A WORKING MODEL FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

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Abstract

The Central Asian States include five former Soviet republics, which have experienced varying degrees of stability since the fall of the USSR. U.S. interests require stability in the region. CENTCOM has quietly conducted Theater Security Cooperation efforts (which also support stability in Central Asian States) through the Humanitarian Assistance and Counter Narcotics (HA/CN) program. These operation are significant because failure could result in more ungoverned space, which terrorist groups use to plan and train. Many agencies and individuals have produced documents that record lessons and develop SSTR concepts. Three examples are, the “Military Support to SSTR Joint Operating Concept,” “Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” by former Administrator of USAID Andrew S. Natsios, and, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction published by the U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute. Those concepts cover common themes which can be consolidated into a few key ideas. Those ideas are validated by experiences in the Vietnam War, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and recent CENTCOM operations in Kyrgyzstan. Leveraging those experiences and the principles defined by various subject matter experts, this paper proposes working model for SSTR operations in Central Asia. The model, the SSTR Coordination Group (SCG) model, connects with current CENTCOM practices and based on an example within Central Asia, seems to harmonize with the Department of State.
Introduction

Alongside its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, CENTCOM has quietly conducted Theater Security Cooperation efforts (which also support stability in Central Asian States) through the Humanitarian Assistance and Counter Narcotics (HA/CN) program. Although the primary USCENTCOM focus is correctly on Afghanistan and Iraq, regional stability requires operations in Central Asia. Failure to achieve independent stability in these states could result more ungoverned space, which groups like al Qaeda use to plan and train for terror activities. Furthermore, if Russia or China were to expand their influence through such instability, the U.S. could lose basing rights, over flight, or other support required for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Circumstances in those states require a different model than that used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The model must be analyzed, discussed, and refined by the Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) community to ensure effective regional operations.

The Central Asian Overview

By the most common definition, the Central Asian States (see Figure 1) include five former Soviet republics bounded on the east by China, on the west by the Caspian Sea, on the north by Russia, and on the south by Iran and Afghanistan. The states include Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. This area was largely on the periphery of U.S. foreign policy until the events of September 11, 2001 forced the Central Asian States (CAS) to the forefront of foreign policy concerns. Their strategic location and resource base could no longer be ignored.

Despite the natural resources of the region (natural gas, oil, uranium, and agriculture), some Central Asian countries have been wracked by poverty. For example, the 2009 per capita GDP in Tajikistan was only 720 US dollars and 53% of the population lived below the poverty line.² In Uzbekistan per capita GDP was only slightly better at $1012 and 25% of the population lived at or below the line.³ Conversely, in Kazakhstan the 2007 per capita GDP was approximately $11,100 and only 13.8% lived below the poverty line.⁴

The CAS have experienced varying degrees of stability since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. From 1992 to 1997 Tajikistan was involved in a civil war. Organizations like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) allied themselves with the Taliban of Afghanistan and brought instability to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and to some extent the entire region.⁵ The diversity of the population adds to these stability challenges. The population is largely Sunni Muslim with the Russian Orthodoxy, Eastern Orthodoxy, Protestantism, and Shia Muslim groups present in individual countries.⁶ Ethnically the population is primarily a combination of the people indigenous to that a region (Tajik, Uzbek, Russian, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and Kazakh).

While the governments of these five states generally claim democratic structures, they are for the most part functionally centralized or at a minimum have a disproportionately strong executive branch. For example the Library of Congress Country studies say the 1992 constitution of Turkmenistan establishes a 5 year presidency with 2-term maximum. “However, since the parliament named him president for life in 1999, Niyazov no longer was required to stand for re-election.”⁷ In Uzbekistan “the presidency, a position occupied by Islam Karimov since
independence, dominates all three branches of government.” Similarly, in Tajikistan the, “president, who is directly elected to an unlimited number of seven-year terms, is the dominant figure in the government.”

Centralization of the government and economic hardship often result in instability. Therefore, it is no surprise that several of the Central Asian States score high on the Fund for Peace Failed States Index. Among the 177 states rated, Uzbekistan scored the worst in Central Asia at 92.8 (31st overall) followed by Kyrgyzstan at 89.1 (42nd overall), Turkmenistan at 84.3 (59th overall), and Kazakhstan at 72.5 (105th overall). Tajikistan was not rated on the Failed States Index, but with its poor economic conditions, history of civil war and internal terrorist activity, corruption, and lack of transparent government, Tajikistan likely would have scored very high. Figure 1 shows the Failed States Index (FSI), unemployment rate, and per capita GDP of the five states and several reference states (higher FSI rank indicates greater instability).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FSI RANK</th>
<th>GDP PER CAPITA RANK</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>GDP PER CAPITA</th>
<th>BASE YEAR</th>
<th>UNEMPLOYMENT RATE</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>169</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>184</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>46400</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 Per Capita GDP and Failed State Index Rankings
(Central Asian States in blue)

Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, internal and external parties began a push for regionalization creating several organizations for economic and security integration. As could be expected in this dynamic environment, many of them failed. Two of the more
successful and influential organizations are the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) and the Cooperative Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).\(^{13}\) However, successful and influential does not mean supportive of US interests.

The SCO and CSTO have worked to check U.S. advances in the region. The Shanghai Cooperative Organization primarily supports Chinese and Russian interests and was at least partially developed to counter influence gained in the region by the United States during OEF.\(^{14}\) In June 2005, the SCO demanded a timeline for the departure of the United States forces from Central Asia. The CSTO is the organization to which Uzbekistan turned when relations with the United States chilled. The separation was driven by the US response to what it and Europe called a “civilian massacre.”\(^{15}\) At that time, Uzbekistan turned from the U.S. sponsored Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldavia organization (GUAM) to the Russian led CSTO as one of many events that indicated a decrease in US influence.\(^{16}\)

In the 1990s the United States placed little emphasis on the newly independent Central Asian States. Goals were limited to countering Chinese and Russian influence in the area. Policy emphasized the independence of Central Asia \(^{17}\) and the denuclearization of Kazakhstan.\(^{18}\) The early days of the George W. Bush administration saw little change in the Central Asian policy. However, the Global War on Terror initiated a new era for the United States in Central Asia.\(^{19}\) The necessity for bases to support OEF and the realization that instability in distant lands could affect the U.S. homeland brought Central Asia to the forefront. The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) states, “South and Central Asia is a region of great strategic importance where American interests and values are engaged as never before.”\(^{20}\)

In light of those lessons, it is clear that even today stability in the region is a homeland security issue for the United States. Influences on security are not limited to those locations in
the headlines. Central Asia must remain an active policy concern for U.S. security. In fact, according to the 2006 NSS, Central Asia must remain an integral part of the larger U.S. security strategy. The US views the CAS as essential to both the Global War On Terror and security in the region as a whole.\textsuperscript{21}

As with previous administrations, the Obama administration has placed little emphasis on Central Asia. The significance the area gained during the initial phases of OEF has waned in light of the US focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan and net influence gains by both Russia and China. However, their strategic significance remains and they cannot be ignored. The near loss of Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan in 2009, highlighted the importance of a foothold in the region. The fact Russian influence drove the Kyrgyz action emphasizes both the competitive relationship that has developed between the U.S. and Russia and the significant gains that Russia has made in the area. Similarly, China has gained important resource rights in the area,\textsuperscript{22} which means those resources will be unavailable to the US. For example, China now has gas exploration and production rights in part Turkmenistan, a country whose production potential is estimated to be in the top15 globally. Furthermore, Turkmenistan has a contract to provide 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China, nearly half the country’s 2007 output.\textsuperscript{23} These dynamics make countering Russian and Chinese influence a continuing concern for the United States.

In a separate case of increasing opposition influence is seen in Islamist groups such as al Qaeda and the IMU. Those groups lost some strength in the region with the fall of the Taliban but, as the Taliban attempts to reassert itself in Afghanistan, their threat to the regional stability desired by the U.S. could grow. The 2006 National Security Strategy explains that “failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas … can become safe havens for terrorists,”\textsuperscript{24} thus threatening U.S. security.
Fortunately, despite the history of instability, the Central Asian States are not war torn Phase IV reconstruction efforts. With the possible exception of Tajikistan, they are all Phase 0 operations. This is a blessing and a curse for regional SSTR operations. It means that SSTR will likely be substantially less expensive in CAS than in Afghanistan or Iraq. However, the lack of violence also means that it will be more difficult to focus attention on the Central Asian States. The more well known, urgent, and difficult Phase IV stability efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq garner much more attention and support from the international community.

**U.S. Objectives in Central Asia**

DoS and DOD objectives in Central Asia line up with the five SSTR lines of effort defined in FM 3-07. While objectives differ from country to country, review of the DoS website shows that the emphasis is squarely on a safe and secure environment, stable governance, and sustainable economy. The 2006 NSS emphasizes those same ideas with the statement, “Our goal is for the entire region of South and Central Asia to be democratic, prosperous, and at peace.” CENTCOM’s regional objectives are classified, but the unclassified theater objectives line up very well with the three emphases from DoS. Understanding these objectives will be important for any reconstruction effort. The CENTCOM Campaign Plan Theater Objectives include: 1) Promote common interests in order to enhance stability, 2) Defeat Violent Extremist Organizations, 3) Counter the proliferation, acquisition, and use of WMD, 4) Assist in the setting of conditions that will enable economic development and prosperity, and 5) Prepare US and partner forces to respond to emerging challenges. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of DOS and DOD objectives and their relation to the five objectives of SSTR operations.
Having reviewed the objectives (ends), we must turn our attention to the ways and means of SSTR in Central Asia. Fortunately, several organizations have analyzed the building blocks for effective SSTR and their wisdom and experience will be helpful in establishing principles and building a CAS specific strategy.

The Security Stability and Reconstruction Principles

The Military Support to SSTR Operations Joint Operating Concept groups SSTR operations into two categories, “high-end” and “other.” While it seems simplistic, this classification model does serve a purpose, by providing a point of focus. High-end operations are the more difficult events, such as post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, that require extensive effort across the spectrum of USG capabilities. Operations in the “other” category of SSTR operations are less demanding. The U.S. operations in Central Asia fall within this “other” category, but “other” does not equate to “easy”. “The primary focus of SSTR operations is on helping a severely stressed government avoid failure or recover from a devastating natural disaster, or on assisting an emerging host nation government to build a “new domestic order” following internal collapse or defeat in war.” No part of that task is easy and every part requires extensive consideration, resources, and planning.

Several reputable “experts” have taken time to record lessons learned and develop concepts for SSTR. Three significant documents that attempt to define concepts are, Military Support to SSTR Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC), the “Nine Principles of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safe/Secure Environment</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan*</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>CENTCOM Theater Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Democracy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable Economy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Well-Being</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3 US Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan*</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
<th>CENTCOM Theater Objectives</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>Sustainable Economy</td>
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<td>Social Well-Being</td>
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<td>X</td>
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</table>

Figure 3 US Objectives
Reconstruction and Development” (a Parameters article) by former Administrator of USAID Andrew S. Natsios, and Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction published by the U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute. Each of these documents provides a helpful list of considerations for SSTR.

After defining the primary focus of SSTR operations, the JOC moves on to define several supporting ideas that make SSTR effective. The supporting ideas defined by the JOC include unified action, contingency planning and preparation, establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment, building host nation capability and capacity and reducing drivers of instability and conflict, and conducting strategic communication.34

From his perspective as the director of USAID, Andrew S. Natsios defined nine principles he viewed as critically important for successful reconstruction. Those principles include ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility, and accountability.35

The final set of SSTR principles analyzed in this document were defined by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in a document entitled, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. That document defines seven cross-cutting principles that are intended to provide guidance to any organization involved in SSTR at any level, which include host nation ownership, political primacy, legitimacy of the host nation, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation, and regional engagement.36

Summarizing the Experts

While there are several differences, a short study of the three lists shows that several common threads run through them. The collective wisdom they provide gives a much more complete picture of the requirements for effective SSTR operations than any single list would
give. They also seem to naturally group into two major categories. The first category is internal factors. These factors address how the various USG agencies work together to accomplish the assigned mission. The second category is external factors or how the USG works with the host nation and its people. Stated another way, internal factors are the principles by which the USG SSTR team should organize and manage its operations, while external factors are concerns which the USG must apply and balance during a specific operation. External factors will sometimes be in competition with one another and it is up to USG leaders to balance their competing demands by building an effective decision-making process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNAL FACTORS</th>
<th>EXTERNAL FACTORS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
<td>Ownership (Natsios)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity Building (Natsios)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed Loop Planning</td>
<td>Host Nation Ownership (PKSOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building Host Nation Capability and Capacity * (JOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/Regional Team Integration</td>
<td>Sustainability (Natsios)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Results (Natsios)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security (PKSOI)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Establishing and Maintaining a Safe and Secure Environment (JOC)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Political primacy (PKSOI)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Legitimacy (PKSOI)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conflict Transformation (PKSOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce Drivers of Instability &amp; Conflict* (JOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Strategic Communication (JOC)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Political contextualization</td>
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</table>

* Note: Building Host Nation Capability and Capacity and Reducing Drivers Of Instability and Conflict is a single concept in the Military Support to SSTR Joint Operating Concept

Figure 4 Internal and External Factors

Internal factors include unity of effort, closed loop planning, and local and regional team integration (regional team integration actually bridges internal and external concerns but is treated as an internal factor). Figure 4 shows the integration of the three lists into the internal and external factors.

Unity of effort is a common theme in many USG communities and is easily understood. Although effective SSTR operations require support from numerous agencies, these individual
agencies have their own objectives and interests. Common understanding of the priority of effort and the desired end state along with effective interagency coordination and good leadership are just a few of the requirements to build unity.

The requirement for closed loop planning is drawn from Natsios’ “Nine principles for Nation-Building,” and the, “Military Support to SSTR Joint Operating Concept.” Four of Natsios’ principles, combine with the concept of contingency planning from the JOC, and the common military concept known as the OODA loop. The idea is demonstrated in experiences from Vietnam and Afghanistan (see case studies) which showed that one of the benefits of the respective SSTR structures is that they allowed personnel to grow continuously in their understanding of the host nation. The personnel could then apply their learning to subsequent operations, which then became more effective. The elements of the OODA loop are observe, orient, decide, and act. There is a subtle parallel to four of the principles identified by Natsios, assessment, flexibility, selectivity, and
accountability. The observe phase centers on flexibility and ties directly to the concept of assessment. The connection is intuitively obvious. The orient phase ties to flexibility and includes both to the ability to respond to changing stimuli and the organizational agility and resources required to do so. The decide phase is tied to selectivity. In this case, decisions involve selecting of the best course of action produced by flexible systems and not wasting resources on other options. The final phase, act, implements the decision from the previous phase. Accountability relates to it, not because it somehow equates to action, but because it implies some action has been taken. In other words there would be no need for accountability if no actions were being implemented. The Military Support to SSTRO JOC describes the foundational requirement of contingency planning. Integrating the previously mentioned elements into an SSTR contingency planning process provides an effective way to consolidate the experience of all three sources.

Figure 6 provides a graphic summary of the process.

External factors describe how USG works with HN during SSTR operations. External factors include ownership and capacity, functionality, security and political contextualization. After the internal operating system is established and functioning well, effectively balancing the external

Figure 6 External Factors
factors will be the primary determinant for success. This require a thorough understanding of the situation, the players, the culture and drivers of conflict along with the technical and managerial capacity to effectively conduct SSTR.

Case Studies

With these principles integrated into a coherent management model we must look at history to test their usefulness.

CORDS Vietnam

History largely views SSTR in the Vietnam War as a failure. At that time leaders within the SSTR or pacification effort faced quite a challenge. Per the JOC definition, Vietnam was a high-end SSTR operation and the damage caused by failed French colonial management gave the armed insurgents support for their cause. The U.S. government’s support of Ngo Din Diem further exacerbated the problem. The U.S. “backed Diem as he mounted a ruthless campaign to suppress any and all dissent against his regime. Armed with US military aid, Diem created a powerful secret police, killed, imprisoned and tortured Viet Minh sympathizers, and effectively ‘pushed the most varied social, political and religious forces in Vietnamese society into each other’s arms in a desperate search for survival’.” 38 Furthermore, the regimes economic policies failed to address disparities. For example “one-quarter of 1% of the rural population owned a full 40% of rice land in the South. Some 57% of the peasantry was forced to rent the land they cultivated, often at rates requiring them to give up over half of what they produced. Saigon’s conservative land reform programme, however, did little to address that inequality.” 39 Lack of representative government, violation of human rights, and the inequitable distribution of resources are common sources of conflict in weak or failing states. These issues set the stage for the challenges the U.S. would face in Vietnam.
During the long and complex conflict, the United States sought a solution to the SSTR challenges Vietnam presented. Significant success came late in the war when it implemented the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. The seeds of the CORDS program were planted in 1964 when the US and the Republic of Vietnam initiated a study to evaluate the effects of a district level partnership for SSTR. By 1968, those concepts had demonstrated enough success that province advisory teams were present in all 44 Vietnam Provinces and over 220 district advisory teams were in place throughout South Vietnam.\(^{40}\)

The effort culminated in merging functions under Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Viet Cong strength fell from more than 12,000 insurgents in 1967 to 9,000 in 1968 to less than 2,000 in 1971. The monthly rate of insurgent and criminal incidents in [one] province fell to 2 or 3 per 100,000 inhabitants by 1971, a crime rate that would be welcomed in any U.S. community today.\(^{41}\)
CORDS resulted from the integration of two programs, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) and Revolutionary Development (RD) Support. The OCO integrated the efforts of civilian organizations including the CIA, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Revolutionary Development Support focused on military operations. \(^42\) When these two elements merged all the pieces needed to apply the various principles identified by the JOC, Natsios, and PKSOI were in place under a single leader.

CORDS operated under the authority of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) with a military commander in the civilian deputy. This integrated civilian-military structure continued down to the district level. \(^43\) The U.S. government organization existed in parallel to a similar Vietnamese structure. Figure 8 \(^44\) shows an organization chart taken from Vietnam era training material. Please note, the Vietnamese organization on the left side and MACV on the right.

The local organization consisted of a sector or provincial advisory team under the command of an O-5 with sub-sector teams organized based on local needs. \(^45\) Figure 8 \(^46\) shows U.S. organization for CORDS.
Advisory team members were to blend into the Vietnamese way of life and provide economic, psychological, sociological, and military assistance to their counterparts in the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Cadre. Revolutionary Development (RD) was a program run by the Government of Vietnam and the RD cadre existed as 59-man teams responsible for organizing the people and developing the community (see figure 9). As the title Revolutionary Development Support implies, the role of the U.S. advisory team was to support the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development effort.

New Life Development was a reconstruction element within the Revolutionary Development program. It focused on work at the hamlet, or local community, level. As should be expected, construction was a significant part of this effort. Development projects were divided into four categories three of which could involve construction (the fourth category focused on oversight). The four categories included field operations, projects, civic action, and

![Figure 9 Revolutionary Development Organization](image-url)
programs (which focused on program oversight). Guidance suggested that construction focus on the areas of rural education, rural health, rural electrification, agriculture\textsuperscript{51}, roads and bridges, self-help\textsuperscript{52}, and special activities\textsuperscript{53} designed to support the effort.

CORDS was responsible for pacification, “the military, political, economic, social process of establishing or reestablishing local government responsible to and involving the participation of the people.”\textsuperscript{54} Not surprisingly, this is similar to the JOC description which describes the role of SSTR operations as, “assisting an emerging host nation government build a “new domestic order” following internal collapse or defeat in war.”\textsuperscript{55} The lessons learned from Vietnam should be applied to modern SSTR operations and the used as a standard to evaluate the applicability of the model developed and this document.

Lessons are apparent in Vietnam era documents. The “Guide for Provincial Advisory Team Leaders,” said, “as the teams became more established, support of all types became more responsive to actual district requirements. The District Chief gained new prestige and the U.S. obtained fresh insight into local conditions, activities, requirements, attitudes, and aspirations of the people.”\textsuperscript{56} This validates two principles described earlier. Firstly, the importance of the prestige of the District Chief validates the concept of political contextualization. These efforts emphasized political primacy and fed legitimacy of the local government, two key elements of that external factor. Secondly, the application of local insight that U.S. teams gained gave them the ability to apply lessons to future operations. It enabled better “assessment,” required “flexibility,” and encouraged “selectivity,” and actions required “accountability.” This is a clear application of closed loop planning and was an element that led to the increased success of the CORDS program over previous efforts. The close integration of host nation and U.S. government workers also improved the program and ensured operations were conducted in a
manner that would be culturally acceptable to the Vietnamese people, valued by them, and sustainable by a government. This integration validates both local and regional team integration and ownership and functionality. Finally, the unification of civil and military efforts was important to the success of CORDS. Prior to the initiation of CORDS, “the civilian and military approaches to the war in Vietnam during this period were fundamentally at odds with one another.”57 CORDS validates the concept of unity of effort.

**PRTs Afghanistan**

After the overwhelming victories in the conventional portion of OEF and OIF, the United States found itself involved in two high-end reconstruction operations as both fronts of the War on Terror degenerated into counterinsurgency is somewhat reminiscent of Vietnam. Recognizing the challenges created by the situation, the U.S. military established new structures that could more effectively deal with the situation than conventional forces. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established in 2002 and charged with three objectives including improving security, extending the reach of the government of Afghanistan, and facilitating reconstruction in priority provinces. Within those provinces, the PRT was to address the most important issues that face the population.58 As was the case in Vietnam, SSTR operations would be conducted in the face of an enemy that was committed to preventing their success. Development had to occur despite such armed resistance. The PRT playbook published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned describes PRTs as follows: “A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities. The PRT is intended to improve stability in a given area by helping build host nation legitimacy and effectiveness in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services.”59
The requirement was similar to that of Vietnam, but there is a substantial difference in the role the host nation played. In Vietnam, a parallel structure existed across the levels of military command and U.S. personnel were advisers supporting the Revolutionary Development efforts of the host nation. Host nation personnel at least nominally had the lead. Under the current PRT structure advisors from the government of Afghanistan are sometimes integrated into the U.S. or NATO led organization. The PRT playbook cites a lack of local capacity as the reason for minimal Host Nation involvement, stating, “it is not likely that the host government representative has the capacity to do more than assist the PRT in better understanding the environment.”

As an entity tailored for semi-permissive environments PRTs are most effective, “where instability precludes heavy NGO involvement, but where violence is not so acute that combat operations predominate.” PRTs function at the province level where they can focus on the operational center-of-gravity for SSTR operations. The 50 to 100 member teams include representatives from DOS, USAID, USDA, and the Government of Afghanistan Ministry of Interior but most team members operate in a support role. In one example, only 7 of the nearly 100 team members actually executed the SSTR mission. The other eighty-six people supported operations by providing meals, housing, transportation and medical support, vehicle maintenance, and other services to facilitate the PRT’s mission. “Every PRT is different based on a number of factors including: the political, developmental and security situation in the province; the PRT host country’s security requirements; and, the province-specific mission that the PRT host country’s higher military and civilian headquarters want to achieve.” However generally speaking that the PRT consists of a command group and support from various functional areas. The command group includes the senior member of each agency or country
represented on the PRT. Its function is to ensure unity of effort by facilitating communication among interested parties.\textsuperscript{66} A variant of the structure is the embedded PRT or ePRT. In an ePRT SSTR operations are tied to a Brigade Combat Team for security, but SSTR functions are unchanged (see Figure 11\textsuperscript{67}).

In a functioning PRT DOD is responsible for security within its designated area of operations, logistical and administrative support, and force protection. DOS performs its role as the lead agency for political issues and USAID focuses on reconstruction.\textsuperscript{68}

Lessons learned are abundant for PRTs. One team member’s testimony before Congress summarizes common lessons very well. In her testimony Michelle Parker, USAID field program officer for the PRT in Jalalabad Afghanistan, identified several lessons learned that are applicable to this discussion. USAID also developed a list of lessons learned. This discussion only involves their first three lessons (the entire list is available in Appendix A). They are lessons are described in Figure 12.

Lessons 1-4 combine to validate the concept of unity of effort. Lesson 5 supports the external factor called ownership and capacity. Lesson 6 supports a closed loop planning as a function of Flexibility by ensuring the system is responsive and operations
can contribute to the SSTR objectives. Lesson 6 supports the External Factor of Security by ensuring the operations can contribute to the SSTR objectives.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Command Group model enables unity of effort.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>The U.S. interagency should develop guidance that clearly outlines the mission, roles,</td>
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<td>responsibilities, and authority of each participating department or agency within the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PRT.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Civil-Military Integration (up and down each agency’s chain of command). Embed advisors</td>
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<td>military in the civilian agencies.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>The U.S. Embassy and Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) need to reinvigorate</td>
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<td>an in-country interagency coordinating body that articulates how national programs and</td>
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<td>PRT efforts fit into broader U.S. foreign policy objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>The Afghan government should take the lead on identifying needs, designing a program and</td>
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<td>allocating funds.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Flexible funding mechanisms are critical the tactical level to address needs immediately</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Dedicated Force Protection. enables freedom of movement, a key to the success.</td>
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**Figure 12 PRT Lessons Learned (Summary)**

Most of these lessons would apply in Central Asia just as well as they apply to the high-end operations in Afghanistan discussed above.

**Kyrgyzstan CENTCOM HA/CN Program**

The Eureka School at Birdik Village in Kyrgyzstan was a Humanitarian Assistance (HA) project conducted by CENTCOM in an uncontested environment. This allowed for a comparatively minor level of effort to be put into force protection and an overall smaller footprint, while still meeting all requirements to keep personnel safe. Therefore, it was not conducted through a model similar to that of the PRT or the Vietnam era Provincial Advisory Team. Rather, agencies under CENTCOM control worked together under the central leadership of the CENTCOM staff. For example, rather than assembling a dedicated on-site team with all the needed Force Protection on, Logistics, Engineering, Contracting and Finance expertise, individuals were tasked from AFCENT/A7 (from both Shaw Air Force Base and Al Udeid Air Base), CENTCOM CCJ4, US EMBASSY, Office of Military Cooperation (OMC), and 376
AEW Manas Air Base. This virtual team contained all the elements required for project execution.

As might be expected, the ad hoc nature of the Eureka school team caused challenges. However, these problems are easily overcome by relying organizations such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE). These organizations maintain an appropriate staff with requisite continuity to develop an understanding of the local area and they have organic support for functions such as financial management, contracting, engineering, and quality assurance. Therefore, while technical execution can be challenging, appropriate solutions seem to be within reach. The greater challenge for effective SSTR in Central Asia lies not in technical execution, but in defining a vehicle to generate effective unity of effort and local partnering.

Oversight responsibility for the CENTCOM HA/CN program, and therefore responsibility for interagency coordination lies with CENTCOM CCJ4E and project approval is given through the Joint Civil Military Engineer Board (JCMEB), a body which integrates expertise from all interested CENTCOM functional organizations such as the Judge Advocate, Financial Management, and Contracting. Project management was conducted by an engineer from the 376 AEW at Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan. Contracting support initially came from the AFCENT/A7 forward staff but was eventually transitioned to the staff and at Shaw Air Force Base. The OMC was responsible for Host-Nation coordination. As might be expected, the diversity of players involved in the project and the rotation of personnel created some complexities in the project. However, the team was able to successfully complete the school.

Eureka was part of a larger CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation effort conducted under Humanitarian Assistance and Counter Narcotics program. These Phase 0 operations are
inexpensive compared to the “high end” Phase IV operations in Afghanistan. They involve the embassy, CENTCOM, and a construction agent (either the US Army Corps of Engineers, or the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment). The lower threat level gives greater flexibility as evidenced by the use of 376 AEW personnel to manage construction. This was somewhat of an anomaly and resulted from an effort to find the best route for project execution. With the development of the Trans-Atlantic Division of USACE, CENTCOM action officers seem to prefer accessing their extensive support system and resource base. The increased flexibility is beneficial, but we must be careful to ensure that the relative simplicity of this Phase 0 situation, does not result in reduced emphasis on engaging all appropriate elements of USG.

**Proposal: SCG Model**

The proposed working model for SSTR operations the Central Asian States described in this document consists of two elements, a functional element (ways) and a structural element (means). The functional element describes the philosophy and processes used in the model. The structural element describes the manpower and organization used in the model. The model attempts to draw the best practices and lessons from both the high-end operations in Afghanistan and Vietnam and the current practices of the CENTCOM HA/CN program and combine them with the SSTR principles laid out by Mr. Natsios, the JOC, and PKSOI.

**Structural Element**

The structural model centralizes key SSTR personnel within the US Embassy’s country team in each of the five CAS states. This facilitates unity of effort and integrates US and HN programs. The structural element of the model is essentially already functioning in the US Embassy in Tajikistan through its Border Law Enforcement Working Group (BLEWG). This embassy-based team provides a forum to fully coordinate projects with all interested USG
entities on the country team. The centralized team should be easily deployable to most locations within the subject country if necessary for increased project knowledge. The diversity of its membership enables a whole-of-government approach at the local level. The concept is essentially the same as the integrated command group in a PRT, but personnel remain centralized at the embassy rather than at the province level. The same players would be involved in the definition, scoping, evaluation, and endorsement of a project. CENTCOM uses the broad skill set and expertise of the US Army Corps of Engineers to provide the support functions such as engineering, design, finance, and contracting. This structural model could be formalized and expanded to other Central Asian embassies. While the intent of this paper is specifically to address construction related stability operations, the concept may also leverage US Embassy initiatives or USAID reconstruction efforts in other sectors of SSTR operations such as improving governance or increasing the capacity of the economic sector. This structural element will support the functional element, integrate the CENTCOM process, and apply internal factors.

As in the case with the PRT’s Integrated Command Group, the SCG would involve members from USAID, USDA, DOS, and other USG agencies as appropriate to the individual country’s situation. However, unlike the PRT, there would only be one SCG per country. The longevity of the members on the country team would provide opportunity to understand the cultural and the political impacts of the project within that culture.

**Functional Element**

Under the model, project initiation could be conducted by any USG entity or the host nation. Other entities such as regional partners or private humanitarian organizations could suggest projects but would require sponsorship by a USG entity. Projects would be evaluated using the closed-loop planning model described earlier. A brief description of the requirement
would be sent to the country team SSTR Coordination Group (SCG) for review and analysis. To minimize administrative burden, the SCG would review only projects above a defined cost threshold (for example $50K), based on the competing interests of the external factors. For projects under that threshold, the SCG would issue guidance to govern the development of projects. This would primarily apply to Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects and allow local commanders to maintain flexibility. If development is conducted in accordance with those guidelines, no SCG review would be required.

Before a project could be reviewed by CENTCOM, the SCG would give the project its endorsement, comments, or non-concurrence. The SCG could also recommend that a project be forwarded to USAID for execution through its Quick Impact Program (QIP) or other programs that could be developed in the future by other agencies. Once the SCG’s endorses the project, it would move to CENTCOM for prioritization, funding, and execution.

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<tr>
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<th>CORDS</th>
<th>PRT</th>
<th>CENTCOM Process</th>
<th>Proposed Model</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
<td>RED</td>
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<tr>
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<td>YELLOW</td>
<td>YELLOW</td>
<td>YELLOW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manpower demand</td>
<td>RED</td>
<td>RED</td>
<td>GREEN</td>
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**Figure 13 Evaluation of Models**

Once at CENTCOM, prioritization, funding, and execution would be conducted established processes. A project champion would be assigned to each individual project to ensure that it moved through the process in a timely manner. The Joint Civil Military Evaluation Board would conduct evaluation as it does today, however it would weigh the comments of the SCG before staffing for OSD funding. The Chief of Mission would receive semi-annual feedback on the response to the projects evaluated by the SCG and his staff would provide similar feed to CENTCOM to facilitate closed loop planning of future operations. Figure 13 shows an external factor based analysis of the models discussed in this paper. The SCG model,
while not perfect performs well based on the conditions in Central Asia. Its proven performance in Tajikistan shows that it is a viable option.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the country team based SCG model would require minimal addition of Manpower to each country’s embassy. It would enable an increase in unity of effort among the USG entities and encourage communication. The increase in coordination over the current CENTCOM process could slow project development and execution, but given proper attention this can be avoided and the likelihood of increased impact and synergy created by multiple agencies providing their insight is well worth the potential delay. The SCG’s recommendation will be available for CENTCOM consideration but will not be the only interest. CENTCOM would be required to provide feedback to the Chief of Mission on its response to SCG endorsement and comments. With respect to the common concerns of cost and manpower requirements this model strike an appropriate balance.

The SCG model leverages the experiences summarized in the principles defined by the Military Support to SSTR Joint operating Concept, former Administrator of USAID, Mr Natsios, and the US Army PKSOI. It is further validated by the experiences of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and even recent Central Asian experience. The concepts are far from radical, but proven and should be considered for Central Asia and other similar environments.
Appendix A

USAID PRT Lessons Learned (USAID PRT in AFG p5-6)

• The U.S. interagency community should develop guidance that clearly outlines the mission, roles, responsibilities, and authority of each participating department or agency within the PRT.
• The U.S. Embassy and Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) need to reinvigorate an in-country interagency coordinating body that articulates how national programs and PRT efforts fit into broader U.S. foreign policy objectives.
• Guidance must be strengthened to direct U.S. PRT commanders to incorporate non-Department of Defense (DOD) representatives into PRT strategy development and decisionmaking; otherwise, PRTs will fall short of their goals.
• To fill key U.S. PRT positions and better achieve assignment objectives, civilian agencies need to further develop policies and incentive structures. In the short term, funding should be provided USAID for more direct-hire staff. Military and civilian personnel tour lengths should be aligned to ensure team development, and personnel must have appropriate experience and training for PRT duties.
• U.S. PRT management and information systems that support civilian representatives need to be strengthened.
• U.S. PRT access to funds and capabilities needs to be improved to support the operational center-of-gravity movement to the provinces.
• USAID needs to recompete the Quick Impact Project (QIP) funding mechanism to draw in implementing partners that can operate more effectively in unstable provinces.
• USDA representatives need access to dedicated funding, as should representatives of any civilian agency who serve on PRTs.
• The USG needs to develop team training for all PRT personnel.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN: AN INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT

5

TRANSITION TO ISAF AUTHORITY

• ISAF, the USG, and the government of Afghanistan (GOA) need to have a common political vision and strategy for PRTs transitioning into the south and southeast regions.

• As ISAF PRT control moves to more volatile areas, NATO and lead nations need to continuously review available combat power and reach-back capabilities to compensate for lead-nation implementation restraints.

• Improved security requires a combination of political, economic, and military efforts. As the list of participating countries in ISAF PRTs expands, NATO and lead nations need to ensure that each PRT has the resources to conduct all essential tasks necessary to achieve GOA and NATO objectives.

• As more Coalition PRTs transition to ISAF control, the United States should ensure that a minimum level of U.S. staff and funding remains to enable continuity of operations and a smooth transition.

EXTENDING THE PRT CONCEPT TO OTHER PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

• PRTs are most appropriate where there is a mid-range of violence, i.e., where instability still precludes heavy nongovernmental organization (NGO) involvement, but where it is not so acute that combat operations predominate.

• PRT security measures need to be periodically reviewed and adapted to local conditions.
• If PRTs are replicated in other countries, their initial focus should be on mapping causes of conflict and developing targeted programs that respond to conditions underlying instability.

• PRT assets and funding must be tailored to specific cultural and security contexts. Therefore, PRT representatives need specialized skills other than those held by many military and civilian officers.
Endnotes

Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan an Interagency Assessment,” Jun 2006, p.8


56 U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, Sep 07, p. 26


60 U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, Sep 07, p. 56

61 U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, Sep 07, p. 24

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63 U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, Sep 07, p. 54

64 House, Role of DOD in Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Hearings before the Committee on House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 137th Cong., 2007

65 U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, Sep 07, p. 56

66 U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, Sep 07, p. 24

67 U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, Sep 07, p. 70

68 U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, Sep 07, p. 54

69 House, Role of DOD in Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Hearings before the Committee on House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 137th Cong., 2007


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72 Lt Col Andrew Sackett, chief, Contracting Branch, USAFCENT/A7K, Shaw AFB, SC, to author, email 26 Oct 2009.

73 John Povelones (US Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL), interview by author, 26 March 2010

74 Lt Col Andrew Sackett, chief, Contracting Branch, USAFCENT/A7K, Shaw AFB, SC, to author, email 26 Oct 2009.

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84 John Povelones (US Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL), interview by author, 26 March 2010
Ratings were determined by subjective analysis relative to the degree of organic integration of the interagency. Those organizations with full integration at the provincial level received a green rating, those with integration above that were yellow. Those with ad hoc integration were identified as red.

Closed loop planning review was rated based on the doctrinal and systemic integration of a feedback loop. If the doctrine intentionally integrates closed loop planning it received a green rating. Those concepts that acknowledged it as a defacto product of the process received a yellow rating, while those that did not address closed loop planning intentionally received a red rating.

Regional and local team integration review was based on the level of integration of local perspective. If local input was the primary source of decision making information and authority, the model received a green rating. If U.S. entities have leadership and were supported by local authority the rating was yellow. Other cases would be red.

Manpower demand was based on the required number of deployed USG personnel members. If the model required fewer than 50 forward personnel per country the model was green. If it required 51-100 it was yellow. Greater than 100 earned a red rating.
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