THE NEWEST AIR FORCE CORE FUNCTION:

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

by

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Biography

Lt Col Jim Kockler completed Undergraduate Pilot Training and later flew both the EF-111 Raven and F-15E Strike Eagle. He served as Future Operations Director and Joint Fires Officer at Commander, Second Fleet, Norfolk Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia. In his previous assignment, Lt Col Kockler served as the Associate Dean for Operations at the Air Command and Staff College as well as an instructor in the Department of Joint Warfighting. He has flown over 100 combat missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia logging over 2,200 hours in Air Force aircraft. In addition to his Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Notre Dame, he received a Master of Science Degree in Aerospace Engineering from the State University of New York at Buffalo and a Master of Arts in Military Operational Art and Science from Air University.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Since the United States assumed the role of a leading security provider after the end of World War II, the Department of Defense has worked actively to build the defense capacity of allied and partner states. ... In today’s complex and interdependent security environment, these dimensions of the U.S. defense strategy have never been more important. U.S. forces, therefore, will continue to treat the building of partners’ security capacity as an increasingly important mission.¹

Quadrennial Defense Review Report
February 2010

Since its creation in 1947, the United States Air Force (USAF) has participated in building partnerships (BP) with other friendly nations. Over the past ten years, the USAF role in BP expanded due to a major air advisory role in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other support activities around the world.

Based on these expanding roles in the last decade, and the BP guidance contained in the Department of Defense (DoD) 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) authored the 2008 Air Force Global Partnership Strategy (AFGPS) to guide BP activities. In February 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense named BP as one of nine joint capability areas (JCA) and thus elevated the importance of BP across the entire DoD.² Similarly, in August 2008, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) made “Building Partnerships” one of 12 core functions, intending to “streamline Air Force lexicon” and align terminology between services and the DoD.³ Unlike such traditional Air Force core functions as “Air Superiority,” “Space Superiority,” or “Nuclear Deterrence Operations,” Airmen are not familiar with this new BP core function. Additionally, the organization, training and equipping of these BP activities remain immature when compared to other legacy core functions.
In order to address these potential shortfalls, the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) developed a Building Partnerships “Core Function Master Plan (CFMP)” mapping the service BP strategy over the next twenty years. In this master plan, the Air Force defined a strategic vision as well as long-term ends, ways and means required to effectively build partnerships. The service’s strategic vision is to provide our nation with “an Air Force organized, trained, and equipped to build trusted partnerships that enhance the security of the United States and our partners.” In order to fulfill this strategic vision, the Air Force will possess the following attributes:

1. clear understanding of USAF BP capabilities and capacities
2. clear understanding of international demand for US aviation defense articles and services
3. sufficient USAF capability and capacity to engage with partners at all readiness levels
4. fully institutionalized BP core function within the USAF corporate structure
5. robust BP force plan; appropriately developing, tracking, sustaining, and employing personnel with the right competencies in the right positions
6. fully integrated and synchronized with Air Reserve Component (ARC) forces
7. synchronized with Joint, interagency, industry, non-governmental agencies, and international partners, etc., to leverage efficiencies and conserve resources

Figure 1. Building Partnership Attributes

These attributes are similar to “ends” in an “ends-ways-means” construct. Additionally, the partnership activities are the “means” required to achieve the “ends.” Finally, the BP CFMP describes the “ways” the USAF will reach the BP attributes with partnership activities. As an example, Figure 1 shows current BP “means”:
Thus, the USAF would share intelligence, exchange personnel, transfer technologies, and exercise with our established NATO partners, but would require other activities with developing nations. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the USAF requires air advisors, state partnership programs, and security, stabilization, transition and reconstruction teams. In all situations, the USAF engages partners with senior leader contacts, public affairs, health engagement, embassy support, training and education.

This paper analyzes current Air Force BP strategy using a “Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF)” methodology to find service capability gaps in this core function. In contrast to the DOTMLPF studies in the acquisition community to define “needed capabilities to guide the development of affordable systems [or material (emphasis added)],”

\[\text{Figure 2. Building Partnership Means}^{6}\]
by investigating the current state of BP doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities.

Each chapter of this paper discusses one or a combination of DOTMLPF factors, and at the end of each section, proposes conclusions at the end of each section. In the paper’s final chapter, this author presents a series of recommendations to enhance future BP capabilities in this new Air Force core function.
Chapter 2

Doctrine

“Building Partnerships” is a new term to describe effective partnering efforts that are decades old. “BP” is a new wine skin for old wine. Major Ann Halle, USAF

Author, AFDD 3-20 DRAFT, LeMay Center

Faced with a long war against insurgent enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff significantly reformed joint doctrine in the past decade creating new counterinsurgency, stability operations and foreign internal defense joint doctrine. Upon this foundation of joint doctrine, the LeMay Center, formerly the AF Doctrine Center, is drafting Building Partnerships doctrine. This draft doctrine defines “Building Partnerships” as an overarching term consisting of building partner capacity (BPC), security cooperation (SC), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and other military activities (OMA). From these terms, one can remember Air Force BP construct by the following “formula” and the accompanying definitions:

\[ BP = BPC + SC + FID + OMA \]

BP: Airmen interacting with international airmen and other relevant actors to develop, guide, and sustain relationships for mutual benefit and security.

BPC: Focused unified actions (by Airmen) to develop the capability and capacity of partner forces and their supporting institutions to achieve common objectives.

SC: All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host-nation.

FID: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.

Clarifying these BP terms supported other Air Force doctrine, namely FID and Irregular Warfare (IW). In mid-2007, the service released Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDDs) 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense and 3-24, Irregular Warfare. AFDD 3-24 highlighted the importance of “Building Partnership Capacity” stating: “Successful efforts to combat IW threats require international cooperation and commitment. BPC is the best strategy for achieving this. BPC is
described as targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the DOD and its partners. BPC encompasses security assistance (SA), foreign military sales (FMS), and FID activities.” Additionally, AFDD 3-24 described the importance of intelligence sharing, exercises, technology transfer and aviation advisory programs as well as the significance of language proficiency and cultural awareness. Similarly, AFDD 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, described the majority of the building partnership activities encountered by the USAF in Iraq and Afghanistan. In AFDD 3-22’s opening chapter, “Foreign Internal Defense Fundamentals,” the doctrine defines seven core FID activities (see Figure 2):

![Figure 3. FID Activities](image)

In turn, one can summarize these FID activities using the acronym “ATAAE”: assess, train, advise, assist and equip. At first glance, current FID and IW doctrine provide an excellent foundation for drafting BP doctrine.

Despite the solid foundation of BP doctrine in FID and IW, the new draft of AFDD-1 “Air Force Basic Doctrine” over-emphasizes “Core Functions” at the expense of Air Force “Operational Functions” and “Distinctive Capabilities” from the previous version of AFDD-1. The 2003 AFDD-1 defines distinctive capabilities as “the combination of professional
knowledge, air and space power expertise, and technological fluency that, when applied, produces superior military capabilities or effects.”

These distinctive capabilities – Air and Space Superiority, Information Superiority, Global Attack, Precision Engagement, Rapid Global Mobility, and Agile Combat Support – are “not necessarily unique to the Air Force, but represent what the Air Force does better than any other organization.” In order to provide these distinctive capabilities to a Joint Force Commander, one or more [of the seventeen] air and space power operational functions may be required. Operational functions, defined as the “broad, fundamental, and continuing activities of air and space power” are “warfighting tasks…deliver[ing] air and space power to the JFC…[to] create an effect at the operational level [of war].” For example, the Coalition Forces Air Component Commander cannot achieve “air and space superiority,” an Air Force distinctive capability, without performing the four operational functions of “counterair, counterspace, information operations, and command and control.”

The draft AFDD-1 combined distinctive capabilities and operational functions into “core functions” and in turn, the “Building Partnerships” core function resulted from a DoD Directive assigning the BP function to all services in 2009. While responsive to the DoD directive, the genesis of BP as a core function violated how doctrine “should be based in critical analysis and lessons of warfare rather than driven by rapidly changing policies, promising technologies, individual personalities, budget battles, and politically trendy catch-phrases. Doctrine should not be written backwards [to] justify a policy position or codify a uniquely tailored organization.” Furthermore, the draft AFDD-1 describes “core functions” as:

ways in which the Air Force is particularly and appropriately suited to contribute to national security, but they do not necessarily express every aspect of what the Air Force contributes to the nation. Nonetheless, the ‘consolidated’ use of core functions evolved with the intent to meld the ‘organize, train, and equip’ functions the Air Force performs according to Title 10 of the United
States Code with the warfighting functions it performs according to its established doctrine and operational experience.\textsuperscript{25}

The designation of BP as a core function could not exist without our Allies and friends desiring the USAF’s ability to perform its “operational functions” and the resulting “distinctive capabilities” provided to combatant commanders. For example, new Eastern European NATO Allies desire partnerships because the USAF can combine the operational functions of “counterair, counterspace, information operations, and command and control” to achieve the distinctive capability “air and space superiority.”\textsuperscript{26} An effective partnership could enable this Eastern European nation to effectively defend its own sovereign airspace while simultaneously facilitating this nation’s contribution to NATO missions around the globe as a strategic partner. Building a solid foundation of Air Force basic doctrine and service-specific BP doctrine will enable these partnerships to endure as the Air Force continues to train and educate future generations of Airmen, and the paper describes specific doctrinal recommendations in Chapter 6.
Chapter 3

Organization

Across the USAF there are many organizations performing Building Partnership[s] activities (from Headquarters to unit levels). However, Service-wide visibility, coordination, and processes are not well defined. From top to bottom, the USAF must assess its Building Partnerships organizational structure and make alignments, adjustments, and consolidations where appropriate. This effort will further enhance core function effectiveness, reduce duplication/redundancies, and maximize efficiencies and resources.37

Air Force Organizations
Building Partnerships Core Function Master Plan 2010-2030

Airmen execute the building partnerships core function in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) world-wide under the command and control of the regional Commander of Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR). On the other hand, Air Force organizational support for this core function is shared between two Headquarters Air Force (HAF) offices:

SAF/IA and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Planning (AF/A3/5).28 The BP CFMP explained:

SAF/IA is responsible for oversight and advocacy of all USAF international programs and policies. In collaboration with the combatant commands, AF/A3/5 determines operational requirements, capabilities, and training necessary to support national security objectives and military strategy. Together, they define and articulate USAF support for DoD-level BP strategy as outlined in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force and Defense Planning and Programming Guidance.39

More specifically, SAF/IA is responsible “for the Air Force Global Partnership Strategy (AFGPS)...[as well as] oversight and advocacy of Air Force international programs and policies...[while serving] as the lead Air Force agent for building global partnerships and overseeing the Building Partnerships Capability Portfolio.”30 The AFGPS, signed by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and CSAF, defines organizational roles and responsibilities to all Air Force organizations engaged in BP, including the AF/A3/5.31 With respect to BP, the AF/A3/5 oversees current USAF partnering activities and integrates BP capabilities into
contingency plans for joint operations worldwide. In the AFGPS, the AF/A3/5 contributes through the following roles:

1. Develops the USAF campaign support plan to support theater campaign plans.
2. Coordinates with SAF/IA, sister Services, and interagency components on partnership activities.
4. Develops and executes, in coordination with SAF/IA, USAF participation in exercises, wargames, and BPC seminars.
6. Manages the International Standardization Office supporting the NATO standardization Agency and the Multinational Air Standardization and Interoperability Council.32

In addition to these two primary organizations, the Air Force possesses many other organizations supporting partnership activities:

| SAF/IA: Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs |
| AETC/IA: International Training and Education |
| AFSAT: Air Force Security Assistance and Training |
| AFSAAC: Air Force Security Assistance Center |
| DLIIEC: Defense Language Institute English Language Center |
| IAAFA: Inter-American Air Force Academy |
| AF POLAD: Air Force Political Advisor |
| ACC POLAD: Air Combat Command Political Advisor |
| PACAF POLAD: Pacific Air Forces Political Advisor |
| USAFE POLAD: United States Air Forces in Europe |
| AMC POLAD: Air Mobility Command Political Advisor |
| AFSOC POLAD: Air Force Special Operations Command Political Advisor |
| AFCENT POLAD: Air Forces Central Political Advisor |
| DIMO: Defense Institute for Medical Operations |
| AFCLC: Culture and Language Center |
| AAA: Air Advisor Academy |
| IOS: International Officer School |
| USAFSOS: USAF Special Operations School |
| 6 SOS: 6th Special Operations Squadron |
| ANG BP Cell: Air National Guard Building Partnerships Cell |
| NGB/SPP: National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program |
| IHS: International Health Specialist |

**Figure 4. Building Partnership Organizations**33

These other building partnership organizations (Figure 4), guided by SAF/IA’s AFGPS, provide trained Airmen to satisfy GCC BP requirements world-wide. Although SAF/IA and AF/A3/5 share responsibility for organizational support to the BP core function, the CSAF designated AETC as the lead advocate for BP and thus, the author of the CFMP.
The CSAF designation of AETC as the lead advocate for BP separates the Air Force “subject matter experts” in SAF/IA from implementing the AFGPS through the CFMP. Desiring a MAJCOM advocate for each core function for budgetary reasons, the CSAF chose AETC as the best representative for BP. In order to assist AETC in developing the BP CFMP, SAF/IA developed a “symbiotic” relationship with the AETC staff. The impact of divorcing the organization responsible for BP strategy, SAF/IA, from the command designated to develop a long-term BP CFMP, AETC, will be explored in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4

Training, Leadership and Education, and Facilities

In anticipation of the growing role of security force assistance in U.S. strategy and operations, the Department is institutionalizing general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance; enhancing language, regional, and cultural abilities; strengthening and expanding capabilities for training partner aviation forces, as well as capacities for ministerial-level training; and creating mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel.\textsuperscript{36}

A Defense Risk Management Framework - Operational Risk
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

Department of Defense guidance in the QDR and other directives clearly demonstrates an increased focus on BP training, leadership, education and facilities. In fact, the 2010 QDR proposed three key BP initiatives.\textsuperscript{37} In the first initiative, “Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance,” the QDR noted the services will add more than 500 personnel to their “train-the-trainer” units for general purposes forces.\textsuperscript{38} The second initiative, “Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability,” demonstrated the DoD’s need for “years, not weeks” of training required for foreign language skills and regional and cultural knowledge.\textsuperscript{39} In 2010, the DoD invested $33 million to support language training requirements of military personnel.\textsuperscript{40} In the third initiative, “Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces,” the DoD acknowledged a 50 percent shortfall in addressing the current demand for partner nation aviation training and thus, set a goal to remedy this shortage by FY2012.\textsuperscript{41} Similarly, DoD Directive 5100.01, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,” assigned “Building partnership capacity/security force assistance operations” as a function for all services.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite these DoD initiatives, pre-deployment Air Force and Army training programs for current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have received mixed reviews. Many PRT commanders, Air University faculty, and Air Forces Special Operations Command instructors
agreed the non-combat skills training for IW and/or SSTR was “ad-hoc,” “disorganized,” and “inadequate,” while a recent Coalition Air Force Training Team (CAFTT) end-of-tour report felt “language training continues to miss the mark.”

In the near term, the Air Force BP CFMP advocated an increased “availability of training and education for USAF personnel assigned to US embassy country teams, Combatant Commands, and other BP related positions across the USAF, Air Reserve Component, joint and interagency.” If adopted, the Air Force would increase capacity to train personnel in the USAF Culture and Language Center, the Language Enabled Airmen Program, the Introduction to Culture Course, and Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS) / Political Military Affairs Strategist (PAS) courses.

Additionally, the Air Force addressed the need for the 50 percent increased demand for air advisors by developing an Air Advisory Academy to support all geographic combatant commanders. The training for Air Advisors would leverage the same cultural and language training provided to other service personnel engaged in partnership activities, but this academy would also focus on specific training for the roles and missions forecast for the partner nation’s air force. Then, the Air Force Special Operations Command’s Joint Special Operations University could provide educational support in one-to-two week courses in Irregular Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Cross-Cultural Communications, and regionally based orientation courses. For other support functions to air operations such as maintenance, airfield operations, and intelligence, the 6th Special Operations Squadron and the Joint Special Operations University contain the indigenous capability to train and educate general purpose forces enrolled in the Air Advisor Academy.
The Air Force requires additional BP enabled forces and BP professional forces to meet the increased demand signal for General Purpose Forces (GPF) conducting security cooperation, FID and BPC. Recently, the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) announced a 33 percent increase in BP Professional Forces by expanding the number of Regional Affairs Specialists from 150 today to over 250 by the end of 2011. Clearly, the demand signal from the Combatant Commanders for professional BP forces continues to increase, but the CSAF also described initiatives at the ascension level by enrolling nearly 500 Air Force Academy and ROTC cadets in the Language Enabled Airmen Program. Therefore the BP personnel pyramid (Figure 5) is growing at both its base and its apex.

Figure 5. BP Personnel Roles, Missions, and Education/Training Levels

The expanding base of the BP personnel pyramid reinforces that every Airman is a BP resource. Therefore, BP training commences on the first day of enlisted “Basic Training” or officer ascension training. Inculcating the values of “Integrity, Service before self, and Excellence in all we do” underpins the professionalism of the Air Force as a service. If USAF partnerships fail to instill these basic values in the cultures of partners and allies, our service undermines the development of these militaries as strategic partners. More importantly, our
partner militaries contribute to the legitimacy of nation’s government\textsuperscript{51} – the goal of all BP activities, and an issue addressed further in the paper’s final chapter.
Chapter 5

Personnel

First and foremost, we must mitigate our strategic risk by inculcating warrior ethos and adaptability into our culture, organizations, and processes. The success of the Air Force and the joint team depends upon the ability of our people and organizations to adopt new, relevant operational concepts, suitable to the dynamics of the strategic environment.\textsuperscript{32}

Chapter 7, Risk: Failure to Anticipate, Adapt, and Learn
The 21st Century Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy

Faced with a Long War against insurgent foes around the world and other nations requesting advisory assistance, the Air Force must engage personnel at all levels to develop a force structure to meet these requirements. As depicted in Figure 5, all Air Force personnel participate in building partnerships, and these airmen, based on their level of training and proficiency, can be divided between BP basic, BP enabled, and BP professional forces. First, the BP basic forces comprise all Airmen engaged in security operation exercises or as a part of short duration military training teams. The education and training for these Airmen may be described as episodic since the majority of the required missions are short-term. On the other hand, the BP enabled forces need a continual education and training since their deployment requirements include a greater cultural and linguistic capability. For BP enabled personnel, the mission effectiveness depends upon a longer-term immersion in both language and culture skills. Finally, the BP professionals include embassy personnel such as Regional Area Specialists, attaches, or security assistance officers, and international health specialists. Most BP professionals obtain high language proficiency, if not fluency, and may have a professional degree in their region of expertise.

While some may argue the Air Force cannot afford to invest in BP enabled and professional Airmen in an environment of reduced resources, a successful global partnership
strategy could result in the most cost-effective method to ensure regional security. Despite this reasoning, Air Force senior leaders\textsuperscript{53} acknowledge the difficulty in advocating for BP funding since assessing impact of BP activities on partner nation militaries remains a complex qualitative measure of effectiveness instead of a quantitative measure of performance – a topic discussed in this paper’s final paragraphs.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Recommendations

Nearly twenty years ago as a captain, I was tasked to destroy the Iraqi Air Force. Now, as a general officer, I’m being asked to rebuild it.\textsuperscript{54}

Brigadier General Anthony Rock
Commander, Iraq Training and Advisory Mission – Air Force (ITAM – AF)

This paper investigated a DOTMLPF analysis to determine potential BP capability gaps in this newest Air Force core function. From Chapter 1 – Introduction, the long-term ends for the Building Partnerships core function are:

3. sufficient USAF capability and capacity to engage with partners at all readiness levels (BP Capacity)
5. robust BP force plan; appropriately developing, tracking, sustaining, and employing personnel with the right competencies in the right positions (BP Force Plan)
8. BP lead integrator efficiently/effectively managing the USAF BP core function (BP Lead Integrator)\textsuperscript{55}

Based on the DOTMLPF investigation in this paper, the greatest capability gaps exist in attributes 3, 5 and 8 as depicted below in Table 1. From this table, the Air Force does not have BP capability gaps in “facilities” and thus, does not need to expend further resources in this area. On the other hand, the Air Force should remedy capability gaps in doctrine, organization, training, leadership/education, and personnel.
Recommendation 1A (Doctrine). In the AFDD-1 Draft, return to the “operational function” and “distinctive capability” definitions outlined in the 2003 version of AFDD-1, and change “building partnerships” to two “operational functions”: FID and Security Cooperation. In essence, “building partnerships” is a euphemism for “security cooperation,” and the DoD prefers to use the “partnership” term publicly instead of “security cooperation,” which connotes warfighting. After the DoD publicly declared “building partnerships” as a military department function, the 2008 SAF/IA Global Partnership Strategy (AFGPS) referred to BP numerous times throughout the document. On the other hand, the 2011 draft AFGPS shifts to “security cooperation,” based on the recently released DoD guidance directing all Departments “conduct security cooperation [and] build security capacity of partner states.” Furthermore, “security cooperation” is a term defined in joint doctrine and should be included in AFDD-1 alongside FID as two Air Force “operational functions.”

Recommendation 1B (Doctrine). Rename the current Draft AFDD 3-20 “Building Partnerships” as “Security Cooperation” and carefully define BP-related terms in the opening chapter of the new doctrine. Unfortunately, the term “Building Partnerships” has already permeated into a Joint Capability Area and into the Air Force as a service core function. Despite
the “newness” of BP as service core function, current Air Force doctrine in irregular warfare (AFDD 3-24) and foreign internal defense (AFDD 3-22) effectively supports nearly all current building partnership activities. In fact, only two doctrinal shortfalls exist: first, AFDD needs to clarify the definition of BP, BPC, security cooperation and FID and second, AFDD 3-24 should incorporate support to provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). While the Air Force has service definitions for BP and BPC, the draft AFDD for BP references a DoD definition for security cooperation (see Chapter 2, Doctrine for BP-related definitions). The broader DoD definition of security cooperation results in a near 100 percent overlap between the Air Force BP and BPC definitions if the word “Airmen” is removed from the service definitions. Creating a supporting service definition for FID and security cooperation nested beneath the DoD definitions could clarify the Air Force role in the new BP core function.

A second omission from service doctrine is the concept of provincial reconstruction teams. Since 2006, the Air Force has led six PRTs in Afghanistan and while most of the lessons learned revolved around training, two observations from returning AF PRT/CC’s indicated a lack of doctrinal support. First, the lack of a single Air Force advocate for PRT policy hampers the doctrinal development, and second, the lack of a process to collect, integrate and resolve PRT lessons observed does not allow for institutional improvement. Overall, these two doctrinal discrepancies may be addressed in either the new BP AFDD or in the next revision of AFDD 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

Recommendation 2 (Organization). Both SAF/IA and AETC must synthesize the guidance in the AFGPS and the BP CFMP. If necessary, AETC should add BP Enabled and BP Professional forces to its staff. In the short term, both organizations should consider providing liaison personnel support to one another in drafting of these documents. Finally, in order to
implement the AFGPS and the BP CFMP, AETC and SAF/IA must coordinate on roles and responsibilities as lead integrators for the BP core function. As a starting point, AETC’s CFMP should align assigned BP functions with SAF/IA’s AFGPS designating roles and responsibilities for various AF organizations.

Recommendation 3 (Organization). The Air Force must continue to invest in BP despite the budgetary constraints on the service. Overall, the Air Force, and to a larger extent, the nation’s ability to build partnerships will strengthen both our partner’s and our own security. If successful, deployed Airmen with other DoD, interagency and multinational partners can prevent war instead of deploying in the midst of instability, a violent insurgency, or broader interstate conflict. Therefore, while the Air Force’s return on building partnership investment may never directly materialize, maintaining peace in partner nations or in a specific region should be seen as beneficial to national security.

Recommendation 4 (Training, Leadership/education, Personnel). While emphasizing culture and language skills for Airmen at the ascension level will not pay dividends for decades, at the BP Professional level, the Air Force should carefully manage the careers of these BP Professional officers ensuring some achieve general officer rank to lead organizations such as Iraq Training and Advisory Mission – Air Force (ITAM-AF), Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF)-Afghanistan, or even Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). The Air Force should transition graduated group and wing commanders from overseas commands into BP professional duties to ensure the leadership capacity for these missions exists in the future. While basic language skills and cultural competence remain paramount for these BP professionals, the ability to lead Airmen in their advisory roles to assess, train, assist and equip our partner nations will always take precedence.
The DoD’s response to the current turmoil in Egypt demonstrates the effectiveness of successful BP activities. During the crisis, the Egyptian military did not action against the anti-government protesters nor overtly support the Mubarak regime. Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Defense Secretary Gates leveraged the three decades of working and training together with the Egyptians to remain in contact with their military and civilian counterparts. After Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, 2011, the Egyptian military initiated a peaceful and temporarily rule while promising a transition to a democratically elected government. In addition, an Egyptian government spokesman pledged the government would honor all current international commitments including its peace treaty with Israel and invited Admiral Mullen to Egypt for talks with the transitional government.

Peering into the future, the Air Force could receive a similar return on a BP investment in the Iraqi Air Force. For example, if the Early Bird publishes the following article in 2020, the Air Force should consider this advisory mission as a hard-fought victory in building partnerships:

CSAF congratulates Iraqi pilot on first combat mission
Posted 1/30/2020
By Capt. Chris Jones
Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs

1/30/2020 – Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar – Iraqi F-16 Squadron Commander, Lt Col Jabal Talabani, son of former Iraqi President of the same name, safely touched down at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar after leading his two-ship in an air defense mission over the Persian Gulf in response to Iranian threats to sink a merchant vessel in the Straits of Hormuz. The Gulf Coalition Council (GCC) responded with a show of force over the Persian Gulf in the last forty-eight hours as Iranian naval vessels and military aircraft demonstrated aggressive intent in the vicinity of maritime commercial shipping. Although the Iranians appear to have backed down from the latest round of UN sanctions against its regime, this particular military response from the GCC included a new member: the Iraqi Air Force.

Following the American invasion in 2003, the Iraqi Air Force ceased to exist. In a building partnership mission, the USAF and its coalition partners embarked on assisting the Iraq Air Force and military to rebuild and in turn, help provide legitimacy for the Iraqi government. The mission of the Coalition Air Force Training Team (CAFTT) and later the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission – Air Force did not always proceed smoothly. In 2005, a small Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 7SL aircraft crashed while surveying potential emergency landing sites in Diyala province.
In response to this accident, the USAF added personnel assigned with the mission to “build the foundation of a credible and enduring Iraqi Air Force.” In 2009, Major General Robert Kane, Commander of the CAFTT, provided a roadmap to develop foundational capabilities in Iraqi airmen and combat support forces. On this foundation, the Iraqi Air Force would build operational capabilities eventually resulting in a professional and credible air force.

Ten years after his service in Iraq ended, Retired Colonel Rhea Dobson, USAF and CAFTT Chief of Staff in 2009-2010 said, “I’m proud of my partners in the Iraqi Air Force. Our CAFTT mission not only assisted the professionalism of the Iraqi Air Force, but also increased the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. Today’s a great day in the history of the Iraqi Air Force and I’d be proud to fly on the wing of any Iraqi airmen, anytime and anywhere.”
ENDNOTES


12 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Definitions of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (As Amended through 31 December 2010), 325.


19 AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, 76.

20 AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, 76.


35 Snodgrass, “SAF/IA Building Partnerships.”
51 Colonel Rhea Dobson, USAF, Air Command and Staff College Vice Commandant, interview by the author, 22 February 2011.
53 Snodgrass, “SAF/IA Building Partnerships.”
54 Brig Gen Anthony J. Rock, (address, ACSC Commandant's Call, Wood Auditorium, Maxwell AFB, AL, 28 November 2010).
63 Barnes, “Military Ties are Key”, 2011.
68 Dobson, interview, 2011.
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