IS THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE POISED TO ATTAIN THE LEVEL OF
MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS ESPOUSED BY ITS VISION?

by

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Biography

Colonel Mokuedi Sianang is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. The Colonel has been an active member of the Botswana Defence Force for 26 years. These years were spent predominantly at Air Arm Command (AAC) as a Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer, the latter 3 years at Defence Logistics Command Headquarters (DLC HQ) and Botswana Defence Force Headquarters (BDF HQ).

He has held the following appointments during his tenure at AAC; Squadron Engineering Officer, Chief Maintenance Planning Officer, Base Engineer, Base Support Service Officer as well as Deputy Director Aviation Engineering. He was subsequently appointed Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics –Acquisitions, and later moved with the acquisition function from Defence Logistics Command to the Defence HQ where he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff – Logistics Acquisition.
Abstract

In order to stay relevant the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) set itself a vision of “a professional prompt and decisive force.” However, this vision is blurred by a mismatch between its missions and capabilities, deficient defense policies and strategic management framework, and a procurement system too duplicitous to attend the real needs and peculiarities of its military. The BDF’s effectiveness has not been appraised; however, its origins in 1977 portray a military formed more as a beacon to sovereignty than a potent force to counter its more powerful adversaries in South Africa and Rhodesia. As southern Africa attained stability and endured the Cold War, there was rise in non-state actor threats, as well as a consequent increase in peace and stability operations in Africa. Conversely, acquisition of defense capabilities in Botswana was not informed by these changes; as such, acquired systems did not match the missions BDF was engaged in.

The evolution of the BDF from the original rifle company seems to have been guided more by theory and desires of the military to mirror our neighbors than realistic strategic assessment and policy adaptation to the evolving internal, regional, and international security environment. Even the creation of the Ministry of Defence Justice and Security (MDJS) did not provide the expected guidance for military planning and acquisition to security and economic imperatives of the country. The BDF Act has been the solitary military specific document the country has produced in the last 36 years. The drought of policies and strategic guidance perpetuated a bottom up approach to the development of the BDF, with the MDJS providing little more than a conduit (not playing management role expected of a defense ministry in a parliamentary democracy). In the absence of strategic superintendence the development of the BDF was mainly a tactical internal initiative; theory, unit preservation and market forces
undermined strategic inevitabilities and mission requirements. In a bid to mirror other militaries, the BDF acquired weapon systems from all over; creating an impossible to integrate, mostly obsolete, and unsustainable inventory, contrary to the theme and operational effectiveness espoused by its vision. The shallow acquisition system failed to interrogate these acquisition selections beyond the procurement paperwork done by the public board.

Consequently, the BDF needs a defense review; not only for the sake of realizing its vision, but to give the nations an opportunity to engage in a debate about their security and to define the whole enterprise. The current stability in southern Africa presents a challenge; there are no traditional enemies to plan around, it also presents an opportunity to mold the BDF according to the national wish. A defense review would be the most preferred approach to making the military relevant to the society. It will be the most effective route to helping the BDF realize its vision and to helping MDJS get into the defense management business.
Introduction

“Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution for all current difficulties.....But each proposal must be weighed in the light of broader considerations: balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable...”  Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Address to the Nation,” January 17, 1961

In pursuit of effectiveness, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) has set itself a decent vision of “a professional prompt and decisive force.” The debate is whether the BDF can attain the level of military effectiveness espoused in its model vision. A capability appearing lethally effective in parade will not translate into an effective military or a cure for national security. Strategists such as Allen Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, define military effectiveness as a process by which armed forces transform resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one deriving maximum combat power from available resources physically and politically.¹ Defense acquisition or procurement, as it’s otherwise known, plays a central role in military effectiveness. Linda S. Brant and Francis W A’ Hearn describe it as “a process whereby the military avail itself capabilities through expenditure of national treasure.”² The BDF is not disposed to transform its resources proficiently enough to realize its envisioned effectiveness. Specifically, attainment of their vision is undermined by a mismatch between its missions and capabilities, deficient policies and a defense management framework and procurement system too duplicitous to attend the real needs and peculiarities of its military. The BDF’s vision of a light highly mobile force resonates well with missions dominated by action
against non-state actors; poachers, border security, and peace enforcements operations. However, this has not been matched with the requisite capabilities (they tended to be heavy weapon platforms suited for interstate conflicts). Additionally, the BDF’s rapid development meant there wasn’t a corresponding growth in defense policies and strategies to define its roles, force levels, and sustainment. Consequently, Botswana has no defense acquisition management system; the current procurement process is too rudimentary to address the peculiarities of the military and lacks the focus to deliver appropriate capabilities.

**Assignments and Capabilities Mismatch**

The BDF is hard to read; its capabilities barely match current missions, regional security environs, or the versatility of its vision. Its order of battle, as captured in Defense Web, is an anti-thesis of the service’s vision statement. Its inventory consists of heavy weapons platforms; these are obsolete cold-war era capabilities drawn from all corners of the world. Poor choices for the missions the BDF has been engaged in over the past two decades. For the most part, these have been actions against internal non-state actors and aid to civil authorities; assignments calling for the light mobile forces correctly advocated by the vision. A review highlights this equipment and assignments mismatch and offers something to consider in preparing for the future.

The BDF’s origins portray a military formed more as a beacon to sovereignty rather than a potent force to counter powerful adversaries. The creation of the BDF, though an important first step in the building of a defense system, did not halt the acts of aggression from Rhodesia and South Africa. During wars of liberation, history attributes the country’s survival to the diplomatic genius of the polity, particularly the country’s first president Sir Seretse Khama, than to the effectiveness of the military. When the wars ended in the 1990s, telling events in
international security were taking place: the end of the Cold War, a rise in non-state actor threats, and a commensurate increase in peace and stability operations in Africa.

As a result, the BDF increasingly resembled a gendarmerie, engaging more in homeland security than conventional military missions. In response to the nation’s Wildlife Anti-poaching Unit’s failure to cope with increasingly violent poaching activities, the government brought in the BDF (they would eventually take primary responsibility). In addition, the BDF began a losing battle to secure borders against illegal immigrants and accompanying criminal elements. Indeed, the 1990s saw a rise in such activity (particularly armed robberies) and this increase threatened to undermine business confidence in Botswana. Concurrently, the BDF was heavily engaged in many regional peace-keeping missions; from the 1992 “Operation Restore Hope” in Somalia, through United Nation’s UNOMOZ in Mozambique to the 1998 “Operation Boleas” in Lesotho. Surprisingly, while Botswana committed to providing a battalion to the Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade in 2007, it has not participated in any of the current and more robust peace-enforcement missions. The closest BDF can claim to having participated in such missions is when it went into Lesotho with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) (more than two decades ago). Concurrently poaching in Botswana has escalated and border security has not improved. Maybe this is because it lacks the requisite light and highly mobile forces; a consequence of its acquisition processes failing to procure the proper capabilities.

Given the nature of its assigned missions (to act against non-state actors in poachers and peace enforcements operations), it could be assumed the BDF would opt for matched capabilities: helicopter gunships, armored personnel carriers, communication equipment, and Special Forces. Instead, in the 1990s, Botswana embarked on ambitious arms programs of heavy
and slow Cold War relics (tanks, fighter aircraft, and drawn-artillery). This led Martin Rupiya and Daniel Henk to retort, African militaries lack the planning required for a realistic assessment of their security environment and a serious effort to match means, ends and ways to procurement decisions. Thus, the BDF’s Order of Battle is dominated by obsolete 1960-70s technology most countries retired at the end of the Cold War, opting for modern lighter and faster technologies.

Two security writers, Peter Batchelor and Susan Willet, explained why the BDF made such a move: years of economic growth enabled Botswana’s leaders to purchase prestige symbols, going against the current trend of disarmament and security cooperation of the region. There was no clear connection between capabilities acquired and challenges the country faced against poachers, border security, and aid to civil society and escalating demands for peacekeeping in the continent. This mismatch naturally invites questions about the focus and influences associated with force development. For a force structure and acquisition process not based on the security realities and expectations of the nation may render the BDF irrelevant as the country becomes frugal.

Deficient Policies and Strategic Defense Management Framework

The rapid development of the BDF from a single rifle company to the current force did not have corresponding formulation of defense policies and strategies to define its roles, force levels, and ways of sustainment. Policy makers neither kept abreast of the BDF’s growth nor changing world events. Consequently, they failed to promulgate requisite defense legislation and policies beyond creating a founding act. The BDF was formed out of and around the logical imperative of the time. It came out of a police branch; hence, it lacked a military history or strategic leadership experience. Thus, it adopted a culture of expediency and tactical solutions at the expense of long term strategic planning.
The Botswana Defence Force Act of 1977, as observed by R. Dale, does very little to define the construction and role of the military. Apart from force employment privileges of the President and the Commander, the BDF Act provides little guidance on the regulation of force size, equipment, and organization. Under the section for the establishment and maintenance of the defense force, the act merely states “There shall be established and maintained in Botswana a force to be known as, "The Botswana Defence Force", which shall consist of the Regular Force of the Defence Force; and the Defence Force Reserve”. It suggests the broad employment of the BDF as “defence of Botswana and with such other duties as may from time to time be determined by the President.” Apart from referring to a Navy (in a landlocked Botswana), Air Force and Army in explanation of “disciplined forces,” the constitution is silent on the construct of the military. This ambiguity and lack of strategic guidance led University of Botswana academic Dr Molomo to observe, “The reality of Botswana’s defence policy is that there is no formalized structure by which it is formulated.” The polity has a minute comprehension of the BDF’s business, capabilities, and formations (or lack thereof), save for a few individuals in legislature and executive who served in the military before joining politics. Consequently, development of the BDF has been an evolution from within; the rest of the government and the nation had insignificant input. In the absence of specific defense management policies, the BDF largely depend on civil service legislation and general orders. This lack of specific guidance forces it to functions as a regular civilian governmental department. This is unlike in other nations. For instance, in the U.S. legislative articles (such as Title 10, United States Code) provide authority to determine size, organization, and directs civilian leadership to provide written policy guidance for military planning. Moreover, in Botswana (as is the case in most of Africa) legislative debates and policy developments are muted by the over classification of
information on military activities. According to Molomo, “On occasion, the legislature has not been allowed to review the defense budget in its presentation in the National Assembly due to national security concerns.”¹⁷ This has not only stifled military legislation and policy development, but has perpetuated ignorance among legislators and festered misguided hostility to the military’s funding requirements.

In the 36 years of the BDF’s existence, Botswana has not carried out a defense review, despite the dramatic end of the Cold War as well as a shift in regional political and security circumstances. Development of the BDF has largely been an evolutionary internal patch-up process rather than through broader strategic guidance from the polity. The current move within the BDF to introduce brigade groupings is yet another self-induced change by the military without any legislative, policy, or doctrinal guidance. Like previous changes, it is largely a copy-paste structure from the U.S. (without appreciating the methods, environment, scale, and experiences that informed Brigade Combat Teams decision in the U.S.), with no study to demonstrate its appropriateness to the country’s defense needs, military effectiveness, or affordability.¹⁸ In the U.S. every new administration has to produce a security strategy within the first two years of office and any resulting transformation will be managed by their Department of Defense (DOD). Indeed, other countries periodical carry out defense reviews to keep their militaries relevant; both South Africa and the United Kingdom completed theirs in the past two years, specifically in response to the end of the Cold War and an increase in non-state conflicts. Similarly, Botswana needs a review of its military to achieve its existing missions or those defined by the review. This re-organization should not be an internal BDF process; it must be a national project, because the people procure the military’s capabilities through their elected representatives. As Clausewitz aptly states, “neither experts in politics or policy making nor
experts in fighting need necessarily be experts in strategy.” Major strategic decisions concerning force development and employment are supposed to be a robust engagement between the polity and the military, producing strategic guidance for the nation.

Consequently, policy makers should consider priorities and equities to shape not only military strategy, but the development of a broader national security strategy to guide all national security agencies. The Ministry of Defence Justice and Security (MDJS) has to provide strategic guidance to coordinate and facilitate the multiplicity of the country’s security actors, such as the police Special Support Group (SSG) and the Directorate of Intelligence Services (DIS) who, like the BDF, also possess substantial kinetic capabilities and coercive force. The ministry is aware of these shortcomings. In the opinion of the Minister of Defense Justice and Security this guidance “will effectively reduce the discrepancies, redundancies and deficiencies in our national security policy implementation process. To this end, the security institutions will be appropriately resourced to deliver the capabilities required” However, it seems the MDJS is hamstrung by human capital to carry on this task; normally the BDF has no more than two middle ranking officers at the ministry. In the U.S., the Pentagon and Secretary of Defense (with a complement of over 3000 civilian and military staff) are a platform for engagement between the military and polity to define policy and sustain the armed forces. The South Africans and the British have similar arrangements; an integrated civilian/military effort converts national resources into military capabilities with due regard to political, military, and economic dimensions. Botswana is not yet there in this top down approach to building military capabilities; the MDJS does not have a robust defense management structure to inform policy, plan force development, and execute defense acquisition. Deficient of this type legislative and bureaucratic guidance, the BDF’s vision becomes an unrealistic internal exercise; another part of a futile
bottom up, stove-piped approach to the country’s security challenges, lacking coordination and synergy with other national sources of power. Because of this practice, the BDF’s inventory has become a perfunctory capability to address every security challenge of a landlocked country surrounded by war tested, dominant, and more populous neighbors.

**Acquisition System Unsuited To Address Military Peculiarities**

Furthermore, the current procurement system does not address the needs of the military. It lacks the requisite focus, making it vulnerable to competing interests of involved parties. Individuals within the military constitute one such interest party. Likewise, in the absence of strategic focus, commercial interests become a major influence. Many of the weapons systems within the BDF are classic examples of an acquisition system improperly poised to deliver effective and sustainable capabilities of a professional, prompt, and decisive force.

The current acquisition system contrasts sharply with international best practices, where defense ministries provide management architecture and policies to convert military requirements into capabilities. Within the U.S., the DOD has an expansive defense acquisition structure (with policy documents such as Directive No. 5000.01). The UK Ministry of Defence has a Capabilities Working Group (CWG) headed by the Chief of Logistics to produce a user requirements document and guidance. In South Africa, their acquisition requirements are developed from the different services and approval of each program is done by the Armament Acquisition Council, the Secretary for Defence, or other authority as required by relevant legislation. In fact, the South Africans have a parastatal company with a mandated function to meet the needs of their security services for material as well as all aspects of defense technology research.²³ In Botswana, acquisition funded through monies obtained from the Botswana
Consolidated Fund (including defense acquisition) must conform to the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA) (Cap. 42:8).\textsuperscript{24} The PPADA is the equivalent of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (1984) in the U.S., it provides uniform policies and procedures for procurement of all goods and services by executive agencies within the federal government. Unlike in the U.S., where additional guidance for defense acquisition programs is provided in the DOD Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Botswana has not promulgated any additional legislation or regulations to addresses the peculiarities of military acquisition. The MDJS has no management framework to guide the translation of military needs into sustainable capabilities. The military depends on guidance from the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADDB) procedures (the mechanics of procurement), without validating and prioritizing requirements.\textsuperscript{25} The Botswana Defense Force acquires military capabilities in the same manner schools acquire books. No additional regulations or processes ensure acquisitions secure freedom of action for the military, future sustainability, or forge strategic partnerships and alliances. Consequently, it comes as no surprise when the inventory of the BDF is a medley of equipment from all over the world. Interestingly, no major capabilities come from our weapons exporting neighbor South Africa, the economic lifeline of our country through the South African Customs Union (SACU), and our combat partner within the SADC standby brigade.\textsuperscript{26} In the absence of specific government policies to address defense acquisition, the BDF is prone to influences not necessarily aimed at providing appropriate and sustainable capabilities to its warfighters.

As previously suggested, a major influence is the military. The military is a tribe, which in the absence of regulation, procures to fit its own culture. To a tank commander, only a tank can kill by another tank, while a military aviator will intuitively opt for fighter jets, irrespective of real national security needs, to preserve their culture. As Jonathan Monten and Andrew
Bennett opined, “organizational cultures are particularly strong and stark in military organizations, where training and acculturation practices are pronounced, individuals in tightly knit social groups are called upon to override even their instincts, and organizational symbols are literally worn on one’s sleeves.” These cultural desires often take priority over military effectiveness, sustainability, and strategic logic. Consequently, the BDF has put little emphasis on forming strategic partnerships with the countries who provide their equipment, conceding sustainability and freedom of action. Because their equipment comes from all corners of the globe; it’s purchased from obscure defense contractors who are not Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and who can’t secure a long term support commitment. Additionally, the country’s limited industrial base and lack of technical knowledge leaves the BDF at the mercy of these unscrupulous suppliers. Having accumulated unsuitable inventories, the military’s flexibility is lost as funding goes towards maintaining out dated equipment.

The country’s weak defense acquisition system is also susceptible to manipulation and influence by business interests. Industry representatives can be anything from relatives of serving members, retired military members, to legislators. Parliament has repeatedly sought to know how BDF conducts its business (particularly how it identifies major equipment suppliers). However, successive defense ministers have declined to go into details citing security reasons. Nor has the BDF explained its relationship with industry’s middlemen. The code of conduct for these representatives is as elusive; they apparently get rewarded based on how close they are to influence acquisition decisions, or how much inside information they acquire for their companies. In the absence of strategic guidance, standards (technical specifications), or a robust acquisition process, the BDF is easily swayed. These defects of defense acquisition can best be
illustrated by the procurement of fourteen Canadian-built CF-5 aircraft from representatives of the Canadian government in the 1990s.

Like most weapon platforms the BDF acquired at the time, the CF-5 was bought second hand. The strategic calculus of its purchase is neither apparent nor documented in the public domain. These CF-5A/B models had far too many operational limitations to be employed as a modern tactical fighter. Consequently, it remains an ineffective air superiority fighter; it is equally ineffective as a ground attack aircraft, and lacks operational range when carrying a weapons load. Insightfully Royal Canadian Air Force pilots stated the CF-5 lacked all-weather navigation and attack capabilities. Specifically, it could not compete with the MiG-19 Farmer when the standard fighter equipment of the Warsaw Pact was the more advanced MiG-21 Fishbed.\textsuperscript{31} Bought at a time when all Botswana’s neighbors possessed aircraft superior to the MiG-19 Farmer, the CF-5 was an inapt answer to most of the BDF’s missions. The operational radius of the aircraft limits its support to our troops, so it can’t reliably provide fire support to a BDF peace-enforcement mission abroad. The CF-5, like other Cold-War era aircraft, has a large logistical footprint; it uses liquid oxygen, an independent ground-power unit, supplemental air for starting, as well as other ground support equipment. Additionally, the aircraft has serious sustainment challenges. The OEM, Canadair, no longer maintains configuration control for the CF-5; similarly Canadian Forces have no interest in its future. This has left the BDF at the mercy of unreliable private suppliers. Subsequently, maintenance is proving to be particularly debilitating for a landlocked, low industrial base country with an extraordinarily demanding operational environment.\textsuperscript{32}

Similar challenges are found across most major weapon platforms in the BDF inventory; reduced effectiveness leads to low operational availability, difficulties in integrating hardware
from different sources leads to inadequate logistics support. This is compounded by the country’s low industrial base and inherent inability to maintain complex military equipment.\textsuperscript{33} A proper defense acquisition system would have rejected these weapon platforms before the BDF acquired them; especially at a time when the proponents of these systems were retiring them for lighter and faster capabilities.\textsuperscript{34} Botswana needs a sensitive defense acquisition system, where operational requirements can dictate the capabilities acquired and a ministry of defense that can provide an appropriate defense acquisition management platform.

**Recommendations**

- Clearly the BDF has outgrown the BDF Act; reliance on civil service General Orders is reason enough to promulgate legislation and regulations that will cover more of BDF mandate and activities. There is need to have separate and distinct military statutes to address among other things authority on size, organization, and written policy guidance for military planning.

- Parliament to should be led on more into the development of the military, as much as the President is responsible for its employment, parliament should play a more active role in appropriating for and resourcing the military to ensure the country’s security. This can only be realized if the military opens up more and is accountable to the legislators.

- A comprehensive security review is overdue for Botswana. Primarily, to inform the role and equipment of the BDF in the current security climate of southern Africa and its missions relative to other security organs within the country. As the Minister observed, this will effectively reduce the discrepancies, redundancies and deficiencies in our national security policy and security institutions will be appropriately resourced to deliver the capabilities required
The establishment of Ministry of Defence Justice and Security (MDJS) did not bring about expected level of involvement in defense management, commensurate with world best practice for similar institutions. The ministry should consider beefing up its staff with individuals knowledgeable of defense management. The ministry should take to both the executive and legislature proposals to stimulate defense policy formulation. To this end the ministry should have the structure and staff for developing defense policy and then translating approved policy into a long term plans and an acquisition and branch to address defense business.

There is a need to take a further look into the current procurement system to accommodate and address the peculiarities of military acquisition, as well as restore public confidence in the processes. Acquisition strategies should be put in place to emphasize standards, as well as partnerships to ensure the weapon systems acquired are operationally and logistically sustainable.

Policies should strengthen smart partnerships to pool resources and capabilities Botswana cannot afford on her own, particularly with well-resourced South Africa; shunning South Africa when our country’s economy is tied to it is wasteful. An arrangement similar to what the Canadians have with the Americans can go a long way in complementing and saving costs for both countries.

There is need to for the nation to have confidence on how defense spending is done. The relationship the BDF has with industry should be as transparent as security allows. Equipment choices should be a product of sound security assessment; neither the military desires nor the industry influences should prevail over strategic imperatives. Middlemen
and companies in the security business need specific regulations; perceptions of undue influence are not only hurtful to the BDF image, but undermine its effectiveness as well.

- Action should be taken to dispose of obsolete systems and their inordinate maintenance costs. Inventory which can’t be brought to the fight, no matter how impressive on parade, will not make the BDF’s vision of “a prompt professional and decisive force.”

Conclusion

The Botswana Defence Force’s vision cannot be realized under the current arrangement. There is lack of strategic focus and a defense management framework for matching its policies and resources to deliver appropriate capabilities. Botswana has been slow to promulgate legislation and develop policies to further define the military’s purpose, guide the acquisition of its equipment, and explain the role the BDF must to play in the country’s security enterprise. The military has largely relied on civil service policies and regulations, with the unintended consequence of it becoming molded into a regular government department. This has been compounded by the continued assignment of the military to perform functions normally assigned to civil authorities. Consequently, the BDF has continued to carry out internal restructuring and acquire capabilities without improving its operational effectiveness; while it is consistently assigned to act against non-state actors, it has acquired the capabilities predominantly required for traditional, state-to-state Cold War era combat. This is also due to its vulnerability to competing interests, not all of which are aimed at delivering appropriate capabilities to the BDF. Regardless, the next big ticket purchases will not address the country’s security concerns. A defense review is needed to establish the proper relationships between the people, institutions,
and the military. Otherwise the BDF’s vision statement shall remain an inconsequential sound bite confined to the military barracks.
Notes


2 Linda S. Brant, and Francis W. A’ Hearn, “The Sisyphus Paradox: Framing the Acquisition Reform Debate” (JFQ, National Defense University, Summer 1997), 34.


7 Frederick H. Fleitz, Peace Keeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and US Interests (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 115.


12 History of the BDF – Botswana Government Portal.


15 “Parliament, through its committee, under the broad framework of separation of powers, is constitutionally mandated to oversee the military. However, as we indicated earlier, a characteristic feature of Botswana’s political system is the fusion of power. Invariably, this state of affairs compromises parliament’s effectiveness to perform its oversight function.” See, Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi, Glen Segell, *Civil-Military Relationships in Developing Countries*: Lexington Books, 2013. Page 178-9

16 10 United States Code (USC), Section 113, paragraph g. (2).

17 Ibid Note 13.


In this regard the input of all security relevant government actors and the civil society ought to be solicited. The resultant policy framework which will come out of the review process will form the basis for which security organs in government and in the public domain will come up with their own security policies. The policy will also ensure that operational decisions are done and implemented in accordance with national interests as well as the short and long-term goals of national policy. This will effectively reduce the discrepancies, redundancies and deficiencies in our national security policy implementation process. To this end, the security institutions will be appropriately resourced to deliver the capabilities required.” Remarks by the Minister for Defence, Justice and Security, Honourable Dikgamatso N. Seretse, at the opening the opening of National Security Strategy Review Seminar: 07/10/2008. See, Tautona Times “Botswana: National Security Strategy Review,” SAP4Africa; Social Accountability Platform For Africa, 13 October 2008 (Accessed 20/11/2013) http://www.sap4africa.net/news/botswana-national-security-strategy-review.


The composition of the Defense Secretariat emphasizes civilian supremacy in defense policy making. In 2004 it was composed of five divisions: Policy and Planning, Finance, Acquisition and Procurement, Inspector General and Affirmative Action. Two of these are particularly influential in acquisition; The Policy and Plans Division is responsible for developing defense policy within the guidelines set out by the cabinet, and then translating approved policy into a long term departmental plan, while the Acquisition and Procurement Division develops regarding defense business. AMSCO is mandated to meet the needs of their Department of Defence for material and for defense technology; research, development analysis, test and evaluation (under the supervision of their ministry of defense). See, Dan Henk, South Africa’s Armament Industry: Continuity and Change after a decade of Majority Rule (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2006), 51. Also see, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries and the Defence Review.


It is also postulated here; arguably, that a disposition is created that tends towards following pet projects by defense institutions in the absence of proper civilian oversight. The offshoot is inevitable, disproportionate hemorrhage of the Consolidated Fund with no matching benefits. Further there is no thorough financial analysis where the CDF will have to bring up net present value, sensitivity or even simulated analysis so that the Defence Council could take to Parliament to prove the pecuniary assessment of the proposed programs.” See, Major Mothusi L. Mompati, “A First Step Towards Zero Down Time: The Creation of Synergy Through Equipment Acquisition Within the Constrains of a Small Budget in an Army With Civilian Oversight – A Case of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF)” (Msc Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, 2005), 26.


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Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 113, paragraph g. (2).
