In order to achieve this end, reform of the present joint development system is required so that competent, effective, and agile leaders for future joint organizations at all levels. In order to achieve this end, reform of the present joint development system is required so that legal, cultural, and organizational barriers that hinder professional development are eliminated and civilians and enlisted service members are better prepared for joint operational and staff assignments.

14. ABSTRACT

The interdependence of the U.S. Armed forces sought by Congressional legislators and Defense leaders is not possible as long as joint education and training are limited to a small portion of the total joint force. Providing enlisted service members and government civilian employees with quality joint professional growth opportunities is essential to the development of competent, effective, and agile leaders for future joint organizations at all levels. In order to achieve this end, reform of the present joint development system is required so that legal, cultural, and organizational barriers that hinder professional development are eliminated and civilians and enlisted service members are better prepared for joint operational and staff assignments.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Joint training, joint education, Goldwater Nichols Act, jointness, joint development reform analytics

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REFORMING JOINT PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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JOINTNESS FOR THE REST OF US:
REFORMING JOINT PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

By Marc R. Meisner

GS-14, Department of Defense Civilian

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this thesis reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This thesis is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes (or appropriate statement per the Academic Integrity Policy).

Signature: 

10 June 2016

Thesis Advisor:

Signature: 

Dr. Bryon Greenwald
Professor of History

Approved by:

Signature: 

Doug Golden, Col, USAF
Committee Member

Signature: 

Miguel Peko, CAPT, USN
Committee Member

Signature: 

Peter Yeager, Col, USMC
Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School

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ABSTRACT

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Defense Department transformation movement that it spawned intended to enhance military effectiveness by creating a level of interdependency where service capabilities are combined to maximize effectiveness while minimizing vulnerabilities. However, despite the passage of thirty years since the law’s enactment, its stated goals are not yet fully realized. This thesis argues that the interdependence sought by Congressional legislators and Defense leaders is not possible as long as joint education and training are limited to a small portion of the total joint force. Providing enlisted service members and government civilian employees with quality joint professional growth opportunities is essential to the development of competent, effective, and agile leaders for future joint organizations at all levels. This expansion will also ensure that those charged with mastering and integrating advanced technologies, developing and adopting innovative doctrine, and transforming DOD as an organization receive the foundational tools needed to excel. Finally, this thesis offers recommendations on reforming joint development in order to create a centrally managed and resourced professional development model that supports the needs of the entire joint force.
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DEDICATION

This thesis work is dedicated to my loving wife, Dawn, who has been a constant source of support and encouragement during the challenges of school and life. I am truly thankful for her prodding, patience, understanding, and, most especially, editing. This work is also dedicated to my children, Matthew, Bob, Sarah, and Bethany for their unconditional love, never-ending support, and encouragement during the long process of completing this thesis.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past thirty years, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 did much to enhance joint education and training. For example, improvements in the training and education of military officers have created a corps of joint qualified officers ready to shape and lead the future joint force. Unfortunately, a similar investment has not been made in the other two legs of the joint triad: civilians and enlisted personnel. As a consequence, civilians and enlisted personnel assigned to combatant commands, joint task forces, and other joint duties do not receive adequate education and training preparation prior to their assignments. This lack of fundamental grounding undercuts military readiness and undermines the armed forces’ ability to protect U.S. national interests.

Research Approach

This thesis analyzes the current state of joint professional development and examines and highlights shortcomings created by the lack of civilian and enlisted joint education and training. It begins with a review of previous recommendations for establishing or improving civilian and enlisted professional development and identifies impediments to the enactment of these reforms. This research concludes with recommendations for developing, codifying, and enacting civilian and enlisted joint development programs. Adopting these program recommendations will lead to an improvement in the performance of the total joint force and advance the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

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1The Defense Department’s civilian workforce includes federal government employees, foreign nationals hired directly or indirectly to work for DOD, and contractor personnel. However, “civilian” in the context of this thesis refers solely to DOD federal government employees.
goal of an interdependent military that is prepared to meet the challenges of the twenty
first century.

Definitions

Before examining the need for improving joint enlisted and civilian education and
training, it is necessary to define what is meant by these terms and the closely related
concepts of learning and development. It is also important to define the term “joint
matters” and to distinguish “jointness” from the routine activities of the military services.
Drawing on a number of sources, the definitions used in this thesis are as follows:

Education - A process and a series of activities that enable an individual to assimilate
and develop knowledge, skills, values, and understanding that are not simply related to a
narrow field of activity, but instead contribute to defining, analyzing, and solving a broad
range of problems. Education provides a foundation of knowledge from which a person
generalizes or transfers in order to solve a similar or novel situation. In simple terms,
education provides a knowledge base that underpins any other activity that the individual
may engage in at a later stage.2

Training – A planned and systemic effort to modify or develop knowledge, skills, or
attitudes through learning experiences in order to achieve effective performance in an
activity or range of activities so that an individual or group is able to perform a given task
or job to a given standard. Basic military and technical training is primarily focused on

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The bulk of the definitions in this section were taken from this source.
enhancing job knowledge, job proficiency and job experience to perform military functions and tasks that are specific to military operations.

Learning - The acquisition of knowledge or skills through experience, study, reflection, or by being taught.

Development - The general enhancement and growth of an individual’s skills and abilities through conscious and unconscious learning, or the integration of education and training.

Joint Matters - Actions related to the achievement of unified action by multiple military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, air, space, or in the information environment. These matters include subjects relating to:

- National military strategy;
- Strategic planning and contingency planning;
- Command and control of operations under unified command;
- National security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States; and
- Combined operations with military forces of allied nations\(^3\)

Joint – Activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.\(^4\)

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\(^3\) National Guard Bureau. *The Joint Qualification Handbook*. (Washington DC: National Guard Bureau, 2010). According to this source the term “multiple military forces” refers to forces that involve participants from the armed forces of one or more departments or agencies of the United States, military forces or agencies of other countries, or non-governmental persons or entities.

\(^4\) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 November 2010), 121.
Jointness - Achieving higher joint combat effectiveness by focusing on the efficient integration of service capabilities in all stages of the military processes, from research, through procurement, and into operations.\(^5\)

CHAPTER 2:
BACKGROUND

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) is widely recognized as the most significant national security policy change since the National Security Act of 1947.\(^1\) In the years since its enactment, the legislation has done much to enhance the joint capabilities of the United States Armed Forces. Among other things, the GNA strengthened civilian authorities, clarified lines of command, improved strategy formulation and operational planning, and generally enhanced the effectiveness of military operations. Moreover, the act eventually became a central pillar in a Department of Defense effort to transform the U.S. military from a 20\(^{th}\) century industrial army into a modern, information driven, and cohesive joint force.

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation recognized that in order to achieve this renovation, the Armed Forces needed “high-quality officers competent in joint matters.”\(^2\) Proponents of the legislation argued that the first step in transforming the armed forces was improving joint officer management and development, particularly officer education and training. Toward this end, Title IV of the GNA called for the establishment of a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) designation and dramatically changed the personnel management of military officers.

Although the military service chiefs initially opposed the implementation of the GNA, more recent generations of senior leaders recognize the importance of joint development. According to the 14th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, the road to transforming the American Armed Forces into the dominant military of the 21st century begins with “a strong program of education and leader development.”3 Likewise, the former Joint Staff, Director for Joint Force Development, Lieutenant General George Flynn, stated that the main goal of the joint education system is to “produce leaders at every echelon who possess the ability to think strategically, critically and jointly.”4 Thus, the Department of Defense (DOD) invested heavily in the education and training of joint officers over the past three decades. As a result, the education and training system created a corps of joint qualified professionals capable of conducting joint combat operations as well as shaping and leading the future joint force.

Unfortunately, over the years a similar investment was not made in the other two legs of the joint triad: civilians and enlisted personnel. There are no laws mandating civilian or enlisted joint education and few policies mandating joint developmental opportunities for either civilians or enlisted service members. Moreover, the small number of policies that have been promulgated are mostly focused on the joint development of senior civilian executives and a small segment of the senior non-commissioned officer corps. As a consequence, DOD civilians and enlisted service members assigned to combatant commands, joint task forces, and other joint duties do not receive adequate joint

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education and training prior to their assignments. In order to correct the above shortcomings, advance jointness, and support the eventual transformation of the United States Armed Forces into a truly interdependent force, civilian and enlisted education and training requires reform. Ultimately, this reform must include both Congressional changes to existing laws governing civilian and military professional development and DOD initiatives to further advance and foster enlisted and civilian joint education and training.

Previous Studies

In the past 30 years, numerous studies have assessed the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols Act or proposed new defense reforms designed to strengthen the legislation or to fill in gaps left by the act. Beginning in 2004, the Center for Strategic and International Studies produced a two-part study that examined the GNA and issues beyond the scope of the original legislation. Significantly, the study found that the Defense Department struggled to attract and retain talented civilian employees, in part, because there was no plan similar to the joint officer management and development program for civil servants.

The study concluded that DOD needed a civilian professional development plan based on education, training, and interdepartmental or interagency rotations in order to enhance civilian skill sets and aid in the retention of experienced employees. Further, the report

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suggested that Congress “establish a new Defense Professional Corps” to draw talented civilians to DOD and to create opportunities for professional improvement and career progression.\textsuperscript{7} The Corps concept envisioned education, training, and rotation opportunities for entry level through senior executives. The report concluded that in order to achieve this goal, DOD career civilians, like their military colleagues, needed the financial resources and management support required to “undertake a sustained program of professional development.”\textsuperscript{8}

In 2008, the RAND Corporation conducted a study commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The study addressed the performance of Senior Executive Service (SES) civilians, Reserve Component Flag/General officers (RC FO/GO), and Senior Non-Commissioned officers (SNCO) in “joint matters.”\textsuperscript{9} The RAND research found that all three groups lacked adequate preparation for joint service. The study attributed this lack of grounding to a variety of factors, but common to all three cohorts was a dearth of foundational joint education and training that prepared them for service in joint organizations. The study participants overwhelmingly stressed that they needed additional joint education and training and they needed it much earlier in their careers.

Further, the RAND study surveyed the availability of joint education and training instruction and found that current programs lacked sufficient capacity to provide adequate educational opportunities for those seeking professional development. The study recommended the expansion of current joint programs, such as Joint Professional

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{9} Conley, 5.
Military Education (JPME), to include more civilians, Reservists, and enlisted in-residence participation. It also called for the development of additional institutions, such as a Joint Senior Enlisted Academy, that could provide enlisted members with a joint educational immersion program. Taken together, the authors concluded, the expansion of current joint programs and the building of new joint institutions would significantly increase the pool of prepared, joint qualified senior executives, military officers, and NCOs.

In 2013, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) produced a report on reforming joint military education and enhancing leadership development. The report assessed a DOD study of the Department’s Joint Professional Military Education program and reviewed its planned follow-on actions for improving officer and enlisted joint education. The report determined that joint education is found at all levels of officer and enlisted professional military education. It also noted that DOD was revamping its JPME program to ensure that it met the joint leader development goals outlined in Joint Force 2020, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s plan for the future joint force.

The DOD study also found that the Professional Military Education system was “basically sound,” but specific subject areas, such as joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations, needed additional emphasis. The report further concluded that “responsibilities for junior officers will increase [in these areas] and that joint education should be expanded at lower levels.”

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11 GAO, Joint Military Education, 4.
Calls for Reform

Besides formal studies, numerous scholarly and professional articles concentrate on the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the place of joint education and training in the transformation of national security related agencies. For example, Catherine Dale, writing for the Congressional Research Service, discovered that the lack of a professional workforce hinders the entire interagency system and prevents effective and efficient application of the elements of national power. In her study, Dale calls for reform of interagency processes aimed at adjusting organizational culture through the establishment of a cadre of national security professionals. This cadre, Dale argues, would make “interagency collaboration and integration second nature.”

Similarly, Professor Don Snider, U.S. Army War College professor and frequent commentator on joint matters, calls for the professionalization of the joint military community. In an article on DOD transformation, Snider suggests that the evolution towards jointness is hampered by the lack of a joint warfare profession that includes a body of expert knowledge and collection of members with a deep comprehension of that knowledge. Snider argues that the language of the GNA, particularly its focus on officer training, inhibits the establishment of this joint warfare profession by limiting the development of military and civilian professionals. He stresses that American strategic culture causes the U.S. military to focus on technology, when it should be concentrating

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on training and educating the professionals that apply the technology. Snider recommends that Congress amend the GNA in order to create a joint warfare profession. Otherwise, he contends, defense transformation will be critically damaged.\textsuperscript{14}

Retired Air Force Chief Master Sergeant Curtis Brownhill, a former senior fellow at the Joint Forces Staff College, supports the findings of both Snider and the 2008 RAND study. In a 2012 article written about enlisted education and training shortfalls, Brownhill’s observations suggested that many of the deficiencies uncovered in both Snider’s work and the 2008 RAND study remained unresolved.\textsuperscript{15} Brownhill points out that improving the jointness of the enlisted corps was not an aim of Goldwater-Nichols. Rather, the act mainly concentrates on redefining command authorities, improving joint operations and planning, and developing officers capable of leading joint forces in the future. As a consequence, Brownhill argues, enlisted members do not receive foundational joint education and have little in the way of preparation for service in joint organizations. Brownhill is particularly critical of the lack of joint development opportunities for senior enlisted leaders and staff non-commissioned officers, and calls for changes in the GNA that would afford joint educational opportunities for senior enlisted leaders on par with those of their officer counterparts.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Opposing Views}

While the vast majority of defense analysts, scholars, and military officers call for further reform of the joint force, this sentiment is not universal. Some critics believe that

\begin{itemize}
\item Don M. Snider "Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession." \textit{Parameters} 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 18
\item Brownhill, 4.
\end{itemize}
the GNA, in its current form, is sufficient to drive America’s military to interdependence, while others contend that the push to jointness actually inhibits effective employment of America’s military force.\textsuperscript{17}

For example, writing in response to Professor Don Snider’s appeal for the establishment of a joint warfare profession, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Coss argues that the current joint processes established by the 1986 GNA are sufficient to provide for the development, management, education, and training needs of the joint force.\textsuperscript{18} Coss agrees with Snider that the pace of joint warfare evolution is “glacial,” but maintains that a new joint warfare profession is not needed to further joint force goals. Coss also acknowledges that it is time to develop better processes for advancing jointness. However, he maintains that the answer to joint improvements does not necessitate amending the GNA, but rather requires codifying the lessons of ongoing operations, empowering United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as a Doctrine and Capabilities Center, and establishing standing joint force headquarters within each of the combatant commands to better organize for joint operations.\textsuperscript{19}

Defense analysts Harvey M. Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz, and Caitlin Talmadge are even more critical of the Defense Department’s drive toward jointness. In “US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy,” the authors point to jointness as an example of

\textsuperscript{17} For a review of the early opposition to joint transformation see David T. Fautua. “The Paradox of Joint Culture,” \textit{Joint Force Quarterly} (Autumn 2000): 81-86.
\textsuperscript{19} Coss, 99. Since the publication of this article both USJFCOM and the standing joint force headquarters have been eliminated and some of the joint doctrine, education, training, and integration functions transferred to the Joint Staff.
DOD’s instinct to “overly centralize planning, organization, and management.”\textsuperscript{20} The authors contend that this tendency may lead to a single strategic concept that is based in orthodoxy or even dogma being imposed from the top down. At the operational level, the authors argue that “jointness, when it occasionally works as intended, might improve efficiency or military effectiveness, but more often it stifles creativity.”\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
CHAPTER 3

IMPEDEMENTS TO JOINT DEVELOPMENT

*Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020)* is the conceptual template established to guide the transformation of America’s Armed Forces. According to this template, the key to operational success in the future is the “creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war because of its flexibility and responsiveness.”¹ *JV 2020* also recognizes that in order to build the most effective force, the U.S. military must be “fully joint; intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.”² However, it is clear from the debate over joint force development that the American military has not yet reached many of the goals envisioned in *JV 2020*. It is equally apparent that numerous impediments to joint force development threaten to derail the Armed Forces’ drive toward interdependence. These obstacles generally fall into three broad categories: legal, cultural, and organizational.

**Legal Framework**

When it comes to joint education and training, Goldwater-Nichols and subsequent legislation provides very specific legal requirements and direction for the development, management, and assignment of joint officers. For example, Title IV of the GNA establishes detailed instructions and management procedures for joint officer selection, education, assignment, and promotion.³ Title IV, in turn, spawned numerous programs

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² Ibid., 2.
that establish policies, provide implementation guidance, institute procedures, and generally steer the activities associated with managing officer joint development.

In fact, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act set the criteria for joint positions that the Defense Department used until 2007. In that year, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2007 directed that the Secretary of Defense establish different levels of joint qualification, as well as the criteria for qualification at each level. The new Joint Qualification System (JQS) “retained the tenets of GNA but also took into account the post-9/11 operational environment by creating a second pathway to joint officer qualification.”

4 The new system offers a standard path, based on joint education and a utilization tour, and a new “experience-based” track with a point system for recognizing joint service. Overall, the aim of the JQS remained consistent: to ensure a systematic, progressive, career-long development of officers in joint matters and to ensure that officers have the requisite experience and education to be highly proficient in joint matters.”

5 Regrettably, unlike their officer counterparts, the education and training of enlisted service members is not addressed in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Hence, there are no legal statutes requiring that enlisted members receive joint education, training or developmental assignments. As a result, enlisted joint development does not take the same comprehensive approach enjoyed by the officer program.

4 Army National Guard, Personnel Gateway. https://g1armg.army.pentagon.mil/soldiers/jqs/Pages/default.aspx
5 Ibid.
However, in the years since the adoption of Goldwater-Nichols, it has become increasingly apparent that enlisted members require a basic level of understanding of joint matters in order to perform joint duties and to support defense transformation. At the very least, enlisted personnel need a starting point for joint tactical employment and joint staff work, even if they do not require graduate-level joint education. As more than fourteen years of combat clearly demonstrate, even if they never serve in a joint billet or joint organization, an increasing number of enlisted personnel are serving in a joint environment and in jobs that require knowledge of other services’ capabilities, organizational structure, and culture in order to ensure interoperability.6

Unfortunately, there is no legal mandate that requires the development of a comprehensive system of education and training that prepares enlisted members for such service. Likewise, no laws covering the development and management of joint enlisted professionals exist. As a consequence, adequate education and training is not provided to enlisted members taking joint assignments or operating in a joint environment, and enlisted members are routinely arriving for joint duty without the requisite education and training to carry out their assignments.7 Thus, long on-the-job training periods, sometimes conducted during combat, are required to ready enlisted service members for joint employment.

Similar to their enlisted counterparts, the training, education and professional development of DOD civilian personnel is not addressed in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. While Congress does recognize that it is “responsible for providing funds,

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6 Conley, 52.
7 Brownhill, 4.
setting associated policy, and providing oversight to ensure that all military and
Department of Defense civilian personnel are properly prepared to perform their
missions,” in practice comprehensive civilian joint development does not exist.8 In fact,
few inside the Defense Department even acknowledge the need for civilian career
development.

Lack of civilian joint education and training is actually part of a larger, systemic
problem with civilian workforce development within the Department of Defense. The
wider issue is that many Defense civilian employees do not have a career development
program to guide their professional progression, let alone legal support for joint
development. For example, as of 2015 there are nearly 80,000 “DOD-Other” civilian
employees, meaning civilians who work for DOD, but are not employed by one of the
uniformed Services. Many of these civilians have no comprehensive workforce
development program designed to provide a holistic approach to career development
through a planned combination of civilian leader development courses, professional and
technical training, progressively more responsible job assignments, and self-
development. In fact, it was not until 2010 that the United States Army, which employs
over 300,000 civilians, finally recognized the need “to create an enterprise approach to
how the Army manages its civilian corps” in order to transform how it “hires, trains,
develops, and sustains its civilian corps.”9

8 U.S. Congress, Another Crossroads, vii.
9 Barbara G. Mroczkowski, “Civilian Workforce Transformation: Enterprise Management of the Army
Civilian Corps.” Army Sustainment, (July-September 2013): 16.
This lack of a comprehensive civilian management program hinders joint civilian development by eliminating any requirement to develop joint skills. Moreover, without a set of compulsory knowledge, skills, and attributes, there is no incentive for DOD to build joint development programs for civilians nor for civilians to develop relevant joint expertise. Consequently, there are few opportunities outside of self-study to acquire needed skills and little reason for the average employee to seek improvement in joint matters.

Even when a civilian employee manages to attend a joint education or training program, there is no law or policy that requires utilization of the newly acquired joint skill set. Few federal agencies require joint tours for those civilians that acquire a joint education, hence there is little incentive to spend time and other resources providing for civilian joint development. In short, DOD has neither a systemic way of providing joint civilian education and training nor any way of making effective use of the joint skills that are developed. Ultimately, the root cause for the inadequate focus on both enlisted and civilian joint development is a lack of foundational statutory requirements.

**Cultural Conflict**

One of the main goals of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was to curb the interservice rivalry that prevented the services from working together effectively. The authors of the legislation felt that “something had to be done to instill a joint culture (e.g., attitudes, values, and beliefs about joint service) among the officer corps, a culture that would lead to an appreciation and understanding of how the services could and should
operate together in future conflicts.” A better comprehension of the policies, procedures, operations, and capabilities of the other Services, argued the authors, would manifestly improve the planning and conduct of joint operations.

In the years since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, DOD has accepted the need for a joint culture and has worked to inculcate jointness throughout the Department. The 2003 Transformation Guidance, for example, outlines the Department’s plan for transitioning the United States military from an expensive industrial age organization into a leaner, more strategically agile information age force. The strategy notes that successful transformation depends on innovation, leadership, and cultural change. It goes on to specify that:

joint education is fundamental to creating a culture that supports transformation founded on leaders who are innately joint and comfortable with change. This requires a fundamentally revised approach to joint professional military education. Joint education must prepare our leaders both to conduct operations as a coherently joint force and to think their way through uncertainty.

Ironically, the strategy’s singular focus on revising officer professional military education is one of the cultural aspects of joint development that is most in need of reform. Leadership in the Department of Defense is not the sole purview of military officers. Leaders are found at all levels of the military and the civil service. Yet, after thirty years, the focus of joint professional development remains firmly concentrated on

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10 Schank, Who is Joint, 16.
12 Ibid.
military officers and a small number of senior Defense civilians. This singular focus is due, in large measure, to cultural factors that not only inhibit the education and training of military officers, but also cause the services and the joint community to neglect the joint development of enlisted members and civilian employees.

Culture, according to organizational theorist Edgar H. Schein, allows people to band together as a group and to develop a unique set of beliefs and practices that all members absorb and accept. In time, the group’s way of thinking, behaving, and working become solidified as the unit labors together to solve problems and reconcile issues. Each successful outcome fortifies the group’s cultural development and further fosters the extent of its accepted values and traditions. Schein goes on to say that culture is neither positive nor negative but should, instead, be characterized by how it aids or hinders the achievement of organizational aims.

Central to service culture is the belief that the services have unique competencies that allow each to master their warfighting domain. Each service brings different capabilities and expertise to the table, as well as different service attitudes. On the positive side, service culture inspires tradition, pride, spirit and technical competence. Culture helps to make the services resilient by promoting unit cohesion, thus enabling them to withstand pressures or to bounce back after setbacks. Conversely, negative cultural attributes may cause the services to be conservative, to emphasize the status quo, to be risk averse, or to

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14 Schein. *Organizational Culture*, 365.
harshly criticize new ideas. These attitudes can contribute to an environment of mistrust and antagonism that undermines joint cooperation.

When it comes to joint matters, service culture acts to limit joint development and, in turn, the effectiveness of the joint force. The same culture that keeps the services focused on honing specific service tasks to the highest degree of professionalism also jealously guards against anything that is perceived as potentially undermining respective service competencies and priorities, particularly when it comes to budgets or manpower. This perspective fundamentally forms the services’ views of themselves, their doctrine, and, ultimately, how much they are willing to concede to the joint community. In this way service culture serves to inhibit joint development in general and civilian and enlisted joint education and training in particular.

A recent blog in War on the Rocks, a popular website that addresses foreign policy and national security issues, captures the tension between service culture and jointness. Two officers, writing about joint officer development, noted that joint development may be valued by today’s officers, “but that doesn’t mean that joint service is sufficiently valued by our services, and we still have to get promoted.” They also wrote that many officers, including themselves, were advised by senior mentors to get back to their services “because the question at every [promotion] board is still, ‘what have you done for me lately?’” This clearly demonstrates that service culture is, in many ways, a barrier to the

15 Ibid., 79.
17 Ibid.
development of a joint officer. Service culture is, however, an even greater obstacle for enlisted and civilian joint development.

As a 2008 RAND study noted, “[t]he services are highly practiced in developing Senior NCOs who have competencies that enable them to effectively lead subordinates and accomplish their service specific missions…but no comparable training exists to prepare SNCOs for joint matters.”\textsuperscript{18} Four years later, Sergeant Major Brian B. Battaglia, USMC, Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a similar observation in the introduction of a Joint Forces Quarterly article:

I have seen the need to improve the quality of joint training and education for our enlisted leaders as they increasingly find themselves confronting the problem of operating in joint formations and staffs around the globe. While their Service training and education have prepared these leaders for their tactical missions, their training and education in joint operations have yet to meet the same standard.\textsuperscript{19}

Part of the reason for the lack of enlisted joint development is the services’ inclination to discount the need for joint education for enlisted personnel. This “officers-think-and-enlisted-folks-do” mentality discounts the valuable contributions enlisted members make to the joint force and the potential that a better educated and trained enlisted corps will make to the advancement of interdependence. It also serves to block reform of enlisted joint education and training by lowering the priority given to enlisted joint development.

\textsuperscript{18} Conley, 51.
\textsuperscript{19} Brownhill, 4.
Similar to their enlisted colleagues, civilian contributions to joint matters are greatly undervalued. As a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on Defense reform succinctly put it, like other national security institutions, DOD “seem[s] to lack an appreciation of the deep experience, institutional memory, continuity across administrations, and seasoned perspectives on policies and programs their civilian professionals provide.” Consequently, “[w]hereas the military personnel system marshals, manages, and maintains quality officers because it views its people as assets whose value can be enhanced through investment, the civilian human resources system of the national security agencies do not follow this precept.”

In addition to a general disregard for civilian contributions, joint development opportunities are limited by the common belief that civilians come to the job fully trained. This belief is reinforced by the fact that many mid-and senior-level DOD civilian employees are former members of the armed forces. In fact, approximately 44 percent of DOD’s mission critical civilian employees have a record of prior military service.

Historically, these veterans were hired with the expectation that they already possessed the requisite skill sets to do their job and, therefore, did not require additional education or training. As a consequence, civilians suffer in a culture that levies few requirements for advancement and provides little incentive to pursue joint developmental opportunities.

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21 Ibid.

Organizational Issues

As noted, non-commissioned officers and civilians will play key roles in DOD’s drive toward interdependence, particularly in exercising joint leadership and management. This requires training in joint skills and education to develop the required mental agility to support joint operations. But Goldwater-Nichols’ focus on officer development and the strength of service culture contribute to institutional and organizational structures that are inadequate when it comes to the joint development of enlisted members and civilians. Consequently, today there are few programs providing joint developmental opportunities for enlisted members and still fewer opportunities for civilians to participate in joint programs.

Educational Institutions

Professional Military Education (PME) is the Department of Defense funded system through which most service members receive their mandated post-enlistment education. The subset of this system that focuses on joint education and training is the Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education (EJPME) program. EJPME is designed to progressively develop “the knowledge, skills, perspectives, and values essential for enlisted personnel so they may function effectively in joint, interagency, and multinational operations and organizations.”

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Ironically, as the CJCS instruction notes, it is the responsibility of the Services to provide enlisted development and progression through the continuum of joint learning. Admittedly, the services provide this joint development under the guidance of the Joint Staff. However, there is an imbalance between service and joint interests, and the services tend to neglect functions that are not central to a service’s own definition of its mission. This results, some argue, in four different versions of jointness, three taught by service school houses and one taught by joint institutions.

Unfortunately, the Joint Staff has only one venue for instilling joint concepts directly to the enlisted force: the Senior Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education (SEJPME) course. This online course is designed to “integrate members from across all branches of service” into a unified force. It also attempts to “expose enlisted personnel to joint education” and prepare them to succeed by improving their ability to operate effectively as part of a future joint force and to supervise members of multiple Services.

In 2015, the SEJPME program underwent a much needed improvement aimed at better preparing “senior enlisted leaders assigned to joint organizations, or those with orders to joint organizations.” The Joint Staff began offering the “Next Generation” SEJPME as two courses tailored to specific audiences: one for E6 and E7s and another for E8 and E9s. The improved program is designed to mitigate “the learning and time gap

28 Ibid.
between what joint knowledge is needed at the E6-E7 level, and what could be years later needed for an E8-E9 preparation for joint assignment.”

While the expansion of the SEJPME program is a positive step towards providing joint educational opportunities to more enlisted personnel and providing it earlier in their careers, online education will not generate the personal, inter-service relationships that are critical to effective joint operations. As Naval War College Professor Joan Johnson-Freese argues, “only continuous exposure to the experiences, problems, and solutions of other joint, interagency and coalition partners will produce an understanding of the various cultures and modes of operation, essential in a joint, interoperable world.”

Unfortunately, service centric educational institutions do not provide the environment necessary to facilitate true joint education. Moreover, even current joint institutions do not provide in-resident joint education programs for enlisted members, similar to officer JPME II. Such a program is, however, vital to providing the interactions that are critical to fostering joint interdependence.

Similarly, despite the growing recognition that the role of the civilian corps is as equally critical to the success of the total joint force as is the military, there is little focus or structure in civilian joint development outside of leadership training. While civilians do not require a separate set of educational institutions to provide for their joint development, they do require better integration into current JPME venues. As Professor Johnson-Freese notes, “[while] civilians are a small minority at PME institutions, they

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29 Joint Staff Hampton Roads Public Affairs Office, SEJPME Program
play a key role in expanding the perspectives military officers are exposed to during their PME educational process. The opposite is also true, civilians benefit significantly from greater exposure to ideas and interactions with future military leaders that take place in joint educational institutions. However, this type of interaction can only be achieved by putting a greater emphasis on educating civilian leaders alongside their enlisted and officer counterparts.

Training Organization

As with joint education, the joint community depends heavily on the services to provide joint training for enlisted members and civilians. The services provide this training under the management of the Joint Staff (JS) which provides direction through of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff Instruction (CJCSI), Joint Training Policy and Guidance for The Armed Forces of the United States and the Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance. These documents provide training guidance “to all DoD Components for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint individual and collective training.” They also aid the services in developing and executing annual joint training plans.

In addition to offering guidance the Joint Staff also provides “integrated individual, staff and collective joint training for Combatant Commands, designated Joint and Combined Force Headquarters, and Coalition Partners” through the JS J7, Directorate for

33 Ibid., 1.
Joint Force Development.” The JS J7 is also responsible for providing support in five other functions of joint force development: doctrine, education, concept development, experimentation, and lessons learned.

Over the past decade, the Joint Staff made great improvements to joint force readiness by aligning joint education, training capabilities, and resources with combatant command operational needs. It has also achieved a greater training unity of effort across services, agencies, and non-DOD organizations. However, as with joint education, there is a gap in joint training that inhibits the development of enlisted members and civilians.

The Joint Staff’s focus on individual, staff, and collective training overlooks the requirement for joint systems and functional training. Moreover, while the services do provide this type of training, they are focused on service needs and not joint requirements. As a result, enlisted members and civilians that are required to be joint technical experts find it difficult to obtain the training that they require to carry out their roles in joint assignments.

In fairness, the Joint Staff has some capability to provide functional and systems training, such as the Joint Targeting School. However, the JS does not have this capability for all six joint functions. For example, under U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) the joint community had a robust capability to provide joint intelligence functional and systems training through the Joint Force Intelligence School (JFIS).

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35 Waldhauser. *J7 Joint Force Development.*
However, DOD eliminated this institution during the 2011 disestablishment of USJFCOM. This loss of capability, and the erosion of functional and systems training in other joint functions, significantly undermines the ability of the joint training community to provide combatant commanders with enlisted personnel and civilian experts that are capable of supporting joint requirements. This capability shortfall, in turn, undermines the ability of commanders and staffs to execute their missions in a joint environment.
CHAPTER 4:

WHY JOINT DEVELOPMENT?

Before making recommendations for reforming enlisted and civilian joint development, it is essential that one understand the importance of advancing joint education and training and the potential impact that these improvements will have on the total joint force and, ultimately, on military readiness and the Defense Department’s drive toward interdependence. First and foremost is the need to develop a force to meet the security challenges of the twenty first century. This complex security environment requires people who are not only substantively qualified and knowledgeable regarding joint issues, but who also possess the leadership abilities to support and direct large complex joint organizations. Regrettably, as demonstrated, the U.S. Government lacks a comprehensive process to ensure the development of mid-level joint leaders capable of effectively integrating the contributions of the services at all levels, from tactical to strategic.

In addition to the complex array of security threats that the Defense Department faces, there are five other key factors that drive the need for improved joint enlisted and civilian development: the changing composition of the joint force, fiscal constraints, technological advances, the need for innovation, and joint development’s impact on organizational effectiveness.
Joint Force Composition

As of November 2015, there were 1,348,878 men and women serving in the active component of the United States Armed Forces. Officers accounted for 229,192 of that total while enlisted personnel made up 1,067,170 of the joint force. The current target group for joint development, officers in the ranks of Major/Lieutenant Commander (04), Lieutenant Colonel/Commander (05), and Colonel/Captain (06), totaled 81,648. At the same time, there were 463,987 non-commissioned officers and petty officers on active duty. In fact, there are more service members in the E7 rank/rating (89,629) than there are in the entire officer population (81,684) targeted for joint development under the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Clearly, one key competency for the success of the joint force is the ability of the non-commissioned officer/petty officer to understand, pass on, and explain the joint commander’s intent or “the commander’s clear and concise expression of what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish to accomplish the mission.” It is the NCO that acts as the joint force commanders’ principal advisor, a source of competence and counsel, and who enhances the officer’s ability to command effectively. The NCO must translate the joint commander’s intent and goals “into operational language that our Soldiers, [Sailors, Airmen, and Marines] can understand.”

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1 All statistics in this section were compiled from data provided by the Defense Management Data Center (DMDC) and is current as of 30 November 2015. These figures do not include the Reserve Component which totals 823,706 service members.
produce a joint-minded warrior capable of carrying out these critical duties, then DOD must develop enlisted service members so that they understand joint collaboration and joint leadership. Additionally, they must be better able to promote joint cooperation, to foster relationships for interoperability, and to further enhance joint capabilities.

Similarly, civilians are playing an increasingly important and expanding role in the joint force. From 2001 to 2012, the active duty military grew by 3.4 percent, while the number of civilian defense employees grew by seventeen percent. In 2003, during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, for every 2.25 active duty personnel there was one civilian employee in support. Today, the concentration is even higher with one civilian supporting every 1.79 active duty service members.4

Of the nearly 750,000 civilians currently employed by the Department of Defense, more than 134,000 work in defense-wide organizations such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, defense agencies, and combatant commands. That number represents more than one and a half times the number of officers targeted by the GNA for joint development. Additionally, while not directly serving in joint billets, thousands of other civilians regularly interact with joint, interagency, and international partners.

One example of the increasing role of civilians in the joint force is their function in the combatant commands, the organizations at the pinnacle of operational command and the embodiment of military jointness. During the first decade of the twenty first century, the

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authorized number of military and civilian positions for the geographic and functional combatant commands rose significantly. During that time, the number of authorized civilian billets in the five commands that the GAO surveyed almost doubled from about 2,370 in 2004 to about 4,450 in fiscal year 2012. In contrast, the number of authorized military positions decreased about 9 percent from approximately 6,250 to 5,670 in the same period.

In fact, despite a 2010 Secretary of Defense efficiency initiative aimed at reducing the size of the command staffs, the number of authorized civilian positions across all commands actually rose due to efforts to convert positions filled by military personnel or contractors to civilians. As a result of this steady rise in billets, the composition of the commands changed significantly. In 2004 civilians made up only one-quarter of the Combatant Command staff. Today, geographic and functional command staffs total over 23,000 personnel, with civilian employees making up nearly one-half of that number (10,753).

In response to the Secretary of Defense's direction to further reduce headquarters spending, DOD is planning to continue decreasing personnel at the geographic and functional commands and their service component command headquarters. For example,

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7 Ibid.
8 Defense Management Data Center data as of 30 November 2015.
CENTCOM is planning to reduce its total authorized positions by 353 billets from fiscal years 2015 through 2019. Notably, however, the ratio between officers and enlisted personnel, and that of service members and civilian employees, is not expected to change.

This suggests that enlisted and civilian personnel will continue to play a critical role in joint operations and will perform a wide variety of joint duties and responsibilities, including mission-essential staff and combat support functions traditionally done by officers. For civilians, this also includes many jobs in combat zones that were customarily performed by service members, including military training, intelligence collection, criminal investigations, logistics development, and weapon systems acquisition and maintenance. In short, DOD has grown progressively reliant on its Federal civilian workforce to provide support in times of war or national emergency, not just in peacetime. It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that the education and training policies applicable to these individuals provide them with the joint development necessary to carry out their roles in support of DOD’s joint missions.

**Fiscal Constraints**

At a time when the entire federal government is facing progressively greater fiscal challenges, DOD “must operate strategically and efficiently, including through cost-effective management of its human capital.” In order to achieve this goal, DOD must take a comprehensive approach to managing its joint force requirements in order to achieve the appropriate balance among all three components—officer, enlisted, and

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12 Human Capital GAO-13-470. 2.
civilian—of its total joint force, and to create a workforce that is sufficiently sized and of the appropriate mix to carry out DOD’s joint mission.\textsuperscript{13}

The joint force will become smaller and leaner, yet it will need to maintain the capabilities to respond effectively and decisively to global challenges. As the Department seeks to produce a joint force that is optimized, integrated, and synchronized, it must also ensure that it is affordable, relevant, and avoids unnecessary redundancy. To this end, DOD must not only strive for joint interdependence among its services, it must also look for the same efficiencies among the elements of its Federal workforce. Therefore, in what promises to be an increasingly tight resource environment, it is imperative that DOD assess the current state of joint development to ensure that the Department is receiving the greatest return on its education and training investments.

**Technological Advances**

Technology is another factor that drives DOD’s reliance on civilian and enlisted support in joint operations. The Department of Defense must figure out how to benefit from the rapid pace of technological advancement, while, simultaneously, defending against its adversaries’ use of the same technologies. Today’s rapidly changing technological world requires that DOD professionals have the ability to think critically about how to leverage technology in original ways. However, in the technological realm, and especially in the cyber domain, many of the most talented and inventive people are not officers or even service members.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 2.
As the department continues to receive high end technology, the need for specialists in various fields and the requirement to give them better education, training, and continuity in key positions will continue to increase. Alas, the civil service personnel system has left DOD with an aging workforce that lacks the diversity and expertise needed to meet twenty first century technology challenges. Across the Federal government, the average civil servant is 47 years old and people under the age of 30 represent only seven percent of the Federal workforce, as compared to 25 percent for the broader U.S. economy.\textsuperscript{14} This data indicates that the Federal workforce is out of step with the broader U.S. economy in terms of age demographics and drastically out of step with the emerging technology sector. While the services generally attract a wider age demographic than the civil service, the armed forces are similarly challenged to attract critical talent in a number of key areas related to new and emerging technologies.\textsuperscript{15}

The overarching point is that fundamental differences in the background, experience, and make-up of the defense workforce relative to emerging technology companies make it difficult to hire and retain skilled professionals. This problem is compounded by the fact that the civil service offers little in the way of technical training or merit based job progression. Enlisted members and civilians are, however, key to exploiting the military-technical revolution and applying its power to joint operations. In order to accomplish this mission, professionals must not only be technically savvy, but also possess a


foundational joint education that serves as the basis for applying their technical expertise in a joint context. Therefore, education, training, and leadership development programs that teach members of the joint force how to incorporate new technological developments and how to think creatively about quickly adapting a broader range of technologies in various military environments are critical.

**Innovation and Change**

As the U.S. military confronts a future of asymmetric threats, a changing workforce mix, increasing financial pressures, and rapidly changing technology, it becomes ever more important for the Defense Department to discover and embrace new ways to deal with the complicated security environment that it faces. In a 2014 memo, then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel highlighted this necessity and outlined “a broad, Department-wide initiative to pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st century and improve business operations throughout the Department.”

Hagel also noted that “American dominance in key war fighting domains is eroding, and we must find new and creative ways to sustain, and in some areas expand, our advantages even as we deal with more limited resources.”

Traditionally the military, being a hierarchical institution, has depended on a top-down approach to innovation. Using this method, new ideas and new knowledge are created at the apex of an organization and pushed downwards by influential senior military officers or civilians in the chain of command that have the authority to impose this innovation on

17 Ibid.
their organization. However, it is evident from the past fourteen years of war, that mid-
level enlisted troops, civilian middle managers, and other subordinates play an important
and evolving role in the generation and implementation of innovative ideas as evidenced
by the adoption of new digital technologies, novel organizational models that streamlined
the exchange of information, and innovative learning, all of which were created through a
bottom-up process.

In bottom-up innovation, “small units provide test beds for new ideas, and the best
ideas eventually filter to the top from which they are then shared with the rest of the
armed forces, usually via a new formal doctrine.” If DOD wants to encourage bottom-
up innovation, it needs to ensure that enlisted service members and government civilians
are familiar with the goals of defense transformation and “think jointly” about the
problems that they need to solve. Again, it is joint education and training that will
provide the underpinning for bottom up innovation.

Organizational Effectiveness

Generally, public administration researchers acknowledge that organizational
performance is “subjective, complex and hard to measure.” Nevertheless, most agree
that effective government organizations have a strong organizational culture that is

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(May 2012), 802
19 For more on bottom up innovation see Adam Grissom, "The Future of Military Innovation Studies,"
Journal of Strategic Studies 29. vol. 5 (October 2006), 907.
20 Foley, 1.
Organizational Performance in Federal Agencies,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory:
closely linked to mission accomplishment.22 Likewise, it is generally accepted that
government agencies are more effective when “they value their employees and view them
not as a cost but as an asset.”23

In addition to treating employees fairly and respectfully, valuing employees means
developing and tapping into their knowledge, skills, and commitment. It also requires that
organizations be willing to invest in the development of its workforce because working
hard, being committed to the mission, and a having a good working environment are not
eough to ensure that individuals will perform at peak proficiency.

As mentioned previously, the services genuinely invest in training to build service-
related technical competencies and the leadership skills of their members, but pay much
less attention to the development of joint skill sets. For civilians the problem is even
greater. DOD does not invest in its civilian workforce in the same way as it does its
military members, and it shows.

Over the past several years, DOD employees have grown increasingly dissatisfied with
their jobs. More specifically, the 2014 Federal employee survey showed that problems
persist in the areas of training, career advancement, accountability, and openness to new
ideas.24 In 2014, nearly 50 percent of DOD employees indicated that they are not
satisfied with job training, and 69 percent said they are not content with career-

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22 Hal Rainey and Paula Steinbauer, “Galloping Elephants: Developing Elements of a Theory of Effective
Government Organizations,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 9 no. 1
(1999): 17
23 Sangmook Kim “Individual-Level Factors and Organizational Performance in Government
advancement opportunities, suggesting workers feel ill-prepared and stuck in their jobs.\textsuperscript{25} When added to what Linda Bilmes, a Harvard lecturer and expert on the federal civil service, calls “an antiquated hiring system, a wave of baby-boomer retirements, and talented young people's lack of interest in civil-service jobs,” DOD has become a malfunctioning, low-tech, low-innovation Federal agency, precisely when it is being asked to do more than ever before.\textsuperscript{26}

With fewer resources and a shrinking workforce, DOD cannot afford to have employees that underperform. To ensure success, DOD requires a well maintained, properly sized and highly capable workforce that aligns to the Department’s mission and workload requirements. For this reason, improving joint development is not only important for increasing employee job satisfaction, it is essential if DOD strives to be an organization that is capable of carrying out its joint responsibilities effectively and efficiently. For it is individual improvement through thinking and learning, which collectively ensures institutional growth and contributes to high levels of organizational performance.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
CHAPTER 4:

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Department of Defense is the nation’s largest employer, with a Federal workforce consisting of nearly 2.1 million active-duty and reserve military personnel and 756,000 full-time civilian personnel.\(^1\) While the Department’s military and civilian workforces peaked in fiscal year 2011 at 3.1 million personnel combined, it steadily decreased over the next five years to below the fiscal year 2001 level of 2.9 million.\(^2\) This reduction in the Federal workforce, and the government’s growing fiscal challenges, underscore the importance of DOD employing a strategic approach to determining the joint functions that are critical for the Department to achieve its missions.

As part of this strategy, the Department must determine how best to develop and manage the enlisted and civilian personnel that constitute the bulk of the joint force. DOD must organize its joint development programs to ensure that enlisted personnel and civilian employees have a joint perspective that increases their depth of understanding of joint programs and operations, cultivates cross service networks, facilitates joint knowledge and information sharing, and prepares enlisted members and civilians for future joint assignments and leadership positions.

Instituting the following recommendations will advance joint development and, in turn, enhance the transformation of the American military into an armed force capable of dealing with the complex security issues of the twenty first century. It will also help

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\(^2\) Ibid., Summary.
balance the personnel and fiscal constraints facing DOD by optimizing the human resources available to the Department.

**Restructuring Joint Development**

**Codification** - Absent the legal and policy underpinnings and structures that have systematized the training, education, promotion, and assignment of military officers, the effectiveness of enlisted and civilian joint professionals will not improve. The first step in further cultivating the joint force is the amendment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 so that enlisted and civilian joint development has the same statutory foundation as the officer program. An amended GNA must address the needs of the total joint force by providing statutory requirements for the joint development of enlisted personnel and civilians alike.

**Identify Requirements** - In order to determine who needs joint education and training and what type of development is needed, DOD must first determine all of its joint requirements. In order to accomplish this, the Department must conduct a comprehensive review of all joint organizations, identify enlisted and civilian assignments that are truly joint in nature, and code those billets as such. Once identified, DOD must expand the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) to include billets that offer enlisted personnel and civilians significant experience in joint matters. By doing so, DOD can identify military and civilian personnel performing joint duties and then align joint education and training development to better support DOD requirements.

**Develop Joint Duty Program** – Once DOD knows the extent of enlisted and civilian joint duty requirements, it can then develop programs that offer enlisted personnel and
civilians professional opportunities to enhance their joint skills and careers. The current Enlisted Joint Development Program should be modified based on the findings of the comprehensive review to ensure that all enlisted personnel filling joint billets follow a prescribed roadmap for developing required joint skill sets. The civilian joint development program must be a sub-set of a comprehensive career development program. The civilian management program developed by the U.S. Army in 2012 and the joint duty program employed by the Intelligence Community provide good models for reform. DOD must also recognize that non-joint coded billets may require some joint knowledge or skill sets and should develop programs that provides basic joint education and training to support these positions.

**Targeted Development** - The joint community must develop the members of the enlisted and civilian corps so that they are able to lead and operate effectively in today’s complex environment as integral partners of the joint team. All DOD enlisted personnel and civilians must be developed appropriately to assume their roles as members of the total joint force. However, while development must encompass training, education, and experiential related opportunities driven by joint requirements, this does not mean that all military and civilian personnel need the same level of joint development. Joint development must be tailored to the needs of the individual billets and their associated joint knowledge, skills and attributes (JKSA).

**Joint Skills Tracker** – Providing joint education and training to enlisted personnel and civilians is useless if the Department cannot track individual joint development and use the information to fill joint billets and assignments. DOD must develop a system that identifies, tracks, and centrally manages individual joint force education, training, and
experience so that joint requirements are filled by service members with the right joint skill sets and not just the correct rank.

**Reforming Joint Education**

DOD must increase capacity in current Joint Professional Military Education institutions to allow for more enlisted and civilian participation in in-resident professional development programs. Accordingly, Phase II of the improved SEJPME program (E8-E9) should be conducted at the Joint Forces Staff College as an in-residence program similar to officer JPME II. Phase II should also emphasize the inclusion of grade equivalent civilians and coalition partners. Additionally, Phase I, should be opened to allow E-5 and grade equivalent civilian participation so that these cohorts are exposed to joint versus service education earlier in their careers.

Besides improving the enlisted education program, civilian education must also be reformed. DOD must develop an education program for civilians that is centrally managed and resourced and runs from entry into Federal service to retirement. This program should be modelled on the joint officer program and include similar milestones related to career advancement. In the end, civilian development must produce leaders capable of operating at every joint organizational echelon. The joint community must deliver the appropriate level of civilian development, embedded in joint doctrine and against established standards, to ensure civilian readiness as technical experts, functional managers, and joint enterprise leaders.
**Joint Training Enterprise Improvements**

DOD must develop an organic capability within the Joint Staff J7 to provide in-resident and Mobile Training Team (MTT) training for joint systems and functional training. This capability will fill the gap left in these areas following the disestablishment of United States Joint Forces Command. In-resident and MTT training of this type provides joint technical training to enlisted and civilian personnel and better prepares them for participation in collective training events and joint operations.

**Support Service Joint Training** - The Joint Staff must also focus joint training support beyond the combatant commands to include direct support to Service training programs. Such support will help to standardize joint training activities within the services and thereby eliminate much of the variation in training that occurs today. Without this support, service provided joint training will continue to deviate widely from established joint standards making it much more difficult for service trained units to operate jointly.

**Legislative Support** – Finally, given the legal, cultural, and organizational impediments to enlisted and civilian joint development, the recommended reforms outlined above are not likely to be enacted without Congressional support. Therefore, DOD needs to garner legislative support for statutory changes of the current system by making enlisted and civilian joint development reform a part of the current effort to amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In fact, in November 2015, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees announced that they were undertaking a “comprehensive review of the United States’ defense organization to identify challenges and potential reforms to the Department of
Defense and the armed forces.” The committee will conduct an examination of the structure, roles, and missions of civilian and military organizations within the Defense Department to include determining whether Defense personnel management is “still appropriate for the joint force of 2015 and beyond.” The reforms suggested in this thesis should be part of that review.

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4 Ibid.
CONCLUSION

The Department of Defense manages a large and diverse workforce that is tasked with accomplishing a wide variety of missions from warfighting to humanitarian assistance. DOD’s enlisted and civilian personnel perform a broad-range of duties and responsibilities, including mission-essential combat and combat support functions such as logistics, intelligence, and maintenance. Over the past decade and in the context of fighting two wars, both the military and civilian parts of this workforce have grown in number and changed in composition. Additionally, the evolving nature of military operations and the declining resources available to support the wide array of possible contingencies has increasingly required enlisted members and civilians to perform effectively in multiservice, multinational, and interagency environments.

As DOD decides how to face these changes, total joint force management and planning will be important elements of ensuring the Department’s continued ability to meet the unique requirements of its missions. To be successful, the Department must carefully consider what critical skills and competencies it needs to meet these requirements and what strategies it can use to develop those skills in its workforce. Whether the ultimate goal is the establishment of a joint professional corps, or simply continuing along the evolutionary path to greater interoperability, improved enlisted and civilian joint development is a necessary part of any plan to enhance the performance of the future joint force. In order to meet this requirement, DOD must revamp its joint education, training, development, and management systems.
For these reasons, joint professional civilian and enlisted development should have the same goals as officer improvement programs namely, to educate civilians and enlisted members throughout their careers, to broaden their knowledge, to improve their performance during joint assignments, and to foster collaboration across the military services. To this end, the training of civilians and enlisted service members must better prepare both cohorts for joint operational and staff assignments by eliminating the legal, cultural, and organizational barriers that hinder their professional development; improving joint education and training; and providing developmental opportunities earlier in their careers.
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Vita

In 1982, Mr. Meisner was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry in the U.S. Army. In 1983, he attended the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Basic Airborne Training, and the Jumpmaster Course before being assigned to the 325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. He was first assigned as a Rifle Platoon Leader in Company B and later, as a TOW II Anti-Tank Platoon Leader, Support Platoon Leader, and Assistant S-4. After returning to the United States, Mr. Meisner was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division where he served as Logistics Officer in the 4th Battalion, 325th Infantry, and later as Assistant Operations Officer.

In 1987 Captain Meisner was transferred to the Military Intelligence Corps and served as the Assistant S-2, 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division. Following completion of the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, Captain. Meisner was assigned as the Division Plans Officer (Intelligence), 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, CA where he coordinated all intelligence aspects of the Division’s participation in theater contingency planning and exercises in Latin America and the Korean Peninsula.

In October, 1989 Mr. Meisner deployed to the Republic of Panama as the S-2 of 3rd Brigade, 7th ID (Light). During Operation “Just Cause” he assumed the position of Senior Intelligence Officer of “Task Force Atlantic”, where he supervised, and coordinated all-source intelligence support. Captain Meisner was medically retired in 1990 due to injuries received during Operation Just Cause.

After leaving the U.S Army, Mr. Meisner served as a Foreign Affairs Officer in the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations where he provided political-military analysis in support of contingency planning to complex emergencies and other operations including "Operation Uphold/Restore Democracy" in Haiti, combined/joint task force operations in Bosnia, non-combatant operations in Liberia and the Central African Republic, peacekeeping operations in Peru/Ecuador, the final withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Somalia, and the relocation of Cuban migrants from Panama to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Operation Safe Haven). Mr. Meisner currently works for the Joint Staff, J7, Joint Force Development.

EDUCATION

The American University, Washington D.C. Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
M.A. International Affairs/U.S. Foreign Policy, B.S. Psychology, May 1983
January 2000 B.S. Political Science, May 1993
Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society

NOTABLE AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Bronze Star Medal (1990), Purple Heart Medal (1990), National Military Intelligence Association’s “U.S. Army Intelligence Officer of the Year” (1989).