AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

BACK TO THE FUTURE:
MAKING A MODERN DAY AIR CORPS IN A “STONE AGE” AFGHANISTAN

By

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Preface

In 2006, I was tasked to support the Army in Afghanistan with little idea of what lay before me. From my arrival into Bagram Air Base, followed by a convoy to Kabul in soft-sided vehicles, to my departure on Blackhawk gunships, I was submerged in a world I knew little about as a tanker pilot. Once in Kabul I would find out that I was part of a group of roughly ten people, with representation from each service, to rebuild the Afghan Air Corps. Thus, with a shoestring budget, little guidance, and a whole lot of motivation from my compatriots, we set out to do the impossible. Years later, I would learn that we were involved in the initial stages of Foreign Internal Defense (FID). The paper is being written to teach myself and others who may read this what is necessary in FID for the Afghan Air Corps. Ideally, it will cover areas that may not have been thought about, or quite possibly may have already been addressed at other levels.

I would like to thank several people for their help in completing this paper. First, and foremost, I would like to thank my family. Without their patience and understanding, I would not have been able to write this paper. I would also like to thank Dr. William Dean, Major Joel Bius and Lieutenant Colonel James “Irish” Kockler for their guidance.
Abstract

US Forces have been in Afghanistan for nearly nine years. During this time, Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations supported by the US did not receive adequate attention. The research paper is designed to take a brief look at FID in Vietnam and Iraq and use this information to better understand FID and how to rebuild the Afghan Air Corps. FID in Vietnam brought to life the challenges of building a large air force in semi-permissive and sometimes even non-permissive environments. Involvement of the US in Vietnam was extensive from the implementation of “Farm Gate” to the eventual withdrawal of the US. Similarly, Iraq is seen as a large FID operation after the disbandment of the military. FID operations in each of these countries are large scale and involve many types of aircraft. Finally, Afghanistan is discussed by first addressing the people in order to build a conceptual understanding of their behavior as well as their physical environment. Then the organization, training, and equipping of the ANAAC is discussed to further our understanding of the FID and the ANAAC.
Chapter 1

Introduction

“…the application of theory, when not firmly grounded in historical experience, can often lead to disastrous results.”\(^1\)

Corum and Johnson
Air Power in Small Wars

Statement of Research Question and Thesis

US Forces have been in Afghanistan for a little over eight years. Combat operations during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) started in Phase 2, seizing the initiative and Phase 3, dominating. They then quickly transitioned to Phase 4, stability operations with the intent of eventually enabling civil authority. Unfortunately, it appears that coalition forces became complacent, not recognizing the regrouping of the Taliban after their fall from power. Indeed, Taliban had reformed and “coalesced into a resilient insurgency.”\(^2\) The once permissive environment in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban quickly evolved into a non-permissive environment depending on the area of operations. Given these conditions, the President has the option to task US forces, general purpose forces (GPF), or special operations forces (SOF), to help rebuild a host nation’s internal defense, also known as foreign internal defense (FID), in support of counterinsurgency operations (COIN). Painting a broad perspective of how the Air Force understands FID, Air Force Depart Directive 2-3.1 (AFDD) characterizes FID in the statement below.

“In reality, FID is a very large domain encompassing the total political, economic, informational, and military support the US provides to enable other governments to field viable internal defense and development (IDAD) programs for counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and counter-narcotics. FID is a component of irregular warfare (IW), defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.”\(^3\)
Understandably, to resolve the problem at hand, one may want to apply a “template” from applications of FID in other operations, thus drawing on the experiences of the past. The challenge however, is to draw from these experiences while keeping in mind that “no two FID programs are exactly alike.” So, how does one go about developing the Afghan Air Corps into a viable military force that is effective in the midst of an insurgency? Where does aviation fall into the construct of FID? More precisely, what steps are essential in rebuilding the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) for FID?

Background and Significance of the Problem

After the defeat of the Taliban, little infrastructure remained of the Afghan Air Corps. During combat operations, coalition air forces targeted airfields and aircraft. Since the objective was to “defeat those who use terrorism and those who house or support them,” and remove “the threat from air defenses and from Taliban aircraft,” there was little forgiveness in achieving these objectives. When major fighting subsided and US forces began occupying the country, the Afghan Air Corps aircraft consisted of less than 20 aircraft in various states of functioning order. The remaining Soviet era aircraft lay in heaps, destroyed beyond repair throughout the country, with supporting infrastructure damaged and unusable in some cases. Anything remotely resembling air power capability was no longer an option for Afghanistan and the Afghan Air Corps needed help in their post OEF reconstruction.

Eventually coalition forces made the decision to rebuild the Air Corps. Even though the insurgency had not yet gotten out of hand, this task was more challenging than expected. This was the first time since Vietnam that a major FID operation involved SOF and GPF on such a large scale. No one realized the complexities of the culture, language, and training and how
they would impact coalition forces’ efforts in rebuilding the ANAAC. All the while, elements of an insurgency began to unfold requiring the need for a credible Air Corps.

Following major military operations, there was relative calm in Afghanistan. Today, insurgent forces remain a threat to stability throughout Afghanistan. Insurgents briefly retreated into the mountains and Pakistan in order to reorganize. This retreat created the illusion that stability in Afghanistan would be easily obtained. However, once reorganized, insurgents in Afghanistan went on the offensive. Offensive Taliban and al Qaeda operations included drug trade, intimidation, and routine attacks on local provinces. In addition, insurgents attacked coalition forces through direct assault and the use of various improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Amidst the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) multinational fight to strengthen Afghanistan, FID became paramount in order to focus “host-nation security forces and other resources to eliminate, marginalize, or assimilate insurgent elements.” For the near future, the development of a strong FID program should drive the development of the ANAAC.

Thus, an effective FID program with clear planning followed by a coherent strategy is essential. Through an effective FID program, the Afghan government will be able to implement its internal defense and development strategy (IDAD) to counter lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. This in turn will aid in the stabilization of the country through security as well as establishing the legitimacy of the government.

American forces in charge of rebuilding the Air Corps in Afghanistan can learn from FID in other countries. This paper considers two case studies covering FID in Vietnam and Iraq. The intent behind choosing these two conflicts is to provide examples of FID operations conducted on a grand scale where there are significant forces involved. The use of operations in Vietnam
shows how FID is conducted at a level similar to Afghanistan. The last case study will address how the US is currently applying FID in Iraq to rebuild the Iraqi Air Force.

Reconstruction of the ANAAC presents a formidable challenge for the US. To address how the ANAAC will contribute to FID, this paper will look at four areas within FID in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These areas are strategy, organization, training, and equipping as they relate to the aviation aspects of FID. Strategy lays the foundation for the construction of the air corps and it “should always be in place first and then resources and tactics (aircraft) should be selected to fit within directly supporting that strategy.”9 Next, the organization of the unit is essential to ensure that there is the correct mix of skill sets as well as the right people. Organization should not necessarily be based on the US model, but must blend with how the host nation (HN) can effectively execute their mission. Training falls shortly thereafter to ensure that there is a continuum of learning, teaching, and growing the organization. Training is particularly significant in that this is where the HN develops the tools to sustain itself once the US leaves. Finally, in deciding how to equip the air corps, significant budgetary requirements, weapons systems that will be employed to implement IDAD strategy and finally all forces will revolve around how to support selected weapons systems in the cockpit, in the air, or on the ground.

The US, as well as other nations participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, likely will not remain in Afghanistan indefinitely. At some point in time, Afghanistan will have to “take the reins” and become self-sufficient. The expense of maintaining ISAF forces in country will become too costly in people and resources and the tolerance of supporting countries and political leadership may not last. This paper will address what steps are essential in FID for rebuilding the Air Corps so that the ANAAC has the tools they need in order to be free, protecting their country from subversion, lawlessness, and an insurgency.10
Methodology

The methodology used for this research paper is a brief explanatory case study for Vietnam and Iraq and then problem-solution for Afghanistan. First, the explanatory case study uses causation to answer how the respective countries conducted FID and why it was or was not effective. Second, the goal of the problem-solution is to discover, interpret, and revise knowledge with the aim at resolving the problem of rebuilding of the Afghan Air Corps. Third, sources for both methods include several articles, books, individuals directly involved with the Afghan Air Corps, and reputable academics in the area of COIN and FID. Interviewees included personnel currently involved with the Afghan Air Corps and personnel associated with Air Force SOF. Finally, I will use personal experiences from working directly with the Afghan Air Corps. This occurred in 2006-2007 when I was tasked to work for the US Army in Kabul, Afghanistan. During this time, I traveled to most of the ANAAC airfields and interacted with the ANAAC leadership, Afghan Ministry of Defense, and ANAAC commanders at several locations on a daily basis as fixed wing advisor.
Chapter 2

CASE STUDIES

“Almost from the moment the airplane was invented a century ago, Western powers found it to be an exceptionally useful weapon for fighting rebellious tribesmen in the colonies.” ¹²

Corum and Johnson
Air Power in Small Wars

Introduction

The relevance of Vietnam and Iraq to this research paper is that each is a major military conflict that had conventional conflict followed by or mixed with insurgent activities. Both dealt with host nation governments where there was corruption in the governing body. Each had or currently has a significant American presence involving predominantly GPF as well as SOF supporting the rebuilding of the HN’s Air Force. In addition, both have seen little peace in their recorded histories. Iraq has particular relevance in that the reconstruction of the Iraqi Air Force is the most recent large-scale FID operation since Vietnam and it has some regional and cultural similarities to Afghanistan.

To truly understand an insurgency, one must examine the historical, political, and physical environments of the country that are relevant to FID. For an insurgency to be successful, Galula states that you need “a cause, a police and administrative weakness in the counterinsurgent camp, a not-too-hostile geographic environment, and outside support in the middle and later stages of an insurgency,” with the first two points as requirements and the fourth optional.¹³ Last, each case study is subdivided into the strategy, organization, training, and equipping of each respective country.
FID in Vietnam

Setting the Stage

Vietnam has historically been a stage for numerous invasions and occupations by vastly superior forces. Its solution for defense is founded in various styles of guerrilla tactics, which has been their mantra for many centuries. Vietnam’s first application of guerrilla style tactics occurred during the Mongol-Chinese invasion in 1284 where the Vietnamese engaged the opposing force by “abandoning the cities, avoiding frontal attacks, and harassing [their] enemies.” If this sounds familiar, it does not take too long to draw a parallel from this approach and the teachings of Mao Tse-tung. Just a little under a century and a half later, the Vietnamese would apply the approach of guerrilla warfare repeatedly. The Vietnamese routed the Chinese in 1418, and employed the same tactics against the Japanese during WWII, and finally during the French occupation in 1954. Determined, and with a strong belief in the efficacy of guerrilla warfare, these incursions laid the foundation for continued application of guerrilla tactics when the Americans entered Vietnam in the 1950s. Application of FID in Vietnam went on for several years. Tactical Air Command activated the 4400 Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) to conduct FID under Operations JUNGLE JIM and FARM GATE, where American servicemen flew with South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) in combat. Unfortunately, even with the valiant work of the CCTS, the efforts of the North Vietnamese eventually paid off when the Americans capitulated in 1972.

Strategy

Operations in Vietnam evolved through all three categories of FID operations from indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), to combat operations. Initially the French had the first application of air power in Vietnam. Operations with the Vietnamese were
divided. According to James Corum, the “South Vietnamese Air Force remained an auxiliary arm of the l’Armée de l’air”. In the Vietnam War, the French applied air power “wherein the Viet Minh would be lured into a decisive battle in which French airpower and artillery would decide the issue.” This overall strategy proved ineffective most significantly at Dien Bien Phu. The Americans fell into a different trap by building the South Vietnamese military along “conventional lines to defeat a foreign invader” creating “an army oriented to fight the wrong war.” Complicating matters, the relations of the services were punctuated by priority challenges as seen below in a RAND trip report from the Vietnam War.

“The USA demands for air support clearly dominate. They soak up the vast majority of the resources. What they don’t get, the ARVN does, in its role as a national army. This leaves very little to trickle down into routine support of those units whose job it is to provide the local area security.”

Finally, Air Force doctrine for COIN remained underdeveloped. Even during General Curtis LeMay’s tenure, he articulated the importance of COIN. He stated that, “counterinsurgency ‘required the total application of the nation’s resources…” This seems to be a theme that is consistent even today.

Training

What is unique about the Vietnamese Air Force is their level of experience when it came to aviation. When the French decided to build an air force in South Vietnam, they started from scratch in 1951. This created numerous challenges since there was no infrastructure to build upon. The simplest hurdles presented challenges. To deal with education, the French utilized sources outside of the region. For example, schooling for pilots occurred in Avord in France, Blida airfield in Algeria, and in Morocco. The Americans took a similar approach upon initial involvement. The Americans trained the South Vietnamese in Florida with a 352-member group
under a program known as “Jungle Jim.” Still classified, later the Americans sent a detachment of 151 personnel with four SC-47s, four RB-26s, and eight T-28s to Vietnam under the code name of “Farm Gate.”

What is interesting about South Vietnam, unlike the situation in Afghanistan or Iraq, is that prior to Farm Gate, South Vietnamese crews were already flying combat missions and averaged “about 2,200 sorties per month” during the insurgency. Ironically, the Americans later moved away from the expertise of the 4400 CCTS. As Corum points out, the “U.S. Air Force abandoned the idea that personnel sent to South Vietnam required specialized counterinsurgency training.”

As the US withdrew, training continued. However, at some point, the South Vietnamese had to train themselves either because of normal losses or more immediately through attrition.

Equipping

The equipping of the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) took on three distinct phases. First was the initial support from the French with the founding of the South Vietnamese Air Force. Second was the transition from French to American aircraft. Third was the equipping of American aircraft. The most significant changes in the South Vietnamese Air Force occurred under American support. From 1951 to 1955, the South Vietnamese Air Force grew to five squadrons with 58 aircraft. Eventually the US, from 1956 to 1958, replaced all French aircraft with fifty-five T-6 “Texans” along with various trainers. Growth in the South Vietnamese Air Force was soon massive. The South Vietnamese Air Force grew in size in 1962 to 1965 from 4,000 personnel to 15,000 with 16 squadrons and 460 aircraft.

Summation

What we can draw from Vietnam and apply to Afghanistan is that they are more alike than we realized. Although South Vietnam did not have an air force in the beginning, by the
time the US took over they were flying their own missions. Points to draw from this case study are that it was an environment that was underpinned by insurgency style warfare. Amidst this insurgency there seemed to be competing priorities between the services as to the application of air power. As the FID program grew, the success of FID may have been hampered by US Forces not being trained in COIN. However, taking training to the HN may have been beneficial. Finally, the rapid growth of the VNAF may not have allowed them time to mature and deal with a larger air force.

_FID in Iraq_

_Setting the stage_

"By the end of major combat operations in operation Iraqi Freedom, the aircraft, defense systems, heavy-maintenance capability, and command and control (C2) structure had all disappeared. All that remained were a few cratered runways and distant memories of the pre-1991 era."[^31]

Iraq, like Vietnam, has had its share of foreign invaders and occupiers, from the Ottoman Empire, to post WWII occupation by the British, until its eventual sovereignty in the 1930s. Although independent, Iraq saw many years of continual regime change through violence. During the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq lost most of its assets.[^32] In what amounted to 42 days of fighting, the Gulf War left the Iraq Air Force (IqAF) with “an estimated 300 to 375 combat aircraft” untouched.[^33] By the time FID operations started, there was a full-blown insurgency throughout Iraq. Dissolution of the Iraqi military by Paul Bremmer created a vacuum in the military that needed filling. “The IqAF effectively ceased to exist in 1991 and officially disbanded in the wake of the coalition invasion in 2003.”[^34] In the beginning, Iraq maintained a robust air force. It was well established, fielding many modern aircraft that had been in existence many years prior to the arrival of US FID operations. This was important in that Iraq
not only needed its air force to secure internal threats, but also to secure the country from external threats within the region.

**Strategy**

Based on the mission statement of the Coalition Air Force Training Team (CAFTT), the approach in IgAF is COIN focused. The CAFTT’s mission statement is to “Build an Iraqi Air Force capable of conducting sustained operations, focused on the COIN fight in the near-term, in order to defeat terrorism and create a stable environment, while setting the conditions for achieving air sovereignty.”

One example of the IqAF supporting COIN is the IqAF 15th squadron. They have six Huey IIs with a projected 48 by the end of 2008. This unit is associated with Iraqi Special Forces providing immediate response and mobility. Additionally, modified Cessna Grand Caravans, Ch-2000s, are being used for surveillance and reconnaissance with the Iraqi Ministry of oil and electricity.

**Organization**

Organization of the Iraqi Air Force is ongoing. About 17 years ago, prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi Air Force consisted of more than 900 airplanes. Today, arrangement of IqAF units after the defeat of Iraq started around nine units. These nine units consist of seven operational squadrons, one helicopter training squadron, and one flying training school. Distribution of these units occurs among four separate bases. The organizational C2 of the IqAF is similar to that in the US Air Force. For example, an operational air tasking is coordinated through an Iraqi Joint Operations Center (JOC). Each of the four bases reporting directly to the Air Staff further organizes the structure of the IqAF.
Training

There is a significant US presence involved in training the IqAF. There are over 200 US Airmen from varied backgrounds working “on the flight lines, in the back shops, and in the classrooms—from Basra to Kirkuk and several places in between.”\textsuperscript{44} This “footprint” shows a commitment by the US in the development of the IqAF. Another large piece in training the IqAF is pilot training. Training a US Air Force pilot can take up to a year to be qualified to move onto a major weapons system such as a fighter or tanker. It appears that the IqAF have moved to a point where they are able to conduct pilot training in Iraq again. In 2007, a new flight-training center was opened. Located in Kirkuk, the program is designed to graduate 130 new pilots a year by the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{45} This is important because “the average pilot who returned to the IqAF was approximately 43 years old, with most flying their last sortie—usually in some variant of a MiG—in January 1991.”\textsuperscript{46} These experienced pilots have only a short time left to fly in the IqAF, so there is a need to increase the flow of new pilots into the IqAF. The establishment of the flight-training center in Kirkuk should help make the transition of an independent IqAF easier by increasing the size of the IqAF and also may reduce costs associated with training IqAF pilots in other countries.

Equipping

Equipping for the IqAF appears to be varied. Estimates put the fixed wing aircraft at around thirteen different models from planned F-16s, AT-6s, T-50s, and TC-208s to seven types of rotary wing including Mi-17s, UH-II, Bell 206s, and Bell 407s.\textsuperscript{47} This presents the IqAF with aircraft and mission options in the short term. For example the Iraqi 3rd Reconnaissance Squadron based at Kirkuk is receiving Hellfire air-to-ground training with their AC-208 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance aircraft as well as using Bell 407s.\textsuperscript{48} However, in
the long term the flexibility to fly multiple aircraft to support different missions may complicate training on those varied aircraft as well as the support that is required to maintain them.

Rebuilding such a large air force will require significant funding. In the immediate future, the US “is expected to cover these costs through a combination of supplemental legislation, FMF, and IMET funds, although specific funding sources have not yet been determined.” As the size of the IqAF grows, plans are estimated that they will reach 1,000 to 2,900 by 2007 and then increase to 6,000 by 2008. This investment came with $300 million in construction, which will provide the IqAF with the needed infrastructure at four of its main bases.

**Summation**

Contrary to Vietnam, US Forces did not go into a standing Iraqi Air Force. After their disbandment of the IqAF, FID had to start from scratch. This was not unlike the Bundesluftwaffe when the US Air Force rebuilt the German Luftwaffe after WW II. In the development of the IqAF, there is also a focus on COIN. This is seen in their mission statement noted earlier. Elements of US Air Force structure are seen in the IqAF through the use of an Air Staff as well as a JOC. The largest challenge is going to be the size of the IqAF. Cycling students to the US would be time consuming and cost prohibitive. To cope with this, a flight training program was established in Iraq. Although training is occurring within the country, the vast number of aircraft being fielded with around 200 airmen involved may be too difficult for the CAFTT to handle in the long run.
Chapter 3

UNDERSTANDING AFGHAN CULTURE

“The better you know your opponent, the better you are equipped for battle. The skill to win a battle lies in knowing the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses.”

Mayamoto Musashi
Five Rings

The Game

It is important that we first understand the country in which the ANAAC has to function and then the ANAAC themselves before considering how to proceed with development of the ANAAC.

In early 2007, I was invited to a Buzkashi game in Mazar-e-Sharif where the style was Qarajai (see Figure 1). There were only a handful of us, three service members, a contractor with his protective service team, a translator, and an ANAAC officer. I think the Afghans were just as surprised to see us as we were once we realized that we were standing in the midst of over a thousand Afghans where the only force protection that day was knowing that we both loved sports and enjoyed watching the game together. The game can tell you a lot about the people. Here are the rules. There are several teams on the field, anywhere from two to ten, all on horseback. There are three circular rings painted on the ground near the stands and a flagged pole in the distance. The circle in the middle is where the game starts, and the circles on either side are where the game ends. I saw no discernable boundaries other than the vehicles parked at the edge of a dirt field. In the US, most games require a ball. In Afghanistan, the ball is a headless sheep that is limp and dirty from the trampling of horse hooves. Once the ball, or in this case headless sheep, is in play there is what equates to a scrum where Afghans on horseback attempt to lean down from their horse, pickup the sheep. This was done amidst a mêlée of boot
kicking, whipping and steady collisions of opponents’ horses. As the receiver leaned over between colliding horses with constant assault from other players, he would reach almost all the way to the ground, grab the sheep with one hand, carry it around the flagpole at the other end of the field, and then back to one of the circles where it would be dropped. Upon scoring, the Afghan that dropped the sheep in the circle would receive cash. The next round would start once players caught their breath.

![Figure 1: Afghans at a Buzkashi game](image)

Life for the Afghans, compared to the game of Buzkashi, is about the love of intense and fierce competition. It is a way of life for them. The strongest and most intimidating are in charge. There are rules, but flexibility to operate outside of them. In one instance, the receiver rode his horse with sheep in tow beyond the perimeter of the cars and back again with other receivers in hot pursuit.

**The People**

The Afghans live landlocked and consumed by the Hindu Kush mountains that reach nearly 20,000 feet into the atmosphere with weather that has little mercy. Nestled in this austere country are Afghan tribes that have lived their lives under the threat of invasion or occupation for thousands of years. Many Americans are familiar with the famous photo in 1985 of a young
Afghan girl caught in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan displayed on the front of a National Geographic magazine (see Figure 2). Her eyes attempt to tell a remarkable story that none of us can imagine. Yet, if we fast-forward to 2003, you will see the same girl, now a woman, with a burka over her head. The expression on her face tells a story of untold hardships.

Figure 2: National Geographic’s “Afghan Girl,” 1984 and 2002

Many factions have attempted to rule in Afghanistan with little success. The ethnic fragmentation of the country and tribal cultures have made it difficult to manage. Leaders have either ruled the country through tyranny, occupation, or most recently in the case of Hammed Karzai, through an attempt at western style democracy. From the 1800s leading into the 1900s, Afghanistan saw internal conflict and three wars known as the Anglo-Afghan Wars. The harshest of these was a British withdrawal in 1842 known as the Massacre of Elphinstone’s army. After safe passage, Afghans massacred roughly 12,000 civilians and 4,500 troops leaving only one survivor. The third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 is significant in that it was the first time the Afghans saw air power. Soviet influence dominates their most recent history from the mid 1900s. An excellent characterization of the challenges of understanding the politics of the country follows:
“[The] village orientation, accentuated by pervasive illiteracy, has made the country resistant to centralized control, even by those preferring constructive reform. In Afghanistan, nationalism is essentially an expression of tribalism.”

Afghanistan, like Vietnam and Iraq, has spent most of its existence consumed by internal strife. From Alexander the Great, to the Anglo-Afghan Wars, to the Soviet Invasion, Afghanistan has lived under constant aggression from external powers. It is not surprising that there is an insurgency in Afghanistan similar to Iraq and Vietnam given the similarities that came about naturally from years of invasions by foreign occupiers. In order to defeat external attackers, each country honed its irregular warfare skills.

A difference between Afghanistan compared to Vietnam and Iraq is that in Afghanistan we are attempting to repel an insurgency and establish a form of government in a country where tribes and tribal law are the way of life. Vietnam and Iraq, however faulty, communist, or corrupt, had some form of a bureaucratic government that existed throughout the country that at least served as a basis for Phase IV reconstruction efforts.
Chapter 4

AFGHAN AIR CORPS

“The successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the adversary’s political strength rather than military power.”  

JP 3-07.1 Joint TTP for FID

The Air Corps

Afghanistan’s introduction to air power started in the early 1900s. Since its inception, the Air Corps lived a peppered life of growth and contraction. Alliances for the Air Corps shifted from one controlling body to another, eventually fracturing an air force that at its zenith reached an estimated 350 aircraft. Remarkably, most of the aviators that had flown under the Russians, Taliban, Northern Alliance, and previous regimes are still in the Air Corps today. The environment of changing allegiances within the Air Corps it not so surprising when one looks at how Afghan tribes interact with each other. As of 2006, the primary foundation of the ANAAC development was under the Russians even though a few pilots received instruction in the US. Russian influence on their military is noted below from a translation of Soviet Strategy by RAND.

“The leadership of the Communist party of the Soviet Union is the main source of the might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the basis of their ideological training, organizational make-up and all-round preparedness.”

“Unity of command is a most important principle in the organization of the Soviet Armed Forces.”

Although the US has been in Afghanistan for nearly nine years, the ANAAC is in their fourth year of FID development. It is interesting to note that the Soviets also occupied Afghanistan for nine years. Growth of the ANAAC has come a long way since advisors first arrived in 2005. The focus shifted from a handful of advisors struggling with how to rebuild an
air corps with no instruction manuals and a shoestring budget to the Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF) that is currently in place. The initial team was at the mercy of their interpreters because they did not speak the language. Days were spent attempting to understand even the most simple of tasks. Even then, “the value of foreign language training cannot be overemphasized.”66 Initially efforts revolved around indirect support by simply mentoring and advising the ANAAC. Since then, with the introduction of the CAPTF, efforts have moved to direct support and a more robust advisor force.67 Although more robust, this increase in forces came from general-purpose forces (GPF) versus Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Training for advisors is minimal compared to AFSOC training where FID is a primary responsibility. This unfortunate lack of understanding of FID can contribute to the overall difficulty in its application. Surprisingly there is no synergy of FID efforts between the IqAF and the ANAAC.68 Currently there is a strategist in Afghanistan that is providing focus in developing current and future strategies for the ANAAC.

**Strategy**

Development of FID policy for the Afghan Air Corps is difficult to ascertain. Without an effective strategy, the ANAAC and their advisors have little to use as guidance. Ideally, established guidance should support the IDAD as it integrates the necessary elements of COIN operations. In review of FID in Vietnam, one should note that FID started in 1951 by the French and lasted even through transition to the US Air Force who provided modern aircraft and departed Vietnam in 1973. Overreliance on GPF versus SOF may have contributed to this, mainly because SOF are specially trained for FID whereas GPF are not. Additionally, because of GPF unfamiliarity with FID and COIN, they may lack the understanding how air power contributes to COIN. Without established guidance, the ANAAC as well as its advisors are
subject to “transitional doctrine” where guidance is based on the leadership of the time, issues as to where aviation falls into FID, and how it supports the overall FID program. A word of caution should be made about aviation and a strictly aviation FID-oriented program. FID incorporates all elements of DIME. As Robert Pape’s analysis of air power in Germany during WWII put it, “air power played a secondary role to land power, and we must question the wisdom of any long-term defense policy relying exclusively on air power.”

Figure 3: ANAAC AN-26 Curl

Organization

Two distinct aspects affect how to organize the Air Corps. First is that we understand the tribal influences that exist throughout the country, as well as the ethnic and language barriers. Second is the influence of Russian command and control (C2).

Tribal influence, ethnic background, and language play a large role in how the country functions. A comparison follows of the US and Afghanistan to provide perspective. There are 34 provinces in Afghanistan (see Figure 4). Of these 34 provinces, located in an area a little smaller than Texas, only 24% of the population is urbanized compared to 82% in the US. Pashto and Tajik are the predominant ethnic groups at 42% and 27% respectively, compared to 79.96% white, 15.1% Hispanic and 12.85% black in the US. The lack of commonality in
Afghanistan exacerbates the difficulties with finding common ground on who should be in charge or what language they should speak.

One striking dynamic seen in the ANAAC is the centralized control that is pervasive within their military. Orders frequently come from senior leadership directly to the pilot himself via cell phone. This lack of trust at the lower echelons is probably the result of ethnic and language barriers as well as the influence of Russian C2.

In the beginning of reorganization, there were three operational squadrons. There was a fixed wing squadron, a rotary wing squadron, and a presidential airlift squadron. All of the operational squadron belonged to one group commander. Currently they have grown to a training squadron and a detachment in Kandahar. Russian C2, which is centralized control and centralized execution, occurs not only on the ground, but also in the aircraft they fly.

Afghanistan is bordered by Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan. Currently there are eight well-known airfields around Afghanistan distributed in the North, East, South, and West (see Figure 5). Three of these airfields are located in the East of the country, in
Kabul, Jalalabad, and Gardez. This region of the country is primarily mountainous whereas the other bases, Shindand, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat, lie at the base of the Hindu Kush mountains. During the Russian occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Russian forces occupied most of these bases while executing operations throughout the country. These locations afford the ANAAC the ability to locate their forces within reasonable response time to conflicts that may occur throughout their country.

Kabul and Bagram are the most prominent airfields about fifteen minutes by air from each other and from Kandahar in the South. They are located in the mountainous region, which provides a natural land barrier. However, at six to seven thousand feet field elevation and associated mountainous terrain, they do not make for an optimal basing location. Herat is located just north of Shindand and is close to the Iran and Afghanistan border. It lies at the outskirts of the city of Herat. Gardez and Jalalabad are the heart of the insurgency. It is common knowledge that insurgents move back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan in this region. Shindand was formerly a training base, similar to a UPT base. Under the Soviets, students would first attend the aviation academy located in Kabul next to the Kabul International
Airport. Upon completion of the aviation academy, students would go to Shindand for pilot training. Mazar-e-Sharif is located in the northern part of Afghanistan at a junction just south of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan roughly 50 miles from each border. This area is not as influenced by the Taliban and was supported by the Northern Alliance. Kandahar is in the southern portion of Afghanistan roughly 75 miles from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. There is a significant presence of US forces here to counter the insurgency in the southern portion of Afghanistan. Additionally, with the growth of the ANAAC, the Air Corps recently set up operations here.

![Figure 6: ANAAC L-39 Albatros](image)

**Training**

In the past, training for the ANAAC came from many sources. Since the 1970s, most, if not all, training was conducted by the Russians with few exceptions that include the US at one point in time. Broader challenges that affect training the ANAAC are language, education, and training location. In Afghanistan, many different languages are spoken. Compared to the US where English is spoken by 82.1% of the population and Spanish is spoken by 10.7% of the population, Afghanistan is predominantly divided between Dari at 50%, Pashto at 35%, and Uzbek and Turkmen at 11%. Literacy rates also exacerbate the situation. In Afghanistan, only 28.1% of the total population, age 15 and over, is literate, 43.1% of the male population, and
12.6% of the female population.\textsuperscript{81} To provide perspective once again, the US literacy rate is 99% for the total population, 99% of the males, and 99% of the females.\textsuperscript{82} Even if language and education were not factors, where to physically train the Afghans is an issue. Do you conduct training in the US, in Afghanistan, or a combination of both? Training for the IqAF occurs in Iraq. This is similar to the VNAF training in Vietnam.

Effects of neglect of the ANAAC are more than apparent. After the withdrawal of the Soviets and fragmentation of forces, flight manuals were lost or destroyed by the Taliban. In Kabul, the ANAAC publications library consisted of stacks of torn and tattered Russian language maintenance and flight manuals. Since flight manuals were in Russian, there was an additional barrier in continuation training after the Russians left. To overcome this barrier, Afghan instructors teach students from meticulously detailed handwritten notes.\textsuperscript{84} Essentially, students make their own text manuals and receive their instruction from instructors who use their personal notes and experience, not unlike a tradesman that teaches an apprentice how to make something from memory.
Today ANAAC units consist of a mix of students formerly trained by Russians, students trained by the Afghans with no formal training, and one graduate from the Aviation Leadership Program (ALP). With the involvement of the US, pilot training for the ANAAC started by sending helicopter and fixed wing pilots to the US. The US Army was quick to get helicopter pilots to the US. The US Air Force took nearly three years after the first Afghan was sent before predecessors would follow. Fixed wing pilots attend a language program at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) before attending Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT). At UPT, they attend a program where they do six months in the T-6 followed by six more months of advanced training in the same aircraft. The program is taught in English with no consideration of the capabilities, challenges, or customs of the Afghan students. This lack of orientation for the instructor pilots is in sharp contrast to the rigorous process that AFSOC personnel go through or even GPF before they are sent to the AOR as advisors.

“According to discussions with AFCENT and AFSOC officials, April 2007 and November 2006. Advisers who received intensive 6SOS type training were better prepared to conduct their work in the remote environment of Afghanistan, were more familiar with existing air capabilities, and were better received by their hosts.”
Equipping

The largest growth of the Air Corps occurred under the Soviets prior to and after their occupation of Afghanistan. Afghan Brigadier General Zahir estimated that in the later 1970s, the aircraft fleet grew anywhere from 200 to 400 aircraft. Jane’s Defense Weekly calculated that assets during this time were on the order of 45 MiG-21s, 60-75 Su-7s, 90 MiG-17s, 45 Il-28s, and 45 L-39s, which corroborates General Zahir’s memory. Here the Afghans have, to some extent, demonstrated the capability to manage a sizable air force relative to the size of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, years of internal fighting took their toll. After OEF, only 3 AN-32s, 2 AN-26s, 1 AN-12s, 6 Mi-35s, 7 Mi-17s, and 2 L-39s remained (see Figures 3, 6-9). Given the ANAAC’s weapons systems, the Air Corps’ grounding in Soviet doctrine and hardware could potentially drive them back to what they are familiar with looking to rebuild a sizable air corps and the glory days of old. Familiarity and past reliance on such a large force may cloud the judgment of Afghan officials in their quest for a new Air Corps.

Figure 9: ANAAC Mi-35 Hind

Looking towards the future, how will the Air Corps fit into the needs of the country’s defense? Afghanistan has no real external threat and should rely on assets that can be used for internal defense, such as those that support CAS and COIN operations. The US should consider the needs of Afghanistan rather than defaulting to highly advanced technological solutions for
resolving challenges in combat operations. This struggle between a technology driven society (US) and a state with minimal resources desiring advanced weaponry (Afghanistan) will need to be resolved before equipping decisions are made. If the ANAAC is not properly equipped, then assets may be ill suited for the current threat.
Chapter 5

FINDINGS

“The host-nation’s IDAD strategy (its overarching counterinsurgency strategy) provides the basis for determining appropriate airpower objectives. Accordingly, Air Force FID assistance should be designed to support and reinforce the host-nation’s IDAD strategy.”  

AFDD 2-3.1
Foreign Internal Defense

To address the ANAAC and provide possible solutions, the order of recommendations will follow the same outline as the previous discussions addressing strategy, organization, training, and equipping. Each of the solutions draws upon the previous two case studies, as well as an analysis of the ANAAC. An underlying theme in the discussion is that “More sophisticated weapon systems do not appear to be necessary and would require a level of infrastructure and support that is beyond the means of the Afghan military.”

Strategy

Development of a strategic plan is crucial to the FID program so that it can support the HN’s IDAD. One strategy is the use of airlift as a way of political projection in addition to COIN. Given the extensive mountainous terrain and remote locations of villages, development of a strategic airlift capability where leadership in Kabul is able to reach out to tribal leaders directly may bridge relationships with Afghan tribes and President Karzai. This strategy would contribute to supporting unity of effort in the COIN fight, minimize violence by interacting with the populace, and provide a more responsive government.

“Presidential airlift, although not normally a military priority, is considered most important in helping the government secure its influence throughout the country.”
Next, is whether to build the ANAAC for internal defense or external defense. One can argue that there are no real external threats to Afghanistan other than support for insurgents. Lieutenant General Hostage, AFCENT Commander, believes that the threat is internal and that equipping Afghanistan for an external threat is not necessary at this time. Taking this line of approach, designing an air corps based on rapid mobility to deal with internal problems is another strategic point. In this case there must be a highly mobile air striking force that is “capable of rapid, overwhelming reaction to an attack.”

**Organization**

Organization of the ANAAC should link directly to the overall strategy, “effective organization is a necessary key to both counterrevolutionary and revolutionary strategy.” Given the propensity for shifting alliances and fragmentation through internal conflict, delegating too much authority to provincial authority over ANAAC assets would be counterproductive. In organizing units around the country, establishment of main operating bases with forward operating locations in potential hot spots will support rapid mobility.

**Training**

“Finally, as predeployment training for Air Force personnel has been reduced to a minimal two-week preparation course, at the time of research and writing, new advisers have not been sufficiently prepared and lack the necessary skills to perform effectively on their arrival in Afghanistan.”

RAND Study

There are a few aspects to consider when training the ANAAC. First, consider the literacy of the Air Corps to include future accessions. Do not assume that the ANAAC needs the same advanced technology as the US. Advanced technology in and of itself presents further problems with training, maintenance, sustainment, and cost. Based on lessons learned from embedded training programs in Vietnam and Iraq, a pilot training program in Afghanistan seems
logical. However, rather than waiting for a UPT style location to be built, GPF instructors should be trained from the beginning to use HN aircraft. If it is not possible to conduct training in the HN, conduct training in the US, with less advanced aircraft, until the environment in the HN is permissive. At this point, bring instructors to Afghanistan to help build an initial training cadre. Finally, consider historical employment of air power in Afghanistan. The Soviets used airpower for about nine years. These experiences could prove beneficial to understanding the future application of air power in Afghanistan.

**Equipping**

“The focus on relatively simple airlift, ISR, and light attack capabilities may be most appropriate for developing nations engaged in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaigns.”

RAND Study

The focus of equipping the ANAAC should keep the following points in mind. First, “strategy should always be in place first and then resources & tactics (aircraft) should be selected to directly support that strategy.” Next, historically good strategy should reflect the fact that the low literacy rate will affect their overall capacity to learn and maintain advanced systems. In addition, these advanced systems typically come with a big price tag. After analyzing current and projected GDP expenditures on defense, the capability of maintaining or purchasing advanced systems without some foreign aid may present a problem. One approach is to continue with what they know. The ANAAC already has a foundation grounded in Russian aircraft. It may be easier to train a handful of US instructors on Russian aircraft, than convert the entire ANAAC over to western aircraft and technology.
CONCLUSION

“Winning a revolutionary war will take massive organization, dedication, sacrifice, and time. The government must decide early if it is willing to pay the price. Half-measures lead only to protracted, costly defeats.” 

John J. McCuen
The Art of Counterrevolutionary War

In John McCuen’s statement above, he presents a perceptive thought that should be understood by all involved in FID. Once FID operations commence, all forces, regardless of whether they are SOF or GPF, should be prepared for the long haul. This is most prominently seen in Vietnam with the French beginning FID in the 1950s and ending with the US in the 1970s. More recently, the US has undertaken major FID operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, two countries that parallel Vietnam in size and scope. With such large programs, it may become difficult to properly organize these forces given that their strategies may have been faulty to some extent. The challenge of training the ANAAC is daunting given their current environment. Years of oppression as well as political strife left its mark on the population. Finally, equipping the ANAAC presents challenges from financing to what systems will support the right strategy.
Endnotes

3 AFDD 2-3.1, 1.
4 JP 3-07.1 Joint TTP for FID, page xi.
5 Sagraves, *The Indirect Approach*.
6 Rumsfeld and Myers, *Briefing on Enduring Freedom*.
7 For this paper, FID in Iraq and Afghanistan are considered to have occurred in the same general period.
8 FM 3-0, Stability Operations, 2-11.
10 FM 3-24, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, glossary-5.
11 This problem-solution methodology will use the following six steps: (1) define the problem, (2) set criteria, (3) analyze alternatives that meet the set criteria, (4) select alternative that best meets the set criteria, (5) select that alternative as the solution, and (6) make recommendations on how to implement selected solutions. ACSC Research Guide AY 2010.
15 Ibid., 229-230.
16 AFDD 2-3.1, 30.
17 Corum and Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars*, 234: Mesko, VNAF, 14. (redo footnote with full citation)
18 Ibid., 230.
19 Ibid., 241.
22 Ibid., 233.
23 Ibid., 234.
24 Ibid., 245.
25 Ibid., 246.
26 Ibid., 250.
27 Ibid., 262.
28 Ibid., 234-235.
29 Ibid., 235.
30 Ibid., 235.
32 Ibid., 5.
36 Ibid., 10.
37 Ibid., 10.
38 Ibid., 10.


The Long War Journal, Iraqi Order of Battle.

Jennifer et al., International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces, Micro-Level Case Study Analysis, 49.


The Long War Journal, Iraqi Order of Battle.

Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 8.

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Curry, “A Life Revealed.”

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JP 3-07.1 Joint TTP for FID, B-1.


Faust, Christian, Personal observation in the ANAAC 2006/2007. After multiple discussions with various members of the Air Corps they pointed out, they received their training by the Soviets, sometimes within Russia. General Darwan, ANAAC commander, stated he was involved in the cosmonaut program at one time. Russian influence was readily identifiable by aircraft, equipment, manuals, and interactions with members of the Afghan Air Corps. American influence was not apparent until, after personal involvement with getting Lt Faiz Ramiki Muhammad in the pilot training. Col. John Hansen, an advisor to the air corps, and my commanding officer pointed out that Faiz had two predecessors 30 plus years prior.


Ibid., 504.

AFDD 2-3.1 Foreign Internal Defense, 65.

Birch, Paul R LT COL MIL USAF CSTE-A Lt Col 438th AEAG, e-mail correspondence, “I think by and large the role of CAPTF as it pertains to AFDD 2-3 is a 'direct support not involving combat'”


Pape, Bombing to Win, Air Power and Coercion in War, 313.

Faust, Christian, Personal photo taken of AN-26, Kabul Airport, Fall 2006.
In 2007, crews would regularly receive cell phone calls from the group commander in the aircraft with engines running, bypassing all channels of communication redirecting missions.

Examples of C2 were seen when the operations group commander would call the aircrews directly in the aircraft via cell phone and redirect their mission.

The AN-26 Curl and AN-32 Cline, two light airlift aircraft, capable of takeoff and landing on unimproved surfaces, has a crew of five. There is a pilot, copilot, engineer, navigator, and radio operator. The command pilot directs all actions almost as if he were captain of the Star Ship Enterprise. For example, during takeoff and landing, he directs the flight engineer to make throttle adjustments. A concept that is foreign to most if not all US aviators.

Shindand is located in the Heart province on the West side of Afghanistan roughly 80 miles from the East side of Iran. It was formerly a training base for the Afghans, most notably during the Russian Afghan war. Fortunately, this airfield is in relatively good condition where most if not all building were left intact to some extent after OEF. In 2006, planning for the airfield was to be an aviation school once again.

ALP is a scholarship program for students from foreign countries to attend Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) at the expense of the US.

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