AIR WAR COLLEGE

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PERSONNEL SERVICES DELIVERY REDESIGN (PSDR)

AND

BRIGADE LEVEL STRENGTH MANAGEMENT

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

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Biography

Colonel David Hater is a U.S. Army personnel officer assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated from the Ohio State University in 1988 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration and in 1990 with a Master of Arts degree in Philosophy. He also graduated from Auburn University (Montgomery) in 2003 with a Master of Public Administration. He has served in a variety of Command and Staff positions in CONUS and Overseas including, G1, 2nd Infantry Division in Korea and as the Chief of Strength Management at Forces Command and has multiple deployments including two deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom while assigned as the Division Strength Manager of the 3rd Infantry Division.
Abstract

The Army faced persistent conflict of a Global War on Terrorism that it had never faced before. It found its forces were not well suited to the conflict and needed to be smaller and able to be a “plug and play” force that could be tailored to specific missions. The solution was modularity. In response, the Army’s personnel community developed Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR). The decision was made after being told to reduce footprint rather than based on a solid mission analysis of capability needed. This invites risk because the critical mission analysis was lacking. This study examines brigade level strength management as a critical component of PSDR and finds that the redesign was effective in many areas, but that there was an overreach on strength management doctrine. Personnel strength management needs to be returned to the general officer headquarters where it formally resided rather than the colonel level brigade that it moved to under the redesigned concept. The justification is based on many factors: larger staffs of general officer level organizations are more capable than brigade staffs. Put another way, brigade staffs lack the resources, expertise and training to conduct strength management; brigade strength management is often personality dependent on the S1, brigade commander and the personnel leadership and commander of the higher headquarters; modularity assumed a brigade centricity and elimination of at least some senior headquarters. Brigade centricity occurred, but the elimination of headquarters did not. Division headquarters still exist and are not willing to give up their former role. Significant remnants of strength management exist at levels between brigades and Human Resources Command (HRC). Lastly, under the previous system, the Division Strength Manager billet was a Branch Qualifying (now Key Developmental) job for an Army AG officer. If the job was that important in the past, a strong rationale would need to be offered for the elimination and/or transfer of such positions.
Introduction

The typical twentieth-century organization has not operated well in a rapidly changing environment. Structure, systems, practices, and culture have often been more of a drag on change than a facilitator. If environmental volatility continues to increase, as most people now predict, the standard organization of the twentieth century will likely become a dinosaur.¹

This quote from Professor John P. Kotter’s book Leading Change applies to some changes the United States Army faced in the late twentieth century. The Army faced persistent conflict in the Global War on Terrorism that it had never faced before. It found that its forces were not well suited to the conflict and needed to be smaller and able to be a “plug and play” force that could be tailored to specific missions. The solution was modularity. In response, the Army’s personnel community developed Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR). LTC Nichols, the director of the Human Resource Qualification Course stated,

Why did the Adjutant General Corps give up its personnel support battalions? The answer is rather simple, but the effects of that decision are still being discovered today. … The short answer is that the Army has transformed into a brigade combat team/brigade-centric force, restructuring brigades to have the organic capabilities they need to accomplish assigned tasks. The long answer is that the human resources (HR) community was told to reduce its support command and control footprint on the battlefield, and the Army’s transformation to brigade-centric operations allowed for the transfer of the functions of the personnel service battalion to the S-1.²

Two issues lie within this explanation. Because the decision was made after being “told to reduce footprint”³ rather than based on a solid mission analysis of capability needed. This invites risk because the critical mission analysis may be lacking. Surprisingly, there has been very little research into how effective PSDR has been. In his assessment of PSDR, COL Michael Masley laments this fact as well as the fact that the available published research comes from the junior officer practitioners rather than the personnel community’s senior leaders,

An overall observation found that there is a lack of documented lessons
learned and writings by senior HR professionals (Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels) about how Army leaders implemented and conducted PSDR at the division, corps and theater levels, even though junior HR professionals (Lieutenants to Majors, Warrant Officers, and Noncommissioned Officers) are writing about their experiences at the battalion and brigade levels. … However finding a documented account written by a senior HR leader (Lieutenant Colonel or above) about the impacts and implementation of PSDR at the division and higher level was almost impossible.4

This study examines brigade level strength management as a critical component of PSDR and finds that the redesign was effective in many areas, but that there was an overreach on strength management doctrine. Strength management is the term that I will use in this study. It is synonymous with the doctrinal term “Personnel Readiness Management” (PRM), which is itself a subset of the Manning the Force” HR Core Competency. FM 1-0 explains this as “The objective of the manning the force strategy is to ensure that the right people are in the right places with the right skills to fully capitalize on their warfighting expertise. Properly manning units is vital to assuring the fulfillment of missions as a strategic element of national policy; it enhances predictability; and ensures that leaders have the people necessary to perform assigned tasks.”5 There is no doctrinal term of “strength monitoring.” The accepted use of “strength monitoring” came about as a result of moving strength management functions to brigades. Strength monitoring came to mean a relatively more passive oversight role of a brigade’s higher headquarters. Personnel strength management functions need to be returned to the general officer headquarters where it formally resided rather than the colonel level brigade that it moved to under the redesigned concept. Moving strength management back to divisions also completely eliminates strength monitoring and clears up confusion as to roles and responsibilities. The rationale for returning the strength management functions is not an indictment of the PSDR concept. PSDR was a much needed redesign of personnel doctrine – the concept just needs to be tweaked a bit. Masley had it right in his assessment of PSDR when he stated,
Perhaps one answer is that senior leaders who implemented PSDR did the best they could during a challenging time and accomplished many positive steps during the transformation of the Army’s Human Resources Support. Then again, the Army’s HR community led by Adjutant General Corps (AG) professionals (civilians, officers and enlisted Soldiers) must still refine and PSDR to continue to improve HR support to the Army for the future. 

The justification for returning to the old way of doing business is based on numerous factors. The larger staffs of general officer level organizations are more capable than brigade staffs. Put another way, brigade staff lack the resources, expertise and training (as a general statement, there are exceptions) to conduct strength management. A corollary is that brigade strength management is often personality dependent on the personality and background of the S1, brigade commander and the personnel leadership and commander of the higher headquarters. Another reason brigade level strength management needs to be returned to the general officer headquarters is the reality in the field and the assumptions of modularity. Modularity assumed a brigade centric Army and the elimination of at least some senior headquarters. While brigade centricity occurred, the elimination of headquarters did not. This resulted in division headquarters that still exist and are not willing to give up their former role. As a result, there are still significant remnants of strength management occurring at levels between brigades and Human Resources Command (HRC). A final reason to re-examine brigade level strength management is the development of Adjutant General (AG) Corps officers. Under the previous system, the Division Strength Manager billet was a Branch Qualifying (now Key Developmental) job for an Army AG officer. If the job was that important in the past, a strong rationale would need to be offered for the elimination and/or transfer of such positions.

**Personnel Organization Structure**

Army Brigade S1 shops were increased from seven personnel to thirteen personnel. These additions would be needed for 48 Brigade Combat Trams (BCTs). The Maneuver Battalions in the
BCT increased from eight personnel to ten personnel. Separate Special Troops Battalions (essentially Division and higher levels that did not have a parent brigade) increased from five personnel to ten personnel. The new requirements of three Human Resource Sustainment Centers (HRSCs) were 83 personnel each. There were also new requirements for Military Mail Terminals (18 PAX), R5 (Reception, replacement, returns to duty, R&R and re-deployment) teams of ten personnel, Human Resource Companies (29 PAX each) as well as Casualty Liaison Teams (5 PAX). It is not the intent of this study to crosswalk all of the billpayers. It is sufficient here to point out the modularity bill is hundreds of Adjutant General Corps authorizations. The bill would largely be paid from the deactivation of Personnel Service Battalions (authorized 180 Soldiers most but not all AG) and the decrease of G1 organizations at the Division of approximately 50% of G1 structure. Since the Essential Personnel Services (EPS) workload transferred to the Brigades, this re-distribution of personnel is logical. However, this re-distribution removes a level of quality assurance and higher headquarters expertise that subordinate units may draw upon. This can cause numerous problems in the area of strength management. One of the critical assumptions in PSDR is “A BCT-centric force means a major shift in workload from SRC-12 units to BCT/BDE (no habitual relationships with DIV/CORPS), major changes from linear processing, results in BCT/BDE discrete TOE S1 section with reduction in SRC-12 units.” What has occurred is that there is a habitual relationship with Divisions and Corps. Because the underlying assumptions of PSDR has not occurred, it is completely appropriate to re-examine the design of PSDR.

**Brigade Versus Division Capability**

Brigades are fully capable of performing many of the PSDR functions that they received as part of their new mission. However, strength management is problematic. Many Brigade S1s are majors from other branches who may be on their first personnel assignment. This major has a
lieutenant as the only other commissioned officer in the S1 section. The LT had the title of Brigade Strength Manager. A LT simply lacks the experience to be an effective strength manager. The experience from the field suggests that the position should be authorized as a CPT. 1st Infantry Division conducted a study on strength management capabilities/structure and concluded, “BCT S1 – No change accept (sic) strength manager should be a CPT (42B).” 10th Mountain Division had the same conclusion when they stated, “BCT – the lieutenant strength mgr should be a CPT - primary focus, personnel readiness. Virtually all of the BDEs that I’ve observed in 10th MTN as the Deputy G1 and G1 since implementation of PSDR filled the LT billet in the BDE S1 with a CPT. The common consensus is that a LT rarely possesses the experience or technical expertise to perform that function effectively.” Because Manning The Force is an HR Core Competency, failure of that task risks failure of the HR function and potentially failure of the entire mission. A unit will be substantially at risk of degraded mission performance if they do not have the right personnel in sufficient numbers. These ideas were prevalent in the Forces Command G1 Strength Management Review. Some may argue that a LT can be mentored by other officers in the Bde S1 or that strength management duties can be performed, in part, by the Bde S1. This is problematic. The only other officer in the Bde S1 organization is the MAJ who serves as the S1. The Bde S1 also had a myriad of other responsibilities other than strength management. One author went so far to point out that, “a brigade or battalion S-1 primarily served as a unit Adjutant rather than an HR professional. The NHRP [National Human Resources Provider] disseminated policy guidance through a series of regulations and Department of the Army pamphlets.” However, changing culture takes time. The S-1 will likely always have some adjutant responsibilities. The distinction between adjutant and more technical personnel duties is the difference between AG and G1. The adjutant duties are more commander’s staff assistant functions. These could be items like calendar
management, protocol, rating scheme management etc. The G1 duties are the HR Core Competencies of: Manning the Force, Provide HR Services, Coordinate Personnel Support, and HR Planning and Operations. As an example of the demands of an S-1 time, the feedback of 1ID is very instructive. Their Division STB S1 was not able to do strength management in a deployed environment.

Upon deployment, the DHHB S1 was expected to manage not only their own Unit but numerous RFFs as well as 39 separate FTNs that are currently OPCON to the CJTF-1. The unit S1 could not manage this load and it shifted to the strength team. In a deployed theater the strength team is engaged with accountability and management of the FML (Force Manning Level) and BOG (Boots on the Ground). The G1/J1 Team would not be able to do this if we had not created a strength team in Garrison.

The 1st Infantry Division G1 also noted the limitations of Brigade S1s doing strength management.

We do allow them to work individual things, however overall all has to come through G1. Not necessarily, when they are not, they call the G1 and I review and if necessary I make the call and coordinate directly and if necessary I make the call and coordinate directly for them which usually works better.

Continuing the theme of experience and expertise, the G1 stated,

The Strength Manager is a 2LT at a BCT. Usually the LT comes directly out of OBC and thrown into the job with no knowledge of strength management. Strength Management is more of an art than a function of trying to predict moves, trying to think two or three steps ahead of both your CG and HRC to ensure the unit is prepared for a mission. As well as at times working issues to ensure your Commander has everything he needs in terms of personnel to complete a mission (being relevant to your commander). This may not necessarily line up with HRC manning levels but combat missions are not always in alignment with MTOE. For example here in Afghanistan as a CJTF-1, I have numerous requirements my MTOE does not fill, JVB, RCC, development cell, reintegration cell etc. All have to be run by a FG Officer that the MTOE does not take into account so you move personnel internally, divert, beg HRC for “just a couple more 01As” and in turn meet your commanders intent any way you can.

Brigade Personnel Experience/Expertise

The success or failure of strength management at the brigade level is largely a function of the personalities and or preferences of the commanders and personnel officers of the BCTs and their
division headquarters. Nearly universally, division commanders expect G1s to engage in active strength management rather than merely strength monitoring. Soldier Support Institute concluded,

G1s continue to perform strength management tasks and are currently executing vs monitoring (emphasis in original) in order to cross-level strength, perform field grade slating, manage reduction of non-deployables, etc. as required to support the operational requirements of the commander. Div Cdrs expect predictive analysis, immediate feedback, implementation of proactive solutions, and active management of personnel at div level.15

Similarly, current Forces Command Strength Manager and former 10th Mountain Division G1 stated, “The command climate through all four CGs since implementation of PSDR on Ft Drum has dictated an engaged strength management cell at division level.”16 Conversations with two previous 10th Mountain Division G1s confirmed this statement.17 At the BCT level, how engaged the S1 is with HRC is often determined by the Bde Cdr and the Bde S1. The AAR of the PSDR pilot program noted that a “Unit visit to HRC is productive” and “The feedback from the units stated the trip was invaluable in making contacts… Additionally it helped debunk the ‘mystique’ surrounding the Hoffman building.”18 Unfortunately, oftentimes the HRC assignment managers don’t even know who a BCT S1 is. HRC may no longer be at the Hoffman building, but this observation is as true today as it was in 2005.19

**Personnel Training**

One of the recurring themes in the research literature was a need for training. The PSDR pilot found, S-1 Soldiers need/desire additional training.

Commanders and S-1s expressed a strong desire for S-1 specific training (strength management, how does the HRC assign soldiers etc.). Majority of training provided by the Pilot training teams was system specific (EMILPO, EDAS, and TOPMIS) and to only select unit S1 personnel. The S-1 officers assigned are not AG officers and the transition to the S-1 position is difficult and challenging.20
There were three recommendations one of which was, “Implement sustainment training at the installation managed by the G-1 or MPD.”\textsuperscript{21} Having a robust G1 organization facilitates training as a CSL selected senior HR officer will be leading an organization large enough to provide valuable training and oversight. In the PSDR pilot AAR, the finding was that, “G1 was performing most strength management functions.”\textsuperscript{22} A recommendation was, “Division of responsibilities should be spelled out in doctrine such as FM 1-0 and not left to individual installations.”\textsuperscript{23} Similarly, the pilot observed,

Division of strength management responsibilities between BCT/BDE S-1s and G-1 is unclear. Role of the G-1 in strength management continues to evolve. The modular G-1 is no longer authorized a robust strength management section; however, the G-1 retains responsibility to monitor unit fill, translate the Commander’s intent, and perform Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting (PASR). BCT/Bde commander’s now own their own DMSL and are responsible for their own personnel fill.\textsuperscript{24}

It seems that nearly eight years later, neither of these situations has appreciably changed. Even this statement from the pilot AAR points out significant problems that was never fully addressed: roles and responsibilities are still not completely codified in doctrine and it seems universally clear that G-1s have some strength responsibilities (at least monitoring, if not management). However, the resources to accomplish even a minimal mission were stripped from the MTOE. Restoring doctrine and previous personnel cuts is the most efficient way to address these long-standing concerns.

**Modularity Assumptions**

As noted by numerous authors (Wark, Masley, Gill, Nichols etc) as well as the Army documents on PSDR, the assumption of modularity was that BCTs would be “plug and play” and not necessarily have a habitual relationship with a parent division headquarters. This was most clearly stated in “Adjutant General Corps HR Support to the Modular Army” when they stated the personnel impact of PSDR is “A BCT – centric force means a major shift in workload to BCT/BDE
(no habitual relationships with DIV/CORPS), major changes from linear processing, results in
increases in BCT/BDE discrete TOE S1 section with reduction in SRC-12 units.”25 Obviously, today Bdes still have a strong habitual relationship with their Division. They may be “plug and play” when deployed, but at home station, they are still very much under the C2 of the division HQs. The second assumption of PSDR was the fielding of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS). Obviously, DIMHRS has not been fielded. Since MTOEs where partially built under the assumption of DIMHRS, it is completely appropriate to revisit manning levels. Masley succinctly notes the issue,

Leaders’ responses at all levels agreed that the Army’s inability to field the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) had a negatively impacted (sic) on the organizational structure, workload and manning of HR Soldiers at the battalion and brigade levels. A key premise of PSDR was that when Department of Defense (DOD) and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) fielded an HR information system, users of battalion and brigade level HR systems would be staffed, though not trained, to accomplish their assigned tasks and HR responsibilities. However, DOD and HQDA did not field DIMHRS, and many HR leaders think that until the Army implements an integrated HR information management system to support automated Personnel Information Management (PIM), Strength Reporting (SR), Personnel Accountability (PA), and Personnel Readiness Management (PRM), that brigade and battalion S-1 sections will remain undermanned.26

Previously strength management was done at the Division level. Because this was a BQ or KD job, it was highly sought after similar to the way a maneuver officer might seek an S3 job. This usually resulted in the Division Strength Manager being “one of the best” with a great deal of HR (and many times specific strength management) experience. Oftentimes, the Division Strength Manager had previous S1 experience. The Division Strength Manager had a robust team. The Enlisted Strength Management section was led by a warrant officer with many years of experience while the officer strength management section was led by a company grade officer. The level of capability was much greater when strength management was at the Division level.
The concept of Brigade Level Strength Management was that HRC would fill Brigades at the Distribution Management Sub-Level (DMSL). HRC does in fact cut orders to this level. There are numerous issues though. If 1st Bde on an installation is at 80% in MOS 11B and calls the assignment manager at HRC, the very first thing HRC will do is, quite correctly, look at 11B strength on the installation. If 2nd Bde is at 120%, HRC will say that the installation is at 100% and needs to crosslevel. It is true that the installation needs to crosslevel. However, as 1st Infantry Division notes, “The capability [crossleveling] is available at BCTs but they do not have the authority to mover personnel from outside their BCT.” If there were no Division/Corps habitual relationship, HRC would have to cut the orders (or have an installation Military Personnel Division (MPD) assume this mission). HRC intends for the installation to do the crossleveling and FM 1-0 specifically discusses “strength monitoring”. The issue is twofold: 1) Division G1s are not resourced to do a very robust strength monitoring and 2) Division commanders still have a habitual relationship with their Brigades and expect much more than “strength monitoring.” A prime example of this is a field grade slate. Most Division Commanders still establish a field grade slate. LTC Lawrence, 1ID G1 states it well. “…from talking to my mentors and peers GO expectations have never changed even when PSDR was incorporated.” This is actually a good thing. The alternative produces some very negative results. One major could get assigned to a BCT and have the opportunity to perform many KD or BQ jobs. Another major is assigned to the Division staff and never receives the same opportunity. His promotion and command opportunity is significantly decreased. In reality, this does not occur because Senior Mission Commanders are involved. FM 1-0 calls this strength monitoring, but depending on the level of involvement and the personality of the Senior Mission Commander, it turns very quickly to strength management.
Modularity’s original assumptions of no habitual relationships between Divisions/Corps and BCTs and/or elimination of Division/Corps echelons of command did not completely occur. The current doctrine is that Division headquarters have training and readiness oversight (TRO) over their BCTs. According to Soldier Support Institute, the Army is explicitly changing to have greater reliance on aligning BCTs to Divisions, “Per FORSCOM G1 several Army leaders have raised concerns that a strength management capability is required at Div/Corps level, especially in light of the effort to align BCTs and other BDE elements to the divisions.” A key component of TRO would is influencing of resources. Divisions can influence personnel through “strength monitoring.” The key issue is how are disagreements between a COL BCT Commander and a MG Division Commander resolved? Given that the Division Commander likely rates or senior rates the BCT commander, it seems fairly certain that the Division HQs will prevail in the disagreement. This would no longer be strength monitoring and has now crossed into strength management.

As noted previously, HRC will not crosslevel on an installation. This is completely logical and follows good de-centralization principles. However, Division G1 shops are not resourced to crosslevel (at least if there were significant crossleveling and diversions taking place). Also, once the Division HQs is engaged in a significant amount of crossleveling and/or diversions, then they are engaged in strength management functions.

Current doctrine may very well state that Divisions will engage in strength monitoring vice strength management. However, the reality on the ground is that Division Commanders expect their G1s to be conducting strength management. Because Division G1 shops are not resourced for strength management, this puts the Division G1s in a difficult position. Obviously, they will do what their boss expects. But there will be a cost. Missions that they are resourced for will suffer or
Soldiers will just have to “do more with less.” Either case is sub-optimal, especially in an Army that may already be stretched thin.

**Development of AG Officers**

The position of Division Strength Manager in the pre-modularity organization was considered a critical position (BQ/KD). Given this relative importance, it is difficult to argue that strength management can be done by a LT at the BCT level or by a MAJ at the BCT level as an additional duty. Even if it were possible to conduct strength management with less experienced personnel, another critical question arises. If there is no field grade level strength management position outside of senior level headquarters, how will the Army develop strength managers with the necessary experience to serve at Army Commands like Forces Command or at HRC? Restoring strength management positions at the Division level not only increases the capability of the Division mission, but it has the significant added benefit of developing Soldiers for future service at higher levels of command.

**Recommendations**

FORSCOM recognizes the need for strength management at the division level. The FORSCOM characterization of the issue is:

- Corps and Division G1s do not have a common operating picture with regard to strength management (SM)
- HQs, FORSCOM has expressed concern with the current level of Strength Management capability in our Divisions, BCTs, Mission Support Elements (MSE) and Human Resources (HR) Command G1/S1 sections.
- Per FORSCOM G1 several senior Army leaders have raised concerns that a strength management capability is required at Div/Corps level, especially in light of the effort to align BCTs and other BDE elements to the divisions.
- IAW TRADOC TASKORD IN120934 – US Army Soldier Support Institute (SSI) with assistance from CAC/MCCoE/MCoE will conduct a DOTMLPFP and troop-to-task analysis with Div/BCT/MSE and HR Commands in an attempt to uncover how much time and resources are used to conduct SM Operations and identify second and third order effects, providing feedback with associated force structure change recommendations NLT 16 July 2012.
FORSCOM plans a pilot program at selected Divisions which will document a seven PAX strength management section at each division.\textsuperscript{30}

FORSCOMs plan is exactly the correct course of action and it corresponds to the findings of several Division G1s. The seven PAX should consist of: 1 MAJ, 1 CPT, 1 WO and four NCOs/Soldiers.

One troubling part of FORSCOM’s recommendation is the potential billpayers. The SSI guidance is, “Define/Clarify doctrinal structure with recommended changes and appropriate billpayers (incl from BCT S1 if necessary) for structure change as part of the Army 2020 design.”\textsuperscript{31} Making BCT S1s a billpayer is the wrong direction. Even though BCTs, should not be in the strength management business, PSDR was highly effective in pushing Essential Personnel Services closer to the Soldier. This trend must be maintained. As COL Wark, quite correctly states, “Feedback from operational commanders whose brigades have converted to PSDR has been very favorable.”\textsuperscript{32} The billpayer should be given back to the Army and not be the Adjutant General Corps positions that were created under modularity. The benefits of having EPS at the BCT level have simply proven to be very valuable. Similarly, the benefits of having AG forces of HRSCs, HR Companies, and R5 and Casualty teams has been valuable in supporting the current warfight. The drawback was the oversight of the BCTs. Having the Army resource some of this oversight reverses some of the negative costs of modularity. The bill to the Army of 10 Division strength management sections would be a relatively small 70 positions.

In a zero growth constrained environment, the proposal of adding positions may not be feasible. If that is found to be the case by force management, then I suggest using echelons above Division HR resources (HRSCs, HR Companies) to pay the bill. While it is true that these organizations have been extremely valuable in supporting the current warfight, in a priority drill it
may be more valuable to eliminate a small number of their positions to support day to day operations in Division sized units rather than have forces dedicated to an ARFORGEN cycle.

Masley, notes this has already been discussed,

"The field does not know what we do was a recurring reminder that HRSC Responsibilities and structure was not well understood. One AAR comment questioned whether the cost of the HRSC equals or surpasses the value of the HRSC. In the eyes of some, the cost of the HRSC surpassed its value. As a result, division and Corps G-1 leaders suggested redistributing HR Company and HRSC assets to division and corps staffs to augment personnel support within tactical and operational units when needed."

This is already how HRSC’s are used. COL Wark noted, “Currently, over 40 personnel augment the ARCENT (FWD) G-1 section beyond the thirteen allocated to the Operational Command Post of the ASCC. The individual augmentation requirements hinders the delivery of other HR support.” This comment was written in 2008, but the situation still exists today. Some of this augmentation comes from the HRSC that is supporting the CENTCOM AOR. The impact of making HRSC’s the billpayer is less forces to support ARFORGEN will be shorter dwell time for HR ARFORGEN units or a greater reliance on individual augmentees to form “pickup” teams to support deployment missions. While both of these are not ideal and involve an acceptance of risk, that risk is less than the current resourcing of Division G1 organizations. That is especially true if the current demand for deploying units is reduced because of reduced operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. During the height of deployment, the Army may have had no choice but to have the HR units available at the expense of Division units.

Another possible choice of billpayer is the installation MSE. Several G-1s note that they have already tapped into installation MSEs to assist with strength management functions. The drawback to using the MSE as a billpayer is that MSEs are, in many cases, highly civilianized organizations and thus may not be deployable and thus may not meet “green suit” billpayer. A
second drawback is that MSEs have assumed an area mission and support all units on a given installation. That capability will have to be maintained.

PSDR is six years old. We have learned many lessons. Masley stated the crux of the issue, “Did the HR community get PSDR right? A simple response of yes or no will not give justice to the question or the analysis of PSDR.”36 The EPS part of PSDR was highly successful, but strength management functions need to be maintained at Division and above level. Because the EPS portion of PSDR is so successful, we must resist the urge to “correct” PSDR by making BCTGs the billpayer. The bill to correct strength management is seven PAX sections. The Army should look for other ways to pay this bill rather than fix one HR problem and cause another. If HR senior leaders must prioritize, looking at HRSCs or MSE would be a first critical step.
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<td>Adjutant General</td>
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<td>Army Force Generation</td>
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<td>Branch Qualifying (see also KD)</td>
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<td>HR</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
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<td>PASR</td>
<td>Personnel Accountability and Strength Reporting</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIM</td>
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<td>PSDR</td>
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<td>R5</td>
<td>Reception, Replacement, Returns to duty, R&amp;R, Re-deployment</td>
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Notes

2. LTC Christopher B. Nichols, “Personnel Services Delivery Redesign,” *Army Logistician* 41, no. 4 (July-August 2009), 1.
7. U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute, *AG Corps HR Support to the Modular Army*, (Fort Jackson, SC), 22 February 2006, 11.
9. LTC John D. Lawrence, G1, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, to the author, e-mail, 7 December 2012.
10. LTC Richard W. Nelson, G1, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY, to the author, e-mail 18 December 2012.
14. LTC John D. Lawrence, G1, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, to the author, e-mail, 7 December 2012.
15. COL Jeffrey Powell, G1 Strength Management Review, staff study, 5 June 2012, 4.
16. LTC Richard W. Nelson, G1, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY, to the author, e-mail 18 December 2012.
17. COL Emma Coulson (former G1, 10th Mountain Division), interview by the author 11 December 2012.
19. Prior to its relocation to its present headquarters at Fort Knox, KY, the U.S. Army Human Resources command was located in two buildings leased from the Hoffman corporation. These two Hoffman buildings were located in Alexandria, VA.


27. Combined Joint Task Force-1, Division G1 Strength Management Capabilities Analysis, 25 April 2012, 1.

28. LTC John D. Lawrence, G1, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, to the author, e-mail, 7 December 2012.

29. COL Jeffrey Powell, G1 Strength Management Review, staff study, 5 June 2012, 4

30. LTC Marion Salters, G1, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY, to the author, 6 December 2012.

31. COL Jeffrey Powell, G1 Strength Management Review, staff study, 5 June 2012, 12.


35. COL Jeffrey Powell, G1 Strength Management Review, staff study, 5 June 2012, 5.

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