gen Moseley signed PAD 07-13, providing the final major evolutionary step for the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. Unlike the previous changes described in this Chapter, PAD 07-13 did not address all of the major areas of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. Instead, the PAD focused primarily on the changes to the management headquarters roles and responsibilities as affected by the USAF consolidation initiative. Within this realm, facets touched on the need for a balanced staff and timely execution of operations, but they were not significant enough to discuss in detail. Outside of the normal three focus areas, PAD 07-13 re-emphasized the importance the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept plays in developing Airman at the operational-level of war.

The primary objective of PAD 07-13 was to create a holistic plan to implement the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2, PAD 06-09, and the VCSAF Consolidation directive.87 In an effort to standardize the USAF and the Component organizations, PAD 07-13 focused on the refinement of the roles and responsibilities of the L-MAJCOM and its delineation from the newly defined C-MAJCOM.

The role of the C-MAJCOM had slowly evolved throughout the development and implementation of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept.

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86 Braun, Interview.
First found in Change 1, Gen Jumper had directed the CC-WFHQ to develop the position to retain the 4-star MAJCOM/CC in the operational chain of command. Next in Change 2, the role of the C-MAJCOM had grown when the development team had added a small staff to the then named AFCHQ. By the time the CSAF approved PAD 06-09, the AFCHQs name had changed to C-MAJCOM forever tying the organization to the historical USAF structure.

During the coordination and development of PAD 07-13, the C-MAJCOM took its final development step, growing into its central role in the Case 1 structures (See Figure 5). Under the new construct, the C-MAJCOM became “the senior component headquarters, responsible for supporting the JFC across all phases of a joint campaign.”88 In this role, the C-MAJCOM Commander determined the best structure for both the C-MAJCOM and the C-NAF to conduct Phase 0-5 operations.89 Finally, the C-MAJCOM staffs required the proper structure, equipment, manning, and training to enable a rapid transition from steady state operations to contingency operations as the COMAFFOR, JFACC, and possibly the JTF/CC.90

To meet the new requirements the task force authorized the C-MAJCOM to create its own complete A-Staff. With the second A-Staff in the Component Command operational chain of command, PAD 07-13 created two redundant and competing headquarters that both worked to meet the needs of the CCDR. One staff focused on the strategic level collocated with the senior USAF representative. A second staff focused on the operational level, receiving its guidance from the C-MAJCOM Commander vice the CCDR. This new structure diluted the role of the C-

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87 HQ USAF PAD 07-13, 2.
88 HQ USAF PAD 07-13, 16.
89 The Phases of Operations are: Shape, Deter, Seize, Dominate, Stabilize the Initiative, and Enable Civil Authority. HQ USAF PAD 07-13, 15.
NAF, taking away the focus on the AFFOR staff and the AOC and weakening the overall component command structure. This change served as the final step in the path to overall ineffectiveness of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept, as it exists today. (Figure 8)

Outside of the three standard focus areas, PAD 07-13 re-emphasized the importance of the operational-level and the role the Component Command plays in it. Similar to verbiage found in Change 1 and Change 2, PAD 07-13 continued to promote the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept as a means to push the USAF towards the operational-level of war. Creating and training the AFFOR staff and the AOC to support the CCDR across the full ROMO develops Airman that plan, understand, and execute at the operational level.

If an airman works at the C-NAF level as a Major or Lieutenant Colonel and then later at the C-MAJCOM level as a Colonel or General, that Airman develops the skills and understanding of the operational level better than those who have not worked on the staffs. With the experience, these Airmen understand how to lead forces at the operational level. These Airman are then better suited to one day return to senior leadership positions within the C-MAJCOM or C-NAF. As part of this, PAD 07-13 emphasizes the importance of placing skilled officers on the leadership path into the C-NAF and C-MAJCOM staffs. This emphasis is an attempt to break away from the traditional staff matching the NAF’s have historically endured and pushes the top-rated officers to fill the staff billets.91

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90 HQ USAF PAD 07-13, 16-17.
91 General Short indicated during his time as 16AF/CC and as CFACC for Operation ALLIED Force, his staff was not fully manned. Additionally, most of the staff members were not the top tier USAF officers. Short, Interview.
Gen Moseley directed the HAF/A3 to develop PAD 07-13 to enable the implementation of Change 2 and PAD 06-09 through the consolidation of the MAJCOMs, FOAs, and DRUs. Within PAD 07-13, the Task Force provided the guidance and the foundation to conduct the CSAF’s directives. Unfortunately, as demonstrated throughout the history of the concept, in execution the PAD fell far short of its goals. First, the MAJCOM, FOA, and agency consolidation never occurred to the level envisioned by the Task Force hold. While there are some consolidated functional areas scattered throughout the USAF, for the most part the consolidation did not occur.92

Second, USAFE and PACAF shed some MAJCOM roles, but for the most part, they exist today as an organization conducting both organize, train, and equip and Component operations. Finally, the move to provide the C-MAJCOM with a complete functional A-Staff to support CCDR,
operations added an unneeded and ineffective layer of bureaucracy. This bureaucracy layer affected the C-NAFs ability to provide direct support to the CCDR, produced tension between the staffs, and created redundancies in the system.93

Summary

PAD 07-13 brought the concept envisioned by Gen Jumper full circle. After five years of coordination, development, and consternation the USAF looked nearly the same as it did in 2002. The Component organizations were standardized in the fact that they were all dual-hatted, forcing them to split their time among USAF and Component responsibilities. Their staffs remained stove piped, lacking the balance to operate effectively across the full ROMO. Finally, the lack of balance combined with the dual responsibilities left the staff unable to seamlessly transition to full-scale contingency operations. In the end, outside of a fancier name and better guidance, they were no different from the organizations that supported OpDS and OAF.

92 Braun, Interview.
93 Braun, Interview.
Chapter 3: The Concept in Practice

Despite eight years of concept development, coordination, and constant change, the USAF changed little because of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the shortfalls of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept and provide the information for the analysis in Chapter 4. To meet the purpose, this chapter is broken down into two areas of focus. The chapter starts by focusing on the overall organizational structure of 12AF (AFSOUTH). This area provides an understanding of 12AF (AFSOUTH) mission focus created by their dual roles as a NAF for ACC and as the Component Command for US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Additionally, this area provides insight into the personnel manning of both the leadership and staff positions within 12AF (AFSOUTH) prior to OpUR.

The second area of focus details OpUR itself and is broken into three parts. The first part provides the background and organizational structure of OpUR. The background provides an understanding about Haiti and the events leading up to OpUR. The organizational structure details the initial response by USSOUTHCOM and their creation of Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H). The second part describes the USAF elements outside of 12AF (AFSOUTH) that provided the initial response forces to enable operations. These elements include USAF Special Operations Forces (SOF), USAF Contingency Response Groups (CRG), and the Regional Air Movement Coordination Center (RAMCC). The final part details the actual 12AF (AFSOUTH) response in support of OpUR. This part of the chapter includes the creation of the 12th Air Expeditionary Task Force (12 AETF). It includes the eventual utilization of an Air Component Coordination Element to liaise with JTF-H. Finally, it discusses the complications experienced creating the Request for Forces
(RFF) and the Time-Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD).

**12AF (AFSOUTH)**

In 1942, as part of the build-up for WWII, the AAF activated the 12AF at Bolling Field. Since its inception, 12AF has remained a NAF providing both operational command and later OT&E functions in support of bombers, fighter, and air-to-ground operations. In 1987, due to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 12AF gained the additional responsibility as AFSOUTH. Since then, 12AF (AFSOUTH) has remained a dual-hatted command. That is, 12AF (AFSOUTH) is ADCON to ACC and OPCON to US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).¹

Under its ACC hat, 12AF serves as one of two NAFs in the MAJCOM. The 12AF mission is to “provide combat ready forces to ACC, train and equip ten active duty combat wings and one RED HORSE Squadron.”² Additionally, 12AF provides standardization/evaluation (stan/eval) and safety oversight to nineteen Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Wings.³ The command focuses on conventional fighter, bomber, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) employment ensuring worldwide employment capability. In all, 12AF provides oversight to over 73,900 personnel and 680 combat aircraft.⁴

As AFSOUTH, the organization serves as the air component to USSOUTHCOM. In this role, AFSOUTH’s mission is “to conduct Air Force, joint, and combined air and space operations in addition to information operations in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.”⁵ The USSOUTHCOM AOR includes Central America, South America, and the

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³ 12AF (AFSOUTH) does not provide train and equip functions for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard wings.
⁴ Twelfth Air Force and Air Forces Southern Fact Sheet
⁵ Twelfth Air Force and Air Forces Southern Fact Sheet
Caribbean. While this is a large and diverse AOR, from an Air Force perspective these countries lack a significant air presence. Some countries maintain fighter aircraft; however, the preponderance of the countries rely on helicopter and small airlift platforms to provide mobility and logistics support to their ground elements. As a result, the primary emphasis of AFSOUTH is Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) to include leadership engagements, humanitarian assistance (HA), exchange programs, and exercise. To support the mission, AFSOUTH primarily employs ISR, intra-theater airlift, and information asset through four forward operating locations.

From an organizational perspective, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) structure consists of a Headquarters (HQ) staff, an AFFOR staff, and the 612 AOC. The HQ staff includes the 3-star Commanding General (CG), a 1-star Vice Commander, a Command Chief, and the CG's special staff. 12AF (AFSOUTH)’s AFFOR staff follows the general guidelines of the A1-A9 construct as detailed in PADs 06-09. There are slight variations within the individual directorates but nothing out of the ordinary. Meanwhile, in-line with PAD 06-09 the 612 AOC contains the required five AOC divisions.

To get a clearer picture of the overall organizational structure, one must understand the operational experience on the staff. As previously stated, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) AOR mission requirements revolve more around logistics, mobility, and HA issues rather than combat forces. Despite this fact, 12 AF (AFSOUTH) is administratively owned by ACC.

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6 Maj Gen Darryl Burke (Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), interview by the author, 11 April 2012.
7 Twelfth Air Force and Air Forces Southern Fact Sheet
8 The HQ/special staff contains 155 total billets. In addition to the CC, CV, and CMS the staff includes the Judge Advocate, Historian, Public Affairs, Financial Management, Force Protection, Administration, Knowledge Management, Protocol, Political Advisor, Chief of Staff, Inspector General, Stan/Eval, Safety, and Surgeon General. 12AF (AFSOUTH) Unit Manning Document, 24 April 2012.
Therefore, historically ACC fills the Commander and Vice Commander billets with general officers from fighter backgrounds.9

During OpUR, the rated manning among the 12AF (AFSOUTH) leadership provides a glimmer of diversity. At the time of the earthquake itself, Lt Gen Glenn Spears was the Commander. Unlike most of his predecessors, he was not a career fighter pilot. Instead, his background contained a diverse mix of aerial refueling, special air mission airlift, and significant bomber experiences.10 His deputy during the crisis was Brig Gen Darryl Burke, a Command Navigator with extensive background within the ISR realm.11 As for the rest of the AFFOR staff and the AOC rated leadership, focus returned to the ACC-centric realities.12 Outside of the AMD Chief, ACC filled the remaining O-6 positions in the AFFOR staff and AOC with ACC-centric personnel.

Digging deeper, the rated mobility manning in the AFFOR staff and AOC was heavily weighted towards ACC-centric personnel. (See Figures 1 and 2) Within the entire AFFOR staff, there are four mobility billets as compared to 53 ACC-centric billets. Of the four mobility billets, three are in the A3 and one is in stan/eval. This means there are no mobility billets in the A5 or A8 divisions to provide support to Programs, Operational Plans and Strategy, or Strategic Planning. When OpUR began, there were no personnel filling the four mobility billets, leaving a clear void on the staff.

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9 Of the twelve 12AF (AFSOUTH) CGs since 1993, all but one has had a fighter background. HQ USAFSOUTH/A9L Commander Linage Spreadsheet, 2 May 2012.
10 Lt Gen Spears flew KC-135 early in his career and later was the Wing Commander at Mildenhall AB. He was also the Wing Commander for the 89 Airlift Wing, responsible for supporting Presidential, Vice Presidential, Congressional, and CSAF airlift movement requirements. Additionally, he flew both the B-52 and B-1 to include commanding units at the Squadron and Group level. USAF Biographies, Lt Gen Glenn Spears, http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=7214.
11 Burke, Interview.
12 ACC-Centric means rated positions with Fighter, Bomber, or Air Battle Managers background. Additionally, due to the ACC ties, USAF fills a majority of the General Pilot and Rated Staff Officer billets with ACC-centric personnel.
In the AOC, there are nine permanent rated mobility billets all within the Air Mobility Division (AMD). Assuming the USAF filled all nine billets, it only provides the 612 AOC with the minimum personnel to perform the core AMD duties during the initial phase of a contingency. Any expansion from these core duties would require augmentation from outside of 12AF (AFSOUTH). During OpUR, there were seven personnel filling the nine billets in the AOC, one of which was the AMD Chief.\(^\text{13}\)

With regard to the 12AF (AFSOUTH) ISR rated manning, the story is not much different. There is only one ISR-rated officer billet on the AFFOR staff.\(^\text{14}\) Fortunately, there was an officer filling the lone ISR billet at the start of OpUR. Additionally, the AFFOR staff benefited greatly from having Brig Gen Burke as the Vice Commander. Within the AOC, the ISR Division (ISRD) contained a diverse compliment of intelligence personnel, but not one single rated billet.

Summarizing, in a mobility and ISR-centric operation, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) contained nine mobility and ISR rated personnel combined. Of these nine, two were in critical leadership positions unable to perform the action officer duties. Six were located in the AOC, unable to support planning and operations due to their own mission responsibilities. This left the AFFOR staff with one ISR and no mobility officers, a fact that proved costly during operations.

\(^{13}\) Col John Romero, USAF (Ret.), Retired as the AMD Chief, 612 AOC, to the author, e-mail, 22 May 2012.

\(^{14}\) The AFFOR A2 contained several intelligence personnel with ISR experience but no rated manning. Col Bryon Mathewson, USAF (Ret.), Retired as the ISRD Chief, 612 AOC, to the author, e-mail, 17 May 2012.
Figure 7. AFFOR Staff Operational Billets. Derived from 12AF (AFSOUTH) Unit Manning Document, 24 April 2012.

Figure 8. 612 AOC Operational Billets. Derived from 12AF (AFSOUTH) Unit Manning Document, 24 April 2012.
Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE: Background and Organization

Haiti, a small Caribbean Island, is the poorest nation within the Western Hemisphere with over 80% of its population living in poverty.\textsuperscript{15} On 12 January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck 15 miles southwest of Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince. Before the earthquake, Haiti suffered from poor infrastructure, poor nutrition, and an ineffective political system. The devastating earthquake only amplified these issues as it affected over 30% of Haiti’s population. The earthquake destroyed or damaged 53% of the dwellings in Port-au-Prince, to include 60% of the overall government infrastructure. Additionally, the earthquake destroyed the seaport, leaving it inoperable. The lack of a seaport left the Toussaint L’Ouverture International Airport (MTTP), located in Port-au-Prince, as the only point of debarkation to which agencies could deliver relief supplies.\textsuperscript{16} However, a lack of power and a severely damaged control tower prevented the Haitian Government from using the airfield. In the end, the earthquake caused over 230,000 deaths and over 197,000 injuries, making the earthquake one of the most devastating natural disasters in history.\textsuperscript{17}

The severity of the event combined with the pre-existing ineffectiveness of the Haitian Government drove the Haitian President to request assistance from the US Government and the international community at-large. In response, on 13 January 2010, US President Barack Obama pledged full US support and appointed the US Agency for International Development (US AID) as the lead agency. To support US

\textsuperscript{16} MTTP contained a single operational runway with a single taxiway and one parking ramp located at midfield. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command Analysis, Assessments and Lessons Learned (HQ AFSOC/A9L), Lessons Learned from AFSOF Support to Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, 24 September 2010, 6.
\textsuperscript{17} Briefing, Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), subject: Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Haiti Earthquake Response, 15 May 2010, Slide 12.
AID, President Obama named USSOUTHCOM as the supported military command to lead the Department of Defense efforts. In response, USSOUTHCOM established JTF-H as the lead military command in support of OpUR.\textsuperscript{18}

USSOUTHCOM is responsible for security cooperation, contingency planning, operations, and engagement in South and Central America and the Caribbean. At the time of the crisis, the USSOUTHCOM staff contained over 1,000 joint personnel. USSOUTHCOM organized their personnel within six functional directorates, with a focus on theater engagements.\textsuperscript{19} The functionally aligned directorates were different from the traditional J-staff construct used by the Joint Staff and the other UCCs.

The unusual USSOUTHCOM structure played a significant role in the command’s initial response for OpUR. First, USSOUTHCOM did not maintain a standard J5 Directorate. A standard J5 organization would have been responsible for maintaining a HA/DR contingency plan (CONPLAN) to include a bi-annual review. A plan of this nature would detail how USSOUTHCOM planned to respond to a crisis including tasks and functions for each of its Component Commands. The plan would include the TPFDD that detailed the personnel and equipment needed to support the HA/DR operation. Finally, the plan would include a Joint Manning Document (JMD) that detailed the joint personnel requirements to support both USSOUTHCOM and the JTF headquarters.\textsuperscript{20}

Second, the unusual structure meant USSOUTHCOM did not maintain a standard J3 Directorate. If USSOUTHCOM had maintained a normal J3, when the earthquake hit the J3 would have followed one of

\textsuperscript{18} JCOA, Briefing, Slide 24.
\textsuperscript{19} United States Southern Command, Factsheet, http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/About-Us.aspx.
two paths. First, if USSOUTHCOM had maintained an HA/DR CONPLAN, the J3 would have used it as a starting point. The CONPLAN would have provided the J3 the planned and coordinated template to initiate USSOUTHCOM’s initial response. This would have enabled USSOUTHCOM and its Components a running start to support OpUR. However, since USSOUTHCOM did not have a CONPLAN, the J3 would have progressed down the second path. The staff, in coordination with its Component, would have developed a crisis action plan in order to provide the CCDR with execution options.

Away from the planning aspects, the J3 would have provided the real-time execution oversight of all operations. In addition, the J3 would develop any additional RFFs, and produced all directives and orders for the operation. Simply, the structural deficiencies left USSOUTHCOM scrambling to properly plan and execute an immediate crisis response. The lack of structure and CONPLAN severely impacted the overall mission effectiveness.

Five days into the operation, USSOUTHCOM recognized its shortfall and reorganized its staff along the J-staff construct. Utilizing the J1-J9 structure, USSOUTHCOM realigned the staff into the appropriate agencies while supporting OpUR. The new alignment was more effective, but it exposed an additional shortcoming. The staff did not contain the experience in crisis action planning, logistics, mobility operations, or HA/DR required to support OpUR. To fix the issue, the DoD augmented USSOUTHCOM with a number of staff personnel to include eight Flag/General Officers. The new structure and staff allowed USSOUTHCOM to conduct 24-hour operations and provide the oversight and guidance required for the contingency.

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20 JTF-H started with 79 personnel from the SJFHQ and grew to 359 with the arrival of the ACP and other Liaison personnel. JCOA, Briefing, Slides 70-79.
21 JCOA, Briefing, Slides 47-50.
When the earthquake struck Haiti, Lt Gen Jack Keen, US Army and the USSOUTHCOM Deputy Commander, was on the ground in Haiti. He immediately began working with US Embassy personnel and the Haitian Government to organize the US response. Soon after, USSOUTHCOM sent their Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) element to Haiti. The SJFHQ supported Lt Gen Keen as he began to organize the JTF-H staff. Two days after the earthquake, USAF Gen Douglas M. Fraser, the Commander USSOUTHCOM, officially ordered the creation of JTF-H and selected Lt Gen Keen as the Commander. Due to the lack of a pre-existing CONPLAN and JMD, Lt Gen Keen worked through US Army channels to request the XVIII Airborne Corps Assault Command Post (ACP). The personnel from the ACP augmented by the SJFHQ personnel provided the core element of JTF-H staff. This core element of mostly US Army personnel lacked significant USAF presence throughout the operation. As a matter of fact, until 12AF (AFSOUTH) deployed the Air Component Command Element (ACCE) eleven days after the earthquake, there was no direct link between JTF-H and the Air Component.

**Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE: The Initial Response**

During the three to four days it took USSOUTHCOM to restructure and establish JTF-H, they were actively engaged in the initial US response. Immediately after the earthquake, USSOUTHCOM began developing the crisis action plan and coordinating with their Component Commands. As the USAF Component 12AF (AFSOUTH) immediately jumped into action, it activated its AFFOR Battle Staff and supported the crisis action plan development. Fortunately, all of the 12AF (AFSOUTH)
senior leaders were in the US to provide the oversight and direction to the AFFOR staff and the AOC.\textsuperscript{23} Unfortunately, the lack of an on-the-shelf CONPLAN and the lack of operational balance on the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff severely impacted their ability to immediately transition to support the contingency operation. In response, USSOUTHCOM and 12AF (AFSOUTH) coordinated with US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), USTRANSCOM, and US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) for immediate assistance.

The first organization to provide immediate assistance was USSOCOM. In order to begin the flow of supplies and personnel to support the HA effort, the airport had to be reopened. To provide this capability, USSOCOM tasked the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) to prepare a first responder force. While USSOUTHCOM prepared the official RFF, AFSOC proceeded with preparations through Verbal Order of the Commander (VOCO). Within hours, AFSOC directed the 1st Special Operations Group (SOG) to prepare for deployment with the requirements to “secure, open and control the airfield; provide critical medical capabilities; conduct lifesaving search and rescue missions; establish stable communications; provide intelligence data; and synchronize aerial port efforts until follow-on sustainment forces arrived.”\textsuperscript{24}

With the VOCO and clear guidance, AFSOC launched the first MC-130H Combat Talon mission to Haiti. At 0900 EST, the first Talon landed at MTTP delivering Col Albert “Buck” Elton, 28 Air Commandos from the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron, a robust communication suite,

\textsuperscript{23} Lt Gen Spears typically spent over 280 days a year on Temporary Duty away from the 12AF (AFSOUTH) Headquarters. Burke, Interview.

\textsuperscript{24} HQ AFSOC/A9L, AFSOF Lessons Learned, 6.
and 6 SOF security forces personnel. Col Elton was the first USAF Commander on the ground in Haiti. Officially designated by USSOCOM as the commander of all SOF forces in Haiti, Col Elton served multiple roles. Despite the lack of specific tasking Col Elton and the Air Commandos assumed the responsibility as the Senior Airfield Authority (SAA). Amazingly, within 28 minutes of the first Talon landing the initial response force secured the airfield, established communications, and began controlling.

In the first two days, AFSOC flew several missions into Haiti delivering additional SOF personnel, supplies, and equipment. Once established, the SOF forces supported up to 50 aircraft arrivals per day using nothing but a handheld radio, a card table, paper, and a forklift. In addition, the SOF forces oversaw the evacuation process, provided critical medical care, provided security details to several distinguished visitors, and surveyed multiple drop and landing zones throughout Haiti. In the end, the first responders executed operations for 15 days at MTTP directing 2,222 fixed-wing and 800 rotary-wing flights while support over 50 nations, all with zero mishaps. It is safe to say that without the actions of AFSOC and the SOF personnel in Haiti during the critical initial hours, the mission would not have been as successful for the US Government.

The second organization to provide immediate assistance was USTRANSCOM. Knowing the AFSOC forces only provided short-term support to the airfield, USSOUTHCOM and 12AF (AFSOUTH) turned to

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25 HQ AFSOC/A9L, AFSOF Lessons Learned, 6-7.
26 The Senior Airfield Authority is the organization, typically a Component Command, which is responsible for all the management and control functions supporting airfield operations. The CCDR assigns an SAA for each airfields utilized within an AOR.
27 Under normal operations Haiti Operations, MTTP supported 20-30 flights per day. An aircraft arrival per day includes arrival, cargo handling, and departure. JCOA, Brief, Slide 88.
28 HQ AFSOC/A9L, AFSOF Lessons Learned, 7-8
USTRANSCOM. In response, USTRANSCOM launched elements of its Joint Task Force – Port Opening (JTF-PO) capability. USSOUTHCOM used the JTF-PO element to bridge the gap between SOF personnel and the follow-on USAF forces obtained through the Global Force Management (GFM) process.\(^{29}\)

The JTF-PO incorporated a USAF CRG and a US Army Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE). The CRG component operates the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) to control, manage, and unload aircraft upon arrival. Once the cargo is unloaded, the RPOE works to distribute the relief supplies away from the APOD as fast as possible. For Haiti, a second RPOE, focused on seaport of debarkation (SPOD) operations, worked to repair the damaged Port-au-Prince seaport.\(^{30}\)

As stated, the USAF element in the JTF-PO construct is the CRG. CRGs deploy anywhere in the world to provide a rapid APOD opening capability. USTRANSCOM maintains six total CRGs worldwide, with two of the stateside CRGs on 24-hour alert. The CRG itself contains mobility aviators, logisticians, security forces, contracting and finance agents, and other personnel needed to create and maintain an APOD for 45-60 days. By design, a CRG is prepared to support follow-on operations within 24 hours of arrival.\(^{31}\)

On 13 January, USTRANSCOM placed the 817th CRG on alert. On the morning of 14 January, USTRANSCOM ordered the 817th CRG to deploy to MTTP to support OpUR. Arriving later that day, the 817th CRG, led by Col Patrick Hollrah, combined with the 688nd RPOE formed

\(^{29}\) A JTF-PO will rapidly establish and initially operate aerial port of debarkation and seaport of debarkation to establish distribution node and facilitate logistical throughput with in a theater of operations. The JTF-PO is worldwide deployable and designed to operate across the range of military operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*, 2 October 2009, II-11.


\(^{31}\) JP 3-17, II-13.
Haiti’s JTF-PO. Col Hollrah represented the second USAF O-6 on the ground in Haiti and the second USAF O-6 who was not OPCON to JTF-H. Once the CRG established their operating capability, they assumed all SAA functions except air traffic control from the AFSOC forces.\footnote{There were qualified ATC personnel within the CRW, however, the personnel assigned to the 817 CRG were now current. Maj Gen Timothy Zadalis (Director HQ AETC A2/3/10), interview by the author, 23 April 2012.} The assumption of responsibility by the CRG allowed the AFSOC personnel to shift their focus away from MTTP and out to support drop zones and helicopter landing zones. The CRG remained in place for 38 days until the 12AF (AFSOUTH) RFF could be approved and those forces could be deployed. In the 38 days, the 817th CRG managed over 6,000 sorties, offloaded 31 million pounds of cargo, and oversaw the evacuation of 15,500 American citizens.\footnote{In addition to the 817 CRG, USTRANSCOM deployed the 572 CRG to San Isidro International Airport, Santa Domingo, Dominican Republic and a smaller Contingency Response Team to Maria Montez Airfield, Barahona, Dominican Republic. These airfields provided additional cargo capability into the AOR to support operations in Haiti. Headquarters, Air Mobility Command Director for Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned (HQ AMC/A9), \emph{Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE AMC Lessons Learned Report}, 2010, 8.}

The third organization to provide immediate assistance was USNORTHCOM, which provided the RAMCC. As a result of the sheer devastation of the earthquake, the world immediately began sending food, supplies, personnel and equipment to Haiti. With the seaport destroyed, MTTP offered the only suitable port of entry to deliver the material. As a result, in the first two days multiple unscheduled flights began to arrive into MTTP. AFSOC and CRG personnel worked to accommodate as many flights as possible. However, the limited capabilities on the ground delayed several flights and in some cases prevented flights from landing.\footnote{601 Air and Space Operations Center/Air Mobility Division (601 AOC/AMD), \emph{Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center After Action Report (AAR)}, February 2010, 5.} 12AF (AFSOUTH) quickly realized they...
needed to establish a RAMCC.\textsuperscript{35}

Officially used for the first time during OAF, the roots of the RAMCC trace back to the Hump and the Berlin Airlift. Then Lt Gen William Tunner managed the flow of airlift, using time and space deconfliction, to maximize the flow of cargo over the Hump and into Berlin. Today, a RAMCC has two primary responsibilities, airspace and airflow management. Airspace management refers to the deconfliction of traffic in the absence of an official airspace structure. Airflow management refers to managing inbound and outbound airflow at a specific airfield.\textsuperscript{36}

While the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff recognized the need to establish a RAMCC, they did not have the personnel or expertise to create one expeditiously. With the AMD only manned with seven personnel to perform the normal operations, 12AF (AFSOUTH) and USSOUTHCOM turned to USNORTHCOM for help. In response, USNORTHCOM authorized First Air Force (Air Forces Northern) (1AF (AFNORTH)) to provide support to 12AF (AFSOUTH) through their RAMCC located within the 601 AOC/AMD. On 14 January, the two organizations determined the 601st AOC would support RAMCC operations until the 612 AOC/AMD could RFF and train the personnel to run their own RAMCC. Additionally, the 601st AOC provided the 612 AOC/AMD with two liaison officers to coordinate operations and provide guidance to establish the new RAMCC.\textsuperscript{37} The 601st RAMCC immediately began monitoring

\textsuperscript{35} In late 2009, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) AFFOR staff participated in a Blue Flag 10-1. During this exercise, the staff learned about the RAMCC concept as a means to enable airflow in and out of their AOR. Based on these lessons, the AFFOR staff understood how a RAMCC helped alleviate the MTTP control issues in Haiti. Burke, Interview.

\textsuperscript{36} 601 AOC/AMD AAR, 8.

\textsuperscript{37} 1AF (AFNORTH) created a full time RAMCC within the 601 AOC in response to lessons learned during its support of the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. 601 AOC/AMD AAR, 8.
operations at MTTP and Homestead Air Reserve Base.\textsuperscript{38}

Despite the fact that the agreement was now in-place, the 601st RAMCC had no authority to manage the airspace and airflow into Haiti. To alleviate the problem, members from the Department of State, JTF-H, 12AF (AFSOUTH) and 1AF (AFNORTH) began working with the Government of Haiti on a memorandum of understanding. Initially, the Haitian Government showed concern over a US military organization controlling the airflow into MTTP. The Haitian Government wanted assurance that all nations, regardless of their relationship with the US, could gain authorization into MTTP.\textsuperscript{39}

In order to diminish the concerns the US agreed to two compromises. First, the 601st RAMCC was renamed the 601st Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center (HFOCC) to emphasize the center’s focus. Second, in order to prioritize the various international support efforts, the US agreed to add liaisons from the United Nations World Food Programme (UN/WFP) into the HFOCC. With the compromises established, Jean-Max Bellerive, the Prime Minister of Haiti, signed the memorandum of understanding on 15 January. Soon after receiving the approval and after working with the AFSOC and CRG personnel, the 601st HFOCC increased the number of aircraft into MTTP from 50 arrivals per day to 150 arrivals per day.\textsuperscript{40}

The 601st HFOCC served as the nerve center for all airflow operations into Haiti until the 612 AOC/AMD was ready to conduct the HFOCC mission on 22 February. In the 39 days the 601st HFOCC ran the mission, they completed nearly 5,000 transactions with only two diverts. In addition, they supported the emergency evacuation of over

\textsuperscript{38} Homestead Air Reserve Base, located outside of Miami, FL, became the primary staging base of humanitarian relief supplies and equipment coming from the US.
\textsuperscript{39} 601 AOC/AMD AAR, 17.
\textsuperscript{40} 601 AOC/AMD AAR, 12-18.
21,000 American Citizens. Once the 612th HFOCC obtained control of the airspace and airflow management operations continued to run smoothly. Finally, on 15 March 2010 the airspace and airflow management returned to Haitian control.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE: 12AF (AFSOUTH) Response}

The forces provided by USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, and USNORTHCOM gave 12AF (AFSOUTH) the time needed to conduct crisis action planning. From the planning, 12AF (AFSOUTH) derived three requirements to support OpUR. First, 12AF (AFSOUTH) created the 12th Air Expeditionary Task Force (12 AETF) with two subordinate Air Expeditionary Groups (AEG). The first AEG, designated the 24th AEG, provided oversight to five ground support squadrons needed to conduct operations in Haiti. The 474th AEG, already operational under 12AF (AFSOUTH), incorporated the established 35 Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (EAS) with two new Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadrons (ERS), the 922nd ERS and the 11th ERS.\textsuperscript{42} Second, the crisis action plan included the establishment of an ACCE to provide coordination between 12AF (AFSOUTH) and JTF-H. Finally, in order to obtain and deploy forces needed to support operations, the crisis action plan included the development of the RFF and TPFDD.

The first major component of the crisis action plan was the establishment of the 12th AETF and its subsequent AEGs. The USAF uses an AETF construct to provide ADCON over all USAF personnel assigned to a specific theater. In most cases, especially for large operations, the USAF designates the theater’s Component Commander as the AETF Commander. Subsequently, the Component Commander

\textsuperscript{41} 601 AOC/AMD AAR, 50-53.
\textsuperscript{42} The 35 EAS, contained four C-130s, aircrew, and support personnel providing intra-theater airlift in support of USSOUTHCOM operations. Burke, Interview.
has the authority to designate a subordinate AETF Commander to support specific JTFs or operations. In the case of OpUR, Lt Gen Spears decided to retain command of both the 12AF (AFSOUTH) and 12 AETF.\textsuperscript{43}

In anticipation of the creation of the 24th AEG, 12AF (AFSOUTH) sent an ADVON team to Haiti on 18 January.\textsuperscript{44} Col Dan Courtois, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) A4, whom Lt Gen Spears designated as the 24th AEG Commander, led the ADVON team.\textsuperscript{45} The arrival of Col Courtois represented the third USAF O-6 on the ground in Haiti and the third O-6 who was not OPCON to Lt Gen Keen as the JTF-H Commander. Despite the command relationships, the ADVON team coordinated with personnel from JTF-H, AFSOC, and JTF-PO to determine the duties the AEG would assume and the dates they needed to assume mission responsibility. Additionally, the ADVON team worked to establish beddown and support requirements for their personnel. After all of the coordination was complete, USSOUTHCOM officially approved the creation of the 24th AEG on 22 January, ten days after the earthquake. These forces were critical as they represented the long-term backfill to the AFSOC and JTF-PO personnel already in theater.\textsuperscript{46}

Since the 474th AEG and the 35th EAS already existed, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff did not have to wait for USSOUTHCOM approval. This enabled the staff to focus on requesting the assets for the two ERSs and determining their beddown locations. The 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff decided to maintain the 474th AEG headquarters and the 35th EAS in Puerto Rico. However, Puerto Rico was too far for the RC-26 of the 922nd ERS

\textsuperscript{43} Headquarters Air Forces Southern (HQ AFSOUTH/A9L), \textit{Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE After Action Report}, December 2010, 16.
\textsuperscript{44} The mission of the 24th AEG was to provide the command oversight to five different USAF expeditionary squadrons conducting ground operations in Haiti. The five squadrons provided support for medical services, air base operations, logistics, engineering, and security forces. HQ AFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 17-19.
\textsuperscript{45} HQ AFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 22.
\textsuperscript{46} HQ AFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 19.
and RQ-1 of the 11th ERS to fly from to conduct effective operations. Instead, due to the proximity to Haiti and the pre-established military relationships 12AF (AFSOUTH) chose the Dominican Republic as the final beddown location for both.\textsuperscript{47}

In order for 12AF (AFSOUTH) to conduct ISR operations from the Dominican Republic to support operations over Haiti, the staff had to acquire three approvals. First, due to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) restrictions on remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), 12AF (AFSOUTH) coordinated to obtain an “Emergency Certificate of Authorization.” The FAA required the authorization anytime the USAF flies RPAs, using the launch and recovery facilities outside of US Airspace. Second, due to International Civilian Aviation Organization procedures, the USAF had to obtain approval from the Dominican Republic and Haiti aviation authorities. The 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff obtained both approvals and established the two beddown locations within ten days of the earthquake.\textsuperscript{48}

The expeditious coordination by the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff was a result of two factors. The first factor was the excellent working relationship between the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff and the Air Force leadership in the Dominican Republic. Years of TSC engagements, through exercises and training events, led to an established working relationship between the key leadership. These relationships enabled the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff to work directly with the appropriate Dominican personnel to obtain approval.\textsuperscript{49}

The second factor was the personnel on the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff with ISR expertise. Between Brig Gen Burke, the ISR pilot on the AFFOR staff, and members of the ISRD, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff was well

\textsuperscript{47} Burke, Interview
\textsuperscript{48} HQ AFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 9.
\textsuperscript{49} HQ AFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 10.
versed in ISR operations.\textsuperscript{50} This allowed the staff to focus on the requirements needed to conduct ISR operations vice waiting for augmentation. In the end, the full motion video provided by the USAF ISR assets directly to the Government of Haiti, JTF-H, and other Non-Government Organizations provided an invaluable capability.\textsuperscript{51}

The second component of the crisis action plan was the establishment of an ACCE. Two specific factors contributed to Lt Gen Spears’ finally deploying an ACCE on 23 January, eleven days into the operation. First, the time and space continuum between 12AF (AFSOUTH) and JTF-H became an issue. As a result, Lt Gen Keen did not have a single point of contact to turn to in order to obtain USAF specific information. Similarly, Lt Gen Spears did not have a representative at JTF-H receiving direct guidance on Lt Gen Keen’s priorities and intent. Placing the ACCE in Haiti with the JTF-H staff alleviated both Generals’ concerns.\textsuperscript{52}

Second, having three different USAF O-6s in Haiti, each with overlapping responsibilities created friction. Early on, without the oversight of a senior airman, the determination of exactly which organization was responsible for a specific requirement caused problems. While each O-6 worked to support OpUR, having three different chains of command meant each O-6 had slightly different concerns and priorities. This blurred the line of responsibility and often led to confusion with Lt Gen Keen and his staff as to who was responsible for what. Despite the lack of any real command authority, sending an O-7 ACCE diminished the friction and provided the theater with the much-needed senior airman.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Burke, Interview.
\textsuperscript{51} HQ AFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 9.
\textsuperscript{52} Burke, Interview.
\textsuperscript{53} HQ USAFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 28.
Lt Gen Spear’s designated Brig Gen Darryl Burke, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) Vice Commander, as the ACCE. Having played an active role in the 12AF (AFSOUTH) response, Brig Gen Burke had an in-depth knowledge of the Haiti operations. To assist him with the ACCE duties, JTF-H authorized Brig Gen Burke a five person staff. Brig Gen Burke took the 612th AOC Deputy Director to coordinate with the AOC and serve as the ACCE Deputy. Recognizing a lack of media coverage, Brig Gen Burke selected a Public Affairs Officer to ensure the media reported on the USAF efforts in Haiti. Knowing he needed technical support, he selected a knowledge manager. Finally, recognizing airlift and ISR were the two primary missions, Lt Gen Spears selected an ISR and a mobility expert to round out the ACCE staff.

Brig Gen Burke was able to take four personnel required to support the ACCE mission directly from the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff. The lone exception was the mobility officer. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 12AF (AFSOUTH) had only seven mobility personnel on the entire staff, all located in the AMD. However, because the AMD was operating 24/7, the AMD Chief could not afford to lose any of the personnel. The lack of mobility personnel forced 12AF (AFSOUTH) to request AMC to deploy a mobility officer to support the ACCE.

While PAD 06-09 describes augmentation as a suitable if not required solution, it does come with a cost. The biggest issue is the augmentee has no idea how the organization works and has no working relationship with the rest of the staff. During a HA/DR operations, the staff has no extra time to waste. Therefore, the delay in deployment and in learning how the organization works seriously affects overall

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54 HQ USAFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 10.
55 Burke, Interview.
56 Burke, Interview.
effectiveness. This is not to say augmentation cannot work, it simply identifies the shortcomings of random augmentation vice utilizing a member of an existing staff. In the case of the 12AF (AFSOUTH) ACCE, the mobility augmentee arrived the day after the rest of the ACCE staff. While he was able to develop good working relationships, by the time he arrived in theater, the combined efforts of AFSOC, CRG, and AEG had already resolved most of the USAF mobility issues.\textsuperscript{58}

In order for the 12AF (AFSOUTH) to execute the crisis action plan, they needed to obtain the personnel to create the 24th AEG and augment its staff. 12AF (AFSOUTH) accomplished this by creating the RFF and TPFDD. The RFF and the TPFDD are two critical components of the DoD’s Global Force Management (GFM) process. A JTF, Component Command, or UCC develop the RFF. The RFF identifies the exact type and number of personnel and equipment needed to provide specific mission capabilities not already residing in theater. Once the requesting CCDR approves the RFF, the UCC staff sends the RFF to the Joint Staff (JS). At the JS, the GFM office coordinates the sourcing of the RFF with the appropriate service provider.\textsuperscript{59} After the service providers source the RFF, the GFM office staffs the RFF through the service Chiefs, the Chairman, and finally for approval by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).\textsuperscript{60}

Upon SECDEF approval, the UCC in coordination with the owning Component Command develops the TPFDD. The TPFDD provides a

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{58} Lt Col Leon Strickland deployed from the 437 Air Mobility Wing, Charleston AFB, SC to Haiti to serve as the Mobility Officer for the ACCE. He arrived on 24 Jan and remained on staff for just over four weeks. Lt Col Leon Strickland, USAF Retired (L3 C-17 Flight Simulator Instructor) interview by the author, 11 April 2012.
\textsuperscript{59} In the case of the USAF, the primary service provider is ACC. However, for mobility personnel the provider is USTRANSCOM and for SOF personnel the provider is SOCOM.
\textsuperscript{60} Headquarters Air Combat Command (HQ ACC/A9L) \textit{Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE After Action Report}, 20 May 2010, 2-3.
\end{quote}
prioritized listing to establish when the gaining component needs the personnel or equipment in theater. Once completed, USTRANSCOM validates the feasibility to meet the timeline established in the TPFDD. After validation, USTRANSCOM tasks its components to begin transporting the forces into theater.\textsuperscript{61} The GFM policy states a UCC should plan 120 days between submitting the RFF and the forces’ arrival in theater.\textsuperscript{62}

In the case of emergency operations, the GFM policy provides procedures to reduce the 120-day requirement. The alternate rules enabled 12AF (AFSOUTH) to complete the request to deployment process in 34 days.\textsuperscript{63} However, 34 days would not have occurred had it not been for ACC sending two personnel from their GFM cell to help the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff. The expeditious deployment ensured the 24th AEG personnel were in-place to assume mission responsibility before the 60-day window of the CRG.

However, based on the lessons learned, two shortfalls within the 12AF (AFSOUTH) significantly contributed to the delay in force deployment. First, at the time of the earthquake the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff lacked GFM expertise and a GFM cell to consolidate the GFM processes.\textsuperscript{64} The lack of oversight on the GFM process caused coordination issue with 1AF (AFNORTH), precluding the deployment of augmentees to support the 601st HFOCC.\textsuperscript{65} Additionally, the lack of GFM expertise created several errors in identifying the appropriate force packages required in theater. The errors significantly slowed the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{61} HQ AFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 30.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Briefing, Joint Staff J-3, Global Force Management Division, subject: Global Force Management, June 2009.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} HQ USAFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 19.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} ACC did send two personnel from their Force Provider Cell to assist 12AF (AFSOUTH) with the GFM process. HQ USAFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 25.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Air Forces Lessons Learned (HQ USAF/A9L), \textit{Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Compendium of USAF Reports}, 19 May 2011, 6.
\end{itemize}
sourcing and approval process further delaying the force deployment. Eventually, 12AF (AFSOUTH) adjusted and created the GFM cell. The GFM cell consolidated members from A1, A3, A4, and A5, each with a significant piece of the GFM process under one process owner. Additionally, the staff conducted daily coordination meetings to track the force movement throughout the GFM process.

The second shortfall, already discussed earlier in the chapter, was the lack of USAF and more specifically 12AF (AFSOUTH) presence on the JTF-H staff. Without someone on staff, the heavily US Army-centric JTF-H staff prioritized the entire 2-82 Brigade ahead of all other forces on the TPFDD. Therefore, USTRANSCOM could not deploy any other support forces into theater until they closed the 2-82nd. If 12 AF (AFSOUTH) had someone on the JTF-H staff or had they deployed the ACCE immediately, they could have influenced the TPFDD prioritization and sequencing. At a minimum, the USAF could have pushed to get critical mission requirements mixed within the flow of the 2-82nd movement. This action may have allowed AFSOC or the CRG to redeploy sooner and certainly would have helped the 24th AEG to establish stand-alone C2 sooner.

**Summary**

Overall, the US Government response to Haiti led by US AID and supported by a broad spectrum of DoD agencies was extremely successful. Despite the early complications created by the

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66 The 12AF (AFSOUTH) GFM Cell is similar to the GFM Cell that USAFCENT established in late 2009. USAFCENT created the GFM cell in order to support the GFM requirements for the Afghanistan Surge and the OIF drawdown. The USAFCENT cell included personnel from A1, A3, and A4. In early 2010 the GFM cell grew from a Branch, to its own Division, led by an O-6, within the USAFCENT/A3. Based on the Personal Experience of the Author as the USAFCENT A3 Force Management Branch Chief.

67 HQ USAFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 25.

68 USTRANSCOM executed 113 C-17 missions to closeout the 2-82 and then began transporting the other components forces. HQ USAFSOUTH/A9L AAR, 30.
USSOUTHCOM structure and the lack of a CONPLAN, USSOUTHCOM was able to reorganize and lead effectively. As for 12AF (AFSOUTH), despite a lack of balance on the staff leading to a slow transition to support the contingency operations they were able to adjust and provide commendable support. However, had it not been for the initial support provided by USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, and USNORTHCOM, the initial US military response could have been far worse.
Chapter 4: Analysis

When Gen Jumper directed HAF/XOXS to create the 2003 AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOPs, he did so in hopes of fixing a systemic problem within the USAF. Based on the lessons learned from OpDS and OAF the USAF had not organized or trained its Component Commands properly to support effective contingency operations. Gen Jumper believed Air Force Component Commands needed a standard structure with a balanced staff to seamlessly transition from day-to-day operations to contingency operations across the full ROMO.

OpUR provides a lens from which to evaluate the effectiveness of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept with respect to the three criteria articulated earlier in this text. This chapter examines each criteria individually, utilizing the lessons learned, shortcomings, and successes of 12AF (AFSOUTH) during OpUR. This does not imply 12AF (AFSOUTH) failed in its mission. It accomplished heroic work, in the toughest conditions, leading to mission success for the US Government. However, there are lessons to learn and areas for improvement.

While the 12AF (AFSOUTH) provides an excellent case study to examine the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept, a good thesis cannot draw conclusions from a single example. Other Component Commands in the USAF have responded to contingency operations, providing additional lessons learned for consideration. Therefore, within each of the three sections in this chapter, the reader will find short vignettes to demonstrate operational successes and/or failures of other Component Commands.

Standardization

One element used to fix the systemic problem Gen Jumper
identified was the development of a standard Component Command structure to support the CCDRs.\(^1\) To fix the problem, the concept development teams worked to provide standardization through two mechanisms. The first mechanism was the staff structure within the C-NAFs. This structure includes the HQ staff, the AFFOR staff, and in most cases an AOC. The second mechanism was the overall Component construct used to determine where the C-MAJCOM and/or C-NAF aligns in relation to the UCC (Figure 7). By standardizing both mechanisms, the USAF looked to present a single face to the UCC.

Utilizing the 12AF (AFSOUTH) case study provides the initial measure of how the two standardization mechanisms are working in the Component Commands. First is the staff structure within 12AF (AFSOUTH) itself. Per the direction in the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2 and PAD 06-09, 12AF (AFSOUTH) contains a HQ staff, the AFFOR staff, and an AOC. The HQ staff contains the normal special staff positions. The 12AF (AFSOUTH) AFFOR staff utilizes the A1-A9 construct as directed in PAD 06-09. Within the AFFOR staff, 12AF (AFSOUTH) chose to create separate A3, A5, and A8 staffs.\(^2\) This separation established a clear delineation between the operations, plans and requirements, and the strategic plans and programs directorates. Finally, the AOC contains the five divisions as originally outlined in the 2002 AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP.

The second mechanism is the overall construct itself. 12AF (AFSOUTH) is a Case 2 Model as described in PAD 06-09. (Figure 7) Per the Case 2 model, 12AF (AFSOUTH) is a dual-purposed C-NAF that is OPCON to USSOUTHCOM and ADCON to ACC. In this relationship, 12AF (AFSOUTH) supports both organizations; however, their primary

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\(^1\) Briefing, HAF/A5XS, subject: AF Component Structure Brief, March 2012, Slide 1.  
\(^2\) 12AF (AFSOUTH) Unit Manning Document, 24 April 2012.
focus is on their Component Command responsibilities.\(^3\) When the two standardization mechanisms are combined, it is clear 12AF (AFSOUTH) serves as an excellent model of what the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept and the PADs worked to define.

However, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) study does not provide the complete USAF Component standardization picture. There are examples of Component Commands that demonstrate the USAF has been less than consistent in its standardization. With respect to the first standardization mechanism, all twelve C-NAFs contain a HQ staff and an AFFOR staff using A1-A9 construct. However, of the twelve C-NAFs, three do not contain an AOC. Of these three, one has no requirement for an AOC. The other two have agreements in-place to receive support from the other AOCs in their AOR.

When examining the other Component Commands with respect to the second mechanism, the standardization element worsens. As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, when Gen Moseley introduced the MAJCOM/CC into the Concept, the USAF began to stray away from a “single face” model. This decision led to the creation of the AFCHQ, which later became the C-MAJCOM. The addition of the C-MAJCOM led to the Case 1 and Case 2 models specified in PAD 07-13. In addition to the ten organizations under the Case 1 and 2 models, the USAF diluted the component structure with 11AF, 5AF, and 20AF.\(^4,\(^5\) In the five years

\(^3\) Brig Gen Burke indicated 12AF (AFSOUTH) spent roughly 80% of their time working component issues and 20% working NAF issues. Maj Gen Darryl Burke (Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), interview by the author, 11 April 2012.

\(^4\) In PAD 10-02, the USAF designated 11AF as a C-NAF supporting both USNORTHCOM and USPACOM. Headquarters United State Air Force (HQ USAF) Program Action Directive (PAD) 10-02, 2 June 2010, 8.

\(^5\) 20AF remains unchanged. In FY13, as part of the PACAF and 13AF merger, there is discussion to make 5AF either a C-NAF without an AOC or retain its core function and add the role as the PACAF ACCE to US Forces Japan. Gilbert Braun (Senior Strategy and Policy Analyst, Headquarters Air Force Plans Directorate), interview by the author, 22 March 2012; Robert Stein, Chief, PACAF Policy Development Branch (A5UP), Hickham AFB, HI, to the author, e-mail, 24 May 2012.
since PAD 07-13, the USAF has further watered down the Component Construct by introducing more cases into the model.

The first example of an additional case is the USAF splitting of 9AF (AFCENT) into two separate organizations. As a C-NAF, 9AF (AFSOUTH) served as the Component Command to USCENTCOM. In this role 9AF (AFCENT) supported TSC and engagement requirements while also providing C2 and admin functions in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Additionally, 9AF (AFSOUTH) supported ACC by providing court martial, administrative, and general oversight to ACC’s east coast wings.\(^6\) Working to support so many responsibilities created a heavy workload on the 9AF (AFCENT) leadership and staff. Therefore, in 2009 the CSAF decided to temporarily split 9AF (AFCENT) into two separate organizations.\(^7\) 9AF transitioned to become a Basic NAF, OPCON to ACC, and performing the duties outlined in Air Force Instruction 38-101.\(^8\) Meanwhile, AFCENT continues to serve as a C-NAF, OPCON to USCENTCOM, performing the duties described in Change 2, PAD 06-09, and PAD 07-13.

More recently, due to budget concerns and manpower reductions, the USAF has begun another round of changes. First designated in PAD 07-13 to support US Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Seventeenth Air Force (Air Forces Africa) (17AF (AFAFRICA)) was recently inactivated. In

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\(^{6}\) From a NAF perspective, 9AF (AFCENT) was responsible for organizing, training and equipping 30 units total (14 flying, 16 support) Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve units throughout the eastern US. These range from F/A-22s at Langley to communications, security forces, and Red Horse engineers. Briefing, Commander 9AF (AFCENT), subject: Ninth Air Force & US Air Forces Central Command, December 2008, Slide 3.


\(^{8}\) Today’s 9AF organizes, trains, & equips Ninth Air Force Airmen to meet the demands of today’s expeditionary tasking while preparing for tomorrow’s challenges. 9AF focuses on the combat/agile support capabilities for the 9AF units in the current fight, while preparing our Airmen for the dynamic requirements of air, space, and cyberspace of the
its place, the USAF activated AFAFRICA to support USAFRICOM but aligned under USAFE. In this new case, the USAFE staff absorbed the 17AF (AFAFRICA) AFFOR staff and NAF staff functions. The 603rd AOC added the role of supporting all operations within USAFRICOM’s AOR. Finally, to provide oversight to the actual AFAFRICA staff, the USAF has dual-hatted the USAFE/CC as the AFAFRICA Commander. This new command structure means the USAFE/CC and the USAFE staff will receive guidance, direction, and tasking from both the USEUCOM and USAFRICOM CCDRs despite being OPCON only to USEUCOM.

As a second and additional factor complicating the NAF standardization, the USAF ordered PACAF to absorb Thirteenth Air Force (Air Forces Pacific) (13AF (AFPAC)) by the end of fiscal year 2012. In this case, the PACAF staff will assume both the NAF oversight and AFFOR staff functions from 13AF (AFPAC). The 613th AOC will shift up a level and fall directly under the PACAF/CC. This new relationship creates a standalone C-MAJCOM without a supporting C-NAF thereby creating yet another case to add to the Component construct lexicon.9

Analyzing both mechanisms against 12AF (AFSOUTH) and the other Components, it appears the development teams had mixed results. With the first standardization mechanism, the development team was successful. With the exception of the three C-NAFs that do not contain an AOC, the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept created a standard C-NAF structure. Every C-NAF has headquarters with an appropriate support staff. Every C-NAF has an AFFOR staff organized along the A1-A9 construct. Finally, all but three C-NAFs have an AOC with five divisions.

With respect to the second mechanism of standardization, the

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USAF has completely failed. There are currently six different Component structures providing Component Command functions to UCCs or Sub-Unified Commands. (See Appendix A) The 2005 Concept created the WFHQ, a single standard structure OPCON to the UCC to provide the Component Command function. Now, years of coordination, personnel cuts, and MAJCOM bickering have left the USAF with a Component construct that is overly complicated. What was once a simple standard structure is now a complicated multi-faced structure few in the USAF can even understand.

**Balance**

The second element required to fix the systemic problem was the need for cross-functional balance within the Component staff to support the full ROMO. In order to support the full ROMO tasking, the initial development team directed the Component Commands to build their staffs with the appropriate mix of operational experience based on their mission requirements. However, throughout the Concept development, the USAF never explicitly stated what the exact make-up of staffs should be. The closest the development teams came was in PAD 06-09. In this PAD, HAF/A5XS stated the A3, A5, and A8 “divisions will be staffed with a cross-section of AFSCs as needed for mission accomplishment.”

Interpreting this statement from an operational perspective, the USAF should fill each Component Command staff with a mix of fighter, bomber, mobility, space, and ISR operators as needed.

To determine if the Component Commands are operationally

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9 As previously noted, 5AF may simply add the role of PACAF ACCE to US Forces Japan. (See Note 5) Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Programming Plan (PPLAN) 11-02, Merger of PACAF and 13AF Headquarters, 7 February 2012, 9.
10 AF Component Structure Brief, Slide 1.
balanced, 12AF (AFSOUTH) provides an ideal case study. In order to meet their daily mission requirements 12AF (AFSOUTH) “employs full-spectrum ISR, intra-theater airlift, and information assets.” As 12AF (AFSOUTH) shifted their focus towards OpUR, they continued to focus on mobility and ISR operations. In an email to the Commanders of USSOUTHCOM and ACC regarding OpUR, Lt Gen Spears emphasized the importance mobility and ISR operations played in meeting mission requirements. He discussed the importance of mobility operations, stating a foreign HA/DR operation is a mobility fight and “air mobility was truly the lifeline until the SPOD could be re-opened.” With regard to ISR, the email emphasized the importance of full motion video. The video provided real-time images to support various agencies with rescue and support operations. Based on their importance, this section examines whether 12AF (AFSOUTH) maintained the balance to support the mobility and ISR missions.

The first 12AF (AFSOUTH) mission area to examine is mobility. Based on the success of the airlift mission in OpUR, one could assume the 12AF (AFSOUTH) mobility manning was sufficient. However, as presented in the last chapter, this was not the reality. Prior to OpUR, the USAF had not filled any of the three mobility positions on the AFFOR staff. In fact, the only mobility experience on the AFFOR staff was Lt Gen Spears. Within the AOC, the USAF filled seven of the nine mobility officer billets, all of which provided leadership and oversight within the

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13 Lt Gen Glenn Spears, Commander 12AF (AFSOUTH), to Gen Douglas Frazer, Commander ACC, and Gen William Frazer, Commander USSOUTHCOM, e-mail, 7 February 2010, in HQ AFSOUTH/A9L OpUR AAR, 9.
14 As stated in Chapter 3, Lt Gen Spears briefly flew the KC-135 and commanded an Air Refueling Wing. Additionally, he commanded the 89 Airlift Wing, responsible for special airlift missions.
Having so few mobility officers on staff meant 12AF (AFSOUTH) lacked the mobility expertise to support OpUR at all levels. At the UCC-level, 12AF (AFSOUTH) should have sent a mobility expert from their staff to USSOUTHCOM. This person could have assisted in the crisis action planning and coordinated between the two staffs. At the JTF level, 12AF (AFSOUTH) should have sent a mobility expert to the JTF-H staff immediately after it was created. This person could have influenced the TPFDD development, in both make-up and order of deployment. He or she would also have provided Lt Gen Keen the USAF expert he needed and provided Lt Gen Spears the representation he needed.

Finally, at the Component level, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff needed mobility expertise in multiple locations. From a command perspective, having a senior leader with mobility expertise would have proven valuable. This leader would have provided expert guidance and advice up and down the chain of command. Additionally, the mobility leader would have provided better ties and reach back to AMC. On the A3 and A5 staffs, mobility operators would have provided critical expertise during the crisis action planning. The mobility expert could have also provided support to the host nation engagements in Haiti and the Dominican Republic to open the various APODs.

The most glaring shortfall was the inability to place a mobility expert on the ACCE staff in Haiti. In lieu of a collocated air component, the ACCE staff plays an essential role in establishing the working relationship with the JTF. As this related to OpUR, had the ACCE moved forward immediately, they would have done so without a mobility expert.

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15 Col John Romero USAF (Ret.), Previously Chief 612 AOC/AMD, to the author, e-mail, 22 May 2012.
16 Key leadership position could include the Commander, Vice Commander, or an A3 or A5 Directorate.
This would have prevented the ACCE from effectively working with AFSOC, CRG, and JTF-H personnel. To solve the problem, 12AF (AFSOUTH) had to rely on augmentation from AMC. While augmentation is not ideal, the Concept development team authorized it as far back as the 2002 CONOP.\(^\text{17}\) Unfortunately, it took the Mobility augmentee 12 days to arrive in theater, providing little impact on the theater mobility operations.\(^\text{18}\)

An even larger issue than their lack of mobility personnel to support contingency operations was the lack of mobility personnel to support 12AF (AFSOUTH)'s day-to-day operations. As stated, 12AF (AFSOUTH) employs intra-theater airlift operations every day through the 474th AEG. Additionally, HA operations, which are typically mobility-centric, are a key component of the 12AF (AFSOUTH) TSC mission. To support the two missions there should be mobility members on their AFFOR staff every day. These personnel would provide mobility experience through engagements, exercises, and contingency planning. Regardless, the simple fact remains that 12AF (AFSOUTH) did not have enough mobility experience on the staff to meet any of their operational requirements.

Based on the lack of mobility personnel the question to ask is, why there is a lack mobility expertise at 12AF (AFSOUTH). 12AF has existed under TAC and then ACC since the USAF moved 12AF from USAFE in 1958.\(^\text{19}\) As such, they have always provided administrative oversight to CAF-centric forces. In 1993, when 12AF became dual-hatted as 12AF (AFSOUTH), the USAF did not add the appropriate mobility personnel to


\(^{18}\) Lt Col Leon Strickland, USAF Retired (L3 C-17 Flight Simulator Instructor) interview by the author, 11 April 2012.

reflect the new mission. Over time, the lack of mobility experience became the accepted standard. In the end, the lack of mobility is a clear failure of 12AF (AFSOUTH), ACC, AMC, and the USAF. They should never allow an operational command, with specific mission requirements, to exist without the appropriate staff expertise.

The second 12AF (AFSOUTH) mission area to examine is ISR. At the time of OpUR, there were only two operators with ISR experience on the AFFOR staff. The remaining ISR expertise resided within the AFFOR A2 and the ISRD in the AOC. Essentially, this meant for OpUR, 12AF (AFSOUTH) had one lone officer on the AFFOR staff to work the ISR issues. These issues included obtaining the authorizations to fly outside of the US, permission to fly over Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and beddown requirements.

With such a large workload, it was clear the AFFOR staff needed more support. In response, 12AF (AFSOUTH) had no choice but to augment the AFFOR staff. From outside of the organization, 12AF (AFSOUTH) reached out to the ISR expertise within the wings under their NAF function. This included active duty and Air National Guard personnel for both manned and unmanned ISR platforms. Just as with other augmentees, their expertise was invaluable, but they lacked the understanding of the staff and organizational requirements.

From inside the staff, 12AF (AFSOUTH) utilized ISRD personnel to work several AFFOR staff related issues. Specifically, the ISRD Chief spent more time working to obtain the proper RPA flight authorizations vice his normal ISRD responsibilities. In this case, dual hatting the ISRD personnel to perform AFFOR duties was a mission necessity. However, it clearly goes against the guidance found as early as the 2002

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20 One of which was Brig Gen Burke, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) Vice Commander.
21 Col Jeffrey Cowan, Chief, AETC Standardization and Evaluation Division, Randolph AFB, TX, to the author, e-mail, 16 May 2012.
CONOP. More importantly, the dual hatting serves as an indicator of the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staffing shortfalls.

12AF (AFSOUTH) was not the only C-NAF that suffered from a lack of balance on their staff. In early 2008, 50 percent of 9AF (AFCENT)’s assigned forces were mobility assets. On a daily basis, these assets conducted over 60 percent of the missions in the USCENTCOM AOR. With 50 percent of the assets and 60 percent of the mission, there should have been an appropriate number of mobility planners and mobility leaders on the AFFOR staff. However, upon examination 9AF (AFCENT) fell short in mobility expertise.

From a leadership perspective, the highest-ranking mobility officer in 9AF (AFCENT) was the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR). In this role, the DIRMOBFOR officially serves in the AOC and reports directly to the CFACC. However, due to the lack of mobility personnel on the 9AF (AFCENT) staff the DIRMOBFOR often worked tasks well outside of the duties detailed in Joint doctrine. When the AFFOR staff had mobility issues, the DIRMOBFOR worked the tasks through the DIRMOBFOR staff and away from AFFOR oversight. This created issues as the AFFOR A3, an O-6, could not directly task the O-7 DIRMOBFOR.

Outside of the DIRMOBFOR, the 9AF (AFCENT) mobility personnel consisted of the 609 AOC/AMD personnel, three mobility operators on

22 HAF/XOXS, AFFOR C2 Enabling CONOP, 6.
23 These included C-130s, KC-135s, KC-10s, and Operational Support Assets aircraft.
24 In 2008, the USAF had not split up 9AF (AFCENT) into separate 9AF and AFCENT organizations. Brig Gen (S) Michael Rothstein, Commander 35th Fighter Wing, to the author, e-mail, 20 May 2012.
25 The DIRMOBFOR “functions as coordinating authority for air mobility...[and] serves as the designated agent for all air mobility issues in the AOR. Joint Publication (JP) 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, 2 October 2009, II4-II5.
27 Rothstein, e-mail.
the AFFOR staff at Shaw AFB, and zero on the AFFOR forward staff.\textsuperscript{28} The 609 AOC/AMD, located forward, contained a full complement of personnel responsible for planning and managing the execution of the mobility assets. As for the three personnel at Shaw, two were country desk officers, working specific country engagements in the A5 directorate. These duties prevented the two from assisting the AFFOR A3 staff. The remaining mobility operator, located in the A3 directorate, was a KC-135 Navigator with very limited airlift experience. Therefore, for the first seven years of OEF and OIF there was only one mobility officer on the entire 9AF (AFCENT) AFFOR staff supporting the planning and execution of theater-wide mobility operations.\textsuperscript{29}

Recognizing the shortcoming on the staff, Col Michael Rothstein, the AFCENT A3, worked to fix the problem. Col Rothstein recognized the issues with the DIRMOBFOR acting as a staff officer. Additionally, Col Rothstein hoped to create a stronger relationship with AMC, similar to the one already established with ACC. This was the first indication of the fighter-centric leadership recognizing a gap in mobility expertise on the staff. Addressing this issue in the summer of 2008, Col Rothstein added two mobility officers to his staff; a C-17 Weapons Officer and a KC-135 instructor pilot. With the additional mobility expertise on the staff, 9AF (AFCENT) would now be better able to respond to mobility crises and issues throughout the AOR.\textsuperscript{30}

Since their arrival four years ago, the importance of the mobility personnel on the AFCENT staff continued to grow. They provided critical

\textsuperscript{28} The 9AF (AFCENT) AFFOR staff contained two staff structures. One structured staff was located “forward” in the AOR and a second structured staff was located “rear” at Shaw AFB, SC. The forward staff oversaw the day-to-day AOR operations and addressed the immediate execution needs of the Commander and the fielded forces. The staff at Shaw handled the long range planning efforts and coordinates with the stateside MAJCOMs ensure the forces CHOP’d to USCENTCOM arrived in the theater ready trained, and equipped to support operations.

\textsuperscript{29} Rothstein, e-mail.
mobility expertise for the two OEF surges, the OIF drawdown, and multiple HA/DR responses. Today, there are three permanently assigned mobility officers and two augmentees on the AFFOR staff located at Shaw Air Force Base, SC. Additionally, there is one mobility officer on the AFFOR forward staff and one mobility officer on the Afghanistan ACCE.\textsuperscript{31} Despite the strides made at AFCENT, the CAF-centric ties continue at the top. Since OEF, there has yet to be a senior mobility operator in a critical leadership position on the AFCENT staff.

The truth is the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept never got to the point of directing the necessary staff requirements. Instead, the USAF chose to leave it up to each individual organization. The lack of mobility and ISR personnel on the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff resulted in a slow and disjointed response to OpUR. The decision by Col Rothstein to add mobility personnel on the AFFOR staff became critical to the overall success of 9AF (AFCENT). The 12AF (AFSOUTH) problem was a direct result of the USAF’s inability to specify exact requirements in the concept, while the 9AF (AFCENT) solution to a similar problem was a result of reaction to operational requirements within the C-NAF—just the reaction the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept development team hoped would occur. Perhaps, had all C-NAFs become independent organizations with no tie to their historical NAF or MAJCOM the staffs would reflect their real mission realities.

**Timely**

The final element used to fix the systemic problem identified by Gen Jumper was the ability to seamlessly transition from day-to-day operations to contingency operations in a timely fashion.\textsuperscript{32} To meet this

\textsuperscript{30} Rothstein, e-mail.
\textsuperscript{31} Major Julie Wiemer, 9AF (AFCENT)/A1L, to the author, e-mail 8 May 2012.
\textsuperscript{32} AF Component Structure Brief, Slide 1.
final capability, HAF/XOXS believed the Component Commands needed personnel from a cross section of the USAF that were trained and ready to immediately deploy anywhere in the world. In the 2002 CONOP, the HAF/XOXS determined 48 hours was the acceptable transition period. Later in PAD 06-09, HAF/A5XS mandated 72 hours as the expectable timeframe to enact the transition. From a historical perspective, 72 hours was similar to the time TAC provided the 19AF to respond to a contingency operation.

The timeframe of 72 hours is understandable if the Component Command were transitioning to execute an operation requiring an extensive build-up. In these cases, the UCC in coordination with their Components would have developed an OPLAN. The AFFOR staff would have already begun working beddown, deployment, and sustainment issues. The Component Staff could have slowly grown through augmentation to the point where they are able to support larger operations. In fact, until kinetic operations begin, the full AOC may not need to be running at 100%.

However, since Gen Jumper initiated the Concept in 2002, the only operation utilizing a long build-up was OIF. In the same period, the USAF has conducted major HA/DR missions in Indonesia, Pakistan, the US, Haiti, and most recently, Japan. In these cases, there is no time for a 72-hour build-up. The Component Commands must be ready to transition to support operations immediately. Brig Gen Burke summarized the importance of this in his OpUR after action report stating, “...during a HA/DR response, unlike many other ops the USAF has become accustomed to, there is NO ramp up time. One needs to be
Unfortunately for Brig Gen Burke and the entire 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff, they learned this lesson from real experience. The 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff simply was not prepared to transition to 100% immediately. There were many contributing factors behind their delays. At the highest level, the lack of USSOUTHCOM structure and the lack of a CONPLAN put the staffs behind from the start. The lack of USAF personnel on the JTF-H staff delayed the deployment of the 24th AEG. The lack of mobility experience on the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff prohibited them from providing immediate augmentation to the USSOUTHCOM and JTF-H staffs. The lack of GFM experience on the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff to accomplish the RFF and TPFDD slowed the deployment of supporting forces. Additionally, the lack of mobility leadership in 12AF (AFSOUTH) contributed to their delay in deploying the ACCE. Finally, the lack of emphasis on HA/DR training across the USAF left the staff unprepared for the mission realities.

As a result of these contributing factors, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) response to OpUR was far from expeditious. Without the assistance of the USAF elements from USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, and USNORTHCOM, the initial US Government response to OpUR would have been its own disaster. The initial APOD opening would not have occurred without the quick reaction of the AFSOC personnel. The throughput at the APOD would not have met the mission requirements without the CRG running MTTP and the airfields in the Dominican Republic. Finally, the aircraft would not have sequenced into MTTP

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without the 601st AOC RAMCC providing airspace and airflow management.

Even with the tremendous support from throughout the USAF, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) initial response was far slower than any other Component. Despite the fact that the AEG/CC was on the AFFOR staff, the 24 AEG ADVON did not arrive in Haiti until six days into the operation. It is hard to understand why it took 12AF (AFSOUTH) six days to create a team and deploy them forward. The team should have left for Haiti immediately to coordinate the built-up and arrival of the follow-on sustainment forces. The slow response left the USAF scrambling for office space and real estate for their facilities and equipment. In the end, it took 12AF (AFSOUTH) 23 days to achieve initial operating capability and 34 days to achieve full operating capability.

A larger shortfall than the late arriving ADVON was the delay in deploying the ACCE to Haiti. Other than the lone mobility officer, the remaining four ACCE personnel resided on the 12 AF (AFSOUTH) staff. This meant the team could have immediately traveled to Haiti to begin operations. If they had, they could have solved the organizational issues, thereby improving the overall effectiveness of the USAF efforts. Specifically, Brig Gen Burke could have provided the senior level oversight to the three USAF O-6s in theater and provided better support to JTF-H. During his interview, now Maj Gen Burke said the one thing he would change was “to be on the ground first. Whether it was the ACCE Commander or some other senior air component leader, the USAF should have been there.”

Overall, the 12AF (AFSOUTH) staff’s difficulty transitioning to the contingency operations centered on their lack of mobility and ISR.

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34 Burke, Interview.
personnel. To provide a counter example, the remainder of this section builds on the 9AF (AFCENT) manning discussions from the previous section. In doing so, this section will examine how 9AF (AFCENT) was able to transition to support emerging requirements because of their now balanced staff.

Seven months after the airlift and aerial refueling pilots arrived at Shaw; they put their expertise to work. In February 2009, the Government of Kyrgyzstan notified the US they were terminating the lease authorizing the US Government to utilize Manas AB. At the time, Manas provided USCENTCOM basing for two critical missions in support of OEF. First, Manas was home to the KC-135 aircraft providing essential aerial refueling support in northern Afghanistan. Second, Manas was the primary reception, staging, on-ward movement, and integration (RSO&I) transit center and airlift hub for forces moving into and out of Afghanistan. As such, losing Manas would have severely affected US operations in Afghanistan.

In response, 9AF (AFCENT) initiated an operation planning team (OPT) to support the crisis planning process led by USCENTCOM. From the start, the OPT began focusing only on the aerial refueling mission. A week into the planning the two mobility pilots returned from a TDY. Immediately, the airlift pilot recognized the OPT was focusing on the aerial refueling mission and not the RSO&I mission. Without Manas and the RSO&I facility, the component would have had to reroute all

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35 Per the terms of the agreement, the USAF would receive 180 days from notification to vacate the base.
36 Both of the mobility officers were on temporary duty away from Shaw when the crisis began. Therefore, the AFCENT A3 placed an F-16 pilot in charge of the OPT.
37 It was not unusual for the fighter-centric staff to focus on the aerial refueling mission. Without the air refueling assets support, the effectiveness of fighter, bomber, and manned ISR assets would be limited.
passengers in and out of theater through other locations in the USCENTCOM AOR.\textsuperscript{38,39} Recognizing the importance of the RSO&I mission, the OPT lead gave the airlift pilot responsibility for the relocation of the RSO&I mission.\textsuperscript{40} A week later, after realizing the aerial refueling beddown issues were similar to the RSO&I issues, the AFCENT A3 designated the airlift pilot as the new OPT lead. This was the first time since their arrival and, likely, the first time in a long while that the operational command had designated a mobility planner to lead an AFCENT OPT.

With the mobility pilot as the OPT lead, the team began working on three areas. First, the OPT developed the courses of action for relocating both missions. While both the airlift and the air refueling missions fall within the mobility realm, their support requirements are quite different. Therefore, having both airlift and air refueling experience enabled a rapid and accurate assessment of suitable beddown locations. Additionally, through improved relationship with AMC and the mobility elements at CENTCOM the OPT was able to determine the long-term sustainment issues throughout the AOR. Combined, these efforts enabled 9AF (AFCENT) to develop suitable alternatives within the first three weeks of planning. Recognizing the 9AF (AFCENT) planning efforts provided higher fidelity with more reliability, USCENTCOM designated 9AF (AFCENT) as the Manas Crisis lead planners. Col Ken Craib, then the AFCENT A3 Plans Division Chief, believed the shift would not have

\textsuperscript{38} The RSO&I contained two key elements. First the RSO&I facility, located on Manas AB, supported the care and feeding of the transiting personnel and provided the training required prior to entry into the AOR. The second element is the airlift mission that provided transportation into and out of Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{39} Col Kenneth Craib, USAF (Ret.), Previous Chief, AFCENT A3 Plans Division, Shaw AFB, SC, to the author, e-mail, 23 May 2012.

\textsuperscript{40} This required a complete understanding of the theater mobility system. The OPT began identifying suitable airfields to support the airlift operations. Additionally, the OPT began to work with the Army and Marine components to USCENTCOM to ensure and integrated plan.
occurred without the mobility expertise on staff stating, “Our mobility planners...were the primary reason for the higher fidelity support to our Commander.”

With the possible beddown locations identified, the OPT began working on the plan to stand-up the new location while simultaneously closing Manas. Recognizing the beddown locations could not be opened without first opening their aerial ports, the OPT lead coordinated with AMC to send planners from both CONUS-based Contingency Response Wings (CRW). Having the CRW personnel in the OPT allowed 9AF (AFCENT) to coordinate the transition plan from CRW forces with the permanent follow-on forces. As a secondary effect, the OPT was able to develop a realistic RFF and TPFDD to support the plan. In addition to opening aerial ports, the OPT and the CRW developed a plan to use the CRW to operate the Manas aerial port prior to its closing. The integration between the two organizations marked the first exposure to the CRW for many of the 9AF (AFCENT) personnel. Over the next few years, this new relationship paid major dividends while supporting the OIF drawdown and the OEF surges.

The final area of work involved the support of USCENTCOM and the Department of State. Based on the data created by the OPT, 9AF (AFCENT) was able to develop a cost/benefit analysis for the retention of Manas AB. This analysis enabled USCENTCOM to lobby for the retention of Manas, if the cost was right. The analysis, along with the overall mobility expertise, led to the airlift planner representing USCENTCOM at the State Department negotiation team meetings.

Over the next three months, the OPT continued to move along the path of closing Manas AB. Through this process, 9AF (AFCENT) began

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41 Craib, e-mail.
42 Craib, e-mail.
opening one airfield and significantly modifying another. At the same time, 9AF (AFCENT) began the process of closing Manas. Finally, just two weeks before the CRWs would deploy to open the new airfields, the two governments reached a new agreement. The US retained the use of Manas AB, based on the expeditious work of the OPT led by the mobility officers on the AFFOR staff.\textsuperscript{43}

The 12AF (AFSOUTH) response to OpUR is proof an organization that lacks balance within their staff can eventually create and execute a plan outside of their expertise. However, the lack of mobility and ISR experience slowed the 12AF (AFSOUTH) planning and response considerably. Waiting six days to send the ADVON and eleven days to send the ACCE was not indicative of a timely transition. Alternatively, the possession of mobility experience on the 9AF (AFCENT) staff enabled a relatively immediate response to a crisis. As Col Rothstein stated, “We [9AF (AFCENT)] could not have responded nearly as well or as rapidly without the experience and networking of the mobility officers.”\textsuperscript{44}

**Summary**

The vision Gen Jumper put forward for standardized Component Commands fell short despite the planned elements designed to fix the problem of inconsistent and inadequate performance. The first element used to fix the systemic problem was the development of a standardized Component Command structure. Based on the analysis, the concept did an acceptable job standardizing the structure within the C-NAFs themselves. However, due to General Jumper and General Moseley’s catering to the MAJCOM/CC concerns vice simply directing policy, the USAF failed to standardize the overall Component structure. By the end of 2012, there will be six different Component structures providing

\textsuperscript{43} Craib, e-mail.
support to the UCC or Sub-Unified Commands. When combined, these two aspects demonstrate that with the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept, the USAF has failed to create a standardized Component Command structure.

The second element created to fix the problem was the ideal of building a balanced staff able to support the full ROMO. PAD 06-09 clearly stated the AFFOR staff should contain a cross-section of AFSCs. Unfortunately, two contributing factors derailed this effort. First, the Concept stopped short of actually mandating the specific personnel required, instead allowing the Component to determine the details. Second, when Gen Moseley shifted the WFHQ from a standalone organization back to the traditional dual-hatted organization, he enabled the Components to retain their functionally tied manning. Combined, the two factors created an environment for the Components to fill their staff based on historic functional manning vice mission based cross-functional requirements. For this reason, the USAF has failed to utilize the AFFOR C2 Enabling to create a balanced C-NAF staff able to support the full ROMO.

The final element used to fix the problem was the need for the Components to seamlessly transition from day-to-day operations to contingency operations. Within this element, many variables can impact a Component's ability to transition. However, PAD 07-13 specifies 72 hours as the acceptable window. If the operation allows a long sustained build-up then 72 hours is reasonable. However, in the more likely case of HA/DR operation, 72 hours is far too long. In these cases, the Components require a balanced staff, prepared and trained in the specific missions that are ready to deploy forward immediately. Based on this discussion, the USAF succeeded in using the AFFOR C2 Enabling

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44 Rothstein, e-mail.
Concept to create a structure that is able to transition within 72 hours for most operations. However, the USAF and the development team failed to consider the full ROMO and the response time needed to meet the most likely scenarios.
Conclusion

In 2001, based on the lessons from Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen John Jumper directed the USAF to develop a new Component Command structure. The goal of the new Concept was to provide the Unified Combatant Commands (UCCs) dedicated, timely, operational-level air and space support across the full range of military operations (ROMO). Over the next seven years, the USAF worked through the Air Force Forces Command and Control (AFFOR C2) Enabling Concept, creating six different documents. Throughout the development, the teams focused on three central elements: a standardized organizational structure, manned with a cross-functionally balance staff to support the full ROMO, and able to seamlessly transition from day-to-day operations to contingency operations in a timely fashion. In 2010, the Air Force put the results to the test when Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern) (12AF (AFSOUTH)) responded to the Haiti earthquake. Based on the inefficiencies with the 12AF (AFSOUTH) response, it is clear the USAF and the Concept failed to fix the operational-level command and control issues identified ten years prior.

So, what went wrong? What explains this USAF failure to develop adequate command and control capabilities? To address these questions, this study used the three elements above as its framework for analysis. Chapter 1 began by providing the critical historical events leading to the dual-hatted Major Command (MAJCOM)/Numbered Air Force (NAF) Components of the 1990s. The shift from standardized and balanced organizations during World War II (WW II) to the functional alignment after WW II was the first step. Later, Nineteenth Air Force (19AF) provided an example of a Component Command focused on
functional balance and timely execution. Finally, in the 1990s, USAF reorganization focused on integrating combat and mobility forces and the reduction of redundant command layers.

With the historical review complete, Chapter 2 detailed the time from Gen Jumper’s initial guidance through the development of all six documents ending with Program Action Directive (PAD) 07-13. The 2002 AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept of Operation (CONOP) focused on the roles and responsibilities of the Component staff. However, it retained the Component’s historic dual-hatted relationships and fell short in addressing the staffs’ functional balance. However, Gen Jumper did not feel that the CONOP was revolutionary enough, leading to the 2005 AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept.

In the new Concept, the development team created the Warfighting Headquarters (WFHQ). The WFHQ was a standalone organization with Operational Control (OPCON) to the Combatant Commander (CCDR) while retaining Administrative Control (ADCON) to the USAF. This new relationship enabled the Components to build a balanced staff based on the theater specific operations, which in turn reduced the transition time to support contingency operations, answering all of Gen Jumper’s concerns.

Unfortunately, the USAF never implemented the 2005 Concept as written, beginning a slow path of devolution. The first step of devolution occurred when Gen Jumper agreed, under pressure from his major command commanders, to insert the MAJCOM Commanders into the UCC-WFHQ chain of command. This allowed the MAJCOM Commanders to retain their historical relationships with the UCC while providing oversight to the WFHQs.¹ With the addition, the development team

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¹ Air Mobility Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, Pacific Air Force, and United States Air Forces in Europe retained their role as a Component.
created the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 1. From Change 1, the team drafted PAD 05-03 providing the USAF the guidance to implement the Concept. Ultimately, Gen Jumper decided not to sign the implementation PAD, instead leaving it to the next Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen Moseley. Regrettably, Gen Moseley never signed PAD 05-03 either. Shortly after taking office, Gen Moseley announced Program Budget Decision 720 directing the USAF to cut 40,000 personnel and consolidate the MAJCOMs. The combination of the two efforts led to the creation of the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept Change 2.

With Change 2 came the second step of devolution. Based on the MAJCOM Commanders desires, the development team created a small support staff to perform the senior component mission. In reality, the Air Force Component Headquarters (AFCHQ) was a redundant layer separating the WFHQ from the UCC and diluting the dedicated support Gen Jumper desired. This decision marked the elimination of a single Component structure. With Change 2 approved, the development team created PAD 06-09 providing the final step towards devolution. In response to the personnel limitations at the time, Gen Moseley retained the dual-hatted Component construct already in existence. By doing so, he left the AFCHQ /WFHQ tied to their historical MAJCOM/NAF. This last step completely changed the make-up and focus of the Component Concept, essentially returning the structure to its original form before 2002.

Over the next two years, the USAF implemented PAD 06-09. At the same time, the USAF continued to work through the personnel reductions and the consolidation of the MAJCOMs. Eventually, this led to the creation of PAD 07-13 designed to clarify the Component-MAJCOM (C-MAJCOM) and Lead-MAJCOM (L-MAJCOM) roles and responsibilities while also providing better direction to continue the
concept implementation. The approval of PAD 07-13 and its subsequent implementation provided the final change to the Concept studied in this thesis. It also served as the last update to the concept before the 12AF (AFSOUTH) response to the Haiti earthquake.

On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 earthquake devastated the island nation of Haiti. Looking back, it is clear the USAF response enabled the world to provide Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) support. However, the initial success was not a result of the 12AF (AFSOUTH) efforts. The fact was, 12AF (AFSOUTH) did not contain the cross functional balance within its Headquarters and AFFOR staffs to properly respond. Specifically, their lack of mobility, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Global Force Management experience prevented their timely response. The fact that it took four days to send the advanced liaison team forward, 11 days to send the Air Component Coordination Element forward, and 34 days to achieve full operating capability in Haiti demonstrates the 12AF (AFSOUTH) inefficiencies. These shortcomings and the lessons learned from the 12AF (AFSOUTH) response provided the data to examine the effectiveness of the Concept through the lens of the three central elements.

Findings

Based on the analysis and using the three central elements there are three key findings. First, with respect to standardization, the USAF failed to use the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept to create a standardized Component Command structure. The Concept adequately provided guidance to standardize the structure within the Component. The delineation of the HQ Staff, AFFOR staff, and Air Operations Center found in the 2002 CONOP established a solid foundation for the follow-
on Concept. On the other side, the Concept did little to standardize the external structure. The 2005 Concept started with a single structure, Change 2 ushered in Case 1 and Case 2, and now by the end of 2012 there will be six different Component structures (see Appendix A). Six different variations on the Component structure simply does not provide standardization to the UCCs.

Second is the evaluation of the USAF’s efforts to create a balanced staff to support the full ROMO. While PAD 06-09 provided guidance to balance the staffs, it fell far short of directing exact requirements. Additionally, General Moseley’s decision to retain the historic dual-hatted organizations enabled the Components and MAJCOMs to retain functional Manning. In the case of 12AF (AFSOUTH), their ADCON relationship to ACC resulted in the staff’s CAF-centric Manning. This led to the lack of mobility and ISR operators on the Headquarters and AFFOR staff, which inhibited 12AF (AFSOUTH)’s ability to support Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE effectively. Based on this example, it is clear the USAF has failed to create a balanced staff to support the full ROMO as desired by the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept.

The final element to evaluate is the ability for the Component to seamlessly transition from day-to-day operations to contingency operations in a timely fashion. This element is the hardest to evaluate as “timely” can vary with each operation. PAD 07-13 provided 72 hours as the acceptable transition period. This is an understandable window for an operation not requiring an immediate response, but not for a HA/DR operation. The fact that it took 12AF (AFSOUTH) 11 days to organize and deploy their ACCE staff forward to support Joint Task Force - Haiti clearly demonstrates a lack of ability for a timely transition. As long as the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept fails to create a balanced staff, the
Components will not be able to seamlessly transition. Therefore, the USAF and the Concept have failed to meet the timeliness requirement.

Based on the evaluation of the three elements it is clear that the USAF and the AFFOR C2 Enabling concept have failed to meet Gen Jumper’s initial vision. The AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept has been ineffective at establishing a standardized, balanced, and timely Air Force Component Structure. This has inhibited the USAF ability to support the UCC. For these reasons, the current USAF Component structure does not provide optimal operational-level planning and execution for the UCC.

**Recommendations**

**Standardization**

The first recommendation comes from the realm of standardization where the USAF must focus on taking the Concept back to the original 2005 vision. That is, the USAF must split the dual-hatted C-NAFs apart into two separate functions: the Component function and the NAF function. To support the Component function, the USAF must create a standalone Component Command structure similar to the WFHQ concept. The USAF must keep the structure simple, without intermediate command layers between the UCC and the Component. Simply, the Component must be OPCON to the UCC and ADCON to the Air Force.

In order to provide the best support to the UCC in the OPCON relationship, the USAF must tailor the Components’ size and rank structure. Using the current terminology, the USAF should designate a C-MAJCOM or a C-NAF as the Component Command. If the UCC structure requires a 4-star Component Commander to provide the appropriate support and advocacy, then a C-MAJCOM should serve as
the lone Component. However, if a 3-star Component would suffice, then
the USAF should designate a C-NAF.

By the end of 2012, the USAF will have its first C-MAJCOM serving
as a standalone Component Command. Based on mission requirements,
the USAF directed the merger of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) with
Thirteenth Air Force (Air Forces Pacific) (13AF (AFPAC)). From this
merger, PACAF as a C-MAJCOM will serve as the lone USAF Component
to US Pacific Command. To enable this, PACAF is absorbing part of the
AFFOR staff and the entire AOC from 13AF. This example is not the
perfect model. The drawback to PACAF as the lone C-MAJCOM is the
fact they will remain dual-purposed as the Component and a MAJCOM.
In an ideal world, PACAF would serve only as the Component with the
USAF pushing all organize, train, and equip functions back to the
responsible L-MAJCOMs. This would allow the C-MAJCOM to focus all
efforts on providing the best operational-level support to the UCC.

If the UCC structure is such that a 3-star Component Commander
would suffice, then the USAF should designate a C-NAF as the
Component. The 2009 CSAF split of Ninth Air Force (9AF) and Air Forces
Central (AFCENT), leaving AFCENT with the sole mission to support US
Central Command (USCENTCOM), provides an example. With AFCENT
as a standalone organization, the Component is able to focus all their
attention on USCENTCOM’s priorities and missions. The drawback to
this example results from Commander Air Combat Command (ACC)
retention of ADCON for AFCENT, allowing ACC to continue to influence
the rated Manning in the key leadership positions. Ideally, there would

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2 Through this effort, the USAF is retaining 108 total positions to include two General
Officers billets. Robert Steen, Chief, Policy Development Branch, Hickham AFB, HI, to
the author, e-mail, 24 May 2012.

3 In this case, PACAF works its mobility or fighter issue through AMC or ACC
respectively.
be no tie to ACC, allowing the USAF to place a variety of operators throughout the leadership positions based on mission requirements.

As indicated above, to sever completely the Component Command ties to historic MAJCOMs, the USAF must shift ADCON to Headquarters Air Force (HAF). The initial reaction to this move will be one of disdain, focusing on HAF’s inability to provide the appropriate oversight. However, if one-steps back and focuses on the ADCON functions, they would find that the MAJCOM’s administrative support focuses on leadership issues, promotions, awards and decorations, and military justice matters. While these functions are important, they certainly are not showstoppers. At worst, HAF will require additional manning, though this will require additional study. The benefits from such a shift include the complete separation of warfighters from MAJCOM ties, allowing the Component and the USAF to create and fill the Component staffs based on the operational needs of the CCDR.

If the USAF moved along the path of separating the Component and NAF functions, then it must determine who will perform the current NAF functions. Due to the impending resource limitations and fiscal constraints, a counter argument might say the USAF cannot afford to support the additional manning requirements. As an example, in order to support the 9AF (AFCENT) split, the USAF created 64 new positions.\(^{4}\) Assuming the USAF needed 64 positions to support 14 C-NAF splits, the USAF likely could not support the 896 manning requirements.

Maj Gen Lawrence Wells, the current 9AF/CC, provided an alternative solution during his interview for this paper. He advocated for the creation of a single standalone NAF to provide oversight to all of ACC’s wings. He postulated that the NAF would need about 100

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\(^{4}\) The 9AF UMD contains 84 total billets. However, as part of the split 20 billets were shifted from 9AF (AFCENT) to 9AF, leaving the USAF to fill 64 new billets. Maj John Sherinian (Executive Officer, Ninth Air Force), interview by the author, 27 April 2012.
personnel to provide direct oversight of the wings, to advocate for their needs, and to coordinate the administrative functions. In this role, a single General Officer with staff could perform the critical administrative oversight to the wings. With the wings cared for, the MAJCOM could maintain focus on its organize, train, and equip responsibilities.\(^5\)

Assuming the USAF needed the same 100 positions to create a NAF for the 10 MAJCOMs, the USAF likely could not support the 1000 additional manning requirements.

There is, however, a third option - the USAF could eliminate the NAFs altogether. The NAF once served a critical function as a command echelon to support the large force structure. However, based on the 1991 reorganization, the NAFs no longer maintain OPCON over their assigned wings. Today, with only limited ADCON authority, the NAF has become a redundant administrative layer.\(^6\) In fact, in many aspects today’s NAFs resemble the Air Divisions eliminated by Gen McPeak in the early 1990s. Eliminating the NAF would not be an easy undertaking; however, it provides an “opportunity to streamline headquarters” as discussed in the 2012 Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy with Constrained Budgets.\(^7\)

The truth is, the elimination of NAFs is already occurring. By the end of 2012, the USAF will eliminate 13AF, 19AF, and Seventeenth Air Force. In each case, the USAF is creating manning savings while shifting the NAF responsibilities to other organizations.\(^8\) In the case of 13AF and 19AF, most mission functions are being absorbed into the A-staff that

\(^5\) Maj Gen Lawrence Wells (Commander Ninth Air Force), interview by the author, 27 April 2012.

\(^6\) The NAF provides oversight to through stan/eval, safety, logistics, administrative, and some legal responsibilities. Sherinian, Interview.

\(^7\) *Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy and Constrained Budget*, 1 February 2012.

\(^8\) The 13AF closure eliminates 108 billets to include two GO positions and 19AF closure saves 18 billets to include one GO position. Steen, e-mail. Col Jeffrey Cowan (AETC Chief, Standardization and Evaluation Division), interview by the author, 23 April 2012.
already provides oversight. As for the administrative and legal functions, the gaining MAJCOMs chose to split them between their A3 and the HQ staffs. Again, these were not easy decisions and the transition will be difficult, but the USAF made the right decision with the bigger picture in mind. The exact savings to the USAF in closing the NAFs clearly requires further study. Nevertheless, as the USAF moves to the smallest force since before 1947, it is clear the requirements for the NAF are shrinking with it.

Balance

Shifting away from standardization, the next element to focus on is the balance within the Component staffs. Throughout the AFFOR C2 Enabling documents, the Concept refers to the importance of balance and cross-functional staffs. Yet, at no time did the Concept provide specific requirements to the Components. This is understandable due to the diversity of the C-NAFs and the sheer workload of solving the problem. While, the Concept should be more directive in nature, the reality is that this is an USAF issue. In order to address the issue, the USAF must force the creation of actual cross-functional, balanced Component Command staffs and then ensure highly qualified officers fill the positions.

The first step is to create the balanced staff. To accomplish this, the USAF must force each Component Command to modify its unit-manning document (UMD). The modifications must ensure that the manning is functionally appropriate to meet the actual mission requirements for the UCC. In doing so, a Component must create balance from the General Officer level down to the senior leader level, and finally to the action officer level. This does not imply the requirement for more personnel; instead, it calls for the redesignation of positions to meet the operational realities.
To provide an example, let us say the 12AF (AFCENT) mission breakdown is 50% mobility, 30% ISR, and 20% Combat Air Force tasks. In this case, the 3-star Commander should possess a mobility background to support Theater Security Cooperation throughout the UCC. The 1-star Vice Commander should have ISR experience. Finally, the A3 or A5 should possess a fighter/bomber background. From there, the remainder of the senior leadership, all the way down to the Division Chiefs, would possess a variety of experience levels. Further, the action officers throughout the staff must contain a proportional mix of fighter, bomber, space, mobility, and cyber officers. If a contingency operation occurred that required a different personnel mix, the core staff would contain enough balance to get the Component through the initial response until the arrival of augmentation forces.

Creating a balanced UMD is only half of the solution. The second half requires the USAF and the MAJCOMs to fill the staff with the right kind of people. Today, the USAF hierarchy for staff matches is 1) Joint Staff, 2) Joint Other, 3) HAF, 4) MAJCOM, and 5) NAF. This means that the top rated officers fill the Joint Staff job, the next level fills the Joint Others, so on, and so forth. Therefore, for the C-NAF staffs, the USAF fills the staffs with its “lowest” rated officers. As a result, most of the officers working in the Component Commands are non-school selects or passed over majors and lieutenant colonels. The exceptions are the few General Officer requested by name or the advanced studies group matches. This is not to say the “lowest-rated” officers are unable to work or succeed, it simply indicates the USAF is not placing those officers it typically deems promotion worthy on the Component Command staffs. This is in direct conflict with the Component Commanders. Typically, only the 3-star Generals the USAF considers for a future 4-star position

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9 In this case, the term NAF represents both the Basic NAF and Component NAF staffs.
fill the Commander role. Therefore, we provide our best Generals with the lowest priority staffs. Worse, the USAF relies on these staffs to provide the USAF airpower perspective to the CCDR’s staff, which contains the best officers from across the Services.

To fix the staffing problem, the USAF must change the staff match hierarchy to focus the right personnel into the Component Command staffs. For an officer leaving Intermediate Developmental Education (IDE), the hierarchy should be 1) Joint Staff, 2) Joint Other, 3) Component, 4) HAF, and 5) MAJCOM. This structure allows the USAF to place those it deems most capable into the Joint jobs, but more importantly, it makes the first USAF-level job for an IDE graduate the Component Command. Conversely, for an officer leaving Senior Developmental Education (SDE) the hierarchy should change to 1) Joint Staff, 2) Joint Other, 3) HAF, 4) Component, and 5) MAJCOM. This continues to demonstrate the importance of the Component staffs, but allows the USAF to groom its young senior leaders for future leadership positions.

The two different hierarchies provide officers multiple opportunities to work on the Component staff. If leaving IDE, an officer works at the Joint Staff-level gaining the strategic and joint experience; then, when the same officer leaves SDE or the next subsequent staff duty, the officer should fill a Component job. This will provide the officer the exposure to the operational-level and the cross-functional staff. The staff combinations are end-less and no two officers will have the exact same experiences. However, the end goal must be that by the time an officer reaches colonel or general, he or she has worked on a Component staff at least once. This will provide these officers the operational-level experience needed.
As a secondary benefit, as the Components contain a cross-functional balance, the officers on that staff will gain knowledge and experience about the other functional areas. This broadening will make the officer better, it will make them more valuable to the USAF, and it will make them better senior officers. More importantly, it might someday provide the means to reduce or even eliminate the stovepipes among the senior officers.

*Timely Execution*

The final element to discuss is how to provide the ability to seamlessly transition from day-to-day operations to contingency operations in a timely fashion. Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to fix this issue. The USAF can only fix this problem through a combination of factors. First, the USAF must develop a standard Component structure without an intermediate command layer interrupting effective communication between the Component and the UCC. Second, the Component staff must maintain a cross-functional operational balance to support the full ROMO for its mission set. This ensures the Components have some expertise ready to support the UCC. Most importantly, the Component staff must train and exercise in a variety of operational environments. This training must include the core mission sets and the most likely natural disasters. If the Components fail in anyone of these three areas, it will be difficult for them to respond in a timely fashion.

The recommendations provided above do not represent easy or fast solutions. Regardless, they are required for the USAF to provide optimal operational-level planning and execution to the UCC. To implement these proposals, the USAF must break away from existing practice, think outside the box, and take risks. The USAF must follow the recommendations so that one-day working on a Component staff
becomes just important in an USAF officer’s professional development as working on the Joint Staff.

**Implications**

Enacting these changes is critical to the future success of the USAF at the operational-level. If the USAF does not make these changes soon, it will remain unprepared for joint operations. It will continue showing up late to the fight and lacking in the operational-level expertise as compared to our joint partners. It will continue to develop stove piped leaders lacking the depth in Air Force operational employment options needed in the Joint Community. The way it was cannot address the way it will be in the future.
### Appendix A: 2012 Component Command Construct

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<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
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<td>9AF</td>
<td>Basic NAF</td>
<td>NAF to ACC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFCENT</td>
<td>C-NAF</td>
<td>C-NAF Only(3)</td>
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<td>12AF (AFSOUTH)</td>
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<td>Dual-hatted as C-NAF and ACC NAF (2)</td>
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<td>L-MAJCOM</td>
<td>Senior Component to USSOCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-MAJCOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Dual-hatted as C-NAF and AFSOC NAF (1)</td>
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<td>C-MAJCOM</td>
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<td>Dual-hatted as C-NAF and AFSPC NAF (1)</td>
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<td>13AF (AFPAC)</td>
<td>C-NAF</td>
<td>Dual-hatted as C-NAF and PACAF NAF (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be inactivated in FY 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7AF (AFKOR)</td>
<td>C-NAF</td>
<td>Dual-hatted as C-NAF and PACAF NAF (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5AF</td>
<td>Basic NAF</td>
<td>NAF to PACAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>May be designated C-NAF with no AOC in FY 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11AF</td>
<td>C-NAF</td>
<td>Dual-hatted C-NAF and PACAF NAF/No AOC (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFE</td>
<td>C-MAJCOM</td>
<td>Senior Component to USEUCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dual-hatted as Commander AFAFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3AF (AFEUR)</td>
<td>C-NAF</td>
<td>Dual-hatted as C-NAF and USAFE NAF (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFAFRICA</td>
<td>C-NAF</td>
<td>C-NAF Only – No AOC (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. PAD 07-13 Case 1: C-NAF with C-MAJCOM
2. PAD 07-13 Case 2: C-NAF without C-MAJCOM
3. C-NAF without C-MAJCOM and not dual-hatted
4. C-NAF with C-MAJCOM and no AOC
5. C-MAJCOM without C-NAF but with an AOC
6. C-NAF without C-MAJCOM, not dual-hatted, and No AOC
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