A ROADMAP TO IMPROVE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S AFRICA ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

by

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Biography

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I. Introduction

In an era of globalization where increased competition for limited resources and conflicts between nations and peoples are increasing, Africa and African stability have become more important than ever to the United States. In July 2009, President Obama reaffirmed Africa’s strategic importance to the United States during a speech in Ghana where he identified four priorities for the U.S. government’s engagement efforts: supporting strong and sustainable democracies and good governance; fostering sustained economic growth and development; increasing access to quality health and education; helping to prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict. The cornerstones of the US government’s engagement efforts in Africa are the Department of State’s (DoS) Bureau of African Affairs, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) for Africa— the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), and DoD’s Regional Center (RC) for Security Studies for Africa— the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS). These last two are the focus of this work.

In light of this Presidential mandate, this paper contends that ACSS and AFRICOM should be more unified in their efforts to support the United States’ national security objectives in Africa. Specifically, the Africa Center is not optimally structured to support AFRICOM due to lack of leadership and personnel diversity, an outdated business model, facilities constraints, and not
being properly synched with AFRICOM in the areas of engagement, communication, scheduling, and training. Each of these issues contributes to limit a truly unified effort between ACSS and AFRICOM.

**Background**

There are five DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies and each is linked to a particular Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) that serves as its Lead GCC. The US Africa Command serves as the Lead GCC for ACSS and the AFRICOM Commander serves as the rating official for the ACSS Director. The relationship between the Africa Center and AFRICOM is unique in that ACSS is the only Regional Center formed before its Lead GCC; the Africa Center was established in 1999 while AFRICOM was declared a fully unified command on 1 October 2008. The verity of the relationship is that AFRICOM following ACSS was problematic. The Africa Center was well established by the time the US Africa Command was created and AFRICOM inherited ACSS’s organization, policies, practices, and procedures. Add to that formula the reality that AFRICOM is still a new GCC with many relatively inexperienced personnel that are still learning their jobs and growing their processes, and AFRICOM may not have known that it could or should influence changes at ACSS.

To further complicate the relationship between ACSS and AFRICOM, each of the Regional Centers has three masters: the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and the RC’s Lead GCC. The nature of these relationships is
outlined in DoDD 5200.41 and provides for USD-P to provide “policy guidance, direction, and oversight for the Regional Centers”; while DSCA’s primary responsibility is to “program and budget to fund…the operations of each Regional Center.” There are obviously other responsibilities that each of the primary players has, but these are the principal ones. The bottom-line effect of this arrangement is that ACSS has no single boss and therefore is really answerable to no particular authority—though under the current arrangement, it is supposed to directly support AFRICOM.

II. Africa Center Challenges

Leadership and Personnel

The Africa Center has had only four directors since its inception in 1999 and a review of past and present ACSS leadership provides insight into its organizational structure and business model. Its first Director was a DoD civilian with no uniformed military experience, Dr. Nancy J. Walker. Dr. Walker was the Director for four and one half years and during her tenure ACSS developed its initial offering of seminars and conducted its first programs in Africa. The Center’s second Director, General (Ret.) Carlton R. Fulford, USMC, was the only one of the four directors that served as a uniformed military professional. He led the Africa Center for two years and his term as Director was remarkable for several achievements, including: creation of the Next Generation of African Military Leaders Course; formation of alumni associations-called
“Community Chapters”; planned for establishment of an ACSS office on the continent; and the Africa Center’s move to the National Defense University (NDU) campus in Washington, D.C.⁶ The third Director, former Ambassador Peter R. Chaveas, was a career diplomat who came to the Africa Center after retiring from the US Foreign Service.⁷ In his almost two years at the helm, he oversaw the initial working relationship with the recently established AFRICOM, as well as the opening of the Africa Center’s two regional offices in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2006, and in Dakar, Senegal in November 2008.⁸ The fourth and current Director, former Ambassador William M. Bellamy, is another career diplomat.⁹ Under his leadership, the Africa Center has continued to build upon the foundation laid by his predecessors and struggled with the significant challenges facing ACSS that are addressed in this work. An analysis of the tenures of the four Directors of the Africa Center shows that in the almost twelve years the Africa Center has existed, only two years were under the leadership of a career military officer. Though there are a few current and retired military officers that work at ACSS, they are under the authority of its non-DOD leadership and the result is a decidedly DoS approach to its mission. That is extraordinary given that ACSS is a DoD institution.

Staff diversity is also a concern since a significantly higher proportion of ACSS employees does not have military experience and some departments
within ACSS have no employees at all with uniformed expertise. This has a direct negative impact on the Africa Center’s planning and operations. At least one senior ranking AFRICOM leader (non-uniformed) interviewed stated that ACSS has trouble planning and is often late with tasks. His perspective is that ACSS does a good job with what they do, but AFRICOM would like better support from ACSS. If AFRICOM gives ACSS money to do a program, they would like to see ACSS do the entire job; but the Africa Center often pushes things back on AFRICOM. His conclusion was that ACSS is understaffed and underfunded.\textsuperscript{10} Given its growing mission requirements and staff level, his observation is valid. However, considering current fiscal and political realities, the likelihood is that future budgets and workforce size will shrink rather than expand.

Still, the Africa Center’s managers are trying to grow their workforce from any and all possible sources—including DoD. A 15 April 2010 Program Objective Memorandum from the ACSS Director mentions the need to fill and expand the number of military billets at ACSS.\textsuperscript{11} However, while looking to the military as an additional source of manning, ACSS still doesn’t comprehend the importance of intentionally diversifying its workforce. The ideal solution is a generous mixture of both groups—military and civilian—in each and every department within ACSS. The bottom line is that the Africa Center does not have enough DoD experience, influence, and planning expertise in its workforce—the optimal mix of skills—to produce the best results.
**Business Model**

The Africa Center and AFRICOM are on different continents and neither is in Africa, though as previously mentioned ACSS does have two very small regional offices in Africa. This arrangement causes difficulties with communication, travel, supervision, and organizational unity with AFRICOM. Furthermore, the Africa Center’s principal engagement tool is programs, or conferences, that are done in either Africa or Washington D.C. Both locations are very expensive due to high travel and lodging costs—a fact ACSS recognizes. For example, approximately eighty to ninety percent of ACSS programs have historically been in Africa; however, in a cost cutting move closer to fifty to sixty percent will instead be done in Washington D.C. in 2011. Another significant expense the Africa Center incurs is approximately $25,000 in shipping costs for materials and equipment for every program it conducts in Africa. Economic stressors such as these become even more acute in light of the budget cuts DoD is facing. In a spreadsheet titled “Regional Center Placeholder Targets – July 27, 2010”, each Regional Center was given its projected budgets for FY12 – FY16. The Africa Center’s projected budget for FY12 was cut from $16.3M to $14.8M with further cuts projected until it levels off at $14.1M in FY15. Given the staggering budget deficits the United States is currently incurring and the growing pressure to cut spending much further, the budget estimates noted above may be overly optimistic.
In spite of this, the ACSS Director seems comfortable with the current business model for several reasons. To begin with, the Africa Center’s leadership is reluctant to change their current mode of operations, because they do not want to leave Washington D.C. due to their close proximity to African embassies and the desire to provide African participants in their programs the cultural experience of our nation’s capital. The Africa Center not wanting to leave Washington D.C. is rather ironic because as one ACSS employee put it, “ACSS is well known in Africa where it is not located, but is relatively obscure in Washington D.C. where it is headquartered”.15 This lack of public prominence is due to poor network-building and ambivalence toward all of the un-tapped resources inside the beltway from other RCs, DoD, DoS, inter-agency partners, academia, non-governmental organizations, and think-tanks. Due to this lack of visibility, others don’t know that ACSS exists or have a minimal understanding about what they do.16 This is unfortunate because the RCs are expected to be models for collaboration as a memo from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the GCC Commanders and the RC directors dated 18 January 2006 demonstrates:

In the execution of your programs, I expect that you will:

- Foster opportunities for USG interagency partners to attend programs and serve on Regional Center faculty and staff;
- Connect your outreach and network-building efforts among the other Regional Centers, other DoD education institutions, and US State Department public diplomacy efforts;
- With the Global Center for Security Cooperation, build collaboration and create efficiencies among the Regional Centers and other DoD international education and outreach providers;17
When seeking evidence of these types of collaboration from ACSS, only a few minor examples could be provided, which brought into question just how much communication and network-building was occurring among the US organizations working in Africa.

Secondly, there is a need to keep ACSS from being viewed by African leaders as a surrogate military organization; because ACSS enjoys access to African leaders that uniformed personnel seldom experience. According to one ACSS employee, ACSS leadership likes having separation from policy makers in the US government because they don’t want to appear to be a mouthpiece for DoD, or as intelligence collectors by our African partners. The perception of most African leaders is that ACSS is an honest broker and as a result, the Africa Center’s personnel usually have access throughout all of Africa—while AFRICOM personnel often don’t. This is a valid point; still, the fact remains that ACSS and AFRICOM personnel should be engaging our African allies in unison—not disjointedly.

Thirdly, ACSS likes being independent and not closely scrutinized. This provides the leadership with less oversight and more freedom to do what they are comfortable with—its current business model—which cannot be easily measured for success. According to a U.S. Army officer who is a Foreign Area Officer (FAO) specializing in Africa, ACSS is process oriented—not results oriented. They conduct a conference or program and equate that to success, while DoD wants measurable results based outcomes and require annual
metrics from the RCs to prove their effectiveness. This is shown in a memo from OSD to the GCC Commanders and RC Directors dated 18 January 2006 where OSD directed the Regional Centers to

Assess your effectiveness within a metrics-based structure coordinated between the Regional Center, DASD-PS and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), as well as the Geographic Combatant Commands...Regional Centers will submit annual program plans and metrics-based assessment mechanism to the DASD-PS after Geographic Combatant Command review.

As one ACSS employee phrased it, “OSD and DSCA want us to provide metrics to justify our existence”. The Africa Center struggles with this requirement since what they do—engagement—is not easily quantified. A prominent ACSS employee said, “It takes a generation of corrupt leaders in African militaries to retire and a new generation of O-4s and O-5s that are Western trained to take their place before results can be seen.” This is a valid point since ACSS is a DoD organization designed to look a lot like a DoS organization, but must financially justify its existence to DoD. This is a real concern because the ACSS business model is unlike any other RC due to facility constraints—and it is expensive.

**Facilities Constraints**

The Africa Center is only 10 years old, and while they are not the youngest RC, they received the leftovers of facilities. For example, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies has its own campus located in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, as does the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, located in Honolulu, Hawaii. The Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies uses NDU’s conference rooms and office space at Fort McNair, Virginia. Only ACSS, also part of NDU and whose offices are located among four historic (very old) buildings at Fort McNair, has no dedicated conference facilities. They could use NDU’s, but have difficulty scheduling them. Additionally, when including transportation costs to and from lodging, it costs more for ACSS to have their programs at Fort McNair than at a hotel in Washington D.C. that will complimentarily provide the conference rooms if the participants are lodged there. The Africa Center would greatly benefit from dedicated facilities since it would significantly decrease the costs of conducting programs.

**Relationship with AFRICOM**

There is a definite need for an improved daily working relationship between ACSS and AFRICOM. While interviewing personnel from both organizations, it became obvious that there was a dearth of familiarity—no real rapport or bond—between the two groups. Being six time zones apart is certainly an impediment; still, communication and cooperation between ACSS and AFRICOM could improve. According to an Africa Center employee, there is no single point of contact between ACSS and AFRICOM—at least not that is properly used. Communication, correspondence and tasks between ACSS and AFRICOM could go to many different individuals and levels of hierarchy. Once a month ACSS and AFRICOM meet via VTC and AFRICOM visits ACSS twice per year, but many at AFRICOM believe that ACSS should come to
Stuttgart more often. Even within AFRICOM, more than one directorate has interaction with the Africa Center so that ACSS could receive direction or queries from more than one AFRICOM directorate. The Strategy, Plans, and Programs (SPP) Directorate is AFRICOM’s office of primary responsibility (OPR) for ACSS with the Outreach Directorate as the secondary. An AFRICOM senior leader stated that he would like cleaner lines of communication and responsibility between ACSS and AFRICOM and recommended ACSS work through SPP solely. This arrangement creates a situation where multiple AFRICOM directorates are competing for limited ACSS resources and are normally unaware of programs ACSS is conducting for another directorate that could be jointly utilized.

Furthermore, AFRICOM and ACSS are not fully linked with each others’ engagement efforts. An example of this is that of the twenty programs yearly produced by ACSS, for FY11 only eight of those were projected to be AFRICOM specific. Moreover, for AFRICOM to participate in one of the non-AFRICOM sponsored programs, ACSS has to initiate the request. There is some interaction, such as General Ward (the prior AFRICOM Commander) attending each of the Leadership Symposia. However, for every one successful cooperative venture, there are numerous missed opportunities; for instance, AFRICOM not sending a representative on ACSS’s Topical Outreach Programs (TOPs) in Africa. This is an important opening for the two organizations to engage together the same audience. The Africa Center could help AFRICOM
build associations with our African allies, but AFRICOM is largely missing these openings.

Another area where ACSS and AFRICOM miss an opportunity is with improved and expanded training for US military personnel operating in Africa. An Army Lieutenant Colonel who is an Africa FAO put it this way,

The Africa Center could do a better job teaching AFRICOM personnel how to work in Africa. Working in Africa is not naturally intuitive to an American; whereas in some parts of the world, such as Europe, it is much more intuitive to Americans to work there without local cultural training.\textsuperscript{35}

The Africa Center does train AFRICOM headquarters personnel twice yearly with a short course in Washington D.C., but this prepares only a limited number of AFRICOM staff while the majority remain relatively untrained in how best to engage with our African associates.\textsuperscript{36} One example of this is that the Africa Center trains about 50 core headquarters personnel for Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti about once per year in a two day course taught in Suffolk Virginia at US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). According to ACSS’s concept paper about the course, it is an introductory-level seminar designed to provide military and civilian officials assigned to the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) with baseline knowledge of political, economic, security and diplomatic history and trends in the Horn of Africa region, as well as an understanding of how they impact US interests and strategy on the continent.\textsuperscript{37}

This course is exactly what is needed by US military personnel required to operate in Africa and engage with our African cohorts. However, this course is only taught to a few core staff while the vast majority of the CJTF-HOA staff...
and subordinate units have no cultural awareness training before or after arriving in Africa. In May 2010, USJFCOM conducted a Staff Assistance Visit for CJTF-HOA’s headquarters staff in Djibouti and there was an obvious need for such training. Yet neither AFRICOM nor CJTF-HOA felt they had the expertise to develop the required training for their workforce. Significant improved cultural awareness training for all US military personnel engaged in Africa would provide a windfall of additional benefits for the US, but both the Africa Center and AFRICOM have yet to fully realize the need for improved training—or the potential rewards.

III. Recommendations

Leadership and Personnel

To fortify itself for the rapidly changing political and fiscal environment, ACSS and AFRICOM together should strongly consider making significant changes. To begin with, ACSS would benefit from a stronger DOD influence and better cross-pollination with the military. As mentioned earlier, the leadership of the Africa Center recognizes the need for more DoD billets and for filling the ones currently vacant; however, they need to do so to deliberately diversify their workforce rather than to simply throw more manpower at their challenges. A better mixture could significantly enhance the planning capacity of the Africa Center and help improve relations with AFRICOM by formalizing processes between the two organizations.
**Business Model**

Possibly the most uncomfortable challenge for ACSS is changing its business model. As previously stated, the ACSS business model is unlike that of any other Regional Center because the Africa Center does not have facilities of its own and that makes its programs very expensive. This challenge is daunting not due to its complexity or cost, but because ACSS’s leadership is comfortable with the status quo and reluctant to change the paradigm. But external factors such as rising travel and lodging costs, increasing demands for programs, and significant budget cuts may force the hand of ACSS’s leaders.

The Africa Center also needs a more effective outreach program to other government agencies, such as OSD, Capitol Hill, and the DoS. Likewise, Africa Center faculty needs to be more visible in think-tanks and with presenting papers at formal conferences. One possible avenue for ACSS to gain public prominence would be to create a Board of Advisors (BoA) and recruit leaders from among the other groups that have significant dealings with Africa to be board members. When the BoA is presented with the challenges facing ACSS, they could use their expertise, contacts, and possibly even resources to help address the problem. The BoA charter could be written in such a way that the board would serve as a true advisory group and not a decision making body, therefore not obligating ACSS leadership to follow their recommendations. The potential benefits for the Africa Center would be tremendous and the risk minimal.
Facilities Constraints

As already noted, many of the issues ACSS struggles with are related to geography and facilities. The Africa Center would greatly benefit by securing a permanent facility to host programs. Ideally, the Africa Center would have its own campus and dedicated facilities. However, such a move appears improbable given current fiscal realities, so ACSS should consider more likely—and less expensive—alternatives. One possibility is to use Building 52, the old Bachelor Officers Quarters (BOQ) building on Fort McNair, to lodge their program participants. According to one ACSS employee, this facility is available and would provide lodging for an entire program’s worth of participants. Fort McNair has agreed to give ACSS the building to fix and use it as its own and the estimated cost for light renovation and new furnishings—the bare minimum needed to use the facility—is approximately $75,000.41 There is a dining hall located very near Building 52 and NDU conference rooms could be secured by closely working with the other RCs at NDU to de-conflict use of the conference rooms. This option is plausible and would make back the initial investment in Building 52 in one program.42 This contrasts with a much more expensive and time consuming alternative which ACSS is considering which calls for the complete renovation of some facilities at Fort McNair. In a Memorandum for Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy, dated 15 April 2010, ACSS stated that it was in discussions with the
Commander Military District of Washington and Commander, Joint Base Fort Myers-Henderson Hall with a view of expanding into base facilities which are in dire need of renovation and/or associated off-base leased facilities available in FY13; the estimated cost exceeds $1.5M annually and is unfunded.43

Perhaps the best solution would be to pursue the two courses of action simultaneously and use a lightly renovated Building 52 for billeting while using NDU’s conference and dining facilities as a short-term solution to ease ever-increasing budget pressures. This would provide enough time to fully explore a more costly long-term solution with NDU, Fort Myers, Fort McNair, and the Military District of Washington.

Fort Belvoir has also been looked into as an option and agreed to provide facilities at no cost if ACSS would pay for the lodging, but ACSS leadership declined the offer.44 This opportunity should be given further consideration since it offers a quick and inexpensive solution to ACSS’s facilities issues and would significantly lower the cost of hosting programs. Such a move would allow for more programs to be conducted, and therefore, directly further the mission of the Africa Center and AFRICOM since it could engage and educate a much larger number of African leaders.

The most dynamic option would be to relocate ACSS to the Marshall Center campus in Germany. If the Africa Center could establish a true partnership with the Marshall Center, while retaining the separate identities and missions of the two Regional Centers, it could be a win-win for both organizations. In addition to cost savings from shared facilities and overhead,
some personnel support positions in administration, tech support, and logistics could be merged to free-up positions for teaching. The extra money ACSS could provide the Marshall Center would relieve increasing financial stress and allow the Marshall Center to retain its relatively large number of faculty. The Marshall Center may be open to such a partnership since it has excess capacity and is actively seeking additional funding to continue its current size.\textsuperscript{45} According to an ACSS employee, the Marshall Center Director, retired Brigadier General Rose, has publicly stated that he spends an inordinate amount of time fund-raising and that the Marshall Center would like to absorb ACSS.\textsuperscript{46} The Africa Center’s leadership is understandably very sensitive to any attempts to merge it with the Marshall Center since it likely would cost them some jobs and degrade the autonomy and prestige they currently enjoy.

There are also curriculum advantages to moving ACSS to Germany. This would permit ACSS to greatly expand the curriculum available for our African allies to include offering a Master’s degree by using Marshall Center faculty to teach generic courses that are not Africa-specific and ACSS faculty to teach Africa-centric curriculum. The Marshall Center offers a wider variety of programs and courses than does ACSS. The Africa Center offers 10 “core” programs that range in length from 3 days to 4 weeks, with the majority in the 3 to 4 day range, and none are degree granting.\textsuperscript{47} The Marshall Center’s courses range from 2 to 3 week short courses up to a 1 year Master’s Degree granting program.\textsuperscript{48} Most of these courses are generic enough to apply to both
Africans and non-African students alike. A partial listing of Marshall Center courses that could be tailored with an African focus and used as a basis for an expanded ACSS curriculum can be found at Appendix 2. Our African partners would undoubtedly benefit from expanded access to these programs and the US government would advance President Obama’s stated Africa engagement priorities. Moreover, there is already precedent for such a joint venture. Since 2004 at the behest of AFRICOM, the Marshall Center has taught an increasing number of African students as a spreadsheet provided by the Marshall Center revealed.

Except for one year, the overall number and percentage of African students attending the Marshall Center have steadily risen each year. These numbers grew from three students comprising 0.4% of the annual student output in 2004 to 88 students comprising 12.4% of students in 2010.

In addition, the Marshall Center is in the same time zone as AFRICOM and most of Africa. The Marshall Center and AFRICOM have already taken advantage of this and twice per year the Marshall Center takes their African students to AFRICOM for a one or two day orientation. This allows African students to actually visit AFRICOM Headquarters in Stuttgart and alleviate their concerns about what AFRICOM is—a headquarters of only a few hundred—and not a large standing military combat force. To address ACSS’s desire to have our African partners meet with their nation’s embassy personnel, foreign area officers, and country teams, as well as be exposed to the culture our nation’s capital provides, ACSS students could go TDY to
Washington D.C. Of course there would be additional expense to relocate ACSS to Germany; however, this would more than be off-set by savings from having its own facilities.

**Relationship with AFRICOM**

There are many practical and inexpensive steps that could improve communication and cooperation between ACSS and AFRICOM. They could begin with a planning conference to exchange ideas about their relationship, how they do business, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, vision, and best practices. Some of the more easily corrected processes are likely to be better discipline in communication by using formal channels and the same points of contact to communicate and schedule events. The Africa Command could attend more Topical Outreach Programs organized by ACSS’s African alumni, and they could also improve the AFRICOM mission brief to make it country specific and tailored to the particular audience in ACSS’s programs.\(^52\) Likewise, an increase in the number of ACSS’s programs that are AFRICOM specific would also prove beneficial.

The greatest single area where ACSS could help AFRICOM is by teaching AFRICOM personnel how to work in Africa and how to deal with our African allies. The Africa Center biannually conducts a course for AFRICOM staff in Washington D.C., but needs to move it to Africa to provide AFRICOM personnel with a better training experience.\(^53\) The course could be divided into two tiers with the basic course for everyone and the advanced portion for O-5s and E-8s
and above, or for key staff of lower rank in special positions requiring the extra training. The advanced course should include a trip to as many of the “big four” African nations (Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and Ethiopia) as possible and a meeting with their country teams. Furthermore, ACSS teaches its Senior Leader Orientation course in Africa but needs to move it to AFRICOM. This would give African senior leaders the AFRICOM engagement piece they lack and allay their fears about AFRICOM’s purpose and intent. Finally, a joint venture between AFRICOM and ACSS of distance learning curriculum specializing in cultural awareness training for military and government employees that will serve in Africa would quickly provide practical help and tangible benefits.

**Conclusion**

The United States cannot afford to approach Africa in a disjointed manner. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies and the United States Africa Command must become more unified in their efforts to support the United States’ national security objectives in Africa. The Africa Center needs to restructure itself by improving workforce diversity to add more military experienced personnel, revamp its business model, and directly address the challenges of geography and lack of dedicated facilities. Finally, AFRICOM and ACSS should sit down and plan together to take advantage of each other’s engagement efforts, improve communication practices, scheduling, and training. Each of these issues affects the development of a unified effort.
between the Africa Center and AFRICOM and their ability to support US national interests in Africa. What is needed is a cultural change—not a change in behavior only. These two institutions are yoked together for better or worse; it’s time they realize this and begin pulling the heavy load—together.
Appendix 1

Research / Interview Methodology

This research paper was written using three categories of sources: interviews, primary source documents provided by those interviewed, and public domain sources. Since there was virtually no material already written on this topic, the interviews were the foundation upon which all else was built. I conducted interviews in person with employees of both the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (20-21 September 2010) and the United States Africa Command (23-24 September 2010) in the employee’s work-space at ACSS’s Fort McNair offices and in Stuttgart Germany at AFRICOM’s headquarters. Additionally, I conducted an in-person interview with a former AFRICOM employee currently working at the United States European Command headquarters, an Army Foreign Area Officer (Africa) in Montgomery Alabama, and a phone interview with a Marshall Center employee. In total I interviewed 11 who were cited, though more than that were interviewed and helped provide context. I used a question and answer format and took extensive notes. Due to the sensitivity of differing with leadership (employers) on key issues and to assure candid responses from those interviewed, I promised confidentiality and anonymity to those interviewed. All interviewed under those conditions were forthcoming and readily provided candid answers.
Appendix 2

Marshall Center Curriculum

“Program in Advanced Security Studies (PASS) – is a 12-week course for civilian government officials, military officers, and government academics. The program provides graduate-level study in security policy, defense affairs, international relations and related topics."

“Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) - addresses numerous aspects of a threat that confronts nations around the globe. The five-week course is designed for military officers, government officials and police administrators currently working in mid- and upper-level management positions of counterterrorism organizations throughout the world. PTSS focuses on how a state can effectively combat terrorism but still adhere to the fundamental values of a democratic society.”

“Program for Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTaR) - addresses both why and when stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations are required in the global security environment and how a nation can participate productively. This three-week course is planned to be offered twice a year for military and civilian officials (lieutenant colonel, colonel or the civilian equivalent) who are working in a position in their government that deals with the planning or execution of SSTR operations.”

“Seminar on Transatlantic Civil Security (STACS) - the three-week seminar examines best practices for ensuring civil security and preventing, preparing for and managing the consequences of domestic and regional crises and disasters. STACS is planned to be offered twice a year for military officers and government officials responsible for civil security policies and programs, as well as representatives of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations with civil security responsibilities.”

Endnotes

5. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Africa Center’s History”, 1.
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12. ACSS Employee 1, Anonymous, 20 September 2010 Interview.
15. ACSS Employee 1, Anonymous, 20 September 2010 Interview.
16. Ibid.
18. ACSS Employee 1, Anonymous, 20 September 2010 Interview.
20. ACSS Employee 1, Anonymous, 20 September 2010 Interview.
23. ACSS Employee 1, Anonymous, 20 September 2010 Interview.
24. Ibid.
25. EUCOM Senior Leader, Anonymous, 24 September 2010 Interview.
27. ACSS Employee 2, Anonymous, 21 September 2010 Interview.
28. ACSS Employee 1, Anonymous, 20 September 2010 Interview.
29. AFRICOM Employee 2, Anonymous. 23 September 2010 Interview.
30. AFRICOM Senior Leader 1, Anonymous. 23 September 2010 Interview.
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32. AFRICOM Employee 2, Anonymous. 23 September 2010 Interview.
33. AFRICOM Senior Leader 3, Anonymous, 24 September 2010 Interview.
34. ACSS Employee 4, Anonymous, 20 September 2010 Interview.
36. AFRICOM Employee 4, Anonymous, 1 December 2010 E-mail Interview.
37. ACSS, “Concept Paper for CJTF HOA Core Staff Orientation Course”, 1.
40. ACSS Employee 1, Anonymous, 20 September 2010 Interview.
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42. Ibid.
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45. EUCOM Senior Leader, Anonymous, 24 September 2010 Interview.
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52. ACSS Employee 3, Anonymous, 20 September 2010 Interview.
54. Ibid.
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