AT THE FULCRUM OF AIR FORCE IDENTITY:
BALANCING THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES
OF IMAGE AND CULTURE

BY

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ABSTRACT

“Today’s Air Force is experiencing an institutional identity crisis that places it at an historical nadir of confidence, reputation, and influence,” wrote Thomas Ehrhard in his 2009 work for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments entitled An Air Force Strategy for the Long Haul. His assertion is not new—it has been made often enough since the end of the Cold War that it has become trite. This thesis explores the roots of the Air Force’s identity problems by applying a theoretical construct to explain why many previous identity initiatives have been so startlingly unsuccessful. The paper concludes that senior Air Force leaders have failed, in part, because of their disregard for the powerful roles that organizational cultures play in the day-to-day lives of the average Airman.

The Air Force chief of staff that hopes to achieve a measure of success in shaping the future of the force will have to find the appropriate balance between the Air Force’s external image and its internal culture. Among the other military services within the Department of Defense, the top Airman will have to make sense of the paradoxical mandates to cooperate to win the nation’s wars while simultaneously competing for scarce resources in a zero-sum Washington, DC, budget battle. The Chief that turns the corner will have to find an acceptable and durable equilibrium among the many organizational Air Force subcultures, and in particular, should consider ways to redefine the organization to achieve a more equitable power-sharing arrangement among the tribes. In the end, this leader will only be truly successful by discovering and communicating an emergent sense of Airman culture that resonates throughout the rank-and-file. Moving beyond the Air Force’s WHAT and HOW, Airmen must be inspired with a clear and compelling WHY.
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Introduction

“Today’s Air Force is experiencing an institutional identity crisis that places it at an historical nadir of confidence, reputation, and influence,” wrote Thomas Ehrhard in his 2009 work for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments entitled *An Air Force Strategy for the Long Haul*. If his were a lone voice in the wilderness, one might be inclined to disregard it, but expressions of concern over the Air Force’s identity have become commonplace enough to border on trite. As early as 1989—on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union—a group of Air Force officers compiled their concerns in an unofficial paper that circulated throughout Air Force leadership. “It is our view, however, that beneath these positive indicators and despite a widely respected tactical, technological, and managerial efficiency, the Air Force has lost a sense of its own identity and of the unique contribution airpower makes to warfighting,” they wrote. Over the past 20 years, Air Force leadership has confronted concerns like these at almost every turn. From the publication of “The Little Blue Book” of Air Force core values in 1997 to the 2000 creation of an official Air Force symbol, from Gen Michael Ryan’s *Developing Aerospace Leaders* initiative to Gen T. Michael Moseley’s clarion call for a *warrior ethos*—the question of “Who are we as an organization?” has nagged on through a series of incomplete analyses and unsatisfying answers. With the concerted focus of so many talented people over such a long period of time, one is left to wonder why the Air Force has not yet cracked this nut.

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The central assertion in this work is that the lack of adequate resolution to the Air Force’s identity question has primarily been a failure of perspective. Institutional identity is, in fact, an incredibly complex, multi-faceted construction of recursive variables, shared understandings, feedback loops, and unique perspectives. What the Chief of Staff of the Air Force considers an identity problem is likely to be light years away from a senior airman’s definition of the exact same phrase. To varying degrees, there has existed a fundamental communication gap between the Air Force’s top echelon of leaders and the teeming mass of individual active-duty, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian Airmen, each of whom get their own vote in the ultimate strength and consistency of the Air Force identity.

This work will not comprise an answer to the question of Air Force identity. To the extent it is deemed successful, it will be in its ability to convince its readers to rethink their perspectives on Air Force identity in light of the analytical framework presented here. Most fundamentally, if the Air Force hopes to institute real changes that help it adapt to the current and future security environment, senior Air Force leaders need to develop an appreciation for the recursive relationship between identity, image, and culture. The multi-tiered analysis of the Air Force’s institutional identity presented here serves three purposes:

1) To uncover potential gaps between senior leaders’ and the rank-and-file Airmen’s perspectives on the Air Force’s identity,

2) To point out where these gaps have led previous organizational change efforts astray, and

3) To offer suggestions about change processes that can help the Air Force overcome some of its past mistakes.
Who Cares?

After almost 15 years of continuous study of what he termed high-performing systems, Peter Vaill concluded that one of their most frequently appearing attributes was a clear sense of shared identity and purpose. “They know why they exist and what they are trying to do,” he observed. “Members have pictures in their heads that are strikingly congruent.” More specifically, strong organizational identities have been directly linked to the following positive organizational outcomes: cooperation and altruism, commitment and loyalty, acceptance of change, acceptance of organizational goals and values, organizational citizenship behaviors, and reduced turnover intentions.

Of particular note is the 2006 study of the dynamics of shared organizational identities undertaken by Zannie Voss and her colleagues. Their assessments of identity gaps among organizational leadership concluded that “organizational success was less likely, both in terms of resources brought into the organization as well as how efficiently resources were used, when top leaders believed in different identities.”

Richard Pascale offered a compelling, although not easily quantifiable,

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explanation for this phenomenon: “When an organization instills a strong, consistent set of implicit understandings, it is effectively establishing a common law to supplement its statutory laws. This enables us to interpret formal systems in the context for which they were designed, to use them as tools rather than straitjackets.”

In short, everyone with a vested interest in the success of an organization should care about the state of its institutional identity. The organization’s identity lies at the heart of so many different measures of institutional performance that at the very least, it deserves a top-notch exploration of its state and its far-reaching effects on every aspect of the organization.

A Method of Analysis

This work began primarily as a response to the portions of Ehrhard’s An Air Force Strategy for the Long Haul in which he identifies and provides recommendations to combat the Air Force’s institutional identity crisis. While Ehrhard’s analysis is insightful and yields a number of valuable policy recommendations, his prescription falls into the all-too-common trap of unknowingly only treating half the problem, and by itself is unlikely to achieve the results he hopes for.

The analytical framework adapted for this thesis draws heavily upon the organizational identity work of Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz, who articulate a parsimonious and highly adaptable model of organizational identity and the dynamic relationships among identity, image, and culture. Their model is supplemented with insights gleaned through Kevin Corley’s 2004 exploration of the hierarchical differences in perceptions of organizational identity to describe two differing, yet interdependent, identity viewpoints, which are termed the managerial

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Finally, after weaving in ideas from Edgar Schein’s landmark work, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, it is apparent that identity change in large organizations can only be successfully accomplished if leaders take both the managerial and the rank-and-file perspectives into consideration when planning their courses of action.

Applying these concepts to the United States Air Force, an analysis of Ehrhard’s work that places it in context with several other initiatives characteristic of the managerial perspective of identity is conducted. Next, an examination of Air Force identity from the rank-and-file perspective, with particular emphasis on events in which the actions of former US Air Force Chief of Staff Gen T. Michael Moseley worked in direct opposition to recommendations that could reasonably have been gleaned from an understanding of this identity perspective, is offered. Finally, Moseley’s initiatives are compared and contrasted to those of current US Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Norton Schwartz, and an assessment of the current plan’s fit with the change model proposed in this thesis is presented. Overall, the work comprises a call for further research using a holistic model of institutional identity and implementing change only with a clear respect for the divergent perspectives of the panoply of people—both inside and outside the Air Force—with a vested interest in answering the overriding question, “Who are we as an organization?”

**Organization:**

This work is divided into four chapters:

**Chapter 1** is designed to provide a theoretical framework within which the exploration of the Air Force’s institutional identity will take place. One of the most striking features of Ehrhard’s analysis is its

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essentially atheoretical approach to the subject. While atheoretical analysis can often be specifically enlightening because of its unconstrained approach to a topic of study, it can also leave potentially valuable areas of research and analysis unexplored because it ignores maps that are available to help navigate the conceptual landscape. This appears to be precisely what happened in Ehrhard’s case; he seems over-reliant on personal experience and intuitive reasoning. The work of previous identity and cultural researchers and theorists help organize the reader’s thinking about the complexities of institutional identity and guide the rest of the thesis.

Chapter 2 is focused on evidence of the managerial perspective of identity as it relates to the Air Force. Beginning with the strategic conundrum faced by all of the military services within the Defense Department, the chapter opens with a brief discussion of the paradoxical mandate to cooperate to achieve the most effective application of military power while simultaneously competing for a finite pool of scarce resources. Highlights of the major points of Ehrhard’s analysis of the Air Force identity crisis are then presented, weaving in a description of how it focuses almost exclusively on the areas identified in Corley’s study as characteristic of the upper levels of organizational hierarchy. Moving beyond Ehrhard’s work, additional and alternative evidence of the managerial approach in the Air Force’s daily life and recent history, including the role of opinion-research initiatives, the Air Force symbol, and some specific Air Force advertising campaigns, are enumerated and assessed.

Chapter 3 turns to the other end of the spectrum and focuses on evidence of the rank-and-file perspective of identity as it relates to the Air Force. It will begin with a discussion of Air Force culture, its cultural history, and what that means to the rank-and-file Airman of today’s Air Force. Moseley’s identity-change efforts are then highlighted as a means of dramatizing their discontinuity with the theorized identity perspective
of the rank-and-file. Finally, a description of how someone with a rank-and-file identity perspective might have interpreted Moseley’s involvement in the scandal surrounding the award of the Thunderbirds Airshow Production Services contract—also known as *Thundervision*—is present to show how this event could have been counterproductive to developing the type of institutional identity that he desired.

Chapter 4 concludes this work with a brief analysis of Schwartz’s different style of identity change, which is shown to be a better fit with the dynamic organizational identity model proposed in this thesis. Organizational identity change is, indeed, possible for the US Air Force as long as organizational leaders attempt to institute it using a balanced approach that simultaneously addresses the strategic and image concerns of the managerial approach with the cultural and meaning concerns of the rank-and-file approach.
Chapter 1

A Dynamic Theory of Institutional Identity and Change

Although the study of individual identity has a long and storied tradition in psychological research, it was not until 1985 that Stuart Albert and David Whetten published their landmark work, which has defined the boundaries of organizational identity research for more than 25 years.¹ Albert and Whetten defined identity as that which is central, enduring, and distinctive about the character of an organization, and this framework has been the cornerstone of almost all treatments of identity since.² From this seed of an idea, however, the field has blossomed into a myriad of nuanced approaches, measurement designs, and confounded models of identity change.³

This chapter’s purpose is to reduce the din of these competing formulations of organizational identity by describing the integrated theoretical framework that guides the remainder of this thesis. One of the most commonly debated elements of organizational identity theory revolves around the “enduring” element of Albert and Whetten’s definition.⁴ While significant evidence has been gathered to support the argument that identity is not as stable as originally theorized, the work of Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz was specifically adopted for this

study because of its elegant and parsimonious articulation, which places identity at the central intersection of a two-way recursive loop between image and culture.\(^5\) The first section of the chapter describes their Organizational Identity Dynamics Model as a whole, followed by detailed descriptions, first of the external feedback loop between identity and image and then of the internal loop between identity and culture. Following this description, two separate challenges to developing organizational identities are presented. First is an exploration of multiple-identity organizations, which is followed by a description of Hatch’s and Schultz’s two different types of organizational dysfunctions. The return to the Organizational Identity Dynamics Model provides a suitable segue to integrate Kevin Corley’s insightful study of the radical discrepancies between the organizational identity conceptualizations held by the uppermost and lowest members—the elite and the rank-and-file—of a hierarchical organization into the theoretical structure.\(^6\) The final section of this chapter highlights elements of Edgar Schein’s description of organizational change to set forth some general guidelines appropriate for judging the likelihood that various types of cultural change initiatives will achieve their objectives.\(^7\)

**The Dynamics of Organizational Identity**

Despite the widespread conceptualization of identity as those characteristics of an organization collectively understood to be central, enduring, and distinctive, organizational researchers over the years have also explored cases in which some identities are less central, more malleable, and less distinctive than commonly believed.\(^8\) Kurt Lewin laid


\(^{6}\) Kevin G. Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture? Heirarchical Differences in Perceptions of Organizational Identity and Change,” *Human Relations* 57, no. 9 (September 2004), 1145-1177.


the theoretical foundations to understand this common type of dynamic interaction in 1951 through his *Field Theory in Social Science*. Lewin’s major intellectual contributions [sic] was the understanding that elements are rarely stable in the way that this term is usually understood. ... Even when it appears that a phenomenon is stable, this stability is only masking the dynamic activity that is keeping the phenomenon in its current state of expression.”

For more than 15 years, Hatch and Schultz collaborated on research to help unravel the dynamic process of organizational identity creation and evolution. This creative collaboration resulted in the *Organizational Identity Dynamics Model* (Figure 1) which juxtaposes organizational identity in the middle of a dual-feedback loop between an externally-oriented understanding of the organization—labeled *image*—and its internally oriented understanding—labeled *culture*. Their model is an organizational abstraction of George Mead’s 1934 articulation of individual identity as a social construction arrived at through two distinct, but connected, processes of individual comparison against the perceived views of others on the one hand and internalized, largely tacit, sense of self on the other. Within this context, Hatch and Schultz define *image* as “the set of views on the organization held by those who act as the organization’s ‘others’.” Conversely, they define *culture* as “the tacit organizational understandings (e.g. assumptions, beliefs and values) that contextualize efforts to make meaning, including internal

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self-definition.”14 *Identity*, therefore, is the answer to the question, “Who are we as an organization?” and is derived from organizational processes that mirror our impressions of how others see us when reflected against the unwritten beliefs and assumptions of our organizational culture.

![Figure 1: The Organizational Identity Dynamics Model](image.png)

*Source: Hatch and Schultz, “The Dynamics of Organizational Identity”*

The single most fundamental concept of this model is the constant flow of perception and comparative judgments between each of the elements included. The theoretical roots of this process extend back to Jerome Bruner’s and Leo Postman’s 1949 study on perception, in which they demonstrated that one of the most fundamental processes of human perception is to compare all new experiences against an existing set of expectancies.15 They wrote, “Expectancies continue to mold perceptual organization in a self-sustaining fashion so long as they are confirmed. It is when well-established expectancies fail of [sic] confirmation that the organism may face a task of perceptual reorganization.”16

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14 Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 996.
In organizational identity theory, this phenomenon was first reported by Jane Dutton and Janet Dukerich in 1991 in reference to an incongruity between the public image of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and its organizational identity.\(^{17}\) In line with Bruner’s and Postman’s work, they concluded the following:

1) Identity was a key constraint on how they interpreted organizationally relevant information in the same manner as the expectancies mentioned above.

2) Image was used as a mirror to compare what they believed about themselves with what they inferred others believed about them.

3) Once the incongruity between image and identity was identified, the discrepancy required resolution, leaving them with the options of either taking action to influence their external image or adjusting their identity to the reality of their image.

Hatch and Schultz argue that a similar process occurs between identity and culture, highlighting the psychological importance for organizations to believe that they are a reflection of the things that they value.\(^{18}\) Some scholars assert that managing discrepancies among differing images of an organization is an indispensable skill of organizational leadership.\(^{19}\) In 2000, Gioia, Schultz, and Corley incorporated the discrepancy-resolution concept into a comprehensive theoretical model.\(^{20}\) For the practical consumer, John Balmer, Guillaume Soenen, and Stephen Greyser acted on this premise to produce the trademarked AC\(^2\)ID test, focused specifically on helping organizational leaders first find and identify discrepancies among various images.
imaginings of organizational identity and then chart their way through a variety of prescriptive techniques to help bring them back into congruency.\textsuperscript{21}

The Organizational Identity Dynamics Model can be divided into two distinct feedback loops representing the external relationship between organizational identity and image and the internal relationship between organizational identity and culture.

**The Connection between Identity and Image**

Members of organizations are regularly confronted with images of the organization, whether they come from direct interaction with other people or through other media like television, newspapers, and the Internet. Hatch and Schultz make the argument that members’ exposure to external images has actually increased over time because of the massive growth of information technology including the Internet as well as a general degradation of organizational barriers caused by organizational efforts to draw stakeholders into closer, more personal relationships than before.\textsuperscript{22} What distinguishes this portion of their model from its other half is its focus on the organization’s external environment and the organization’s relationship with external actors, often referred to as stakeholders.\textsuperscript{23} Deciding which stakeholder opinions are most important is a key task for an organization and is highly subject to an organization’s assessment of the stakeholder’s power, legitimacy, and networking capacity as well as the urgency of the issues that the stakeholder represents.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} AC\textsuperscript{2}ID is an acronym that stands for the five different identity types in their model—actual identity, communicated identity, conceived identity, ideal identity, and desired identity. See John M. T. Balmer and Guillaume B. Soenen, “The Acid Test of Corporate Identity Management,” *Journal of Marketing Management* 15, nrs 1-3 (1999), 69-92, and John M.T. Balmer and Stephen A. Greyser, “Managing the Multiple Identities of the Corporation,” *California Management Review* 44, no. 3 (Spring 2002), 72-86.

\textsuperscript{22} Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 990.


\textsuperscript{24} Scott and Lane, “Stakeholder Approach to Organizational Identity,” 47-50.
One challenge of the vast amount of literature on image management was clarifying terms and meanings among the many interdisciplinary scholars researching identity and image. In response, Tom Brown and his colleagues collaborated to synthesize existing research and theory on the multiple viewpoints of a single organization’s identity.\textsuperscript{25} Their framework (depicted in Figure 2) describes the following four fundamental questions that face all organizations as they interface with their environments:

1) Who are we as an organization?
2) What does the organization want others to think about the organization?
3) What does the organization believe others think of the organization?
4) What do stakeholders actually think of the organization?

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Key Viewpoints of Identity and Image}
\label{fig:identity}
\end{figure}

The answers to these four questions differentiate their four proposed terms of identity, intended image, construed image, and reputation. Of note, Brown’s term reputation directly correlates with what Hatch and Schultz have called image.26

This model helps clarify the transfer of information described in the identity-image portion of Hatch’s and Schultz’s Organizational Identity Dynamics Model. Seeking to affect the answer to Question 4—“What do stakeholders actually think of the organization?”—organizations will engage in the process of impressing.27 David Whetten and Alison Mackey argued that one of the key motivations of organizations’ impressing behavior is to define themselves as unique and distinctive when compared to other organizations in their environment.28

Impressing is generally viewed as the active process of impression management undertaken by organizational leadership and designated organizational spokespeople; however, some scholars have clearly highlighted the potential for unintended actions to make a significant impression on stakeholders as well.29 Although many scholars focus on impression management in terms of identity claims of what an organization is, equally important is the process of differentiating the organization by disidentifying itself from organizations or identity groupings to clarify what it’s not.30

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26 Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 995.
The other half of the external model, *mirroring*, is depicted in Brown’s diagram as Question 3—“What does the organization believe others think of the organization?” Whetten and Mackey characterize this process as the organization’s attempt to receive feedback regarding its impressing efforts. There are a variety of reasons why this feedback process is important, but among the most significant is the fact that the organization’s impressing efforts often do not provide the only data available to stakeholders about the organization. Instead, their images are likely to be influenced by media reports as well as the opinions of people and organizations that run counter to the organization’s intended image. Particularly important for an understanding of the mirroring process is its demonstrated effect on the organization’s identity, most notably because “organization members perceive the prestige of the organization as it is externally perceived.” For example, Dutton, Dukerich, and Celia Harquail relayed a story describing how Exxon’s identity was significantly shaken as a result of the feedback they received in the wake of the 1989 Valdez disaster off the coast of Alaska. Additionally, in 2005, Luis Martins conducted a compelling study of this feedback loop, in which he demonstrated that the actual identity effect of corporate reputation rankings varied based on cultural factors unique to

31 Whetten and Mackey, “Social Actor Conception of Organizational Identity.” 401.
each of the organizations rated.\textsuperscript{35} This and other connections between identity and culture are the subject of the next section.

**The Connection between Identity and Culture**

The second feedback loop in the Organizational Identity Dynamics Model depicts the internally referential relationship between an organization’s identity and its culture. Hatch and Schultz argued that this relationship is both critical to an understanding of organizational identity and significantly understudied.\textsuperscript{36} According to Edgar Schein, one reason for this situation is that organizational culture resides primarily in the unspoken assumptions and norms of an organization. “Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of culture as a concept is that it points us to phenomena that are below the surface, that are powerful in their impact but invisible and to a considerable degree unconscious.”\textsuperscript{37} That is not to say that organizational culture is inaccessible, however. Through the processes of reflecting and expressing, organizations both imprint their identity onto their cultures and create artifacts that reflect their cultures in turn impacting their identities.

According to Hatch and Schultz, “Organizational members not only develop their identity in relation to what others say about them, but also in relation to who they perceive they are.”\textsuperscript{38} After receiving external images through the previously described mirroring process, organizational members reflect on the consistency of these messages with their embedded cultural norms and values.\textsuperscript{39} As highlighted in Robert Jervis’s landmark work *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, there is ample research to support the idea that the more often people process information that confirms their expectations, the stronger

\textsuperscript{35} Luis L. Martins, “A Model of the Effects of Reputational Rankings on Organizational Change,” *Organization Science* 16, no. 6 (2005), 713.

\textsuperscript{36} Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 996.

\textsuperscript{37} Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 8.

\textsuperscript{38} Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 1000.

\textsuperscript{39} Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 1000.
those expectations become over time. In general, people expect that other people’s perceptions of their organization will be consistent with their own culturally-based perceptions of it; therefore, the degree to which these expectations are fulfilled shapes and molds the strength and character of an organization’s culture.

Highlighting the final path in the Organizational Identity Dynamics Model, Hatch and Schultz describe how organizational culture finds expression through artifacts that weave their way back into the organizational identity. They describe a variety of examples of these types of artifacts such as corporate dress, rituals, and designs and symbols. Schein emphasizes that it is not often easy for outsiders of an organization to fully interpret the cultural roots of the artifacts they encounter, but “if the observer lives in the group long enough, the meanings of artifacts gradually become clear” through processes of socialization.

Having covered the basic dynamics of organizational identity, the next two sections are focused on some of the challenges faced by organizational leaders as they attempt to shape their organizations and lead them towards the successful accomplishment of their goals. The first challenge described is multiple-identity organizations, and the next section is devoted to exploring how the interactive dynamic between individual members and the group as a whole can lead to the development of fractured identities and cultures. The second challenge arises in organizations that fail to balance the inherent tension of organizational identity dynamics by overemphasizing either the views and expectations of external stakeholders or their own internal cultural reflections. These related dysfunctions lead to what Hatch and Schultz

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41 Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 1002.
42 Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 27.
respectively described as *hyper-adaptation* and *organizational narcissism*, each of which are described in the subsequent section.\(^{43}\)

**The Challenge of Multiple-Identity Organizations**

The theoretical structure presented above is a highly simplified, and somewhat idealized, rendering of one aspect of organizational life; however, it should not take disasters like the Enron collapse, Hurricane Katrina, the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, or Space Shuttle Columbia’s disintegration to realize that not all organizations function optimally all the time. In fact, it is easy to take the opposite position. Peg Neuhauser, who uses the term *tribal warfare* to describe a common state of conflict among organizations’ cultural subdivisions, claimed that “managers spend anywhere from 25 to 60 percent of their working day dealing with conflicts or fallout from people-related problems.”\(^{44}\) This level of conflict can clearly have a profound impact on organizational identity dynamics and can represent an enormous drain on the resources of the organization.

If leaders are to have any chance of harnessing the strengths and minimizing the hazards of multiple organizational identities, they must understand their origins. To do this, it is first important to distinguish between identity (the thing) and identification (the process). Next, by drawing on self-categorization and optimal distinctiveness theories, one can begin to paint a picture of how individual values can motivate group members’ identification processes. Finally, an exploration of reward structures can show how organizations institutionalize their values and create structural incentives that shape both the type and level of individuals’ identification with the organization.

What is sometimes lost in discussions about organizations is that they are actually made up of individuals, who are each motivated by a

\(^{43}\) Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 1006-1013.

unique combination of experiences, needs, and aspirations and who each make individual choices of what organizations to be a part of and how much of themselves to commit. To reiterate the definition used in this work, an organizational identity is that which is held by a group to be central, enduring, and distinctive about an organization. Identity, therefore, is a collective set of characteristics negotiated and agreed upon by a group of people. Identification, on the other hand, is an individual behavior in which a person perceives oneness with or belongingness to a group to the point that he or she begins to blur the distinction between the personal-self and the organizational-self. As described by Marlene Fiol, “Identification processes are the critical linking pins that bind these independent levels of identity.” According to Denise Rousseau, this identification can take place on a superficial, task-oriented level—which she terms situated identification—or on a level that has deeper implications on a person’s self concept across roles and over time—which she calls deep structure identification.

This process of defining the self through one’s membership in groups is thoroughly explained in Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s social identity theory and its related extension, self-categorization theory. What is most significant for this discussion, however, is what the

theories describe about the hierarchical nesting of personal and social identities for each individual. According to self-categorization theory, “individuals can categorize themselves on different levels,” Rolf van Dick and his colleagues observed, “as unique individuals (personal level), as group members distinct from members of other groups (intermediate or group level), or as a human being in comparison to other species (superordinate level).” Fundamental to this process of identification on various levels is the fact that social identities are chosen. As Marilynn Brewer noted, “Individuals may recognize that they belong to any number of social groups without adopting those classifications as social identities. Social identities are selected from the various bases for self-categorization [sic] available to an individual at a particular time. And specific social identities may be activated at some times and not at others.”

This issue of selective identification takes on a particularly challenging aspect for extremely large organizations because it has been identified that the larger, more geographically separated, and diversified an organization is, the higher the likelihood that the shared understandings of both culture and identity will begin to form fault lines between clustered groups of like-minded people. Brewer provided a social identity theory-inspired explanation of this situation in her 1991 article introducing optimal distinctiveness theory. She described that all people find themselves in a paradox that creates internal tension within individual identification processes. “At the heart of this paradox

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49 Peter Foreman and David A. Whetten, “Members’ Identification with Multiple-Identity Organizations,” Organization Science 13, no. 6 (November-December 2002), 622.
rests a basic conflict between two fundamental human motivations,” wrote Matthew Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten about the theory, “the need to experience group belonging and the need to feel like a differentiated individual.”54 In balancing the two competing needs, people tend to identify most completely with organizations that are large enough to be substantial, but exclusive enough to be prestigious. Among the eight different strategies for achieving optimal distinctiveness described by Hornsey and Jetten, one very common within large organizations is subgroup identification, the process of identifying more closely with one of the many formal or informal groups of an organization than with the superordinate organization itself.55 These groups could include anything from divisions or work groups to professional roles or personal friendships. The nature of the subgroup itself is not important, only that the group is deemed to optimize one’s fulfillment of both belonging and distinctiveness needs and is perceived as appropriately salient to the specific social context from which one is operating.56

While there are many factors that can influence a particular person’s patterns of identification with an organization, one of the most substantial factors is the nature of the formal and informal reward structures of the organization.57 In fact, Shelley Brickson cited reward structures as one of the key elements that determined the salience of the various levels of the organization at which workers identified.58

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54 Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “The Individual Within the Group: Balancing the Need to Belong with the Need to be Different,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 8, no. 3 (2004)
55 Hornsey and Jetten, “Individual Within the Group,” 251-252.
many research studies have focused on the effects of rewards on individual behavior, Charles O’Reilly and Sheila Puffer are among the few who extended their work to explore specifically the effects of positive and negative sanctions on group members other than the person actually sanctioned. In their now-landmark 1987 article, Jeffrey Kerr and John Slocum particularly addressed the unique relationship between rewards structures and corporate culture that is of significance to this thesis. “Much of the substance of culture is concerned with controlling the behaviors and attitudes of organization members, and the rewards system is a primary method of achieving control,” they asserted. “The reward system—who gets rewarded and why—is an unequivocal statement of the corporation’s values and beliefs. As such, the reward system is the key to understanding culture.” Kerr and Slocum identified two distinct reward systems—the performance-based system and the hierarchy-based system. Although elements of both systems can be evident in the same organization, they emphasized that differing reward systems within different parts of an organization will reinforce distinct behavioral norms and belief systems, which can actively develop and reinforce organizational sub- and counter-cultures. Of particular note is that rewards that stem from subjective appraisals of conformity to organizational norms, as are found within the hierarchy-based system, specifically reinforce the cultural relationship between the person responsible for giving the sanctions and those receiving them. Kerr and Slocum observed that hierarchy-based reward structures tend to reinforce a clan culture in which “the individual’s long-term commitment

60 Jeffrey Kerr and John W. Slocum Jr., “Managing Corporate Culture Through Reward Systems,” Academy of Management Executive 1, no. 2 (May 1987), 99.
to the organization (loyalty) is exchanged for the organization’s long-term commitment to the individual (security).”\(^{63}\) Rousseau asserted that this type of trust-based relationship was ideal for the development of deep structure identification.\(^{64}\)

In summary, multiple-identity organizations present a number of unique challenges to the development and maintenance of organizational identity and culture. At the root of these challenges is the fact that every individual makes unique decisions about what level of the organization to identify with and how substantially the social identity is incorporated into one’s own self-concept. Organizations, in turn, institutionalize their values and norms into differing types of reward structures that have the power of reinforcing patterns of behavior. This reinforcement often leads to the development of fractured cultures, consisting of a variety of organization sub- and counter-cultures all competing for salience within the identity patterns of organizational members.

**The Challenge of Balancing Internal and External Identity Focus**

Having explored some of the roots of multiple-identity organizations, I return to Hatch and Schultz’s Organizational Identity Dynamics Model for two purposes: 1) to highlight some of the challenges associated with a failure to appropriately balance an organization’s focus between image and culture, and 2) to demonstrate the tendency for different levels of the organizational hierarchy to err on opposite sides of this equation. Because of the dynamic and fluid nature of the overall model, they believe that “when organizational identity dynamics are balanced between the influences of culture and image, a healthy organizational identity results from processes that integrate the interests and activities of all relevant stakeholder groups.”\(^{65}\) They wrote that organizations placing too much emphasis on the external identity-image

\(^{64}\) Rousseau, “Why Workers Still Identify with Organizations,” 222.
\(^{65}\) Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 1005.
link are engaging in *hyper-adaptation* by responding to every single stimulus from the environment while abandoning or disregarding their cultural heritage.\(^{66}\) Conversely, they describe the phenomenon of *organizational narcissism* as the tendency for an organization to focus almost exclusively on their own organizations culture and artifacts without seeking referential feedback from its stakeholders.\(^{67}\) The descriptions of these two complementary pathologies of excess provide a useful jumping off point to explore Corley’s research, in which he highlighted the proclivities for different echelons of a hierarchical organization to exhibit each of these two problems.

Over the course of an 18-month embedded, explanatory case study, Corley observed and catalogued individual and institutional perceptions of organizational identity in a global technology-service company undergoing a significant structural transition, and his inductive analysis of the data revealed massive identity discrepancies along hierarchical lines, with the sharpest contrasts evident between those people at the top of the hierarchy and those at the bottom. He discovered wildly divergent perspectives between these groups’ conceptualizations of 1) the nature of organizational identity, 2) what constitutes an identity discrepancy, and 3) what forms the basis for successful identity change.\(^{68}\) Put in the terms of Hatch’s and Schwartz’s analysis above, Corley discovered that managers showed a high proclivity to engage in hyper-adaptation, while those at the bottom of the hierarchy emphasized the other half of the model with tendencies to engage in organizational narcissism.\(^{69}\) On the one hand, this distinction might seem self-evident given the two groups’ respective functions in the organization. The most significant red flag in this case, however, was that the two groups with the greatest conceptual discrepancies showed

\(^{66}\) Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 1010.
\(^{67}\) Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 1008.
\(^{68}\) Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1155.
\(^{69}\) Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1173.
no indication that they even recognized their differences of perspective. This left the organization open to significant gaps of communication and repeated misunderstanding between the organization’s strategic leaders and the workforce powering the engine or organizational progress. The managerial and rank-and-file perspectives are each described in greater detail in the subsections that follow.

**Managerial Perspectives on Identity**

According to Corley, for the executives he interviewed, “who they were as an organization was reflected in what the organization’s mission and purpose was, how it distinguished itself from its competitors, and how the organizations was compared with its rivals in the competitive landscape of the industry.” As shown in Figure 3, the managerial perspective on identity is essentially a more detailed expression of what Hatch and Schultz described as identity-image relationship.

![Figure 3: Identity-strategy relationship as seen by a senior executive](source)

As noted earlier, one of the key elements of the identity dynamic is the discovery of discrepancies among different imaginings of an organization’s identity. Corley discovered that organizational managers

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70 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1170-1171.
71 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1157.
72 Dutton and Dukerich, “Keeping an Eye on the Mirror,” 548-549.
had the tendency to define identity discrepancies almost exclusively as they exist in the organization’s external environment between the image they intended to transmit to external stakeholders and the image they construed those stakeholders to hold. This perspective was particularly noticed in executives’ commonly held belief that the media misrepresented the company and continually spread inaccurate information about it.

Finally, in accordance with their preoccupation with image-related identity issues, Corley discovered that “those at the top of the hierarchy saw [organizational] labels and images as the building blocks of a new identity, and acted in accordance with this belief.” Of particular concern with this obsession with the symbols of identity was that very few of the executives Corley interviewed even recognized the possibility that their newly minted and distributed labels and identity statements could mean different things to different people. This lack of understanding served to highlight the massive intellectual and emotional disconnect between the conceptions of senior executives and the rank-and-file workers within the organization.

**Rank-and-File Perspectives on Identity**

At the other end of the spectrum, Corley’s study painted a very different picture of the world when viewed from the perspective of the rank-and-file worker. Rather than focusing on the organization’s strategic position in respect to other organizations, “Who they were as an organization’ was reflected in the values and beliefs that guided organizational behavior and determined which actions were the most appropriate in a given situation.” This emphasis on shared organizational values and norms is precisely what Hatch and Schultz

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73 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1160.
74 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1161.
75 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1165.
76 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1166.
77 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1157.
described as organizational culture. Because of this perspective, rank- and-file members of the organization tended to view the organization’s identity as much more stable, much less influenced by the views of outsiders, and much harder to change than did the executives.

The stability that rank-and-file members believed to be inherent in their organization’s identity also gave rise to their very different perspective on identity discrepancies. Rather than focusing on image disconnects among external stakeholders, lower level employees expressed significant concern about discrepancies as they existed across time. This type of fascination with legacy identities was also explored by Ian Walsh and Mary Ann Glynn, who further demonstrated how organizational identities sometimes outlive the organizations themselves.

In Corley’s work, organizational members identified discrepancies with both the past—Who we were as an organization—and the future—Who are we becoming as an organization?

Finally, regarding the tools necessary to bring about organizational change, members from the bottom of the hierarchy tended to eschew the trappings of labels and slogans and were much more concerned about the meanings underlying the labels and how those meanings were demonstrated through executive and organizational actions. This difference between the views of organizational leadership and the rank- and-file workers represents the most significant gap between these two subcultures of the organization. Organizational leaders “did not see that their initial attempts at formal identity change were not well received by the rest of the organization,” Corley observed. “Those change efforts did not take because they were not backed up by the necessary behavioral

78 Hatch and Schultz, “Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” 996.
79 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1169.
80 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1162.
82 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1162-1163.
83 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1166.
changes that would have helped spell out what the new identity labels meant and how the remaining old identity labels had been redefined."\textsuperscript{84} The environment of organizational change described here was one in which actions certainly spoke louder than words, and organizational leaders would be well-served to take note of the lessons provided here when embarking on their own forays into managing effective organizational change.

**Effective Organizational Change**

Hatch and Schultz’s Organizational Identity Dynamics Model makes it eminently clear that organizational identity represents a key node at the nexus of a complex relationship between the unspoken assumptions and values captured in an organization’s culture and the varied perceptions and images held by an organization’s many external stakeholders. Corley’s observations of the hierarchical differences in the perception of organizational identity support the assertion that organizational leaders are well-equipped—or at least predisposed—to address the challenges of the identity-image relationship because “their day-to-day responsibilities [involve] issues such as the organization’s vision and mission, satisfaction of various stakeholder groups, [and] strategic decision-making.”\textsuperscript{85} Where they were shown to fall short, however, was in their understanding of the deep-rooted and culturally-based perceptions of organizational identity as it was understood by members of the lowest echelons of their organization. The assertion presented here is that the executives described in Corley’s research are not unique. This is a position shared by Schein in his landmark book on the subject, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. In this final section of Chapter 1, specific elements of Schein’s work are highlighted to provide suggestions on ways in which organizational leaders can shift their focus partly away from the world of external stakeholders to

\textsuperscript{84} Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1168.
\textsuperscript{85} Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1156.
promote a more balanced approach to organizational change that takes into consideration the very real and powerful forces of their organizations’ cultures.

The first step in developing this approach to change and culture is to understand that there is no such thing as an empirically good or bad culture. Instead, Schein asserts, that the yardstick for judging organizational culture is the extent to which it is functionally effective in helping the organization conquer the two sets of problems that face all groups, regardless of size: “1) survival, growth, and adaptation in their environment; and 2) internal integration that permits daily functioning and the ability to adapt and learn.”86 Overcoming these two problems are the things that will require leaders to institute organizational change. In this regard, Schein emphasizes that organizational leaders should focus their organizational change efforts by setting goals concretely in terms of the problems they are trying to fix, and culture change cannot be the goal. “One of the biggest mistakes that leaders make when they undertake change initiatives is to be vague about their change goals and to assume that culture change will be needed,” he claimed.87

Organizational culture provides the context in which all group members operate, and in this regard the culture can either enable or hamper the organization’s pursuit of its goals; however, Schein makes it clear that cultural changes are merely the means to the ends, not the ends themselves.

Schein argued that organizational culture evolves with the organization, primarily as a mechanism to create stability and reduce uncertainty for members of the organization. He wrote,

The human mind needs cognitive stability; therefore, any challenge or questioning of a basic assumption will release anxiety and defensiveness. In this sense, the shared basic assumptions that make up the culture of a group can be

86 Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 18.
87 Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 334.
thought of at both the individual and the group level as psychological cognitive defense mechanism that permit the group to continue to function. Recognizing this connection is important when one thinks about changing aspects of a group’s culture, for it is no easier to do that than to change an individual’s pattern of defense mechanisms.\(^{88}\)

Because of this, organizational leaders need to understand that change will only be successful when group members perceive and embrace a clear and compelling need for change. When organizations have a proven track record in which their cultural assumptions have helped them achieve success, they are “unlikely to want to challenge or reexamine those assumptions. Even if the assumptions are brought to consciousness, the members of the organization are likely to want to hold on to them because they justify the past and are a source of their pride and self-esteem.”\(^{89}\)

Change, therefore, is not something that organizational leaders can impose in spite of the culture, but rather by appreciating the importance of the culture and the perspectives of the people who have been a part of its evolution. To cheapen Abraham Lincoln’s words somewhat, culture is also something that is of the people, by the people, and for the people.\(^{90}\)

“Much has been said of the need for vision in leaders, but too little has been said of their need to listen, to absorb, to search the environment for trends, and to build the organization’s capacity to learn,” Schein argued. “Only when they truly understand what is happening and what will be required in the way of organizational change can they begin to take action in starting a learning process.”\(^{91}\)

Only after executives have a clear performance goal in mind and a healthy appreciation for the important stabilizing role that culture plays in their organization will they be ready to lead their organizations

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88 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 32.
89 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 312-313.
91 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 410.
through the challenges of organizational change. In pursuing this change, Schein offers insights in the following three areas:

**The Roles of Subcultures:** Subcultures develop as a natural product of task specialization and adaptation, particularly in large organizations. “Building an effective organization is ultimately a matter of meshing the different subcultures by encouraging the evolution of common goals, common language, and common procedures for solving problems.”

The goal is not to stamp out subdivisions within an organization, but rather to find ways to integrate and harmonize them in ways that help the organization adapt and survive. When one of the subcultures becomes too dominant, the organization cannot survive.

**The Roles of Promotion and Rewards:** Reward structures are one of the most important ways that organizations institutionalize and demonstrate their unspoken organizational values. Steven Kerr argued that “numerous examples exist of reward systems that are fouled up in that behaviors which are rewarded are those which the rewarder is trying to discourage, while the behavior he desires is not being rewarded at all” (emphasis in original).

Leaders need to assess their reward and promotion structures constantly to ensure that they are reinforcing the kinds of values and behaviors they think they are, he said. Schein argued that changing the reward and punishment system is also one of the quickest and easiest ways to begin to change aspects of the culture; however, these changes must be undertaken with care because, like all actions, the signals associated with rewards and punishment can be ambiguous and hard for newcomers and outsiders to interpret.

**The Roles of Actions and Meanings:** Finally, Schein highlights that leading organizations through periods of change is extremely challenging.

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92 Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 289.
93 Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 199.
95 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 127-128.
work that requires high levels of perception and insight, motivation, and emotional strength, and often takes a long time to accomplish. Ultimately, culture will be embedded in the organization by much more than the leader’s words and messages; members of the organization will observe and interpret leader actions and draw conclusions about what the leader—and by extension, the organization—values.⁹⁶

In summary, conducting successful organizational change will be hard for any leader, but it will be impossible for those leaders who fail to appreciate and balance the incredibly powerful roles of both the perceptions of external stakeholders and the culture shared by the organization’s members. In light of the identified propensity for leaders to underestimate the importance of the cultural elements of change, this chapter concludes with one final observation from Schein. “The culture cannot be changed directly, unless one dismantles the group itself. A leader can impose new ways of doing things, can articulate new goals and means, can change reward systems, but none of those change will produce culture change unless the new way of doing things actually works better and provides the members with a new set of shared experiences.”⁹⁷

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⁹⁶ Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 246-262.
⁹⁷ Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 335.
Chapter 2

A Manager’s Approach to the US Air Force Identity

All organizations are challenged to find their places in a world of stakeholder views, opinions, and actions, and—as presented in Chapter 1—it is characteristic of those in the senior levels of hierarchical organizations to understand their organization’s identity through the lens of these external relationships. In this regard, the United States Air Force is little different than for-profit companies competing in the private sector. This chapter is focused on the specific application of the managerial approach to identity within the Air Force. While senior Air Force and private-company leaders might share the same perspectives on organizational identity, the organizations themselves operate in a very different environment with very different measures of success.

The chapter opens with a brief discussion of the strategic conundrum faced by all of the Defense Department’s military services, as they balance the national mandate to cooperate for maximum effectiveness in the application of national military power with the survival requirement to compete for a finite pool of scarce resources. Following this setting of the strategic stage, highlights of the major points of Thomas Ehrhard’s analysis of the Air Force identity crisis are presented, weaving in a description of how his recommendations are tailored almost exclusively towards improving relationships with external stakeholders like Defense Department and Congressional leadership, the other military services, and the think-tank and intellectual communities.¹ Moving beyond Ehrhard’s work, additional examples of

the managerial approach in the Air Force’s daily life and recent history are presented. These examples include the role of opinion-research initiatives, the development of the new Air Force symbol, and the implementation of strategic communication advertising campaigns.

**The Strategic Paradox of Military Organizational Dynamics**

The United States military services are faced with a strategic conundrum. On the one hand, they are charged with cooperating together as a joint team on battlefields across the globe, wielding the most awesome destructive power ever known to humanity as they prosecute the nation’s wars. Theirs is a profession of life and death, where the slightest failure can lead them to fulfill what Sir John Hackett termed the *unlimited liability clause*, demanding their ultimate sacrifice. They are the agents behind Kenneth Waltz’s famous assertion that, “In international politics force serves, not only as the *ultima ratio*, but indeed as the first and constant one.”

On the other hand, the services’ institutional desires for survival and efficacy transform them into intense rivals and fierce competitors when it comes to laying claim to the finite pool of public resources allocated for defense spending through the Congressional budget process. While it might appear that such a rivalry is no different than separate divisions of a corporation competing over limited funds, what makes this different from an image perspective is that these debates are not kept locked away behind the closed doors of the boardroom. Instead, they turn into wars of words that take center stage in the public sphere, showing up everywhere from public speeches and open-door congressional hearings to the pages and electrons of the mass media. One particular thing that exacerbates this situation is that each of the service secretaries is given a relatively free hand to advocate their unique

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perspectives directly to members of Congress. Under each of their respective sections of Title 10 of the US Code the service secretaries are empowered as follows: “After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the [insert service name] may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.”

Designed to facilitate the free flow of information between the military and Congress, this privilege has also has the side effect of spurring debates that reverberate throughout the public sphere. These very public spectacles can cause serious—and sometimes unpredictable—effects on the images that stakeholders develop about the services individually and the Defense Department collectively.

As one scholar noted, these clashes sprang up almost immediately after the advent of powered flight because before then “the water’s edge provided a natural boundary for fixing lines of responsibility between land and sea warfare;” however, it was in the wake of World War I that the interservice sparks really began to fly. Onto the public stage burst then-Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, where Williamson Murray said, he “found himself the darling of the media.” Because of his outspoken criticism of the General Staff, Mitchell and other senior Army Air Corps members were seen as “firebrands” by Army leadership. Mitchell exhibited a talent for panache and showmanship through his very public bombing experiments against defunct naval ships, including the captured German battleship Ostfriesland, followed closely by running mock air raids on cities along the Atlantic coast to demonstrate their

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7 Trest, *Roles and Missions*, 22.
vulnerability to hostile air attacks. He continued his public attacks on
the Navy both up to and after his highly publicized court martial for
insubordination and conduct unbecoming an officer, convinced up until
his death in 1936 that aviation—both military and civil—would be the
cornerstone of America’s future success.

Although the rivalries would fade into the wings during the
crucible of World War II, they were never far off stage, particularly as the
war in the Pacific began to wind down and Army Air Forces commander
Gen H. “Hap” Arnold “personally willed his B-29s to crush Japan and
force its surrender” in order to properly position the force for its post-war
independence bid. In the wake of the 1947 order that signaled the
successful conclusion of the US Airman’s 40-year quest for
independence, the public acrimony once again reached fever pitch as
budgetary battles between the Air Force and the Navy led to the now-
legendary “Revolt of the Admirals.”

This fight between acquiring either
the six-engine B-36 bomber for the Air Force or the Navy’s $188 million
supercarrier led a senior Navy official to leak purposefully fabricated
accusations of contractual irregularities to the press and spurred weeks
of public Congressional testimony in which each of the services fought
tooth-and-nail to denigrate the other.

The challenges of balancing the paradoxical demands of peacetime
competition and wartime cooperation would continue almost unabated
for the next 35 years. Ian Horwood painted a stark picture of these
contests, asserting, among other things, that during Vietnam the Air

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8 Trest, Roles and Missions, 34-36.
9 Robert S. Ehlers Jr., “A Note on Billy Mitchell and His Book”, in Winged Defense: The
Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military, William
10 Herman S. Wolk, Reflections on Air Force Independence (Washington, DC: Air Force
History and Museums Program, 2007), 105.
11 For a detailed accounting of this 5-year chapter of aviation history, see Jeffrey G.
12 Trest, Roles and Missions, 125-135.
Force simultaneously blocked Army procurement of potentially life-saving close-air-support platforms and then “remained disinclined to provide close air support in the manner desired by the Army,” ultimately having “a detrimental effect on the combat efficiency of tactical airpower” in that war.\(^\text{13}\) Despite largely unrealized efforts to reform in the wake of Vietnam, operational interoperability problems would continue to plague the services as they attempted to execute high-profile missions throughout the 1980s, including the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran, the invasion of Granada, and the retaliation bombing of Libya.\(^\text{14}\)

Mounting concerns over the ability to conduct coordinated, joint operations as well as the quality of military advice available to the President led ultimately to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.\(^\text{15}\) Ironically, the Act implemented reforms that were strikingly similar those Eisenhower sought—but was unable to achieve—in 1958, the last time the Defense Department had undergone any kind of significant reorganization.\(^\text{16}\) In the intervening 24 years the overwhelming success of Operation Desert Storm has faded to a barely audible whisper behind the din of more than eight years of apparently interminable conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, leaving many to question whether Goldwater-Nichols went too far—or not far enough.\(^\text{17}\) Regardless of one’s position on the issue, however, the fundamental nature of the


\(^{14}\) For an excellent review of the lessons from these operations as well as British air operations in the Falklands, see Col Stephen E. Anno and Lt Col William E. Einspahr, *Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid*, Research Report no. AU-AWC-88-043 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1998).


\(^{17}\) For a variety of perspectives on this debate, see the June 2006 edition of *Armed Forces Journal* available online at http://www.afji.com/2006/06/.
paradox is unchanged. This inescapable tension between bureaucratic competition and operational cooperation is the single dominant feature of the Air Force’s relationships with its most influential stakeholders in the other services, the Defense Department, Congress, and ultimately in the minds of the American people, who might not understand the dynamics of the game, but are nonetheless afforded a front-row seat for the fireworks.

**The Ehrhard Prescription**

Given this backdrop of the Air Force’s stakeholder environment, Ehrhard’s perspectives and the recommendations included in *An Air Force Strategy for the Long Haul* begin to come into clearer focus. The purpose of this section is to highlight the elements of Ehrhard’s work that have direct relevance on the concerns he raises about the Air Force’s institutional identity; therefore, matters like his projections about the future international security environment—while interesting and worthy of further debate—are not addressed in this study. The analysis presented facilitates an emergent recognition that Ehrhard’s work—though produced during a period during which he was not employed by the Air Force—remains true to the manager’s perspective on identity as described in Kevin Corley’s 2004 exploration of the hierarchical differences in perceptions of organizational identity.¹⁸

**Defining the Problem**

Among the many concerns Ehrhard expressed about the state of the Air Force and its ability to meet the challenges of the future security environment is his specific assertion that the Air Force currently suffers from a crisis of institutional identity. He wrote, “This crisis is not just perceived by outsiders, it is also felt by its members, many of whom have

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observed or even become a part of an ideological malaise within the Air Force that seems to have accelerated in the past eight years.”

He identified three separate components, or manifestations, of the crisis. First, he highlights that Defense Department has usurped the Air Force control over its most significant acquisition programs, despite the Title 10 responsibility assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force for organizing, training, and equipping the force. This loss of institutional control began in the wake of the allegations that Darleen Druyun—the Air Force’s second most-senior procurement official—had “unfairly steered billions of dollars to Boeing as she sought jobs at Boeing for herself, her daughter, and son-in-law.” Ehrhard wrote that repeated problems with the aerial refueling contract reversed trends towards a brief loosening of Defense Department oversight, and he emphasized that no other military service is subjected to the level of contractual restrictions under which the Air Force currently operates.

Second, Ehrhard identified the Air Force’s lack of representation at the senior levels of joint combatant commands as taking away key opportunities for Airmen to exert control over when and how Air Force forces are employed in military operations. This concern was echoed in 2008 by Rebecca Grant, who highlighted that out of 110 theater commanders appointed since World War II, only four have been Airmen. Ehrhard asserts that the absence of Airmen in leadership

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21 Leslie Wayne, “Is Boeing the Enron of the U.S. Air Force? Heads roll as web of cozy deals unravels,” The International Herald Tribune, 17 December 2004. In addition to the quote, this article contains a significant discussion of the broader ethical implications of the scandal and its effect on former Air Force Secretary James Roche.
24 Rebecca Grant, “Why Airmen Don’t Command,” Air Force Magazine 91, no. 3 (March 2008), 46. For an earlier analysis on this subject, see Lt Col Howard D. Belote, Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command—Lauris Norstad, Albrecht Kesselring, and Their Relevance to the Twenty-First Century Air Force, CADRE Paper No. 7 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2000), which was a re-print of his 1999 SAAS thesis.
positions “reveals the Air Force’s rather profound lack of institutional influence compared to the other three services.”

Finally Ehrhard characterized the Air Force as overwhelmed by the adversity of procurement cutbacks, the influence of the other services’ strategies, and the simultaneous replacement of the Air Force secretary and chief of staff, which he said led to a “lack of a stimulating vision of its future role.” Others, including Col Dennis Drew, have attributed the absence of a compelling vision to pervasive anti-intellectualism within the Air Force. Drew contended, “For 20 years I have watched the crème de la crème of the Air Force officer corps come to Air University’s Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) and Air War College (AWC). For the most part, these officers have been appallingly ignorant of the bedrock foundation of airpower thinking, virtually oblivious to airpower theory and its development, and without any appreciation of airpower history and its meaning.”

Key Recommendations

From these three broad symptoms of the problem, Ehrhard proposed a number of “steps the Air Force might take to reinvigorate and establish Service [sic] as a viable, influential force in the defense policy debate.” As can be seen from this quote alone, Ehrhard’s focus was primarily on how the Air Force, as a unitary actor, can engage with its key external stakeholders in an ongoing conversation about the current and future employment of the military element of national power. Although he did not organize them this way, his recommendations can be recast into three broad aims, each of which is described in additional detail below:

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1) Build trust with Defense Department leadership in order to regain Title 10 autonomy.

2) Build joint-service trust through flawless accomplishment of the Air Force’s assigned missions and improvement of the Air Force’s interface with the joint planning system.

3) Shape the marketplace of ideas by recapturing joint warfare conceptual and operational development.

**Build DOD Trust.** Ehrhard expressed grave concerns that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had lost the confidence in the Air Force’s ability to generate requirements and purchase major weapon systems, like a new aerial refueling tanker and a replacement combat search and rescue helicopter. “For a Service [sic] to have its number one acquisition program [the tanker] managed by OSD is embarrassing to both the Air Force and OSD,” he asserted. “[Rehabilitation] should focus in the near term on the full restoration of Title 10 ‘equip’ authority for all Service [sic] air and space programs.”

Ehrhard stressed that the Air Force needs to rebuild its ailing acquisition corps and ensure it has appropriate senior leader oversight, as well as repair its broken requirements generation process, “especially in the way it communicates with contractors about what it wants, and how it manages contract modifications.”

A second initiative designed to allow the Air Force to make its way from the acquisitions penalty-box is to restore the tight linkages between senior leadership and the functions of science and technology research, and research and development. Ehrhard asserted the Air Force needs to recapture the technologically engaged relationship and visionary insight of leaders like Hap Arnold and Thomas White, while also nurturing officers with the appropriate academic credentials along “a technology-centered career path that could lead to four-star rank.”

He feared that because of a lack of senior leaders with advanced degrees...

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in engineering or science, the Air Force has “essentially outsourced important investment decisions to mid-level technologists in the hope that they produce something useful absent strategic direction.”

He suggested that the Air Force should play the role of a venture capitalist, investing in promising technologies, assisting in the expensive testing of prototypes, and displaying the strategic vision and fiscal discipline to kill weak programs. “The world’s preeminent air force cannot survive on a diminishing diet of air and space technology development,” he claimed. “Reviving this cornerstone establishment by revitalizing its people, focus, and relevance must be a high priority for those interested in the Air Force’s long-term rehabilitation.”

**Build Joint-Service Trust.** The cornerstone of building trust among the Air Force’s joint partners is to selflessly and flawlessly accomplish the unique missions that have been entrusted to the service on behalf of the American people. Most importantly for Ehrhard, this means first restoring the Air Force’s focus on maintaining the readiness of the nation’s nuclear arsenal by reinstituting Strategic Air Command-era practices like no-notice alerts, high attention to detail, and low tolerance for error. These high levels of accountability must be coupled with valuable career incentives, a “SAC-caliber” feedback and internal review system, and “a reinvigorated nuclear force posture vision more in tune with the future security environment.” Another mission area he highlighted as requiring improved focus and development is the staffing and operational integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles—dubbed Remotely Piloted Aircraft in the current lexicon. Of particular concern for Ehrhard was the development of a dedicated UAV career field to serve

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as the institutional advocates for continued acquisition and development of the technology.\textsuperscript{38} Finally, Ehrhard recommended that the Air Force reevaluate the manner in which it presents forces to the joint war fighting community in order to better integrate with the standing joint global force- and operational- planning constructs.\textsuperscript{39} To do this, Ehrhard suggested that the Air Force “abandon the combat wing concept and adopt the AEF [Air and Space Expeditionary Force] construct as the core of its future force planning methodology” and enable a modular tailoring of the capability that could serve as analogues to a Navy strike group or Army brigade.\textsuperscript{40} While Ehrhard’s recommendations in this category have a number of significant structural and internal ramifications, it is clear once again that his focus is less on the cultural aspects of his proposals and more on what the Air Force needs to do to repair some of the damage that has been done to its relationships with its joint war-fighting partners.

**Shape the Marketplace of Ideas.** Finally, Ehrhard observed that “the Air Force, compared to the other Services [sic], now exerts marginal influence on the development and implementation of joint operational strategy” and recommended that the most promising way to change that is to “develop and advocate compelling ideas.”\textsuperscript{41} To do that, he emphasized that first the Air Force must improve its officer education on the fundamentals of national security history, structure, processes, and institutions—including in-depth examination of the other three services.\textsuperscript{42} Additionally, he argued that graduate education of its officers through civilian institution programs needs to be a significantly higher priority for the service, citing that no current three- or four-star Air Force leader at that time held a degree from a tier-one educational

\textsuperscript{39} Ehrhard, *An Air Force Strategy*, 56.
\textsuperscript{40} Ehrhard, *An Air Force Strategy*, 56.
\textsuperscript{41} Ehrhard, *An Air Force Strategy*, 57.
\textsuperscript{42} Ehrhard, *An Air Force Strategy*, 57.
institution. These two initiatives, Ehrhard asserted, would help provide the Air Force with the intellectual foundation necessary to develop innovative operational concepts applicable to the full spectrum of joint military operations, rather than just those niche areas related to air and space. Specific directions in which Ehrhard recommends the Air Force seek to expand the intellectual horizons include high-end asymmetric warfare, opposed network operations, GPS independence, AirSea battle, distributed operations, counter-proliferation, and homeland defense. The purpose of this widespread education and advocacy, according to Ehrhard, is to begin the “long-term rehabilitation of Air force ideology, doctrine, messaging, and relationships with other key organizations” in a revitalization of former Chief of Staff General Mike Ryan’s Developing Aerospace Leaders initiative, which suffered a premature death at the hands of the post-9/11 operational environment.

As one can see from the explanation of each of the three broad development areas above, Ehrhard’s recommendations are in keeping with the perspective Corley attributed to senior executives in that they focused primarily on developing the Air Force’s relationships with key external stakeholders like leadership in the Defense Department and senior policy makers across the federal government.

**Public Image-Focused Identity Initiatives**

While relationships with key elements of the federal government clearly have wide-ranging effects on the Air Force’s ability to gain funding and accomplish its mission, the true lifeblood of the organization is the dwindling pool of qualified youth, thousands of whom are required to feed the service’s ranks each year. In order to convince them of the value

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46 The entire Summer 2001 edition of *Aerospace Power Journal* was dedicated to various perspectives on leadership, including one specifically emphasizing the DAL initiative by Mike Thirtle, “Developing Aerospace Leaders for the Twenty-First Century,” *Aerospace Power Journal* 15, no. 2 (Summer 2001), 52-57.
of a career in the military—which turned into an all-volunteer force in 1973—the military services have discovered that they must develop relationships with two critical groups of people. First are the potential recruits themselves, but just as important are influencers—the parents, coaches, guidance counselors, and others who wield enormous power in the decision-making process of these young adults.47

Following the post-Vietnam War slump in military recruiting, 1999 marked a watershed year for these relationships when the Air Force failed to meet its recruiting goals for the first time since 1979.48 A number of explanations emerged, including the record performing economy, widespread civilian job availability, and the ongoing round of projected base closures, as well as a decline in the number of 18-22 year-old population by almost 20 percent between 1980 and 1999.49 Reaction within the Air Force was swift and significant. For the first time in its history, the Air Force purchased paid television advertising, following the trail the Army so famously blazed with its “Be All You Can Be” jingle in 1981.50 Use of the medium of television, which more than tripled the Air Force’s annual advertising budget from $22 million to $76 million, was meant to complement massive military pay raises proposed by both President Clinton and Congress, as well as an increase in Air Force recruiters by almost 30 percent.51 This shocking turn of events also marked a fundamental change in the way that senior Air Force leaders looked at the organization’s relationship with this key group of external stakeholders, as total Defense Department advertising spending

increased by 150 percent between 1999 and 2007, the Air Force portion of which also increased.\textsuperscript{52} In addition to increased spending, this changed perspective prompted them to take unprecedented steps over the next decade for the specific purpose of managing external images of the Air Force. Three of these initiatives are described in more detail below: a new reliance on scientific public-opinion data to assess external image, the design and marketing of a radical new Air Force symbol, and later, the development and execution of a massively expanded advertising program comprehensively targeting influencers directly rather than recruits, as had been the norm for previous campaigns.

**External Market Research**

At this time, Air Force leadership significantly increased its emphasis on the amount and quality of scientific public-opinion research data necessary to support a proper assessment of the Air Force’s image among key external stakeholders. In particular, they hired a full-time professional research consultant into the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs (SAF/PA) to provide critical expertise for the function, which was previously accomplished by active-duty public affairs officers.\textsuperscript{53} Public-opinion research initiatives gained in both frequency and sophistication over the next several years, with SAF/PA initiating 24 separate formal externally-focused research projects between 1999 and 2005.\textsuperscript{54} In the fall of 2005, the Air Force again upped the research ante. One month after taking over as the new Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen T. Michael Moseley ordered a major public communication reorganization, increasing the headquarters staff from 59 to 110 and creating a new two-star director of communication over the


\textsuperscript{54} SAF/PAX, “USAF Projects Continuity Files [USAFProjects List.xls]” (working files, n.d.).
organization.\textsuperscript{55} One of the specific chief of staff vectors for the new director of communication was to improve the research data and analysis function of Air Force communication programs.\textsuperscript{56} Over the subsequent years, research reports were conducted and eventually formalized into a series of communication research bulletins, over 100 of which were distributed through the Air Force public affairs community between 2007 and 2009.\textsuperscript{57}

Air Force external research initiatives over the 10 years highlighted here covered a wide variety of research topics, but three streams of research emerged. First, Air Force leaders were keenly interested in comparing public opinions of the Air Force to those of the other military services and the Defense Department in general. For example, in 2005 SAF/PAX produced a report of a longitudinal analysis comparing the public’s propensity to associate various attributes with each of the military services using four waves of data starting in early 2003 just before the initiation of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom.\textsuperscript{58} Gauging public perceptions of the differences among portions of the Defense Department was a key interest item, with at least four communication bulletins dedicated specifically to these comparisons.\textsuperscript{59} Second, in 2007 and 2008 the Air Force went beyond simple measurement of attitudes and developed a series of conceptual models in an attempt to better segment public audiences by identifying those most likely to support the Air Force and explaining the specific causal relationships between these audience segments and their

\textsuperscript{56} Brig Gen Erwin F. Lessel III, “Strategic Communications Strategy” (working briefing, 9 Dec 06), 21.
\textsuperscript{57} SAF/PAX, “Communication Research Bulletin Index” (working paper, 2009).
\textsuperscript{58} Steve Everett, “Public Perceptions of the Military: The War in Iraq” (working briefing, SAF/PAX, 27 September 2005).
\textsuperscript{59} Communication Research Bulletin\textsuperscript{\textregistered} numbers 34, 67, 71, and 86 were focused specifically on intra-service attribute comparisons.
attitudes. This analysis was used to assist in the targeting of key recruiting influencers through the *Above All* advertising campaign discussed below. Finally, as the strategic communication model firmly took hold within the Air Force headquarters, a significant portion of the public research effort was focused on maintaining clear situational awareness on specific issue-related perceptions and tracking the data through trend analysis in order to capture quantifiable evidence of the effects of Air Force communication activities. For example, when Moseley initiated the Air Force Weeks program in 2007, research consultants conducted pre- and post-event surveys of community members in order to assess the program’s effectiveness. Research focus also highlighted key ongoing public and Defense Department debates like the troubled tanker and rescue helicopter contract processes, unmanned aerial system development efforts, and incidents involving the Air Force’s mishandling of nuclear weapons during this period.

**The Air Force Symbol**

Beyond the deliberate measurement of public opinions and attitudes, the 1999 recruiting shortfall also prompted the air force to take specific action in the form of the design and marketing of a radical new Air Force symbol to become the visual representation of the organization for all internal and external audiences. The Air Force hired New York advertising agency Siegel & Gale and charged them with the task of researching and designing the new image, logo, and tagline. After almost a year of research and planning, the Air Force unveiled the

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60 *Communication Research Bulletin* numbers 9, 24, 33, 40, 41, 76, and 78 reported on the development of these audience segments and conceptual models.

61 *Communication Research Bulletin* numbers 1, 5, 13, 19, 20, 21, 35, 59, 69, and 82 were assessments of Air Force Week programs.

62 *Communication Research Bulletin* numbers 37, 46, 51, 53, 60, 68, 81, 88, 96, 97, and 99 reported on these types of efficacy assessments.

new Air Force symbol (Figure 4) in January 2000. “We want to ensure our core identity is part of our culture and is understood by our own people and the citizens we serve,” said then-Chief of Staff Gen Michael Ryan. “As we enter the 21st Century, our identity—who we are, what we do, and what we believe—will represent both our heritage and our future.”

The Air Force spent more than $800,000 on the research and development of the new logo, and hoped to use it as an agent to visually unify Air Force communication and overcome the widespread inconsistency exposed by the research. The logo was rolled out before its final approval along with a proposed slogan—World Ready—in order for the Air Force to test the waters of public opinion before it made any

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66 “Air Force Identity, Symbol in Transition.”
irrevocable choices. According to press reports, the slogan “fell flat in initial soundings.” Air Force Public Affairs conducted research on both the internal and external perceptions of the new symbol in both 2001 and 2007, and although acceptance of the symbol was initially slow in coming, the final report showed that the new symbol was widely recognized and supported by the audiences.

**The Above All Advertising Campaign**

The third example of Air Force attempts to manage its external image did not yield the same success of the previous two examples. Suffering from what it perceived to be a widespread lack of awareness of the importance contributions the service made to national security, the Air Force launched a $26-million advertising campaign in February 2008 under the tagline *Above All.* In what the advertising trade publication *AdWeek* called “an oblique approach to recruiting,” the campaign was focused specifically on changing perceptions among the influencer audience of parents, counselors, and coaches rather than the potential recruits directly. According to budget documents uncovered by *Air Force Times* journalists, “the goal is that each [of 220 million] adults [in the target audience] over a year’s span will see 30 Air Force advertisements, from ads on Web sites to full-page newspaper ads to prime-time television ads.” According to an Air Force press release, “The new slogan is admittedly a bold one, but so are Airmen,” said Col Michael Caldwell, Air Force public affairs deputy director. “This campaign captures the professionalism of our Airmen, our technological

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edge, and our ability to meet today’s threats while at the same time prepare for future challenges.”

Almost immediately out of the gate, the campaign was met with scathing criticism by both unnamed Pentagon officials and from within Congress. Representative John Murtha was quoted as calling the advertisements “outrageous” and is said to question whether the campaign represented an illegal lobbying effort on the part of the Air Force. “Across the Pentagon, the new motto was seen as boasting of a different kind of exceptionalism, one that put the Air Force above the rest of the military when the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded that all the branches work together in new ways.” Finally, a number of blogs and public web forums were noted to have picked up on the similarity between the slogan Above All, and the portion of the German national anthem that was most popular among the Nazis—Deutschland über Alles. The ironic thing is that senior Air Force leaders had identified this potential connection in December, but production schedules had already been delayed, and the decision was made to go ahead with the campaign as designed against the recommendation of experts stationed in Germany. In the end, both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force were forced to answer extremely pointed questions from congressional leaders during their testimony on Capitol Hill for the Air Force’s annual posture hearings. For example, Representative Allen Boyd of Florida asked Secretary Wynne, “Can you briefly tell the committee why the Air Force felt compelled to run these ads, which, to

77 Col Susan Strednansky, director, USAFE Public Affairs, Ramstein AB, Germany, to author, e-mail, 20 December 2007.
some, appear to be the kinds of ads that an advocacy group would run, when, in fact, it’s specifically prohibited in law?”

In deconstructing the disaster that the campaign ultimately became, it is an under-reported fact that the slogan’s roll-out plan originally included three full months of communication activities focused specifically on socializing the slogan among Air Force internal audiences before launching it in the media; however, production and bureaucratic pressures delayed final approval of the program, and the campaign was eventually launched with the internal and external audiences simultaneously. The objectives of the internal campaign were three-fold: 1) Focus all Airmen on one vision of the brand, 2) create enthusiasm and pride among all Airmen, and 3) foster belief and support in new brand positioning by enabling Airmen to participate directly in the launch. Of particular importance to the internal campaign was a 50-second video—too long for television, but perfect for contextualizing what the phrase Above All was intended to convey. The video was eventually hung on the Air Force Portal; however, the massive multimedia campaign of emails, base-paper advertisements, news articles, and face-to-face briefings was essentially boiled down to the one Air Force press release that was sent to the media and hung on the Air Force web site. One is left to wonder whether more serious attention to the internal campaign would have put the Air Force as an institution in a better position both to frame the public discussion of the campaign and to respond to the inevitable questions as they came up.

81 Idea City, Above All Campaign Video—50 seconds, electronic file.
82 Idea City, “Public Awareness Campaign,” 12.
Conclusion

The discussion put forth in this chapter is not intended to specifically judge whether or not image management techniques have any empirical value or potential efficacy for the Air Force. In fact, the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1 supports the assertion that fully half of the equation lies in the realm of stakeholders and construed images. The theory, however, also asserts that senior leaders within large organizations who tend to focus primarily on external images without dedicating the same level of effort to their organizational cultures are ultimately doomed to fail in the development of internally consistent and stable organizational identities. What should be clear from the information provided in Chapter 2 is that the Air Force operates in a stakeholder environment that is fraught with inescapable conflicts of purpose that need to be balanced delicately in order to succeed in the long run. What should also also be clear is that both senior Air Force leaders and think-tank policy pundits are highly attuned to these challenges and spend a great deal of their attention focusing on strategies to help the Air Force successfully navigate this unpredictable environment of stakeholder relationships. The remaining question, however, is whether they dedicate a commensurate level of skill and energy to understanding and shaping the largely unspoken norms and values that define the Air Force’s culture. This question is the subject of Chapter 3.
While senior Air Force leaders expend enormous amounts of time and energy focusing on the institutional realities of the external world, the balance of the force—more than 830,000 active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian Airmen—live in a completely different world.\(^1\) As highlighted in Kevin Corley’s 2004 study, the rank and file live in a world of inferred meaning, temporal discrepancies, and the powerful, unspoken assumptions that form the stable backbone of the Air Force culture.\(^2\) The purpose of this chapter is to explore this critical perspective on the Air Force’s institutional identity. To do this, the first section is focused on describing the central, defining characteristic of the Air Force’s cultural structure—specifically, the oligarchical domination of the institution by tribal groups representing highly specialized functional subcultures. After exploring the structure’s origins and identity effects, the Air Force’s rewards system is highlighted in terms of its tendency to reinforce the salience of specific career-field identities rather than an overarching Air Force identity. Turning from these framing issues, the next section focuses on former Chief of Staff of the Air Force General T. Michael Moseley and three related cultural change initiatives he attempted to institute during his truncated tenure as the Air Force’s top Airman. These initiatives are framed as an ill-advised attempt to unilaterally overlay a dominant subcultural mythology across the varied, competing cultural experiences of the vast majority of Airmen. Finally, even if Moseley’s change initiatives had not proven fundamentally

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\(^1\) Strength totals calculated from the Air Force Association’s 2010 USAF Almanac issue, *Air Force Magazine* 93, no. 5 (May 2010), 52.

\(^2\) Kevin G. Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture? Hierarchical Differences in Perceptions of Organizational Identity and Change,” *Human Relations* 57, no. 9 (September 2004), 1169.
incompatible with the cultural base of the average rank-and-file Airman, in the final section of this chapter Moseley’s involvement in the *Thundervision* scandal is presented as an example of how discrepancies between senior-leaders’ rhetoric and behavior can have significant identity consequences for those at the bottom of the hierarchy.

**The Roots of the Air Force Culture**

According to Corley’s study, in lower levels of an organizational hierarchy, perceptions of the institution’s identity are based on an emergent interpretation of the organization’s and its leaders’ behaviors, which forms a tacit understanding of the group’s beliefs and values.³ The thesis presented here is that most Airmen’s perspectives are framed by a ubiquitous emphasis on their specific functional identities, rather than a focus on a superordinate identity of the Air Force—an umbrella identity that uniquely captures the essence of all the varied subgroups beneath it. This frame stems from the Air Force’s longstanding tradition of being led by one very narrow, but powerful, dominant subculture for the vast majority of its independent existence.⁴ In order to understand the long-term effects of this concentration of power on the Air Force’s culture, it is important to explore how the Air Force got to this point in the first place.

Numerous scholars have attempted to describe the Air Force’s culture and, by extension, central elements of its institutional psyche. Probably the most iconic of those works focused specifically on the Air Force is Carl Builder’s 1994 treatise on the ideological underpinnings of Airman culture, *The Icarus Syndrome*. Builder’s inductive exploration of the fracturing of the Air Force into functional tribes characterizes the cause as a loss of ideological focus on the fundamental theories of air

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³ Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1169.
⁴ For a discussion of the leadership demographics of the other services, see W.M. Bruce Danskine, “Fall of the Fighter Generals” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 2001), 109-115. Danskine argued that the Navy and the Army have a significantly more equitable power-sharing arrangement among their respective tribes and that the tribes represent larger portions of the respective services.
power, resulting in the original means of the theory (the airplane) being mistaken for the only means to accomplish its theoretical ends.\textsuperscript{5} Other researchers characterize the evolution of the Air Force as a sometimes-misguided ideological struggle, fueled by the rhetoric of a core of Airmen unequivocally convinced of an as-yet unrealized dream of Airpower winning wars through independent strategic bombing unshackled from obligations to conduct subordinating supporting missions for the other services.\textsuperscript{6} While these arguments have an undeniable humanistic appeal, their reliance on relatively subjective, personality-driven explanations of the causes of certain events undermines some of their value when attempting to transfer their lessons into the future. Thomas Ehrhard’s doctoral dissertation comes closer to providing an actual theory in his choice to focus on the structural and power dynamics of the service as a key causal factor of organizational behavior.\textsuperscript{7} Unfortunately, however, although he observed the highly concentrated power of pilots within the leadership of the Air Force and used it as an independent variable for other actions, he specifically declined to speculate on definitive causes of this concentration.\textsuperscript{8}

Critical insight into the power dynamics of American public institutions like the Air Force can be found in Frederic Mosher’s work, Democracy and the Public Service. “In most public agencies which have been in operation for some time,” Mosher argued, “there is a single occupational group whose knowledge, skills, and orientations are closely


\textsuperscript{8} See footnote number 166 of Ehrhard, “UAVs in the US Armed Services,” 87.
identified with the mission and activities of the agency. ... [this group becomes a core] at the center of the agency, controls the key line positions, and provides the main, perhaps the exclusive, source of its leadership.”

Further into his description of this commonly occurring core of professional leaders, he argued, “Among subgroups there is normally a pecking order of prestige and influence. The most elite of them is likely to be the one which historically was the most closely identified with the end purpose, the basic content of the agency.”

Framed in this light, the question of concentrated Air Force leadership becomes less about the leaders themselves and more about the narrowing definition of the Air Force’s end purpose. Of the vastly diverse set of advantages that entering the third dimension can bring to the modern battlefield, why is it that only one of them came to dominate the US Air Force? This process is best explained by an analogical detour.

In the mid-1300s, several successive waves of plague spread across Western Europe in what came to be known as the Black Death, killing as much as one-third of the total population over the course of several years. “Knowledge, skills, experience, relationships, and raw person-power were all lost at a throw, in many ways crippling a generation and more.” In the wake of this dramatic population shift, human coping mechanisms conspired to yield a subtle, but fundamental, shift in the societal structure of the day. According to Norman Cantor, “The main social consequence of the Black Death was not the advancement of a workers’ protocommunist paradise but further progress along the road to class polarization in an early capitalist economy. The gap between rich and poor in each village widened. The wealthiest peasants took advantage of the social dislocations caused by

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10 Mosher, Democracy and Public Service, 124.
the plague and the poorer peasants sank further into dependency and misery.”

The aftermath of World War II provided a very similar experience for the budding US Air Force, and it yielded an almost identical consolidation of power among a small group of institutional survivors. In June 1944, the US Army Air Forces was the largest of the three services, numbering 2,372,293 people. Post-war demobilization would reduce that number to 300,000 by May 1947 and would reduce US defense spending from 40 percent of the gross national product in 1944 to 4 percent by 1948. This time was the Air Force’s Black Death, and as the available resources became more and more scarce, segments of the survivors scrambled to consolidate their power just like the peasants of Medieval Europe. The wealthiest peasants in the Air Force at the time, however, were not simply pilots; they were that smaller group of pilots who could deliver the nation’s newest and most destructive weapon. Nuclear weapons—not an ideological fascination with the Air Corps Tactical School doctrine of long-range industrial bombing—were the scarce resource that fundamentally redefined the Air Force’s end purpose. As Bernard Brodie observed, “People often speak of atomic explosives as the most portentous military invention ‘since gunpowder.’ But such a comparison inflates the importance of even so epoch-making an event as the introduction of gunpowder.” Within his first year in office, President Eisenhower had articulated that the nuclear weapon was to be the backbone of all US defense policy, and up until that point, the only people that could successfully deliver on his policy of massive

14 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 27.
retaliation were the bomber pilots of Strategic Air Command.\textsuperscript{16} Although the United States had been working on the development of long-range missiles to carry nuclear warheads for some time, it was not until the summer of 1955 that the President ordered ICBM development to become the highest national priority.\textsuperscript{17} By that point, the die had already been cast in the power dynamics of the budding US Air Force. Put simply, it was the President, and by extension the American people, who redefined the Air Force’s central purpose as SAC’s nuclear delivery mission, and if Mosher’s analysis holds any truth, the ascendancy of a corps of leaders associated with this mission was, therefore, inevitable.

Once the professional elite has been clearly defined and ensconced in power, Mosher asserted that its hold on power would be nearly unshakable without completely redefining the purposes of the organization.\textsuperscript{18} In particular, its power is felt and maintained through extremely tight controls over the budgetary process. During the Eisenhower age of fiscal conservatism, there would not be enough money available for both the nuclear and conventional air power missions, and the national priority was clear—particularly to the bomber-pilot elite at the helm. Although the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command “received funding to develop 23 different fighter aircraft types from the end of World War II to 1954, it would receive only one new production series aircraft from 1955 to 1964.”\textsuperscript{19} As Julie Duck and Kelly Fielding demonstrated in their 2003 study of organizational leadership, when members perceive that organizational leaders from a different subgroup show favoritism for their own tribes, identification with the superordinate

\textsuperscript{17} Craig, \textit{Destroying the Village}, 53.
\textsuperscript{18} Mosher, \textit{Democracy and Public Service}, 134. Also, for an interesting analysis of the employment and maintenance of power by dominant subgroups, see Steven Maynard-Moody, Donald D. Stull, and Jerry Mitchell, “Reorganization as Status Drama: Building, Maintaining, and Displacing Dominant Subcultures,” Public Administration Review 46, no. 4 (July/August 1986), 301-310.
\textsuperscript{19} Worden, \textit{Rise of the Fighter Generals}, 85.
group diminishes substantially and is supplanted by a commensurate identification with their own subgroup.\textsuperscript{20} It is, therefore, through the dominance hierarchy created in the formative years of the Air Force that the clear and definitive fracturing of the superordinate Air Force identity took place and supplanted it with significantly higher levels of identification with individual career fields instead.

Finally, although the roots of the tribal fracturing of the Air Force identity can be discerned, one could be easily left to wonder how these divisions perpetuate themselves over generations of Airmen flowing through the organization. The most substantial clue to that puzzle can be found by a brief examination of the Air Force personnel system. According to Mosher, one of the most significant methods of organizational control in public institutions is exerted through the administration of rewards and punishment through their personnel systems. “A basic drive of every profession, established or emergent, is \textit{self-government} in deciding policies, criteria, and standards for employment and advancement, and in deciding individual personnel matters,” he asserted.\textsuperscript{21}

They determine the standards and criteria for entrance; the policies and procedures of assignment; the appropriate work content of elite corps positions; the criteria for promotion. They also set up the machinery for personnel operations, usually including boards, all or a majority of whose members are drawn from the corps itself. They also superintend the policies and operations of personnel management for other employees, including other professionals, who are not in the elite, yielding as little as they must to civil service requirements, to other employee groups to outside professional interests, and to political pressures.\textsuperscript{22}


\textsuperscript{21} Mosher, \textit{Democracy and Public Service}, 134.

\textsuperscript{22} Mosher, \textit{Democracy and Public Service}, 135.
While the fundamentals of the entire Air Force personnel system are certainly influenced by the dictates and decisions of the ruling elite, each individual career field controls the flow of a significant stream of rewards within its community, which serves as a continual incentive for career-field loyalty and long-term subgroup identification. Most significantly, this stream of rewards includes nomination for command opportunities, selection for assignments, and endorsement for special-duty and educational opportunities, all of which are accomplished within career-field specific developmental teams.

Of particular importance to the Air Force’s reward system is that the vast majority of it is based on what Jeffrey Kerr and John Slocum identified as a hierarchy-based reward system. “In the hierarchy, superiors defined and evaluated the performance of subordinates …. Superiors were free to define those aspects of a manager’s role that would be considered important. Thus, performance criteria could vary according to who one was working for.”23 This highly subjective nature of judgment and rewards creates uncertainty for ratees and drives them to develop stronger relationships with their supervisors in order to better understand, predict, and conform to these unwritten expectations.24 According to Denise Rousseau, these relationships open the door for the exchange of particularistic rewards, like status or other symbolic sanctions, which can have significant effects on the employees’ deep structure identification with the organization. “A positive feedback loop exists,” she argued. “Once particularistic rewards are exchanged and identification begins, individuals are likely to become concerned with the broader interests of the organization, including its reputation, survival,

23 Jeffrey Kerr and John W. Slocum Jr., “Managing Corporate Culture Through Reward Systems,” Academy of Management Executive 1, no. 2 (May 1987), 100.
and continued success, which generates activities and resource exchanges ... that foster further identification.”

For junior Air Force members seeking advancement within the Air Force, the career-field development teams are the fonts from which almost all major rewards flow; therefore, cultural identities that were initially fractured by SAC’s meteoric rise to power have been continually reinforced through the unending feedback loop of non-material exchanges between Airmen and their career-field leadership. Without a fundamental reengineering of this reward structure, there is no reason to believe that career-field identification will lose any of its strength in the future.

**Warrior Ethos from the Desk of the Chief of Staff**

When Gen T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley, a career fighter pilot from the Air Force’s then-dominant subculture, was sworn in as the Air Force’s 18th chief of staff on 2 September 2005, he came armed with a vision—”the reinvigoration of rich Air Force warrior culture.” Within weeks, Air Staff officials announced that utility uniforms—flight suits, battle dress uniforms, or the newer Airman battle uniform—would be the official uniform of the day for Airmen in the Pentagon. “Wearing our (battle dress uniforms) and flight suits as our duty uniform every day will serve as a constant reminder to us and those who we come in contact with that our job is to support our fellow warriors,” said Lt Gen Arthur Lichte, then-assistant vice chief of staff for the Air Force. The term

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Warrior Ethos became the latest in a series of buzz-words to sweep first the Air Staff and then the Air Force. By November 2005, basic military training for all enlisted Airmen had been transformed to incorporate a “warrior first” mentality, facilitated in part by issuing every Airman an M-16 rifle on the first day.28 “We don’t want airmen [sic] to be in a position ever again that when they’re deployed into harm’s way, they don’t know what to do with an M-16 or how to put on their chemical decontamination suit,” said Col Gina Grosso, then-commander of the Lackland Air Force Base unit responsible for all Air Force basic training. “Everyone has to be a warrior now.”29 In November 2008, the training was extended by two weeks—to eight and a half—in order to further enhance the graduates’ warrior skills before they enter the Air Force and are deployed to any of the world’s current combat-zones.30 In Moseley’s own words, “We are warfighters [sic]. ... From the pilots who drop bombs on target in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the security forces person protecting a forward-deployed base, to the combat search and rescue teams risking their own lives to save others, Airmen are contributing to the fight each and every day.”31

Not everyone agreed. According to one Airman, “I sit at a desk in front of a computer. I qualify on a weapon only when I deploy. When I deploy, I sit at a desk in front of a computer. This makes me a ‘warrior’? Now, be honest, what percentage of airmen can actually say they are

29 David McLemore, “Air Force No Longer the ‘Chair Force’,” Charleston Gazette (West Virginia), 30 April 2006, 14A.
‘warriors’? I have a lot of respect for those that are. But if we’re to be honest, the vast majority of us aren’t.”32 One Airman made this analogy:

I and most of the people I work with are Ford Focuses. We’re not flashy or sexy, but we get good mileage and accomplish our mission competently, dependably, and safely. Then someone comes along and slaps a Ferrari bumper sticker on my rear and says ‘Hooah, you’re a Ferrari now! Feel the power!’ I’ve still got the same engine under the hood, still driving the same route in the same manner. To anyone who looks at me, I’m still quite obviously a Focus. But for some strange reason, some seriously deluded people are going to keep insisting I’m a Ferrari.33

To be clear, these comments neither denigrate the term warrior nor assert that it has no rightful place within the Air Force. Quite the opposite, in fact, they describe an uncomfortable discontinuity between the powerful connotations of the word and the reality of the daily lives that these Airmen live. They seem to place value on the warrior idea; however, they are very clear that the label is an anathema to their daily Air Force experiences. Air Force polling throughout the period consistently reported that about half of Airmen chose “I feel like a warrior” over both “I don’t feel like a warrior, but I wish I did” and “I don’t feel like a warrior, and I don’t want to” when given the option.34 Through the power of modern market research, however, rephrasing the question to ask whether Airmen agree that “today’s Airmen have earned the right to be called ‘Warriors’” [emphasis added], the portion agreeing or strongly agreeing shot up to 64 percent.35

Evidencing Moseley’s belief that clothes make the (Air)man, on 18 May 2006 Air Force officials announced a second element of the Warrior

33 MTPCO, “The Airman’s Creed - A Closer Look.”
Ethos initiative when they unveiled prototypes of a new high-necked service coat, reminiscent of Billy Mitchell’s iconic official photos of the early 1920s (before his court martial for insubordination, see Figure 5). Citing “informal feedback” that the service dress should have a “more military,’ and less ‘corporate’ look and feel,” Brig Gen Robert Allardice said, “The Uniform Board has come up with some options to explore these concepts, and the initial prototypes are direct descendants of our heritage, rooted in Hap Arnold and Billy Mitchell’s Air Force.”

By March of 2007, Allardice announced that the Air Force had decided on which version of the new jacket would be field tested later that fall. “We talked extensively to Airmen, both in the field and through the Air Force Uniform Board process, and this is something they’ve repeatedly asked for,” Allerdice said. “We want a service dress that clearly represents our pride as Airmen and history as a service, and we want to make sure we get it right. That’s one of the reasons we’re referring to the proposal as the Heritage Jacket.”

In an interesting display of solidarity, when Allerdice’s replacement, Brig Gen Floyd Carpenter, announced the test locations for the Heritage Jacket several months later, he said the same thing ... verbatim. Capt Jonathan Pellum, the program manager for the Heritage Jacket program, apparently did not receive the memo. Rather than following suit with the generals and citing extensive informal feedback as motivation for the program, Pellum simply said, “General Moseley wanted the coat updated to reflect Air Force heritage.”

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39 Rudy Purificato, “Brooks to Serve as Initial Venue to Test Fit New Service Coat” (US Air Force Press Release, 23 January 2008). During the time the Heritage Jacket was under development, the author was an executive officer on the Air Staff. Pellum’s statement echoes the author’s understanding that this was Moseley’s personal idea, which was going to be instituted regardless of the feedback received.
The official wear test of the jacket was delayed several times, eventually being rescheduled for summer 2008; however, no final decision on whether to proceed was made before Moseley’s sudden departure. Although many of the test participants liked the proposed changes to the jacket, the feedback also highlighted another consistent theme—why tinkering with the uniform was given such a high priority in light of the serious problems the Air Force was facing with the ongoing war and the mistaken transfer of nuclear weapons that had taken place in August. “Being a nation at war, I’m not sure what message changing our service dress coats sends,” submitted one participant. “Especially (considering) we’re in need of more funds to upgrade airframes. Recommend putting service coat on hold to later date.” The program hung in limbo for the next year, until Moseley’s successor Gen Norton

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42 Lyle, “Heritage Coat Production Uncertain.”
Schwartz directed in May 2009 that “no further effort be made on the Heritage Coat project.” Schwartz said it was important for the Air Force to focus on elements of the uniform problem that kept people from successfully accomplishing their operational tasks. “It is paramount that we provide fully functional and appropriate uniforms for our Airmen as they carry out our worldwide, joint mission,” Schwartz said. “It’s critical that we respond to Air Force uniform needs since they affect every Airman, every day—so we need to get it right.” The sigh of relief from the force was palpable. In a survey immediately following Moseley’s dismissal, Airmen were asked the open-ended question, “What’s one program, initiative or point of emphasis the old USAF leaders put in place that you’d like to see the new leaders reverse or set aside?” The new service dress uniform topped the list.

Completing his hat-trick of ill-fated culture-change initiatives, on 25 April 2007, Moseley introduced an Airman’s Creed in a letter to all Airmen. “Over the years, we have become so technically proficient and specialized that we sometimes drifted from our core essence and let our functions override our mission-focus and warfighting orientation,” Moseley claimed.

The Airman Warrior [sic] tradition was built by heroic visionaries and practitioners—such as Mitchell, Arnold, Chennault, Doolittle, LeMay, and Schriever—who charged us to believe in and advocate the value of air power for the Nation [sic]. They left us a spirit that fosters initiative, innovation, and forward thinking. They left us an institutional belief in leading by example, from the front, and assuming the full measure of risk and responsibility. They left us a heritage of valor, honor, service, and sacrifice. This

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44 Gray, “New Uniforms.”
47 Moseley, “CSAF Presents Airman’s Creed.”
legacy - the contrails they left behind - defines who we are, shapes what we do, and sets the vector for our future. We stand on the shoulders of giants.\textsuperscript{48}

Although Moseley envisioned the Airman’s Creed as a set of unifying principles for all Airmen, it was actually inspired by an editorial written by a lone senior master sergeant at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base for his base newspaper. “It soon circulated Air Force-wide,” SMSgt Clayton French later said. “General Moseley did contact me, stating that my words put him ‘on fire to create a single Air Force, one that we can be proud of.’”\textsuperscript{49} From the time Clayton wrote the article to Moseley’s distribution of the official creed to replace all creeds, only three months had passed. “I was invited to be on the small team that created ‘The Airman’s Creed’,” Clayton said. “The whole process was done via e-mail, and much of it is shrouded with mystery; a whole lot of e-mailing back and forth and asking, ‘What do you think of this?’ etc., and then one day it was completed without a final, ‘What do you think?’”\textsuperscript{50} The creed was immediately plastered on glossy posters and laminated cards and distributed throughout the Air Force, with a particular emphasis at enlisted professional military education programs like Airman Leadership School, the NCO Academy, and the Senior NCO Academy.

In a move eerily reminiscent of George Orwell’s \textit{Ministry of Truth}, Moseley declared, “Our new Airman’s Creed will replace all existing Air Force-related creeds.”\textsuperscript{51} In particular, he was referring to the noncommissioned officer and senior noncommissioned officer creeds, which many enlisted members had the tradition of reciting at their promotion ceremonies to staff sergeant and master sergeant. The text of the Airman’s Creed is as follows

\textsuperscript{48} Moseley, “CSAF Presents Airman’s Creed.”
\textsuperscript{50} Pivnick, “First Sergeant Leaves Legacy.”
\textsuperscript{51} George Orwell, \textit{Nineteen Eighty-four: A Novel} (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949); and Moseley, “CSAF Presents Airman’s Creed.”
I am an American Airman.
I am a Warrior.
I have answered my Nation’s call.

I am an American Airman.
My mission is to Fly, Fight, and Win.
I am faithful to a Proud Heritage,
A Tradition of Honor,
And a Legacy of Valor.

I am an American Airman.
Guardian of Freedom and Justice,
My Nation’s Sword and Shield,
Its Sentry and Avenger.
I defend my Country with my Life.

I am an American Airman.
Wingman, Leader, Warrior.
I will never leave an Airman behind,
I will never falter,
And I will not fail.

In his effort to create a unifying identity for Airmen, Moseley actively sought to extinguish the cherished traditions of a large portion of the force. Contrast that with the US Army, where the 2003 Soldier’s Creed is somehow able to peacefully co-exist with the 1975 Noncommissioned Officer’s Creed.⁵² In October 1972, Sergeant Major of the Army Silas Copeland provided this particularly poignant insight: “A code of ethics...cannot be developed overnight by edict or official pronouncement. It is developed by years of practice and performance of duty according to high ethical standards. It must be self-policing. Without such a code, a professional soldier or a group soon loses its identity and effectiveness.”⁵³ Relating his dissatisfaction with the way

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⁵² The Soldier’s Creed was first published in conjunction with the following editorial: Brig Gen Benjamin C. Freakley, “Warrior Ethos—Hear of the Infantry,” Infantry 92, Issue 2 (Winter 2003), 1-2. Also, for an exploration of the origins of the Army’s NCO Creed, see SGM Dan Elder and SGM Felix Sanchez, “The Origins of the Creed of Noncommissioned Officer” (US Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, TX, 3 May 1998).

the Airman’s Creed was developed, one Airman called it “a generic creed that reads like a cult initiation chant ... and that glorifies the warrior flyboy with comic-bookish descriptions” of the past.\textsuperscript{54} Another Airman wrote, “When we were handed the Airman’s Creed, we didn’t develop it, we weren’t passing down tradition and expectations to our future leaders. It was forced upon us as we were told that our professional creed’s [sic] that we developed, the NCO Creed, the SNCO Creed, etc were to be abolished. We sat by idly [sic] and let it happen.” Official Air Force polling also demonstrated an inconsistent level of identification with the Airman’s creed. According to an Air Force Public Affairs (SAF/PA) \textit{Communication Research Bulletin}, “More than half of respondents (62-69\%) feel that the Airman’s Creed applies a ‘great deal’ to aircrews, enlisted, maintainers and officers. Fewer than half of respondents (29-48\%) feel that it applies to active-duty office workers, USAF retirees and civilian employees.”\textsuperscript{55} In particular, Airmen expressed that they had “no connection” to the line asserting that they were the nation’s “sentry and avenger.”\textsuperscript{56}

The purpose of the preceding section is not to judge whether or not today’s Airmen would benefit from being socialized into an institutional culture that places more value on the warrior tradition. Moseley’s \textit{aims} are not the subject of this thesis; his \textit{process} for achieving them is. The three examples focused on in this section—the widespread application of the \textit{warrior} label, the Heritage Jacket, and the Airman’s Creed—were specifically chosen to highlight how Moseley’s method for pursuing his stated aims prove themselves to be ineffective in light of the theoretical framework and considerations presented in Chapter 1. In particular,

\textsuperscript{56} SAF/PAX, \textit{Communication Research Bulletin}, no. 14. Respondents rated their connection to the phrase “sentry and avenger” as an average of 3.8 out of 7, as compared to other phrases that received scored as high as 5.8.
Corley’s work clearly associates each of these initiatives with the mentality of top managers and in direct contradiction to the frames of reference associated with rank-and-file workers. Each of these initiatives focuses on the forms of culture, rather than the substance beneath it. In this regard, Corley attributed the following to a senior vice president in the company he profiled—it could just as easily come from Moseley: “Those labels are very meaningful because they set our strategy; they set a direction for the company [insert ‘Air Force’]. They really say, ‘This is what we want to be.’” While Moseley’s perspective is understandable given his position, it brings to mind echoes of *Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus* to realize that there was no indication that Moseley had ever entertained the possibility that the rank-and-file Airmen’s concepts of identity might be 1) wildly divergent from his, and 2) equally valid from their own unique perspectives. One is reminded of Corley’s admonition that “the findings of the current study suggest that members of organizations must proactively consider the possibility that their sense of ‘who the organization is’ differs from that of their colleagues, and that these differences may lie at the heart of perceptual differences regarding the necessity for change in the organization.”

Moseley’s very framing of the goal—the reinvigoration of rich Air Force warrior culture—almost precludes the possibility that someone who did not share Moseley’s perspective on Air Force culture would be permitted to engage in the organization’s change process. In fact, in direct contradiction to Edgar Schein’s advice presented in Chapter 1, Moseley had defined changing the Air Force culture as the *ends* rather than merely the *means* to a more substantial end. This failure to articulate

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57 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1155.
58 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1165.
60 Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1174.
a clear *organizational*—rather than a *cultural*—need for change, as also suggested by Schein, was likely a contributing factor in the overwhelming ineffectiveness of these particular change initiatives.\(^{62}\)

**Judging Leaders’ Values from Perceptions of their Behavior**

Corley’s rich description of the predictable variations of workers’ perspectives on organizational identity provides valuable insight into the significance of leaders’ behavior in shaping the culture of the organization. Beyond their relatively predictable instrumental roles in the organization, leaders are critical for their symbolic roles, because employees throughout the hierarchy are keenly aware of leaders’ behavior and constantly judge it to refine their beliefs about the organization’s culture.\(^ {63}\) “Employees holding positions lower in the organization were more concerned about the meanings underlying the identity labels and how those meanings were enacted through the managerial and organization actions,” Corley observed. “For these employees and others changes in the organization’s identity were emergent and based in changes to behavior, not language.”\(^ {64}\) Gerard George and his colleagues put it most succinctly: “To succeed in the communication and transfer of culture, leaders continually reinforce the key components of the desired culture by their behaviors.” “The leader’s faithfulness to the core values and beliefs that make up the desired culture of the organization elevates the group’s trust in the leader, the organization, and the leader’s vision of culture.”\(^ {65}\) This concept is nearly ubiquitous in the modern conception of leadership, so much so that this key relationship between leadership actions and employee trust is even emphasized in the Air Force’s own organizational dynamics handbook.

According to the guidebook given to commanders to help them

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\(^{62}\) Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 312-313.

\(^{63}\) Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1166.

\(^{64}\) Corley, “Defined by Our Strategy or Our Culture?” 1166.

understand and share the results of the most recent Air Force Climate Survey, “Integrity is believed to be the most significant dimension in developing trust. ... Leadership behaviors related to the development of trust are identified as consistently acting in accordance with AF core values and ethical standards of behavior, compliance with AF policy and guidance, and following through on commitments to members. ... If words and behaviors are incongruent, people will pay attention to how you act not what you say. Actions speak louder than words.”

Given the importance of integrity and trust, it should not be surprising that the Air Force has taken steps in its research programs to measure and report on these key metrics. Although the numbers dropped several percentage points between the 2005 and 2008 Air Force Climate Surveys, Airmen consistently indicated that they have high levels of trust in their closest commanders at the squadron or similar level, with trust rating ranging in the upper 70 to 80 percentage points. Views of senior Air Force leaders, on the other hand, were not nearly as positive. On two separate SAF/PA-organized surveys, about 90 percent of Airmen agreed that “There’s a pretty clear set of ethical rules and expectations that all Airmen should know and follow.” In May 2008, however, only 61 percent of Airmen agreed that “Air Force senior leaders set a good example of ethical behavior for me and my fellow Airmen.” One month later in the immediate wake of the firings of the Chief and Secretary of the Air Force, less than half of Airmen agreed. Similarly, on a separate survey, 96 percent of Airmen agreed that “The welfare of our families is an important enabler for Airman’s success in combat,” but

67 “2008 AF Climate Survey Results” (working briefing, Headquarters Air Force, n.d.)
69 SAF/PA, Communication Research Bulletin, no. 49.
70 SAF/PA, Communication Research Bulletin, no. 52.
only two-thirds of Airmen felt that the Air Force is committed to Airmen’s quality of life. For the theoretical purposes of understanding organizational culture and identity, it is unimportant whether or not there exists a real integrity gap among senior Air Force leadership. What matters in this context is that Airmen—who are the final arbiters on their own judgments and feelings—perceive there to be a gap between the values espoused by their most senior leaders and the behavior they observe. To make matters worse, when Airmen’s preconceived expectations are confirmed by actual events, this will have a disproportionately large reinforcing effect on their future attitudes and perceptions, as is discussed in Richard Oliver’s landmark work on expectancy-confirmation theory. This is precisely the kind of negative reinforcement that one could have expected when Airmen were suddenly confronted with media reports of Moseley’s alleged involvement in the award of the Thunderbirds Airshow Production Services (TAPS) contract—also widely publicized as Thundervision.

On 5 March 2006, Arizona Republic reporter Robert Anglen broke a front-page story with the headline “Air Force Chief Tied to Steering of Contract: Tempe Company Protested Deal.” The article alleged that Moseley “pushed a $49 million publicity project for the Thunderbirds air show that is now being investigated by federal regulators.” The company that received the contract counted the recently retired four-star Air Combat Commander Gen Hal Hornberg among its four owners. Only after a competitor had filed an official Government Accountability Office protest in February 2006, did Air Force officials look more closely

74 Anglen, “Chief Tied to Steering of Contract.”
at the contract and decide to cancel it.\textsuperscript{76} At that time the Secretary of the Air Force referred the case to the Defense Department Inspector General for further review.\textsuperscript{77} Two full years later, once the DOD/IG investigation was concluded, then-Secretary of the Air Force Wynne took direct administrative action against three members of the selection process and referred action for two others to their chain of command.\textsuperscript{78}

Moseley was not among those singled out in the report for criminal prosecution, a distinction that Moseley claimed to have cleared him of any wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{79} He and Wynne immediately signed a memorandum for all Air Force senior leaders that stated, in part, “We must scrupulously avoid the appearance of impropriety or favoritism. ... Senior Leader involvement in the acquisition process, even when unintended, that results in improper influence or unfair outcomes is unacceptable and violates our Core Values.”\textsuperscript{80}

Others, however, read the full investigation and reached different conclusions about Moseley’s culpability in the contract process gone awry. Senator Claire McCaskill contacted Wynne—and dissatisfied with his response, later contacted Secretary of Defense Robert Gates—to express her concerns regarding Moseley and his actions in this case.

Provided the significant findings already identified, it is incomprehensible to me that no action has been taken to reprimand General Moseley or to evaluate his continued fitness to lead the Air Force. ... The General’s commitment to upholding the letter and spirit of the law, his respect for subordinate commanders, and his devotion to properly managing tax dollars, let alone his ability to set appropriate priorities for Air Force spending during this time of warfare when budgets are extremely tight, are in direct question. ... I

\textsuperscript{78} “SECAF Receives DOD/IG Report.”
\textsuperscript{79} Gen (ret) T. Michael Moseley, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, to Michael B. Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, memorandum, 28 September 2009.
\textsuperscript{80} Michael W. Wynne and T. Michael Moseley to Air Force senior leaders, memorandum, 26 March 2008.
would like to note, as I did when we spoke, that the message sent in the letter that you cosigned with General Moseley to Air Force leaders regarding senior leader responsibilities in ethics shows a great degree of hypocrisy on General Moseley's behalf that is astonishing. The letter captures my very own sentiments on these issues, but it should have been sent direct to General Moseley, not have come from him.\(^{81}\)

Senators Carl Levin and John McCain, the chairman and ranking members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, requested that DOD/IG conduct an additional review focused specifically on whether or not Moseley was guilty of any “criminal conduct, ethical violations, and failures of leadership.”\(^{82}\) In July of 2009—fully three-and-one-half years after the original fraudulent award of the *Thundervision* contract—DOD/IG provided a final report, in which they substantiated four separate allegations of Moseley violating the Joint Ethics Regulation. Specifically the inspector general's conclusions were:\(^{83}\)

1) Gen Moseley provided preferential treatment to a contractor, Strategic Message Solutions (SMS);

2) Gen Moseley created the appearance of improper disclosure of nonpublic information to SMS;

3) Gen Moseley misused subordinates’ time and Government property; and

4) Gen Moseley solicited and accepted gifts from a prohibited source.

Secretary Wynne’s replacement, Michael Donley, “determined administrative action was warranted against General Moseley and administered a letter of admonishment in retirement.”\(^{84}\)

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\(^{81}\) Claire McCaskill, Senator from Missouri, to Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force, memorandum, 24 April 2008.


\(^{83}\) DOD/IG, *Alleged Misconduct*, 45-46.

Moseley maintained his innocence to the last, writing, “I categorically disagree with the findings and I reject the notion of any wrongdoing on my part. ... As this investigation revealed no new facts from the previous 2-plus [sic] year investigation, one can only conclude that following the public pressure brought to bear on the DOD/IG by certain officials in the Congress (an elected member and staff) to continue to vilify senior Air Force leadership and find some type of wrongdoing on my part—we find ourselves where we are today.”

Without delving into the legal specifics of Moseley’s innocence and guilt, the purpose of this section has been to highlight the significant discrepancies this situation could possibly have raised in the perceptions of Airmen judging their leader’s actions in relation to the well-known values and standards of ethical behavior the organization espouses. Take, for example, the following excerpt from the first DOD/IG report:

“[One member] stated that being part of the SST [source selection team] was ‘the dirtiest thing I ever experienced.’ He said it was a ‘Kangaroo Court,’ in which it was obvious from the beginning that SMS was going to be awarded the contract.”

A second example from the report is the following text of an email sent from Moseley to the owner of the company:

“Dude...I’ve talked to lawyers about your idea and I’ve talked to contracting bubbas about getting on with planned good ideas and I’ve got a way huge notion of building a better strategic communication effort. There is a lot ‘o [redacted first name of SMS owner] in this one. I want to chat with you about all this to see what you think. Thanks again for the note & the pics. YOU ARE THE MAN. I’ve watched the movie multiple times. It’s huge and it helps. But, I want to save the comments until we can talk. Thanks my friend.”

This email was sent to the owner of SMS one week after he submitted his proposal for the contract and almost three months before the contract

85 Moseley to Donley, memorandum.
87 DOD/IG, Report of Investigation, 156.
was actually awarded. Finally, there is the following email sent from then-Air Combat Command commander Ronald Keys to Moseley protesting the significant waste he saw in this contract. “Boss, we asked for bids on this capability and they have come back. I know you said ‘press’ and ‘found’ some fy [sic] ’05 right-colored money to be able to acquire this capability. However, this is turning out to be an $8M per year project...something over $40M for the FYDP, and I cannot support burning that kind of money to fix something that isn’t broken, when I’m not buying fixes to things that are broken....”

In the end, regardless of the verifiable facts of the final award of the Thundervision contract to SMS, two things are clear. First, relatively junior-ranking Airmen at both Nellis and Langley Air Force Bases who had been charged with ensuring the Air Force got the best possible value for its contract dollar believed—rightly or wrongly—that the four-star Chief of Staff of the Air Force had selected a single contractor before the request for proposal had ever been issued. Second, Airmen talk—which, when combined with the power of the twenty-first century social media, fairly ensured that most Airmen heard something about the Thunderbirds Airshow Production Services contract and knew it was not good, even if they didn’t know all of the details. The final, unanswerable question is what effects do these two facts have on the rank-and-file Airman’s trust, not just in Moseley, but in other senior leaders or in the institution of the Air Force as a whole? Even if the repercussions cannot be completely quantified, given the theoretical framework provided above, it is unrealistic to argue that there were none.

**Conclusion**

This chapter was designed to offer some important food for thought on an underemphasized perspective of the Air Force’s institutional identity—the rank-and-file perspective as understood by hundreds of

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thousands of Airmen through their unique observations and judgments about the organization and its leaders. To open the chapter, it was theorized that the dominant characteristics shaping every member’s understanding of the institution are the Air Force’s highly fractured tribal culture and the excessively concentrated power dynamics resulting from a longstanding tradition of being led by one very narrow, but powerful, dominant subculture for the vast majority of its independent existence. Next, former-Chief of Staff Gen T. Michael Moseley’s cultural change vision was presented along with examples of three of the vision’s supporting initiatives. It was shown why these initiatives were doomed to failure because of the wildly divergent identity perspectives held by Moseley as a representative of the upper echelon of the organization and the rank-and-file Airman at the bottom. Finally, even if Moseley’s initiatives had not been scuttled by massive disconnects in perspective, the final section of this chapter described how his association with the Thundervision contract scandal could have critically damaged his ability to lead cultural change in the organization because of the deterioration of trust caused by Airmen’s judgment of the rhetoric-to-values discrepancies they witnessed. The final chapter tackles the question of whether true organizational change is even possible.. Evidence of the change initiatives of Moseley’s successor, Gen Norton Schwartz is presented and evaluated for its coherence with the principles outlined in Chapter 1. Capstone concepts for how organizational change should be attempted within the United States Air Force are presented as issues for future exploration..
On 5 June 2008, the Air Force entered uncharted territory when Defense Secretary Robert Gates made the unprecedented decision to remove both the senior civilian and military leaders of the service simultaneously. Investigations into two separate incidents of the mishandling of nuclear weapons and weapons components asserted that a lack of critical self-assessment in the Air Force had exacerbated an ongoing trend of declining stewardship of this essential national capability.\(^1\) “I deeply regret that the issues before us require the actions that I have taken,” Gates said. “While this is a difficult day for the Air Force, for the Department of Defense and for me, it also marks the beginning of a return to the standards of excellence and accomplishment for which the Air Force has long been known.”\(^2\) On 9 June, Gates cancelled the retirement plans of Gen Norton Schwartz and announced his intention to recommend Schwartz for nomination as the 19\(^{th}\) Chief of Staff of the Air Force.\(^3\) As Schwartz assumed the helm of a deeply troubled US Air Force on 12 August 2008, the questions remained—would this new leader part substantially from the example set by his predecessor, and would his approach be any more successful in helping the Air Force rediscover its institutional identity? In this final chapter, elements of Schwartz’s change initiatives are highlighted and assessed for their congruency with the recommendations from Chapter 1. It concludes with an eye to the future and some final recommendations.

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1 “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon” (US Defense Department Transcript, 5 June 2008).
2 “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates.”
To summarize the theoretically derived suggestions from Chapter 1, the overriding point was that organizational change should be highly focused on finding organizational solutions to clearly articulated problems. Given a clear and compelling need for change, leaders should seek to implement their plans within the context of a deep understanding of the organization’s existing culture and a clear respect for the value organizational members place on the sense of stability the existing culture provides them. It was recommended to focus attention on three specific areas of concern: the role of subcultures, the roles of promotion and rewards, and the roles of actions and meanings.

On Schwartz’s first day, he and the then-acting Secretary of the Air Force conducted a press engagement in which they outlined their vision for rehabilitating the wounded Air Force. Their universal theme was simple and clear, focusing on regaining “the nation’s trust by applying the ‘back-to-basics’ standards of precision and reliability in the execution of every mission.”4 The cornerstone of this approach was a focus on integrity and keeping the solemn promises each service member had made to the American people and the nation. “My pledge to all today is that the Air Force will keep the promise to our teammates, our families, and to all our partners who rely on us every day,” Schwartz said. “Precision and reliability is our standard, regardless of job or specialty, and we will return the vigor and rigor to all the processes and missions for which we have been entrusted.”5 Schwartz emphasized that the nation was depending on the Air Force to inspire trust and confidence. “I ask you to consider that if America suffers from a shortage of any commodity, it is a shortage of confidence, faith, and sacred trust. Yet integrity is proven to be the most valuable commodity on the market, and unlike other treasures, it never fails, crashes, or collapses on those who

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5 Randolph, “SECAF, CSAF stress ‘back to basics’.”
invest in it,” he said. “You word must be your bond.”6 He emphasized that one of the fundamental promises the Air Force has made is to support the other military services in order to win the nation’s wars. “An air, naval, or ground victory alone is insignificant to the overall achievement of national political objectives,” Schwartz said. “In the end, only the combined success of the military instrument, in concert with other national levers of power, is truly meaningful.”7

Regarding the role of subcultures in the Air Force, Schwartz departed markedly from the pilot aggrandizing warrior ethos tagline of Moseley, favoring instead a much more inclusive perspective on the functional communities and their subcultures. “I think the fundamental thing is that everybody counts,” he said. “No one, no job, no specialty is more important than any other. Everyone matters and everyone is an important part of this team.” As one reporter observed, “It is the job of Schwartz … to mediate between the old and new pilot tribes.”8 Schwartz would consistently warn Airmen, “This is a team sport, and everybody’s got to play their position for us to be successful. If we do that, everything else takes care of itself.”9 As was highlighted in Chapter 3, one of the fundamental challenges the Air Force faces is its deep-rooted history of defining itself very narrowly by one or two specific functions. Schwartz clearly recognized this problem, and “has also pushed to broaden the Air Force’s definitions of its core missions beyond strategic bombing and control of the skies.”10

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10 Jaffe, “Drone Pilots Rise on Winds of Change.”
Although his initiatives in the areas of promotion and rewards have not been all-encompassing, Schwartz has provided some focus in several specific areas. First, taking a page from Stephen Peter Rosen’s theory of peacetime military innovation, he has placed specific emphasis on ensuring there are “career paths along which younger officers specializing in the new tasks could be promoted.”

This is particularly evident in Schwartz’s attention to the remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) field, which is responsible for the operation of the Air Force’s growing inventory of unmanned aircraft such as the MQ-1 Predator and the MQ-9 Reaper. “The Air Force culture must promote a strong and healthy [RPA] community – not a leper colony or an agency of expedience,” Schwartz said. “We will do everything we can to ensure our [RPA] units are properly organized, trained, and equipped for today’s fight, and prepared for future challenges.”

Addressing a group of newly trained RPA pilots, Schwartz said, “You are part of the major new Air Force development of the decade. This cultural change for our Air Force has to do both with the future of these unmanned systems, and how we see ourselves as Airmen. Secretary Donley and I recognize that our Airmen are the linchpin in this shift, and we are giving it our personal attention.”

Beyond the RPA career field, Schwartz also said that the Air Force’s evaluation system—for both enlisted and officers—needs particular attention. “Not everyone is a five,” General Schwartz said, referring to the highest ranking category on the enlisted performance report. “We need to be honest with ourselves and we need to be authentic how we rate each other.”

Finally, focusing on the roles of actions and meanings, Schwartz appears to have a clear and abiding appreciation for the significance of personal and organizational actions in the judgments of both the Airmen and the external public. To a group of senior enlisted leaders, he said, “Another way for us to lead—even more compellingly—is through the example that we set. Every act that we take and thought that we share is instructive, in various degrees, to our Airmen. When we advocate Integrity, Service, and Excellence, we must also live it.” That sentiment also carries to the perspectives of external people on the organization. “All of us here today, starting with me ... will be judged by our ability to meet our obligations and commitments to our Joint teammates, especially those engaged in combat, to our combatant commanders, to our leadership in the Administration and in Congress, and to the American people, who watch our actions closely.” In short, he said, “We must, as an Air Force ... do the right thing and do the right thing right. That’s as simple as it gets.”

The preceding does not necessarily imply that Schwartz has gotten everything right. For example, in December 2008, Schwartz announced that the Air Force would no longer use the term “in-lieu of”—or ILO—to refer to Airmen deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan to perform tasks not traditionally associated with the Air Force, such as guarding detainees or driving convoys. Instead, he decreed that the new term would be Joint Expeditionary Tasking, or JET. “When it comes to being part of the joint fight, the Air Force is all in,” Schwartz said. “The term JET reinforces our commitment to the joint fight as an equal member of the joint team. The amazing contributions Airmen make around the world every day are

17 Branum, “Chief of Staff Wraps up Middle East Tour.”
not in lieu of anything."\textsuperscript{19} Some Airmen, however, took this as another example of senior leadership manipulating labels without actually changing the substance of the actions that were taking place. “I can't argue with the logic of using Airmen to fill needed billets, as long as there is justification,” one Airmen posted on the Air Force website in response to the announcement. “However, I do find the changing of the acronym from ILO to JET to be disingenuous. You need to call a spade a spade and if we're doing a mission in lieu of an Army soldier, then it should be called just that.”\textsuperscript{20} Although Schwartz seems to have developed a flight plan that avoids several of the tragic pitfalls that consumed his predecessor, his eventual success is not guaranteed. If it becomes common perception that Schwartz has begun to focus more on terms and labels rather than substance and reality, it will still be possible for him to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

\textbf{The Path to the Future Starts with WHY}

Ultimately, since Schwartz’s chapter of the Air Force’s history is still being written, it is too early to tell whether his efforts will be judged successes or failures in the final accounting. As articulated in this thesis, however, some of the criteria are clear. He will have to find the appropriate balance between the Air Force’s external image and its culture. Among the other military services within the Department of Defense, he will have to make sense of the paradoxical mandates to cooperate to win the nation’s wars while simultaneously competing for scarce resources in a zero-sum Washington, DC, budget battle. He will have to find an acceptable and durable equilibrium among the many organizational Air Force subcultures, and in particular, should consider ways to redefine the organization such that there is a more equitable power-sharing arrangement among the tribes. These are all daunting

challenges for Schwartz, but it is not yet clear whether his vision will
come to fruition in the form of bona fide changes to the cultural fabric of
the Air Force. Quoting renowned author and consultant Peter Block,
Schwartz said, “It is not so much the product or service of our workplace;
it is the culture and texture and ways of creating community. Our task
is to create organizations we believe in and to do it as an offering, not a
demand.”21 Achieving such a lofty goal will certainly be a challenge.
Luckily for him, many have already traveled this road, and one person in
particular has provided the keys to the kingdom if Schwartz is willing to
listen.

Simon Sinek, a recovering advertising strategist with an
undergraduate degree in anthropology, has articulated the pathway to
precisely the organization Schwartz describe above in an extraordinarily
simple model he calls The Golden Circle (Figure 6).22 According to Sinek,
“There are only two ways to influence human behavior; you can
manipulate it or you can inspire it.”23 While manipulations lead to
transactions between an organization and an individual, inspiration leads
to loyalty.24 Inspiration, Sinek said, comes when leaders communicate
from the inside of the Golden Circle rather than from the outside, which
is normal for both people and organizations.25 “Every single company
and organization on the planet knows WHAT they do,” Sinek asserted.
“Some companies and people know HOW they do WHAT they do. ... Very
few people or companies can clearly articulate WHY they do WHAT they
do.”26 The WHY is the fundamental expression of what an organization
values and serves to differentiate the organization in a way that creates

21 Peter Block, Stewardship: Choosing Service Over Self Interest, quoted in Gen Norton
Schwartz, “Stewardship in National Defense” (address, National Defense University
22 Simon Sinek, Start With Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action
23 Sinek, Start With Why, 17.
24 Sinek, Start With Why, 30-33.
25 Sinek, Start With Why, 39.
26 Sinek, Start With Why, 39.
connections with people who value the same things. Sinek used Apple as an example, asserting that their WHY is “Everything we do, we believe in challenging the status quo. We believe in thinking differently.”

Apple does that by making beautifully-designed, simple-to-use and user-friendly products, some of which just happen to be computers. “People don’t buy WHAT you do, they buy WHY you do it,” Sinek argued. “If a company does not have a clear sense of WHY then it is impossible for the outside world to perceive anything more than WHAT the company does.”

![Figure 6: The Golden Circle](image)


The fundamental challenge facing Schwartz and the United States Air Force is first to recapture and then articulate the Air Force WHY in a way that is true to the essence of its distinctive culture yet sensitive to the inescapable technological dynamics and political imperatives of the twenty-first century. Consider the following passage from Schwartz’s 2009 address to the Air Force Association within this context as one possible starting point:

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28 Sinek, *Start With Why*, 64.
Common to our heritage is the relationship between the aviator and the machine, alone together in the vastness of sky or space. The relationship is etched into our very psyche. It is so powerful an idea, that it has attracted the best and the brightest that the world has to offer to our Nation’s service. It is these people who made us the service of technological innovation; but today, the evolution of the machine is beginning to outpace the capability of the people we put in them. We now must reconsider the relationship of man and woman, machine, and air. We must question, and ultimately answer, manned or unmanned in combat and support aircraft. We must continue to evolve and embrace the culture of technological innovation which has been our hallmark. We have always, and will continue to use this technological innovation to provide for the security of our nation. Technology will allow us to better execute defense, when in the past only offense was viable.\footnote{Schwartz, “Air Force Association Convention Speech.”}

The key measure of merit for the Air Force’s WHY will be its resonance among the Airmen. As Thomas Hughes, a professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, said, “The degree to which an idea resonates is the degree to which everyone else was just about to say the same thing.”\footnote{Thomas Hughes, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies professor, conversation with author, July 2009.} To truly capture the WHY of the Air Force, it has to emerge from tapestry that is its culture, rather than be imposed upon the majority by a zealous—if misguided—minority. It will require a significant effort by a highly committed Air Force to gain a full appreciation of this emergent WHY.

The first step is for those in the highest levels of the hierarchy to engage in the lowest levels in a direct, open conversation that challenges everyone’s assumptions—those things that each person just \textit{knows} somehow. The challenge has never been greater. The twenty-first century Air Force is not the flying club of the early 1900s. With the increasing importance of space, cyberspace, and unmanned platforms, the core Air Force assumption that the Air Force was all about airplanes
has suddenly been put into question. For the first time in the history of the Air Force, there is, in fact, nothing about the Air Force’s identity that is non-negotiable.\(^{31}\) Schwartz and other Air Force leaders cannot allow that to deter them, however. There is no substitute for the loyalty that is inspired when an organization begins with the clarity of WHY, keeps its focus with the discipline of HOW, and resonates authenticity throughout its own people and its stakeholders with the consistency of WHAT.\(^{32}\) Sinek provided the following example. “In the summer of 1963, a quarter of a million people showed up to hear Dr. King deliver his “I Have a Dream” speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. But how many people showed up for Dr. King? Zero. They showed up for themselves. It was what they believed. It was what they saw as an opportunity to help America become a better version of itself. It was they who wanted to live in a country that reflected their own values and beliefs.”\(^{33}\)

The Airmen of the United States Air Force believe. They want to help the Air Force become a better version of itself. They want to be a part of something that reflects their values and beliefs. They are ready to be inspired.

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\(^{31}\) James Forsyth, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies professor, conversation with the author, 13 May 2010.


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