JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY: 

A CONTRARIAN VIEW

by

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## CONTENTS

Disclaimer  ................................................................. i

Contents ................................................................. ii

Illustrations .............................................................. iii

Biography ................................................................. iv

Introduction .............................................................. 1

The Current Conduct of Personnel Recovery ........................................... 2

USAF
USN
USN
USMC
USSOCOM
Jointness in PR

The Pros and Cons of Joint PR ..................................................... 10

Pros
Cons

Recommendations ............................................................. 16

Conclusion ................................................................. 17

Bibliography .............................................................. 19

Notes ....................................................................... 20
Illustrations

Page

Figure 1. Personnel Recovery Options, Categories and Methods ...........................................3
Figure 2. Operating Areas .......................................................................................................9
Figure 3. Principles of Joint Operations ..................................................................................10
Biography

Commissioned from the United States Air Force Academy in 1989, Lt Col Michael R. Outlaw attended Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) at Vance AFB, OK. Following UPT, he flew C-130Hs at Dyess AFB, TX. Three years later he trained to fly MC-130P Combat Shadow aircraft and was assigned to Eglin AFB, FL for three years. Lt Col Outlaw served two years at the Air Force Special Operations Command as an IG inspector and the Chief of SOF readiness in the FM directorate. Lt Col Outlaw then trained in the MC-130H Combat Talon II and was transferred to the 7th Special Operations Squadron at RAF Mildenhall, UK. Following his tour in Europe, he was assigned to Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, NC. Selected as an operations officer, he was assigned to the 550th Special Operations Squadron at Kirtland AFB, NM. Lt Col Outlaw was then selected for the commander of the 71st Rescue Squadron, Moody AFB, GA. He has participated in Operation Restore Hope, Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, Joint Guardian, Shepherd Sentry, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Lt Col Outlaw also served twice as 81st Expeditionary Rescue Squadron commander in Djibouti. He is a command pilot with over 4,600 in various versions of the C-130 aircraft.
Introduction

On 6 Apr 2009, Secretary Robert Gates announced the termination of the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)-X helicopter procurement program. He stated that,

“this program has a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution with a single-purpose aircraft. We will take a fresh look at the requirement behind this program and develop a more sustainable approach.”

The result of this announcement is a period of limbo for Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel Recovery (PR) programs while the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) evaluate the requirement.

Although the Secretary referred to CSAR, OSD-Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office and USJFCOM are studying the broader mission set of PR. PR refers to the “the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.” Best described, CSAR is a method (or operational capability) for conducting PR. Since Secretary Gates referred to the CSAR mission, it is logical to investigate the PR mission rather than the CSAR method—the nuances of these terms routinely complicate understanding of PR.

This concern for recovering our nation’s isolated personnel will not go away in the future or in any way become simpler. In the face of overwhelming military force, US enemies will focus on asymmetric means to erode our political will. In current overseas contingency operations (OCO), US military members find themselves in an increasingly non-linear battlespace that stretches forces and creates vulnerabilities for these enemies to exploit. Our enemies believe that the political clout of a POW or hostage in this era of mass, near instantaneous media can erode political will. As the US faces this non-linear battle space,
maintaining a credible recovery force for isolated personnel is critical to US security objectives. As a matter of policy, “the Department of Defense has an obligation to train, equip, and protect its personnel, prevent their capture and exploitation by adversaries, and reduce the potential for using isolated personnel as leverage against U.S. security objectives.”

The SECDEF’s statement doesn’t reflect an immediate shift of US policy, but it implies an assessment to “affirm or adjust current DOD policy… and will provide a basis from which to ensure that the national combat search and rescue capability provides for recovery of any downed, injured, or isolated service member, including [in] combat environments.” It is this ongoing assessment that this paper addresses. This paper will describe how the US currently conducts PR and examine the pros and cons of a joint force utilizing the joint principles of war. It will then provide a recommendation for improving joint PR without dismantling the current construct—gaining efficiencies at the margin. With major organizational changes, a joint PR force could be effective across the range of military operations; but such a change is expensive and time-consuming. The US should maintain the current PR service/component capability. While a joint solution is attractive, such a solution would either sacrifice capability—leaving the isolated US personnel without an organic recovery capability and a potentially hollow high end recovery capability—or increase training and manpower requirements in a time of constrained (or constricting) budgets. The AF must be allowed to continue its PR mission as a primary mission and core competency.

The Current Conduct of Personnel Recovery

Joint Publication (JP) 3-50, Personnel Recovery, clearly states that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible for the execution of personnel recovery. The focal point for this effort is the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC).
“CCDRs [Combatant Commanders], or their designated subordinate JFCs, should establish a JPRC to plan, coordinate, and monitor PR missions, and to integrate PR activities with other operations and activities in the assigned operational area… The JPRC should be integrated into the JFC’s or designated supported commander’s appropriate operations center.”

Many CCDRs and JFCs choose to delegate this responsibility to the component commander.

Each service/component addresses PR in a unique way to include terminology, training and force structure.

In the joint construct, current doctrine states that each service-component of a joint or combined force is responsible for the recovery of its own isolated personnel within its capabilities. However, each accomplishes those critical PR tasks in its own way, some using assets dedicated to the purpose (like the USAF), others taking the capability “out of hide.” Therefore, not all components have the inherent capability to accomplish all the necessary PR tasks.⁸

Figure 1 is modified from JP 3-50 to demonstrate the different methods to accomplish the recovery task and their association with a particular service/component.

![Personnel Recovery Options, Categories and Methods](image-url)

Figure 1. Personnel Recovery Options, Categories and Methods.⁹
United States Air Force (USAF) Personnel Recovery

The AF is the only service to designate PR as a core function and it organizes, trains and equips to this mission to include HC-130 fixed wing aircraft, HH-60 rotary wing aircraft, Guardian Angel Weapons System (GAWS, pararescuemen and combat rescue officers), and dedicated PR staffs. Also unique to the AF are the dedicated Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) professionals. In addition to these dedicated personnel and equipment, Rescue Escort (RESCORT)/Close Air Support assets are typically employed with dedicated rescue forces in uncertain or contested environments. A limited number of F-16 and A-10 crews are “Sandy” qualified to act as Rescue Mission Commander (RMC) for contested rescues. AF assets are ideally positioned to accomplish all five tasks of PR—Report, Locate, Support, Recover and Reintegrate. Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC) currently conducts annual interagency/multinational operational level exercises through the Angel Thunder exercises as well as PR scenarios conducted during Red Flag exercises—these exercises address both current OCO scenarios as well as major theater war.

United States Army (USA) Personnel Recovery

The US Army’s PR philosophy is best described as “one of leadership and accountability. It comprises primarily the Soldier’s Creed, directed responsibilities, and practical considerations. The Soldier’s Creed is a major portion of the USA PR philosophy." They utilize the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) as their recovery force and this force is generally more designated than dedicated. This QRF generally consists of general purpose maneuver units and may be designated to one or more missions (i.e. reserve force may be assigned a variety of missions of which PR is one). The QRF may consist of maneuver units (infantry, armor, aviation, cavalry, and long range surveillance) that are not normally tasked for PR; however, they have the ability
to task organize to a specific tasking and will conduct it the “same way they would execute a combat patrol similar to a raid or movement to contact to execute a link up operation.”

Likewise, army units utilize their existing command and control structure regardless of mission type—PR is considered just another implicit be prepared to (BPT) task for the commander. This construct of PR accurately reflects the operating context of the land component—their isolated personnel would most likely be in close proximity to their ground forces. Time, distance and proximity to ground forces greatly aids the army component’s ability to recover their own personnel without a dedicated force.

**United States Navy (USN) Personnel Recovery**

The US Navy PR capabilities stem from its self-sufficient identity and are largely formed around its aircraft operations—placing “increased emphasis on integrating rescue planning and coordination into planning and execution of all strike operations.” The US Navy units “are tasked and trained to execute a full spectrum of PR missions, including over water recovery, underwater recovery, and over land recovery.” All US Navy helicopter crews are not trained for overland combat—“for isolated personnel located in low or medium anti-air threat areas, recoveries are assigned to units specialized in CSAR.” In addition, the Navy trains other select crews for CSAR tasks, such as F/A-18 crews as Rescue Mission Commander as well as inherent E-2C capabilities. Navy helicopters don’t have inflight refueling capability but do maintain the ability refuel by “pad hopping” to surface ships and FOBs. Additionally, Navy crews are not specifically trained as combat recovery personnel and may need to include SOF for such support.
United States Marine Corps (USMC) Personnel Recovery

“The Marine Corps lives by the adage that ‘Marines Take Care of Their Own’” and like the Army they do not dedicate forces to PR.21 USMC views PR as an implicit requirement and considers all elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) able to support PR operations.22 Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) is the method used by any combination of air, ground and waterborne assets to recover aircraft and personnel.23 Their mindset is similar to the Army’s as their personnel are likely to be close to general purpose forces and these forces are the best postured to effect recovery; as well as inherent similarity in the Soldier’s Creed and the “Marines take care of their own” mantra. This use of general purpose forces is demonstrated in joint doctrine, “USMC assault transport helicopters are not specifically configured for PR with the extra armor and defensive armament required.”24 From the author’s personal experiences, long-range capability is not the strongest suit for USMC crews—they are more suited to short range operations in direct support of ground troops. This correctly reflects the component’s nature of operations and training is weighted toward assault support functions and not CSAR. As Marine recon units project further into the battlespace, it is likely that a component capability gap exists for long-range recovery of these personnel. A noted USMC deficiency with respect to Recon Marines is a “shortfall in the ability to exfiltrate at the maximum extent of the supported commander’s Area of Interest.”25

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Personnel Recovery

USSOCOM’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) do not maintain dedicated PR forces but “regularly train to conduct PR in support of their own operations.”26 PR taskings would come at the expense of their ability to perform their core tasks and, as such, their emphasis is on SOF recovery operations and Nonconventional Assisted Recovery.27 SOF units tasked for recovery
missions “should conduct training on recovery operations during unit collective training exercises and mission rehearsals.” Title 10 of US Code assigns responsibility for theater SAR “insofar as it relates to special operations.” As the only service or service-like force to have Title 10 responsibility for theater SAR, many have misrepresented this as overall responsibility for theater SAR. The terminology “insofar as it relates to special operations” demonstrates the intent to limit it to SOF operations. Previous SOF doctrine listed CSAR as a collateral activity, but has since removed all collateral activities and now designates recovery operations as subset of its core task of direct action. This reflected an overuse/misuse of SOF for the theater PR effort in the 90’s. In 1997, a GAO report to Congress stated that, “there may be opportunities to use conventional forces instead of SOF…for some missions that are already the responsibility of conventional forces, such as combat search and rescue.” The study further stated that these missions reduce the readiness of SOF units. Due to their lean nature, SOF may also choose to leverage the existing (or planned) conventional PR structure—that leverage may be as a primary, secondary or tertiary recovery option; METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations) dependent. The lack of routine training with combat air force assets also limits the effectiveness of SOF PR in higher threat environments. In Kosovo, this was determined to be a complicating factor in the rescues, “SOF elements were uncomfortable and unprepared to work as an element of a conventional CSARTF.”

**Jointness in Personnel Recovery**

The term joint is defined by Joint Pub 1 as “activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.” It is also described as the
“ability to be interoperable and effectively integrate operations.”\textsuperscript{35} The following excerpt from Joint Pub 1 effectively describes this concept.

All Service components contribute their distinct capabilities to the joint campaign; however, their interdependence is critical to overall joint effectiveness. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both; the degree of interdependence varying with specific circumstances. Fundamentally, joint forces require high levels of interoperability and systems that are “born joint” (i.e., conceptualized and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies).\textsuperscript{36}

The focus is on eliminating seams and weak points for the enemy to capitalize on. Figure 2 shows how the joint force may divide the battlespace for different forces to operate in. It could be argued that the only “joint” components are the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and the Joint Forces Aviation Component. In these components multiple services interact to accomplish a given mission rather than given separate areas and separate objectives. So, why the push for a joint solution for PR? Likely this is a result of seams (real or perceived) in the PR mission. Many authors contend one of these seams is doctrine that encourages components to handle their problems and let the JPRC know when help is needed. Current doctrine states that, “the JFC will most often desire the components to provide capabilities to conduct the five PR execution tasks for their own forces and for other isolated personnel within their areas of operation.”\textsuperscript{37} In many ways PR forces operate in a joint context—in Afghanistan USAF HH-60s conducting US Army MEDEVAC missions are escorted by AH-64s, but this is more of a supporting and supported relationship. The best example of a joint rescue force is CJTF-HOA—USAF HC-130s, USMC CH-53s, USAF GAWS and USA security teams all working for the JFC. However, despite the large AO, it is a limited threat AO and due to this lighter threat, these disparate capabilities can be coalesced to provide an appropriate PR force. However, this same
group might not be very effective against an integrated air defense system common in moderate and higher threat areas.

Figure 2. Operating Areas.\(^{38}\)
Pros and Cons of Joint PR

This section will observe several pros and cons of joint PR against the status quo utilizing the joint principles of war from JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

![Principles of Joint Operations](image)

**Figure 3. Principles of Joint Operations.*[^39]  

**Pros**

A joint PR force would experience several advantages over component PR forces.

Current PR operations are driven by a service-centric focus as shown in current doctrine,

“the Services and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are responsible to prepare and present forces to the geographic combatant commanders that are organized, trained, and equipped to perform PR tasks consistent with the roles and functions established in law and by the President and SecDef and the missions specified by the JFC.”[^40]
This service-centric doctrine may have an adverse impact on PR operations with respect to Unity of Command, Objective, Economy of Force, and Maneuver.

Unity of command would be enhanced by a joint PR force. “Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”\textsuperscript{41} By aligning all component PR capabilities under a single commander, these forces would be better postured to support a PR event. Such a force would be involved in pre-mission planning so that forward-looking PR plans could be prepared and readied before the operation. This would provide the joint commander with a PR “playbook” to execute in the case of an isolated personnel event and bring the best forces to bear. Dedicated forces under a single commander can improve the chances for success—“PR using a joint force can be a difficult mission under the best of circumstances, and risk increases when performed by an ad hoc force.”\textsuperscript{42} The tragedy of Bengal 15 in Desert Storm illustrates this point. SOF turned down the mission and designated it a red zone—indicating an unlikely successful rescue and probably impossible in daylight. Since SOF was unwilling, the mission was offered up to a conventional army helicopter unit and they accepted it without conducting a mission analysis—as a result the aircraft was shot down, five were killed and three were captured by the Iraqis.\textsuperscript{43}

Objective could also be enhanced with a joint PR force. JP 3-0 states, “the purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.”\textsuperscript{44} By ensuring these PR forces are focused only on the PR objective the commander can ensure that his PR force is ready at the right place and the right time. Additionally, this principle would help to eliminate seams by training, rehearsing, planning and operating as a joint team—according to the Institute for Defense Analysis, “there are significant seams between the various
Services’ doctrines. There are enough differences among Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and SOF doctrines to cause interoperability problems.”\textsuperscript{45} Operations in CJTF-HOA demonstrate this principle. Although units do not train together before deployment, they train frequently together with bilateral or multilateral training up to four times a week and monthly joint full mission profiles. After a month or so these forces coalesce into an effective PR team, but higher threat areas may not permit such a train up and operations may not allow a train up period.

Economy of force is a typically cited attribute to joint operations. Rather than each component dedicating PR forces, economies of scale may allow an overall force to accomplish PR throughout the AO rather than numerous smaller forces residing in the components with a more limited aim. “The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.”\textsuperscript{46} The intent would be to eliminate redundancy of PR efforts. PR is typically thought of as a secondary effort as it produces no direct combat effects—according to the Institute for Defense Analysis,

PR does not have a priority internally in any military service for the personnel, equipment, and funding commensurate with its frequently stated importance. Both within the Combatant Commands and the Services, PR occupies an across-the-board, low priority of importance except in the Central Command.\textsuperscript{47}

This relegation of priority might be overcome by reducing inherent redundancy in the service-centric approach and forcing components to provide PR trained forces to the JFC. Eliminating redundancy is shown in the below example from Col Lee K. DePalo’s paper, \textit{USAF Combat Search and Rescue: Untapped Combat Power}.

There are cases in the GWOT where too much force is concentrated on PR because the PR assets come from different components. Economy of force would free up a portion of this redundant capability, enabling reconstitution or utilization in other areas. Recently in OEF, there were USAF HC-130 aircraft and PJs on CSAR alert sitting side-by-side with SOF MC-130E Talon I aircraft, also on alert. One of the principal roles of both aircraft was to refuel CSAR and SOF helicopters conducting operations in Afghanistan. Each weapon system also had other, slightly divergent roles such as resupply of SOF for the
MC-130 and air-dropping PJs to conduct PR for the HC-130. However, these divergent roles were within the capabilities of either type of weapon system. A joint perspective employing the principle of economy of force would require only one of these aircraft types along with the PJs to conduct missions in support of the air component and the SOF component, freeing up LD/HD assets to reconstitute or conduct missions elsewhere.\(^{48}\)

Maneuver can also be enhanced with a joint PR approach and is defined in JP 3-0 below.

Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage… Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.\(^{49}\)

A joint PR force would overcome one of the disadvantages of the service-centric approach. The problem with the current doctrine is that it encourages components to attempt to accomplish PR operations on their own and only seek assistance when their capabilities have been exceeded.\(^{50}\)

This may be more of a problem in application of doctrine versus the doctrine itself as JP 3-50 states, “when a component independently initiates a PR mission, it is required to notify the JPRC through its PRCC to help ensure effective coordination and deconfliction. Thereafter, the JPRC will monitor the mission and be prepared to support as required.”\(^{51}\) Regardless, a delay in execution of the correct PR operation can have disastrous consequences—“according to numerous historical studies, after four or more hours on the ground, the chance that a survivor in combat will be successfully rescued is historically less than twenty percent.”\(^{52}\) This failure was identified in Desert Storm and summarized by LCDR Malachy Sandie.

38 coalition aircraft were lost, and 63 personnel were isolated in hostile territory. Only seven personnel-recovery missions were launched, of which only three were successful… The significance of the above is that none of the downed aviator rescue attempts during Desert Storm were accomplished inside the critical two-hour window used so successfully in Vietnam.\(^{53}\)
While Unity of Command, Objective, Economy of Force and Maneuver may enhance Joint PR, some of these principles may have drawbacks and other principles may favor the current approach.

**Cons**

A joint PR force might experience several disadvantages than component PR forces—these include Mass, Objective, and Security; as well, Simplicity and Unity of effort can mitigate unity of command.

Mass would be adversely affected by a joint PR force for the Marine and Army components. “To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect.” Marine and Army components utilize designated, not dedicated, forces for their PR efforts and may have multiple missions assigned to these forces. This construct would sacrifice Marine and Army component capability by removing these multi-mission forces from the component—component commanders would still require additional forces for the other missions these forces represent. This effect can be mitigated somewhat by requesting additional forces in the Joint Manning Document (JMD); but, as they are general purpose forces, would require some time to train up for the task. The larger the force required for PR, the greater the impact on the component commander’s capability.

Objective can also work against a joint PR force. As stated earlier, a joint PR force separates the PR force mission from the component mission. These PR forces would be optimized for a joint context. As such, some organic capabilities may be sacrificed in favor of joint efficiencies. If the MAGTF lost a portion of its organic capability, it could no longer be employed in a single component operation (i.e. NEO) with an appropriate PR force.
Additionally, these forces would be cut out of their normal component command and control structure to a joint command and control structure. Such a situation existed in CJTF-HOA. USAF forces were required to submit operating waivers to Air Force staffs that were not focusing on the JTF’s mission and resulted in denial or delays in required operational waivers—in one instance, the numbered air force was so slow in renewing a standing waiver that valuable time and effort were expended getting approval for a mission recovering eight isolated personnel and three wounded in action.

Security can also be adversely affected by a joint PR force. “Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise.” When a joint PR force tailors itself to a joint construct some high-end capability may be lost. Different components require different capabilities—as Navy and AF components require higher level forces capable of rescuing a stranded aircrew alone behind enemy lines, Army and USMC may require a less robust force to rescue personnel—according to the Army’s PR analyst, dedicated PR forces are not required as isolated personnel will be in close proximity to ground forces and those that are POWs/detainees would be rescued by USSOCOM forces. A joint construct may reduce the effectiveness of a high end capability. It doesn’t take a peer competitor to require a high end capability—simply examine the Desert Storm example against even a moderate/degraded Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) our scorecard was one saved for every six lost.

Simplicity and Unity of Effort can offset the benefits from Unity of Command. “When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons.” Tasking general purpose forces for a new mission with a different command and control system would complicate efforts. It would
produce better results to assign a component the mission utilizing the best postured forces within its command and control channels. Not only would such a construct be simpler than a joint structure, it would permit unity of effort within that component commander’s AO. While discussing coalition and interagency operations, JP 3-0 states, “unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.” It might not be necessary or even desirable to achieve unity of command if unity of effort would suffice.

**Recommendations**

Different services have different concepts and force structures for PR for a reason—their components have different missions and operating contexts. The USAF and USN dedicate and train PR forces due to the nature of their operations—their high risk personnel are isolated from friendly forces during air operations; whereas USMC and USA designate (not dedicate) general purpose forces for this task based on their closeness to land component general purpose forces—their high risk personnel are intrinsic to general purpose forces and would, most likely, be isolated in close proximity to land component forces. A joint solution can’t undermine the effectiveness and speed of a component force or PR force simply for the value of “jointness.” A noted USMC deficiency with respect to Recon Marines is a “shortfall in the ability to exfiltrate at the maximum extent of the supported commander’s Area of Interest.” It is at these margins where joint capabilities may be more practical. Many have argued for the creation of a JPRTF or JCSARTF under the special operations component utilizing a blend of conventional and special operations forces. However, SOF have been so critical that they have been constrained on their own missions. Rather than taking on a new mission or growing an existing one, SOF should be discarding these missions that conventional forces can perform. Admiral Eric T. Olson stated in the 2010 SOCOM commander’s guidance letter that SOF “will increase interoperability with our
partners from the General Purpose Forces” and “[do] what we ought to do, not what we want to do.” Currently JFACC forces are conducting some PR for SOF. Since the AO of the JFACC and the JSOTF are nearly identical—requiring recovery throughout the entire battlespace—the US might be better served by having the JFACC accomplish the SOF PR mission. JFACC forces consistently train to a primary mission of recovery operations in a higher threat environment with associated combat air force capabilities; whereas SOF rarely train to PR operations in conjunction with combat air forces. SOF could not delete the self PR mission entirely, it would still be needed for SOF-only missions (or those that the JSOTF deems more prudent to be handled in house), but JFACC forces would be able to minimize the drain on SOF for small contingencies/irregular warfare through major combat operations. The addition of SOF PR and possibly Marine Recon PR to JFACC PR tasks can gain joint efficiencies without sacrificing the inherent benefits of the land component general purpose forces—it would be ill advised to detract from the MAGTF or the combined arms land component capabilities. Additionally, the JFC would still retain the ability to task other components to assist or conduct the recovery of land component personnel where conditions warrant. Rather than completely reworking the PR construct, it is more beneficial to maximize the effectiveness of the current construct.

**Conclusion**

There is no magic bean for PR. While an “ad hoc” joint force may be effective for limited threat areas like AFRICOM, it would not be appropriate for high end conflicts. The higher the threat the more that the JFC will be forced to rely on the PR capabilities of dedicated forces. The training and organizational changes required to ensure a joint force is credible for high-end conflicts is a cost the US can’t afford. A high threat is not necessarily driven by a peer
competitor; rather the existence of a moderate IADS is enough to impact effective PR. The DoD should refrain from pursuing joint for the sake of being joint. Our current PR structure reflects 50 years of cumulative knowledge base so a drastic change should not be approached lightly.

Utility of PR forces can be maximized by incorporating the SOF PR mission and other capability gaps into the JFACC’s PR mission. While the recovery portion of PR is a tactical event, it counters a strategy employed by our nation’s enemies and embodies the creeds of American military services. As noted by Sun Tzu and not missed by our nation’s enemies, “if asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: ‘Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will.’”63 The best airmen, soldiers, sailors and marines in the world deserve the best our nation has to offer to return with honor.

To me it has always been a sense of wonder and pride that the most potent and destructive military force ever known should create a special service dedicated to saving a life. Its concept is typically American…we hold human lives to be the most precious commodity on earth. – Brig Gen Dubose64
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