TIME FOR A NEW THREAT PARADIGM

by

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Biography

Colonel Karen Stoff is a U.S. Air Force officer assigned to the Air War College. She graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1991. She began her career as a non-rated operations officer and transitioned to the logistics discipline in 1997. She has worked in an Air Operations Center, on a Joint Task Force J5 staff, in a combatant command, and while deployed to Afghanistan in a Sustainment Brigade. Colonel Stoff commanded a Logistics Readiness Squadron and recently completed a tour as a Deputy Mission Support Group Commander. During her career, she has completed two tours in South Korea, an overseas assignment in Germany, and three deployments. In addition to Air Command and Staff College, she is also a graduate of the Advanced Studies of Air Mobility program.
Abstract

The Cold War left two things in the United States, a mindset that threats equated to traditional, military force-versus-force activities and a framework to build strategy based upon threat assessment. One endures while the other has been superseded by today’s globalized environment. In a world where economic power provides the basis for all other power, the greatest threat to a nation now comes from the potential to attack an economy. Yet, traditional mindsets prevail when assessing threats, focusing on traditional force-on-force conflicts. This paradigm must change in order to accurately focus efforts in order to protect national power on the international stage. The same framework used to assess the Soviet threat during the Cold War, to draft NSC-68, applies to assessing today’s economic threats. If the United States used that same framework, shifting its threat paradigm to focus on protecting US economic power from attack, the nation would have a comprehensive grand strategy to sustain its international power well into the 21st century.
Introduction

Newscasts, talk shows, and editorials speak of the nation’s loss of power on the international stage. For the past two decades, the lack of a rudder to steer the nation in the sea of international affairs has left the country with a strategic dilemma, because the United States “owns the twenty-first century but is strategically clueless as to what to do with it.”\textsuperscript{1} The state of the world has changed drastically over the past 20-years; technology and innovation skyrocketed at a rate never before seen, national economies globalized to prosper and then share each others’ crises, and non-state actors emerged to challenge powerful countries. Yet the country has failed to put serious strategic thought into the nation’s future in the next century because leaders have refused to see threats in a new paradigm to coincide with global changes. The American perspective of grand strategy must change in order to address emerging threats to long-term national survival. By reviewing the basis and purpose of grand strategy, discussing a new threat paradigm to consider, and assessing current national strategy, this paper will address what our country must do in order to develop a grand strategy to guide the United States through the next century.

The Basis of Strategy

Grand strategy has many definitions and bases. To some, in reaction to a threat, strategy acts as a method of, or procedure for, military thought in order to “codify events, set them in order of priority, and then choose the most effective course of action.”\textsuperscript{2} However, other schools of thinkers assert that strategy, in the context of grand strategy, encompasses much more than just the military perspective. “National strategy fuses all the powers of a nation, during peace as well as war, to attain national interests and objectives.”\textsuperscript{3} Additionally, others apply a business model to grand strategy; like a plan focused on achieving the core aspects of a corporation, a grand
strategy ensures the values and interests of a nation. But a business-centric view also introduces
the necessity of prioritization of objectives to achieve the desired end state. Regardless of the
viewpoint on the basis of strategy, whether or not it exists because of threats, interests or values,
all definitions center around strategy’s linkage of end state to resource use. Strategy’s
formulation evolves through the determination of how leaders will use the national resources of
power to control the attainment of state objectives. Plainly speaking, strategy is simply a plan
of how you will use what you’ve got to get what you want. The complexity of strategy centers
on how a state defines its wants.

A state can determine its ends using three common lenses, those of values, interests and
threats. Focusing on values, “societies’ values, when applied to specific issues or circumstances
in the international environment help define national interests, the end-state desired.” Some see
those values as democracy, self-determination, international cooperation and free trade. Others,
such as Samuel Huntington, see the values more as a creed, focusing on the individual, equality,
freedom, justice, opportunity, the pursuit of happiness, people as the source of political power,
and government limited by law. Yet more see American values as individual rights, democracy,
morality-based politics, human life, peace, winning and national security. And finally some
intellectuals keep it simple by pointing out that American values come from the preamble to the
United States constitution and have endured for over two centuries. Taken together, to include
the Preamble, American values boil down to the four basic principles of democracy, liberty,
security, and prosperity—all of which could guide American strategic ends. Values should drive
the determination of national interests, those issues of the highest national importance or
reflective of a state’s basic wants or needs. Knowing what our nation values the most helps to
determine, and even prioritize, national interests. While American’s do highly cherish
democracy, liberty, security, and prosperity, above all else, American’s value the existence of their country that enables its people to strive for everything that they treasure. The Cold War held such importance because another power in the world had the ability to threaten the very survival of our nation, and thus the “conditions that preserve our independence, geographic integrity, [and] fundamental institutions.” Survival is the primary national interest.

To protect the nation’s highest interest, the country should identify the biggest threats to national survival. Post World War II, deliberate assessment identified the Soviet Union as the biggest threat to United States national survival and leaders developed a grand strategy to counter the Soviets. At the end of the Cold War, the nation struggled to define the threat to national survival, mostly because no threat arose as so acute to elevate it above all others. Even after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, “the new threat of global terrorism lacks the compelling nature of the old Soviet threat” of the Cold War. Yes, a non-state actor committed horrific attacks against US citizens on American soil, but the attackers did not pose a threat to the survival of the nation. The country kept functioning with only relatively minimal degradation to our national power; in fact, the world seemed to breathlessly wait for the United States to unleash its power against those who carried out the attack. While terrorists can inflict damage, potentially devastating damage if using a weapon of mass destruction, their capacity to bring the nation to its knees does not exist. Right now, the United States has no overarching grand strategy, mostly because the nation has not identified a threat, or at least the correct threat, to national survival.

Security Threat Redefined

A threat to national survival exists, but not in the traditional sense of threat. Most people associate threat with force, and when people think of force they think of warfare as battles,
bombs, and bloodshed. So the most “traditional” concept of threat revolves around those who can bomb our homeland, battle our armed forces or shed the blood of our citizens. This concept of force forms the most common perception of warfare. However, warfare encompasses many other actions, to include diplomatic and economic actions. “War is not only an arena for the armed forces. The economic aims of a war are achieved at the same time that the armed forces fight for their military goals and in conjunction with fierce fighting on the political front.” So, since warfare encompasses more than just bloodshed, people must not solely focus threat assessments on those items that can cause bloodshed; they must also focus on threats to US economic and international political power. “Power is the ability to effect the outcomes you want, and if necessary, to change the behaviors of others to make this happen.” The more a threat degrades our national power, the more vulnerable our nation to decline. Our national power, as a whole, derives from the strength of our economic power. Without wealth we cannot fund forces to ensure security from traditional threats, we cannot protect the lines of shipping that allow for growth of our wealth, and we cannot freely act on the world’s diplomatic stage to protect our interests. In the end, to counter those traditional threats, “military power rests upon adequate supplies of wealth which in turn derive from a flourishing productive base, from healthy finances, and from superior technology.” Because economic power provides the basis of all other power, then the classic thought about threats do not make sense. Instead, the threat paradigm about national survival must shift and focus first on threats to our nation’s economic power before looking at more traditional threat concepts.

In history, people compare the United States to the Roman and British empires. While not entirely the same entities, those two empires provide the closest example to compare relative power. Both empires ended up overextending themselves, projecting forces far from home for
many years by using their economic power to fund these military actions and focusing on countering traditional threats instead of focusing on economic growth and prosperity. Both empires failed to balance the uses of their power. As their internal power declined, so, too, did their power to influence external actors decline.21 These empires failed to balance “perceived defense requirements and the means it possessed to maintain those commitments” and preserve the “economic bases of its power from relative erosion.”22 The lesson from these two empires revolves around their lack of attention to the threat to their economic power, both external in the form of resource loss to other states or peoples and internal in the form of use without adequate planning for growth. These empires proved that a state could decline despite the strength, or power, of their military.

The Roman and British empires depended on economic power to survive; our country has the same dependency. “Not only does economic growth provide the sinews of hard power, it also burnishes the reputation and self-confidence of the country and thus contributes equally to soft power.”23 Without economic power, and the means to grow that power, our country can only aspire to the status quo while others march ahead to develop their own economic strength. Without growth, others will begin to close the gap in power, and the United States will find itself unable to sustain its status in the international order. Instead of military performance on the battlefield, the future of the nation could depend on its foresight to protect our economic power from threats.

Threats to US economic power, not traditional threats, pose the biggest challenge to national survival today. The most formidable enemy to the United States to arise post-Cold War, al Qaeda, has approached warfare with such a threat paradigm change. Their leader, Osama bin Laden, told the American public in a speech after the 9/11 attacks their explicit aims, that they
“…bled Russia for ten years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat…so we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.”24 Their strategist, Ayman al Zawahiri, studied Kennedy’s *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* to conclude that “great powers fall for three reasons: spiraling costs for maintaining internal security, an expanding military presence in the world with an attendant increase in personnel and financial commitments, and powerful foreign competition in trade and commerce.”25 They tailored al Qaeda’s strategy around this thought because they thought that the United States had already gotten close to the first and second conditions…an empire in decline.26 The al Qaeda strategy to the year 2020 has five stages: to provoke America into invading Muslim lands, to awaken the Islamic community to conduct jihad, to expand conflict in Muslim lands to put the United States in a war of attrition, to build a global network, and to stretch the United States beyond its capabilities by fighting wars on multiple fronts to secure the oil fields in the Gulf and protect Israel.27 The fifth stage focuses on attacking US economic power to crash the American military budget, force bankruptcy and implode the country.28 Not only does al Qaeda have a strategy, but the strategy encompasses more than just traditional military confrontation; they recognized the potential of threatening a nation’s economic power because a nation’s economic strength enables all other national powers. If al Qaeda has switched to this paradigm, then how many others have done so, and are other world rivals looking at squelching US power by attacking our economic power?

One must look at the effects of globalization to see the potential of economic threats. Some would say because of a globalized world, “all countries are to some extent dependent on market forces beyond their direct control.”29 In this view, if a country targeted the economy of a stronger economic power, then they would also be targeting other countries, thus expanding their
list of enemies. Yet, because one can never know how truly interwoven markets can become, they could also end up hurting their own economy. But, this same networking of markets can give a smaller state more power, because they no longer have to stand up alone against a larger power, but can have the collective economic power of many, without any formal alliances. If one looks at globalized markets-and-traders as hubs-and-spokes, the United States has predominately occupied the position of the hub.\textsuperscript{30} Over the years, other hubs have emerged around the world. Now, the nation not only occupies some hub positions, but it also has some spoke positions, too, linked to other hubs. Eventually, those hubs will outgrow the hubs of the United States, because our population of 250 million pales in comparison to the populations in Asia. When this happens, the US economic power will cease to be as powerful on the world stage as it has been in the past. The closest economic threat comes from China, with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development predicting its economy will surpass the US economy by the next presidential election in 2016.\textsuperscript{31}

The economic power of the United States has faltered since the 2008-2009 economic crisis. American economic woes have influenced our freedom of action, as witnessed in the limited participation in Libya in 2011 when “all forms of aid and assistance had to be dispensed much more carefully than before.”\textsuperscript{32} Attention remains on ending military action in Afghanistan, applying more restraint when dealing with contentious issues, and relying on regional partners to resolve conflicts diplomatically. While some may say that this shift in approach reflects the international relations viewpoints of the Obama administration, no one can simply ignore the effect a stagnant economy has on deciding between diplomacy versus military force when addressing international conflicts. Additionally, over the past few years, China has financed US debt, as well as “taking over much of the traditional British, and then American, role as the
lender of last resort, thus contributing to the stabilization of the world economy." Some would say this is an opportunity for China to wage economic warfare on the United States, by using “any and all means to maintain or expand the economies of the user and his allies at the expense of the enemy, and to neutralize or diminish the opposition’s economic capacity and potential.” While China has set itself up with an advantage, others note that the globalized world economy would not allow for such warfare to happen. If China dumped US dollars into the market the value of the dollar would fall as well as the overall US economy; yet, because China depends so much on exports, the resulting dollar devaluation would make American goods cheaper and cut into China’s export market, in turn hurting their own economy. This symbiotic relationship between the American and Chinese economies prevents economic acts of aggression and stimulates cooperation to boost each other’s economies; however, we do not know how deep those ties run.

If a small non-state actor such as al Qaeda has a published strategy to target the United States economy in order to bring about the eventual downfall of the nation, should we assume that the largest populated nation in the world has no similar strategy? After all, the United States currently acts as the world military superpower with diminishing economic power. We do not have a published Chinese grand strategy to determine if they threaten our country, but then again, we didn’t publish the Cold War NSC-68 grand strategy, either, because it was so essential to national survival that we couldn’t afford to declassify it and make our full intentions known to the world. We must acknowledge that all world powers eventually decline and take matters into our own hands to try and shape our future instead of react to others’ plans. We have reached a point in time when we need a regimented review of threats to national survival to determine what threats to national survival exist, what risks we can afford to take, and what actions our country
must take. And we can no longer myopically view threats from a traditional perspective; threats to our economic power outweigh all other threats because our economic power acts as the cornerstone to the structure of all other US powers.

**From Grand Strategy to No Strategy**

Unfortunately, the United States does not have a true grand strategy. During the Cold War, the country had a grand strategy, a document linking ends to ways, something to guide all foreign policy, resource acquisitions, economic growth, and information collection in order to focus national efforts into a singular objective…to survive in the global ideological war against the Soviet Union and emerge with our democratic nation of free peoples intact and strong.\(^{36}\) The nation had something solid to focus its efforts against. The strategy, born from an initial assessment of the threat of the Soviet Union after the start of the Berlin Blockade, called NSC-20, evolved to include a reassessment of the Soviet threat given their advances with thermonuclear weaponry.\(^{37}\) That reevaluation, NSC-68, expanded on the framework used for the formulation of NSC-20. It addressed US national interests, where they were challenged, and basically defined the current problem, or threat, facing the United States.\(^{38}\)

While both NSC-20 and NSC-68 did just that, the inclusion of more detailed analysis with recommendations sets NSC-68’s framework apart. Not only did it identify the aims of others, but it assessed if others could achieve those objectives, what enabled them to achieve objectives, and what current activities others took part in to get to their objectives.\(^{39}\) The framework also identified which aims against the United States posed the most immediate danger to the country as well as possible actions to offset the threat and the consequences of not doing so. This strategic assessment differed from others because it took a holistic, whole-government approach to solve the stated problem and provided actionable details for the nation’s
leaders to follow. It outlined how the nation must achieve its objectives, detailing the ways, not just stating the means. In the last course of action presented, the document listed 16 specific actions for the nation to take in order to counter the Soviet threat. Additionally, the preferred course of action, called the “militarization of containment” used other sources of power to support the military-centric solution. This grand strategy advocated military growth to “inhibit aggressive Soviet action,” the “build up of strength [to] support a firm policy directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design,” and boldly stipulated actions such as reduction in non-military spending and increasing in taxes to achieve national objectives. It also recognized such a strategy would require a significant amount of time for implementation: “A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve our national objectives.”

This strategy had a very solid framework to assess the nature of the threat and provided options to counter that threat.

The issue since the end of the Cold War centers on the lack of a threat. “Twenty-first century threats, including global terrorism, have not been threatening enough to impose uniformity of purpose, and Americans do not have a shared vision of a desired future.” Some suggest the National Security Strategy (NSS) documents since 1990 have laid out US strategy, but these documents read as both vision statements and political advertisements “…that tout an administration’s accomplishments but yield little insight into how the United States might act in a future situation.” NSS documents do contain strategic thought, but they lack any evidence of structured assessment and identification of threats to national survival, proposed counter action to the threat in order to guide all decision-making, prioritization of programs to diminish the threat, and concepts to endure across administrations. Instead, most NSS documents focus on
the here-and-now issues that hurt us but don’t threaten long-term national survival, spread
resources thin by not prioritizing the use of American power to concentrate on ensuring national
survival, and sometimes act as political documents so that an administration can demonstrate to
interest groups concern over very specific issues. Post Cold War NSS documents have attempted
to act as grand strategy, but have failed because they do not apply the rigor used in the
development of NSC-68, lack focused prioritization, and omit detail on how to use resources to
achieve an objective that counters a threat.

While the current 2010 NSS from the Obama administration reflects the effects the
economic crisis has had on the US economy and its power, it still views threat from a Cold War context, specifically from the traditional military, force-on-force perspective. It acknowledges multiple threats, but remains sighted on maintaining “military superiority that has secured our country, and underpinned global security, for decades.”

A slight shift in thought appears because the NSS places more emphasis on the US economy, specifically growing the economy, but no true change of paradigm occurs because the document speaks of growing the economy in order to use that power for other efforts, but fails to address protecting economic power from threats and attack. The section of the NSS dedicated to security continues addressing the growth of economic power as an enabler to other powers. It does identify economic vulnerabilities, such as the US financial system, irresponsible lending practices of financial institutions, the budget deficit and exports, as well as how bad actors abuse the international financial system in order to further their own illicit causes.

Additionally, the NSS identifies vulnerabilities in space and cyberspace systems. But stating “the internet and e-commerce are keys to our economic competitiveness” shows a view of a threatened domain more so than a view of a threatened economy. This myopic focus on protecting a domain instead of protecting overall economic
power from attack, or even economic warfare, indicates a need to rethink possible threats to the United States. Cold War grand strategy focused on countering “traditional” threats, but over twenty years later, our perception of threat has basically remained in the “traditional” mindset. Unfortunately, the NSS still views economic power as something free from attack, subject to market forces alone, and able to continually grow in order to fund a plethora of programs designed to support efforts to counter primarily military-based threats.

**Wanted: New Paradigm and New Strategy**

The United States cannot continue down a meandering strategic pathway and must develop a new grand strategy using a different paradigm. We no longer have the economic power to counter every threat, fund every pet project, nor champion every ideal. We had a honeymoon period after the end of the Cold War, but now must face reality and define our role in the world for the next 50-years. We must ask the fundamental question, do we want to be the world superpower or can we live with sharing power with other countries in the world? We may not have a choice in our answer. While the nation does maintain the edge in military power, thinking that power alone can sustain United States hegemony shows a thought process mired in Cold War mentality. Economic power has emerged on the world stage as the premiere power.

In today’s globalized world, because economic power has overshadowed military power as the most desired power, the threat paradigm has shifted so that economic threats to a nation hold more consequence than military threats. The acknowledged author of NSC-68, Paul Nitze, pointed out this shift in an address to the National War College in 1993. “While economic security has not traditionally been held to be a security issue, the interdependence of the world economy…reminds us of how foreign economic events affect the well-being of the United States…our economic vulnerability has become a security issue.”\(^{50}\) Yet over 15-years after this
remark by one of the nation’s most revered strategists, the NSS still reflects a view that the
nation should bolster its economic strength not because of its vulnerability to attack, but because
it’s needed to boost the strength of other national powers and the prosperity of US citizens. This
nuance of thought makes a big difference. We can either focus on building economic strength to
use it, or we can focus on protecting what economic strength we have. We must shift our threat
paradigm to see the use of economic tools as a means of attack, and shore up our nation’s
economic vulnerabilities in order to protect our economic power from attack. The need to
protect it grows exponentially as other countries develop their own economic strength and begin
to combine their economic capabilities into power blocks.

Countries have already banded, realizing the shift in paradigm…that economic power
can wield a mightier sword than military power. The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa) have 29% of the world’s landmass and 40% of the world’s population,
and by 2050 their combined economies of approximately $44-trillion will surpass the combined
economies of the rest of the world.51 They started on the road to cooperation over three-years
ago, and while they have only begun to cooperate, it could signal how the world will change in
the next few decades. They organized because “the leaders of the world’s biggest emerging
markets demanded a greater say in the global financial system.”52 In their 2012 summit, the
BRICS countries’ leaders “proposed and alternative to the World Bank…and looked at ways to
increase their trade links and decrease dependency on Europe and the United States.”53
Additionally, they have worked out the means to trade with each other by using local currencies
instead of the dollar, further marginalizing the dollar as the reserve currency.54 We see here the
emergence of a group, intent on using its combined economic strength, to try and influence and
change the international stage that has been the way of the world since the end of World War II.
“America’s financial and economic problems are so grave that they are bound to affect its overall role [in the world] negatively. Still, no single power, or combination of powers, is yet able to challenge the United States for the top leadership position.”55 How much longer can that last on our present course and with the emergence of new economic alliances? The United States still has an economic gap in our favor, but if we do not protect it, it will not last long.

Recommendations

The United States must use the new threat paradigm and employ a framework similar to the one used to build NSC-68 in order to develop a new grand strategy. First, we must create an interagency working group, free of political baggage, to develop this strategy. The group must remain focused on the task, free of the tethers of day-to-day work responsibilities. The group must have a mission statement in similar format to the one given to the NSC-20 and NSC-68 authors. For example: methodically assess existing and foreseeable threats to US economic power, formulate objectives and means to counter the threats, and determine implementation measures in order to counter, deter, offset, or defeat the threats. With a clear understanding of expectations, the group could move on to assessment.

Second, the group must apply an assessment framework similar to one used to create NSC-68. The assessment must begin with a clear identification of threats to our economic power, both current and potential, by state and non-state actors. Threat assessments should include a determination of vulnerabilities, too. The next phase of assessment centers around threat analysis. The group should determine the capability of others to achieve their aims against US economic power, their previous activities, the likelihood of future activities, and the potential for capability improvement or alliances to shore up capability. This should produce a list of threats that the group would then need to scrub for relevance. The group would need to
determine the consequences to the nation for each threat, to include second and third order
effects, and then prioritize the threats to identify those most dangerous to the country and most
likely to occur. Once complete, the group could develop courses of action. Each would identify
national objectives, the measures to counter, deter, offset or defeat the identified threats, and the
ways the country will implement in order to meet the objectives. This framework would provide
the methodical assessment needed to view a different type of threat to the United States. It
worked once before, and could very well help the nation find its direction into the 21st century.

Conclusion

The United States must first change our paradigm to see threats not just as traditional
threats, but also as economic threats. Then, we must change our perspective of grand strategy to
address emerging threats to our national survival. No longer can the nation follow the broad to-
do lists laid out in NSS documents. We must apply a methodical assessment of the economic
threats facing the country, now and into the future, and develop a strategy from that assessment
that states how the nation will counter those threats and prevail as a leader on the international
stage. The framework used to create NSC-68 provides a sound template for such an assessment.
The world has evolved to find new vulnerabilities and new means of warfare that can bring a
country to its knees and totally dependent on bail out by others. Yet the framework that guided
us to prevail in the Cold War still has applicability today. We must ensure we have the ability to
survive in a new economic era. We cannot hold onto false hopes that the nation will remain
dominant in this new era, and we must face the facts by developing a well thought out grand
strategy that will ensure our survival in a world where the United States does not have supreme
power.
Notes

7. Ibid, 86.
11. Nelson S. Drew, ed. NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment with Analysis by Paul H. Nitze. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994), 39; and Collins, Grand Strategy, 74. The citation from Drew is actually from the NSC-68 document itself, a section entitled “A Fundamental Purpose of the United States”. From the United States National Archives (online) at https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.htm accessed on 10 Dec 2012, the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States is: “We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.”
13. Huntington, Who Are We, 10.
15. Murdock, Improving the Practice, 4.
16. Ibid.
21. Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 514-515; Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: from the first century A.D. to the third (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), introduction through page 1; and Nye, Paradox of American Power, 111. While the info in the paragraph is an extreme oversimplification of what really happened to both empires, my point is that each empire focused too much on things outside of its borders and failed to ensure
its kept a strong enough economic power in order to finance everything. Other factors hurt their economic power, but it merely shows that economic power is vulnerable to threats and should be treated as something that can be attacked as much as a military force or people can be attacked. I gained insight from the sources cited above.

26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, 221-222.
28. Ibid, 222.
30. Ibid, 91-95.
33. Ibid, 82.
35. Lundestad, *Rise and Decline*, 78.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid, 5 and 132.
40. Ibid, 87-90.
41. Ibid, 5.
42. Ibid, 90-92.
43. Ibid, 89.
44. Murdock, *Improving the Practice*, 12.
45. Ibid, 11.
47. Ibid, 32.
48. Ibid, 8.
49. Ibid, 27.
51. Lundestad, *Rise and Decline*, 39. Plus the following data. Projected 2025 combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) came from adding up the projected GDP growth of each country from the second chart on the OECD web page found at [http://www.oecd.org/eco/productivityandlongtermgrowth/2060interactivecharts.htm](http://www.oecd.org/eco/productivityandlongtermgrowth/2060interactivecharts.htm). Projected population came from adding up each country’s projected population from a chart found on the


55. Lundestad, Rise and Decline, 88.
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