Assessing the Effects of Organizational Changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Nuclear Mission

GRADUATE RESEARCH PAPER

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Abstract

A series of organizational changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) since the Cold War’s end arguably fostered a devolution of focus on the nuclear enterprise. This culminated with inexcusable incidents that questioned the credibility of the United States’ nuclear enterprise. Through a content analysis of reports, directives, and historical documents with interviews of Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, this research found that the organizational changes contributed to a dissolution of critical OSD offices that had played a critical role in nuclear policy and decision making, which negatively affected the nuclear enterprise. Furthermore, efforts to reduce OSD staff personnel and assess OSD organizational performance, while positive in nature, may also have a negative effect on the nuclear enterprise if not executed with prudence.
To my Wife and Son, I’d be working a cash register at Chuck-E-Cheese if it weren’t for you two :o)
Acknowledgments

Dr. Johnson, thank you for taking on the daunting task of being a research advisor and mentor to a USAF Security Forces officer and helping me through this roller coaster ride. A huge thank you goes out to my Brothers-in-Arms of SANDS-01, I couldn’t have been able to do this without each and every one of you, thanks for all your help, Cop-Serious.

Bieber
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I. Introduction

Significant organizational changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) arguably have affected the Department of Defense (DoD)’s ability to execute the United States’ (US) nuclear mission. OSD in the past has made numerous changes to meet evolving national security strategies. This research discusses these changes and their implications to the nuclear enterprise. Understanding these changes and their outcomes can help the OSD to improve both its organizational structure and the direct support it provides to the US nuclear enterprise.

Overview

Nuclear weapons have protected the US from major conflict for more than seventy years. When the US dropped the atomic bombs “Fat Man” and “Little Boy” on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945, a new era of US power and nuclear military capability was ushered in. This awesome capability and responsibility requires intricate management and oversight, because the nuclear enterprise provides the foundation for US national security and regional stability around the globe. Nuclear weapons undergird US national security through the concept of deterrence. Deterrence is designed to preserve US national security and interests by convincing a potential adversary that an attack on the US will elicit a response with unacceptable costs to that adversary. Because deterrence is in the mind of the adversary, they must believe the US deterrent threat is credible, through a demonstrated capability and will. Otherwise, deterrence will fail.

The end of the Cold War and fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the beginning of a degradation of the US nuclear enterprise. Without an apparent adversary, the nuclear enterprise began to suffer from a gradual decline in mission focus, support, and execution from the highest levels of government down to the lowest tactical levels of the uniformed service members.
executing the nuclear deterrent mission. This degradation of nuclear focus culminated in unacceptable incidents, such as the 2007 unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons from Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana and the unauthorized shipment of nuclear warhead fuses to Taiwan. Incidents like these can question the credibility of US nuclear deterrence.

Today, the DoD contributes to US deterrence strategy by maintaining the nation’s capability through a robust nuclear triad. This triad provides continuous options for the President of the United States. The Air Force is responsible for the B-52 and B-2 long range bombers, as well as the ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile force which remains on alert. The US Navy is responsible for the submarine-launched ballistic missile force via Ohio-class submarines constantly on patrol worldwide. However, the Air Force and Navy wouldn’t be able to execute the critical mission of the US nuclear triad without policy direction and oversight at the highest level of the OSD.

Although the international political environment seems far more complex than it was during the Cold War, the importance of the nuclear enterprise is being downplayed. President Obama’s remarks during his 2009 Prague speech are consistently taken out of context and when juxtaposed against the incidents of 2007 – 2008, used to support abolitionist agendas. The US nuclear weapons programs and infrastructure must not succumb to the disarmament efforts of organizations such as the Ploughshares Fund (Amarelo, 2008). Therefore, the OSD needs to be operated and structured in a manner which will provide for the policy guidance, direction, and budgeting needed to ensure that US nuclear weapons remain a strong and viable deterrent well into the twenty-first century. Inadvertent nuclear weapons flights, warhead fuse shipments to Taiwan, and other incidents like these drew an unfortunate light to the US nuclear enterprise.
Consequently, a number of task forces, blue ribbon reviews, tiger teams, working groups, and councils were formed. Each of these endeavors conducted comprehensive reviews of the nuclear enterprise to find root causes for the nuclear enterprise’s decline.

Problem Statement and Research Focus

The Carnegie Foundation defines organizational change as, “the process by which an organization changes its structure, strategies, operational methods, technologies, or organizational culture to affect change within the organization and the effects of these changes on the organization” (Grimsley, 2015). OSD was created in the late 1940s and has since undergone numerous changes to meet the needs of changing national security strategies. Constant and consistent goal-setting, evaluation, and restructuring (Poole, 1995) are needed in order for an organization as large as the OSD to remain viable. Based on the analysis of organizational changes, this research will identify how organizational changes within the OSD have affected the execution of the United States nuclear deterrent mission. The nuclear mission has had to address multiple wars and contingency operations such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the post-9/11 terrorist threat. Through each of these challenges, the OSD attempted to improve and adapt its operations in order to address the ever-changing security environment. This process is required as an organization attempts to continuously improve and evolve (Gibson, Ivancevich, & Donnelly, 2012).

Research Objectives

The objective of this research is to assess the effect of OSD changes on the nuclear enterprise. Successful organizational change cannot be solely reactive adjustments to emerging problems, but rather a process of identifying a problem, establishing goals and performance
measures, and assessing the efforts to reach established goals (Gibson, Ivancevich, & Donnelly, 2012). Analyzing the effects of OSD changes requires a review of historical reviews, reports and directives.

This research is based on qualitative content analysis. Qualitative research will be conducted to develop an understanding of what organizational changes have been made within OSD as it relates to the nuclear enterprise. OSD organizational changes and impacts will be analyzed by conducting a qualitative analysis of previous reports and reviews of the OSD, its organizational structure, and organizational change impacts to the nuclear enterprise. Reviews and reports analyzed will include documents from congressional testimonies, United States law and codes, DoD directives, mission statements, and other organizational assessments. Interviews will also be conducted with DoD personnel. The analysis will highlight recurring themes, trends, and change-effect relationships to assess significant changes within the OSD and subsequent effects on the nuclear enterprise.

The following four chapters will provide insight into the background of the issues analyzed, methodology to conduct the research, analysis and results, and finally conclusions based on the data analysis and interviews with recommendations for the OSD. The background chapter will provide foundational information on the organization of the OSD, specifically on the offices which directly support the nuclear enterprise. The methodology chapter will expound on the manner in which content analysis of the data gathered and interviews conducted answered the research question. The analysis and results chapter will outline what the research discovered regarding the OSD offices in direct support of the nuclear enterprise, headquarters staff reductions, and OSD performance assessment efforts. The final chapter will provide conclusions based on organizational changes within the OSD and recommendations for future improvements.
II. Background

The Office of the Secretary of Defense

In order to put the OSD structure into perspective, a look is needed into how the DoD functions as a whole and how the OSD organizational structure has evolved over time. The premise which undergirds the foundational control of the United States military is that this country’s military forces will always be ultimately directed by civilian authority. This was initially laid out in the National Security Act of 1947 which established the foundation for the current US military structure and the premise for ultimate civilian control of those forces. Today this concept is explicitly stated in DoD Directive 5100.01 (DoDD 5100.01), which states, “All functions in the Department of Defense are performed under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense”. As the scope of the Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef) responsibilities grew, so did the office and the associated secretary positions, whether those positions were assistants, deputies, etc. The US DoD writ largely consists of the Office of the Inspector General, OSD, Departments of the Army, Navy (to include the Marine Corps), and Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and the Combatant Commands. This overall organizational structure is mandated by law and outlined in DoD directive. Figure 1 illustrates the current organization of the DoD.
While the day-to-day mission is carried out by the military services and combatant commanders, the OSD is the immediate staff of the SecDef responsible for providing DoD policy guidance illustrating national security objectives and direction, fiscal thresholds, and the priorities of the military services and their respective missions. Today, The OSD consists of 40 major element offices including the SecDef position itself. One of the most important tasks of the OSD is to work with the service secretary and joint staffs to ensure the efficient DoD administration and to ensure that when called upon, the military services can coalesce into a single integrated fighting
force capable of preserving US national security strategy and policies (Department of Defense, 2010).

It took a multitude of different efforts to get the OSD where it is today. For example, in the early stages of the first nuclear age what was then known as the Atomic Energy Commission, the civilian agency ultimately responsible for nuclear weapons at the time, had to work closely with the DoD to ensure military requirements were efficiently integrated in nuclear weapons development (Gilmour, 1993). Unfortunately this was an extremely volatile and inefficient relationship ripe with incoherent and duplicative processes. Therefore, the Military Liaison Committee was created to help improve this relationship and develop more efficient information-sharing between civilian officials and the military. While the Military Liaison Committee was not an end-all, be-all entity, it was a step in the right direction and ensured that there was an efficient and transparent means for the Atomic Energy Commission and DoD to continue meaningful work on such a critical endeavor (Gilmour, 1993).

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was another effort to improve DoD organizational structure. Multiple DoD failures had led one to believe that the DoD could not coalesce and fight as a cohesive and integrated force. The Goldwater-Nichols Act provided more influence and power to senior military leaders in an effort to level out what many perceived to be an imbalance of power in the DoD, which had arguably left senior civilian leaders with too much influence in military affairs. The passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the late 1980s is the most recent major DoD reorganization effort (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2013).

The rise of the Soviet Union and the effort to contain communism led the US DoD to build up the nuclear enterprise in an effort to counter the only existential threat facing the US (Clark, 1985). Some interviewees for this research stated that during the Cold War, a person
seemingly couldn’t walk into an OSD office in the Pentagon without at least one mention of the word nuclear, and the majority of military installations in the US supported or executed some facet of the US nuclear mission. The US nuclear enterprise was ripe with activity, a sense of purpose, and an allure that caused money, resources, and policy decisions to gravitate to it effortlessly. Given the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons were needed to protect every man, woman, and child in the US.

The end of the Cold War would serve to mark as an unfortunate turning point for the DoD nuclear enterprise as expertise, public and government attention, and fiscal resources would significantly attrit over the next 15 – 20 years.

The Soviet Union’s fall in December of 1991 led to the US becoming the sole superpower in the world, a democratic central authority whose lone existential threat was gone. It was this false sense of security that led to the dissolution of US army operated short-range nuclear weapon systems and withdrawal of the majority of US nuclear weapons in Europe. This was followed by the 1994 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which envisioned a US that needed to further reduce its nuclear arsenal and did not need to develop any new nuclear weapons systems (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 2015). In 2001 work began on an updated NPR which again called for the further reduction of US nuclear weapons, but the review’s circulation was extremely limited and prevented an opportunity to address the public on the importance of the US nuclear enterprise (Merdock, 2008). Any efforts to bring any kind of reinvigoration of the nuclear enterprise would soon be overshadowed by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This new terrorist threat combined with an attempt to bring positive attention back to the nuclear enterprise led to a merging of what seemed to be two competing areas of thought: conventional and nuclear
forces. The new threat environment and finite fiscal resources could no longer allow for solely conventional or solely nuclear strategies. Strategic Air Command and its nuclear focus were eliminated in favor of the newly created US Strategic Command, which was charged with utilizing kinetic, non-kinetic, conventional, and un-conventional means to deter, and if needed, defeat an enemy (Gilmour, 1993). As changes were made at the military service level throughout the years, the OSD had to change and evolve as well. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the OSD structure in 1948 and 1991 respectively and serve to show the changes made in order to provide the oversight and management needed at the highest levels of the DoD. In 1948 the highest level OSD office to focus on the nuclear enterprise was the Military Liaison Committee and in 1991 the offices of International Security Affairs and Atomic Energy focused on the nuclear enterprise, providing oversight from both the policy and sustainment perspectives.

Figure 2. OSD Organizational Structure (1948)
(Goldberg, 1992)
Who works with nukes in OSD?

One of the main pillars of the United States government is civilian control of its military. This is accomplished by the President through the SecDef who bears the responsibility of all things military, positive and negative (Department of Defense, 2010). The SecDef executes his authority mainly through his Under Secretaries of Defense (USD). Figure 4 illustrates the current lines of authority from the SecDef to the USDs and Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASDs).
Two major elements in the OSD are responsible for ensuring the safe, secure, and effective management and oversight of our nation’s nuclear deterrent mission: the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

The USD(P) is the principal advisor and assistant to the SecDef on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy while ensuring the integration of DoD policies and plans in the execution of national security objectives (Department of Defense, 1999). The USD(P) contains five offices as shown in Figure 5: International Security Affairs, Asian & Pacific Security Affairs, Homeland Defense & Global Security, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts, and Strategy, Plans, & Capabilities (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), 2015).
The USD(P)’s Strategy, Plans, & Capabilities office develops US nuclear policy and strategy. The office conducts reviews and advises on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, coordinates the President’s Nuclear Posture Review, and teams with the National Security Council and offices within USD(AT&L) to oversee long range nuclear plans and outlooks (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), 2015). Key offices within USD(P) advise the SecDef and President on nuclear force structure and strategies for employing the weapons.
The USD(AT&L) is the principal advisor and assistant to the SecDef on all matters concerning major acquisition, technology, and logistics programs within the DoD. This office also oversees the Nunn-Lugar non-proliferation efforts; US nuclear forces; nuclear, chemical, & biological defense programs; missile defense programs; and major weapons systems (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics), 2014). Within USD(AT&L) there are approximately 18 offices and directorates. Many of these offices and directorates touch the nuclear enterprise in one way or another but the two offices that deal with the nuclear enterprise are the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Space, Strategic, & Intel Systems and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, & Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB)). USD(AT&L) is charged with acquiring the needed nuclear weapon systems based on the desired nuclear policy and strategy, and how to best sustain and protect those weapon systems in conjunction with the Department of Energy (DoE). Figure 6 depicts the current USD(AT&L) organizational structure.
The offices of the USD(AT&L) and USD(P) represent the largest offices in the OSD with approximately 574 and 564 military and civilian personnel authorizations respectively (Government Accountability Office, 2015). While nuclear weapons are not the sole focus of these offices, the weapons are their most important one, and allocating the correct amount of personnel to these paramount missions is critical in order to ensure that proper management and oversight is conducted; oversight and management that OSD has lacked in the past (Schlesinger, 2008).
As a result of nuclear missteps by the DoD dating back to 2007, then SecDef Robert Gates commissioned a Task Force to evaluate the effectiveness of the entirety of the DoD in executing the nuclear mission. This Task Force led by the Honorable James Schlesinger found that the DoD needed to refocus attention to the nuclear enterprise. This attention was lost with the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which drove a shift into a more complex security environment (Schlesinger, 2008). Schlesinger found, “…a serious lack of attention to policy formulation and oversight of nuclear deterrence with the OSD. Responsibilities for the nuclear mission have been dispersed and downgraded throughout the OSD” (Schlesinger, 2008). This Task Force also reported on the office structures of the USD(P) and USD(AT&L) during that time. This research will analyze the organizational structure of those offices with respect to the changes that have taken place since the Soviet Union’s fall and recommend improvements to ensure adequate oversight and management of the nuclear enterprise.

It is critical to ensure correct oversight and management both of a large organization and of the means and processes by which the organization can evaluate performance and proposed changes. Two organizations within the OSD that execute this oversight mission for the SecDef are the Deputy Chief Management Officer and the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.

Organizational Performance Assessment

In OSD the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) is charged with ensuring efficient business operations are conducted in support of the DoD’s warfighting mission (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Deputy Chief Management Officer), 2014). This office was established out of the need for an enduring capability to assess organizational effectiveness at a
business enterprise level. It is intended to ensure that as the operational environment and technology changes, the OSD is able to synchronize, integrate, and coordinate efforts in the most efficient manner. This can be seen in a majority of OSD assessments which identify practices, policies, or procedures that can be implemented or improved such as when SecDef Robert McNamara saw the need for a centralized resource allocation and budgeting process for the DoD in the 1950s. This centralized resourcing system would later come to be known as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (Cabe, 1987).

The DCMO’s office today contains a number of directorates which directly support these improvement and cost-saving efforts. The Planning Performance & Assessment Directorate is responsible for establishing applicable metrics that measure OSD performance in executing and attaining DoD’s strategic level goals and priorities. The Defense Business Management, Analysis & Optimization Directorate is responsible for assessing management processes and activities, identifying improvement areas and possible solutions, and then assisting with the creation or dissolution of identified organizations in an effort to bring more efficiency to the OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Deputy Chief Management Officer), 2014). The Oversight & Compliance Directorate is responsible for liaising with DoD Privacy, Civil Liberties and Freedom of Information Act programs, the Government Accountability Office, and Inspector General (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Deputy Chief Management Officer), 2014). The Administration Directorate is responsible for coordinating daily operational activities with various field agencies to include those in the National Capital Region. The Organizational Policy & Decision Support Directorate is responsible for ensuring the OSD offices, appointed officials, and Defense Agencies all operate off of approved DOD instructions. The Organizational Policy & Decision Support Directorate ensures these instructions are up to date.
and correctly formatted and makes the organizational rules for the OSD and maintains all the charters that govern their roles, responsibilities, and organizational structure (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Deputy Chief Management Officer), 2014). The DCMO and supporting directorates are not only important to ensuring adequate support for the warfighting mission but they all contribute to the DCMO’s Annual Organizational Assessment, Congressional Reports, Annual Performance Plans, and its Annual Performance Report.

The Annual Organizational Assessment is a performance assessment produced by the DCMO every year. The performance assessment is based on metrics derived from individual and organizational tasks and actions outlined in the DoD Annual Performance Plan and Annual Performance Report (Department of Defense (Deputy Chief Management Officer), 2014). The SecDef is required by United States Code to submit an annual report on DoD compliance with funds obligations of the qualified defense programs estimated to cost at least $1M, cost saving efforts and business improvements.

The Annual Performance Plan and Annual Performance Reports are used to identify DoD-wide goals and priorities with which to measure performance via the Annual Organizational Assessment (Department of Defense (Deputy Chief Management Officer), 2014). They also identify DoD-wide results of the prior year’s goal and priorities along with trend data from previous years’ information.

This research analyzed the DCMO’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2008-2015 DoD Organizational Assessments and FY 2012-2016 Annual Performance Plans and Annual Performance Reports with respect to how they convey and provide outputs regarding the nuclear enterprise. The findings can be found in the Analysis and Results section of this research paper.
The Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is responsible to “Provide the Department of Defense with timely, insightful and unbiased analysis on resource allocation and cost estimation problems to deliver the optimum portfolio of military capabilities through efficient and effective use of each taxpayer dollar” (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation), 2012). CAPE provides the SecDef insight and options with regards to defense capabilities programs and analysis to assess a wide range of alternative for major acquisition programs. CAPE’s analytical competencies promote better performance and efficiency in analyzing national defense planning and allocating ever shrinking budgetary resources (Department of Defense, 2012). It was through the recent evaluations of the DoD’s nuclear enterprise such as the 2008 Schlesinger Report and the 2014 Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise that CAPE was tasked with overseeing tasking and recommendations to improve the nuclear enterprise. While many of the taskings and recommendations are being executed by the military services and organizations outside of the OSD structure, within the DoD this type of oversight and management is needed to maintain proper focus of the criticality of the nuclear mission at the highest levels.
III. Methodology

In order to address the investigative questions, unclassified information sources were evaluated in an effort to extrapolate relationships and themes regarding:

- dissolution and creation of offices and positions within the OSD
- effect of policy and decision memorandums on OSD outputs
- outputs of assessments and analysis branches in OSD and resulting effects.

A qualitative content analysis approach was adopted to provide proper categorization and interpretation of data collected in terms of common themes, identify causal relationships, and identify specific characteristics to further identify cause and effect relationships (Leedy & Ormond, 2012).

Qualitative research can be accomplished through a variety of means; however, the methods utilized focus on phenomena of complex situations in order to interpret or define aspects that are truly important (Ormrod & Ellis, 2013). In order to build a picture of the research topic, the nature of qualitative research is heavily relied upon to effectively describe and explain the problem. Thus, data collected would be from a content analysis of various reports and other documents in lieu of synthesized laboratory experiments (Flick, 2014).

This research will not be testing or utilizing any formulas or concepts that are already known or established, as none are known to exist. Instead, qualitative research was selected to discover new ideas regarding OSD organizational changes and how the changes have affected its ability to support the nuclear enterprise.

The goal of data collection for this study is to rely on more than one source of information. In doing so, the results will be more credible as data not only becomes verifiable, but also potentially can be converged into facts (Yin, 2009). To address the overall research
objective, unclassified information sources are used. Literature collected for this study include historical/current DoD Directives and organizational charts, Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, OSD reform initiatives, statement of fact interviews, academic research articles, congressional testimonies, DCMO assessments and performance reports, and personal observations from experiential site visits. Internet resources include Google Scholar, Defense Technical Information Center, Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center, DoD publication archives, and DoD official office websites.

Interviews were conducted in order to provide context to the literature. A total of 17 DoD personnel were interviewed. The interview pool was chosen based on nuclear enterprise experience or knowledge (past and present) and experience or knowledge in the OSD and how it interacted within the nuclear enterprise. The interview pool consisted of both military and civilian members of various rank and status. Ten individuals were USAF officers with time in service ranging from 15 to 30+ years, seven individuals were civilians employed by the DoD for six to 20+ years. All interviewees had or currently have positions that interact with various elements of the nuclear enterprise. Ten individuals have worked or currently work within the OSD. The interviews were conducted both in-person (9 people) and over the telephone (8 people) and lasted approximately 45-90 minutes. Five personnel were interviewed twice and two personnel were interviewed multiple times; the repeated contacts were for clarification purposes and to follow-up on previously unanswered questions. Each of the interviews were documented via hand written notes and later transferred to Microsoft Word documents. Six baseline questions were used to initiate the interviews (Figure 7). Additional questions were asked based on answers to baseline questions and experience or knowledge of events and issues as they
pertained to the research topic. All personnel were guaranteed anonymity to ensure the candidness of their responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Questions</th>
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<td>1. When OSD offices (Principal Staff Assistants) are dissolved and mission tasks of those offices are transferred to other offices, does that office receive more manpower?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How does your office assess manpower and mission requirements?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How has your office been affected by the 20% mandated staff reductions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How is your office's performance assessed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How effective has the Deputy Chief Management Officer’s annual organizational assessments and annual performance report been in assessing organizational performance?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Since 2007 how has the “reinvigoration of the nuclear enterprise” affected manpower in key offices that support the nuclear enterprise in OSD?</td>
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Figure 7. Baseline Interview Questions

The reviews, reports, testimonies, and other data collected were analyzed to determine the impact to the nuclear enterprise. For example, OSD reform initiatives and policy memorandums were evaluated for significant changes (e.g. personnel reductions) and compared against related organizational changes (e.g. dissolution of offices, consolidation of missions, etc.) to determine the effect on the nuclear enterprise. As another example, GAO reports were scanned to identify any significant increases or decreases in manpower and compared to policy memorandum decisions and functional taskings for any possible trends. Ultimately, the analysis of data collected extrapolated relationships and themes surrounding the dissolution and creation of offices and positions within the OSD, the effect of policy and decision memorandums on OSD outputs, and the outputs of assessments and analysis branches in OSD with the resulting effects.
IV. Analysis and Results

USD(P) and USD(AT&L)

A comprehensive review and evaluation was conducted of DoD directives, mission statements, programs, reform initiatives, reports, and assessments as they pertained to the offices of USD(P) and USD(AT&L). Of note was the dissolution of direct, top level support to the nuclear enterprise which coincided with the end of the Cold War (early 1990s). Before the end of the Cold War three high-level offices within OSD were charged with coordinating nuclear policy and decision-making efforts. These offices were the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ASD(ISP)); Director, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces; and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (ATSD(AE)) (Welch & Harvey, 2014). Collectively these offices were responsible for formulating nuclear weapons strategy and policy, developing the nuclear weapons and systems to execute the policy and strategy, and sustaining the weapons and infrastructure.

Four interviewees noted that as the focus shifted from nuclear to conventional war with a threat of biological and chemical attacks in the early 1990s, these offices were tasked with additional workloads without increases in manpower which detracted from their nuclear enterprise focus.

For example, after the Cold War ATSD(AE) was tasked with taking on chemical and biological defense programs for OSD and his/her official title was changed to Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Historical Office), 2016). Focus was quickly placed on the new missions of chemical and biological defense programs in this office, and with no increase in manpower authorizations the sustainment of the nuclear weapons program was no longer the true
focus in this office. The current title of this office is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, & Biological Programs (ASD(NCB)). This is now the key organization within USD(AT&L) that works nuclear enterprise issues. ASD(NCB) not only deals with nuclear weapons, but also with chemical and biological defense programs, arms control and nonproliferation, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) falls within ASD(NCB) (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs), 2015). Nuclear weapons programs and sustainment is a responsibility of the ASD(NCB), but it not necessarily its primary focus, a necessary aspect needed but lost over 20 years ago.

The ASD(ISP) suffered a fate similar to that of ATSD(AE). ASD(ISP) was an office created in 1981 and was responsible for US nuclear policy and strategy and was steeped with expertise in the European theater of operations and the Soviet Union (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Historical Office), 2016). The Soviet Union’s fall led to this office’s dissolution in 1993 and its subject matter experts spread across at least five newly created offices which would repeatedly dissolve and be re-established under different names over the next 20 years, continually taking on new responsibilities and losing nuclear expertise. What was once a focused mission for one office, ASD(ISP) in the OSD, is now spread between five ASD offices in USD(P). Within those five offices, responsibility for nuclear related aspects of the enterprise are coordinated between ten more offices; and every single one of those offices has other tasks and missions besides nuclear strategy and policy.

Eleven of 17 personnel interviewed for this research reported that as a result of the multiple dissolutions and consolidation of offices, many duplications of effort began to happen within the OSD, Services, Joint Staff, and even DoE. This duplication of effort led to a swollen
bureaucracy with slow processes that strain the relationships of the aforementioned organizations. An example of the duplication of efforts reported during an interview were threat assessments conducted by the OSD, Joint Staff, and national laboratories. By codifying that only one organization needs to execute this task in coordination with pertinent parties, the additional personnel could then be tasked with other functions.

Over the years recommendations for improvement have been made by means of various reports or recommendations in an effort to reinvigorate the oversight and management of the nuclear enterprise. The 2008 Schlesinger Report recommended that “considering the unique and special nature of nuclear weapons, a single OSD advocate for the nuclear mission is needed” (Schlesinger, 2008). The report advocated for the creation of a new ASD position reporting directly to the USD(P). Unfortunately the creation goes against the trend of OSD dissolving offices in order to create new offices with consolidated missions and tasks inherited from other offices, but without the corresponding manpower. In early 2015 the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities was created which took on the responsibilities of nuclear and missile defense policy, which was previously executed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. This position provides for a single OSD advocate at the ASD level within USD(P) that paves the way for streamlining and focusing nuclear oversight and management at the OSD level.

**Headquarters Staff Reductions**

Manpower reductions in the DoD are not new. When a contingency or war arises the DoD increases funding and manpower, knowing that it will be taken away when the conflict ends. While there are no current large-scale combat operations, the rising costs of technology
and personnel coupled with shrinking budgets are forcing the DoD to make more personnel cuts at all levels. Recent reductions in military end-strength over the last few years have left all of the services with more to do, but with less people. Whether it’s pilots in the air or soldiers on the ground, each of the military services has shown that increasingly consistent manpower cuts across the board have adverse effects on combat readiness and sustainment (Losey, 2014). In recent years there have been concerted efforts at calling for broad stroke personnel cuts at the highest levels of the DoD in order to save money (Carter, 2013).

In July 2013, then Deputy SecDef Ashton Carter released a policy memorandum (Attachment 1) directing headquarters management staffs throughout the DoD to be reduced by 20% (Carter, 2013). The memorandum specifically recognized the need to reduce the number of SecDef Principal Staff Assistants (PSA), who are the SecDefs USDs, ASDs, directors and equivalents responsible for executing the DoD management and oversight missions on behalf of the SecDef. The memorandum also clarifies that the 20% staff cuts would also apply to budgets (Carter, 2013) further aggravating the fact that critical OSD offices would lose both people and funding. This element of the 20% budget cuts led to two different impressions with the interview pool. Four interviewees agreed with the aforementioned assessment but five stated this could be a positive clarification in that applying the 20% cut to the budget would stress reducing office budgets versus just personnel numbers.

The memorandum closed with specific direction: “Senior managers should ensure that cuts are made aggressively and as soon as possible” (Carter, 2013). It is critical to note that the Air Force was given the same direction by its senior leaders the following year, aiming to bring its active duty personnel levels from 330,700 to 310,900 in approximately two years (Losey, 2014). The Air Force suffered critical manning shortages, critical training and maintenance
activities ceased and recruitment and retention were also adversely affected. Due to the loss of mission readiness, senior Air Force leaders are now calling for more manpower after the personnel cuts, and other senior leaders have stated that the Air Force’s push for aggressive and swift manpower cuts was a mistake (Losey, Gen. Mark Welsh sounds alarm on undermanned Air Force, 2015). Ten interviewees also said that the Air Force’s aggressive personnel cuts in such a short period of time were unneeded and should have been executed in a more gradual manner.

While the OSD headquarters staffs are small when compared to total Air Force end strength, there is evidence that broad and swift manpower cuts are detrimental to mission execution.

In a follow-up memorandum distributed in late 2013 (Attachment 2) more guidance was provided for the forecasted 20% staff cuts that would now be extended by an extra fiscal year, to FY 2019 (Hagel, 2013). Due to the concurrent end strength reductions going on in the military services, more direction was given in defining headquarters staffs versus personnel who were directly supporting combat operations and training. This was done as a mitigating measure due to lower level echelons of staffs being cut, but roles weren’t directly defined and understood at all levels within the DoD. A positive aspect here is that the SecDef noted that during this arduous review process, a number of critical OSD staff functions happened to have the fewest amount of personnel (e.g, offices within ASD(NCB)) and recognized, for the moment, that further staff reductions would degrade those offices’ ability to support the nuclear enterprise beyond his risk threshold. An example of accommodating smaller OSD office is involves the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters (DASD(NM)) (Reference Figure 8) which resides within ASD(NCB). Four of the personnel interviewed conveyed that many nuclear related offices within the OSD have extremely small staffs that only have one or two personnel. For example, many of the offices within DASD(NM) have 1-person
staffs, and to fully implement the staff reductions some offices would have no personnel assigned and their function reassigned to one or more other offices. This was articulated in the organizational review conducted as a result of the first 2013 memorandum and those offices were not affected by the 20% staff reductions.

Initially OSD projected to save $1 billion over the next five years through initial 20% staff cuts, but through further analysis and reductions in civilian personnel and contractor reductions the
OSD has been able to project a $5.3 billion savings over the next five years (Government Accountability Office, 2015). This can be due to the fact that full-time contractor equivalents constitute 3,287 of the almost 6,000 personnel working in OSD. (Government Accountability Office, 2015) It must be taken into account that while federal employees and full-time contractors constitute a great percentage of the OSD workforce, the hiring of more civilians and contractors was due to efforts to relieve the task burden of uniformed military personnel at the tactical level and provide proper oversight and management of DoD functions with civilian personnel (Government Accountability Office, 2015). Two personnel interviewed with knowledge of congressional efforts to return uniformed personnel to the service level, mentioned that civilian and contractor personnel were hired to prevent a total loss of productivity by removing uniformed personnel requirements at the OSD and Joint Staff. While there are statutory limits for the number of authorized military and civilian personnel going back decades, OSD has leveraged the use of contractor employees to execute their functions, especially when extra functions are directed by Congress.

Also listed in this late 2013 memorandum were efforts to increase OSD efficiencies amidst the personnel reductions. The SecDef directed the realigning of the Office of the Director of Administration and Management under the DCMO to better assess ways to improve DoD processes and alignment (Hagel, 2013). He also directed various ASDs to balance workloads across their offices and realign functions to address concerns brought on by the staff reductions (Hagel, 2013). While these efforts may mitigate some negative effects of the staff reductions, without a baseline to illustrate how many personnel are required to perform specific tasks these efforts lack the efficacy to provide the efficiencies desired from the changes.
OSD Performance Assessment efforts

The OSD has made concerted efforts to evaluate areas of improvement within its own organization and strives for efficiency, ranging from the PPBS implementation to the current efforts to reduce and streamline OSD headquarters staff personnel. An integral force behind these efforts are the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and the follow-on 2010 GPRA modernization effort. The GPRA was enacted as an effort to improve federal program management by requiring federal agencies to submit five year strategic level plans and a method to annually assess and report on their progress (103rd U.S. Congress, 1993). The 2010 modernization effort took into account the speed and different mediums within which information moves (111th U.S. Congress, 2011). This drove an increased frequency of performance report generation and updated the means by which to do this (e.g., government websites) to induce transparency.

As a result of the GPRA efforts, the OSD’s Annual Performance Plans and Annual Performance Reports became the basis for the DOD’s Annual Organizational Assessment. Utilizing these three products, the performance of DoD organizations and high level senior executive service level officials are evaluated. An identified problem with this process is that while the number of milestones and performance measures are based off of strategic goals and plans such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, National Security Strategy, National Intelligence Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), each respective agency is responsible for ultimately assessing how it performs against the identified milestones and performance measures (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Deputy Chief Management Officer), 2014). There are offices within DCMO that assist with developing milestones and performance measures, but the final say falls on the respective
agencies being evaluated. This system of performance measurement is similar to how the US Air Force assesses its wings’ organizational performance through the Air Force Inspection System. This system requires that each Air Force wing assess how it does through performance measures governed by DoD, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Air Force instructions. Throughout the year each wing identifies performance measures through an online system and at various time intervals determined by the US Air Force annual inspections are conducted to validate these results. The OSD system of performance and organizational assessment as shown lack this critical validation by an objective party. There are informational and investigative reports conducted by organizations such as the GAO or Inspector General, but short of committing a crime, there are no identified avenues for recourse if an organization identifies that they truly failed in accomplishing a performance measure.

How have the Annual Performance Plans, Annual Performance Reports, and Annual Organizational Assessments identified the success of OSD’s ability to execute adequate oversight and management of the nuclear enterprise? The Annual Performance Plan and Annual Performance Report are submitted along with the annual presidential budget request as an “overview book”. In this product strategic goals and efforts to reach those goals are articulated in narrative format and correlate at the macro level to the annual presidential budget request (Office of the Secretary of Defense (Deputy Chief Management Officer), 2014). This product is aimed to highlight the most significant aspects of the specified year’s budget; focusing on applicable changes as compared to the previous year’s budget and items of high interest to government and the public. In this consolidated product the reader can see what the overall presidential budget is, learn what significant initiatives the DoD is undertaking to execute that budget and see how the DoD performed in their own assessment during previous years.
This research focused on nuclear enterprise aspects of the Annual Performance Plans and Annual Performance Reports. From 2008 - 2015 the significant areas regarding the nuclear enterprise were the narrative regarding the consistent support for maintaining and modernizing the nuclear enterprise, the nuclear enterprise performance measures, and the increasing integration of other DoD efforts to the nuclear enterprise.

Establishing a consistent narrative espousing the need and support of a robust and effective nuclear enterprise is critical to maintaining congressional and public support. In each year’s overview the report repeatedly uses language such as:

- “We are robustly funding all parts of our nuclear triad” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011)

- “Primary missions of the US Armed Forces….Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012)

- “the FY 2014 budget focuses on reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013)

- “We will continue to invest in modernizing our essential nuclear delivery systems, warning, and command & control” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014)

- “Strengthening the nuclear enterprise remains the number one mission priority…” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015)

This messaging highlights the support needed and given to the nuclear enterprise. An avenue the OSD should explore in presenting this information is to annotate dollar amounts to the initiatives more frequently in these annual reports and juxtapose them against the entire presidential budget if not the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the United States in that year. This would show that fiscally the nuclear enterprise is relatively cheaper than supporting other government programs such as Medicare, social security, or welfare. Without this, the reader is forced to extrapolate the information themselves from a number of other sources. This product
can inform the public of how the DoD is spending money, which would help dispel myths and rumors more clearly.

Another aim of the overview book is to summarily assess previous years performance measures to exhibit transparency in how the DoD is executing its mission. There are many other reports that can articulate this, but this overview book is an excellent medium to consolidate this information into one product for Congress and the public which correlates DoD performance with the presidential budget request.

The reports integrated into the annual overview book articulate the many initiatives the DoD executes with the presidential budget, both nuclear and non-nuclear. From 2012 - 2016 it was evident that the overview books increasingly integrated how nuclear enterprise efforts underpin and support other DoD initiatives through their narrative:

2012 – “Maintaining the nuclear triad assures allies; helping build partnership capacity which is a key tenet of this year’s goal of rebalancing and enhancing military capabilities” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011)

2013 – “Attributing nuclear threats to their source is a critical capability that is directly supported by increasing space and cyber capabilities” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012)

2014 – “Funding aircraft terminal command and control systems directly supports nuclear deterrence operations by ensuring the viability of interconnected nuclear command, control, and communications” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013)

2015 – “Continued efforts to support nuclear triad modernization directly impacts the strength of two of the DoD’s three national defense pillars of national defense strategy; protecting the homeland and building security globally, through the reassurance of allies and partners abroad” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014)

2016 – “By investing in personnel increases and facility improvements at Navy and Air Force installations, many of which support both nuclear and non-nuclear missions, the DoD is able to improve mission execution and quality of life for the DoD’s greatest asset, its people” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015)

By associating the underpinning and integration of the nuclear enterprise to the entire spectrum of DoD missions, the overview can present nuclear investments as a capability that is important
to the entire department, not just those who have the word “nuclear” in their job description. Over the last few years various reviews of the nuclear enterprise have shown a disparity between the articulated importance of nuclear weapons and the subsequent actions to reinforce that. With continued use of mediums such as the aforementioned reports OSD will reduce that disparity.

While the overview books do provide performance measures that show how previous years assessments compare to each other, the Annual Organizational Assessment is where those measurements are listed with more specifics and detail.

The Annual Organizational Assessments correlate strategic goals with performance measures and milestones as annotated in the Annual Performance Plans and Annual Performance Reports. The performance measures and milestones are derived from DoD strategic goals. For FY 2008 they were:

1. Prevail in the Global War on Terror
2. Strengthen Joint Warfighting Capabilities
3. Focus on People
4. Transform Enterprise Management

The strategic goals from FY 2009 were:

1. Successfully Conduct Overseas Contingency Operations
2. Deter or defeat attacks to US
3. Reshape the Defense Enterprise
4. Develop a 21st Century Total Force
5. Achieve Unity of Effort

The strategic goals from FY 2010 were:

1. Win Our Nation’s War
2. Deter Conflict and Promote Security
3. Defend the Homeland
4. Integrate Business Operations

The strategic goals from FY 2011 were:

1. Prevail in Today’s Wars
2. Prevent and Deter Conflict
3. Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies
4. Preserve and Enhance the All-Volunteer Force
5. Implement Reform Agenda

The strategic goals from FY 2012 to FY 2014 were the same except for:

5. Reform the Business and Support Functions of the Defense Enterprise

The strategic Goals from FY 2015 were:

1. Defeat our Adversaries, Deter War, and Defend the Nation
2. Sustain a Ready Force to Meet Mission Needs
3. Strengthen and Enhance the Health and Effectiveness of the Total Workforce
4. Achieve Dominant Capabilities through Innovation and Technical Excellence
5. Reform and Reshape the Defense Institution

It is key to note the changes in the strategic goals of the eight OSD Annual Organizational Assessments evaluated. These are what the organizational performance milestones are derived from, and the changes create difficulty in evaluating how each organization performed as compared to a previous year’s assessment. As the strategic goals changed, subsequent changes occurred in performance milestones. In regards to the strategic goals and the nuclear enterprise, it was not until the 2010 Annual Organizational Assessment that
“deterring conflict” became a strategic goal and nuclear milestones became performance measures.

For the Annual Organizational Assessment reporting time period these strategic goals were transformed into a total of 663 performance milestones. For each year the number of performance milestones ranged from 184 in 2008 to as low as 49 in 2009. Each of the performance milestones were reviewed as they directly related to supporting significant functions within the nuclear enterprise. For purposes of this research a “significant function in direct support of the nuclear enterprise” was defined as:

- directly funding or supporting the execution of nuclear deterrence operations (employment, maintenance, training, or security)
- official meetings with allies or foreign security partners directly linked to nuclear deterrence
- evaluation or assessment of organizations executing nuclear deterrence operations
- creation or dissolution of organizations which execute any of the above functions
- creation or cancellation of nuclear policy, memorandums, or directives.

The Annual Organizational Assessments were examined to identify the number of nuclear milestones (performance measures) assigned to OSD offices, specifically USD(P) and USD(AT&L), and how OSD assessed the output in regards to performance. FY 2008 contained five milestones but they belonged to US Strategic Command. Comparatively USD(P) and USD(AT&L) each had 73 and 41 non-nuclear milestones respectively. As evaluated there were no nuclear milestones assigned to OSD. This was followed by FY 2009 which also had no nuclear milestones. USD(P) and USD(AT&L) had four and 14 non-nuclear milestones, respectively. In FY 2010 there were no nuclear milestones but USD(P) and USD(AT&L) had 2 and 18 non-nuclear milestones respectively.
FY 2011 saw the addition of a strategic priority of “maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the US and allies & partners” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015). There were two nuclear milestones with both being assigned to USD(P). The two nuclear milestones were:

- Number of DoD led meetings with international partners reaffirming extended deterrence
- 100% pass rate on Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections (DNSI)

USD(P) aimed for 5 meetings with 11 being executed in FY 2011 and 85.7% of nuclear units passed their DNSI. Tracking the number of international meetings reaffirming extended
deterrence was an effort to evaluate OSD’s performance in executing the vision of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Report. Active engagement with international partners was needed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and assure allies while the US was shrinking its nuclear arsenal. While this performance measure tracks the number of international meetings there is no annotation of any treaties, legal agreements, or concrete efforts that were developed or signed as a result of these meetings. This finding demonstrates the lack of efficacy of this performance measurement. Tracking pass rates of DNSIs with a goal of no failures is not a good indicator of true mission effectiveness. This was annotated in many reports which articulated that by this time DNSIs led operational units to strive to “pass the inspection” versus “execute the mission”. DNSIs also led to a culture of perfection with zero errors which led to extremely low morale and a culture of micromanagement within the Navy and Air Force.

In FY 2012 OSD reported a baseline of four meetings and executed 17; an increase over FY 2011, but again with no tangible documents or agreements to show. There was a 100% pass rate for DNSIs in FY 2012, achieving the OSD’s goal after missing it in FY 2011. USD(P) and USD (AT&L) also had eight and 25 non-nuclear milestones respectively. FY 2012 also saw the addition of two performance measures regarding START compliance regarding the number of operationally deployed strategic warheads and the number of attributable warheads (includes non-deployed warheads) both performance measures showing full compliance with START, at this point fully six years head of the 2018 deadline for START compliance. Interestingly this was only annotated in the Annual Performance Report and not the Annual Organizational Assessment. There is no functional explanation for this, only that in the overview books and Annual Organizational Assessments it is noted that respective organizations can coordinate what performance measures they would like presented in the Annual Performance Plans, Annual
Performance Reports, and Annual Organizational Assessments. This removes the ability to strictly compare the Annual Performance Plans, Annual Performance Reports, and Annual Organizational Assessment against one another. The data has to be extrapolated from the consolidated overview books and Annual Organizational Assessments for a more accurate analysis to be done.

In FY 2013 12 international meetings were conducted with the same previous baseline of requiring at least four, but no tangible documents or agreements were annotated. For the second consecutive year, there was a 100% pass rate for DNSIs. The FY 2013 Annual Organizational Assessment recognized that there were only two performance measurements assessing nuclear enterprise performance and referred to the mitigating circumstance that there are a number of reports that the services, national labs, and other organizations that report on the health of the nuclear enterprise (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013). USD(P) and USD (AT&L) had 17 and 26 respective non-nuclear milestones.

FY 2014 saw the reclassification of the previous two nuclear milestones preventing the annotation of the performance measurement results. The Annual Organizational Assessment further stated that the two measurements would become re-occurring annual measurements, but would be annotated elsewhere. USD(P) and USD(AT&L) had seven and 15 non-nuclear milestones respectively, an approximate 50% decrease from the year before. The FY 2015 Annual Organizational Assessment, the last year on file to date, had no nuclear milestones to assess USD(P) or USD(AT&L) performance. USD(P) and USD(AT&L) had four and 17 non-nuclear milestones respectively and furthermore there were no nuclear strategic priorities listed as in the FYs 2012-2014.
While USD(P) had at most two nuclear milestones, USD(AT&L) never had significant nuclear performance measurements assigned for the time periods evaluated. There were a small number of nuclear-related milestones that were assessed but not assigned to either USD(P) or USD(AT&L). These milestones concerned implementation plans for the “new triad” (STRATCOM); COCOMs ready to execute theater mission (STRATCOM); completion percentage of the Nuclear Command, Control, & Communications modernization plan (DoD Chief Information Officer); and training and equipping National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, & Nuclear civil support teams. These milestones were not assigned to USD(P) or USD(AT&L) and also were inconsistent in the years they were assessed (e.g., assessed in FY 2012 but not in FY 2013).

While the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons from Minot AFB to Barksdale AFB began to reveal a sustained lack of focus on the nuclear enterprise, the Secretary of Defense and other senior DoD officials have stated numerous times that the nuclear enterprise is a top priority and number-one focus of the DoD. Efforts to refocus and prioritize the enterprise have followed and were executed through increased allocation of resources to the nuclear enterprise, the creation of an Air Force major command commanded by a four star general, and the key positions of Deputy Commander, STRATCOM and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force being filled by generals with extensive experience in the nuclear enterprise. These efforts are overseen and managed from the highest levels of the OSD, namely within USD(P) and USD(AT&L). In that respect, looking at how USD(P) and USD(AT&L) have changed and the effect of broad stroke personnel reductions is critical. These changes coupled with efforts on how to assess organizational performance can provide insight into the positive and negative effects that different efforts and initiatives have on the OSD.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations

The OSD is the management and oversight entity which acts on behalf of the SecDef in executing DoD national security policy, a daunting task that requires a large organization that must evolve and adapt to a fluid global security environment. This research evaluated how organizational changes within the OSD affected its ability to support the nuclear enterprise. Specifically, the offices of the USD(P) and USD(AT&L), OSD staff reductions, and OSD performance assessment efforts were examined. Due to the lack of numerical data to identify relationships between organizational changes and performance interviews were used to provide insight into any effects from the changes. All of the personnel interviewed agreed with the following statements: (1) The continuous dissolution and consolidation of OSD offices contributed to a loss of focus within the OSD, but efforts to refocus have been positive, (2) The OSD staff is bloated and the staff reductions are long overdue, (3) Without a mechanism in place to provide a baseline of minimum personnel requirements for personnel requirements for various OSD offices, the staff reductions will have less efficacy. The interviews provided inputs that filled the gap left by a lack of numerical data and will be further expounded on in this section.

Conclusions

As the OSD grew in size and complexity over the years its functional offices had to accommodate these changes. This is no different in the current offices of USD(P) and USD (AT&L). The repeated dissolution and re-tasking of missions within USD(P) and USD(AT&L) do not allow of a continuity of effort or leadership in their large and complex organizations. Furthermore, the inability for OSD to institute these changes without the correlating personnel plus-ups and structure to systematically review personnel and mission requirements creates an overly duplicative bureaucracy. By instituting staff reductions within OSD without a systematic
means of analyzing the effects of reduced personnel numbers or quantifiable mission requirements in the offices of USD(P) and USD(AT&L), the OSD will only find itself as the US Air Force has; cutting a large amount of personnel quickly, only to realize that swift broad-stroke personnel reductions was a mistake.

Five of the interviewees expressed strong concerns over the duplicative efforts of the OSD, Joint Staff, DoE, and national laboratories (e.g., Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratories). During the interviews these members agreed that a mechanism to evaluate specific tasks such as conducting threat assessments needs to be instituted. This mechanism could then lead to assessing the performance of duplicative tasks and the organization with the “best practices” could take on the task as the sole provider and coordinate with pertinent offices as needed. Individuals who currently worked in the OSD expressed less concern over the duplicative nature of this argument and conveyed the intricacies of the perceived duplicative efforts such as different timing and reporting requirements for the various offices and products. While a valid argument, this can be examined through OSD performance assessments and evaluated more objectively with measurements that can discern the best organizations to execute duplicative tasks, and after a robust vetting process reduce duplicative tasks throughout OSD.

**Recommendations for USD(P), USD(AT&L), and staff reductions**

* Codify office directives in mission requirements that directly support mission execution in a manner similar to how US Air Force units outline mission essential tasks in designed operational capabilities (DOC) statements. From these DOC statements Air Force units derive manpower requirements and mission essential tasks to ensure manpower levels are commensurate with mission essential tasks and can thus articulate mission degradation based on
varying manpower levels. This will assist nuclear focused offices within OSD in assessing the effects of personnel reductions and/or the addition of mission tasks. The majority of personnel interviewed articulated that the lack of specific mission directives also contributed to duplicative work efforts that exacerbate the perception of personnel overages at the OSD level. The majority of those interviewed were also in agreement that personnel reductions at the OSD were needed but without a system in place to correlate office task loads with personnel requirements, the personnel cuts seem arbitrary.

*OSD should institute a mechanism whereby USDs can systematically determine personnel requirements and be able to address the difference between uniformed, civil service, and contractor personnel requirements.* The lack of a structured system to conduct this evaluation prevents a clear assessment for personnel requirements with no baseline for minimum personnel requirements in order to execute a particular offices mission. Units in the military services already execute this kind of recurring personnel vetting and can provide higher headquarters accurate sight pictures on unit manning thus articulating personnel shortages or excesses. The interviews also revealed that most of the offices of which the interviewees worked in or were familiar with, did not have personnel authorization documents such as those utilized by USAF squadrons. When asked about personnel requirement vetting in the OSD, three of the interviewees said that they would get temporary backfills assigned when tasked with a high visibility project, and that if other offices needed short term personnel backfills supervisors would conduct what seemed to be informal polls in order to determine who they could release in order to temporary backfill another OSD office. These facts were the closest reference to any kind of system or process to assess personnel requirements within the OSD by the interview pool.
Without a mechanism in place to systematically identify personnel requirements against mission requirements within the OSD staff, broad-stroke personnel reductions will not offer the efficacy needed to ensure mission effectiveness with fewer personnel. Until this is done, critical offices within USD(P) and USD(AT&L) that support the nuclear enterprise can fall to the same fate of their predecessors when the cold war ended. The sentiment of a bloated OSD staff was strong in the interview pool and while the interviewees felt the OSD staff should be reduced they expressed the need for the personnel billets be returned to the operational level of the services.

**Recommendations for improvement of OSD performance measurement:**

*Efforts to assess organizational performance must be continually reassessed and refined.*

The functions of the Annual Performance Plans, Annual Performance Reports, and Annual Organizational Assessment may suffice for executing statutory requirements such as those levied by the 1993 GPRA, but truly fall short as a mechanism to accurately assess performance and more importantly identify areas of concern and improvement. This is especially evident in regards to the Annual Performance Reports and Annual Organizational Assessments as they were evaluated in assessing nuclear performance milestones. The lack of nuclear performance measurement at the OSD level prevented any true assessment of how the OSD provides adequate oversight and management of the nuclear enterprise. Some Annual Organizational Assessments documented that the health of the enterprise and other performance measurements are located in other reports, but those reports do not directly relate to USD(P) or USD(AT&L) support of the nuclear enterprise.

None of the interviewees were familiar with the OSD’s efforts to assess organizational performance. When asked about assessing their respective organization’s performance, all interviewees replied that the only official means of documenting performance were individual
performance reports. Clarification regarding the assessment of individual versus organizational assessment illustrated that while four individuals were vaguely familiar with the OSD’s Annual Organizational Assessments, the remaining interviewees had never heard of this product. All personnel were in agreement that a mechanism is needed to assess the efficacy of OSD’s nuclear enterprise support efforts. This mechanism can also serve to assess the degree to which duplicity in the OSD affects work flow and support efforts.

OSD should have one office that can coordinate and correlate all the information to prevent the gaps in the transfer of information from one document to the other. Currently the Annual Performance Reports, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Organizational Assessments have different offices within OSD that publish these documents. Having an entity such as the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) as a coordinator for OSD nuclear performance measures would greatly assist in creating viable and measurable metrics. All the key entities in the nuclear enterprise are represented by the NWC. The NWC has representation from USD(P), USD(AT&L), the National Nuclear Security Administration, USSTRATCOM, and the Joint Staff. The NWC has been in place since 1987 and has since expanded in scope and responsibility, with an ever increasing call for better use and more empowerment of this nuclear organization (Government Accountability Office, 2015). OSD/CAPE is another organization that can be leveraged in the assessment process.

OSD/CAPE is populated with experts in providing objective analysis of all aspects of major defense programs in the DoD and can provide assistance in how to improve OSD’s use of Annual Performance Reports and Annual Organizational Assessments. Based on their expertise in assessment and analysis they could provide critical input in how to best develop performance measure timelines that correspond with an initiatives timeline or align with the FYDP in order to
accurately assess performance for longer term projects and prevent the haphazard picking and choosing performance milestones which consistently change. This relentless change can cause assessments to become overly subjective and prevent accurate assessment of what truly needs to be assessed for any particular OSD office.

Both the NWC and CAPE entities could reverse the trend of utilizing inadequate assessment milestones for USD(P) and USD (AT&L) regarding the nuclear enterprise which prevents a detailed assessment of how well they support the nuclear enterprise. As experts in the nuclear enterprise and program evaluation, enlisting the help of the NWC and CAPE can provide the Annual Performance Reports and Annual Organizational Assessments with the structure and metric formulation to accurately assess OSD performance -- especially within the offices of the USD(P) and USD(AT&L) which are critical to ensuring the successful execution of the nuclear enterprise.

Further research can provide greater insight and more ways to improve the OSD in supporting the nuclear enterprise. For example, by researching organizational structures and theories, a better understanding for what functions and how best to align and assign personnel can be discovered and lead the OSD to more efficient processes and support for the nuclear enterprise. More clarity is also needed on the effects of organizational improvement versus total reengineering. Analyzing the efforts undertaken to produce gradual improvements versus “starting with a clean slate” can open the doors to truly creating an organization with the flexibility and viability to manage and oversee the nuclear enterprise.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: 20% Headquarters Reductions

Secretary Hagel has directed a 20% cut in management headquarters spending throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). The cuts, which will take place regardless of the budget levels approved by Congress, are designed to streamline DoD’s management through efficiencies and elimination of lower-priority activities. This memorandum defines the nature of these important reductions more specifically.

The headquarters cuts will apply to all higher headquarters staffs including Office of the Secretary of Defense Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) and their associated Defense Agency staffs, Joint Staff, Service Secretary staffs, Service Chief staffs, Service 4-star major commands and Service component commands, lower level Service staffs (down to the appropriate level determined by the Service Secretaries and Chiefs), and Combatant Command staffs. Intelligence staffs will also be affected (primarily Military Intelligence Program-funded Intelligence Centers and, with the concurrence of the Director for National Intelligence, National Intelligence Program-funded centers).

Service Secretaries and Chiefs will decide the allocation of cuts among various organizations within their headquarters staffs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will make the same allocation for the Joint Staff. Each PSA and Defense Agency should achieve a 20% reduction. If necessary, I will consider reallocations during program review.
The 20% cut applies to the total headquarters budgets. Total headquarters budgets include government civilian personnel who work at headquarters and associated costs including contract services, facilities, information technology, and others that support headquarters functions. Budgets are those specified in the Future Years Defense Program supporting the President’s budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, extended to FY 2019 assuming growth for inflation. The 20% cut applies to budget dollars. However, organizations will strive for a goal of 20 percent reductions in authorized government civilian staff at their headquarters. Similarly, while military personnel are not part of headquarters budgets, organizations will strive for a goal of 20 percent reductions in military personnel billets on headquarters staffs. Finally, subordinate headquarters should not grow as a result of reductions in higher headquarters. I will be reviewing proposals to ensure that these various goals are met.

I recognize that the FY 2014 budget reflects past efficiency decisions, some of which affected headquarters. This 20% reduction represents an additional cut, which I know will be challenging. However, in this period of additional downward pressure on defense spending, we must continue to reduce our headquarters budgets and staffing. Components are encouraged to suggest changes in policies and workload that would help them accommodate these dollar and staff reductions.

Senior managers should ensure that cuts are made aggressively and as soon as possible, both to eliminate uncertainty for our employees and contractors and to maximize savings. Generally, cuts should be roughly proportional by year – with about one fifth of the cut in FY 2015, another fifth in FY 2016, and so on. Components are free to implement reductions more rapidly. To the extent feasible, some cuts should begin in FY 2014 in order to increase savings and reduce the cuts required in later years.

Reduction plans should be submitted along with the Program Objective Memorandum submissions, which are due on September 23.

[Signature]

[Handwritten signature]
Appendix 2. OSD Organizational Review

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Subject: Results of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Organizational Review

This memorandum outlines the results of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Organizational Review recently concluded by former Secretary of the Air Force Mike Donley. It includes implementation of my direction to reduce the total number of OSD personnel and its budget, my decisions on the Strategic Choices and Management Review and other proposals for organizational changes, and related planning for the future.

First, I want to thank you for your continued service and dedication to both our Department and our Nation. This has been a trying period for all DoD personnel and their families in the wake of sequestration, furloughs, and a Government shutdown. Through it all, you have remained dedicated to your work and focused on accomplishing your important missions, as we undergo a difficult transition from ending the second of America’s two longest wars, in an era of significant budget growth, to one of reduced resources and a world that presents new threats and new challenges. There is no doubt that, as the DoD’s most senior civilian staff, OSD continues to provide the essential support and leadership that will help us overcome any challenge this Department or our Nation may face in the future.

It is the responsibility of our Nation’s leaders to work together to replace the steep, abrupt, and deep spending cuts that have been imposed under sequestration. At the same time, in this very constrained budget environment, it is critical that we bring greater efficiency to our DoD management headquarters, including OSD, so that scarce resources can be focused on combat capabilities. I have, therefore, directed a 20% reduction in OSD’s operating budget over the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015-2019 Future Years Defense Program. To protect joint readiness and training, this reduction will not include the Combatant Commanders’ Exercise and Engagement Training Transformation Program; however, this Program will be reviewed separately for potential management efficiencies in the ongoing FY2015 Program Budget Review. In addition, I have taken into account the impact of these reductions on some of the smallest OSD offices and directed appropriate accommodations.

Over the next five years, OSD’s total workforce of civilian, military, and contractor personnel will be reduced to obtain the necessary savings. Some of these savings will be achieved through significant reductions in civilian personnel; much of these savings will be achieved through contractor reductions. We are still finalizing the details, which will be available when the budget is submitted next year. But we will save at least $1 billion over the next five years. I will provide implementing guidance to the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to finalize OSD budget and manpower totals during the FY2015 Program Budget Review and to reflect these decisions in an appropriate Resource Management Decision.
In reducing and constraining the size of our management headquarters, we must also take the opportunity to reshape and strengthen our staff to better position OSD to meet the emerging challenges ahead. In this context, I am directing the following organizational changes and realignments:

- Strengthening the Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) to meet Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congressional expectations for better coordination and integration of DoD’s business affairs by realigning the Office of the Director of Administration and Management (DA&M) and its subordinate elements and resources within the DCMO structure, better enabling DCMO to fulfill its responsibilities.

- Strengthening the ability of the Office of the DoD Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) to address the growing information technology (IT) and cyber challenges, improve oversight of IT resources, and further enable successful implementation of the Joint Information Environment through the realignment of the oversight of business systems from the DCMO to the DoD CIO, allowing each organization to focus on its core responsibilities.

- Restructuring the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to balance workload across its Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASDs), sustain emphasis on the Asia-Pacific Region, and strengthen focus on security cooperation.

- Directing the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to undertake a study to rebalance internal resources across her Office’s three ASDs, to better position the Office to address major concerns related to DoD downsizing, such as readiness, total force management, and compensation.

- Directing the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to establish its post-9/11, post-Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom steady-state configuration and level of effort.

- Combining the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight with the Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office under the DA&M.

- Realigning the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, preserving it as a distinct organization that reports to the Secretary, through the Under Secretary, to better ensure that ONA’s long-range comparative analyses inform and influence the Department’s overall strategy and policy.

- Approving plans for eliminating the five remaining non-Presidentially Appointed, Senate-confirmed Deputy Under Secretaries of Defense, fulfilling the direction from Congress.
Specific guidance and timelines related to these decisions will be distributed separately to the affected offices. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will oversee implementation of these changes. My desire is that these changes begin immediately and be in place by January 1, 2015. The DA&M will track and report the progress of implementation to the Deputy Secretary on a regular basis. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense, in coordination with the ASD for Legislative Affairs, will prepare any legislative proposals necessary to effect these changes and seek fast-tracking of such proposals through OMB to Congress for its consideration and approval.

Mr. Donley also recommended, and I have approved, issues for additional follow-up that would further improve the management and administration of OSD. These include refining OSD budget categories, improving oversight of contractor support, reviewing DoD databases managed by OSD, and completing a systematic review of OSD’s workload. I am also directing a biennial review of OSD to establish a regular assessment of OSD requirements and enhance the agility of this critical staff in response to rapidly changing DoD needs. I have assigned these follow-up tasks to the DCMO and the DA&M for appropriate action.

As we implement these changes over the next year, I ask that you continue to focus on OSD’s top leadership and management tasks: establishing direction and setting DoD priorities, formulating policies; allocating resources; guiding force employment; representing DoD in our external relationships; and overseeing policy and program implementation in DoD’s operating components. As a critical staff for the Deputy Secretary and myself, and as a critical asset for this Department, you should be focused on performing only those top leadership and management tasks that cannot be performed by others; and, consistent with your assigned responsibilities, you should, therefore, continue to look for opportunities to divest administrative and program management responsibilities where feasible.

Thank you again for your dedicated support to our mission of national defense and for your continuing efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of this Department.

DISTRIBUTION:
Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretaries of Defense
Deputy Chief Management Officer
Commanders of the Combatant Commands
Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
General Counsel of the Department of Defense
Inspector General of the Department of Defense
Assistant to Secretaries of Defense
DoD Chief Information Officer
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Director, Administration and Management
Director, Net Assessment
Directors of the Defense Agencies
Directors of the DoD Field Activities
MEMORANDUM FOR Dr. Alan Johnson

FROM: John J. Elshaw, Ph.D.
AFIT IRB Research Reviewer
2950 Hobson Way
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7765

SUBJECT: Approval for exemption request from human experimentation requirements (32 CFR 219, DoDD 3216.2 and AFI 40-402) for Organizational Change Study.

1. Your request was based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 101, paragraph (b) (2) Research activities that involve the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior unless: (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects, and (ii) Any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation.

2. Your study qualifies for this exemption because you are not collecting sensitive data, which could reasonably damage the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation. Further, the demographic data you are utilizing and the way that you plan to report it cannot realistically be expected to map a given response to a specific subject.

3. This determination pertains only to the Federal, Department of Defense, and Air Force regulations that govern the use of human subjects in research. Further, if a subject’s future response reasonably places them at risk of criminal or civil liability or is damaging to their financial standing, employability, or reputation, you are required to file an adverse event report with this office immediately.

[Signature]

Signed by: ELSHAW, JOHN J. 1076680454
JOHN J. ELSHAW, PH.D.
AFIT Exempt Determination Official
Appendix 4. Interview Background Paper

TALKING PAPER

ON

THE EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES WITHIN OSD ON ITS ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

- The purpose of this talking paper is to provide an overview of the OSD organizational change study. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between organizational changes in OSD and its ability to support the nuclear enterprise.

- Issue / Research Problem Statement

  -- The OSD is the senior civilian oversight entity for the nuclear enterprise and organizational changes within this entity over the years have negatively affected the nuclear enterprise. This study serves to evaluate relationships between certain changes and nuclear enterprise outputs and mission performance.

  -- This research will focus on organizational changes in the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and assessment efforts in judging mission performance by these offices.

- Research Objectives

  -- Identify specific roles of USD(P) and USD(AT&L) in the nuclear enterprise

  -- Identify significant organizational changes that affected USD(P) and USD(AT&L)

  -- Identify organizational assessment efforts within OSD

  -- Identify and quantify organizational assessments and outputs involving USD(P) and USD(AT&L)

  -- Identify benefits which could be realized by significant organizational changes and assessment efforts

- Research Methodology

  -- Content Analysis

  -- Interviews

- Points of Contact

  -- Principal Investigator, Major Marc Anthony C. Ortiz, Student, SANDS
Appendix 5. Interview Consent Form

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW

DISTRIBUTION OF AIRMEN TIME RESEARCH

You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by researchers from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Department of Operational Sciences. The main objective of the project is to determine the impact of organizational changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the nuclear enterprise. The results of this interview will be included in a report as well as a graduate research project defense. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because of your knowledge, experience, and first-hand account of the tasks of interest. You should read the information below and ask questions about anything you do not understand before deciding whether or not to participate.

- This interview is voluntary.
- You will not be compensated for participating in this interview.
- The information you tell us will be kept confidential.
- Data collection for this project will be completed by August 2016. All survey documents will be stored in a secure workspace until 1 year after that date. The documents will then be destroyed.

I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.

Name of Subject:

Signature of Subject __________________________ Date __________

Signature of Investigator __________________________ Date __________

Please contact Major Ortiz with any questions or concerns at marcanthony.ortiz@us.af.mil or 505-846-4094
Appendix 6. Quad Chart
Bibliography


Assessing the Effects of Organizational Changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Nuclear Mission

A series of organizational changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) since the Cold War’s end arguably fostered a devolution of focus on the nuclear enterprise. This culminated with inexcusable incidents that questioned the credibility of the United States’ nuclear enterprise. Through a content analysis of reports, directives, and historical documents with interviews of Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, this research found that the organizational changes drove a dissolution of critical OSD offices that had played a critical role in nuclear policy and decision, which negatively affected the nuclear enterprise. Furthermore, efforts to reduce OSD staff personnel and assess OSD organizational performance, while positive in nature, may also have a negative effect on the nuclear enterprise if not executed with prudence.