MISSION ASSURANCE: AN OPERATING CONSTRUCT
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

by

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Biography

Mr. Jeff Wooden is a retired Naval Officer and current Department of Defense Civilian assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated from the Illinois Institute of Technology in 1987 with a Bachelor of Business Administration degree with a major in Marketing and a minor in Naval Science, and The Catholic University of America in 1998 with a Masters of Arts in International Relations. He served 22 years on active duty, earning his Naval Flight Officer wings in 1990, completing one combat tour in 1991 and logged nearly 2,800 hours in the T-34, T-43, P-3C and C-12. He has served on the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff in various capacities since 2002, most recently as the Director, Defense Intelligence Mission Assurance Office. He is currently a member of the Defense Senior Leader Development class of 2013.
Abstract

There have been a significant amount of studies and papers written on the individual yet interrelated disciplines of Continuity, Crisis Management, Emergency Management, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Pandemic Planning. However, to date none of them have taken a holistic look at covering those critical areas under a single unifying management and organizational construct. The proposed construct; Mission Assurance, would allow for comprehensive and integrative planning, to ensure both mission and personnel are taken care of in the event of natural or man-made catastrophe. This qualitative study utilized a “mix-methodology” of case study and ground theory to determine if the Mission Assurance construct could provide for better utilization of resources as well as enhancing disaster and emergency response programs. The results showed that while there are significant cultural, organizational and in some cases individual biases to overcome, Mission Assurance is a construct that could allow for enhanced resource utilization and provide for integrative planning in developing a coordinated all-hazards response.
Introduction

Background

Currently there is no single unifying construct of the numerous specialties or subject areas that constitute the Crisis or Emergency Management discipline either at the Federal, State, and Local or Tribal level. There are many possible contributing factors, among which are lack of Federal guidelines incorporating these disciplines coupled with a general lack of organizational or cultural acceptance by the various Public Safety entities of their roles and responsibilities.

There have been multiple studies conducted by organizations such as the General Services Administration, Department of Homeland Security-FEMA, The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), and the National Association of Emergency Management (NAEM), but none of them have used a holistic look at covering all of these critical disciplines under a single unifying construct, that of Mission Assurance (MA). Each entity was individually reviewed or critiqued, never as an integrated whole. Furthermore, until now, while potentially relevant as a construct, the operating concept of Mission Assurance has been limited to Space Craft or Satellite operations.

For this study, Mission Assurance is an approach to streamline the planning efforts that organizations undertake. Mission Assurance is a construct allowing for comprehensive and integrative planning, ensuring both mission and personnel are cared for in the event of natural or man-made catastrophe. It encompasses the traditional disciplines of continuity of operations and emergency management planning, with its partner planning disciplines of critical infrastructure protection and crisis management. It also takes into account the other outlying planning efforts that have a part in the true assurance of mission such as pandemic planning, personnel accountability and security. This paper utilizes a qualitative study of the Department
of Defense and its policies as they relate to the separate areas described and how unifying these under one policy construct will better serve the department.

**Statement of the problem and research hypothesis**

There is a lack of coherent and relevant policy as well as practical implementation and integration of the interrelated disciplines of Continuity of Operations, Crisis Management, Emergency Management, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Personnel Accountability and Pandemic Planning and others. Currently these disciplines are all viewed in isolation. This creates duplicative tasking and suboptimal resource allocation. It also might develop conflicting procedures that in times of crisis will limit the effectiveness of Federal, State, Local and Tribal public safety and emergency management organizations as they attempt to respond in a timely and efficient manner.

This paper explores the idea that the principle of Mission Assurance is the appropriate overarching management and policy construct that would successfully tie the interrelated disciplines together. This integration would create a better utilization of resources as well as enhancing disaster and emergency response programs.

Potential Research Questions:

1. What are the relevant Department of Defense policies as they relate to the separate areas described?

2. How might unifying the separate disciplines under one policy construct better serve the department and create efficiencies in resource utilization?
Operational Definitions

The following operational definitions are retrieved from the “Dictionary of Emergency Management and Related Terms, Definitions, Legislation and Acronyms, and additional authoritative sources as noted:

All-Hazards: “The spectrum of all types of hazards including accidents, technological events, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, warfare, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive events.” (DHS, FEMA, Federal Continuity Directive 1)

Catastrophe “Catastrophic events are different in the severity of the damage, number of persons affected, and the scale of preparation and response required. They quickly overwhelm or incapacitate local and/or state response capabilities, thus requiring coordinated assistance from outside the affected area. (GAO, Emergency Preparedness and Response 2006)

Crisis: “A collective crisis can be conceptualized as having three interrelated features: (1) a threat of some kind, involving something that the group values; (2) when the occasion occurs it is relatively unexpected, being abrupt, at least in social time; and (3) the need to collectively react for otherwise the effects are seen as likely to be even more negative if nothing is done sooner or later…”

Preparedness: “The range of deliberate critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels of government and between government and private sector and nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required activities and resources to mitigate risk.” (DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2006)

Prevention: “Actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring. Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property. It involves applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation, or quarantine.” (DHS, FEMA NIMS 2007)

Response: “The term ‘response’ as used in this framework includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery. (DHS National Response Framework 2008)

Risk: “A measure of potential harm that encompasses threat, vulnerability, and
consequence. In the context of the NIPP, risk is the expected magnitude of loss due to a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other incident, along with the likelihood of such an event occurring and causing that loss.” (DHS NIPP 2006)

Literature Review

Overview

Little has been written with regards to Mission Assurance (MA) as an overarching management frame work for Federal, State of Local critical response structures. A search of databases; academic, government and open sources is more likely to provide copious data regarding space craft operations when mission assurance is the key word search. A similar search yields no success when MA is related to the areas of Continuity, Crisis, Emergency Management, and Critical Infrastructure Protection. Therefore, to engage in the traditional literature review, one must review the individual related areas and disciplines to create the appropriate context for further study and analysis.

This chapter examines the background and basis for current Continuity, Crisis, Emergency Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection polices and guidelines; their history, key concepts, principles, pertinent legislation and original roles and responsibilities. Additionally, the review of specific DoD as well as other Federal agency directives and polices will together, provide the basis for the development of the concept and practice of Mission Assurance as a viable overarching management construct.

Continuity, Crisis and Emergency Management research

Leading emergency management authors such as Alexander and Choi wrote extensively on issues related to planning and strategic management as it related to emergency management. Alexander provided specific and detailed guidance on developing an emergency management
plan.\(^1\) Choi discussed a study which argued the necessity for and the benefits of a strategic management approach in current emergency management systems.\(^2\) Choi’s study addressed the following benefits of integrating strategic management into emergency management: forward thinking, professionalization, capacity building, goal identification and achievement, increased public support, increased funding, and greater accountability.\(^3\) While these studies are comprehensive as they relate to overall emergency management, there is no consideration given to the integration of strategic requirements or planning related to emergency management, critical infrastructure protection, or integration with continuity of operations planning or implementation.

Nam, Sung, and Kim developed a study that was a mixed method analysis on crisis management organizations in the corporate sector and how they respond during a crisis. The authors cited Hermann’s (1972) definition of crisis management as well as numerous research studies conducted from 1992 to 2007 by various scholars on the subject of Team Level Crisis Management. They conducted surveys and statistical analysis to determine if external environments or internal conditions had a greater effect on team performance. They determined that difficulties in team-level crisis response stemmed more from external environments and that external rather than internal factors played a larger role in facilitating positive crisis resolution.\(^4\)

Uhr, Johansson and Fredholm suggested a methodology that could provide “a better understanding of emergency response management” as well as demonstrating how the method can be employed.\(^5\) Building on previous research in system response, interpersonal dynamics and the idea of trust, the authors went on to conduct a social network analysis to determine how the relationships between the personnel evolved, and why certain actions did or did not take place.
They also studied how the actual implementation of a response system differed in execution during an emergency response from the pre-crisis developed plans and procedures.

Subramanian, Ali and Shamsuding expanded on the Uhr, et al study by further developing a study which attempted to develop a framework for “understanding the antecedents of emergency response performance” to determine their effects on team performance. They provided a thorough description of the phases of emergency management while integrating such variables as team resources and structure. They also utilize Robbin’s (1993) model of group behavior to further analyze emergency response team performance. 6

Rounding out basic Emergency and Crisis Management research is a study by Prizzia and Helfand. Their case study examined interagency coordination at the Federal, State, and Local level as well as interagency training, disaster drills and partnerships between Federal entities such as FEMA and private sector as well as medical entities. The authors used the State of Hawaii’s construct and organization to determine if increased interagency drills, coupled with increased funding and training for Community response teams could enhance overall preparedness and response. 7

**Critical Infrastructure Protection**

Johnson supplied a significant paper with regards to Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). He focused on the August 14, 2003 catastrophic and cascading loss of power to over 50 million people in the parts of the Midwest, Northeast United States and Ontario Canada. He reviewed the causes; managerial, technical and human as well as the algorithms used to predict potential distribution problems. He further explored the role that governmental policies and regulations played in the event. In describing why this event occurred and its severity, he utilized
accident investigation techniques to represent and reason about the complex interactions between these causes. 

Mission Assurance Documents

Until recently, there were no actual documents, directives or polices specifically addressing Mission Assurance. The DoD has now taken the lead in this area. Both the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I) have undertaken to develop Mission Assurance Strategies for the Department and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) respectively.

The Defense Intelligence Mission Assurance Office (DIMAO), previously called the Defense Intelligence Continuity and Crisis Management Office, began its efforts in late 2008, but reached a road block in developing common terms of reference and funding. In 2010, a renewed effort by the DIMAO coupled with direction contained in the 2010 Defense Planning and Programming Guidance resulted in separate draft strategies that are currently being developed in concert by the USD-I and USD-P.

These draft strategies provide an initial framework adopting Mission Assurance as the preferred approach to all-hazards planning for the department. The strategy currently proposed by the USD-I attempts to achieve a portfolio of all-hazards planning disciplines that is more effective and resource-smart than the sum of the separate disciplines. The PDUSD-I stated that the proposed USD-P definition is “far too narrow, and focused heavily on infrastructure and utility topics. It does not include all the facets of planning to assure a mission can continue through all circumstances.”
Multiple GAO reports cover FEMA and issues related to being a part of DHS, in preparing, responding and mitigating both natural and manmade disasters. A key report is part of a special GAO series, first issued in 1999 and updated periodically since 2001, entitled the *Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and Program Risks*. The report identifies management, program and risk issues that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will face as it strives to accomplish its missions in an all-hazards environment. The report details FEMA’s actions already taken being implemented to meet these challenges as well as FEMA’s future environment. Finally, this report identifies potential new challenges and identifies actions as well as potential remedies that key stakeholders can take to improve the chances that FEMA can be successful in achieving its mission.11

In 2008, Congress directed the GAO assess how DHS was implementing a regional approach to preparedness through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program and what changes to this approach resulted from the relevant 9/11 Act provisions. The GAO conducted a review to answer the following questions: To what extent has FEMA assessed how UASI regions’ collaborative efforts build regional preparedness capabilities? And, how did UASI officials describe their regional collaboration efforts and changes, if any, resulting from the 9/11 Act? Additionally, to determine the extent which FEMA has assessed how UASI regions’ collaborative efforts build regional preparedness capabilities, the GAO reviewed DHS strategic policies and guidance such as the National Preparedness Guidelines and the Target Capabilities List, as well as FEMA’s UASI program policies and guidance.

As a result, the GAO determined that FEMA currently has no measures to determine the impact of the UASI regions’ collaborative efforts on regional preparedness. With such measures
in place, FEMA would be better positioned to determine the national return on investment for the more than $5 billion awarded in UASI grant funds to date.\textsuperscript{12}

In 2006, the Congress again asked the GAO examine FEMA’s past, present and future challenges. The report: \textit{Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement} reviewed FEMA’s history from an organizational perspective, mission requirements, as well as overall effectiveness in disaster response. Before the establishment of FEMA and its placement within DHS, federal disaster response and recovery was also managed by an agency (Federal Disaster Assistance Administration: FDAA) within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The 1960s and early 1970s brought massive disasters requiring major federal response and recovery operations by the FDAA. Examples of such massive disasters include hurricanes Carla (1962), Betsy (1965), Camille (1969), and Agnes (1972), as well as the San Fernando (1971) and Alaskan earthquakes (1964). To respond to this concern, Congress passed the 1974 Disaster Relief Act that established the process of Presidential disaster declarations. However, emergency and disaster activities were still fragmented. In 1979, President Carter issued an executive order merging many separate disaster-related responsibilities into a new, independent Federal Emergency Management Agency.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Commercial and Association Studies}

Bern authored a document describing a process or collaborative effort that was conducted over a one year period. It resulted in the development and acceptance of a set of guidelines intended to enhance or protect a person, who was displaced due to natural disaster from losing their human rights. These guidelines were accepted by the IASC WG in June 2006. \textsuperscript{14}
Acosta, Chandra and Sleeper authored a report providing an expansion of thought and consideration on how various entities can be integrated to provide better coordination and allocation of resources. Their report summarized three interrelated conference sessions conducted by Rand to “generate a national policy agenda that summarizes the challenges to involving NGOs in disaster response and recovery and to identify potential policy and program recommendations to address these challenges”. The report summarized the recommendations into five areas: “defining and formalizing roles for NGOs, structure and integration of governmental and nongovernmental organizations in common plans, information sharing, service capacity, and resource allocation.”

Summary

The literature search in addition to the standard library database search utilized government databases such as; GAO, OMB, Department of Defense, as well as State and association sites and also ‘think tank’ entities. Ultimately, the literature review portrays extensive writing done on the pieces and parts but with the exception of two draft strategies, nothing that cohesively ties them together.

Methodology

Overview

Since the construct of Mission Assurance derives itself from the understanding and integration of multiple disciplines, it is logical to follow an interdisciplinary research and evaluation plan. The study is based on both individuals and their subject matter understanding as well as the overall philosophy and implementation of numerous policies and directives both internally and externally to the DoD. The research is a qualitative study following a mixed
model of case study and grounded theory. During this study, the author conducted a review of current defense policies and instructions related to the variables and themes, interviews of 5 out of 6 (one member was unable to participate) current continuity and crisis managers within the defense establishment and 1 federal agency manager, and a review and analysis of current federal policies and available studies, lessons learned and critical reports from such agencies as the GAO, OMB and the Congressional Budget Office.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

**Data Collection and Analysis**

In addition to the directive, policy and report reviews, an interview protocol of 7 questions was utilized. The plan was to conduct all interviews in-person. As a back-up, Video-teleconferencing (VTC) was available, and as a last alternative, phone or email interviews could be conducted as required. The interview data was supplemented by using contact summary sheets to further develop the “main concepts, themes, and issues.” Ultimately, 6 interviews were conducted; 4 in person and 2 via email with follow-up conducted via telephone. Interviews were conducted with 2 individuals from the DIE, 3 from DoD and 1 individual from the Department of Energy (DoE). The questionnaire is located at Appendix A.

**Analysis and Effectiveness**

The document review of DoD polices, directives and instructions confirmed that other than the draft strategies under development, there are no relevant documents that directly address Mission Assurance. Similarly, further review of academic and government data bases confirms that while many texts, government reports and think piece articles have been written on
Emergency Management, FEMA, Crisis response and Continuity Programs, nothing has been written on a unifying framework for these interrelated disciplines.

Expanding the case study to include a comparison of the DoE programs to that of the DIE provided further support for the hypothesis that by combining the separate disciplines under one policy construct, there could be a corresponding creation of efficiencies and resource utilization.

The interview sessions also provided confirmation that key individuals within the defense and federal community are supportive of the need for and potential benefits that could be derived by the creation and implementation of an overarching management construct.

**Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations**

**Interpretation of Findings**

This studies document review portion provided both a historical as well as current look at how Continuity, Crisis and Emergency planning are conducted, specifically within the DoD and in general within the Federal government.

As evidenced from the literature review, during the Cold War, the focus of emergency planning was primarily done in the very small and secretive nuclear community. The planning was stove-piped, focusing almost exclusively on nuclear security and weapons readiness, without any coordination with those who supported them. This led to conflicting guidance over who was in charge and what procedures should be followed during emergency situations. This also created an environment where there was little or no coordination on planning. This often resulted in duplicative planning efforts, inefficient use of resources and at times, power struggles during emergency situations. Unfortunately today, as illustrated by the organizational structures of Defense, Energy and even within FEMA itself, many of those issues remain.
The four major disciplines of emergency planning (Continuity, Emergency Management, Crisis Management, and Critical Infrastructure Protection) have many areas where their planning efforts overlap. Figure 1 provides a high level overview of some of the major responsibilities of each planning discipline as well as the overlaps. The private sector often refers to critical infrastructure protection as IT/DR. Regardless of the title, the responsibilities remain essentially the same. A review of the guidance published by the DoD shows that there are separate guidance documents for each planning element, in some cases multiple documents for a single element. Yet when referenced, they do not mention the other planning documents, or address the interdependencies between the elements, and their responses to an emergency situation.

It would seem that these shared responsibilities would ensure that planning was comprehensive and coordinated across the offices involved, however that is not the case. In traditional planning structures, these four rarely, if ever, communicate with one another. This creates redundancy of effort, often resulting in conflicting guidance to the workforce.\textsuperscript{16}
Continuing with the case study methodology, a comparison between the DIE and the DoE program provided the following information:

Within DoE, Emergency Management and Continuity reside in the same overall organization (NA-40), but they don't talk to each other, and the heads of the two organizations appear to be reluctant to work cooperatively. This appears to be partly due to the overall organizational structure, but the majority of their reluctance comes from the fact that they have been allowed to view their areas of responsibility as completely separate, thus driving each organizational head towards a territorial (or stove-piped) environment. With this perspective they are constantly in conflict as the planning that they need to do crosses functions and they won’t acknowledge their need to work together to comprehensively solve the problem. Security is in a completely separate organization and doesn't disseminate their plans or procedures until they have responded to an emergency. Furthermore, the Emergency Operations Center is not involved in conducting personnel notifications or alerts; they are primarily a situational awareness center for the Department’s leadership.

The CIO shop doesn't coordinate with either Emergency Management or Continuity functions unless it is to determine the process for loading new hardware or software onto the DOE backbone. In discussions with a CIO planner, it quickly became evident that he was completely unaware of the scope of continuity planning elements, let alone the MA concept. Organizationally, every part of the mission is stove-piped and inefficient from a process standpoint.

Other than providing annual COOP awareness training to the populace, the continuity shop doesn't provide any additional training. Therefore, very few people (to include the COOP Coordinators for each subordinate organization) have a reasonable understanding of what
constitutes continuity of operations planning. When the MA concept was described by the author to people in other organizations (CIO, OGC, Emergency Mgmt., EOC, and others), the concept was generally received favorably, but the overall consensus is that being able get leadership buy-in would be difficult, because of a lack of basic understanding on their part as to what the MA requirements are.

The USDI readily embraced Mission Assurance as the operating construct of choice, designating the Continuity and Crisis Management Office as the Defense Intelligence Mission Assurance Office (DIMAO), and establishing the Defense Intelligence Mission Assurance Working Group whose charter is to work across the enterprise to identify gaps and seams in programs that affect the ability of the enterprise to continue to execute mission-essential functions in all environments. Consequently, within the DIE, MA is rapidly gaining ground as the management construct of choice.

The DIMAO has incorporated the previously separate functions or programs of Continuity, Crisis Management, Emergency Management and Personnel Accountability under one Director responsible not only for the internal USDI program, but for the policy direction for the rest of the DIE. Since its establishment, the DIMAO created the first ever Mission Assurance Plan for the USDI which integrated and de-conflicted what had been 3 separate plans; Continuity of Operations, Crisis Response, and Emergency Management. Additionally, the DIMAO in conducting bi-annual assessments of the DIE components (NSA, NGA, NRO and DIA) has identified critical gaps and overlaps in capabilities that have resulted in 10-20 million dollars in savings as well as a community of best practices that the components have leveraged to ensure their ability to carry out mission essential functions in all environments.
**Interviews**

Five out of the six members interviewed (83%) concurred with generalized belief for the need for an overarching construct, yet not necessarily any agreement as to what areas it should cover. Only one member disagreed with the need for an overarching construct, believing that it would add an unnecessary bureaucratic overlay with no benefit. The results show agreement that Continuity, Crisis Management, Emergency Management and Critical infrastructure should be included, but then it becomes a mixed bag of choices for additional issues; with Security, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) and Antiterrorism being most frequently mentioned. Furthermore, the majority agreed that the MA construct would allow for integrative planning and a potential to reduce duplicative efforts and create greater resource efficiency. However, there was also a common belief that a lack of leadership understanding and support could create roadblocks to the creation and eventual implementation of the construct.

MA is an approach to streamline the planning efforts that organizations undertake. MA is a construct allowing for comprehensive and integrative planning, to ensure both mission and personnel are cared for in the event of natural or man-made catastrophe. It encompasses the traditional continuity of operations and emergency management planning, with its partner planning disciplines of critical infrastructure protection and crisis management. It also takes into account the other outlying planning efforts that have a part in the true assurance of mission such as pandemic planning, personnel accountability and security.

The perceived benefit of MA is that it builds resiliency into an organization, as well as agility and reliability. Planners in all disciplines need to ensure that the plans and procedures they are putting in place can truly be trusted to be effective during an emergency. This small data collection and analysis project has provided a strong indication that MA is a valid and
potentially beneficial construct not only for the DoD, but possibly the larger federal, state and local community of practice.

**Recommendations for Action**

Regardless of what it is eventually called, the DoD should engage in the development and implementation of an “Integrative Planning” process. As portrayed in Figure 2, similar to the pieces of a puzzle, all the pieces need to find their proper place, and work cooperatively to display the complete picture, regardless of the emergency facing the department. Truly integrative planning is a team effort, with all the different planning disciplines understanding, participating, and coordinating with the intent to ensure the mission continues regardless of the emergency situation. The planning is about ensuring the mission success, not the organizational turf battles that often ensue when trying to do emergency planning.

![Integrative Planning Diagram](image)

Figure 2

The benefits of integrative planning far outweigh the potential initial increase in costs of doing it. Streamlined efficiency allows planners to focus their efforts on incorporating emerging
technologies that may enhance the organization’s ability to continue mission-essential functions not only in adverse conditions, but also during an often changing political and economic environment. Streamlining also assists planners to engage in planning that is truly comprehensive and integrated into all facets of the organization.

Wal-Mart is a prime example of an organization that successfully integrated the different planning elements. They spent approximately 18 months, growing their continuity/emergency personnel from 20 to 38, working to ensure that their operations (thousands of employees in 32 countries) could provide support to their customer base during emergency situations. They have 4 separate units, focusing on specific planning areas, working cooperatively. All the senior managers report to the Continuity Manager. With this process, they reopened 14 of the 15 stores in Florida that were damaged during Hurricane Katrina. Even more remarkable, they re-opened those 14 stores within 24 hours. Of the 173 stores affected by the Katrina (100 suffering damage), 66% were operational within 48 hours.23 24 25

Cross-training planners into multiple disciplines provides for internal resilience within the planning organizations which, in turn, allows the organization to handle internal adversity (such as employee illness, pandemic situations, and employee death or turnover). It also allows for multiple perspectives on a given issue, to ensure there are fewer unplanned consequences to an emergency event.

One of the biggest hurdles in implementing this approach is overcoming the current mindset. A shift is required. It requires people who’ve been doing one portion of the planning to step outside their comfort zone, and start learning and planning or at least coordinating their planning within other disciplines in the organization. People tend to protect their current projects, and there could be some angst raised by trying to implement the MA construct. Another
consideration has to be the expense associated with this transformation. Both initial interviews and follow-up questioning indicated that there will be additional short-term expenses for training of current staff, or possible hiring of new multi-discipline planners. But in all of this, these initial expenses will help make the organization more resilient, and better positioned to continue operating in an all-hazards environment both now and in the future. This can prove to be a more cost-effective approach, focusing on long-term goals while using short-term markers that lead towards the completion of long-term projects.

**Recommendations for Further Study**

Topics for further study may include a cost analysis implementing the MA construct to estimate the long run potential resource savings that may occur. Another worthwhile study would be to examine what additional disciplines should be incorporated and how they would benefit.

Ultimately the development and continued study of MA as an integrating construct will serve to contribute to the body of knowledge needed to further address the issue by describing its application; potential benefits in the areas of strategic resource allocation as well as overall unification of community education and exposure. It will also tie in previous research in individual areas as a foundation for the development of the philosophy from a DoD construct to a whole of government construct, examining the difficulties, benefits and the efficiencies that could occur.


Horwitz, Steven (2008) “Making hurricane response more effective: Lessons from the private sector and the Coast Guard during Katrina.” Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Retrieved from http://www.mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Publications


Appendix A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR PSP

Title/Position:

Time in Position:

Overall Related Experience:

1. In your position as a leader or manager in Crisis, Emergency or Continuity related programs, what is the frequency and nature of your interaction or coordination with any of the following areas: crisis management, continuity programs, emergency management, critical infrastructure or pandemic planning?

2. Do you believe that there are challenges if any in creating and implementing effective Crisis, Continuity or Emergency Management programs? If yes, what are they and how would you recommend overcoming those challenges?

3. As currently constructed, is there a relationship between the areas of crisis management, continuity programs, emergency management, critical infrastructure or pandemic planning? If yes, what is the nature of the relationship?

4. In relation to your response to the previous question, what do you believe could be the advantages and/or disadvantages to the development of an overarching management construct that would tie together several of the previously mentioned related areas?

5. Based on your previous answer regarding the advantages/disadvantages of an overarching management construct, how would your planning efforts be enhanced or hampered by a “concise framework and objectives” to guide future policy development and implementation measures in the areas of Continuity, Emergency Management, Continuity Programs and Critical Infrastructure?

6. Utilizing the following definition for Mission Assurance: Actions taken to protect the continued function of mission essential assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, information, infrastructure, and supply chains so the DoD can execute its missions in a normal or disrupted environment, which planning elements do you consider to be either core or partner planning elements to Mission Assurance. Please identify each as:

   Core = C    Partner = P    Non-Applicable = N

   — Critical Infrastructure Protection
   — Continuity of Operations
— Emergency Management
— Crisis Management
— Infectious Disease/Pandemic Planning
— Senior Leader Communications
— IT Disaster Recovery
— Information Assurance

7. Are there other planning disciplines that you think should be included in a Mission Assurance construct? If so, what would you recommend for consideration?
Endnotes


3 Ibid


16 Common theme developed during interviews with Continuity/Crisis Managers, October-December 2011

17 Developed by author and staff as part of DIE MA Strategy working papers March 2011

18 Follow up interview with Emergency Manager, DoE, interview by author 4 October 2011

19 Ibid
20 Interview with Continuity Planner from DoE, interview by author, 3 October 2011

21 2010 Defense Intelligence Mission Assurance Assessment (U), Organizational Accomplishments Section. (Top Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

22 Developed by author and staff as part of DIE MA Strategy working papers March 2011


25 Horwitz, Steven (2008) “Making hurricane response more effective: Lessons from the private sector and the Coast Guard during Katrina.” Mercatus Center, George Mason University p. 4