HELP WANTED:

POST-CONFLICT SKILLS FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REBALANCE

by

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Biography

Lt Col William D. Fischer is assigned to Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL. He was previously the Executive Officer to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy. In this position, he assisted with developing DoD policies regarding recruiting, retention, compensation, travel, the Armed Forces Chaplain Board, and the entire spectrum of human resource management issues for the DoD’s 1.4 million active duty military members.

Prior to his OSD assignment, Lieutenant Colonel Fischer was Deputy Commander, 51st Mission Support Group, 51st Fighter Wing, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea. In this position, he provided strategic leadership for five diverse squadrons totaling more than 2,800 personnel, supporting the Air Force’s most permanently forward deployed wing, a numbered air force and 20 tenant units. He was also previously assigned to the Air Staff as Deputy Chief, Strategic Plans Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel and Services. In this capacity, he was responsible for policy regarding all education, training, utilization, readiness, strategic planning, and doctrine issues for the personnel officer career field. Lieutenant Colonel Fischer has also commanded the 22d Mission Support Squadron and the 455th Expeditionary Mission Support Squadron.

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Abstract

Synergies exist between the skillsets of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations (Phase IV) and building partnership capacity (Phase 0) operations. The negative connotations that many associate with post-conflict “nation building” are actually valuable skills for the Asia-Pacific rebalance. DoD can increase the opportunities for success in the Asia-Pacific rebalance by using the Phase IV skillsets learned from the last decade of conflict, since many of the same concerns exist in a post-conflict environment that the DoD will be looking to address with its Asia-Pacific partners in the future. As resources decline, using the post-conflict skillset for the Asia-Pacific rebalance is actually a wise use of DoD resources and will benefit the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Phase IV skillsets and guidance complement those for Phase 0 operations and fit into the DoD’s new strategic guidance and the Air-Sea Battle concept being used as the major framework for the Asia-Pacific Rebalance. The Philippines is an example of how Phase IV concepts can actually assist Phase 0 efforts with other partners in the Asia-Pacific region, providing a model for low cost, small footprint engagements for the future.
Introduction

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is involved in simultaneously concluding operations in Afghanistan while undertaking a rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, all in an environment of declining fiscal and personnel resources. This research analyzes if the skillsets and guidance from the last decade of conflict can be leveraged for the objectives identified in the Asia-Pacific rebalance.

This paper begins with an overview of the strategic guidance and debates surrounding the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. It also discusses the continuing debates such as reducing the DoD role in long-term nation-building activities in a resource-constrained environment. A shift in DoD mindset from suppress and contain to shape and solve is identified as a key enabling concept for the Asia-Pacific rebalance. A consistent theme from this discussion will be balancing the DoD’s requirement for Phase 0 and building partnership capacity with declining budgets and personnel, while continuing to train for major combat operations.

The second part of the paper continues with a specific discussion of the skills and taskings required with the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. It begins with a review of the Air-Sea Battle concept, which is central to dealing with a rising China. After these concepts are reviewed, Joint and Army publications will be assessed to determine which skills are required to support the revised strategic guidance. Specifically, this portion of the review will focus on assessing future requirements for Phase 0, which has been projected as a major portion of the DoD effort going forward.

The final section involves a comparison of Phase 0 and building partnership capacity requirements of the Asia-Pacific rebalance with skillsets from other phases of military operations. For example, this research will review competencies from the Iraq and Afghanistan
conflicts that could be applicable to the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Specifically, tasks and skillsets from Phase IV will be reviewed, since the continuation of long-term nation-building and the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction mission has come into question as the wars of the last decade come to an end.

This paper concludes, based on analysis and evidence, that there are significant complementary features of Phase IV skillsets that strengthen Phase 0 and building partnership capacity. Therefore, the lessons learned from the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts are likely to be helpful in the U.S. effort to expand its shaping mission in the Asia-Pacific region.

A separate appendix provides an example of a current operation highlighting the complementary features of Phase IV and Phase 0 skillsets. Specifically, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) is an operation that can be used as a model for future engagements for the Asia-Pacific rebalance under the Air-Sea Battle concept. It is an example of the clear linkages between Phase IV and Phase 0 concepts for low-cost and small footprint operations and how the DoD can leverage Phase IV concepts to forge the enduring relationships envisioned under the Asia-Pacific rebalance.
Strategic Guidance and Prepping the Battlefield

The first step of this analysis involves an overview of the strategic guidance and debates surrounding the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Reviewing the Asia-Pacific strategy begins with the Obama administration’s over-arching guidance, but also includes a discussion within the DoD of how the military instrument of national power will be applied in this new environment. This “roles and mission” review is important, since the Pentagon is at a nexus of drawing-down from Afghanistan in an environment of declining resources and personnel while attempting to determine how to re-focus from Post-Conflict Phase IV operations to Building Partnership Capacity Phase 0 operations. The DoD must guard against the desire to quickly divest itself from a costly and confusing mission that many saw as a mission not best suited for the military without a careful analysis of how that experience can inform the future. To prevent strategic errors during the transition, a review of the Obama administration’s guidance is an appropriate departure point.

The United States signaled a clear intent to transition from post-conflict and Phase IV operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to a building partnership capacity and Phase 0 emphasis for the Asia-Pacific region. The President used an address to the Australian parliament on 17 November 2011 to outline a “deliberate and strategic decision [that] the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.”\(^1\) Secretary of State Clinton reinforced this strategic shift in a major policy address later in November 2011 when she argued, “one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade [will] be to lock in a substantially increased investment…in the Asia-Pacific region.”\(^2\) This was followed by DoD’s revised strategic guidance in January 2012, which referred to increasing partnerships and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region to ensure increased capability and capacity.\(^3\) Most
recently, Secretary of Defense Hagel asserted during a policy address delivered on 25 August 2013 in Malaysia that the United States is rebalancing because it is preparing for a future that has greater connections – in number and significance – to the nations of the Asia-Pacific region.\(^4\) The strategic guidance for increased presence and engagement is clear and consistent from the administration. However, there are significant questions regarding how the military instrument of national power will be used in this rebalance.

The transition from post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan towards building partnership capacity through the Asia-Pacific rebalance requires what Peter Phillips and Charles Corcoran refer to as a change from a “suppress and contain” posture to a “shape and solve” capability.\(^5\) At its heart, this transition represents DoD’s struggle for a workable methodology to address instability, lack of governance capacity, and insurgent/terrorist threats, regardless of the intended target of the rebalance effort. Therefore, it is appropriate to review three major issues surrounding the “roles and mission” debate regarding the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

The first consideration involves the internal debates regarding the role of DoD in post-conflict and stabilization operations. While the military clearly has unparalleled expeditionary capabilities to restore order in contested and austere environments, many within the interagency process and internationally frequently view the DoD as an organization ill-suited for consensus building and cultural sensitivity.\(^6\) However, there is no other agency possessing the manpower, funding, equipment, and global reach similar to DoD. Therefore, the “Stuckee Theory” of General(ret) Anthony Zinni becomes the default answer. Zinni asserts that DoD gets Phase IV missions because no other agency can do it, even though it is not suited to do so.\(^7\) Since leadership of the post-conflict mission set has fallen to DoD, this puts the military in what the Center for Defense Information refers to as a “double bind.”\(^8\) Under this concept, a major source
of confusion and debate is created because the military is being tasked to not be too “hard” or too “soft.” This can create the problem of trying to be ‘jack of all trades and master of none.’ This ‘roles and missions’ debate is framed by many factors, but most importantly, by how many resources can be dedicated to the Phase IV mission while still maintaining skills and capabilities needed for direct action operations and other missions.

A second concern involves how to prepare for the Asia-Pacific rebalance and re-focus on Phase 0 operations in an era of fiscal austerity. The new strategic guidance for DoD clearly states, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” Therefore, the danger exists that DoD’s hard-won skills in Phase IV from the last decade of conflict are in danger of liquidation. Although ‘lessons learned’ efforts are continuing, the nexus of withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, refitting the force, declining budgets and personnel, all while rebalancing to Asia-Pacific, presents a danger of losing skills that may be valuable later. The DoD models from the last decade of conflict involve large footprints, since the Phase IV strategy involved ensuring a significant presence to protect populations and support emerging local governments. While many envision a ‘light’ footprint under the Asia-Pacific rebalance, the enduring military presence suggested by Phase 0 and building partnership capacity may be a hard sell to policymakers and taxpayers. General Martin Dempsey highlights a further problem beyond defining the problem only in terms of current fiscal resources. General Dempsey has identified an institutional barrier to adjusting to a new mission. The multi-year acquisition and planning process under the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) means approximately 80 percent of DoD’s structure is already in the FYDP pipeline. He asserts that, although assessing the 20 percent that remains is a given, there may be resources in the current 80 percent that would serve the needs of DoD’s future. Since there are multiple impediments
to a major change in mission sets, a well-defined mission analysis using current resources and skills will be required for DoD’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

The third area of debate concerning a move from *suppress and contain* to *shape and solve* is how DoD will plan for the future in the Asia-Pacific region. The DoD’s current strategic guidance requires a wide range of military skills for the future as it lists ten primary missions for the U.S. armed forces, from “Deter and Defeat Aggression,” and “Provide a Stabilizing Presence,” to “Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations.”\(^\text{12}\) This will involve traditional tasks such as securing territory from opposing armed forces to assisting with partner training and confidence building. Under this guidance and the shift to the Asia-Pacific region, Frank Hoffman’s discussion of hybrid threats is instructive.\(^\text{13}\) It is clear DoD will not be able to choose between high-intensity conflict or long-term stabilization operations. The military’s requirement will clearly be to maintain both capabilities simultaneously. The result is that mission sets cannot be viewed in terms of a zero-sum game. Michael Noonan’s discussion of *next-war-itis* is also compelling as a cautionary tale for future DoD planners.\(^\text{14}\) The United States will have to guard against using the same techniques from Iraq and Afghanistan or currently-existing capabilities for situations that actually call for other tools in the DoD skillset. A convincing summary of the DoD’s future planning for the Asia-Pacific rebalance and moving from *suppress and contain* to *shape and solve* comes from Marine Corps Commandant, General James Amos, who asserts that future conflicts will continue to involve Phase IV and long-term military-to-military relations.\(^\text{15}\)

The Asia-Pacific rebalance primarily addresses a rising China that is seen as threatening U.S. access to key areas and support of its allies. Therefore, the U.S. needs an operational
concept that provides an enduring counter to the rise of China. The next section of research
determines what skillsets are envisioned in the Asia-Pacific rebalance.
Is the Air-Sea Battle Concept All There Is In The Pacific Rebalance?

The second major area of this research continues with a review of the skills and taskings involved with the Asia-Pacific rebalance and its supporting Air-Sea Battle concept. Specifically, this portion of the review will focus on assessing future requirements for Phase 0 and Building Partnership Capacity skillsets. Even though the recent DoD guidance states the military will not be sourced for long-term nation-building activities, there are significant implications for long-term capacity-building activities for U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region. After the Air-Sea Battle strategy is reviewed, Joint and Army publications will be assessed to determine what competencies are being required of commanders to support the Asia-Pacific rebalance.

The Air-Sea Battle Office was initially activated in 2011. The Air-Sea Battle concept is the implementation linkage between DoD’s 2012 strategic guidance and its requirement to ensure access to the global commons in an environment with increasing anti-access and area-denial concerns. However, the implications of anti-access and area-denial go far beyond countering direct threats to U.S. fielded forces. This concept assesses that there will be little indication and warning about actions against U.S. interests. In addition, many areas of U.S. presence and allies are within the threat rings of current adversaries in the region. However, while the Air-Sea Battle concept it is frequently viewed solely in terms of anti-access and area-denial, this initiative requires many other skills for the DoD’s part of national security to be successful and to ensure the prosperity of U.S. allies in the region. Indeed, when this concept refers to “pre-integration” of combat power, a vital criteria for success is how nations across the Asia-Pacific region can assist this effort.
One of the major concepts of the Air-Sea Battle strategy is *shaping and engagement*:

Shaping and engagement activities…ensures conceptual alignment with our partners and allies, builds necessary partner capacity and strengthens our relationships which facilitate and assure access to multiple domains in the event conflict occurs.\(^{20}\)

While it is easy to interpret these and other statements from the Air-Sea Battle concept as an exclusive focus on Phase 0 operations and an excuse to dismiss the inconsistent record of Phase IV operations, this paper asserts that a deliberate review of existing skillsets is needed. It is clear the Air-Sea Battle concept requires significant involvement of partner nations throughout the region. Although beyond the scope of this paper, there are other entities such as USPACOM’s Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance and the Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations that will be critical to U.S. success in the Air-Sea Battle strategy and the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. These organizations have extensive expertise in collaboratively promoting stabilization and reconstruction issues as well as building partnership capacity in unstable environments.\(^{21}\) How the DoD works with partner nations and other agencies is the next area of investigation. Therefore, a review of the elements involved in Phase 0 and Building Partnership Capacity from Joint and Army publications is appropriate.

Michael Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict observed, “the task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery of defense strategy to become a critical skill set across our armed forces.”\(^{22}\) There are five primary sources used in this review to assess the major skills tasked under Phase 0 and Building Partnership Capacity. The first source is Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations.” This guidance provides the foundation of the review, since it outlines the different phases of military operations.
Joint Publication 3-0 also refers to Phase 0 as “Shape,” and offers the following definition:

Shape activities are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation by shaping perceptions and influencing adversaries’ and allies’ behavior; developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; improving information exchange and intelligence sharing; providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access; and mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis. [emphasis added].

Therefore, the task under Phase 0 and Shape is how to create a stable and legitimate security environment in partner nations so U.S. forces can leverage that relationship to further U.S. and allied interests. There is also a second significant implication suggested by the Phases outlined in Joint Publication 3-0. The graphic also asserts a cyclical nature of the Phases; Phase IV/V at the end of a conflict become the new Phase 0. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume similarities and complementary linkages between Phase IV and Phase 0. Those linkages will be discussed later in this paper.

A second primary source for assessing Phase 0 and building partnership capacity skillsets is Joint Publication 3-22, “Foreign Internal Defense.” The elements in this publication are
directly linked to the discussion of *developing allied and friendly military capabilities* in Joint Publication 3-0. Joint Publication 3-22 defines Foreign Internal Defense as efforts directed towards building governmental institutions that are responsive to the local society. These efforts are intended to “prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence” and is a program that is “ideally preemptive/Phase 0.” Joint Publication 3-22 also provides examples of objectives under the Foreign Internal Defense initiative, including mitigate grievances exploited by insurgents; assist in setting the conditions and capabilities to increase civil society and the rule of law; and increase cooperation with, and legitimacy for, local government security and law enforcement entities.

A third source closely related to Phase 0 and building partnership capacity is Joint Publication 3-24, “Counterinsurgency Operations.” Although counterinsurgency operations are traditionally associated with Phase III operations, a close examination of the skills and taskings in this mission set finds they are closely related to the elements identified in Joint Publications 3-22 and 3-0. For example, the *clear-hold-build* strategy discusses concepts such as fostering government control with the aim of gaining the populace’s support. Some specific tasks under this concept include provide security for the indigenous population; support the rule of law; rebuild government institutions; and reduce insurgent presence. The end-state implied by Foreign Internal Defense is a stable government perceived as legitimate by its population because it can provide fair and equitable services for its constituencies. This, in turn, allows allies like the United States to operate on the basis of issues of mutual interest.

A fourth source involving Phase 0 and building partnership capacity is Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, “Stability.” Although the title implies a utility in Phase IV and post-conflict
stabilization operations, this document provides a discussion on building partnership capacity that is instructive in highlighting parallels with other sources. For example, ADP 3-07 defines building partnership capacity as the ability to increase a partner’s ability to implement policies regarding “security, rule of law, essential services, and governance” while improving inclusiveness and civil society. This concept also focuses on repairing a government’s ability to control the population under its jurisdiction and ensure a stable environment dedicated to solving its governance issues through the political process.

A fifth and final policy document governing Phase 0 and building partnership capacity is Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-8-4, “Building Partnership Capacity,” which lists key events in increasing a local government’s ability to increase capacity for governance. These key activities include: security cooperation, security force assistance, and assisting partners with developing a more capable and self-sustaining force. These efforts include developing a recruiting and training pipeline to increase professionalism.

The DoD’s strategic guidance and the Air-Sea Battle concept for the Asia-Pacific rebalance are clearly dependent on the U.S. military’s ability to leverage host-nation capabilities. These strategic documents have identified Phase 0 and building partnership capacity as the methodologies to ensure continued access and influence in the Asia-Pacific region and the global commons in that area. There is also clear and consistent guidance for Phase 0 and building partnership capacity in Joint and Army publications. The next portion of research will determine relevant skillsets from recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan using these methodologies and relationships. Specifically, there may be existing skillsets that are useful for the “new” Asia-Pacific model for the future.
Can the U.S. Leverage Phase IV for the Asia-Pacific Rebalance?

The final element of this paper involves an investigation of how Phase IV skillsets might complement the Phase 0 and building partnership capacity requirements of the Asia-Pacific rebalance. There could be competencies from the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts that could be applicable to the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Specifically, the tasks and skillsets from Phase IV will be reviewed, since the continuation of nation-building related competencies may be of value for U.S. security interests.

Phase IV skillsets are required to make Phase 0 more effective, since many countries in the PACOM AOR are dealing with insurgencies and need to strengthen state capacity to weaken or prevent rebellions (see Appendix 1 on the Philippines). In fact, although beyond the scope of this paper, the Phase IV and Phase 0 skillsets would also prove valuable in the Asia-Pacific rebalance in partner countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, India, and Malaysia. This methodology could also help build on the emerging relationship with Myanmar, or in a scenario such as a complete failure of the North Korean government’s ability to function.

There are three primary sources to assess the skillsets tasked to DoD under Phase IV and post-conflict operations. The first is Joint Publication 3-07, “Stability Operations.” This document provides authoritative guidance to the U.S. Armed Services for stability operations. It defines stability operations as efforts to “maintain or establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”31 This definition implies a DoD capability that is able to deploy and sustain itself to perform the simultaneous tasks of protecting a population and providing essential government services, infrastructure repair, and humanitarian relief. The mission scope described in this environment also assumes the parallel accomplishment of these tasks.
A second source for guiding Phase IV operations is Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations.” This describes a very similar concept for stabilization operations, when it states the intent is to “reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” Therefore, the clear intent to the Services is to ensure the safety of the population, enable the provision of essential services, and facilitate government legitimacy. The next step is to review Army publications to assess how this JCS-level guidance is promulgated.

The third major source to assess the skillsets tasked to DoD under Phase IV and post-conflict operations is Army Doctrine publication 3-07, “Stability.” This is the authoritative Army doctrinal guidance that also serves “as a resource for the other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities who seek to better understand the role of the military in broader reconstruction and stabilization efforts.” The Army’s Phase IV guidance describes the post-conflict effort in three major areas: goals, tasks, and end state conditions.

The overall goal of stability operations in ADP 3-07 is to ensure the local population regards their situation and their government as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. Since these three elements are used to define stability, the Army then proceeds to describe three sources of instability to be addressed by Army Phase IV efforts. The first source of instability is decreased levels of support for local government authority. This decreased support is based on what the population expects from their government. This decreased support for the established government leads to the second source of instability – increased support for anti-government groups. This shift occurs when the population views these other groups as a better source of the provision of government services or addressing grievances. The third source of instability occurs
when the spoiler group and the population that supports them begins to undermine the legitimacy of the established government. The evolution of instability described in ADP 3-07 then requires a listing of tasks and a concept of an end state to address these sources of instability.

The Army’s methodology of addressing instability also includes a listing of tasks and end-state conditions for Phase IV and post-conflict operations. There are two key elements in this task area. These duties are “legitimacy and host-nation ownership” and “building partnership capacity.” The end state conditions directed by ADP 3-07 are: “Safe and secure environment, established rule of law, social well-being, stable governance, and sustainable economy.” It is clear that Army guidance closely tracks with JCS guidance to ensure the safety of the population, enable the provision of essential services, and facilitate government legitimacy. The next task is to assess if the skills and tasks previously identified in Phase 0 and building partnership capacity are complemented by those of Phase IV and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

There are two examples of a cognitive disconnect that highlight the lack of appreciation for the similarities between Phase 0 and Phase IV operations and how Phase IV skills complement Phase 0. The first example is from the discussion of stabilization skill sets in ADP 3-07. In this guidance, the Army asserts that Phase IV tasks and engagements are valuable across the entire range of military operations:

“Before conflict, engagements with fragile states act as preventative measures, and reinforce alliances or demonstrate support for more stable countries…During conflict, stability tasks help to set post-conflict conditions and mitigate the sources of instability that foster the conflict… In peacetime, stability tasks are often the critical element of decisive action supporting such missions as peace operations (specifically conflict prevention), and building local capability and capacity (most often in the form of security cooperation) [emphasis added].”
Army doctrine clearly acknowledges the importance of Phase IV and post-conflict skills across all phases of military operations. However, while the Army professes the cyclical and continuous nature of Phase IV capabilities, there is an example of the disconnect in JCS guidance.

Joint Publication 3-0 provides a second disconnect that could explain the confusion regarding the continued utility of the post-conflict skill set. Figure V-3 in Joint Publication 3-0 (below) visually portrays a good understanding of the cyclical nature of the phases of military operations, since Phase IV is a necessary pre-cursor to Phase 0. However, this guidance suggests the false impression that Phase IV activities such as “Enabling Civil Authority,” “Stabilizing Activities,” “Deterring Activities,” and “Shaping Activities,” while also occurring during Phase V, abruptly stop at the beginning of Phase 0.

This visual inaccuracy exists even though its definition of “Shape” involves the same activities as those occurring in Phase IV. Fortunately, there is good alignment between Army, JCS, and the Department of State regarding stability operations (see below).
Although this task alignment across Army, JCS, and DoS is encouraging, the lack of appreciation for those skillsets across the entire spectrum of military operations will most likely limit DoD effectiveness in the Asia-Pacific rebalance. A summary of the major skillsets from JCS and Service guidance reveals the following similarities:
It is clear the directives governing Phase IV and Phase 0 speak to essentially similar skills and tasks. The danger comes when DoD tries to create a “new” approach when the skills already exist.

The DoD’s drive to extricate itself from an unpopular, confusing, and difficult skillset filled with wicked problems, combined with strategic guidance directing that the DoD will no longer be sourced for long-term nation-building activities, may prevent DoD from seeing that Phase IV skillsets are an invaluable complement to Phase 0 skillsets.
Back to the Future: Post-Conflict Skills for Building Partner Capacity

This paper determined that there are skillsets from the last decade of conflict that can be leveraged for the objectives identified in the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Specifically, it determined that synergies exist between the skillsets of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations (Phase IV) and building partnership capacity (Phase 0) operations. The analysis used three main areas of effort to highlight the similarities.

The first area of review was the strategic guidance for DoD in the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Although budgets and end strength are declining, and DoD has been told that they will not be sized or resourced for long-term nation building, there are many tasks and skillsets from Phase IV that will be valuable to the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Therefore, it will be important to leverage skills currently in the inventory instead of reinventing new methodologies for a “new” mission.

The second area of analysis provided a deeper analysis of the skillsets tasked in the strategic guidance identified in the first section. Specifically, the research highlighted the Air-Sea Battle concept and its emphasis on Phase 0 and building partnership capacity capabilities. The review found consistent guidance in Joint and Army publications for the Phase 0 mission.

The final area of this paper highlighted the synergies between the skillsets of Phase IV and Phase 0 operations. It also highlighted a potential intellectual disconnect in the framing of Phase IV and Phase 0 tasks. Specifically, the research asserts that while the DoD does a sufficient job of visually describing the cyclical nature of military operations, it creates a false dichotomy between Phase IV and Phase 0 skills, since they are largely similar, but may differ in the context of application. Given that many potential partner nations in the Asia-Pacific region are experiencing levels of insurgency, Phase IV skillsets are required to strengthen them and
make them more effective partners in balancing a rising China (see Appendix 1 on the Philippines).

There are clear ways in which DoD’s guidance for Phase 0 and building partnership capacity are complemented by Phase IV tasks for stabilization and reconstruction. Unfortunately, the negative connotations that many associate with post-conflict and “nation building” during the last decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan are in danger of unnecessarily limiting the assessment of what are essentially the same skill sets. This will weaken prospects for success of the Asia-Pacific rebalance because it will preclude a full range of options that DoD could have in its inventory.

This paper asserts that DoD can increase opportunities for success in the Asia-Pacific rebalance by using the Phase IV skillsets learned from the last decade of conflict, since many of the same concerns exist in a post-conflict environment that the DoD will be looking to address with its Asia-Pacific partners in the future. As resources decline, using the post-conflict skillset for the Asia-Pacific rebalance is actually a wise use of DoD resources and will benefit the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The danger is that DoD leadership will fail to appreciate the valuable synergies of Phase IV skillsets in complementing Phase 0 operations. DoD cannot let next-war-itis and the drive to complete Iraq-Afghanistan operations as an excuse to – once again – forget the lessons of the past. In fact, the events of 9/11 that started the events of Iraq-Afghanistan have been widely attributed to the U.S. inability to connect the dots. The U.S. must not make the same mistake in the Asia-Pacific rebalance by failing to connect the dots between Phase IV and Phase 0 skillsets.
Appendix 1
The Philippines: A Template for the Future?

A current DoD engagement in the Asia-Pacific region highlights the complementary aspects of Phase IV and Phase 0 operations. It provides an example of how DoD can leverage these complementary concepts for enduring, low-cost, and small footprint operations to serve as a model for the Asia-Pacific rebalance.

Although there are currently prohibitions in the Philippine constitution prohibiting permanent basing of foreign military forces in the country, there is a 1999 agreement with the United States that does allow for visits on a temporary basis.\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the original intent of these temporary visits has led to a relationship that has significantly evolved into an enduring presence, even though the United States Pacific Commander, Admiral Samuel Locklear III, confirmed as recently as August 2013 that he did not have any plans to request permanent bases in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{41} A review of what led to this enduring relationship and its major initiatives is appropriate.

The current U.S. presence in the Philippines has its roots in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, with the initial deployments in January 2002 under the guidance of JTF-510 and later evolving into JSOTF-P.\textsuperscript{42} Threats to the Philippine government come from insurgents and terrorists such as Jemaah Islamiyya, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf. Many of the incidents of instability are focused in the regions of the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao, where a disaffected Muslim population totaling approximately 5 million is claiming unfair treatment by the majority Catholic government.\textsuperscript{43} The mission of JSOTF-P is to assist the government and military of the Philippines in eliminating safe havens for terrorist and counterinsurgent forces while assisting in the establishment of conditions for a stable and
legitimate government that will be able to promote peace and prosperity for its people. There are three regional task forces in Mindanao and a contingent coordinating activities with the State Department and other elements of the Country Team. There are also three main lines of effort for JSOTF-P: humanitarian assistance and infrastructure improvements; sharing information such as intelligence and operations planning; and increasing the capabilities of the Philippine armed forces by providing subject matter experts for joint training, education, and professional development. These are clearly Phase IV tasks and skillsets.

One of the most successful aspects of the JSOTF-P experience has been what Mark Munson refers to as the Basilian Model. This concept involves a close working relationship between the U.S. and Philippine government personnel at the tactical level. These small, quiet, but enduring relationships have created a significant civil-military dialogue that has increased the confidence of the local population to share information. This is a two-phase process. First, the JSOTF-P effort must be seen as enduring and a legitimate effort to assist the local population so they can feel confident of helping the joint Philippine and U.S. effort. Second, the joint effort must successfully deliver increased security and legitimate government services based on that relationship. The cycle is self-reinforcing; as the local government is more successful, the population is more willing to share additional information and confer legitimacy on the government. Being able to strengthen these relationships created numerous examples of the local population stating that they began to “question everything the guerrillas had told them about Americans.” This isolates the insurgents and terrorists without requiring major force-on-force battles.

As the small U.S. units engaged local populations with appropriate language and cultural skills, they were able to bring Philippine forces from disarray into a more coherent stabilizing
The better relations with the local populations increased security for government forces, allowing them greater freedom of movement and led to government forces being able to take the initiative against the insurgents and terrorists. As the security situation stabilized, more ambitious infrastructure projects were possible, further increasing stability and prosperity. Finally, as the situation continued to improve, Philippine professionals, such as doctors and teachers, began to return, further increasing local ownership of stabilization efforts.

The example of the joint U.S. and Philippine effort under the auspices of JSOTF-P is a compelling example of how a consistent and culturally sensitive presence using a small footprint can succeed. A stronger government and armed forces enable the Philippines to more effectively stand up to China and become a stronger partner to the U.S. in its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.
Notes


20 Ibid., 11.

21 The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance has operated under United States Pacific Command since 1994 to improve responsiveness across the spectrum of engagements, from humanitarian relief to complex contingencies. It also helps foster civil-military integration through education, training, and collaboration events and applied research. See http://www.coe-dmha.org/Default.aspx. The Bureau of
Conflict and Stabilization Operations under the Department of State was created in 2012 to address cycles of violence in target countries by coordinating crisis response and fostering stabilization efforts. Specific areas of emphasis include Increasing governance capacity by helping states control their territories and ensure the well-being of their citizens by providing expertise in conflict analysis, strategic planning, and developing local initiatives. See http://www.state.gov/j/cso/index.htm. Both organizations have experience in collaborating with NGOs in insurgency-like situations, providing additional institutional capacity for enabling Phase IV skillsets.


23 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, V-6, Figure V-3.
24 Ibid., V-8.
26 Ibid., II-5.
28 Ibid., X-3.
32 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, V-9.
33 Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, Stability, ii.
34 Ibid., 1.
36 Ibid., 6.
37 Ibid., 8.
38 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, V-6, Figure V-3.
39 Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, Stability, iii. The State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review can be accessed at http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/. Also see Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, III-2, Figure III-1.
48 Ibid., 7.


Center for Defense Information. “Getting the Military Out of Humanitarian Relief.” *The Defense Monitor* 26, no. 6 (October 1997).


State Department, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, 2010.
