A NEW VECTOR FOR AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
OF JOINT LEADERS

BY

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Wiley Barnes is a second generation Airman, the son of a Korean War and Vietnam War veteran. He earned his commission as a distinguished graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Tennessee in December 1996. After completing intelligence officer training, he served in a variety of assignments including: intelligence support to B-1 and C-130 operations; U-2, RQ-4, and MQ-1 reachback intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations; instructor duty at Officer Training School; senior intelligence officer for the 28th Bomb Wing; and Air Force Intern on the Air Staff, the Joint Staff, and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Major Barnes has deployed twice in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, with duty as the 480th Intelligence Wing’s Distributed Common Ground System liaison officer at the Combined Air Operations Center and as the senior intelligence officer for the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing.

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This work is dedicated to the memory of my dad who died on 15 October 2009. His commitment to family, hard work, education, and patriotism, along with his service in our nation’s Air Force (1949-69), continue to inspire me. F-86s, C-130s, and the Eiffel Tower--thanks dad!

I firmly believe that to whom much is given, much is expected. Over the past year, many people have given me counsel and support that I can never fully repay. I can only begin to thank them here.

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Special thanks goes to a group of officers that I have been privileged to know for the past seven years. They have challenged, inspired, and supported me intellectually, personally, and professionally.

Most importantly, my wife and sons are my strength. Their love and support is incredible. I will always remember my thesis survival kit and the thesis spell that finally worked.
This thesis asks the following question: how should the Air Force develop joint leaders? To answer that question, the thesis describes the historical, legal, and policy context of jointness and defines attributes of joint leadership; determines the extent to which the Air Force is represented in leadership positions within the joint community; identifies elements of Air Force policy and culture that enhance or detract from the development of joint officers; proposes solutions to enhance joint officer development for airmen; and assesses the proposed solutions using the criteria of feasibility and effectiveness. The thesis finds that the Air Force has not developed officers with credentials necessary to be competitive for senior positions in the joint community, largely due to functionally focused institutional norms that place a high value on technical competence and a relatively low value on breadth of experience. The thesis concludes that the Air Force can develop better joint leaders while maintaining a razor-sharp technical competency for warfighting, but in order to do so, changes are required. The thesis proposes eight changes: 1) require only one command tour for colonels; 2) direct Development Teams (DTs) to meet institutional requirements; 3) task assignment teams to meet institutional requirements; 4) emphasize joint experience at promotion boards; 5) strengthen institutional identity; 6) enhance the Air Force vision and mission statements; 7) improve Air Force leadership doctrine; 8) bifurcate technical and leadership tracks. Taken together, these eight steps will develop more capable Air Force joint leaders, thereby both increasing Air Force representation in senior joint billets and enhancing American national security.
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INTRODUCTION

Joint warfare is team warfare.

Joint Publication 1

In June 2009, General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF, was appointed commander of United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), making him only the fourth airman to hold a geographic theater commander position since the establishment of the geographic combatant commands (COCOM) in 1947. Fraser’s three airman predecessors in theater command were Generals Lauris Norstad, Joseph W. Ralston, and Victor E. Renuart. Norstad was the first to blaze the theater command trail for airmen, serving as commander of United States European Command (EUCOM) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) from November 1956 to December 1963. Norstad’s trail went cold for over 36 years before another airman followed. Then from May 2000 to Jan 2003, Ralston served as commander of EUCOM and SACEUR. In March 2007, Renuart took command of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), a descendent of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) established in 2002 to manage Department of Defense (DOD) homeland defense efforts and coordinate defense support to civil authorities.

In the wake of World War II (WWII) it was clear that airpower had matured as an integral element of warfare. This was evident in the establishment of the Air Force as a separate service under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. While roles and missions have been

1 With its commander serving as a deputy commander of NORAD, a functional command, the air-defense focused CINC Alaska (CINCAL) is not considered a geographic COCOM commander for this thesis.
arguable in the context of interservice rivalry, the importance of airpower to American national security during the past decades is not. If, then, airpower has been integral to the conduct of war, why have so few airmen been selected for theater command?

There is no simple answer to this question, but recent changes in Air Force senior leadership begin to give hints. The 2008 dismissals of Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) Michael Wynn and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) General T. Michael Moseley by newly appointed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates kicked down an already wide-open door of faltering Air Force credibility. Gates claimed the unprecedented dismissals were solely a result of Air Force mishandling of nuclear weapons. However, the dismissals also appeared to be the culmination of a series of missteps by the Air Force over the previous five years, including acquisitions improprieties, improper contracting practices, inappropriate Global War on Terror (GWOT) prioritization, and an intractable disagreement between senior Air Force leaders and the SECDEF on the future of the F-22 program.  

Nearly two years have passed since the dismissals, and the Air Force continues to work to recover political capital and renew institutional credibility. Progress in this effort demands a comprehensive evaluation of how the Air Force

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provides value to its primary stakeholders, the American people. Such value is most convincingly demonstrated in the Air Force’s contribution to the joint effort of all services to provide for the common defense.

Air Force and joint force effectiveness at the operational and strategic levels of war depend, in part, on the Air Force’s capacity to develop officers capable of filling joint leadership positions. These positions are the general officer billets on the Joint Staff and in the headquarters of the geographic or functional COCOMs, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), COCOM commander positions, and their respective vice or deputy commanders. As the examples of Generals Fraser, Renuart, Ralston, and Norstad attest, Air Force competitiveness for geographic COCOM commander positions is well behind the other services. Since 1986 the Army has had 21 geographic COCOM commanders, the Navy has had 18, and the Marines have had six. As the chief warfighters reporting directly to the SECDEF and the President, the geographic COCOM commanders are particularly influential in shaping the nation’s ways and means of military power. Given current lack of representation by airmen in the joint community, the Air Force’s influence in joint warfighting debates appears inadequate to foster due diligence and diversity in the consideration of strategic and operational planning for the military instrument of power.

Proportional representation in the joint world is a useful measure of Air Force influence on strategic outcomes. Joint representation also indicates the value DOD leadership places on the potential contributions to be made by airmen and airpower. The joint community is an important venue for the Air Force to influence strategic outcomes. Thus, it is not surprising that Secretary of the Air Force Michael B. Donley and Chief of Staff of the Air Force Norton A. Schwartz have expressed specific interest in the development of Air Force officers in terms of their competitiveness for joint leadership positions, including combatant
command. In light of the above issues and the direct interest by Air Force leadership, this thesis asks the following question: how should the Air Force develop joint leaders?

**What Does “Joint” Mean?**

To begin to address this issue requires a brief elaboration of the term “joint.” The military instrument of US national power derives great strength from the cooperation and interdependence of the military services operating in the land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains. The term joint characterizes this cooperation and interdependence. The concept of jointness also serves as a guiding aspiration for the development of military leaders.

The first formal definition of the term *joint* emerged from the Arcadia Conference of early 1942 held between President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and their military staffs. The Arcadia Conference, which established the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the supreme planning body for the British and American effort in World War II, defined *joint* as action involving two or more services of the same nation. Both the experience of WWII and the National Security Act of 1947 incorporated the concept of joint action among the services. This legislation created the Air Force as an independent service, established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and created positions for the first COCOM commanders. Nearly forty years later, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 strengthened the joint character the Department of Defense (DOD). Among its key provisions, Goldwater-Nichols effectively strengthened the CJCS’s

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4 Peter Pace, CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, November 2005.
advisory role, bolstered combatant commander authority, and legislated steps to improve the quality of officers assigned to joint billets.

Today, DOD officially defines the term *joint* as “activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.”6 In the 2005 *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*, General Peter Pace amplified the definition of joint to encompass the evolving scope of senior military leadership across the range of military operations. Within the context of this joint officer development construct, Pace defined joint as “integrated employment of US and multinational armed forces and interagency capabilities in land, sea, air, and space and in both the human and virtual domain.”7 Pace’s definition paints a vivid picture of the leadership complexity faced by today’s senior military officers and is helpful in articulating the officer development demands placed on both individuals and the services.

**Methodology and Evidence**

To answer the research question, this thesis defines the attributes of joint leadership; determines the extent to which the Air Force is represented in leadership positions within the joint community; identifies elements of Air Force policy and culture that enhance or detract from the development of joint officers; proposes solutions to enhance joint officer development for airmen; and assesses the proposed solutions using the criteria of feasibility and effectiveness.

Chapter 1, “Joint Leadership Fundamentals,” establishes the conceptual foundation for this work, including the strategic, operational, and tactical imperatives for jointness. Then, by examining literature of military leadership and integrating the particular requirements levied on contemporary military leaders, it articulates the major characteristics of

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7 Pace, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*, 1.
joint leaders. These characteristics are: 1) *technical expertise*, 2) *experience*, 3) *education*, 4) *intellect*, and 5) *interpersonal skills*.

Primary sources for Chapter 1 include biographical data from the general and flag officers from all four services, providing a useful picture of the experience in each senior officer grade. Secondary sources include combatant command and Joint Staff histories. Works by authors such as Carl von Clausewitz, John Frederick Charles Fuller, Martin van Creveld, and James R Locher; essays from *Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ)*; and numerous research studies from research organizations such as RAND and the service colleges establish the historical foundations and legal requirements for joint leadership. These studies include analyses of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Chapter 2, “Air Force Joint Officer Development,” first establishes the degree to which the Air Force is represented in the joint community. It then examines factors that contribute to the level of Air Force representation in the joint community by analyzing Air Force personnel policy and culture. Primary sources include policies promulgated by the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Air Force Personnel Center, the Air Force Colonel Management Office, and the Air Force General Officer Management Office. Joint Staff and COCOM websites provide the existing status of service representation within the joint staffs. A mix of primary and secondary sources illuminates Air Force culture and organization issues, including policy documents, research studies, and speeches by Air Force senior leaders.

Chapter 3, “Analysis,” assesses the information presented in Chapter 2 and proposes solutions in the areas of Air Force personnel policy, culture, and organization. The proposed solutions include considerations determined by the tests of feasibility and effectiveness.
Chapter 4, “Conclusions,” summarizes the thesis argument, identifies the most significant recommendations emerging from the analysis, and offers suggestions for further study.

As an organization dedicated to defending the nation in cooperation with the other military departments, the Air Force must evaluate institutional processes and outcomes relative to external context. In light of such continuous evaluation, the Air Force must adapt to new realities to maintain relevance. The place to begin this evaluation is by establishing the historic and contemporary context that drives the requirement for effective joint leaders within the US system of national defense.
Chapter 1

Joint Leadership Concepts

Perhaps more than ever before, the United States requires joint military forces able to function and succeed across a wide geographic and operational spectrum. Moreover, military forces must be capable of working effectively with a range of civilian and international partners.

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report

In the 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), the most fundamental of US military concepts, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen states, “US military power today is unsurpassed on the land and sea and in the air, space, and cyberspace.”1 Mullen further asserts that the ability to integrate the diverse capabilities developed by each military service into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts is “an unassailable American strategic advantage.”2 But Mullen also acknowledges that changes in the character of warfare demand that the US armed forces adapt to meet the new challenges by modifying current capabilities and developing new capabilities.

Sound leadership is a fundamental component of any successful military institution. The demands of modern war dictate close integration of the various services. Thus, at the highest levels, the concept of sound leadership must include a proper appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of all services—in a word, jointness. To frame this thesis on developing airmen as joint leaders, this chapter examines and articulates the underpinnings of joint leadership. It

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1 Joint Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0 (2009), iv.
2 Joint Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, iv.
establishes the imperatives of joint leadership in the American armed services by examining the following: 1) the historical antecedents of joint warfare, 2) the legal requirements for jointness in the US defense structure, 3) the environmental context and policy precedents that guide DOD’s approach to jointness, and 4) the characteristics of the joint leader.

The Evolution of Joint Warfare

In his JFQ essay “The Evolution of Joint Warfare,” Williamson Murray offers a historical perspective of joint warfare. According to Murray, the riverways of the west encountered during the American Civil War fostered “the first genuine joint operations.” Ulysses S. Grant used joint land and maritime operations to take Forts Henry and Donelson in the early winter of 1862. These twin victories opened avenues into the heart of the Confederacy, along which naval forces projected army forces. Close cooperation between naval gunboat officers and army commanders also proved its worth at Shiloh in April 1862 and again during the Vicksburg campaign of 1863.

Murray also notes that World War I (WWI) saw only limited joint cooperation. One area of success was the joint integration of air power with ground maneuver at the tactical level. Both Germany and the Allies supported ground units with air forces. Germany even gave specific squadrons the mission of close air support. In the Allied offensive of August 1918, the use of air assets to support tank and infantry maneuver was noticeably effective. According to German General Eric

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4 Murray, Evolution, 32.
5 Murray, Evolution, 32.
Ludendorff, the Allied air attacks caused “increased confusion and great disturbance.”

Murray indicates that the interwar years saw mixed advancement in the development of joint capabilities. In Germany, the Luftwaffe became a separate service and worked closely with the German army to develop and enhance its approach to combined arms warfare that later became known as blitzkrieg. The German navy and the Luftwaffe, however, did not collaborate to develop effective air-maritime capabilities. During the interwar period, the British had the only truly joint command apparatus, the Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Nevertheless, the British armed forces failed to produce joint doctrine and joint capabilities.

Murray asserts that the United States showed a somewhat better record in advancing joint warfare in the interwar years, relative to the other nations that would fight in WWII. While the Department of the Navy led the way in joint doctrine development, the Army Air Corps was disinterested in working with either ground or naval forces. However, both the Navy and the Marine Corps, the Navy’s ground force, had air forces of their own. The tyranny of distance in the Pacific combined with the Department of the Navy’s having integral naval, ground, and air assets provided a unique nexus for the development of joint amphibious warfare doctrine. By the opening salvos of WWII, the Marine Corps had created, with help from the Navy and Army, mature doctrine and procedures for joint amphibious operations. Offsetting these modest steps forward, US advancement of joint cooperation remained limited.

7 Murray, Evolution, 33.
8 Murray, Evolution, 33.
9 Murray, Evolution, 33.
Despite the combined arms success demonstrated by the German *blitzkrieg* at the tactical level at the beginning stages of WWII, Murray indicates that Hitler’s military forces lacked a joint command or staff organization with which to develop effective joint strategy and operational concepts.\(^{10}\) Although Germany successfully invaded Norway in 1940, its victory was largely due to British mistakes and the effective cooperation of German tactical commanders, despite operating under a chain of command split along army, navy, and air force lines.\(^{11}\) Also in 1940, planning for Operation Sealion, the projected invasion of Britain, lacked a common concept of operations and failed to integrate ground, naval, and air forces. Indicative of Hitler’s dearth of strategic acumen and a predilection for selecting his key advisors based on loyalty rather than strategic prowess, the failure of Sealion planning served as an indicator of strategic and operational setbacks that would haunt German military operations throughout the remainder of the WWII.

Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and American entry into WWII, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill established the Combined Chiefs of Staff.\(^{12}\) The Combined Chiefs consisted of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Though lacking congressional sanction and a formal definition by the President, the JCS was comprised of the US counterparts to the British leaders of the army, navy, and air arms. The Combined Chiefs functioned as “the supreme military body for the strategic direction of the Anglo-American war effort.” The formation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff formed a strong foundation for joint strategic planning throughout WWII.

\(^{10}\) Murray, *Evolution*, 34.


The geographic expanses of the Pacific theater in WWII placed significant demands on US capacity to project force. General Douglas MacArthur worked closely with his airman, General George Kenney, and naval component planners to defeat the Japanese in the southwest Pacific. Close coordination among Army, Navy, and Marine planners also enabled Admiral Chester Nimitz’s central Pacific island-hopping campaign.

Joint planning and execution at the strategic and operational levels were critical to US success in the Pacific theater. But the greatest test for joint operations in WWII was the invasion of France in 1944. The coordinated Allied use of air, naval, and ground forces undergirded the massive invasion of France and the subsequent campaign that led to Germany’s unconditional surrender. General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, extolled the efficacy of the D-Day naval and air operations. The naval operations were “carried out almost entirely according to plan” and air operations had both tremendous “moral effects” for the embarked invasion force and physical effects on German “targets along the shores and artillery positions” and “key centers of communication behind the enemy’s lines.” The Allied forces that ultimately defeated the German armed forces in Europe were so effective in their “combination of fire power, mobility, and air power” that Eisenhower called for a purposeful scrutiny of the success so the lessons “might be incorporated into our military doctrine.”

13 Murray, Evolution, 35.
14 Murray, Evolution, 35.
Unfortunately, the US armed forces would not experience the level of joint cooperation enjoyed by Eisenhower in WWII again until Operation Desert Storm in 1991.\textsuperscript{17} The Key West Agreement of 1948 fueled interservice rivalry over roles and missions and contributed to lackluster joint cooperation until the joint reforms of Goldwater-Nichols took effect in the late 1980s.

Jointness was problematic in both Korea and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{18} The Army and Marine Corps cooperated when necessary in Korea, but the character of the conflict’s final two years complicated operations for the soldiers and marines in the midst of the stalemate. Institutional biases toward strategic bombing, originally proffered while vying for status as an independent service and reinforced by the Cold War arms race, led the Air Force to be either unwilling or unable to cooperate with ground and naval forces for a variety of parochial, organizational, and doctrinal reasons during the Korean War.

The American conduct of the Vietnam War reflected near antithesis of joint cooperation across the levels of tactics, operations, and strategy.\textsuperscript{19} The Air Force and Navy fought two separate air campaigns against North Vietnam with minimal cooperation. US forces conducting operations in Vietnam lacked a unified chain of command. The commander of Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MAC-V) ran the ground war in South Vietnam and commanded Seventh Air Force assets assigned to support his campaign in the south. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) owned the naval assets and the air forces stationed outside Vietnam, except for the bombers owned by the commander of Strategic Air Command (SAC). Not surprisingly, this lack of command unity significantly hampered joint planning and execution.

\textsuperscript{17} Murray, \textit{Evolution}, 35.
\textsuperscript{18} Murray, \textit{Evolution}, 36.
\textsuperscript{19} Ian Horwood, \textit{Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War} (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).
Disheartened and in disarray following the Vietnam defeat, the US armed forces attempted to regroup. Due to more pressing threats facing the government, such as social strife, economic challenges, and political turmoil, jointness was not a high priority for the fiscally constrained DOD of the middle and late 1970s.

The debacle at Desert One on April 25, 1980 quickly dashed hopes for American military redemption in the new decade. President Carter had authorized Operation Eagle Claw to rescue American hostages held in the US Embassy in Tehran. The operation ended in disaster at the Desert One landing zone when a Navy helicopter piloted by marines crashed into an Air Force C-130 carrying army special operations forces. Service parochialism, non-integrated planning, and a lack of unity of command delivered an operational result that highlighted the absence of jointness in the US military establishment. Three years later, the operation to liberate US students and prevent a Cuba-friendly regime from taking control in Grenada again demonstrated parochialism among the services and set the stage for Congressional legislation of jointness in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

**Legal Requirements for Jointness**

Two years after the end of WWII, Congress passed the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. The law established the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Military Establishment, the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Air Force and the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Joint Staff, while subordinating the three service departments to the Secretary of Defense. The bill effectively created the national security and interagency framework in place today. Congress has made only minor modifications to the framework in the past six decades. By passing the NSA of 1947, Congress both acknowledged the complexity of managing

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the global role the United States had assumed with the destruction of the Axis powers and affirmed America’s intent to continue asserting its power and influence on the world stage in the years to come.

Congress created the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) position and the National Military Establishment (NME) in the 1947 act, then bolstered SECDEF authority and renamed the NME as the Department of Defense by 1949 amendment. These laws provided the president a single cabinet member with full responsibility and authority for all military activities. Despite their unification under the authority of the SECDEF, the individual services were to remain independent while attempting to integrate “into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.”

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had existed since the early days of WWII as the senior military council under President Roosevelt, the NSA of 1947 formally established the JCS and defined its membership as the service chiefs of the Army, Navy, and newly formed Air Force. Congress added a chairman to the JCS by amendment in 1949, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) became a voting member with the 1958 amendment.

The 1947 act provided the JCS with a staff body called the Joint Staff. Congress periodically amended the personnel ceiling for the Joint Staff and finally abolished the limit in 1991. The 1947 act also gave the JCS responsibility to establish unified commands in “strategic areas” subject to the authority of the President and SECDEF.

The most sweeping modification of the NSA of 1947 came in 1986. The American people had grown increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of the armed forces. The disaster at Desert One, the bombing of a Marine barracks in Beirut, the problems in Grenada, and

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failure in Vietnam loomed darkly over the nation. Acting on the political force created by the failings of the services, Congress embarked on a military reform campaign that ultimately resulted in landmark legislation, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

The first public call for defense reform by a high-level official within DOD was trumpeted by an unlikely source, the sitting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General David Jones. Many current and former defense officials also joined the chorus for change. In November 1983 hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1975, concisely captured the need for DOD reform stating: “Sound structure will permit the release of energies and imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the nation.” 24

After three years of sometimes highly contentious hearings, studies, debates, and negotiations, President Ronald Reagan signed the Goldwater-Nichols Act into law on October 1, 1986. With an eye toward improving the dynamic between joint and service-centered actions in DOD, Congress identified eight purposes for the legislation:

- to reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian authority
- to improve the military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense
- to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands
- to ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with

the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands - to increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning - to provide for the more efficient use of defense resources - to improve joint officer management policies - otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administration\textsuperscript{25}

The Goldwater-Nichols Act signified US recognition of the increasingly complex international security environment, the demands the environment would continue to make on the US armed forces, and the inadequacy of the existing military organization, to provide effectively for the nation’s defense.

The primary effects of Goldwater-Nichols were two-fold. First, the act established jointness as the driving theme for DOD. Since 1986, the joint theme has influenced everything from organization, strategy, planning, and executing operations, to training, equipping, and educating the force. Second, the act specified personnel measures in Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy designed to enhance the quality of personnel serving in joint duty positions on the Joint Staff and on unified command staffs. These two components of Goldwater-Nichols are powerful forces that should compel the Air Force to develop joint leaders.

The 1985 staff report on defense organization to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) pointed out sixteen specific DOD problems that the Goldwater-Nichols Bill should address. One of the problems identified in the report focused directly on the inadequate quality of joint duty military personnel: “DOD has given insufficient attention to the development of military officers capable of performing joint duty assignments. In addition, the substantial disincentives to serving in

such assignments have been permitted to persist.”

The report acknowledged that good people could overcome organizational obstacles, but it argued that improving DOD would require both structural change and the enhancement of leadership and management skills of senior officials.

Congress designed Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Joint Officer Personnel Policy, to improve the quality of joint staffs in three dimensions: 1) inherent skills and talents as professional military officers; 2) education and experience; and 3) sufficiently long tours to become effective and to provide continuity. Title IV procedures addressed the selection, education, assignment, and promotion of joint duty officers. Parochial oversight by the services, characterized by promotion and command selection being contingent on an officer’s support of service interests, had been a problem for officers serving in joint positions. Title IV sought to negate parochial oversight of officers in joint duty by dictating minimum promotion percentages to the services for officers who had served in joint assignments. Title IV also provided incentives for the most capable officers to serve in joint billets by making joint duty a requirement for promotion to flag rank.

**The Context of Strategy and Policy**

Carl von Clausewitz famously asserted that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.” While the nature of war remains unchanged since Clausewitz wrote his seminal work *On War*, today’s interconnected world, characterized by the globalization of political, economic, social, and security interests, continues to demand close coordination and integration of the military and non-military means used to achieve policy ends. As technology continues to diminish the

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time required for communication of people, materiel, and ideas around the globe, the importance of Basil Liddell Hart’s concept of integrating instruments of national power in what he called “grand strategy” grows.²⁸ The current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan offer vivid, tangible examples of the importance of not only integrating diplomatic, economic, information, and military means to accomplish national policy ends, but also navigating the challenges and pitfalls of working with coalition nations. Experience indicates that joint cooperation and integration across the US armed services is neither simple, nor assured. The vexing challenge that now confronts DOD is how to ensure US military forces are prepared to work together not only as a joint military team, but also as an interagency and coalition team.

The context of these widely varied demands on the armed forces is plainly reflected in national strategy and military policy. The 2006 US National Security Strategy (NSS) acknowledges that “the time when two oceans seemed to provide protection from problems in other lands...has long since passed.”²⁹ The NSS directs government agencies and departments to improve interagency coordination at home and abroad, to strengthen capacity to plan and execute across a full range of contingencies, and to build capacity to do comprehensive results-oriented planning.³⁰

The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS), DOD’s contribution to achievement of the NSS, also addresses a strategic context characterized by a wide spectrum of potential threats.³¹ The NDS posits that the United States cannot act alone in meeting future challenges and that to succeed the nation must integrate all aspects of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends, and partners. In the section

³⁰ Bush, NSS, 45, 49.
titled “Integrate and Unify Our Efforts: A New Jointness,” the NDS advocates a “whole-of-government approach” to achieving national objectives. Just as military leaders must integrate with their sister services for joint military operations, the NDS suggests the whole-of-government approach is only possible if every government agency understands the competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals. According to the NDS, effectively combining civil and military capabilities and options characterizes the new jointness.

The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) describes, through an overarching narrative of “full spectrum dominance,” the CJCS plan to achieve near-term military objectives and posture for decisive capability in the future. The 2004 NMS predates the current national security and defense strategies; it was finalized three years after the 11 September 2001 attacks and one year after the invasion of Iraq. The NMS espouses the strategic principle of integration across the instruments of national and international power, the military services, the interagency, and the commercial sector, then relegates joint force coordination and synchronization with international partners and NGOs to a “where appropriate” basis. In order to meet complex security challenges, the NMS calls for the joint force to be flexible and able to combine the strengths of the services, the combatant commands, other government agencies, and multinational partners, while ensuring technical, doctrinal, and cultural barriers do not limit the joint commander’s ability to achieve objectives. According to the NMS, the leaders of the joint force must combine superior technical skill, operational experience, intellectual prowess, and cultural expertise to employ the joint force effectively. While the NMS recognizes leadership

32 Gates, NDS, 1.
as an important element of the joint force, joint leader development is given only a cursory nod in terms of a modified senior officer capstone course and a general push for professional military education at the noncommissioned, junior, and senior officer levels.

One year later, in November 2005, under the hand of General Peter Pace, the ten-page *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* outlined a general vector to the military services.\(^{34}\) Pace drafted the vision in response to legislation in the 2005 Ronald Reagan Defense Authorization Act that directed the SECDEF to develop a plan for joint officer education and development linked to overall DOD goals and missions. The vision offered the Chairman’s view of the new meaning of “joint” and delivered ambitious expectations for “transformative changes” in the development of joint leaders. Pace’s vision was developed on the assumption that future joint operations would be planned and executed in a multi-service, multi-agency, multi-national environment and that joint officers must possess the ability to integrate diverse elements in a complex environment. In this context, Pace defined *joint* as “integrated employment of US and multinational armed forces and interagency capabilities in land, sea, air, and space and in both the human and virtual domains,” a significant departure from the traditional multi-service definition of joint.

General Pace’s objective, within the framework of the *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*, was for all officers in the grade of O-6 to be “skilled joint warfighters who are also strategically minded, critical thinkers.” The CJCS vision focuses building a pool of joint generalists by inculcation of jointness at the rank of colonel and captain. In appropriate recognition of the necessity first to build competent tactical warfighters in their respective domains, Pace acknowledged that effective joint officers develop from effective service officers. To facilitate the

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\(^{34}\) Peter Pace, *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* (2005).
creation of joint colonels and captains, Pace expected the services to make joint leadership competencies integral to their service competencies.

**Joint Leadership Characteristics**

Scholars and practitioners have studied the concept of leadership across a wide spectrum of civilian and military contexts. Regardless of its application, the fundamental nature of leadership centers on people. While its nature may remain fixed, the character of leadership has evolved over time with changes in technology and society. While sharing commonalities with other leadership contexts, leadership in warfighting also takes on a particular status due to legal sanctioning of killing and the potential to give up one’s own life.

Theorists have attempted to capture the nature of combat leadership for centuries. In his mid-19th century work *On War*, Clausewitz described his concept of “military genius” as “a very highly developed mental aptitude” and a “harmonious combination of elements” with the primary components being courage and intellect. In his post-WWI treatise on generalship, JFC Fuller offered three pillars of generalship, “courage, creative intelligence, and physical fitness” as an antidote to the poor leadership responsible for the stalemate in the trenches. In the late 20th century, John Keegan added a new

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perspective to the description of attributes offered by Clausewitz and Fuller by explaining the application of leadership. Keegan described the nature of warrior leadership in his central proposition on command: “the leader of men in warfare can show himself to his followers only through a mask, a mask that he must make for himself, but a mask made in such a form as will mark him to men of his time and place as the leader they want and need.”

Events since the attacks of 11 September 2001 have demonstrated a growing interdependence among various military means, the instruments of national power, international coalitions and partners, and non-governmental organizations. The changing global context shapes the evolution of the character of warfare and military action. In turn, the new character of military action demands joint leaders with leadership capacity commensurate with the environmental demands. The timeless leadership characteristics offered by Clausewitz, Fuller, and Keegan remain relevant to the development of leaders and the application of military leadership in the 21st Century. However, the character of warfare and the contextual challenges faced by today’s military officers demand further adaptation and refinement of the leadership characteristics necessary to meet US national security requirements. What skills, capabilities, competencies, characteristics, and qualities do joint leaders need to meet these security requirements?

In his thesis examining two airmen who held theater command, Howard Belote identified capabilities vital to the success of coalition commanders in WWII and used them to examine the background and performance of General Lauris Norstad and Field-Marshal Albrecht Kesselring. Belote used the following three key areas for his analytical

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framework: *comprehensive professional knowledge, understanding of international political-military realities, and the personal skills to blend multiple services and nationalities into a coherent whole.*

John Edwards’ study of Air Force General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1978 to 1982, highlighted Jones’ *tactical, operational,* and *strategic* leadership competency, along with his astute *political awareness.* This political awareness enabled Jones to navigate the complexities of American civil-military relations and successfully argue for major defense reform in the early 1980s as one of the most powerful proponents of Goldwater-Nichols.

To refine the broad competencies offered in the 2005 CJCS joint officer development vision, Milton Sands focused on the heart of the joint leadership issue. His thesis titled “Leadership Competencies of the Joint Warrior” offers a study of the military services and interagency outlines three competencies critical to the joint leader: *building trust, communicating,* and *thinking critically.*

The demands placed on joint leaders by the NSS, NDS, NMS, and *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development* require the joint leader to be a strategic leader. General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2001 to 2005, and Dr. Albert Pierce attempt to add to the joint leadership dialogue from the perspective of “strategic leadership” in a 2009 *Joint Forces Quarterly* essay. Myers and Pierce proposed that six characteristics of strategic leadership were particularly relevant for the future: *openness, nuance, agility, integration, teamwork,* and *ethics.*

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as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) from 1956-1963. Field-Marshal Albrecht Kesselring served as Commander in Chief of German forces in the Mediterranean from 1941-1945.


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Martin Cook also argued that *moral reasoning* is an important competency for strategic leaders. He asserted that strategic leaders deal almost exclusively in the realm of the ambiguous, uncertain, and unexpected, which demands that leaders have a capacity to approach problems in novel ways. Cook said that leaders must develop increased levels of moral reflection and analysis to be successful at the strategic level.

**Summary**

Joint warfare has seen significant highs and lows since its debut in the Civil War. WWI offered limited examples of joint planning and execution at the tactical level. In WWII, the US campaigns in the Pacific theater and the Allied invasion of France were major joint planning and execution successes at the operational level, while the JCS provided Roosevelt with effective advice, planning, and execution at the strategic level. Despite Eisenhower’s recognition of the need to improve military doctrine based on the lessons of WWII, US conduct in the Korean and Vietnam Wars indicated that the nation’s armed forces had not made appropriate advances in joint doctrine, planning, and execution. Not until Operation Desert Storm in 1991 would the United States again see the same degree of joint cooperation and integration demonstrated in the 1944 invasion of France and campaign to liberate Europe.

The National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 form the foundational legal requirements for jointness within the US defense establishment. Both laws demonstrated a recognition by Congress that the lessons of the past and the anticipated US role in global security affairs demanded a suitable framework within which the US government could fulfill its responsibility to provide for the common defense. To optimize the effectiveness and efficiency of the US defense apparatus, the overriding theme which emerged from these two acts was *jointness*. 
Today’s defense strategy and policy statements reflect demands on military leaders that far exceed the traditional meaning of joint warfare. The current international security environment requires not only a multi-service approach from joint leaders, but also an approach that integrates multi-service, interagency, multi-national, and non-governmental components to address the complex global security challenges faced by the United States.

While the fundamental characteristics of a good leader have not changed, the context in which leaders must operate has changed. In a synthesis of the surveyed policy and academic works, the following characteristics will be used for the remainder of this thesis as the foundational requirements for a successful joint leader: technical expertise, experience, education, intellect, and interpersonal skills. While these characteristics would likely form a worthy foundation in almost any field that required good leadership, the development of these characteristics is necessarily distinct between the contexts of the joint environment and the Air Force.

The proliferation of officers with a natural genius for all things military and strategic would be the optimal solution to the demand for joint leaders. However, reality compels DOD and the services to create a leader development framework with appropriate rigor to meet the complex demands of the future. Current policy and academic works suggest numerous characteristics and competencies necessary for successful joint leadership. The challenge for the Air Force remains how should the service develop joint leaders? Before answering this question, this thesis will first assess Air Force standing vis-à-vis the joint community.
Our Air Force has the following overriding imperatives: to increase our capabilities, to decrease our vulnerabilities, and to enhance our integration with our Joint and Coalition partners.

General Norton Schwartz, CSAF

The combined historical, legal, policy, and leadership perspectives from the previous chapter frame the context of the primary focus of this work, Air Force leadership in the joint community. This chapter narrows the aperture by examining Air Force leadership in the joint community, Air Force officer development policy, and Air Force cultural issues that impact joint leader development.

**Should the Air Force Be Concerned?**

The 2008 *Unified Command Plan* (UCP) delineates the responsibilities of six geographic and four functional COCOMs. Of the 10 COCOMs, Air Force officers currently command four. To the casual observer a 40 percent market share of the COCOM commander positions would appear to be a slightly more than proportional balance of power for a service that maintains only 23 percent of the active duty end strength and 33 percent of the defense budget. However, a broader look at

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2 Sources for CJCS and COCOM commanders include data from COCOM history offices, COCOM websites, and Wikipedia websites for the COCOMs (accessed 21-25 Mar 2010).

3 The overall DOD budget includes funding for the military departments and for defense organizations/functions that do not belong to any of the military departments. For this context, the Air Force share of the defense budget (33 percent) was calculated by comparing the Air Force budget only with the budgets of the other military
current Air Force representation in the joint community and a deeper look at historic trends offer evidence that justifies CSAF and SECAF concerns regarding joint officer development in the Air Force.

Since enactment of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation, Air Force officers have been selected for command of a COCOM on 18 occasions out of 78 opportunities, for a 23 percent selection rate. Adding the CJCS position to those numbers reduces the selection rate to 22 percent. Of the 18 Air Force officers selected for COCOM command, only four were selected to command a geographic COCOM, two for US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), one for EUCOM, and one for SOUTHCOM. For geographic COCOMs, Air Force officers have been selected at a modest eight percent of the opportunities. To date, an Air Force officer has never been selected to lead arguably the most powerful and influential geographic COCOMs since the fall of the Soviet Union, US Central Command (CENTCOM) and US Pacific Command (PACOM). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US counterbalancing of Iran, and numerous actions against terrorist groups in Southwest Asia illustrate the high priority and deep commitment of the United States to influencing the CENTCOM area of responsibility. The growth of China’s regional and global influence, the India-Pakistan nuclear standoff, and the Korean peninsula offer a few compelling examples of the importance of the PACOM region to American national interest. Despite challenges in the geographic COCOM category, Air Force officers have garnered a healthy 48 percent of the functional COCOM commander jobs since 1986.

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Table 1. COCOM Commanders & CJCS by Service Since 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>CJCSC</th>
<th>PACOM</th>
<th>EUCOM</th>
<th>CENTCOM</th>
<th>SOUTHCOM</th>
<th>NORPACOM</th>
<th>AFRCOM</th>
<th>ACOM</th>
<th>JFCOM</th>
<th>TRADOC</th>
<th>STRATCOM</th>
<th>SOCOM</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from COCOM history office data and Wikipedia.

In addition to the COCOM and CJCS positions, the Joint Staff is a high profile and influential venue for service representatives to shape the policy and doctrine that guide US national defense. The Air Force currently holds a formidable 31 percent of the twenty-nine one-star and two-star general officer positions on the Joint Staff. But at the three-star and four-star level, the Air Force currently holds only one of the ten billets on the Joint Staff.4

Air Force personnel leaders acknowledged the lackluster Air Force representation at the senior levels of the joint community in a February 2010 presentation developed by the Headquarters Air Force Personnel Directorate (AF/A1). The briefing highlights a trend of low representation of Air Force officers in “senior joint warfighting positions” at the three-star and four-star level from 2004 through 2007.5 Despite better than expected representation at the one-star and two-star levels in joint warfighting positions, the presentation outlined the beginnings of a deliberate process to remedy the perceived shortfalls by improving the development of Air Force officers.

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5 AF/A1D, “Preparing for Joint Assignments or Developing AF Officers for Operational and Strategic Level of Leadership” (briefing, 1 Feb 2010).
Are Air Force Officers Competitive for COCOM Commander Jobs?

Since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Air Force has achieved significant success on the battlefield in concert with joint and coalition partners, including the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999 Kosovo campaign, the rout of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in late 2001 and early 2002, and the initial Iraq campaign that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. These operational successes by the service have not translated into Air Force officers being selected as COCOM commanders in proportion with the other services.

In Stuart Archer’s 2008 research paper for the Air War College, the views of two former Secretaries of Defense and two former Deputy Secretaries offer some insight into the incongruity between operational success and selection to command a COCOM. According to Secretaries William Cohen and Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretaries John Hamre and Gordon England, whose service under two Presidents from different political parties collectively spanned from 1997 to 2009, the three critical determinants for selection of a COCOM commander are joint experience, broad perspective, and reputation, with the most critical of these being joint experience. Three four-star Air Force generals, who served in prominent joint positions, also concurred with the determinants identified by the former secretaries and deputy secretaries.

Archer’s research highlighted both a perception gap and a capabilities gap with respect to Air Force officers competing for command of a COCOM. According to interview responses from senior civilian defense officials and Air Force generals, Air Force officers were indeed

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7 General Richard Myers, former VCJCS and CJCS, General Joseph Ralston, former EUCOM commander, and General Gene Renuart, former military assistant to the SECDEF and current NORTHCOM commander.
capable warfighters but were not perceived as being capable by the other services. Archer points to insufficient joint experience and to Air Force service parochialism as causal factors for the lack of trust indicated by this perception. In addition to the inter-service perception problem identified in the study, the defense leaders also indicated that Air Force officers lacked diplomatic and interagency skills comparable to the other services. Inadequacy of diplomatic and interagency skills, combined with perceived warfighting weakness by the other services, detracts from all three of the critical COCOM commander selection criteria identified by Archer’s study, resulting in a weak pool of Air Force candidates relative to candidates from the other services.

**Air Force General Officers**

A review of today’s Air Force general officer population provides some evidence helpful in explaining the Air Force challenges in the joint community. The context in which these officers were developed is important in attempting to frame their rationality and worldview. The current cadre of Air Force generals began their careers in the post-Vietnam Cold War era and experienced the transition from a bipolar world to multi-polar world with the collapse of the Soviet Union. These officers witnessed, and participated in, the successful employment of air power in the Gulf War and in the Kosovo campaign. On 11 September 2001, most were lieutenant colonels or colonels with strong records of performance consistent with the demands of their commanders and functional communities. Almost all of them would serve as commanders at the squadron, group, and wing levels, or the equivalent organizational levels for non-flying officers. Some would command at the wing level

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10 General Roger Brady is the only remaining active-duty Air Force general who served in the Vietnam War. Brady, currently serving as commander of US Air Forces in Europe, is slated to retire upon confirmation of his replacement, likely within the next 12 months.
more than once. Ninety-three percent of current two-star and three-star generals had not yet pinned on their first star when al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

Viewing the current general officer population through the lens of joint development reveals several trends. Before the significance of the data can be understood, a brief explanation of methodology is required. Figure 4 shows a compilation of the data. The categories that appear in the chart were selected to attempt to isolate timing and intensity of joint experience as indicated by when and how many joint tours the officer had completed. The Goldwater-Nichols Act stipulates that an officer must complete a joint tour before the officer can be eligible for promotion to flag or general officer rank. In order to meet the stipulations of the law, officers competitive for promotion to flag or general officer rank may complete their minimum joint tour at the rank of colonel or Navy captain. The categories of “Joint tour before O-6,” “2 joint tours before O-7,” “Joint tour as a GO,” and “Joint tour as a GO & 2 joint tours before O-7” provide additional fidelity beyond the binary Goldwater-Nichols requirement.

The analysis of the current Air Force active-duty general officer population excludes non-line officers (chaplains and medics) and JAG officers due to their highly specialized career paths and limited impact on joint matters. The analysis also excludes Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard officers who are currently serving in an active status. For the purposes of this analysis, if an officer began a joint tour in the rank of lieutenant colonel and was promoted to colonel during that tour, the officer was given credit for a “Joint tour before O-6.”
Table 2. Air Force Active Duty General Officer Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force Active-Duty General Officer Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of GOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig Gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The data in Table 2 indicate a significant disparity between the lieutenant generals and the generals. A respectable 31 percent of the four-star generals are in joint positions, which reflects the fact that four of the 10 COCOM commander positions are held by Air Force officers. In contrast, only three of the 33 lieutenant generals are in joint positions. Despite outnumbering the four-star generals 33 to 13, the three-star generals actually hold fewer joint positions than the four-star generals. Overall, the lieutenant generals trail the percentages of both the generals and the major generals in every category measured, except “Joint tour before O-6.” Perhaps indicative of an emphasis on joint experience before flag rank that was developed further as a general officer, the category of “Joint tour as GO & 2 joint tours before O-7” is the most informative. In this category, lieutenant generals are outpaced by a ratio of three-to-one by generals, two-to-one by major generals, and five-to-three by brigadier generals.
Isolated from all other factors, one may interpret the Figure 4 data in several ways. If one accepts that each cohort’s percentage of officers “Currently in a Joint Tour” should remain roughly constant as the cohort transitions to the next higher grade, the current cohorts will produce four-stars with the following number of COCOM commanders: current brigadier generals-five, major generals-four, and lieutenant generals-one. Another approach assumes that the data in Figure 4 indicate that joint experience will produce better joint leaders and will be weighed in promotion selection and hiring for important joint positions. Under that assumption, those officers with less joint experience will be culled by the institution in order to deepen the joint experience pool of its four-star bench. Finally, similar proportions between the two categories of “Currently in a joint tour” and “Joint tour as GO & 2 joint tours before O-7,” the most stringent joint experience category, may indicate that the level of joint experience within a general officer grade cohort is indicative of that cohort’s competitiveness for joint positions, particularly for three-star and four-star joint positions.

The joint character of the current cadre of Air Force general officers is only one component of the complex matter of diagnosing joint development concerns for the service. How an officer gains joint experience and how the officer applies that experience are influenced by two major factors, institutional culture and policy.

**Influence of Policy and Culture**

The SECAF and CSAF have identified a need to assess and improve Air Force officer development as it relates to competitiveness for joint leadership positions. Current and historic Air Force representation in the joint world, along with consensus among senior Department of Defense appointees and prominent Air Force four-star generals, validates the concerns of the service chief and secretary. Analysis of service policy and culture influences will facilitate both understanding and improvement of the Air Force approach to developing joint leaders.
Graham Allison defines organizations as “groups of individual human members assembled in regular ways, and established structures and procedures dividing and specializing labor, to perform a mission or achieve an objective.”

The form and function of organizations offer both capabilities and limitations, depending on the objective of the organization and the context in which the organization operates. Both the policy and the culture of an organization shape its capacity to accomplish its mission. **Policy** is defined as the formal guidance that defines *what* and *why* things are done in an organization. Air Force policy for force development is found in a variety of forms: doctrinal documents, Air Force Instructions (AFIs), and strategic guidance, along with letters, memoranda, and speeches from the SECAF, CSAF, and other senior leaders. Policy may influence the shaping of an organization’s culture. In turn, new policy will likely be shaped by the existing culture of the organization.

In *The Leadership Experience*, Richard Daft defines **culture** as a pattern of shared assumptions about how things are done in an organization. Daft suggests that culture serves two functions in an organization: 1) integrating members so they know how to relate to one another; 2) helping the organization adapt to the external environment. Allison asserts that organizational culture emerges to shape the behavior of individuals within an organization in ways that conform to both formal and informal norms. The culture of an organization is reflected, in part, by its formal norms captured in policy. Policy may used by institutional leaders to reinforce, adjust, or attempt to remove formal or informal norms. For the Air Force, policy is also a significant mechanism

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with which service leaders may shape leadership development within the institution.

**The Developing Aerospace Leaders (DAL) Initiative**

In March 2000, a time when most of today’s brigadier generals were wearing the rank of major or lieutenant colonel, General Michael Ryan, the CSAF, initiated a comprehensive review of the service’s force development practices and procedures. Ryan’s vision for the Developing Aerospace Leaders (DAL) initiative was for senior leaders to reach beyond their traditional functionally-focused career development pyramids and broaden the expertise of “aerospace” leaders.

DAL was the first review of its kind in over twenty years and was largely driven by the post-Cold War environment that placed new demands on the service and its leaders. In the years after the Soviet Union’s collapse and the Gulf War rout, the Air Force had a smaller force than it had before, no peer competitor in the international arena, and a bewildering array of operational requirements. The service attempted to grapple with these new realities and set an appropriate institutional vector. Between 1990 and 2000, it adopted three different vision statements. This decade of turbulence challenged Air Force’s flexibility, sense of identity, and vision.

The service’s functionally focused officer development pattern that predated Desert One, Goldwater-Nichols, and the fall of the Soviet Union was no longer adequate to meet the new demands. The challenges of the 1990s illuminated the need for Air Force leaders with broader skills than the Air Force had deliberately developed in the past. In a 2001 *Aerospace Power Journal* essay, General Ryan characterized the force development challenge facing the Air Force: “Although our traditional

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17 Ryan, “A Word From the Chief.”
“functionally managed” career system was responsible for producing the world’s best Air Force, we had become an Air Force comprised of highly specialized competencies with too few airmen possessing cross-functional training or experience. This contrasted with our experience over the last 10 years, in which modern aerospace operations increasingly required effective, cross-functional coordination and smooth, horizontal integration within a larger mission context.”

Ryan argued that the context facing the Air Force required major changes across the institution, with major implications for Air Force culture and policy. Unfreezing the old paradigm and creating a new paradigm, according to Ryan, would “require a change in the Air Force mindset and to some, their Air Force identity.” Two important policy mechanisms for effecting these cultural and process changes grew out of the DAL initiative: 1) service leadership doctrine was captured for the first time in Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 18 February 2004; and 2) the Air Force Development Team (DT) process was established by Air Force Policy Directive 36-26, *Total Force Development*, 1 January 2004 and Air Force Instruction 36-2640, *Executing Total Force Development*, 23 January 2004.

**Leadership and Force Development Doctrine**

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 18 February 2006, first published in February 2004, serves as the foundational policy for Air Force officer development. In the document’s Foreword, Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper stated that AFDD 1-1 “establishes the principles and tenets that are experience-based and rooted in all levels of the Air Force.” As the Air Force statement of leadership and force development principles, the policy articulated in AFDD 1-1 offers pertinent perspective on Air Force

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19 Ryan, “A Word From the Chief.”
institutional priorities in relation to the degree of emphasis placed on joint leadership development.

In the AFDD 1-1 section on Air Force core values, the value of “Excellence in All We Do” is explained, in part, through the concept of “Organizational Excellence.” AFDD 1-1 states, “Organizational excellence is achieved when its members work together to successfully reach a common goal in an atmosphere that preserves individual self-worth. No Airman wins the fight alone—even the single-seat fighter pilot relies upon scores of maintenance and support personnel to accomplish every sortie. Leaders foster a culture that emphasizes a team mentality while maintaining high standards and accomplishing the mission.”

AFDD 1-1 defines the term force development and places a heavy emphasis on development at the operational level of war. The document defines force development as “a series of experiences and challenges, combined with education and training opportunities that are directed at producing Airmen who possess the requisite skills, knowledge, experience, and motivation to lead and execute the full spectrum of Air Force missions” and organizes force development using the three levels of warfare--tactical, operational, and strategic. AFDD 1-1 emphasizes the operational level of war stating: “The focus of Air Force organization and employment is at the operational level. It is here where

21 AFDD 1-1, 7.
22 AFDD 1-1, 14, 17.
warfighting is executed and the day-to-day command and control of Air Force operations are carried out.” This statement suggests the Air Force priorities for organizing, training, and equipping the service for its warfighting mission. The emphasis on the operational level of warfare is not reflected in Air Force assignments and promotions and the path to flag rank does not pass through the Air Force’s operational warfighting units, the Numbered Air Forces (NAF). In fact, only two of 33 Air Force three-star generals, ten of whom are currently serving in operational-level command positions, held a NAF position prior to becoming a general officer.23

Although AFDD 1-1 sparingly mentions interagency cooperation, it does not neglect joint issues. The document establishes the importance of joint and multinational operations in its description of “Operational Excellence.” AFDD 1-1 states, “The Air Force leader understands that all efforts in developing and employing air and space forces are directed at providing unmatched air and space power to secure the national interests of the United States. Airmen should prepare for joint and multinational operations by learning the doctrine, capabilities, and procedures of other US Services and allied forces.”24

The Air Force identifies three leadership competencies: personal, people/team, and institutional. AFDD 1-1 asserts that the institutional competency exists at each leadership level, but predominately at the strategic level, and includes technical competence in unified, joint, multinational, and interagency operations. See Appendix B, “AFDD 1-1 Relationship of Leadership Levels and Enduring Leadership Competencies.”

24 AFDD 1-1, 8.
The AFDD 1-1 section dedicated to strategic level education emphasizes both Air Force culture and an understanding of joint and coalition capabilities. The guiding principles for strategic education of senior leaders highlights the following goals related to the joint community: 1) “It focuses on the institutional Air Force and joint, interagency, business, and international views.” 2) “Education and training should hone their ability to express Air Force views within joint, interagency, and international forums.” 3) “A successful program will enable them to align their organization to serve the personnel, the Air Force, and the nation, and shape the way air and space forces are employed.” The AFDD 1-1 emphasis on expression of “Air Force views” suggests that there may well be some validity to Archer’s reservations about the service’s officers being wedded to the “Air Force solution.”

The character of AFDD 1-1 is, by design, decidedly focused on the development of institutional leaders. Despite ample discussion of joint issues within the document, the language used to describe the context of Air Force interaction within the joint world does not go as far as it should to encourage joint cooperation and suggests an Air Force-centric approach to war. In sum, AFDD 1-1 does not discourage the air single-mindedness that too often handicaps Air Force leaders in the joint community.

Development Teams

In January 2004, the Air Force published force development policy that established Development Teams (DTs) for each major functional area.25 Issued within weeks of AFDD 1-1, Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 36-26 Total Force Development and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2640 Executing Total Force Development instituted the DT process and assigned the DTs primary responsibility for managing force development within their functional families. Each DT consisted of functional

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community representatives, including: a senior member of the functional community serving as chairperson; the Air Staff career field manager (CFM); an assignment team member from the Air Force Personnel Center; and representatives from each Air Force major command that employed members of the functional community. The intent in establishing the DTs was to integrate the service-wide force development requirements, as articulated in AFDD 1-1 and by service leadership, with the requirements of each Air Force functional community. (See Appendix A “Air Force Officer Development Team Responsibilities.”)

### Table 3. Air Force Officer Development Teams (DTs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force Officer Development Teams (DTs)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAF (Combat Air Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weather</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contracting</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAF (Mobility Air Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications &amp; Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF (Special Operations Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Munitions / Missile Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of Special Investigations</td>
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<td>Control and Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics Readiness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Affairs Strategist and Pol-Mil Affairs Strategist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airfield Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scientist</td>
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<td>Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Space and Missile Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developmental Engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integrated Warfighting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remote - Pilot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acquisition Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from information found at the Air Force Force Development website for DT Minutes at https://www.my.af.mil/qcss-af/USAF/ep/contentView.do?contentType=EDITORIAL&contentId=cF575FC8E213502B6012136A5BFB0049B&channelPageld=s6925EC134EE60FB5E044080020E329A9&programId=tF575FC8E213502B601213653BEFB0416 (accessed March 2010)*

By 2007, anecdotal evidence gathered by AF/A1 indicated that the DTs were not adhering to the intent of the force development policy.

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26 AFI 36-2640 directs that DTs are almost exclusively composed of functional community leaders. AFI 36-2640 policy also allows that DTs may include “subject matter experts” in their membership as needed.
issued in 2004. AF/A1 conducted a study in 2007 to assess development policy. The purpose of the study was to determine what policy changes were needed to ensure DTs met Air Force institutional goals, rather than focusing narrowly on functional community requirements. The study found that the majority of DT chairpersons believed that existing policy was sufficient and recommended only minor changes or none at all. Despite the responses from the DT chairpersons, the study’s recommendations included two significant policy changes. The first was to update AFI 36-2640, 16 December 2008, with the newest CSAF force development guidance. The second was to provide annual service-level guidance to the DTs from AF/A1. Finally, in recognition of the need for balance between narrowly functional and broader institutional priorities, the study closed by cautioning against policy changes that would dictate a “one-size-fits-all” approach to force development in every functional community. The Air Force continued to monitor its DTs over the next three years, published updated versions of both AFPD 36-26 and AFI 36-2640 in 2008, and commissioned follow-up DT study in December 2009.

While DTs may prove in the future to be the ideal mechanism for applying institutional priorities to the functional communities, the DT resistance to a “one-size-fits-all” approach may be indicative of opposition by the functional communities to the imposition of Air Force institutional priorities. Furthermore, the membership makeup of the DTs, consisting predominately of functional community leaders, may also contribute to DT prioritization of functional needs over service interests.

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28 The results of the DT study commissioned by AF/A1 in December 2009 have not been published.
Institutional Competencies

In April 2009, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lieutenant General Richard Newton, announced the establishment of a competency-based approach to developing what he referred to as Air Force human capital.\(^{29}\) The framework established a lexicon, defining both functional competencies and institutional competencies. It also included a list and description of the newly established Air Force institutional competencies, organized in three categories: personal, people/team, and organizational. Table 4 (below) shows the Air Force institutional competencies.

Table 4. Air Force Institutional Competencies

![Diagram of Institutional Competencies]


The institutional competencies are intended to be durable, cover all occupations, apply to every level of organization, and establish the guidelines for the force development process. As a complement to and enhancement of AFDD 1-1, the descriptions of the new institutional competencies provide a more inclusive approach to leadership and national defense. (See Appendix B “Description of Air Force Institutional Competencies” for detailed description of each competency.)

The competency-based approach offers significant promise for management and development of Air Force leaders. With respect to joint leadership development, Newton’s policy combines institutional competencies and functional competencies in a framework that covers the five characteristics critical for joint leaders: technical expertise, experience, education, intellect, and interpersonal skills.

**Individual Interface with Functional and Institutional Requirements**

The number of Air Force DTs gives some indication of the difficulty the service faces in developing officers who are capable and credible within their occupations, within their service, and within the joint community. Standing in the midst of the complex global context, under the umbrella of institutional versus functional friction, is the individual Air Force officer. In navigating their individual development paths, officers formally interface with the bureaucratic process by interacting with supervisors and by completing Internet forms used by their respective DT and AFPC assignment teams to develop them and determine future assignments. To facilitate the interaction between officers and their supervisors for the purpose of officer development, the Air Force established formal feedback and mentoring programs.³⁰

Despite the existence of formal mentoring policy dating back to 1996, anecdotal evidence indicated to AF/A1 officials that individual

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supervisors had executed the mentoring program insufficiently.\textsuperscript{31} In an effort to improve mentoring across the service, the AF/A1 deputy director for force development sent a memorandum to the personnel directors of all Air Force major commands. Although the memorandum encouraged compliance with existing policy, the memorandum appears to have had minimal effect because it was communicated through personnel channels, rather than command channels and was signed by a colonel rather than the CSAF, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force (VCSAF), or the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

One of the newest Air Force initiatives, MyXODP is designed to link the institutional, functional, and individual components of force development and make them accessible to every officer.\textsuperscript{32} MyXODP also offers a mentoring function that enables mentors selected by the officer to see the officer’s records, career goals, and development options. In a single online application, officers can see development expectations of the service and their functional community requirements, they can chart a development path with the help of mentors, and they can submit their assignment requests. MyXODP offers convenience for mentors and a central mechanism for AFPC assignment teams and the DTs to communicate with individual officers. MyXODP offers a means to improve to the challenges of multi-level collaboration and communication, synchronization of institutional and functional messages, and tailoring based on individual needs.

**A Search for Identity?**

Despite battlefield successes and unrivaled capability throughout its history, there are several indications suggesting that the US Air Force lacks a shared cultural identity. In 1994, Carl Builder argued that the


\textsuperscript{32} Author’s MyXODP.
Air Force lacked a central organizational purpose and held Air Force senior leaders responsible for this failure. To Builder, one could hardly blame officers for committing, in the absence of a unifying mission focus, to the advancement of their own careers and specialties. In his 2000 initiation of Developing Aerospace Leaders, General Ryan stated that Air Force leaders were too functionally oriented, asserting that occupationally-focused development was no longer sufficient for the institution. Thomas Ehrhard argued in his 2000 dissertation, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed Services: A Comparative Study of Weapon System Innovation,” that the Air Force is a “monarchical” culture, drawing powerful service chiefs from a dominant subgroup. Ehrhard further argued that the Air Force was largely defined by its technology, and he identified divisions between subgroups along these lines: pilot and non-pilot and different communities of pilots, such as fighter pilots and bomber pilots.

The list of Air Force functional DTs in Figure 3 offers another lens through which to view the subculture lines within the service. For example, the names “CAF” and “MAF,” Combat Air Forces and Mobility Air Forces, indicate a major dividing line. The long legacy of CAF generals in the CSAF position, bomber pilots from 1947-1982 and fighter pilots from 1982-2008, was broken for the first time in 2008 with the selection of General Schwartz, a special operations and mobility pilot.

In 2005, the service formally added cyberspace to its mission statement, “To fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace.” The statement indicates that while the variety of tasks that the Air Force, or

34 Ryan, “A Word From the Chief.”
perhaps “Air Forces,” can perform provides valuable flexibility to national defense, the challenge of rallying the service around a common institutional purpose has grown more difficult.

The task of unifying the diverse, and often divergent, subcultures of the Air Force institution falls on the shoulders of the CSAF. Aided by his fellow general officers and the headquarters staff, the CSAF sets the tone for Air Force conduct. Besides formal written policy issued by the staff, CSAF speeches and letters establish policy and mold a culture by communicating vision, priorities, and expectations to the entire service. The speeches also inform outside observers such as the Secretary of Defense, other services and agencies, allies, and taxpayers. When combined with actions consistent with the message, CSAF and senior leader speeches can build credibility for the service. Despite the CSAF’s best efforts, each Air Force tribe exerts extensive influence on assignments, promotions, and the day-to-day quality of life of its officers. Unless the CSAF’s message resonates with the tribal audience, is reinforced with policy, and backed by the actions of subordinate commanders, subcultures can easily subvert the message with their own priorities. This means the CSAF almost always faces significant challenges in the battle to inculcate a common culture.

While one may infer that a strong institutional identity could make jointness a difficult concept to embrace within a particular service, the opposite effect may be true for the Air Force. First, a weak institutional identity, overridden by functional identities within the service, may contribute to two significant cultural effects on the Air Force officer corps: a feeling of insecurity relative to the other services and a lack of integrative thinking. When the Air Force manifests a need to justify its existence as an independent service, these efforts draw on the intellectual and moral capital of senior leaders that could be better spent elsewhere. Justification efforts also contribute to outside perceptions of Air Force exceptionalism or desperation, while drawing the attention of
senior leaders away from improving actual combat capability. This in turn leads to a credibility mismatch between service rhetoric and reality. While numerous environmental factors contribute to service insecurity with respect to independence, such as negative perceptions by legislative and executive branch leaders or the ground-centric character of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, a strong institutional identity can provide a cultural safe port in which the Air Force could maintain its standing while weathering passing storms. Second, a lack of integrative thinking across both the service functional communities and across the service domains of air, space, and cyberspace indicates that Air Force officer development does not foster the ability to think in an integrative way across the joint community. If service cultural factors allow primacy in officer development to reside in functional communities, how can Air Force officers be expected to think in terms of the service-wide enterprise or in terms of a joint perspective?

Summary

Since 1986, the Air Force has held 23 percent of the COCOM commander positions, which exactly matches the service’s current share of active duty end strength at 23 percent. Air Force officers currently occupy 40 percent of the COCOM commander positions. However, despite a 48 percent selection rate for functional COCOM commander positions, the Air Force has filled only 8 percent of the geographic COCOM commands since 1986. Air Force personnel officials also found that selection rates of both three-star and four-star officers for important joint warfighting positions has not met service expectations. Is this a problem? In the eyes of the Air Force, indeed it is. It may also be a problem for national defense because of objective requirements for USAF officers in geographic COCOM commander positions. PACOM, a province of the US Navy since its inception, comes readily to mind.

Senior defense officials and Air Force generals have indicated that although Air Force officers have the requisite warfighting skills, they have
a poor reputation with the other services and are perceived as being overly service centric, too often offering “Air Force answers” rather than joint solutions. This negative perception may be an outcome of behaviors that resulted from the service’s functionally focused approach to developing leaders.

After 20 years without a comprehensive review of force development practices and policy, General Ryan recognized in 2000 that Air Force leaders were unprepared for the demands of the post-Cold War era, which would be characterized by increasingly diverse missions requiring broader leadership skills. Ryan’s DAL initiative started the gradual process of changing the service’s force development processes from being functionally focused to being institutionally based. New leadership and force development doctrine, policy, and processes developed since 2004 have made progress in shifting the force development culture. However, cultural changes of this magnitude take time, and gaps still exist.

Operational prowess, produced by the functionally focused development approach of the past, has proven insufficient to buoy Air Force influence in the joint community as the character of conflict has evolved. The weakness of Air Force leaders is not operational skill. The weakness of today’s Air Force leaders lies in their lack of capacity and willingness to appreciate, understand, and apply sister-service, interagency, and coalition contributions to the mission demands of today’s environment.

The Air Force institutional culture, largely characterized by a set of loosely organized functional subcultures, lacks a focus and vision sufficient to unify the service across the functional boundaries. Changes in context, technology, resources, and mission sets have complicated efforts to modify the entrenched subcultures and unify the service. The dialogue about the Air Force’s identity crisis extends beyond service boundaries into the defense department, inter-agency, and public
domains. With the Air Force’s functionally focused officer development, lack of unified institutional identity, and an ongoing existential crisis narrative, today’s Air Force general officers are less likely to possess a whole-of-service approach to leadership, let alone a joint service approach to national defense.

The Air Force preference for sustaining depth of service warfighting skills over breadth of skills, experience, and a mindset of warrior leaders is caused, in part, by two components of service culture, functionally focused officer development and an institutional insecurity in the Air Force’s status as an independent service. The service culture has historically allowed its functional communities to develop leaders, each using its own formula. The Air Force routinely feels compelled to justify its existence as an independent service, despite the powerful allure of airpower gratification without commitment for politicians, the service’s inextricable ties to the politically powerful defense industry, and the fundamental need for a cadre of professional airmen to integrate within the national defense apparatus. Archer’s discussion of Air Force officers who are overly air centric and the language in Air Force leadership doctrine also indicate an overly self-centered approach to national defense.

Can the Air Force overcome parochial interests among its own functional communities to facilitate a shared institutional perspective? If so, can the Air Force improve its leadership development to incorporate a more integrated and less parochial approach to national defense without sacrificing principles required for the development of air, space, and cyberspace leaders for the Air Force? Ultimately, the question becomes, can the Air Force improve development of joint leaders without sacrificing combat capability?
Chapter 3

Analysis

All human institutions must inevitably deal with the tension between continuity and change, between preserving that which has met the needs of the past and adapting to the challenge of change in a confusing present and uncertain future.

Harold R. Winton

The evidence presented thus far indicates that the current cadre of Air Force general officers lacks sufficient skill and experience to compete effectively for senior positions in the joint community. This deficiency threatens the service’s influence in the joint community, weakens joint warfighting capability, and undermines national defense. Air Force officers are products of their service institution. The institutional culture profoundly shapes the officer development process and is ingrained in the final product. The evidence in the previous chapter suggests that two particular components of the Air Force culture, its functional focus and its emphasis on technical expertise, have contributed significantly to this situation. The service’s functional focus and emphasis on technical expertise have shaped a culture that has stifled the development of a service-wide perspective and discouraged officers from seeking breadth of experience, hampering the development of integrative thinking.

This chapter offers proposals that will be useful in enhancing the Air Force officer development product. The proposals are divided into two overall categories, modest policy changes and deep cultural changes. The modest policy changes include the following: 1) require only one command tour for colonels; 2) direct DTs to meet institutional requirements; 3) task assignment teams to meet institutional requirements; and 4) emphasize joint experience at promotion boards.
The deep cultural changes include: 1) strengthen institutional identity; 2) enhance service vision and mission statements; 3) improve leadership doctrine; and 4) bifurcate technical and leadership tracks. These proposals, perhaps radical in the eyes of some, are intended to position the Air Force to be a full player in the joint community and particularly to earn an increased percentage of joint leadership positions at the three-star and four-star levels.

**Require Only One Command Tour for Colonels**

The Air Force values command experience, expects officers to seek command positions, and rewards those who successfully lead airmen in command tours. Beginning with squadron command at the rank of lieutenant colonel, most Air Force senior leaders served in three command tours before reaching the rank of brigadier general. With command tours of two years and the service’s practice of promoting “fast-track” officers up to four years earlier than their peers from their commissioning year group, the Air Force has chosen to limit the opportunity for the “fast track” officers to serve outside their operational career fields. Under existing norms, the path to command positions in the Air Force requires deep service-oriented technical credibility. Additionally, the Air Force career path to the grade of O-7 now requires completion of multiple command tours, with officers often commanding twice as a colonel.¹

The service should discontinue the informal norm that requires talented colonels to command at both group and wing levels. This practice significantly inhibits potential general officers from serving more than the obligatory 22-month joint tour before promotion to flag rank.

¹ Some of the Air Force’s “fast track” officers even command at the wing level up to three times as an O-6 and O-7. For example, four of the 33 Air Force three-stars (12 percent) commanded three wings. Having met the service norm of commanding at the group level before commanding at the wing level, each of these four officers completed a total of four command tours in the grades of O-6 and O-7. Source: Air Force General Officer Biographies, [http://www.af.mil/information/bios/index.asp](http://www.af.mil/information/bios/index.asp) (accessed 21 - 25 Mar 2010).
Eliminating this norm would provide the opportunity for officers to gain two additional years of experience outside of their functional community. It would also emulate the other services, which require only one command tour at the grade of O-6. Furthermore, successful wing-level command does not require skills or experience gained through group-level command. Command at the squadron and either group or wing levels should be the criteria for promotion to O-7. In addition to emphasizing joint experience, the SECAF should direct general officer promotion boards to expect only one command tour for colonels.

**Direct Development Teams to Meet Institutional Requirements**

The tension between depth and breadth and between functional and institutional priorities is reflected most vividly in the Air Force officer assignment, promotion, and command selection processes. Assignment teams at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) decide, with inputs from each officer, the officer’s commander, and the development team, whether an officer will stay in operations or be assigned to a staff and to which staff they will be assigned. Promotion board members make value judgments on officer records based, in part, on the depth and breadth of experience attained by the officer in order to discern whether the officer has the potential to serve in the next higher grade. Development teams (DT) make similar value judgments in providing officers with assignment vectors. Based on formal policy and unwritten norms, commanders, promotion board members, DT members, and assignment officers apply the values of the service culture to their respective officer development decisions.

Air Force DTs require more definite guidance from service leadership to improve DT work toward meeting institutional requirements, rather than narrow functional needs. The CSAF should direct DTs to emphasize development of joint experience in their respective disciplines. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (AF/A1) should establish a requirement for the percentage of joint
vectors the DTs will assign. Membership of the DTs should also be modified to add an officer to represent the service’s interests. The representative should be from AF/A1, have a rank no lower than O-6, and must not be a member of the functional community over which the DT presides.

**Task Assignment Teams to Meet Institutional Requirements**

Assignment teams from AFPC apply the institutional and functional priorities to the actual assignment process. The teams, organized by functional area, balance the requirements of commanders in the field with the requirements for officers to fill Air Force and joint billets. The teams also weigh the personal preferences of the officers and the DT vectors for each officer. The AF/A1 should direct the assignment teams, through the AFPC commander and in coordination with the respective DTs, to assign a designated number of officers to joint positions each year, to ensure compliance with institutional requirements for development of joint experience. These measures would mitigate any potential assignment team bias toward functional requirements over institutional requirements that could occur due to an assignment team’s support to DTs, commanders in the field, and service-level functional leaders. The AF/A1 should require an annual report on joint assignment metrics, organized by functional area, from the AFPC commander to verify compliance.

**Emphasize Joint Experience at Promotion Boards**

Air Force promotion boards act as a powerful force in reflecting priorities, reinforcing norms, and establishing norms through their selection of officers for promotion to higher grades. Building a cadre of

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2 In this context, the term *vector* is defined as “the DT's collective recommendation for an experience level (e.g., Joint Staff, Air Staff, MAJCOM, base-level, etc.), training or education opportunity (e.g., resident DE, advanced functional training), or position type (e.g., flight commander, division chief, instructor, special duty, etc.) a member should be considered for in his or her next or subsequent assignments.” Source: AFI 36-2640, *Executing Total Force Development*, 16 Dec 2008, page 14.

3 See previous note for definition of the term “vector.”
officers with greater capacity for joint leadership requires service promotions that reward officers who possess greater breadth of experience.

At each promotion board, the SECAF provides service-level guidance directly to board members. Title 10, United States Code gives service secretaries significant latitude to furnish each selection board with “guidelines relating to the needs of the armed force concerned for officers having particular skills” and guidelines to ensure the board gives “appropriate consideration to the performance in joint duty assignments.”

The SECAF guidance should emphasize joint experience in the scoring of officer records by directing the boards to promote joint qualified officers (JQOs) at a rate not less than the highest major command (MAJCOM) promotion rate at each board. The resulting promotions of Air Force leaders with joint experience would foster the formation of a new institutional norm for the development path officers should follow in order to reach flag rank.

**Strengthen Institutional Identity**

Air Force institutional identity is weak compared to functional identities within the service. When asked about their occupation at a cocktail party, most airmen respond with their functional specialty rather than “I’m an Airman” or “I’m an Air Force officer,” due to the relative strength of functional community identity versus service identity. Under the existing construct, by the time an officer becomes a general, he is steeped in technical expertise but may lack the experience and breadth of vision to consider service-wide issues. If the officer lacks the capacity to consider the service enterprise, he will certainly be unable to integrate

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5 This promotion metric was suggested by thesis reader, Stephen E. Wright, PhD, Col, USAF (retired), in feedback to author on 14 May 2010.
across services, agencies, or partner nations in a joint leadership position.

Peter Senge, author of *The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization* and founder of the Center for Organizational Learning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), argues that when people focus only on their position, they have little sense of responsibility for the results produced when all positions interact.\(^6\) The logic of Senge’s individual-level assertion applies to the current Air Force situation and further suggests that a functional community that focuses only on its particular type of operations will fail to understand and cooperate effectively with external entities. In contrast, the nature of teamwork, the existing character of warfare, and national defense strategy and policy demand an interdependent mindset within the Air Force and across the services, agencies, and our partner nations. Counter-intuitively, building a stronger Air Force institutional identity will be an important first step toward the establishment of an enterprise-wide perspective as a norm among service leaders.

The task of strengthening institutional identity is easier said than done, particularly for a force that consists of a confederation of functional guilds, each with its own identity and little incentive to adopt a broader identity. According to Allison and Zelikow, an organization’s identity is its conception of self, organized into rules for matching actions to situations, with the rules both defining and emerging from a distinctive organizational culture.\(^7\) In their book *Organizational Development*, Wendell French and Cecil Bell assert that establishing a supra-ordinate goal is an effective means of uniting teams and that a

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shared vision, mission, and action plan help to establish a shared purpose.8

**Enhance the Air Force Vision and Mission Statements**

The Air Force vision and mission statements should embody the common goal within the institutional culture. They are the banners under which the entire service should be ready and willing to rally beneath. Although changing the Air Force mission and vision statements will not be the sole source of a stronger institutional identity, changes to the mission and vision may foster greater service unity as part of a larger campaign.

An effective vision statement connects the people within an organization by providing a common aspiration and provides a focus for the energy of an organization.9 In addition to the internal effects on an organization, a vision statement also sends meaningful message to stakeholders outside the organization. The existing vision statement “Global Vigilance, Reach and Power” lacks a future orientation and reads more like a mission statement. The Air Force has been executing global mobility, strike, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions for decades. As a result, the existing vision essentially says “keep doing the same thing we’ve been doing.”

In contrast to the relatively effective vision statement language, the existing mission statement “Fly, Fight, and Win in Air, Space, and Cyberspace” may detract from a unified service identity. Airmen do not fly in the cyberspace domain, just as “surf, fight, and win...” would not fit the domains of air and space. Use of the verb “fly” as a co-equal with “fight” and “win” also suggests that the act of flying itself is just as important as winning battles in each of the three domains. The other services do not say “sail, fight, and win” or “drive, fight, and win.”

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Excessive functional focus has taken its toll on the Air Force and the existing mission statement may be aggravating this problem.

During the deliberation of new vision and mission statements, Air Force senior leaders should incorporate the following three concepts: interdependence of service operations in and through air, space, and cyberspace; the service role of organizing, training, and equipping forces to support COCOM commander requirements; and service integration with joint, interagency, international, and non-governmental partners. First, emphasizing the interdependence of air, space, and cyberspace, perhaps in a global commons context, would capture the cross-domain essence of the means provided by the Air Force to the national defense apparatus, providing the Air Force with an intellectual touchstone through which the service could begin to develop a stronger institutional identity. Second, stating the Air Force role of organizing, training, and equipping forces to support COCOM commanders reinforces the legally defined end for which the Air Force exists and the joint context in which the capabilities developed by the service would be brought to bear. Third, articulating the joint, interagency, international, and non-governmental character of partnerships required of the Air Force in the modern environment would make explicit the integrative ways through which the Air Force would provide value to the COCOM commanders and the nation. Although the overarching theme of these concepts, integration across both the service and the national defense enterprise,

10 Title 10 United States Code (USC) states that, among other duties prescribed by law or by the President or SECDEF, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for both “carrying out the functions of the Department of the Air Force so as to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands” and “effective cooperation and coordination between the Department of the Air Force and the other military departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication.” Source: Title 10 USC, Section 8013, “Secretary of the Air Force,” 5 Jan 2009, Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00008013----000-.html (accessed 4 May 2010).
would likely be helpful in improving service unity and cooperation with partners, incorporating these concepts into the service’s mission and vision statements would also send a useful message to external audiences regarding Air Force priorities. While these concepts may evoke strong reactions among various camps, both internal and external to the service, their greatest utility should be in informing the dialogue of senior leaders determining the appropriate way forward for the Air Force. A new mission statement using these considerations may look like something like this: “In defense of our nation, we command in air, space, and cyberspace for combatant commanders and the joint team.” And a new vision may read like: “Phenomenal Airmen, enabled by cutting-edge technology, providing the world’s most powerful air, space, and cyberspace force to combatant commanders for our nation’s defense.”

**Improve Air Force Leadership Doctrine**

While the occupational skills and experience that officers gain in their functional communities provide the foundation of technical warfighting competence, inculcation of integrative thinking at an early stage of an officer’s career would help prepare Air Force officers for the complex strategic environment they will encounter as senior leaders. As the institutional centerpiece of Air Force leader development, AFDD 1-1 offers an ideal venue for shaping a unified institutional culture in which leaders value critical, integrative thinking.

Although AFDD 1-1 should be a uniquely Air Force expression of leadership doctrine, an overhaul of AFDD 1-1 should first include the addition of a concise summary of joint doctrine and DOD policy regarding leadership development. This summary, essentially providing a doctrinal equivalent of a strategy-to-task linkage, would intellectually frame the service approach by acknowledging that the Air Force exists as part of a wider defense community.

The AFDD 1-1 “Introduction” is doctrinally and legally inaccurate in its assertion that the Air Force routinely conducts operations
“independently.” The passage reads, “[AFDD 1-1] ensures leaders at every echelon throughout the Air Force have a baseline for preparing themselves and their forces to conduct operations. This is essential for the success of the highly flexible and rapidly responsive operations in which the Air Force routinely engages either independently or as a component of a joint/multinational task force.”11 American military services do not conduct operations independently. Under the US system, COCOM commanders conduct military operations, using forces organized, trained, equipped, and provided by service secretaries, under the provisions of Title 10 United States Code (USC), 5 January 2009 and in accordance with Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, 10 July 2001. While this distinction may seem like intellectual hair-splitting, the introductory stanza of AFDD 1-1 shapes the spirit and intent of what General Jumper, CSAF from 2001-2005, called “the Air Force statement of leadership principles and force development.” An AFDD 1-1 leadership narrative underpinned by the incorrect notion of independent Air Force operations both undermines jointness and fosters a mentality among Air Force officers which is incongruent with the reality of American military operations. The “Introduction” should be modified both to eliminate the inaccurate, unhelpful independent operations passage and to incorporate language promoting the Air Force’s role in preparing forces to execute operations and the airman’s role in leading the execution of operations under the command of COCOM commanders.

The Air Force should also update AFDD 1-1 to remove language reflecting a service-centric approach to national defense, adding language that reinforces the integration necessary to conduct successful operations within the global security context. Existing language in AFDD 1-1 such as, “education and training should hone [senior leader] ability to express Air Force views within joint, interagency, and international

for[ums]” should be changed to reflect an enterprise-wide perspective. With this in mind, the above passage is better written with the following tone: “education and training should hone [senior leader] ability to integrate with joint, interagency, and international partners to develop and execute strategic and operational plans that meet national policy objectives.”

Finally, a new version of AFDD 1-1 should add appendices with leadership vignettes and case studies that tell the stories of airmen operating with joint, interagency, international, and non-governmental partners. These appendices should also include examples of leadership across the domains of air, space, and cyberspace. While service doctrine aids in shaping the intellectual and cultural framework of Air Force leadership development, the experiential component of Air Force leadership development is heavily influenced by a dependence on technical proficiency in the officer corps.

**Bifurcate Technical and Leadership Tracks**

Another major balancing act presents itself within the context of joint leader development, technical depth versus breadth of experience. The technical skills required to operate effectively as a tactical warfighter take considerable time to build and significant time to maintain. The average time from an officer’s commissioning to the point the officer is qualified as an instructor in his or her weapons system may three to six years, depending on the officer’s specialty and weapons system. When officers become qualified instructors, most take their place in the continuous cycle of training new operators, preparing to deploy, and deploying for contingency operations.

The Air Force is obliged to maintain a first-rate warfighting capability, which requires a force with the proficiency to operate the service’s high-technology weapons in combat. Under the Air Force’s existing promotion system, the service convenes promotion boards in which all line officers, who have met the required time-in-grade
minimums, are considered for promotion to the next higher grade. This central board process is used for line officer promotions, across all functional communities, beginning at the grade of O-4. The centralized and cross-functional nature of Air Force promotion boards suggests that institutional priorities enjoy primacy at officer promotion boards, which is partially reflected by the strong service-wide norms that demand every officer complete the requisite professional military education (PME) and civilian education to be selected for promotion. For example, every Air Force major must complete Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), either in residence or through distance learning, and complete a master’s degree to meet the entry-level requirements for promotion to lieutenant colonel. For officers who elect to focus their professional efforts solely on their technical specialty and do not complete ACSC and a masters, their records will meet the promotion board but they will have only an infinitesimal chance of being selected for promotion. Do the world’s best cyber operators, space officers, or pilots need ACSC and a master’s degree to continue adding value to the Air Force as technical experts? By contrast, do officers with an interest and capacity for leadership and strategic thinking need to have the same credentials as the most technically proficient officer in their functional community in order to command within that community and add value to the greater Air Force institution? In both cases, the answer is: “Probably not.”

The Air Force can and should make adjustments that will sustain the technically intensive warfighting capability while also improving officer development opportunities by adopting personnel changes that designate a set of technical experts. Three options include: eliminating the “up or out” promotion and separation requirement, establishing a limited duty officer (LDO) program, and establishing a warrant officer program. Of these three options the LDO program is probably the most feasible and effective.
First, the existing “up or out” personnel policy requires officers to separate from active duty if they are not promoted before certain career points.\(^{12}\) If an officer is not promoted, the officer may request selective continuation of active-duty service. The Air Force may elect to keep the officer on active duty, depending on its need for the officer’s specialty skills. Each case in which an officer is retained is essentially an exception to policy.

Changing the “up or out” policy would allow the service to keep an experienced cadre of airmen, while giving officers the option to focus on technical skills to the exclusion of the greater body of leadership development expectations. Officers who had no interest or desire to be commanders or to serve in staff tours could focus on their occupational specialty and continue to serve at the tactical level, including tactically focused jobs at the operational level, such as some Numbered Air Force (NAF) or Air Operations Center positions. There would be potential training cost savings for the service through retention of fully trained personnel. Each officer could make the choice not to pursue promotion or the officer may simply fail to make the cut at the promotion board.

Although abolishing the “up or out” policy would aid retention of technical expertise, a manageable and predictable manpower pool of technical experts would be elusive for the service or the respective functional communities to manage without a mechanism through which an officer could declare his or her intention to follow one of two tracks:

\(^{12}\) According to the RAND study on the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) passed in 1980, DOPMA directed the “up or out” promotion system to provide in the words of Congress “in peacetime, a youthful, vigorous, full combat-ready officer corps.” The “up” portion of the system provides that officers move through the system in cohorts originally determined by the year of commissioning and compete for promotion with other members of the cohort at designated years-of-service points. The “out” portion of the system provides that officers twice passed over for promotion, after a certain number of years, depending on their grade, are to be separated from active service. DOPMA also provides exceptions to the mandatory separation rules, including early retirements and selective continuation on active duty of officers twice passed over for promotion. Bernard Rostker et al., The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 1993), 12.
leadership or technician. If the Air Force indeed elected to establish a dual-track system, it would essentially be instituting a *de facto* limited duty officer program. Also, in order to abolish the “up or out” policy, a provision of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) passed by Congress in 1980, the service would require Congressional modification of the DOPMA legislation.

Second, the Air Force should consider instituting a limited duty officer (LDO) program. The Navy began its limited duty officer (LDO) program in 1948. Navy LDOs are technical specialists who may reach the grade of O-6 but are not authorized to command at sea. An Air Force LDO program would provide a pool of career technical experts that would help sustain the service’s warfighting capacity. The LDO program would create a formal distinction between technical experts and leadership cadre in the officer corps and alter the existing service norm that expects officers to be technical experts before they are selected for command, freeing leadership track officers both to command and pursue breadth of experience across the service and joint communities.

The cultural transition to an LDO program in the Air Force would be fairly seamless within the officer-heavy flying and missile squadrons. While the technical focus of LDOs would make them distinctive, the cultural fabric of many Air Force squadrons would easily absorb LDOs due to their rank structure that mirrors line officers.

An Air Force LDO initiative would probably require a personnel management capacity, distinct from line officers, for administering the program across the service, particularly at the Air Force Personnel Center, various major commands, and Headquarters Air Force. While the management of the LDO program would be distinctive from line officer career field management, LDO career field management could closely parallel existing mechanisms across the Air Force functional communities.
Third, the Air Force should consider reinstituting a warrant officer program. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all have warrant officer programs. The Army program, particularly in the Army aviation community, offers a useful model due to its similarity with Air Force flying squadrons. While the Army aviation battalion commander, executive officer, and company commanders are commissioned officers, the majority of aviators in a typical aviation battalion are warrant officers. Although the ratio of warrant officers to commissioned officers in Air Force squadrons could vary depending on mission or weapons system, the number of warrant officers would have to be sufficient to provide a cadre of technical experts to lessen the technical burden on commissioned officers. The elevated risk associated with nuclear missions would likely preclude warrant officers from missile or nuclear bomber crew positions, but the remaining flying and non-flying specialties would likely benefit from a dedicated force of technical experts in a “3rd Lieutenant” grade.

An Air Force warrant officer program would provide a pool of technical experts with a significant steady-state cost savings compared to the cost of commissioned officer billets. Retention bonuses for specialties such as pilots would probably be necessary when the economy is strong. However, as the service transitions to a force structure predominately consisting of unmanned aircraft, the need for pilot bonuses may decrease as the likelihood of transferring skills from unmanned military aviation to commercial aviation decreases. Although a warrant officer program would free commissioned officers to broaden their leadership experience and still command flying units, the program would require a period of institutional adjustment.

Despite of the potential benefits to Air Force leadership development, the bifurcation of technical and leadership tracks in the form of an LDO and/or a warrant officer program would require significant cultural transformation across the flying community. The
norm of technical expertise as a prerequisite for command would be superseded by the greater institutional imperative of developing Air Force leaders with capacity to integrate across the service and across the joint community.

A potential source of resistance to bifurcating Air Force leadership and technical tracks may emerge from a powerful service subculture, the USAF Weapons School community. The Weapons School originated as a highly intense training program for mid-grade officers in the fighter community in 1965 and expanded in the 1980s and 1990s to include the combat air forces (CAF), mobility air forces (MAF), special operations forces (SOF), space, and intelligence communities. Although the influence is more profound in some communities than others, the Weapons School effectively serves as a gatekeeper for command selection in the CAF. If LDOs or warrant officers assumed the mantle of being the technical experts in flying squadrons and technical expertise were deemphasized for command and leadership development, graduation from Weapons School would cease to be a major qualifying factor in selection for command, even in the CAF.

Many non-flying specialties, on the other hand, would probably welcome the bifurcation of technical and leadership tracks. The existing development paths in Air Force intelligence and communications communities, for instance, sacrifice depth in their various sub-disciplines in favor of breadth of experience to prepare officers for senior leadership positions. An LDO or warrant officer program would provide greater technical depth along with the rank and status necessary to lead operations at the tactical level and effectively coordinate with officers and enlisted within the service and with sister-service partners.

**Summary**

Improving the Air Force’s development of joint leaders is a complex problem with deep ties to service culture, particularly the service’s functional focus and its emphasis on technical expertise. The Air Force
may either ignore the problem and treat its symptoms by merely altering policies related to assignments and promotions or, affirmatively, the Air Force may choose to develop a comprehensive campaign to shift its culture toward being in greater harmony with the requirements of joint action.

As part of a comprehensive culture change campaign, a number of modest policy adjustments would contribute to improving development of joint leaders. While these adjustments may appear simple on the surface, effective implementation of these adjustments will likely be hampered by the larger cultural undercurrents that have fomented the service’s difficulties in developing joint leaders in the first place--functional focus and emphasis on technical expertise. These modest policy adjustments include the following: 1) direct DTs to meet institutional requirements; 2) task assignment teams to meet institutional requirements; 3) require only one command tour for colonels; and 4) emphasize joint experience at promotion boards.

Changing a service’s culture is a daunting task and requires visionary leadership. Efforts that attempt to re-weave the fabric of the service culture will be extremely difficult to execute and may have unexpected consequences, potentially making the situation worse. Service leaders should take these steps only after careful consideration and planning. These proposals are the most challenging, but will also be the most rewarding for the service: 1) strengthen institutional identity; 2) enhance service vision and mission statements; 3) improve leadership doctrine; and 4) bifurcate technical and leadership tracks.

The price of maintaining service status as an equal joint partner and increasing access to senior joint positions, including geographic COCOM command, demands significant changes in the Air Force development of joint leaders. Achieving this goal will require the Air Force to embark on a major campaign to shift its culture. Success in a
campaign of this nature will require strong visionary leadership at every level, but particularly from the CSAF.
CONCLUSIONS

Discerning the fundamental character of the future environment and preparing organizations to meet the challenges of the anticipated environment are two critical components of strategy. When an institution is confronted with the difficult choice of continuing on a proven path of success or changing its direction based on the anticipated environment, the uncertainty and imperfection associated with predicting the future environment creates friction that is both helpful in prompting rigorous analysis of the environmental system and problematic in generating the buy-in required for implementation of institutional change. The degree of risk associated with US national defense significantly amplifies these dynamics, particularly when one considers the level of capital and political investment involved.

As the chief executives for the Air Force, the Secretary and Chief of Staff have identified the quality of joint leadership in the Air Force as an area of concern. The evidence presented in this thesis indicates that the Air Force has not developed officers with credentials necessary to be competitive for senior positions in the joint community. Based on this evidence, Air Force leaders are presented with a difficult choice: continue or change.

The status quo path for the Air Force is characterized by functionally focused institutional norms that place a high value on technical competence and a relatively low value on integrative thinking. These norms are reflected in policy, doctrine, assignments, and promotions. As a result, Airmen tend to identify more with their functional community than their service and Air Force senior officers too often offer “Air Force solutions” in joint circles.

Remaining on the current path will likely have several negative consequences. First, Air Force officers will likely not be hired for senior
joint positions with a frequency proportional to the other services. Second, assuming the environment continues to grow more complex through globalization and technology advancements, the importance of integrating across the service, joint, interagency, international, and non-governmental communities to provide for the common defense will continue to grow, while the technologically focused skills of the Air Force officer corps will become more dissonant from the demands of the environment. As a further consequence, the Air Force may be marginalized as less-than-equal partner with the other services. Ultimately, by remaining on the status quo path, the Air Force puts national defense, service influence, and the effectiveness of its officers at risk.

There is no simple solution to this complex problem. In fact, some Air Force officers argue there is no problem. They may take the argument a step further and say that Air Force officers are too joint already, which detracts from warfighting capabilities. While the “too joint already” argument might have been appropriate for the Cold War heyday of Curtis Lemay’s Strategic Air Command, it is counterproductive in today’s complex environment. While it is true that the number of years in an officer’s career is finite and the time away from one endeavor has an associated opportunity cost with respect to another endeavor, the opportunity for the Air Force to improve development of joint leaders need not come at the cost of the technical competence treasured by the service culture and valued by COCOM commanders.

The Air Force can indeed develop better joint leaders while maintaining a razor-sharp technical competency for warfighting, but changes are required to do so. Finding new ways to balance risk and exploit opportunities requires creative thinking and courageous leadership. The proposals offered in this thesis range from minor policy changes to deep cultural changes and form the basis of a bold and
essential campaign for the revitalization of the Air Force. The eight recommendations are listed below.

Require only one command tour for colonels. While excellence and experience in command must remain a high priority for the institution and its officers, the Air Force’s fast-track officers would gain an additional two years to develop broader joint experience by commanding only once as an O-6.

Direct Development Teams (DTs) to meet institutional requirements. The CSAF should direct DTs to emphasize development of joint experience in their respective disciplines. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (AF/A1) should establish a requirement for the percentage of joint vectors the DTs will assign. Membership of the DTs should be modified to add an officer to represent the service’s interests. The representative should be from AF/A1, have a rank no lower than O-6, and must not be a member of the functional community over which the DT presides.

Task assignment teams to meet institutional requirements. The AF/A1 should direct the assignment teams, through the AFPC commander and in coordination with the respective DTs, to assign a designated number of officers to joint positions each year, to ensure compliance with institutional requirements for development of joint experience.

Emphasize joint experience at promotion boards. In his guidance to promotion boards, the SECAF should direct that joint qualified officers (JQOs) be promoted at a rate not less than the highest major command (MAJCOM) promotion rate for each promotion board. The resulting promotions of Air Force leaders with joint experience would foster the formation of a new institutional norm for the development path officers should follow in order to reach flag rank.

Strengthen institutional identity. It is necessary to establish the primacy of the institution over that of the functional communities. Doing
so will contribute to building collective confidence in the service’s standing as a full member of the joint team.

*Enhance the Air Force vision and mission statements.* The Air Force vision and mission statements should embody the common goal within the institutional culture. They are the banners under which the entire service should be ready and willing to rally. In developing a new vision and mission statements, Air Force senior leaders should incorporate the following three concepts: interdependence of service operations in and through air, space, and cyberspace; the service role of organizing, training, and equipping forces to support COCOM commander requirements; and service integration with joint, interagency, international, and non-governmental partners.

*Improve Air Force leadership doctrine.* As the institutional centerpiece of Air Force leader development, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1 offers an ideal venue for shaping a unified institutional culture in which leaders value integrative thinking. An overhaul of AFDD 1-1 should include adding a concise summary of joint doctrine and DOD policy regarding leadership development; remove misleading language about independent Air Force operations; and adding language promoting the airman’s leadership role in executing operations under the command of COCOM commanders.

*Bifurcate technical and leadership tracks.* The Air Force can make adjustments that will sustain the technically-intensive warfighting capability while also improving officer development opportunities by adopting personnel changes that designate a set of technical experts. Three recommendations include: eliminating the “up or out” promotion and separation requirement for officers, establishing a limited duty officer (LDO) program similar to the Navy’s, or establishing a warrant officer program similar to the Army’s. The most effective of these options is probably the LDO program. The LDOs would enjoy the same rank and privileges as line officers, while focusing their professional lives on...
maintaining technical mastery, allowing line officers to move freely among technical or command tours and broadening tours.

**Further Research**

Additional research beyond this thesis will facilitate a deeper understanding of the complex issues encompassing Air Force officer development, particularly a comparative study of the Air Force officer development system with those of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. Analysis of the careers of flag officers from all four services will also offer useful perspectives on shared and divergent institutional priorities across the services, while comparison of officer development policy across the services should illuminate approaches that the Air Force may adopt to improve officer development.

**Final Thoughts**

The Air Force has taken several positive steps in the past 10 years to develop its officers more effectively, but these measures have been insufficient. The “Developing Aerospace Leaders” initiative led to the service’s first leadership doctrine and established the development teams for each functional community in the mid-00s. In 2009 the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel established “institutional competencies” for the service. If the Air Force wants to meet tomorrow’s security challenges, ensure its leaders are best prepared to maintain service warfighting capability, assure service influence, and provide the best possible support to the national defense team, the service must take additional, more far-reaching measures. The Air Force should recalibrate the balance of its leadership development process to sustain technical competence, establish institutional primacy over functional communities, and put a high priority on developing the breadth necessary to grow the capacity of its officers to integrate with joint, interagency, international, and non-governmental partners.
Appendix A

AIR FORCE OFFICER DEVELOPMENT TEAM RESPONSIBILITIES
Development Team Responsibilities (ref AFI 36-2640, 23 Jan 2004)

Development Team (DT):
Provides oversight of personnel development to meet both functional family and Air Force corporate leadership requirements. Functional Managers (FMs) will establish appropriate DTs based on characteristics of their functional family. Minimum membership should include the chairperson, CFM, AFPC Assignment Team (AT) representative and appropriate MACOM Points of Contact (POC). DT may include enlisted, Guard/Reserve, or senior civilian representatives depending on the functional community. The DT may include Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), as required, and should meet at a seniority level that matches the developmental decisions to be made (e.g., Sq/Cc candidate selection). The FM or their designated representative chairs the DT. Responsibilities include the following:

2.8.1. Providing advice, guidance, and assistance to functional family through the CFM.
2.8.2. Having cognizance of career field policies, plans, programs, training, and actions affecting career field management.
2.8.3. Ensuring that recommendations for new initiatives are coordinated with the FM.
2.8.4. Evaluating developmental opportunities within the functional force structure and recommending appropriate developmental assignment vectors for individual officers.
2.8.5. Reviewing Career Planning Guides, as created by the CFMs, for the FM’s (or FM’s designee) approval.
2.8.6. Identifying potential developmental pairings within a functional community and submitting to the FM for validation; coordinating pairings with FDO; considering the career field’s unique characteristics and requirements in determining development opportunities that meet institutional needs when determining an individual’s career progression.
2.8.7. Reviewing criteria and previous DID qualifying positions and making recommendations for DID criteria changes to the FM through the CFM.
2.8.8. Providing developmental feedback to officers and commanders via Officer Development Plan (ODP).
2.8.9. Providing documentation, support information, and recommended changes or AFI updates and revision.
2.8.10. Providing input into the DE selection process. Air Force members may be selected for DE opportunities by meeting a Central Designation Board (Intermediate Developmental Education [IDE]/Senior Developmental Education [SDE] levels) or by filling a DE quota provided to the Functional Authority (FA) by the AFERB at the BDE level.
# Appendix B

## EXPLANATION OF AIR FORCE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES

### Personal Competencies

**Embody Airman Culture**

- **Ethical Leadership**
  - Promotes Air Force Core Values (Integrity first, Service before self, Excellence in all we do) through goals, actions and referent behaviors
  - Develops trust and commitment through words and actions
  - Accountable for areas of responsibility, operations of unit, and personal actions
  - Maintains checks and balances on self and others

- **Fellowship**
  - Comprehends and values the essential role of followership in mission accomplishment
  - Seeks command, guidance and/or leadership while providing unbiased advice
  - Aligns priorities and actions toward chain of command guidance for mission accomplishment
  - Exercises flexibility and adapts quickly to alternating role as leader/follower; follower first, leader at times

- **Warrior Ethos**
  - Exhibits a hardness of spirit despite physical and mental hardships – moral and physical courage
  - Continuously hones their skills to support the employment of military capabilities
  - Displays military/executive bearing, self-discipline and self control

- **Develops Self**
  - Assesses self to identify strengths and developmental needs
  - Seeks and incorporates feedback on own performance; aware of personal impact on others
  - Continually increases breadth and depth of knowledge and skills; develops life-long learning habits

### Communicating

**Speaking and Writing**

- Articulates ideas and intent in a clear, concise and convincing manner through both verbal and written communication
- Adjusts communication approach to unique operational environment and audience needs
- Effectively creates communication bridges between units, organizations and institutions

**Active Listening**

- Fosters the free exchange of ideas in an atmosphere of open exchange
- Actively attempts to understand others' points of view and clarifies information as needed
- Solicits feedback to insure that others understand messages as they were intended
# People/Team Competencies

## Leading People

### Develops and Inspires Others
- Helps and motivates others to improve their skills and enhance their performance through feedback, coaching, mentoring and delegating
- Empowers others and guides them in the direction of their goals and mission accomplishment
- Inspires others to transcend their own self-interests and embrace personal sacrifice and risk for the good of the organization and mission

### Takes Care of People
- People first - attends to the physical, mental, and ethical well-being of fellow airmen and their families
- Creates an environment where Airmen take care of Airmen 24/7, 365 days a year, including your leaders, peers and subordinates; integrates wellness into mission accomplishment
- Establishes work-life balance through time management and setting clear expectations/priorities

### Diversity
- Leverages the value of differences in perspectives, approaches, preferences, race, gender, background, religion, experience, generation, thought, and other factors
- Leverages diversity for mission accomplishment and fosters a tolerant environment
- Shows respect for others regardless of the situation; treats people in an equitable manner

## Foster Collaborative Relationships

### Builds Teams and Coalitions
- Builds effective teams for goal and mission accomplishment and improves team performance
- Contributes to group identity while fostering cohesiveness, confidence and cooperation
- Sees and attends to the interests, goals, and values of other individuals and institutions
- Develops networks and alliances that span organizational, service, department, agency, and national boundaries

### Negotiating
- Understands the underlying principles and concepts applied before, during and after a negotiation
- Attains desired mission outcomes while maintaining positive, long-term relationships with key individuals/groups
- Uses appropriate interpersonal styles and methods to reduce tension or conflict between two or more people, anticipates and addresses conflict constructively, anticipates and prevents counter-productive confrontations
- Persuades and influences others; builds consensus; gains cooperation; effectively collaborates
# Organizational Competencies

## Employing Military Capabilities

### Operational and Strategic Art
- Understands and applies operational and strategic art in conventional and irregular warfare, peacekeeping, and homeland defense operations
- Demonstrates expertise in integrating and leveraging doctrine, concepts and capabilities within an effects-based approach to operations
- Utilizes innovation and technology in the employment of lethal and non-lethal force

### Unit, Air Force, Joint and Coalition Capabilities
- Considers and applies capabilities of the Air Force across air, space, and cyberspace
- Understands how Air Force capabilities relate and complement other service capabilities
- Understands interdependencies and interoperability across services, agencies, departments and coalition partners

### Non-adversarial Crisis Response
- Recognizes the national security implications of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief operations and support to civil authorities, both foreign and domestic
- Understands the need for engagement before and after warfighting/crisis response, the need for integrated involvement with interagency and multinational partners and the need for multipurpose capabilities that can be applied across the range of military operations

## Enterprise Perspective

### Enterprise Structure and Relationships
- Understands the organizational structure and relationships between the Air Force, the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, the joint commands, the defense agencies, and other elements of the defense structure
- Understands how one’s function or unit fits into its parent organizations
- Understands how one’s parent organization relates to its external environment—supporting and supported organizations, the public, Congress, etc.

### Government Organization and Processes
- Understands essential operating features and functions of the Air Force, DoD, the national security structure, other related executive branch functions, and Congress, to include: leadership and organization, roles of members/committees/staffs; authorization, appropriation and budget processes; acquisition policy and procedures; interdependencies and relationships

### Global, Regional and Cultural Awareness
- Conscious of regional and other factors influencing defense, domestic, and foreign policy
- Seeks to understand foreign cultural, religious, political, organizational and societal norms/customs
- Develops linguistic skills

### Strategic Communication
- Informs and appropriately influences key audiences by synchronizing and integrating communication efforts to deliver truthful, timely, accurate, and credible information, analysis, and opinion
- Formulates the institutional message, telling the Air Force story
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