DEFENSE OR DIPLOMACY?
GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS

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Concerns over issues such as the militarization of foreign policy and current fiscal realities in the United States could lead to decreased relevance, downsizing, and/or dissolution of the Geographic Combatant Command unless the commands are able to redefine their contribution to Phase Zero contributions. In a globalized, increasingly complex security environment, there will be a corresponding increase in diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. Currently, the Department of Defense shoulders the lion’s share of the load for “Phase Zero operations,” those operations designed to assure or solidify relationships with US friends and allies. This mission clearly overlaps with the responsibilities of the Department of State. Recent congressionally mandated studies cite this imbalance and recommend changes that could affect the future of the Geographic Combatant Command. By recognizing and adapting to the changing environment, the Defense Department can better contribute to the increased national security of the United States.
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Introduction

If we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all of the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad.

—Robert Gates
Secretary of Defense

The United States provides some form of security assistance to about 150 countries.

—Department of State
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

Over a span of almost 50 years, the greatest danger to the United States was the Soviet Union. The Soviets posed an existential threat; the very survival of the nation depended on a constant, cautious resistance to Soviet power. Within this scenario, one department of the United States Government thrived. The Department of Defense (DOD) emerged from the Cold War as the United States’ most powerful department.

The post-Cold War era has seen the continued dominance of the Department of Defense within the US Government, yet the challenge set has changed. The United States, now confronted with threats posed by weak and failing states, faces a new international system. The current system is comprised of influential non-state actors, failing long-standing oligarchies, and emerging democracies. One obvious question emerges: Is the Department of Defense properly structured to face this new environment?

Recently, changes emerged within the Defense Department illustrating the dynamic modern security environment. There is now a new “phase” in joint publications. Phase Zero is an all-encompassing phase in campaign planning used to incorporate activities to shape the international environment. Nevertheless, a closer review of this new phase reveals its similarities to State Department roles and missions. This thesis examines these issues and ultimately offers recommendations to the Department of Defense to better integrate with the State Department.
Chapter 1 offers background on the situation. It begins with a case study of ancient Rome. It presents and debunks the analogy of the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Commander as a Roman Proconsul. It then reviews the history of the Geographic Combatant Command as established by the Unified Command Plan. It reviews the original missions and finally discusses the current roles and missions.

Chapter 2 further defines Phase Zero operations. It begins with a review of joint publications and the importance of establishing democracies with a particular emphasis on US Southern Command and US Africa Command. Chapter 3 then reviews the Department of State (DOS). It begins with an examination of the establishment of ambassadors and embassies in the international system. It then moves to the responsibilities of the Department of State, namely diplomacy and development. Next, Chapter 3 reviews the establishment of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). It concludes with a short look at why the State Department is woefully underfunded compared to the Defense Department.

Chapter 4 begins with an assessment of the current US methods of operation in shaping the international system. It then introduces some objections to those shaping operations. Chapter 4 concludes with an examination of the militarization of foreign policy. Chapter 5 opens with calls for change in the current methods of operation starting with recommendations for reorganizing the National Security Apparatus. It then analyzes some of the more prominent recommendations for change in the current US system. It concludes with a review of what those changes could mean for the Department of Defense.

Chapter 6 offers recommendations for the Department of Defense. The US Congress recognizes a need for more integration of the Defense and State Departments, but severely limits the funding options to make those changes. Nevertheless, there are ways for the Defense Department to better integrate with the State Department within the current realities established by Congress. This chapter details these ways.

Ultimately, current fiscal realities in the realm of US foreign policy could lead to decreased relevance, downsizing, and/or dissolution of the Geographic Combatant Command unless GCCs are able to redefine their contribution to Phase Zero. In an age of increasing democracies, globalization, multinational corporations, and non-
governmental organizations, there will be a corresponding increase in diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. Currently, the Department of Defense shoulders the lion’s share of the load for Phase Zero operations, those operations designed to cultivate and solidify relationships with friends and allies.¹ This mission clearly overlaps with the responsibilities of the DOS. Recent congressionally mandated studies cite this imbalance and recommend changes that could affect the future of the Geographic Combatant Command. By recognizing and adapting to the changing environment, the Defense Department can better contribute to increased security of the United States.

¹ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (26 December 2006), IV-35.
Chapter 1

Background

As is fitting of any study of length, this work begins with a look to history. The concept in question is the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and the GCC commander. Research of the GCC revealed a prevalence of hearsay and incomplete analogies. This chapter will review the most common analogy and then offer a fact-based history of the GCC.

General Anthony Zinni, USMC, retired, invoked the analogy of a Roman Proconsul when discussing his time as the US Central Command commander.¹ Yuen Kong offered a description of the concept of historical analogy. Kong stated, “The term historical analogy signifies an inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another.”² Kong later explained that while analogies are often used poorly, they still offer a structure to help humans make sense of their environment.³ Thus, in an attempt to further the study of the GCC it is time to turn the pages of history to examine the Roman Proconsul. Such an examination will determine the validity of the analogy.

Roman Proconsul

Rome makes an interesting analogy in relation to the United States. Rome had a republic government with checks and balances inherent in the combination of governing bodies. The consuls represented monarchy, the senate represented aristocracy, and the popular assemblies represented democracy.⁴ Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, USA, retired, detailed the development of this government. “Rome was originally ruled by

¹ Priest, Dana. *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military*, (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), 70. General Zinni stated that he had become a “modern-day proconsul, descendant of the warrior-statesman who rules the Roman Empire’s outlying territory, bringing order and ideals from a legalistic Rome.”
kings, but late in the sixth century BC it had become a republic with two chief magistrates, consuls, who were elected annually. Until the Second Punic War—against Carthage and Hannibal—the consuls had had charge of the government and also led the armies in the field.”

As the Roman Empire expanded, Rome’s government evolved. Although, as Lily Taylor described, there were still class divisions with consuls coming from family lines approaching the status of nobility. Colonel Dupuy explained the origin of the proconsuls, “When Rome’s increasing power and responsibility made it necessary to increase the number of Roman legions, and to maintain armies in widely separated provinces, command had been extended to other officials.” As consuls only served for one year, they quickly handed over power in Rome but governors were needed in other parts of the empire. The Roman Empire was divided into provinces and, after his term in Rome, a consul would normally be appointed governor of one of the provinces.

Outgoing consuls were known as proconsuls when they served abroad. It was normal to give the proconsuls a prestigious governorship of an important province as a reward for service as consul.

Reverend Lawrence Heber Waddy explained a well-known Roman’s ascension to proconsul. “Outside Rome something more was needed, and so [Augustus] was granted ‘Proconsular Power’ for ten years. Proconsuls were men who passed on from the magistracy at Rome to be provincial governors and Generals of the frontier armies. By possessing this power, Augustus was recognized as the Commander-in-Chief of the troops in every province…. [The position] did not carry with it any power in Rome and Italy, but it made Augustus the arbiter of war and peace throughout the Empire.”

Edward Gibbon explained this authority given to the generals was not a violation of the principles of the constitution.

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7 Dupuy, *The Military Life of Julius Caesar, Imperator*, 4-5.
As this study relates to events in the United States, there is a particularly relevant case study of the Roman Proconsul Agricola. He had served in Britain as a junior officer and as a legionary commander before his governorship. He also held the consulship, like all governors of Britain. Following is Tacitus’ account of Agricola’s Romanization policy.

Practical and thorough, he was a good soldier as well as a capable administrator. The following winter was given over to highly expedient projects. In order to make the Britons, scattered and uncivilized as they were, and therefore easily given to war, accustomed to peace and inactivity by means of the attractions of pleasure, he encouraged individuals, and subsidized communities, to build temples and shopping centres and grand houses. He praised those who listened to his hints, and made the idle regret their tardiness. Competition for his favour thus took the place of compulsion. He had the sons of chieftains educated in the so-called liberal studies. He expressed admiration for the natural ability of Britons. … And so men who at one moment turned from the Roman tongue in disgust, with the next breath aped our eloquence. Then they began to prize Roman dress, and the toga appeared everywhere. Gradually they descended to the allurements of vice—colonnades and baths and sumptuous dinners. Little knowing, they called this “civilization,” when really it was part and parcel of their slavery.¹³

Waddy argues that Tacitus’ portrayal of Romanization as equal to slavery is a stretch,¹⁴ but is willing to give Tacitus a pass because he wrote Agricola, which Waddy used to gain the caption above.¹⁵ Tacitus was a cynical and bitter historian and was Agricola’s son-in-law.¹⁶ Tacitus even offered a compliment to Agricola that he behaved justly among civilians.¹⁷ Thus, while the account may be cynical it is most likely historically accurate. Even Edward Gibbon relies on Tacitus’ accounting of events in his famous “The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.”¹⁸ As such, it is unwise to disregard it outright, as it is similar to events today where GCC commanders import western ideals.

This case study reflects the current sentiment of the Roman Proconsul as it relates to the GCC commander. General Anthony Zinni, USMC, retired, was the commander of

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¹³ Waddy, Pax Romana and World Peace, 156.
¹⁴ Waddy, Pax Romana and World Peace, 156.
¹⁵ Waddy, Pax Romana and World Peace, 156. Note 37 on page 184 refers the reader to the Bibliographical entry Agricola on page 236.
¹⁶ Waddy, Pax Romana and World Peace, 37, 61, 149.
¹⁷ Waddy, Pax Romana and World Peace, 114.
¹⁸ Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 25. See Gibbon’s note 4 from page 25. In it, he describes that he borrows language from Tacitus to describe events.
US Central Command. Dana Priest describes General Zinni’s experience as a GCC commander, wherein General Zinni found that in many ways he was treated as a modern-day proconsul bringing order and ideals from America.\textsuperscript{19} Although Zinni’s role did not involve “slavery” as Tacitus described, it did include the infusion and acceptance of ideals regarding the West’s republican institutions. With the foundation of the Roman Proconsul established, it is now possible to move forward to the United States’ establishment of Geographic Combatant Commands in order to examine the comparison and its validity.

**Why was the US GCC created?**

The history of the Geographic Combatant Command is tied to the history of the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The idea of unified command was born in World War II. Ronald Cole detailed the history of the UCP in *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993*. Published by the Joint History Office in Washington, DC, this document offers highlights pertinent to this study.

- Unified command over US operational forces was adopted during World War II. It was a natural concomitant of the system of combined (US-British) command set up during that conflict by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Unified command called for a single commander, responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] assisted by a joint staff, and exercising command over all the units of his assigned force, regardless of Service. The system was generally applied during World War II in the conduct of individual operations within geographic theater commands. Even before the war ended, the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] envisioned retention of the unified command system in peacetime.\textsuperscript{20}

- The impetus for the establishment of a postwar system of unified command over US military forces worldwide stemmed from the Navy’s dissatisfaction with [the] divided command in the Pacific. On 1 February 1946, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] characterized the existing arrangement, with Army and Navy forces under separate command, as “ambiguous” and “unsatisfactory.” He favored establishing a single command over the entire Pacific Theater (excluding Japan, Korea, and China), whose commander would have a joint staff and would exercise “unity of command” over all US forces in the theater.\textsuperscript{21}

- [The Outline Command Plan,] which was in effect the first Unified Command Plan, was approved by President Truman on 14 December 1946. It called for the

\textsuperscript{19} Priest, *The Mission*, 70. General Zinni stated that he had become a “modern-day proconsul, descendant of the warrior-statesman who rules the Roman Empire’s outlying territory, bringing order and ideals from a legalistic Rome.”


eventual establishment, as an “interim measure for the immediate postwar period,” of seven unified commands.\textsuperscript{22}

- Approval of the UCP [Unified Command Plan] did not in itself establish the commands named in the command; a separate implementing directive was required for each command. The first three to be created were the Far East Command (FECOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Alaskan Command (ALCOM). A JCS directive of 16 December 1946 established these commands effective 1 January 1947.\textsuperscript{23}

- On 16 February 1950, the JCS removed the statement “interim measure” from the Unified Command Plan.\textsuperscript{24}


- By 1958, President Eisenhower had become convinced that rapidly developing military technology, as dramatized by the launching of the first Soviet satellite, Sputnik, demanded a more unified and streamlined chain of command to deploy combat forces. The days of separate land, sea, and air warfare were over, the President believed; therefore complete unification of all military planning and combat forces and commands was essential. To this end, the President proposed and the Congress enacted the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, amending the National Security Act of 1947. The new law authorized the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of the JCS, to establish unified and specified commands, to assign missions to them, and to determine their force structure.\ldots The intent of the new law was to establish a clear line of command from the President through the Secretary, with the JCS as the Secretary’s operational staff. The commanders of unified and specified commands were made responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for carrying out assigned missions and were delegated full ‘operational command’ over forces assigned to them.\ldots By separate executive action, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, discontinued the designation of military departments as executive agents for unified and specified commands. Henceforth, the chain of command would run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commanders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned to serve as the Secretary’s staff in performing this function.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{22} Ronald H. Cole et al., \textit{The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993}, 13.
\textsuperscript{24} Ronald H. Cole et al., \textit{The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993}, 18.
In 1993, the Secretary of the Army lost his role as Executive Agent for many ‘peacekeeping’ operations; the UCP now assigned combatant command over peacekeeping forces to the appropriate [combatant commander].

The end of the Cold War triggered dramatic changes in the US military establishment but not in the UCP, because unified command structure was the product of different factors.

The UCP is still in use today; however, as a classified document it is impossible to cover the details contained within it in this forum. The Department of Defense website describes the current UCP: “The Department of Defense has updated the Unified Command Plan, a key strategic document that establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of combatant commands. The UCP 2008, signed by President Bush 17 December 2008, codifies USAFRICOM [US Africa Command] and assigns several new missions to the combatant commanders; and assigns all combatant commanders responsibility for planning and conducting military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.”

What was its original mission? Has that mission changed? Current GCC Roles and Responsibilities

The original mission of the GCC as detailed in the UCP was to facilitate unified command over military forces in a geographic region. That mission remains today. Joint Publication (JP) 1 states, “GCCs are assigned a geographic AOR [Area of Responsibility] by the President with the advice of the SecDef [Secretary of Defense] as specified in the UCP.”

JP 1 provides a table of common functions of the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

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30 Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (20 March 2009), III-12.
This review demonstrates that the functions of the GCC have not changed appreciably since their creation. JP 1 also lists some responsibilities specific to the commanders of the GCCs. They are to “deter attacks on the United States, its territories, possessions and bases, and employ appropriate force should deterrence fail; and carry out assigned missions and tasks and plan for and execute military operations, as directed, in support of strategic guidance.”\(^{31}\) While this list reveals little, it does lay the foundation that the GCCs are to make plans. In order to delve further into the plans relevant to this study, it is necessary to broaden the review.

In November 2005, the Department of Defense issued DOD Directive 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, and then reissued the same in September 2009 updating policy and responsibilities. Of note, there is a section identifying tasks for the Combatant Commands. Of the eight tasks, four are pertinent to this study: b, d, e, and g.

The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:

b. Integrate stability operations tasks and considerations into their Theater Campaign Plans, theater strategies, and applicable DOD-directed plans.

Align DOD theater strategies and plans with complementary stability operations-related capabilities, strategies, and plans of other US Government agencies, foreign government and security forces, and the private sector, as they mature and capacity increases.

d. In coordination with the USD(P) [Under Secretary of Defense for Policy], support efforts of other US Government agencies and international partners to develop stability operations-related plans.

e. Gather lessons learned from stability operations and disseminate them to the DOD Components and US Government agencies as appropriate.

g. Provide recommendations to incorporate roles and responsibilities into the Unified Command Plan based on stability operations tasks and responsibilities.\(^{32}\)

The Secretary of Defense’s Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) are classified documents that task the Combatant Commanders to create plans. As of 2005, and as directed by DOD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, those plans are to include stability operations. Thus, the DoD created a new phase to add to the normal operational phases of a plan. \textit{Phase Zero} is the moniker for those operations that take place before, during, and after combat operations; i.e., stability operations. The GCC commander is tasked with many duties, the details of which are classified. Nonetheless, enough information is available to shed light on the original investigation of the analogy of the Geographic Combatant Command commander as a Roman Proconsul.

The use of the historical analogy of the Roman Proconsul is a tool to help characterize the roles of the current GCC and GCC commander; however, it ultimately falls prey to Khong’s prediction and fails as a relevant analogy. Khong warns that, “More often than not, decision-makers invoke inappropriate analogues that not only fail to illuminate the new situation but also mislead by emphasizing superficial and irrelevant parallels.”\(^{33}\)


\(^{33}\) Khong, \textit{Analogies at War}, 12.
There are some similarities between the modern-day GCC commander and Roman Proconsul as General Zinni highlighted. The modern-day commander is responsible for some aspects of diplomacy, whether or not this is beneficial. Nevertheless, GCC commanders are not former US presidents rewarded for their service by being given governmental control of portions of a US Empire and command of thousands of military forces to use as they see fit. GCC commanders are recommended by the president and approved by the Senate as the lead military liaison of the United States to the countries within their purview. Thus, while providing an interesting study, the analogy of the Roman Proconsul is not completely legitimate. If, as some have recommended, the GCC commander was subordinated to a regional Ambassador to form some sort of “super Ambassador” with control over DOD and DOS actions for a region, then the analogy of a Roman Proconsul would be appropriate if applied to the “super Ambassador.”

While there are some similarities, the Roman Proconsul, is not a completely valid analogy for a current US GCC commander. Nevertheless, there is room for more DOD and DOS integration in US operations. Thus, the next step in this study of the integration of the Departments of Defense and State is to examine the details of Phase Zero operations.

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34 Priest, *The Mission*, 70. General Zinni described meeting with African kings and princes, emirs, presidents and prime ministers, defense chiefs, and military officers.

35 See STRATEGOS The Journal of the United States Military Strategist Association Volume II, ISSUE 2 Fall 2010 INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A WORKABLE SOLUTION, BY MAJOR BENJAMIN J. FERNANDES. On page 35, MAJ Fernandes (USA) recommends “The six regional military Combatant Commands (COCOM) should become regional ITFs [Interagency Task Force] (RITF) subordinate to a ‘Super’ Ambassador or regional security director appointed by the President.”
Chapter 2

Phase Zero

The next step in this research is to further define Phase Zero operations. In 2006, General Charles Wald, the Deputy Commander of US European Command (USEUCOM), discussed Phase Zero in Joint Forces Quarterly. He stated, “The traditional four phases of a military campaign identified in joint publications are deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. Phase Zero encompasses all activities prior to the beginning of Phase I—that is, everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place.”1 General Wald continued by stating, “The primary goal of Phase Zero is to invest fewer resources in a pre-crisis situation to avoid an exponentially larger expenditure later.”2

The State Department also described the need for this type of operation. Despite their complexity, patterns emerge in the causes and enabling conditions of these conflicts. The link between internal conflict and weak governance stands out. Fragile states are unable to provide physical security and basic services for their citizens due to lack of control over physical territory, massive corruption, criminal capture of government institutions, feudal gaps between rich and poor, an absence of social responsibility by elites, or simply grinding poverty and the absence of any tradition of functioning government.3

This highlights the shared understanding between the State and Defense Departments that intervention before a crisis is more beneficial than response after.

General Wald and USEUCOM refrained from taking credit for originating the concept of Phase Zero but maintained that the concept was a central element of the command’s theater strategy.4 With a focus on Phase Zero, USEUCOM’s goal was to “sustain Phase Zero engagements with no transition to subsequent conflict...[making] it more appropriate to describe Phase Zero as a campaign in and of itself—a new kind of campaign that must be fought continuously by US joint forces in concert with the

interagency community and in cooperation with allies and partner nations.”

From this genesis, Phase Zero has continued to evolve.

Currently, there are six distinct phases defined in joint publications, from Phase Zero to Phase Five. Joint Publication 5-0 (JP5-0) defines a phase as “a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.” JP5-0 further explains that phasing is a way to arrange operations and “that it assists commanders in systematically achieving objectives that cannot be achieved concurrently by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence.” The Joint Publication then depicts a figure that details one phase that is distinctly different from all other phases as it takes place before Operation Plan (OPLAN) activation, during OPLAN execution, and after OPLAN termination.

![Figure 2 JP 5-0 Notional Operation Plan Phases](image)

Source: Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, IV-34.

Phase Zero is now known as the Shaping Phase and, as depicted in Figure 2, encompasses global shaping, theater shaping, and operational shaping. JP5-0 defines

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7 Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, IV-33.
shaping as “joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities [that] are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. [Shaping activities] are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives.”

The Joint Publication goes on to explain that Phase Zero activities occur in the context of day-to-day operations and as such are beyond the scope of JP5-0.

What are the purposes of Phase Zero? JP5-0 suggests Phase Zero operations “are designed to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with peacetime access.” This statement requires a more detailed examination of the different claims.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directs the preparation of JP5-0. Its stated intent is to “provide military guidance for the exercise of authority by Combatant Commanders and other Joint Force Commanders.” The initial, and thus primary, stated intent for shaping operations is “to assure success.” This phrase implies some type of competition or confrontation in which the United States is seeking victory. Thus, the Chairman is directing combatant commanders first to seek victory through operations that shape the initial context in political, diplomatic, environmental, military, economic, and social terms.

The next phrase describes how the United States can achieve its goals. The combatant commander is to “shape perceptions and influence behavior.” The less politically correct, single word, that describes this is manipulate. Who are the combatant commanders to manipulate? They are to act on both adversaries and allies. Adversaries are a given. Allies, however, are less inclined to be manipulated. With one seemingly innocuous phrase, the Chairman is directing his combatant commanders to achieve

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8 Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, IV-35.
9 Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, IV-35.
10 Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, IV-35.
11 Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, i.
success in a competition with our allies through their manipulation. Of the four stated objectives, the middle two (developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing) are less controversial and thus will not be discussed. Nonetheless, the final charge to the commanders is again troubling.

Shaping operations are to “provide US forces with peacetime access.” The layman’s phrase would be to get a foot in the door. One does not have to exercise too much imagination to envision why the Chairman would issue such guidance. Combat deployments are typically to locations previously visited by US forces. Turkey surprised the United States when it denied access to stage US forces from Turkish territory for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), but this situation may not be isolated. The combatant commanders, charged with executing shaping operations, provide a better description than the Joint Publication of the actual goal.

General Douglas Fraser, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Commander, discussed his vision of SOUTHCOM’s shaping goals. “As globalization trends continue, our security will depend upon expanding cooperative engagement with multinational, multi-agency, and public-private partners in our hemisphere. We will be better able to meet complex challenges of the twenty-first century security environment by building robust, enduring partnerships now. Together we are stronger and more effective than working as a single organization or nation operating individually. Our vision embodies this belief.” General Fraser highlights globalization as a driving force for cooperative engagement. Another force is the increase in the numbers of democracies.

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12 Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, IV-35.
14 General Douglas M. Fraser, “Posture Statement of General Douglas M. Fraser, United States Air Force Commander, United States Southern Command before the 111th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee,” (2010), 2.
Immanuel Kant wrote *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* in 1795. In it, he introduced the idea of a federation growing to encompass all states. He stated, “The practicability (objective reality) of this idea of federation, which should gradually spread to all states and thus lead to perpetual peace, can be proved. For if fortune directs that a powerful and enlightened people can make itself a republic, which by its nature must be inclined to perpetual peace, this gives a fulcrum to the federation with other states so that they may adhere to it and thus secure freedom under the idea of the law of nations. By more and more such associations, the federation may be gradually extended.” Kant’s idea informs the United States’ desire to spread democracy.

As Kant described, democracies are less inclined to war with other democracies than with other forms of government. Thus, the more democracies there are in the world, the less wars there will be. In 2007, Freedom House listed 123 electoral democracies. In 2009, the Journal of Democracy stated there are 121 electoral democracies, “assuming a feasible democratic ideal.” The US Department of State declared there were forty new electoral democracies in the past twenty years. No matter the source, as the Journal of Democracy highlighted, democracy is “almost universally valued, institutionalized in more than three-fifths of the world’s states, and demanded by large movements in many among the remaining two-fifths.” As a leading democracy in the world, the United States shoulders the burden of helping to develop democracies as a way to reduce the likelihood of future war. While an important mission, there is little actual guidance given to Geographic Combatant Command commanders detailing how to execute this mission. Nevertheless, as discussed below, Phase Zero is clearly intended to help develop and support fledgling democracies.

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22 Gilley, "Is Democracy Possible," 113.
The classified Joint Strategic Cooperation Plan (JSCP) mandates GCCs to accomplish Phase Zero planning, yet there is no Joint Publication that addresses the doctrine of Phase Zero planning. Geographic Combatant Commands normally detail their Phase Zero operations in their classified Security Cooperation Plans (SCP). Although US Central Command (CENTCOM) is obviously engaged in other phases of operation in its conduct of OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), some commands, such as US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and SOUTHCOM, are primarily focused on Phase Zero shaping activities and thus pour considerable resources into this ill-defined endeavor.

This focus on Phase Zero activities yields staffs of thousands of personnel that are dedicated to planning and overseeing shaping activities. For example, AFRICOM has a staff of approximately 1300 personnel with the expressed mission: “in concert with other US government agencies and international partners, conduct sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy.”23 As of the spring 2009 posture statement, AFRICOM has 27 interagency personnel assigned to the command.24 The commander touts the importance of this interagency involvement stating, “We multiply effects and achieve greater results when we work closely with our [US Government] interagency partners. Having interagency personnel imbedded in our command enhances our planning and coordination….”25

General Fraser discussed SOUTHCOM’s shaping missions during a speech at the Ft. Lauderdale Navy League in April 2010. He began by illustrating the region’s importance to the United States. “The Western Hemisphere is the United States’ largest market with nearly 38 per cent of US trade travelling north and south, equating to $1.5 trillion; we get 52 per cent of our crude oil from this region—only 13 per cent comes from the Persian Gulf; by 2011, US trade with Latin America is expected to exceed trade

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25 Ward, "Statement of Commander before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee," (2009), 37.
with Europe and Japan.”26 He also commented on democracy in the region. “In addition to these demographic and economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean, we share a common commitment to democracy, freedom, justice, and respect for human rights. Compared to three decades ago when the majority of countries in the region were non-democratic, most nations in the region now subscribe to democracy.”27

Based on the comments above, General Fraser then described SOUTHCOM’s shaping mission.

US Southern Command is committed to being a good partner—more to the point, our goal is to be the enduring partner of choice throughout the region. To that end, we work to build partner capability and capacity, and build cooperative security relationships throughout the region. We work with other US federal agencies to enhance cooperation. We work with the private sector, business community, and non-governmental organizations, to combine our individual capabilities to improve our combined impact and effect.28

Clearly, Geographic Combatant Commands, such as SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, are engaged in activities designed to shape other nations.

Radical change may be necessary to usher the United States to the next level of integration between the Departments of Defense and State. As it currently stands, the Department of Defense ultimately shoulders the lion’s share of the load for Phase Zero operations. The next chapter examines whether the State Department is better suited for this role.

As with the first chapter, it is important to begin the review of the Department of State with a nod to history. Thus, this chapter begins with a historical review of the establishment of embassies and ambassadors in general and the Department of State in particular. Following the history of the State Department is a review of its responsibilities and an examination of how those responsibilities led to the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004. Finally, this chapter suggests possible causes for the perpetual underfunding of the State Department.

### Establishment of Ambassadors and Embassies

The history of embassies and ambassadors dates back thousands of years. Over one hundred fifty years ago, an anonymous British author known only as “The Roving Englishman” penned an exhaustive history of embassies and ambassadors, titled, *Embassies and Foreign Courts—A History of Diplomacy.*\(^1\) The history presented herein first examines the US State Department’s views and then draws upon The Roving Englishman’s insights.

The State Department defines diplomacy as “the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations,” and as “skill in handling affairs without causing hostility.”\(^2\) The Department of State traces its diplomatic origins to ancient Mesopotamia, almost 5,000 years ago, where messengers traveled between city-states on missions of war and peace.\(^3\) From Mesopotamia, the State Department’s pedigree moves to ancient Greece where heralds were the first diplomats and diplomatic immunity was introduced.\(^4\) “The Romans later built on the Greek system of diplomacy. They were the first to apply the idea of the sanctity of contracts to treaties with foreign nations — and

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\(^3\) US Department of State, "A History of Diplomacy."

\(^4\) US Department of State, "A History of Diplomacy."
that idea is the foundation for international law today.”

This State Department narrative, however, is incomplete.

The Roving Englishman offered a more complete history. He observed, “The rights of legation seem to be little understood by the ancients.”

Travel between states was infrequent during ancient times and thus there was not a requirement for international laws for diplomacy.

The Roving Englishman argued that the nations of the ancient world had no permanent diplomatic relations with each other. While often credited to the ancient Greeks, the idea of *jus faciale* actually originated with the Romans.

Nevertheless, the codified international system cannot be attributed to the Romans. “Rome was then so mighty, that she considered the whole world as her lawful prize. She regarded all other nations as barbarians, whose subjection dispensed her from the observance of any other laws towards them than those of conquest.”

In other words, since the rest of the world was Rome’s for the taking, there was no need to codify the laws of international interaction. Progress occurred during the intervening period, but the next main event in the history of diplomacy occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

The Roving Englishman stated, “The establishment of permanent embassies took place about the same time as the formation of standing armies. Both these important changes in European policy began to appear towards the end of the fifteenth century, though they did not become general till the sixteenth, after the time of Richelieu and the peace of Westphalia.”

Although the Englishman makes no more of the correlation of

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5 US Department of State, "A History of Diplomacy."
10 US Legal.com defines *jus faciale* (also spelled *jus faciale* and *jus fetiale*) as “a Latin term which represents the law of negotiation and diplomacy. It is a well established tradition of law built upon the principle that ‘therefore the only justification for war is that peace and justice should prevail afterwards.’ This phrase captured the standard notion of international law.” http://definitions.uslegal.com/j/jus-fetiale/ (accessed 15 March 2011).
12 The Roving Englishman, *Embassies and Foreign Courts*, 36. The Roving Englishman made an apparent error in dating the time of Richelieu and the peace of Westphalia. Both events were during the seventeenth century. Nonetheless, this minor error does not detract from the overall validity of his historical accounting.
the establishment of standing armies and permanent embassies, a reasoned inference can connect the two occurrences. With the establishment of standing armies and the security dilemma presented therein, there rose the necessity of permanent representation to assuage fears.\(^\text{13}\)

This period represented the transition to the codified rules of embassies and ambassadors. Once again, the eloquent prose of the Roving Englishman explains the situation with clarity: “At this period, also, first arose discussions as to the representative rank of an ambassador, a point not hitherto fixed. Thus, during that time of transition between the middle ages and modern times, a diplomatic corps was gradually formed at every court, whose business it was to maintain friendly relations between their own governments and that of the country to which they were accredited.”\(^\text{14}\) The United States, among others, continued this tradition.

America’s diplomatic legacy originated with the birth of the nation. The first official US diplomat was Benjamin Franklin, who succeeded in winning French support for the colonies.\(^\text{15}\) With the precedent of Franklin’s overwhelming success as a diplomat, President George Washington created the first cabinet department, the Department of State, in 1789 and appointed Thomas Jefferson as the first Secretary of State.\(^\text{16}\) Upon the shoulders of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, the State Department continues the tradition of being the lead agency for diplomacy. With an understanding of the history of diplomacy, embassies, and ambassadors it is now possible to move forward to the responsibilities of the State Department.

**What are the responsibilities of the DOS?**

Like the Department of Defense, the State Department is a large bureaucratic institution with many duties. The mission statement of the Department of State is, “Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous

\(^{13}\) Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30 (2): 167-214, 1978. In this article, Jervis defined the Security Dilemma stating that many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security in turn decreases the security of other states by inadvertently threatening the other states.


This statement captures the expansive nature of the State Department’s mission. However, this study will be limited to those State Department missions that resemble or match the Defense Department Phase Zero operations.

After assuming responsibility for the State Department, Secretary Hillary Clinton used her experience serving on the Senate Armed Services Committee to extract lessons for her new portfolio as Secretary of State. While a Senator, Secretary Clinton watched the process the DOD used to create the Quadrennial Defense Review document. Impressed, she implemented a similar process for the State Department. Secretary Clinton called for a review of the core missions of the State Department, namely, diplomacy and development. The result of that review is the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The QDDR will form the foundation of this review of the State Department missions that resemble Phase Zero.

There is a fundamental difference (among many) between the State Department and the Defense Department. The State Department relies on individuals and the relationships they build to carry out diplomacy. Without the individual diplomats, the State Department could not operate. The Defense Department relies on airmen, soldiers, marines, and sailors who must be replaceable, as the loss of a single one cannot lead to failure. The person serving beside a recent casualty must be able to immediately begin doing the mission of the deceased. Unlike the military, the QDDR illustrates the State Department’s reliance on individuals: “Our diplomats are the face and the voice of the United States on the ground in countries around the world.”

The QDDR emphasizes that modern diplomats must go beyond engaging with governments; they must also be able to engage with non-state actors. These actors range from “non-governmental organizations to business, religious groups to community organizations.” Diplomats must also recognize the importance of public opinion, even in authoritarian states.

The State Department recognizes that these changes make it important for diplomats not only to meet with their foreign ministry counterparts, but also with tribal

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elders and local authorities.\textsuperscript{22} The QDDR states, “Our diplomats must build partnerships and networks, implement programs, and engage with citizens, groups, and organizations. As they do so, we must ensure that they are equipped and empowered with the skills, resources, strategies, and institutional structures they need to carry out this increasingly important work.”\textsuperscript{23} This illustrates the State Department’s reliance on individual diplomats to complete its mission. The next step is to compare briefly the State Department’s mission to the Defense Department’s mission of stability operations.

The State Department describes its mission as Preventing and Responding to Crisis, Conflict, and Instability.\textsuperscript{24} It focuses on internal conflict, weak or failed governance, and humanitarian emergencies.\textsuperscript{25} This focus plays out almost daily on the front pages of the national news. During the spring of 2011, the world watched the State Department engage in the internal conflict within Libya, weak governance in Pakistan, and a severe humanitarian emergency in Japan. While the State Department dutifully carries out its mission, the DOD has defined a similar mission for itself.

DODI 3000.05 defines stability operations as “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”\textsuperscript{26} This standard military definition is similar to the State Department’s focus discussed above. Nonetheless, the DOD now states that stability operations are a core military mission and that it will be prepared to conduct that mission with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.\textsuperscript{27}

Possibly recognizing a means for increasing its effectiveness, the State Department proposes to work more closely with the Defense Department.\textsuperscript{28} The State Department recognizes the massive logistical, operational, and personnel capacities to

\textsuperscript{22} US Department of State, "Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review," 59.
\textsuperscript{23} US Department of State, "Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review," 59.
\textsuperscript{24} US Department of State, "Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review," 59.
\textsuperscript{25} US Department of State, "Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review," 59.
\textsuperscript{26} US Department of Defense, "Instruction 3000.05." 1.
\textsuperscript{27} US Department of Defense, "Instruction 3000.05." 2.
\textsuperscript{28} US Department of State, "Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review," 121.
operate in crises inherent in the Defense Department. The unanswered question is how are the departments to work together?

In the future, the State Department pledges to create new ways to work with the military. Recognition of the need for integration is a key first step, but the details must be codified. A step in the right direction was a further clarification of the mission of the State Department by the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

What is S/CRS?

The State Department’s mission was further refined in July 2004 when Congress authorized the creation of the State Department’s S/CRS. Congress established the S/CRS as a response to a perceived need within the Executive Branch, Congress, and independent experts for the US Government to develop a more robust capability to prevent conflict when possible. The S/CRS mission is “to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.”

While the S/CRS has a sizable mission that corresponds to the DOD’s Phase Zero mission, it does not have the same resources that are available to the DOD. S/CRS began operations in July 2004 and by early 2005 had a staff of 37 individuals. The S/CRS continued to grow and as of January 2009, had a staff of 112. Of the 112 personnel, only a little over half were State Department personnel, with other executive branch agencies and contractors making up the remainder.

Although the S/CRS had a moderate start, it remains funded and continues to grow. Until 2008, the S/CRS received the majority of its funding through

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32 (S/CRS), "Mission Statement."
33 (S/CRS), "Mission Statement."
congressionally approved transfers from the DOD. In September 2008, Congress passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act. The Act detailed the functions of the S/CRS and created a Civilian Response Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps.  

President Obama saw the relevance of the office and requested funding to develop not only the S/CRS, but also a Civilian Response Corps (CRC). In 2009, “The Obama Administration requested $323.3 million in FY2010 funds to continue developing the CRC active and standby component…and to establish a 2,000-member civilian reserve component.” Nonetheless, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees eliminated funding for the CRC reserve component in their 2010 bills. A question surfaces: Why is the State Department perpetually underfunded?

**Why is DOS underfunded?**

The issue of funding for the Department of State is exceedingly complex and illustrates the domestic and foreign political imperatives, lobbying influences, and changing predilections of Congressional patrons. One analyst, David Kilcullen, helps explain why funding for the diplomatic service remains anemic. He explained that the military industrial complex makes up a substantial portion of the economy of the United States. Kilcullen also noted that many jobs in almost every congressional district are linked to production of conventional war fighting capacity, adding that, “It takes factories, jobs, and industrial facilities to build battleships and bombers, but aid workers, linguists, and Special Forces operators are vastly cheaper and do not demand the same industrial base.” The jobs necessary to build the massive military products are important to the United States economy in the macro sense and to individual congressmen in the micro sense. Military products are also a very visible return on investment, unlike spending dedicated to the State Department which is mainly on personnel.

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“So,” Kilcullen argues, “shifting spending priorities onto currently unconventional forms of warfare would cost jobs and votes in the congressional districts of the very people that control that spending. This makes it structurally difficult for the United States fundamentally to reorient its military capabilities away from conventional war-fighting or to divert a significant proportion of defense spending into civilian capacity” (emphasis added). The United States finds itself in a self-sustaining loop. Military procurement means jobs for Americans, thus votes for congressmen, thus more spending on military procurements.

Congressmen often try to justify this cycle with animosity toward the State Department. On the Fox News channel’s “The O’Reilly Factor,” US Senator Tom Coburn (R) from Oklahoma summed up at least one Congressman’s opinion of the Department of State. When Mr. O’Reilly asked the Senator what we had accomplished with the $1 billion in earthquake aid the US had sent to Haiti, Senator Coburn responded, “About the same as everything else that we do through the State Department, it is highly ineffective and wasteful.”

With this foundational knowledge of the State Department, the Defense Department’s Phase Zero, and the Geographic Combatant Command, the next chapter explores current shaping operations.

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42 Bill O'Reilly, “The O'Reilly Factor,” (USA: Fox News, 12 October 2010).
Chapter 4

Current modus operandi

The next step is to review the current modus operandi of shaping activities. This begins with an appraisal of possible errors in the current policies followed by some general objections to shaping activities. The final portion of the chapter looks into the details of two possible detrimental aspects of shaping activities: the militarization of foreign policy and diminishing overseas access to the US military.

While, as previously mentioned, the actual Theater Security Cooperation Plans for each Geographic Combatant Command are classified, a review of two GCC commanders’ posture statements to Congress will shed light on their Phase Zero operations as well as their interaction with the State Department. All of the commands have shaping phases in their plans, but by their very nature, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and US Africa Command (AFRICOM) are most keenly focused on shaping activities and thus inform this study.

General Douglas M. Fraser, Commander, SOUTHCOM, submitted his posture statement to Congress on 11 March 2010 and argued, “While remaining fully ready for combat operations, diplomacy dominates so much of what we do, and development is a mandatory requisite of true, long-term stability and prosperity.”¹ In his concluding remarks, General Fraser stated he is continuing to seek “‘whole of government’ and in some cases ‘whole of society’ approaches to create a secure and stable environment that sets the conditions for long-term prosperity for the Americas…. We will continue to dedicate the majority of our resources to building and complementing the security capabilities of our partners while encouraging an environment of cooperation among the nations in the region.”² The general’s submission to Congress aptly describes SOUTHCOM’s focus on shaping activities and reveals an intense diplomatic effort by the region’s top uniformed official.

¹ Fraser, “2010 Posture Statement,” 35.
² Fraser, “2010 Posture Statement,” 41.
General William E. Ward, Commander, AFRICOM, submitted his posture statement to Congress on 9-10 March 2010. General Ward highlighted not only the preeminence of shaping operations in AFRICOM but also the importance of integrating interagency partners in accomplishing this mission. He stated,

The construct of US Africa Command is based on the premise that interagency partner integration leads to better planning and greater unity of effort by all USG [US Government] stakeholders. As mentioned in this statement, our national interests have benefited from US Africa Command’s interagency collaboration. Our collective efforts have produced significant positive results in the areas of security sector reform, military professionalization, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster preparedness, pandemic response programs, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.

AFRICOM is continuing to improve its interagency partner integration. It currently has memoranda of agreement with eleven departments and agencies. The most recent departments to join with AFRICOM are the US Geological Survey, the Department of Energy, the US Department of Agriculture, the Department of the Interior, and the Transportation Security Administration. In his oral testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Ward stated that planning is the current area of interagency focus. General Ward concluded his posture statement by reviewing the command’s priority and focus on interagency cooperation and emphasized the United States is most effective when all US agencies work together to meet national security objectives. While AFRICOM is taking the all-important first steps to interagency integration, there is still much work to do in order to integrate fully. Even considering interagency integration, there are those who object to shaping operations altogether.

**Objections to Shaping Operations**

There are critics of both the military and civilian components of the US government being involved with Phase Zero and shaping activities. The opponents of the military involvement claim that the activities create a Combatant Commander with too

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3 General William E. Ward, "Statement of Commander before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee," (9-10 March 2010), 38.
much power, lead to the militarization of US foreign policy, and do not lead to a “whole of government” approach. The militarization of foreign policy is discussed in detail in its own section. The critics of the S/CRS argue that there is no need for shaping activities or that, if shaping is accomplished, it should be done by the military.

The Geographic Combatant Command commander is one of the most powerful US government representatives in the realm of foreign policy. While an Ambassador is the spokesperson for the president in their assigned country, the GCC is responsible for many countries. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory addressed this phenomenon in its Final Report of the Joint Urban Warrior 2009 Exercise. The Final Report notes that “in the US diplomatic community, authority lies with the ambassador, who operates at the country level, while in the US military it is vested at the regional level with the combatant commander. This creates a mismatch of authority with DOD operating at the regional level and State operating at the country level."\(^8\) There is little argument to be made against the vast authority of the GCC commander.

The GCC, as the chief instrument of American foreign relations, is not the only problem critics see with the military Phase Zero operations. Many see an imbalance between civilian and military capacity in foreign relations. Ideally, the civilian sector would take the lead in foreign policy, or at the least, the responsibility would be shared equally. Nonetheless, the Congressional Research Service notes that “the highly unequal allocation of resources between the Departments of Defense, State and USAID, hinder their ability to act as ‘equal partners’ and could lead to the militarization of development and diplomacy.”\(^9\) The Joint Urban Warrior Final Report pinpoints the imbalance, stating, “The [US government] is drastically unbalanced with respect to military/civilian ratios (210:1 in personnel, 350:1 in budget).”\(^10\) Dr. Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the US Naval War College, also discussed the imbalance. In his book *Exporting Security*, Dr. Reveron cites both former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and current Vice President Joe Biden expressing concern over the heavy military

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The concerns listed above are valid, but the Congressional Research Service worries about possible militarization of foreign policy, when in reality it is already militarized.

There are also critics of S/CRS involvement in shaping activities. The first critical view is that shaping activities are unnecessary and potentially detrimental. Nina Serafino of the Congressional Research Service quotes two think-tank studies that dispute the concept that weak and failing states are among the most significant threats to the United States. They point out that “weak states are not the only locations where terrorists have found recruits or sought safe-haven as they have exploited discontent and operated in developed countries as well.” A report of the Center for Global Development lists demography, politics, religion, culture, and geography as factors that contribute to the development of terrorism. A focus on shaping activities in weak and failing states may actually be detrimental, and Ms. Serafino suggests that the emphasis may lead the United States to overlook more tangible threats and greater areas of interest. This view, however, ignores the reality of events such as the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Of course, terrorists can exist in developed countries, but the safe havens for their training exist in the ungoverned spaces of weak and failing states.

Critics of S/CRS also claim that shaping activities are best addressed by the military. As previously discussed, the military has many more personnel at its disposal for such activities. The Department of Defense is also more adequately funded, transferring its own budget resources to the Department of State to keep the S/CRS afloat. Critics also look to post-World War II Germany and Japan as success stories for military involvement in weak states; however, Ms. Serafino highlights that the successes in Germany and Japan were due to conditions not replicable in other areas. Although totally defeated by external forces, Germany and Japan had the infrastructure for a functioning government, unlike most weak and failing states today.

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There are also critics that believe that neither the Defense Department nor the State Department should be involved in weak and failing states, but that they should be ignored altogether. Dr. James Forsyth and Lt Col Chance Saltzman make this argument in their *Air and Space Power Journal* article “Stay Out—Why Intervention Should Not Be America’s Policy.” That Forsyth and Saltzman argue there are more failing states today is not a surprise. There are more states now than ever, 81 United Nations recognized states in 1958 and 192 in 2008. Nevertheless, they aver failed states are not the problem; all of the attention they get is the real problem. While Forsyth and Saltzman present a thought provoking idea, it is largely discounted by those actually making policy. Former Secretary of State Rice highlighted that in the current interconnected world, the international state system is only as strong as its weakest link. Thus, preventive engagement is the current policy.

**Militarization of US Foreign Policy**

With the addition of Phase Zero activities to the GCC portfolio, designed to build relationships and build capacities, the GCC became more powerful, leading some to decry the militarization of US foreign policy. Dr. Richard H. Kohn is the Chairman, Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense and Professor of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and the Executive Secretary, Triangle Institute for Security Studies. Dr. Kohn describes the rise of the military in foreign relations. While foreign policy in the Clinton Administration in the 1990s focused upon economic relationships with the rest of the world, an increasing portion of diplomacy and bilateral relationships…were absorbed by the military, specifically by the regional commanders responsible for defense planning and security relationships around the world. Military-to-military exchanges, personal contacts, cooperative training missions, and joint and combined exercises increased so dramatically that on some of the most important political and alliance issues, the military displaced other government agencies as the chief tool of American foreign relations.

Kohn is not the only author describing the militarization of US foreign policy.

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David Kilcullen also discussed the imbalance of US military versus civilian capacity.

United States military capability not only overshadows the capabilities of all other world militaries combined, it also dwarfs US civilian capabilities. As an example, there are 1.68 million uniformed personnel in the US armed forces. By comparison, taking diplomatic capacity as a surrogate metric for other forms of civilian capacity, the State Department employs about 6,000 foreign service officers, while the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has about 2,000. In other words, the Department of Defense is about 210 times larger than USAID and State combined, in personnel terms. (In budgetary terms, the mismatch is far greater, on the order of 350:1.) This represents a substantial asymmetry, particularly when it is realized that the typical size ratio between armed forces and diplomatic/aid agencies for other Western democracies is between 8 and 10:1 (compared to 210:1 in the case of the United States). The overwhelming size and capacity of the US armed forces therefore has a distorting effect on US national power and on America’s ability to execute international security programs that balance military with nonmilitary elements of national power.²⁰

US authors like Kohn and Kilcullen are not the only voices discussing the militarization of US foreign policy. The South African government openly expressed opposition to the creation of AFRICOM.²¹ South Africa was echoing the feelings of the Southern African Development Community, a group of African countries.²² Dr. Abel Esterhuyse, a senior lecturer at the South African Military Academy Stellenbosch University, stated it is a reality that “the US military is often the leading US foreign policy institution.”²³ Dr. Esterhuyse claimed the image of US foreign policy is tainted by current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. “It is an image that is strongly associated with the US military in general and the aggressive use of military force in particular. This very aggressive and ‘militarized’ image of US foreign policy stands in stark contrast to the efforts by everybody involved in the creation of AFRICOM.”²⁴ Considering the US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is understandable that countries in Africa would see a militarization of US foreign policy. Many of those same countries are considered

²³ Esterhuyse, “The Iraqization of Africa?,” 27.
weak and/or failing and thus may require intervention from a preventative engagement policy. A 2007 Congressional Research Report noted this reality citing apprehension in the region over the US motivations for creating AFRICOM.\textsuperscript{25} Apprehension is understandable, as weak African states are made wary by Thucydides famous dictum: “Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”\textsuperscript{26} There is no question, if the United States chose to intervene in one of the African countries, there is little the country could do to resist. This overwhelming evidence leaves no doubt that there is a militarization of US foreign policy and it is time for the United States to pursue a change.

With all of the previously mentioned dissenting views of shaping operations, whether from the Department of Defense or the Department of State, it is not surprising that there is a call for change in the US national security realm. The next chapter introduces and discusses these issues.

Chapter 5

Call for Change

The first step toward defining a new approach to conflict prevention and response in fragile states is to define and execute it as a civilian mission.
—State Department, QDDR

One does not have to look far to find a military journal or opinion piece calling for change in the current national security apparatus. This chapter first reviews some ways to reorganize the national security apparatus. It then examines specific recommendations for change. The chapter ends by analyzing what these changes mean for the Department of Defense.

Reorganization of the National Security Apparatus

As she began her tenure as Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton stressed the need to reorganize the national security apparatus. She called for the elevation of diplomacy and development alongside defense and argued that civilian power must be brought into balance with military power. Concerns like this, where there is an inability to integrate resources across federal agencies, led to the formation of a group of leading defense and policy professionals charged with recommending a way ahead for the US government. The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) originated from the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 which called for a “study of the national security interagency system by an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization.”

The PNSR is a non-partisan project led by James R. Locher III. Locher was a wise choice to lead the project, as he was a principal architect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that modernized the joint military system. The PNSR consists of over 300 members, with some notable members being General Wesley Clark, USA, retired, Ken Weinstein, Brent Scowcroft, and Newt Gingrich. The project published Forging a New Shield, a

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4 "Forging a New Shield," 4.
5 "Forging a New Shield," 6.
742-page document with the expressed purpose to “provide a comprehensive historical analysis of the current US national security system, an evaluation of the system’s performance since its inception in 1947, and a detailed analysis of its current capabilities.” Among other things, the report concludes there is compelling evidence for redesigning the US national security system.

Similar to the approach taken by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in restructuring the Defense Department, the PNSR recommends drastic changes to the entire national security system. Just as reform was slow and met with opposition in the DOD, transformation will likely be slow and opposed by many in the national security apparatus. Nonetheless, change will likely occur. The PNSR’s Forging a New Shield proposes a bold reform; “if implemented, it would constitute the most farreaching [sic] governmental design innovation in national security since the passage of the National Security Act in 1947.”

Considering the previous chapters’ review of the current modus operandi, change is necessary.

The PNSR is resolute in its assertion that reform of the current system is necessary.

Clearly, the US national security apparatus failed at many integrative challenges before the Vietnam War, and it failed at many such challenges after Vietnam. It is troubled still, as current dilemmas attest. After more than seven years, the US government has proved unable to integrate adequately the military and nonmilitary dimensions of a complex war on terror, or to effectively integrate hard and soft power in Iraq. It has faced the same challenge in Afghanistan, where it has also had trouble integrating allied contributions into an effective strategy…. It is our unshakable conviction that the United States simply cannot afford the failure rate that the current national security system is not only prone but virtually guaranteed to cause.

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6 “Forging a New Shield,” Precis, 25.
7 “Forging a New Shield,” Precis, 25.
9 “Forging a New Shield,” Exsum i, 26.
10 “Forging a New Shield,” Exsum iii, 28.
Political leaders should not take such strong words from such an influential group of thinkers lightly.

David Kilcullen also sheds light on the situation. In *The Accidental Guerrilla* he asserted that America’s soft power is a critical enabler when dealing with terrorist threats. Thus, he contends that there needs to be more balance between the instruments of national power. Kilcullen provides a view from outside the government that coincides with those from within.

The State Department also recognizes that things need to change. The QDDR echoes Secretary Clinton’s assertion that civilian leadership is critical when addressing the concerns of fragile states. In an odd twist, as if to add credence to the argument, the State Department QDDR quoted the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in calling for increased civilian agency leadership in conflict prevention. The QDDR first acquiesced the Department of Defense plays a critical role in “shaping security environments, preventing military conflict, building partnerships, and influencing other nations’ strategic decisions.” It then cited the DOD’s QDR, noting the need for civilian agency leadership to accomplish that role. The State Department then admitted its responsibility to work with the National Security Staff and other civilian US government agencies to develop an effective civilian capability in order to assume its rightful role from the Defense Department Thus, the State Department joins the chorus calling for a change in the national security apparatus.

A review of the titles of some of the more prominent articles calling for change is indicative of the growing frustration with the current national security apparatus. “Do We Want to ‘Kill People and Break Things’ in Africa?,” “Redefining Security Cooperation: New Limits on Phase Zero and ‘Shaping’, “Death of the Combatant

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16 US Department of State, "Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review," 127.QDDR, 127
17 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Munson, "Do We Want To "Kill People and Break Things" In Africa?,” *Air & Space Power Journal* 1, Inaugural Edition (Winter 2009), 35-44.
Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,”19 “Herding Cats: Understanding Why Government Agencies Don’t Cooperate and How to Fix the Problem,”20 and finally “Expeditionary Sidekicks? The Military-Diplomatic Dynamic.”21 All of these articles have at least one thing in common—an assertion that the current way of doing business must change. The next step is to review the recommendations for change.

Review of Prominent Recommendations for Change

Recommendations for change take many forms. This section will list some of the more prominent recommendations and give a short description of each. A brief analysis concludes each recommendation. Nevertheless, this study’s recommendation is contained within Chapter 6.

The State Department’s QDDR vaguely describes a change. It states, “To build the civilian component of US conflict and crisis prevention and response and to give our military the civilian partner they need and deserve, we must start by clearly defining the civilian mission and identifying its leaders. And we must create a framework to bring together all the resources, expertise, and capabilities of the US government and our international partners in support of that mission.”22 By far, this is the weakest recommendation for change, as it simply calls for defining missions, identifying leaders, and creating a framework. Other recommendations are more drastic and intriguing.

One of the more interesting calls for change is contained in the Joint Forces Quarterly article, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach.” In this article, Brigadier General Buchanan, et. al., recommend dissolving the Geographic Combatant Command structure and establishing Joint Interagency Commands (JIACOMs).23 They aver that these JIACOMs should be led by “highly credentialed civilians, potentially with a four-star military deputy.”24 They offer no creative nomenclature for this new position. The JIACOM leader’s charter would

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23 Buchanan, Davis, and Wight "Death of the Combatant Command?", 95.
24 Buchanan, Davis, and Wight "Death of the Combatant Command?", 95.
include “true directive authority to all agencies below the NSC [National Security Council], as it would relate to activities occurring in the assigned region—to include US Ambassadors and country teams.” Buchanan then expands the discussion of the proposed authorities suggesting the JIACOM would take operational-level responsibility for all US foreign policy in a region. He explained, the JIACOM “would contain or have direct access to and tasking authority over all US agencies likely to be involved in planning and implementing these policies, up to and including the use of military force” (emphasis added). Thus, this proposition establishes a position that would resemble a Roman Proconsul. All regional authority, including military force, would rest in a single civilian. The JIACOM construct is not likely to be adopted as it vests an inordinate amount of power in one individual. Currently only the president has that much authority, a monopoly he would be unlikely to cede.

The Project on National Security Reform listed three possible courses of action for revising the national security apparatus. Two of the three options are outside the scope of this study, but “Option Two: Integrated Regional Centers” fits well within the current review. The PNSR recommended establishing Integrated Regional Centers (IRC) to act as interagency headquarters for national security policy. While the PNSR self-identifies this approach as similar to a proconsul, upon closer review it falls short of the analogy as it excludes the authority to command military combat forces.

An Integrated Regional Director appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate would lead the IRC. The director would be senior to rank to ambassadors and chiefs of mission with “authority over all national security institutions and personnel in the region, with the exception of operationally employed military forces” (emphasis added). The director would review and approve all plans that drive activity and

25 Buchanan, Davis, and Wight "Death of the Combatant Command?" 95.
26 Buchanan, Davis, and Wight "Death of the Combatant Command?" 95.
27 Option One, summarized on page 441, recommends the establishment of a President’s Security Council and a director for national security with super-Cabinet authority on interagency issues. The focus inside Washington DC excluded Option One from this study. Option Three, summarized on page 442, recommends the establishment of a hierarchy of national, regional, and country-level decentralized teams that would manage issues for the president at all levels on a day-to-day basis. The necessity to completely disestablish the national security apparatus excluded Option Three from this study.
28 “Forging a New Shield,” 441.
29 “Forging a New Shield,” 498.
30 “Forging a New Shield,” 499.
resource allocations; for example, the country team plans, DOD operational and security cooperation plans, and foreign assistance plans would all funnel through the director’s office.\footnote{Forging a New Shield,} Unlike the JIACOM, the Integrated Regional Center would not replace the Geographic Combatant Commands but would be paired with the regional commanders.\footnote{Forging a New Shield,} The IRCs would contain sub-regional and country desks to “integrate all levels of policy and implementation support for ambassadors and their empowered country teams and interact directly with US government missions to multilateral organizations in the region.”\footnote{Forging a New Shield,} Thus, with the exceptions of replacing the GCC and control of combat forces, the PNSR’s IRC proposal is remarkably similar to the JIACOM. These minor differences make the IRC somewhat more likely to be implemented than the JIACOM.


Carafano recommends reducing the number of GCCs from six to three: EUCOM would be replaced by US-NATO command, PACOM would be replaced by US Northeast Asia headquarters, and NORTHCOM would remain as is.\footnote{Carafano, “Herding Cats.”} In addition to the three GCCs, Carafano recommends three “Joint Interagency Groups” (InterGroups) be established for Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and South and Central Asia. The InterGroups would focus on national security concerns such as “transnational terrorism, transnational crime (e.g., piracy and drug and human trafficking), weapons proliferation, and regional instability.”\footnote{Carafano, “Herding Cats.”}
Each of the InterGroups would contain a military staff tasked with planning military engagements, warfighting, and post-conflict operations.38 This military staff would form the nucleus of a Joint Task Force to be established should military operations be required in their respective areas of responsibility.39 Carafano concluded his article by stating he proposed a reasonable and achievable agenda of rather modest innovations for Congress and the Bush Administration.40 Obviously, either Congress or the Bush Administration (or both) decided his innovations were not reasonable and achievable since his recommendations were not accepted.

Prior to serving on the PNSR, Dr. Christopher Lamb, Director, Center for Strategic Research in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at National Defense University, presented a prepared statement to the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on Implementing the Global War on Terror, House Armed Services Committee on 15 March 2006. The topic and title of his statement was “Overcoming Interagency Problems.”41 Dr. Lamb used the US government’s focus on combating terrorism to present a proposal for improving national security. This proposal emphasized why interagency coordination is important, specifically between the Defense and State Departments. Lamb stated, “In the abstract there is almost unanimous agreement on why interagency collaboration is important for national security and the war on terror in particular: because national security issues require the application of all instruments of national power to be efficiently and effectively resolved in our favor.”42 With the premise that interagency cooperation is important to national security, Dr. Lamb proceeded to recommend specific changes to the current system.

One of these changes involved the formation of a cross-agency or cross-functional interagency team with the power to make decisions and control resources.43 The team’s

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38 Carafano, "Herding Cats."
39 Carafano, "Herding Cats."
40 Carafano, "Herding Cats."
42 Lamb, "Overcoming Interagency Problems."
43 Lamb, "Overcoming Interagency Problems."
authority would be empowered by the National Security Council. The team would manage the war on terror on a “day-to-day basis and would have directive authority over agencies’ activities” and would focus on “seeking out and eliminating strategic inconsistencies or confusion and key impediments to strategy implementation.” While initially focused on the war on terror, the concept could be expanded to other national security problems that require interagency solutions.

Dr. Lamb acknowledged his solution will be considered radical and impractical but not impossible, especially if the United States faces a major security disaster on US soil. He concluded his statement with the bold proclamations, “The lack of interagency collaboration is our most glaring national security problem,” and, “Reforms that would ensure interagency collaboration would be the single most significant step we could take to improve our security posture.” Nonetheless, like the previous recommendations, Dr. Lamb’s recommendations were not implemented, most likely due to its self-confessed radical and impractical nature.

One of the least radical recommendations was made by Lt Col Robert Munson, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Comparative Military Studies at Air Command and Staff College, in the *Air and Space Power Journal* article, “Do We Want to ‘Kill People and Break Things’ in Africa? A Historian’s Thoughts on Africa Command.” Lieutenant Colonel Munson restricted his recommendation to AFRICOM, calling for it to evolve into a true interagency command, not “merely a military command with a few nonmilitary trappings.” He suggested AFRICOM should have three equal main components: the military, a political element, and a development section. This new organization should follow the organizational model of an embassy rather than of a military organization with a dominant civilian role. The commander of AFRICOM would be the US ambassador to the African Union and would represent the United States.

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44 Lamb, "Overcoming Interagency Problems."
45 Lamb, "Overcoming Interagency Problems."
46 Lamb, "Overcoming Interagency Problems."
47 Lamb, "Overcoming Interagency Problems."
48 Lamb, "Overcoming Interagency Problems."
49 Munson, "Kill People and Break Things," 37.
50 Munson, "Kill People and Break Things," 37.
51 Munson, "Kill People and Break Things," 37.
to the whole of Africa.\textsuperscript{52} This ambassador would lead the military component of AFRICOM also. The military subcomponents of the command would be spread throughout the continent with the diplomatic and developmental subcomponents, collocated in regional groupings.\textsuperscript{53} While this recommendation is less controversial than previous ones, it jeopardizes the status and authority of individual country ambassadors. By making an ambassador that represents the United States to the whole of Africa, it leaves the current role of individual ambassadors in question. If they represent the president in their assigned country, how are they subordinate to the African ambassador? Similar to the previous recommendations, Lt Col Munson’s recommendation has not been implemented.

What Does This Mean for the DOD?

All of the previous recommendations call for a change in the current US foreign policy apparatus. Each of these calls for massive change in the national security apparatus would ultimately lead to change in the Department of Defense, and the most obvious change would be in the defense budget. As more agencies integrate into the national security system, the DOD would likely see a resultant decrease in its budget. The Defense Department would also likely see a reduction in its authority to carry out diplomacy-based shaping operations, possibly leading to an elimination of Phase Zero from its realm of responsibility.

As previously discussed, the DOD has a budget 350 times the size of the State Department’s budget. With entire combatant commands dedicated to Phase Zero operations, if those responsibilities shift to the DOS, the DOD budget would drastically decrease. What is at risk? The PNSR highlighted the short answer: money.

A new concept of national security demands recalibration of how we think about and manage national security resources and budgeting. Today’s more complex challenges impose qualitatively more demanding resource allocation choices, even in good economic times. If we should face a period of protracted austerity in government, as now seems more likely than not, meeting those challenges will become orders of magnitude more difficult. In developing and implementing national security policy, the rubber meets the road where money is spent, and we are unanimously agreed that the current system’s gross inefficiencies risk collapse under the

\textsuperscript{52} Munson, "Kill People and Break Things," 42.
\textsuperscript{53} Munson, "Kill People and Break Things," 43.
weight of the protracted budget pressures that likely lie ahead. We need to do more with less, but we cannot hope to achieve even that without fundamental reform of the resource management function.\textsuperscript{54}

In other words, the PNSR predicts things must change in the Defense Department or the entire system will collapse.

To address the aforementioned budgetary issues, the PNSR had bold recommendations that would affect the entire security budgeting process. “We recommend the creation of \textit{an integrated national security budget} to provide the president and the Congress a government-wide understanding of activities, priorities, and resource allocation, and to identify redundancies and deficiencies in the resourcing of national security missions” (emphasis in original).\textsuperscript{55} Such a change would relegate the Department of Defense to one of many agencies vying for one pool of defense dollars. There is hardly a prediction that would suggest this type of change would result in an increased DOD budget. It is much more likely this type of change would lead to a substantively decreased budget.

The PNSR recommended a change in the national security system that is comparable to that experienced by the DOD with the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The Marine Corps’ “Joint Urban Warrior” report made a similar claim stating, “The PNSR recommendations echo some of [Joint Urban Warrior’s] main themes, including the implementation of a Goldwater-Nichols Act to reform US interagency operations….”\textsuperscript{56} Surprisingly, senior Defense officials have made similar claims. In 2004, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, “suggested a Goldwater-Nichols Act for all of the federal government to improve the way the country responds to terrorism.”\textsuperscript{57} This type of change would most likely lead to decreased DOD authority to carry out the primarily diplomatic mission of shaping operations, as this mission would have an interagency focus with the State Department in the lead.

The reorganization of the national security apparatus is not the only challenge to the DOD continuing its Phase Zero mission. Senior military officials recognize the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{54} “Forging a New Shield,” Exsum v.
\textsuperscript{55} “Forging a New Shield,” Exsum xi.
\end{footnotesize}
growing reluctance by many countries to invite the US military to conduct operations within their borders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognizes this, stating, “Diminishing overseas access is another challenge anticipated in the future operating environment. Foreign sensitivities to US military presence have steadily been increasing. Even close allies may be hesitant to grant access for a variety of reasons.” Obviously, the mission of shaping operations within failed or failing states would be impaired or completely impeded without access to across foreign borders.

This chapter cited many recommendations for change from different sources and the implications of those recommendations for the Department of Defense. Considering these, it is now possible to proceed with specific recommendations.

Chapter 6

Recommendations for the DOD

First and foremost, I think it's important that we don’t militarize our foreign policy. That would be a tremendous mistake. The State Department must do diplomacy, [USAID] must do development, Defense must do Defense.

Adm. James Stavridis
Commander of US Southern Command

The first step in moving ahead for the Department of Defense is to accept its proper role in policy, a role clearly defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen defines that role:

“The fundamental purpose of military power is to deter or wage war in support of national policy. In these capacities, military power is a coercive instrument, designed to achieve by force or the threat of force what other means cannot. While it may be employed in more benign ways for a variety of important purposes across a wide range of situations, these other uses should not be allowed to imperil its ultimate ability to wage war.”

Thus, the military recognizes that its primary role is to fight the nation’s wars.

With the proper mission defined, the next step is to identify the Defense Department’s role in the soft power application of engagement and shaping activities. The Chairman addresses this also.

Combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction must all be competencies of the joint force. While some special-purpose forces will specialize in particular aspects of one or more, general-purpose forces must be able to operate in all four types of activity in one way or another. Currently, US joint forces possess codified doctrine for the conduct of combat, but doctrine and capabilities with respect to the other activities are less robust. That imbalance must change. That said, it is important to keep in mind that while other agencies can perform security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction, only the military can conduct combat.

The Chairman recognizes there is a mission for the DOD in Phase Zero, but he does not make it clear exactly what that mission is and how to accomplish it.

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1 “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3,” 1.
2 “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3,” 21.
Unlike previously presented recommendations that would require significant changes to the current system, there are ways the Defense Department can effect change to better the national security environment without fundamentally altering the current structure. Surprisingly, the procedures already exist for the Department of Defense to augment the State Department in shaping operations. Therefore, the recommendation herein is for the Defense Department to utilize the existing system to bolster the State Department with funding and personnel.

It might appear that the most obvious solution would be for the Defense Department simply to transfer funds to the State Department in order to facilitate shaping operations. Nevertheless, the apparent solution is not always the best solution. There are laws that govern how the Department of Defense can spend its allocated budget. These laws restrict government agencies from reallocating funds. Thus, the DOD cannot simply fund State Department programs.

Recognizing the State Department’s funding needs, but still unwilling to simply give the money directly to the State Department, Congress added a provision to its Defense Department allocation. Congress granted DOD the authority through section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, then section 1210 for Fiscal Year 2008, to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per fiscal year to fund S/CRS; thus, it is not a violation for the DOD to support the DOS with funding. This authorization extended through Fiscal Year 2010. Nonetheless, its future is uncertain. Some relevant examples are contained in Table 1 below.

3 Major Bradford B. Byrnes, "U.S. Military Support to International Humanitarian Relief Operations Legal/Fiscal Limits and Constraints," Liaison online IV, no. 1 (2008), coe-dmha.org/Publications/Liaison/Vol_4No_1/Dept03.htm (accessed 15 March 2011). It is a violation of law (31 USC 1301(a) “purpose statute”) for the DOD to use its appropriation for anything other than what is stated in the appropriation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project’s Purpose</th>
<th>Fiscal Year (FY) (Funding Amount)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Help train and outfit additional Lebanese Internal Security Force members (i.e., Lebanon’s national police) to allow police to free Lebanese Army forces performing policing duties in the Bekaa Valley to enforce the Israeli-Hezbollah cease-fire in southern Lebanon</td>
<td>FY 2006 ($5.0 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Strengthen [internal security forces] ISF communications capacity and assist the ISF in introducing community and proximity policing in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp and surrounding areas</td>
<td>FY 2008 ($10.0 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Provide training and technical assistance to local government, local law enforcement representatives, and community leaders to enhance skills to promote stability in conflict-affected and unstable areas, including the Ferghana and Rasht Valleys and the Afghan border areas</td>
<td>FY 2007 ($9.9 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Promote stability by assisting in areas where the central government is largely absent in order to deter youths from joining terrorist groups</td>
<td>FY 2007 ($8.5 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Examples of DOD funding to S/CRS


Considering the Defense Department’s contributions, Congress is not satisfied with the extent of its involvement in the S/CRS. In her report to Congress on 1207 funds, Nina Serafino included the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) public statement following Defense Secretary Robert Gate’s testimony regarding the DOD’s contribution to the S/CRS.

In its report accompanying S. 3001 (S. Rept 110-335), SASC stated that DOD had “inappropriately restricted the uses for which services or funds may be provided to the Department of State under section 1207....” Pointing to the Secretary of Defense’s April 15, 2008, testimony at a HASC hearing that Section 1207 authority “is primarily for bringing civilian expertise to operate alongside or in place of our armed forces,” SASC stated that the legislative intent of section 1207 authority was broader, and was meant “to enable the Secretary of Defense to support the provision by the Secretary of State of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.” SASC further stated such assistance could include “providing early civilian resources to avert a
crisis that could otherwise subsequently require US military forces to assist or intervene.”

The Department of Defense should immediately take advantage of this congressional call for greater involvement. While it may be counterintuitive for the Department of Defense to increase its involvement in State Department activities, it could be the key to the Defense Department’s continued relevance in Phase Zero—and more importantly, for continued budget allocation. As previously discussed, Defense receives the lion’s share of shaping dollars, but Congress wants to see more Defense Department involvement in S/CRS activities. One solution to this dilemma is for the Department of Defense not only to allocate budget resources, but also to allocate personnel.

The robust Combatant Commands, primarily responsible for Phase Zero activities, often have staffs of over 1,000 personnel. The Department of Defense could substantially increase the staff and capability of the S/CRS by deploying/attaching/exchanging a small portion of Geographic Combatant Command Phase Zero staffs. The Defense Department could deploy or exchange its military members to the S/CRS. These personnel would not have to be military members in uniform, but could be civilians hired with the expressed intent of augmenting the State Department. Through this move, the Department of Defense would continue to show the need for personnel, and thus justify its budget, but would also show increased willingness to assist with the interagency solution for the shaping conundrum. This may appear as little more than a shell game moving personnel; but as already discussed, Congress is reticent to increase funding, and thus personnel allocations, to the State Department.

The next step would be for the Defense Department to further its integration with the State Department by implementing the same type of program to augment the country teams of each embassy with personnel from the corresponding Geographic Combatant Command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognizes the importance of the country team in engagement activities. In his Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, he makes this clear.

Even more than other categories of joint activity, engagement is subject to a myriad of laws and regulations governing everything from limits on funding and the deployment of military personnel to legislative restrictions.

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4 Serafino, "Section 1207 Fact Sheet," 5.
on the tasks to which military assistance may be applied. Given these complexities, nothing can compensate for close and continuous interagency coordination at the individual country level. The key to that coordination is the country team and the US Ambassador to whom it answers. As the permanent agent of the US government’s diplomatic relationship with the host nation, the country team alone can negotiate the access essential to effective engagement. And as the President’s personal representative, only the ambassador has the authority to insure synchronization of interagency operations. Above all, by virtue of its routine political contacts with the host government and its familiarity with local conditions, the country team is uniquely placed to assess the partner nation’s ability and willingness to accept military engagement and, where those differ from the US appraisal, to convince the host government to modify its views. For all these reasons, the country team will be the coordinating authority in most engagement efforts, and the success of those efforts will depend on the effectiveness of the liaison between and among the regional combatant command and the country teams in its area of responsibility.\(^5\)

Congress has granted the president authority to use Department of Defense personnel in noncombat-related duties in foreign countries. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended through 2008 and published in July 2010, codified this authority in Chapter 2—Military Assistance Sec. 503.\(^6\) One example of DOD assistance through the FAA is Security Cooperation Organizations. Section 515 of the FAA governs the overseas management of assistance and sales programs.\(^7\) This section is the governing authority that is used to establish the Security Cooperation Organizations. Security Cooperation Offices serve two purposes. First, it is the Defense Department’s organization with the mission of “effective planning and in-country management of US security cooperation program, including security assistance.”\(^8\) The second mission is as “an extension of the Combatant Command to carry out security cooperation activities in-

\(^5\) “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3,” 17.

\(^6\) “Foreign Assistance Act 1961 Us Code, Legislation on Foreign Relations through 2008,” (2008): 264. “General Authority.—(a) The President is authorized to furnish military assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance, by—... Assigning or detailing members of the Armed Forces of the United States and other personnel of the Department of Defense to perform duties of a non-combatant nature.”


\(^8\) SOUTHCOM Security Cooperation Offices briefing, obtained by author from SOUTHCOM J7, 4.
country in support of the Theater Campaign Plan.”

SOUTHCOM has 23 Security Cooperation Offices. The official names of the offices are taken from bi-lateral agreements and include Military Assistance Advisory Group, Military Group, Military Liaison Office, Office of Defense Cooperation, and Office of Defense Representative. Unfortunately, those offices are congressionally restricted to six personnel in all but certain identified countries. As long as Congress limits this capacity, other options must be explored to increase the Defense Department’s contribution to the country team.

The Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5105.75 discusses the “policy and responsibilities for the operation of DOD elements at US embassies.” The DODD does not restrict the number of DOD personnel that can operate in US embassies. It does create “the position of Senior Defense Official (SDO) as the principal DOD official in US embassies,” and as such, the SDO is “the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy.” Thus, the framework for Defense Department personnel to operate as part of the embassy team is already in place.

DODD 5105.75 also establishes the SDO as the Chief of the Security Cooperation Organization. Importantly for this discussion, the DODD states the SDO in each embassy shall “act as the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, supporting, and/or executing US defense issues and activities in the host nation, including Theater Security Cooperation programs under the oversight of the [Geographic Combatant Commander].” Thus, the position is already established to carry out Phase Zero activities. Department of Defense personnel are already assigned to work in the

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9 SOUTHCOM Security Cooperation Offices briefing, 4.
10 SOUTHCOM Security Cooperation Offices briefing, 4.
11 SOUTHCOM Security Cooperation Offices briefing, 4.
12 “Foreign Assistance Act 1961 Us Code, Legislation on Foreign Relations through 2008,” 279. Currently, there are 17 countries worldwide where there are more than six personnel authorized.
embassies. The recommendation contained herein is to increase that staff, outside the confines of the Security Cooperation Offices, and offer their services to the ambassador to assist the embassy mission. The important next step is to convince the ambassadors that the additional personnel would substantially increase their ability to affect national security policy in their assigned country; given the paucity of foreign service officers, this should be a welcome opportunity for ambassadors.

A 2010 RAND study echoed this recommendation. In “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team, Options for Success,” Terrence K. Kelly, et al., recommended increases to security assistance organizations. Kelly suggested, “The [security assistance organizations] should also include military personnel who possess the ability to act with great political sensitivity, who have a good understanding of US foreign policy goals in their country and how military efforts fit within this framework, and who are experienced in the execution of advisory and assistance missions.”

Senior military officers have also recommended to Congress increases in State Department funding.

In his March 2011 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the senior military commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, said that “substantial military gains could be jeopardized unless Congress provides adequate funding to the State Department and the US Agency for International Development to provide economic development, governance and other civilian assistance. ‘I am concerned that levels of funding for our State Department and USAID partners will not sufficiently enable them to build on the hard-fought security achievements of our men and women in uniform.’”

The avenues exist for the Defense Department to help allay the general’s fears. As mentioned above, Congress authorized the DOD to provide funds to the S/CRS. In fact, the Defense Department allocated $10 million of Section 1207 funds to S/CRS in order to improve Afghanistan’s Pol-e-Charkhi prison.

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In addition to 1207 funds, there is an indirect way that the DOD increases assistance to the State Department. Section 1206 provides the Defense Department funding to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. This mission has historically belonged to the State Department under the auspices of International Military and Education Training (IMET). The Fiscal Year 2011 presidential budget request seeks about $490 million in Section 1206 funds. These funds are to be used to provide counterterrorism support and to train and equip foreign military forces for military and stability operations in which US forces participate. As of June 2010, approximately $1.2 billion in Section 1206 funds were allocated since Fiscal Year 2006. Thus, instead of providing funds to State Department missions, the Defense Department simply began doing those missions.

Section 1206 funds are also indirectly contributing to stability in Afghanistan. As of June 2010, Pakistan received $203.4 million through Section 1206 funds providing equipment and training to increase the government’s ability to counter terrorism threats emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Congress continues to research whether this funding should be given directly to the State Department as part of IMET.

There is no suggestion here that the Defense Department’s budget or personnel are limitless. Nonetheless, there is substantial room for change given the current ratios, 350:1 and 240:1 in budget and personnel, respectively, before the United States even approaches the ratios of most Western countries. An increase in Defense Department budgetary contributions directly to the State Department would require Congress to authorize greater than $100 million per year in the NDAA section 1207.

All Defense officials from the Secretary of Defense to the Geographic Combatant Command commanders should echo this request during their annual testimonies: “Increase the authorization for Section 1207 funds in order to improve the national security apparatus in the quickest, most efficient manner.” In fact, the original proposal

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22 Serafino, "Section 1206," 5.
by Senator James Inhofe for the FY2006 NDAA was for $200 million.\textsuperscript{24} In March 2008 the Defense Department requested Congress to double the $100 million for 1207.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, the recommendation contained herein is realistic; it only requires Congress to approve a higher ceiling on an existing program. Even without congressional action, the Defense Department can implement the personnel portion of this recommendation and continue to execute the minimal percentage of its budget authorized for these activities.

\textsuperscript{24} Serafino, "Section 1207," 2.
\textsuperscript{25} Serafino, "Section 1207," 3.
Conclusion

This study discussed many recommendations for how the United States can improve the way it influences the international system to foster security for America and the world. While interesting and even compelling, those studies call for drastic changes that, at the least, will take years to implement and, more likely, will be ignored. Thus, the recommendation in Chapter 6 for the DOD simply to do more of what it is already doing has the possibility of immediate implementation since it does not require seismic organizational upheaval.

The recommendation contained herein is intended to allay concerns of the militarization of foreign policy. Nevertheless, there could be a related concern of militarization of the State Department. This is a valid concern, but as long as the Defense Department remains the tool of choice for addressing security, militarization is a reality. It is better to militarize an agency of the US government than the entire US foreign policy. As the world moves further away from the Cold War, Americans may become more comfortable with other government departments taking a greater role in national security. Until then, the Defense Department can better contribute to global security by integrating its efforts with the State Department.

This thesis took a broad look at the American security apparatus. It began by reviewing history, specifically one of the most prominent historical empires, Rome. As might be expected, Roman Proconsuls do not provide the best method for the Defense Department to emulate nor do they provide a good analogy to discuss current Geographic Combatant Commands. The US Geographic Combatant Command began with the Unified Command Plan from the lessons of World War II. While its roles and missions may have changed, it remains an important tool in US security.

Phase Zero, shaping operations, codify all of the efforts that take place mostly in the background before combat operations. If successful, Phase Zero operations would preclude the need for combat operations altogether by helping to grow and strengthen democracies or in the very least dissuade potential adversaries through various forms of soft power. From the fifteenth century, this type of engagement has taken place in embassies by ambassadors. The United States continued this tradition by creating the
Department of State, its first cabinet department. Yet today, the Department of Defense conducts much of its diplomacy.

Recognizing the need to be more proactive in preventing crisis and taking a step in the right direction to move diplomacy away from the Defense Department, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. While this office has a role similar to the Department of Defense’s Phase Zero efforts, it has considerably less funding to carry out its duties. Ultimately, Congress holds the purse strings. Until there is an improvement in congressional support towards the State Department, mitigation measures are required. For now, Congress continues to support Geographic Combatant Commands that focus on shaping activities, especially SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM. Not surprisingly, there are some objections to these operations such as concerns over the militarization of foreign policy.

Recognizing these difficulties, many influential people have called for a change in the way America handles foreign policy. The Project on National Security Reform is among the leading proponents. The State Department is also calling for a change in the national security apparatus codifying its recommendations in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Many other authors offer their own ideas about transforming America’s approach to diplomacy. Each of these recommendations for change affects the Defense Department, and most call for a decrease in Defense budget.

In order to remain relevant in the current international system, the Defense Department should adjust its focus on shaping operations. Instead of supporting massive regional staffs focused on Phase Zero, the Defense Department can reorient its efforts and shift this capability to where it belongs: the State Department. The Defense Department can take advantage of existing programs and authorizations to effect this transition and, ultimately, improve America’s security.
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