STABILITY OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR
1999-2000: A CASE STUDY

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Stability Operations in East Timor 1999-2000: A Case Study

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FOREWORD

This stability operations case study project emerged from a Joint Requirements Oversight Council task to examine how Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions teach operational planning for steady-state peacekeeping and stability operations. The Joint Staff J-7 requested the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), as the Joint Proponent for Peace and Stability Operations, to accomplish a number of tasks to improve JPME curricula. As part of this effort, PKSOI is developing a series of professionally focused, historical case studies of successful joint peacekeeping and stability operations. The purpose of these case studies is to provide balanced analyses of the strategic conditions and guidance underlying each selected operation, and describe how military leaders successfully interpreted and implemented this guidance during the conduct of joint operations. The case studies provide current and future military leaders with insights into the principles and challenges of stability operations, and describe practical approaches for designing, planning, and conducting joint operations in a complex environment, particularly in situations when the Department of Defense does not lead the U.S. Government effort. Each case study focuses on answering the question: "Did the joint force commander and staff effectively design, plan, and establish the mission in a way that provided for
initial operational success, while establishing the basis for long-term operational and strategic success?”

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INTRODUCTION

The stability operation in East Timor from September 20, 1999 to February 23, 2000, demonstrated how the United States can support the leadership of a well-respected and capable regional partner to strengthen the legitimacy of international efforts and encourage burden sharing at a time of competing Joint Force demands.\(^1\) The East Timor action, known as Operation STABILISE, was a United Nations (U.N.) sanctioned, Australian-led, multinational peace enforcement operation.\(^2\) Its objective was to end the violence in East Timor, establish security, and set conditions for the transition to a U.N. peacekeeping force in what was then a province of Indonesia.

As the lead nation for Operation STABILISE, Australia was responsible for building the coalition, planning the operation, and providing the majority of the combat forces involved in the effort. The strong reputation of the Australian military and the participation of over 20 nations, especially from Asia, gave credibility to the international effort. The Joint Force played an unusual supporting role within the International Force East Timor (INTERFET). In the aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. forces had led peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and most recently Kosovo. Competing demands on U.S. military capabilities incentivized U.S. policymakers to support the Australian leadership role in East Timor. As differences arose between the U.S. and Australian contingents on the ground—as they inevitably do even amongst the closest of allies—military commanders resolved each issue with skill and professionalism. Dialogue was essential on a range of subjects, from intelligence sharing and force
protection, to the termination criteria for various activities.

In addition to the Australian lead role, the East Timor operation had several other distinguishing features. Policymakers in Washington were keen on preserving U.S. relations with Indonesia, even as they pressed leaders in Jakarta to collaborate with international stabilization efforts. The East Timor intervention showed how commanders can deploy robust combat power and seize key terrain to deter threats during stability operations. The effort also illustrates how the Joint Force can provide security and logistical capabilities to enable international relief entities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and non-Defense U.S. Government departments and agencies to address the needs of the local population.

This case study includes eight sections. “Background and Strategic Conditions” describes the legacy of colonial rule in East Timor, the Japanese occupation during World War II, and Indonesia’s annexation of the territory following the departure of the Portuguese. These circumstances set the stage for a protracted struggle between pro-independence groups and the Indonesian security forces, which eventually necessitated the international action that is the focus of this case study. “Operational Environment” describes conditions in East Timor, including the local geography, economy, and society. This section introduces the principal protagonists to the conflict. “Strategic Guidance” provides an overview of U.S. interests and evolving U.S. policies, which shaped the operational direction given to commanders. “Design and Planning for the Operation” examines various concurrent planning efforts, culminating in the establishment of U.S. Forces INTERFET (USFI). This section outlines
the initial USFI mission, task organization, and end state for the operation. “Deployment and Intervention” describes the unfolding of events, from the initial arrival of international forces to the redeployment of the U.S. contingent. This section outlines USFI support to INTERFET and identifies key Joint Force partners in the area of operations. “Assessment and Insights on Joint Planning and Operations” examines Operation STABILISE through the prism of the fifteen fundamentals of peace operations. The “Conclusion” provides overarching observations and distills a series of best practices derived from this study. The case study includes ten appendices with primary source documents and other supplemental materials to aid in a more detailed study of the operation.

The examination of Operation STABILISE is important to the education of military and civilian national security leaders because it highlights the challenges and opportunities of supporting a regional partner in the role of lead nation during the conduct of stability operations. In the end, the United States applied persuasion and pressure successfully to enable a “coalition of the willing,” while contributing Joint Force capabilities selectively and in a manner that had the greatest impact.

**Background and Strategic Conditions for the Operation**

On August 31, 1999 the people of East Timor participated in a “popular consultation” to determine whether they would have autonomy within or independence from Indonesia. When officials announced the pro-independence results on September 4, 1999, pro-integration militias, with support from the In-
donesian National Armed Forces (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, TNI), began a rampage of terror that drew international condemnation. In response to the violence and under Australian leadership, INTERFET initiated operations in East Timor on September 20, 1999, to establish order and security. A review of the East Timorese historical and political context leading up to the intervention is necessary to understand the complex environment INTERFET faced.

**Portuguese Rule**

Portuguese interest in Southeast Asia dates to the late 1400s with Vasco de Gama’s voyage around the Horn of Africa and into the Indian Ocean. His expedition opened a new route in the lucrative spice trade, bypassing the Muslim and Venetian traders that dominated the Eastern Mediterranean. As exploration in Southeast Asia expanded, the Pope charged the Portuguese with converting the inhabitants of the newly colonized regions to Christianity. In 1561, the Portuguese established their first settlement on the island of Timor, which included a number of Dominican friars. The Portuguese founded their first permanent outpost in East Timor in 1633. At the same time, the Netherlands expanded its influence in the area. By 1637, the Dutch had taken control of the western half of Timor. The proximity between the Dutch and Portuguese on the island contributed to a number of disputes, which they eventually resolved in a 1661 treaty that divided Timor between them. When the two countries signed a convention at The Hague, international recognition of the division between East and West Timor soon followed.⁵
The Portuguese centralized their control of East Timor by appointing the first governor, António Coelho Guerreiro, in 1701. This began nearly three centuries of Portuguese exploitation of the people of East Timor. The Portuguese administration remained distant from the general population and used tribal chiefs to control the local inhabitants. This included efforts to take advantage of tribal rivalries, often using one group to quell the insurrections of another. Initially, East Timor was a key source of valuable sandalwood, slaves, and horses. As the supply of sandalwood diminished, the Portuguese instituted coffee growing in an attempt to increase revenues from the small island. Despite these attempts to increase the profitability of colonial rule, East Timor remained “little more than trading post” for the Portuguese. They did little to develop the local infrastructure or improve the welfare of the population. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were a series of rebellions culminating in two major revolts in 1910 and 1912. After 1913, the Portuguese reestablished dominion over the island until the Japanese seized control during World War II.

The rise of imperial Japan and its territorial expansion, embodied in the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, soon brought war to isolated East Timor. Japan relied on raw materials, including oil from the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), to sustain its war machine. Fearing a potential Japanese invasion, Australia occupied East Timor despite Portuguese neutrality. In 1942, the Japanese invaded Timor to establish an outpost from which to protect the resources in the Dutch East Indies. Australian troops, fighting with local support, conducted a year-long guerilla campaign against the Japanese. However, the Japanese even-
tually forced the Australians to withdraw from East Timor in 1943. In subsequent reprisals against the inhabitants, the Japanese killed 40,000 to 70,000 East Timorese.9

Following World War II, many European countries began to decolonize their former possessions in East Asia. Immediately after the war, The Netherlands gave self-rule to the Dutch East Indies, resulting in the birth of Indonesia. At the same time, Portugal’s African colonies began a series of bloody rebellions, which eventually led to their independence. The Portuguese, however, retained control of East Timor. While Portugal attempted to institute reforms in its colonial system and increase its financial support to the territory, there was a growing desire for independence amongst the local population. By 1974, the East Timorese had developed a true separatist movement.

Independence and the Indonesian Invasion

The first real chance to achieve East Timorese independence came in 1974 as a result of political changes in Portugal. The Carnation Revolution in Lisbon led to a military coup d’état, seeking “democracy and decolonization following the painful conflicts in Africa.”10 The East Timorese seized the opportunity to gain their freedom and quickly formed three political parties with the intent of achieving statehood: the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente, FRETILIN), the Timorese Democratic Union (União Democrática Timorense, UDT), and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense, APODETI).11 FRETILIN called for immediate independence from Portugal. The UDT initially ad-
vocated for a gradual transition towards statehood to allow for the development of political and economic structures. APODETI, the smallest party, argued for integration into Indonesia. Many observers believed that APODETI was a surrogate of the Indonesian Intelligence Service, which sought to influence events in East Timor.

During this period, former army General Haji Mohammad Suharto, a staunch anticommunist, was president of Indonesia. He had come to power a decade earlier after blocking an attempted coup d’état by pro-communist forces in Jakarta. Under Suharto, the TNI dominated the Indonesian government. As events unfolded following the Carnation Revolution, the TNI worked behind the scenes to influence developments in East Timor. The TNI instituted Operation KOMODO in 1974 using a combination of propaganda and special forces (Komando Pasukan Khusus, KO-PASSUS) to create instability and set the conditions for East Timor’s integration into Indonesia. The TNI information campaign depicted the FRETILIN as a communist party. Within a Cold War context, including the recent fall of South Vietnam, and in light of Suharto’s anticommunist stance, Indonesia would not tolerate a communist controlled country on its periphery.

In January 1975, the FRETILIN and UDT formed a political alliance to achieve political change. By August, suspicious of the FRETILIN’s growing popularity and influenced by Operation KOMODO, the UDT attempted to overthrow the Portuguese administration in Dili. Fighting soon broke out between FRETILIN and the UDT, resulting in the Portuguese Governor’s departure. Lisbon effectively abandoned the local inhabitants to their own fate. After several weeks of un-
rest and with the support of the local armed forces, the FRETILIN consolidated its control over the territory. In November 1975, the FRETILIN declared East Timor independent from Portugal.

The FRETILIN declaration of independence provided the pretext for the Indonesian invasion of East Timor on December 7, 1975. Fearing the spread of communism in the region, the United States and Australia gave tacit support to the Indonesian annexation. Despite strong resistance from FRETILIN’s armed-wing, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (Forças Armada de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste, FALINTIL), Indonesia successfully annexed East Timor. Jakarta designated East Timor as Indonesia’s 27th province in July 1976, but the FALINTIL committed itself to an extended insurgency.\(^\text{13}\)

**Indonesian Rule and East Timorese Resistance**

The TNI conducted a brutal counterinsurgency campaign against FALINTIL from 1975 through 1983, which often included the summary execution of suspected FALINTIL supporters. The fighting contributed to widespread food shortages and the outbreak of disease. As a result, by 1980 an estimated 200,000 East Timorese had died as either a direct or indirect consequence of the conflict.\(^\text{14}\) The FALANTIL sustained severe losses at the hands of the TNI, resulting in a reduction of its fighting strength from approximately 27,000 to 5,000 by 1978.\(^\text{15}\) These reverses and the death of its first commander, Nicolau Lobarto, effectively neutralized the FALINTIL for a number of years.

With the perceived defeat of FALINTIL, the Indonesian Government changed its approach to governing East Timor. Unlike its Portuguese predecessor, the
Government of Indonesia sought to control the populace in East Timor directly and bypass the traditional tribal leadership. During the 1980s, Jakarta provided substantial financial support to the province, administering a variety of economic and social development programs. These efforts contributed to a reduction in the level of violence for most of the decade, but simmering resistance continued.

After the death of Lobarto, José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão rose to lead both the FRETILIN and FALINTIL in 1981. Under his leadership, the FALINTIL became a more traditional guerilla force and gained the backing of the local population. A network of groups, collectively known as the Clandestine Front (Rede Clandestina), publicly exposed Indonesian despotism in East Timor to the outside world, raising international awareness and funding for the independence movement. Gusmão also instituted political changes within the FRETILIN. He eliminated the “leftist rhetoric of previous years” and established the National Council of Maubere Resistance (Conselho Nacional Resistência Maubere, CNRM). Jose Ramos-Horta became the Permanent Representative of FRELITIN to the U.N. and worked incessantly to focus international attention on East Timor. In 1998, the CNRM reconstituted as the National Council of Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional Resistência Timor, CNRT) with the FALINTIL as its armed force. The CNRT established a united political and military resistance movement for the first time. The change in approach and subsequent increase in political support sustained the struggle for independence from Indonesia.
International Reaction

After the 1975 Indonesian invasion, the initial international reaction was mixed. There was no outcry against the violence and human rights violations, nor was there any effort to invoke East Timor’s right to self-determination. Due to concerns of a communist domino effect, the United States naturally aligned with anticommunist governments to stem the spread of Marxist influence. After the fall of South Vietnam (1975) to the communists, the United States was keen to reassure regional partners of its reliability. The day prior to Indonesia’s invasion, U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with President Suharto in Jakarta. The outcome was the U.S. administration’s effective support for the invasion to prevent the establishment of a communist state on Indonesia’s periphery.20 Subsequent U.S. administrations continued to provide military hardware and training to Indonesia until the 1999 international intervention.

Australia, like the United States, also sought strong political and military relations with Indonesia. The Australian Government’s interest in Indonesia’s stability led to the establishment of close military relations, which included participation in combined training and exercises. In the economic sphere, Australia signed the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia to extract oil from East Timorese territorial waters. Accordingly, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrew Peacock remarked on January 20, 1978 that the “Government has decided to accept East Timor as part of Indonesia.”21 Thus Australia gave recognition to the Indonesian government’s annexation.
In contrast to U.S. and Australian policies regarding the occupation, the U.N. never recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. It continued to view Portugal as the administering power for the restive territory. In response to the invasion, Portugal sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 384, which recognized the right of East Timor to self-determination, deplored the Indonesian military intervention, and called for the withdrawal of the TNI. While the U.N. passed eight subsequent General Assembly resolutions between 1975 and 1982 on the East Timor situation, it became evident that UN member support was waning with each resolution. After 1982, there was scant international interest in East Timor until the Santa Cruz Cemetery massacre sparked international outrage on November 12, 1991. Thereafter, international interest in East Timor increased and remained high throughout the 1990s. Key developments kept the spotlight on the conflict, including the arrest and trial of Xanana Gusmão from 1991 through 1992, and the selection of two East Timorese for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. The renewed focus on East Timor brought increased scrutiny of the Indonesian Government and the TNI. Unfortunately, international attention did not stop TNI efforts to crush East Timorese resistance, as human rights violations continued unabated. In 1998, East Timor gained its next opportunity for independence.

Changing Political Currents

Indonesia experienced significant changes in 1998. The Asian financial crisis caused widespread protests throughout Indonesia and forced President Suharto to resign after more than 30 years in power. The fi-
nancial crisis also made Indonesia more dependent on economic aid, particularly from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This reliance on the outside world would increase the international leverage in shaping the events to come.

Suharto’s successor, B. J. Habibie had to contend with a disgruntled Indonesian population, calling for increased democracy and questioning the TNI dominance over the government. To demonstrate his commitment to democratization, Habibie announced his willingness to grant East Timor a measure of autonomy within Indonesia. This announcement provided a new impetus to U.N.-sponsored talks between Indonesia and Portugal. In October 1998, the negotiations led to a proposal to grant East Timor autonomy within a broad framework of Indonesian rule. The proposal established a basis for continued talks, despite differences of opinion regarding what “autonomy” constituted. Political progress did not diminish violence in the province though. The FALINTIL continued its guerilla campaign against the TNI, and popular independence demonstrations were often met with military force, resulting in the death of unarmed protesters. Elements within the TNI, concerned with the direction of the talks and the continuing FALINTIL guerilla campaign, began to mobilize militia groups to counter the pro-independence movement.

As a result of developments in East Timor, Australia’s policy towards Indonesia began to change. Australian leaders viewed Indonesia’s political and economic stability as crucial to their country’s security. They saw the situation in East Timor as a destabilizing factor that could isolate Indonesia from the international community. As a result, in December 1998, Australian Prime Minister John Howard wrote
a letter to President Habibie, proposing eventual self-determination for East Timor, with Indonesia granting increased autonomy over a period of years. President Habibie surprised the international community, the members of his government, and especially the TNI when on January 27, 1999, he offered East Timor the chance to accept or reject autonomy within Indonesia. If East Timor rejected autonomy, then “Indonesia would withdraw and East Timor would be on its own.”

The U.N. negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia now gained momentum. On May 5, 1999, the three parties signed what is known as the May 5 Agreement (see Appendix E). This accord established that the East Timorese would accept or reject autonomy within Indonesia through a direct vote called a “popular consultation.” It was clear that rejection of increased autonomy would lead to immediate independence. The agreement assigned the U.N. responsibility for the organization and conduct of the popular consultation. It also made Indonesia responsible for providing a “secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation” during the popular consultation process.

**UNAMET**

On June 11, 1999, the UNSCR 1246 established the U.N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). UNAMET had the responsibility of planning, preparing, and overseeing the popular consultation. The UNAMET organization included staff to register voters, monitor the campaign, and conduct the popular consultation. It also included approximately 300 civilian law enforcement personnel to provide assistance and advice to the Indonesian police force responsible for main-
taining security. UNAMET established its headquarters in Dili, East Timor, and immediately developed a plan of execution. UNAMET envisioned a 20-day voter registration process and a two week campaign, followed by the actual balloting on August 6, 1999. Due to the pro-integration militia’s ongoing campaign of violence and intimidation, the U.N. delayed the registration process for three weeks and eventually rescheduled the vote for August 31, 1999. Despite the violence, UNAMET registered 466,666 voters. It oversaw the popular consultation, and an impressive 98.6 percent of registered voters cast their ballots. Overwhelmingly, the populace rejected autonomy and chose independence.

U.S. Strategic Moves

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) military engagement and security cooperation during the period prior to Operation STABILISE, shaped conditions that enabled the command to respond to the situation on the Indonesian archipelago. Prior to the intervention, USPACOM was preparing for Exercise CROCODILE ‘99, an amphibious training exercise with Australia. Although USPACOM planned this operation prior to the May 5 Agreement, Exercise CROCODILE ‘99 had the fortuitous benefit of prepositioning forces in the vicinity of East Timor. Previous combined education, training, and exercise venues assisted in building trust between many Australian and U.S. military leaders involved in the East Timor operation. These engagements also enhanced U.S. and Australian interoperability, notably with regards to communications. Over time, USPACOM leaders developed direct access and communications with key Indonesian military leaders.
Diplomacy was crucial to getting Indonesia to request and collaborate with the multinational force. The United States made use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in early September to assist Australia in its efforts to build a broad coalition. The U.S. Congress also passed legislation that cut funding for all military cooperation initiatives with the TNI, ramping up pressure on Jakarta. General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander (CDR) USPACOM, made direct contact with the Indonesian Defense Minister and head of the TNI, General Wiranto. Most important, the U.S. administration threatened to delay IMF economic assistance to Jakarta. The diplomatic efforts led to President Habibie’s reluctant request on September 13 for a U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping force in East Timor. Two days later, the U.N. passed UNSCR 1264, which authorized the multinational force. The Indonesian request and the UNSCR were key preconditions for Australia to lead INTERFET.

Consultation Results and Operation SPITFIRE

UNAMET announced the popular consultation results on September 4, 1999. Almost immediately, pro-integration militias, with direct and indirect TNI support, began a reign of terror that systematically destroyed over 70 percent of East Timor’s infrastructure and caused widespread damage to government administrative buildings and businesses. The violence resulted in an estimated 900 deaths and displaced more than 400,000 East Timorese. At least 250,000 inhabitants either fled or were forcibly moved to West Timor.
Aside from attacks on East Timorese communities, assailants intimidated UNAMET personnel and on occasion attacked local nationals working on the UNAMET staff. As the violence escalated, UNAMET relocated personnel to the main U.N. compound in Dili. By September 8, 1999, there were over 2000 UNAMET staff and local civilians in the U.N. facility. While the TNI claimed it was attempting to restore security and declared martial law on September 7, its surrogate militias laid siege to the U.N. compound.31

Anticipating potential trouble in East Timor, the Australian Government had earlier increased the readiness of the 1st Brigade, 1st Australian Division. Major General Peter Cosgrove commanded the 1st Division, and the unit’s headquarters served as the Australian Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ).32 By mid-1999, Major General Cosgrove had directed his staff to prepare a variety of contingency plans for East Timor, including an evacuation of U.N. and Australian personnel. The plan, code named Operation SPITFIRE, employed a limited number of Australian troops to extricate personnel through the Dili and Baucau airfields. On September 6, at the request of the U.N. and in coordination with Indonesian officials, Major General Cosgrove executed Operation SPITFIRE. Over the next few days, Australian aircraft and troops completed the evacuation successfully.33

Establishing INTERFET

The Indonesian decision to request international assistance to stem the violence in East Timor resulted in quick U.N. action. On September 15, 1999, the U.N. Security Council passed UNSCR 1264 (Appendix G), under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (Appendix I).
The resolution authorized “the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfill (its) mandate.”

It was among the most strongly worded U.N. resolutions ever given and provided INTERFET with the authority to accomplish its tasks fully. Specifically, UNSCR 1264 authorized the establishment of a multinational force to:

- Restore peace and security in East Timor
- Protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks
- Facilitate humanitarian assistance operations

The mandate did not task INTERFET with providing transitional governance. Jakarta remained responsible for governing East Timor and for facilitating a “peaceful and orderly transfer of authority” to the United Nations. A United Nations peacekeeping contingent would replace INTERFET and provide the needed transitional governance once Indonesia relinquished control.

After previous consultations, and despite initial Indonesian objections, the U.N. invited Australia to assume the role of lead nation for Operation STABILISE. Australia was a logical choice. Due to its proximity to East Timor and ties to Indonesia, Australia had important interests at stake. The Australian military had a solid reputation, and the armed forces of other countries would likely accept an Australian leadership role. The fact that Australia was a regional power, and a former colonial possession with no prior history of imperialism, would contribute to the legitimacy of the operation. With the Indonesian request for assistance and the passage of the UNSCR 1264, Canberra would be confident that the intervention would conform to
international norms. As a result, Australia accepted
the lead for Operation STABILISE.

**Operational Environment**

The operational environment in East Timor that awaited INTERFET was complex and continuously evolving. This section looks at the physical factors in the various domains and identifies select PMESII\(^3\) variables that impacted the planning of the international effort.

**Geography**

The island of Timor lies in the Southwest Pacific Ocean at the eastern end of the Lesser Sunda Archipelago. It is approximately 644 kilometers north of Darwin, Australia. East Timor includes the eastern half of Timor Island, Pulau Atauro Island off the north coast, and the Oecussi Enclave approximately 70 kilometers west of the East Timor border on the northwest coast of West Timor. East Timor is bounded by the Wetar Strait to the north, the Timor Sea in the south, and has a common border with West Timor (Indonesia) to the west. East Timor is approximately 245 kilometers long and 110 kilometers wide. It covers an estimated 19,000 square kilometers or an area roughly the size of New Jersey. The central region is mountainous. The highlands extend to the northern shore in some areas, creating a steep coastline. There are coastal plains in the south, and East Timor’s surface ranges from dry and rocky with sparse vegetation to thick rain forests. Approximately ten percent of the land is arable. The climate is tropical with consistently hot and humid temperatures throughout the year. In the mountains,
temperatures are milder than on the coastal plains, especially at night. There are distinct wet and dry seasons. East Timor has an abundant population of airborne insects, which carry diseases such as malaria and dengue fever. The wet season lasts from December through April, during which there are heavy monsoon rains. The dry season lasts from May through November and can result in extremely dusty conditions.

Due to conditions in area of operations, international forces could only access East Timor and the Oecussi Enclave by sea or air during Operation STABILISE (Figure 1). The border between East and West Timor offered numerous challenges. First, West Timor was a major source of resupply for the TNI and the militias in East Timor. Second, the area across the inter-Timor border had the potential for offering a sanctuary to militias seeking to operate within East Timor. Controlling the border, preferably in cooperation with the TNI, would be essential for establishing security. The distance between Australia and East Timor, and the mountainous terrain within the province, complicated signals communications. The difficult topography and forested landscape, in combination with the limited road network, and the impending arrival of the wet season, would constrain ground mobility and access to some rural areas. In fact, the monsoon rains had the potential to severely limit both ground and air mobility. Joint planners weighed these facts as they considered the conduct of amphibious and airborne or air assault operations to get troops and supplies on the ground. They also recognized the need to protect air and sea lines of communications.
Economy

In 1999, East Timor was one of the poorest provinces within Indonesia. Its annual per capita income was approximately $400 dollars or about half of the Indonesian average. There was little manufacturing capability, and non-Timorese persons dominated most of the lucrative businesses, such as the coffee industry, as well as most of the professional civil servant occupations. Much of the local population relied on subsistence farming and received limited benefit from the exploitation of the province’s natural resources. The
forced displacement of large portions of the population during the period of instability resulted in the collapse of much of East Timor’s economy. The marginal transportation system used to support the import and distribution of food and supplies ceased to function. The ongoing violence and displacement of civilians halted much of the local food production. As a result, the population had little access to basic necessities and was at risk of malnutrition or starvation.

Social Factors

The East Timorese population consists of a number of Malayo-Polynesian ethnic groups as well as a small Chinese minority. In 1999, the population was estimated at 850,000. Most of the people were illiterate, and 90 percent lived in rural areas. The extended family was the basis for social organization and identity, but individuals also belonged to a number of clans. The East Timorese social structure included various tribal chiefs and a royal class that had its roots in the kingdoms that preexisted the Portuguese. The population was approximately 90 percent Catholic, and the Catholic Church had significant influence over the people.

Infrastructure

The two largest cities in East Timor were the provincial capital, Dili, with a population of approximately 100,000, and Baucau, which had a population of about 25,000. Both cities were on the north coast. The governments of Portugal and Indonesia had done little in the way of infrastructure development. There were few paved roads, and most were built to support
the Indonesian counterinsurgency campaign. In 1999, the road network was not well maintained and washouts were common during the rainy season, which restricted ground access to many areas. There was electrical power within the major urban areas, but no national level power grid existed. The telecommunication system was poor in the urban areas and almost nonexistent in rural parts. The sea and air transportation systems were also limited. The primary port, located in Dili, could only handle two ships at a time. The port at Baucau was even smaller. There were two major airfields at Dili and Baucau, with several smaller dirt strips throughout the country. The airfield at Baucau was the largest, with a runway long enough to handle large commercial airliners. The Dili strip was shorter and could accommodate C-130 and smaller aircraft.

The militia rampage, after the popular consultation results were announced, destroyed upwards of 70 percent of East Timor’s infrastructure. Although the airfields and ports were left relatively unscathed, the destruction to the power and telecommunications systems, administrative buildings, local businesses, and transportation network meant that any incoming force would require a high degree of self-sufficiency.

Military Threats

There were three potential military threats facing INTERFET. These consisted of the TNI, pro-integration militias, and the FALINTIL. The TNI was the most dangerous and capable potential threat. TNI officers and men had suffered significant casualties over 25 years of counterinsurgency operations. In addition, many TNI leaders were con-
cerned that losing East Timor might encourage other separatist regions within Indonesia to seek independence. The TNI had large and capable ground, air, and naval forces, including advanced fighters and submarines. It had over 25,000 army and police personnel in East Timor with the potential for reinforcement from West Timor. TNI troops were well equipped with modern weaponry. Not even President Habibie was entirely sure how the TNI would react to INTERFET’s arrival in East Timor. It was critical for INTERFET to monitor TNI forces and counter any aggressive actions. The potential for an inadvertent clash with TNI forces was real. Establishing effective communications and coordination between the TNI and INTERFET, and developing a thorough understanding of each other’s operations, were essential.

The TNI-supported pro-integration militias were the most likely threat to INTERFET. There were at least 20 active militia groups by September 1999, ranging in size from less than 100 members to over 1500 personnel each.\textsuperscript{41} The TNI originally organized and armed these militias in the late 1970s as part of the counterinsurgency campaign to fight FALINTIL. Although many militias demobilized during the 1990s, the TNI began to reconstitute them in late 1998 to counter any movement towards East Timorese independence. In some cases, TNI members, primarily from the KOPASSUS, led individual militia groups. The militias had a mixture of modern assault rifles, older rifles, grenades, shotguns, and machetes. They did not have any heavy weapons and were not capable of winning an outright fight with coalition forces, but were still dangerous. In early 1999, the nature of the relationship between the militias and the TNI was largely unclear to coalition forces. As late as Septem-
ber 1999, TNI leaders claimed the militias were an indigenous and spontaneous response to the independence movement and the popular consultation; TNI officers asserted that the militia groups might count on the backing of not more than a few rogue TNI personnel. However, intelligence intercepts, the sustained high-level of violence and tempo of operations, the sophisticated intimidation tactics used across the province, and the systematic destruction of property and displacement of civilians indicated the militias benefitted from well-organized TNI support. The lack of response to, and in some cases, the active participation in, militia violence on the part of the TNI and the Indonesian police provided further evidence of a concerted effort. Indications soon arose that the TNI actively coordinated and controlled some of the militias. The paucity of pro-integration violence during the visits of international dignitaries to East Timor also suggested a level of collusion. President Clinton acknowledged a measure of concern over TNI support to the militias on September 10, 1999, when he stated, “It is now clear that the Indonesian military is aiding and abetting the militia violence.”

Separating the militias from their TNI supporters and logistical bases in West Timor was critical to establishing security. The least likely threat to coalition forces and the success of their operations was the FALINTIL. Armed mostly with automatic weapons, FALINTIL members were relatively well disciplined. A real possibility existed that they might fight the pro-integration militias to protect the local population. Still, FALINTIL attacks on the militia could complicate security efforts and lead inadvertently to a clash with INTERFET forces. Accordingly, Gusmão and other FALINTIL leaders recognized the potential for conflict, and before the
consultation, ordered all FALINTIL forces to move to and remain in four cantonment areas. FALINTIL commanders resisted calls to fight the militias, even when the rampage began after officials announced the consultation results.

Friendly Forces

INTERFET would grow to include forces from over 20 different countries, including the United States, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Europe, and the Middle East. The capabilities of each country’s forces and their level of contribution varied widely.

As the lead nation, Australia provided the bulk of the military forces during Operation STABILISE. The Australian military was a small, yet modern and very professional force. It generally maintained one combat brigade at a high state of readiness for national defense and crisis response. In March 1999, the Government of Australia directed the Australian Defense Force (ADF) to bring a second brigade to a high state of readiness. This was seen by many within the ADF as a response to the developing crisis in East Timor. The Australians had never been the lead nation for such a large peace operation, although they had led smaller efforts. Recognizing that the United States had experience in assembling and leading large coalition operations in the past, Australia requested U.S. planning assistance.

Military leaders had to ensure effective communications and the ability to share information between each national contingent of the coalition and the Commander INTERFET (COMINTERFET). Given the varying modernization levels within the coalition, a
flexible network was necessary to enable communications.

Some of the contributing countries had limited strategic mobility or had never deployed beyond their own shores. As a result, there was a need to provide strategic airlift to transport national contingents from their respective home countries to Australia and then inter-theater lift for movement from Australia to East Timor. Finally, some coalition personnel would be unaccustomed to East Timor’s climate. This would require a period of acclimatization in Australia, which would delay their arrival to East Timor.

Strategic Guidance

U.S. Interests in Indonesia

The United States took an active role in setting the conditions for and enabling INTERFET’s success in East Timor. There were numerous considerations that shaped the U.S. involvement in the operation. As part of its strategic assessment, the Clinton Administration weighed the U.S. relationships with Indonesia and Australia, Washington’s preexisting global commitments, and the limited significance of East Timor to U.S. national interests.

The United States viewed Indonesia as an important contributor to stability and security in Southeast Asia. During the Cold War, U.S. policy supported Indonesia as a key bulwark against communist influence in the region. After the Cold War, U.S. leaders continued to see Indonesia as “a useful counterweight to China’s expanding influence in the Asia-Pacific region.”

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Indonesia was also important because of its location astride the strategic Malacca Straits, which are critical to the world economy and U.S. military strategy. An unstable or hostile Indonesia could threaten maritime commerce that transits the straits daily. It could also pose a risk to U.S. naval forces traveling from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Both scenarios represented an unacceptable risk to vital U.S. interests.

Indonesia was also a critical contributor to the world’s economy. It was the fourth most populous country in the world and had vast mineral resources, including oil. Washington had an interest in ensuring the political and economic stability of Indonesia and was keen to maintain good relations with Jakarta.

**U.S. Relations with Australia**

The United States had strong relations with Australia going back at least to World War II. Australia participated in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and even provided naval support during Desert Storm. In reaction to Habibie’s January 1999 announcement regarding the East Timor consultation, the United States and Australia began a dialogue on the potential consequences. As early as February 25, 1999, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth and Australian Foreign Ministry official Ashton Calvert, held discussions that included the topic of East Timor. Consultations between the United States and Australia continued throughout the summer of 1999. Washington’s desire to maintain a strong relationship with Australia had a significant impact on the U.S. decision to support and participate in the INTERFET mission. Although the United States
initially was against providing any forces to INTERFET, consistent pressure from Australia and the U.S. desire to demonstrate support for a key ally were key factors in President Clinton’s decision to participate in the coalition’s military effort.

**U.S. Interests in East Timor**

The United States did not have any vital interests at stake in East Timor itself. Washington’s top concern was the stability of Indonesia. According to a New York Times report “The [Clinton] Administration . . . has made the calculation that the United States must put its relationship with Indonesia, a mineral-rich nation of more than 200 million people, ahead of its concerns over the political fate of East Timor.”46 Both the United States and Australia understood that Jakarta would see the situation in East Timor as an internal Indonesian affair. The allies wanted to avoid a deterioration of relations with Indonesia and thought it was necessary for Jakarta to request international assistance before sending a multinational force to East Timor. Both the United States and Australia wanted to highlight that Indonesia was acting as a cooperative host country for the operation. A number of U.S. Administration statements prior to September 9, 1999 reinforced the “Indonesia first” policy. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), for its part, did not support a leading U.S. military role, citing an overextension of U.S. forces worldwide and the lack of clear U.S. national security interests in East Timor.47
U.S. Commitments

Enduring U.S. military commitments around the globe constrained the level of support the United States could render to INTERFET. Aside from its security obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Korea, and Japan, the United States had significant military contingents in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Kuwait. As such, the Pentagon recommended only limited support of the UN mission in East Timor.

Changing U.S. Position

Initially, the Clinton Administration advocated for Indonesia and the TNI to maintain security in East Timor prior to and after the popular consultation, in accordance with the May 5 Agreement. Statements prior to September 8 by numerous U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, outlined the U.S. position. By September 9, the U.S. perspective began to change for two major reasons. First, despite Jakarta’s perceived efforts to restore order by imposing martial law and sending in additional troops, the violence in East Timor continued unabated. Second, Australian pressure on the United States, to make a diplomatic and military commitment in support of Canberra and the multinational force, changed U.S. priorities. The need to maintain solidarity with Australia grew in importance. In a press conference prior to his departure for the APEC summit on September 9, President Clinton articulated the administration’s changing position. He emphasized the importance of Indonesia’s future and the need for Jakarta to end the violence or request international assistance to do so.
He also outlined diplomatic and economic initiatives to encourage favorable action on the part of Indonesia. Finally, President Clinton stated, “The United States is prepared to provide support to this Australian-led effort.”

The U.S. Decision to Support INERFET

By September 10, 1999, the United States made the decision to support Australia and a multinational force in East Timor with military capabilities. Diplomatic and economic pressure on Indonesia finally yielded results on September 12, 1999, when President Habibie requested U.N. assistance to halt the violence in East Timor. On September 16, 1999, President Clinton announced the decision to participate in Operation STABILISE with U.S. military forces:

After consulting closely with Congress and with the Government of Australia on the best way for the United States to support this operation, and on the recommendation of Secretary Cohen and my national security team, I have decided to contribute to the force in a limited but essential way, including communications and logistical aid, intelligence, air lifts of personnel and material, and coordination of the humanitarian response to the tragedy. We will deploy about 200 people, about half of whom will serve on the ground in East Timor. In addition, elements of the Pacific Fleet will provide support.

The Pentagon directed USPACOM to provide key enabling capabilities in support of the multinational force, as requested by the Australians. While Washington wanted to ensure Australian success, U.S. policymakers also sought to minimize the U.S. footprint.
in East Timor. The U.S. military would not provide any forces to conduct direct peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations on the ground. President Clinton’s strategic guidance limited the size of the U.S. force that would deploy to East Timor. A U.S. National Security Council briefing identified a preliminary requirement for 250 personnel. This figure became the initial limit or “force cap” for the U.S. force in East Timor.\(^\text{52}\)

**Design and Planning for the Operation**

Initial U.S. military efforts to design and plan Operation STABILISE occurred in parallel with the diplomatic discussions and the development of strategic guidance discussed above. USPACOM began assessments and contingency planning for a potential intervention in East Timor as early as February 1999. As the situation developed and the role of U.S. joint forces became clearer, USPACOM shifted its focus to crisis action planning.

**Initial Contingency Planning**

USPACOM leaders quickly recognized the significance of President Habibie’s announcement of a popular consultation in East Timor and acted accordingly. On February 1, 1999, Admiral Blair, CDRUSPACOM, directed Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) to begin planning for possible peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in East Timor.\(^\text{53}\) Preparatory activities included the conduct area assessments and contingency planning for the potential evacuation of U.S. civilians in the conflict area. Military planners initially prepared for a possible peace enforcement
operation, which U.S. forces would conduct unilaterally or as part of a coalition, with or without U.N. sanction.\textsuperscript{54} However, by July 1999, there were indications that Australia, not the United States, would lead the international force in East Timor as part of a U.N.-sanctioned effort. Subsequent USPACOM planning focused on examining contingency scenarios, developing intelligence, studying the East Timor geography, and preparing estimates for supporting the Australians.\textsuperscript{55} In addition to MARFORPAC, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) began to conduct daily planning sessions to determine the availability of resources and the feasibility of providing specific enabling capabilities.\textsuperscript{56}

### Crisis Action Planning

As the situation in East Timor worsened and the militias began their systematic campaign of terror in early September, USPACOM transitioned to crisis action planning to develop and gain approval of an operational plan.\textsuperscript{57} In order to facilitate the effort, Admiral Blair issued the following planning guidance that incorporated his understanding of the situation and strategic guidance:\textsuperscript{58}

- Ensure Australian success
- Provide U.S. unique capabilities
- Keep the footprint small
- Think transition . . . from the very beginning

MARFORPAC retained the planning lead with support from USARPAC and the other USPACOM components. The III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) conducted parallel planning until the establish-
ment of USFI. Translating Admiral Blair’s guidance into action required several steps: understanding Australian support requirements, identifying where the U.S. capabilities would come from, and deciding whether to establish a joint task force.

Australia, as the lead nation, developed the concept of operations to accomplish the tasks in UNSCR 1264. U.S. joint planners needed to understand the Australian plan and the required U.S. capabilities to support it. Admiral Blair directed the deployment of the USPACOM Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) to Australia on September 11, 1999. The DJTFAC integrated into all three levels of the Australian command structure: the ADF, the Headquarters Australian Theater, and the DJFHQ. The DJTFAC assisted Australian planning, identified ways that unique U.S. capabilities could contribute to the operation, and provided information back to USPACOM planners on Australian requirements. In addition to the DJTFAC, Admiral Blair used other avenues to identify what was needed. Sometime in early September, he met with the USPACOM component commanders. Blair directed them to visualize what the United States would need if it were the lead nation and then to coordinate to provide these capabilities to support their Australian counterparts.

As U.S. planners studied what capabilities the Australians needed to support the operation, USPACOM initiated efforts to resource the requirements. For this, Admiral Blair again turned to the USPACOM components. Each of the components had to conduct an analysis, which considered: the availability of forces within the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR), the feasibility of providing the required capabilities, and an assessment of how quickly the United States
military could provide what was needed. Resourcing the capabilities with USPACOM-assigned forces would reduce the time needed to deploy material and personnel to the area of operations. If the needed capabilities were not available within the AOR, then USPACOM would request forces through the Joint Staff. The scheduled Exercise CROCODILE ’99 with Australia proved fortuitous in this case. Naval and Marine forces were already preparing for the exercise and, in some cases, were already forward deployed. A case in point was the positioning of the USS Mobile Bay and the USNS Kilauea. These ships were en route to Australia to support the exercise. The USS Mobile Bay was a Ticonderoga-class Aegis guided missile cruiser, which could provide command and control afloat and a robust counter-air capability. The ship could serve as a visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to the coalition and in particular to the Australians. On September 10, 1999, Admiral Blair redirected these ships to support the Australian forces with the mission to “escort commercial and military transports in the vicinity of East Timor and to be prepared to serve as ‘lily pads’ for helicopters transiting between Australia and East Timor.”61 Admiral Blair designated the ships as Joint Task Force, Timor Sea Operations (JTF TSO).

One of the largest challenges in identifying U.S. capabilities for the operation centered on the need to ensure reliable communications. In this regards, USARPAC and the Army played a key role. The U.S. 25th Infantry Division (25th ID) had an organic signal battalion capable of addressing many of the communications requirements. As USARPAC planners studied the operational needs, they identified a readiness issue. If the 25th ID deployed a portion of its signal battalion, the entire division’s readiness level would
As a result, USPACOM put a request forward to the Joint Staff to fill the communications requirement. In the end, the Army Signal Command filled the request with a reinforced company, designated Task Force (TF) Thunderbird, from the 86th Signal Battalion, 11th Signal Brigade out of Fort Huachuca, AZ. Ultimately, the only forces sourced from outside of USPACOM were TF Thunderbird and a civil affairs detachment from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. (For a full list of the units assigned to USFI, see Appendix J). By the time INTERFET commenced operations, USPACOM had identified all of the participating U.S. forces, which were either already on station or preparing to move to the theater.

Prior to Operation STABILISE and as a general practice, U.S. military commanders would designate any U.S. force that included units from two or more services deploying in support of contingency operations as a joint task force (JTF). Joint doctrine clearly defines a JTF as:

A joint force that is constituted and so designated by a JTF establishing authority (i.e., the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander [CCDR], a subordinate unified commander, or an existing commander, joint task force [CJTF]) to conduct military operations or support to a specific situation.

Doctrinally, USPACOM should have designated USFI as a JTF. Admiral Blair made a deliberate decision not to do so, based on three considerations. First, Operation STABILISE was not a U.S.-led effort. Since the United States had frequently designated JTFs during U.S.-led operations, he was concerned that it would
send the wrong strategic message of U.S. intent in East Timor. Second, past JTFs were large organizations, which typically consisted of more troops than the 250 personnel force cap briefed to the U.S. National Security Council. Third, the East Timor operation was in many respects unprecedented, and Admiral Blair did not want to suggest any comparisons with past U.S. peacekeeping operations, which a customary organizational arrangement might suggest. While the lack of a JTF designation did not prevent USFI from accomplishing its mission, it did create some issues. Some of these challenges were internal to USFI and others affected the interactions with external organizations. Military leaders wrestled with how to organize USFI internally, and questions arose regarding command relationships and legal responsibilities for personnel and units assigned to the organization. The USFI headquarters team, with time, worked through these issues. The USFI external challenges dealt primarily with USFI interactions with higher headquarters and supporting agencies. These outside entities were accustomed to working with JTFs. In some cases, the lack of a JTF designation appears to have resulted in delays in obtaining necessary support. Again, these issues were resolved over time and with USPACOM support.

**USFI Planning**

Prior to the conduct of Operation STABILISE, USFI developed an entry strategy. The USFI approach centered on developing a comprehensive force protection plan, establishing a minimal footprint in East Timor itself, rapidly introducing unique U.S. capabilities, and reinforcing the message that the Australians were in charge.
Transition Planning and Exit Criteria

The initial plan identified the required capabilities and stated in broad terms that U.S. forces would redeploy upon completion of assigned tasks. Unfortunately, the initial planning did not define successful completion criteria. Shortly after deployment, USFI began to develop its exit criteria in greater detail. USFI leaders determined that their mission would be accomplished when one or more of the following was true for each mission task:68

- Commercial alternatives were in place.
- Replacement forces were trained.
- Assets were no longer required.
- Operation STABILISE terminated.

Critical tasks that were part of the drawdown plan included scheduling units for redeployment, preparing for redeployment, and the actual redeployment itself. Once USFI had developed its exit methodology, U.S. military leaders briefed their approach and timelines to COMINTERFET. The USFI exit methodology, with three mission task examples, is shown below.
Mission

Admiral Blair established USFI on September 15, 1999. He designated Brigadier General John G. Castellaw, United States Marine Corps (USMC), as CDR USFI and issued the following mission: “When directed, COMUSFORINTERFET will provide unique U.S. capabilities to COMINTERFET in order to facilitate INTERFET operations to restore peace in East Timor.” In addition to the mission statement, Admiral Blair issued terms of reference (TOR) to define the boundaries clearly within which USFI could operate:

- Exercise national command of all U.S. forces assigned to INTERFET.
- Establish a small headquarters in Darwin.
- No U.S. forces will engage in active peace keeping/enforcement activities in the field.
• Provide unique U.S. capabilities in support of INTERFET.
• CDRUSPACOM approval is required for:
  • COMINTERFET requests for forces/resources.
  • Transfer of tactical control of U.S. forces to COMINTERFET.
• All requests for support from contributing nations must be validated by COMINTERFET.

USFI Organization

Brigadier General Castellaw was the Deputy Commander III MEF and the Commander of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) prior to his designation as CDR USFI. With limited time to finalize planning and form the USFI headquarters, he drew his staff members primarily from III MEF, with the exception of the J-3, operations officer, who was a colonel from the Pacific Air Force (PACAF). The USFI staff consisted of 35 personnel, and the element adopted a doctrinal joint structure.

Initially, USFI organized geographically, with commands established in Sydney, Darwin, Tindal, and Dili. Military leaders quickly realized that this was inefficient, and Castellaw reorganized USFI by components, with the exception of the forces in East Timor itself as shown in figure 3 below (see Appendix J for a complete list of units and their commanders).
Air Force Forces, USFI

The U.S. Air Force Forces (AFFOR) component of USFI centered on the 613th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG). The Group included three C-130 transport aircraft and crews, a Marine C-12 detachment, an EP-3 detachment, and a Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE). AFFOR’s primary missions were to provide intra-theater lift between Australia and East Timor, support the delivery of humanitarian assistance, facilitate the return of displaced persons, enable command and control for airlift missions, and provide movement support for distinguished visitors.  

Figure 3: U.S. Forces INTERFET Organization  
(Source: East Timor: USARPAC OPD Briefing)
Marine Forces, USFI

The U.S. Marine Forces (MARFOR) initially consisted of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which was embarked on the USS Belleau Wood. The 31st MEU included CH-53 and CH-46 helicopters and the MSQ-126 JTF Enabler communications package. The 11th MEU (Special Operations Capable [SOC]) eventually relieved the 31st MEU. The 11th MEU was embarked on the USS Peleliu and was also equipped with heavy lift helicopters. The MARFOR missions consisted of resupplying USFI and INTERFET forces in East Timor, providing ship to shore transport, supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and exercising command and control of assigned forces. Initially, the Marine combat forces remained on their respective ships. As the mission in East Timor progressed, MARFOR sent limited numbers of Marines ashore to provide force protection to USFET.\textsuperscript{73}

Naval Forces, USFI

The U.S. Naval Forces (NAVFOR) consisted initially of the USS Belleau Wood (LHA) with landing craft air cushioned (LCAC) and landing craft utility (LCU). Its primary missions were to establish a military presence, provide a platform and lift support for the Oecussi Enclave and Atauro Island operations, and support humanitarian assistance efforts. JTF Timor Sea Operations was a separate task force until its departure on October 5, 1999. It consisted of the USS Mobile Bay (CG-53) and the support ships USNS Kilauea and USNS San Jose.\textsuperscript{74}
Brigadier General Castellaw designated the forces in Dili as the U.S. Forces East Timor (USFET) under Colonel Randolph Strong, U.S. Army. Colonel Strong also served as the Deputy Commander USFI and the Army Forces (ARFOR) commander. The USFET was a geographical joint command. Its mission was to “deploy to East Timor, and provide communications, intelligence, civil military operations and heavy lift helicopter support to INTERFET.” USFET consisted of a joint headquarters, TF Thunderbird (communications element), an intelligence augmentation team, a civil military operations center (CMOC) support team, and an Air Force chaplain. In December 1999, the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOG-CAP) contracted four heavy lift helicopters to replace the MARFOR capability. These helicopters, under USFET control, provided heavy lift support to USFI, INTERFET, the U.N., and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). TF Thunderbird had the mission to provide communications and automation support to INTERFET forces. The intelligence augmentation team included two Trojan Spirit intelligence terminals from the USARPAC Intelligence Brigade and a counterintelligence (CI), human intelligence (HUMINT), and intelligence analysis capability from the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion. The 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion initially provided twelve soldiers to support the INTERFET CMOC, which were later replaced by 12 reserve soldiers from the 322nd CA Brigade. Their missions included establishing the INTERFET CMOC, under an Australian lead, and providing a link between INTERFET, U.N. relief agencies, NGOs, and the local populace.
Deployment and Support

From September 17 to October 20, 1999, there was an almost continuous flow of USFI personnel first into Australia and then to Dili. USFI assets supported INTERFET from the first day of Operation STABILISE. As USFI capabilities grew, so did the support they provided. In general, there were no unanticipated complications with the deployment of forces to Australia. However, as discussed later in this section, force protection concerns initially slowed or otherwise complicated the flow of USFI personnel and equipment into East Timor proper.

Operation STABILISE Campaign Plan

The structure of INTERFET facilitated the execution of operations and enabled unity of effort. Each country retained command authority over its national contingents. COMINTERFET had operational control of all forces, allowing Major General Cosgrove to plan and direct the military operations of each national contingent.
Major General Cosgrove developed a four phase campaign plan to accomplish INTERFET’s mission under UNSCR 1264. The plan made use of the so-called ink spot strategy, securing key locations first and then gradually spreading out—establishing order across much of East Timor. The four phases of the operation were:77

- Phase 1 – Control (secure point of entry into East Timor and lodge the force to take control of Dili);
• Phase 2 – Consolidation (extend INTERFET’s influences across East Timor);
• Phase 3 – Transition (hand-over of responsibility for providing security in East Timor to a U.N. peacekeeping force);
• Phase 4 – Redeployment of INTERFET following successful transition.

The following paragraphs provide a sequential narrative of U.S. deployments, support, and key INTERFET decisions during Operation STABILISE.

Initial Deployments and Support

Shortly after USFI’s establishment, Brigadier General Castellaw flew to Darwin on September 17, 1999, to conduct coordination and prepare for operations. Two days later, Australian Prime Minister Downer announced the appointment of Major General Cosgrove as COMINTERFET. On that same day, Major General Cosgrove made a decision that proved pivotal to the course of Operation STABILISE. He flew to Dili with the Deputy INTERFET commander, Major General Songkitti of Thailand, to meet with the Indonesian commander in East Timor, Major General Kiki Syahnakri. The purpose of the meeting was to gain TNI cooperation and prepare for the arrival of INTERFET forces the next day. Major General Cosgrove described his plan to land over 1000 troops with combat vehicles at Komoro airfield in Dili. The meeting with Major General Syahnakri set the conditions for continuing cooperation between INTERFET and the TNI until Indonesia’s final departure in October.

On September 19, three U.S. C-130 cargo planes and a KC-130 tanker, part of the 623rd AEG, arrived
at the Royal Australian Air Force Base at Tindal. The aircraft had supported President Clinton’s visit to the APEC Summit in New Zealand, and USPACOM diverted them to assist USFI.\textsuperscript{79} The following day, as the first INTERFET troops landed at Dili, the KC-130 assisted in delivering personnel to East Timor, including USFI liaison officers to the INTERFET Headquarters.\textsuperscript{80} The 623\textsuperscript{rd} AEG formed a portion of the air bridge that moved multinational troops, supplies, and returning displaced persons to East Timor, with operations beginning in earnest on September 21. At about the same time, an EP-3 detachment arrived from Misawa, Japan, to provide airborne intelligence collection. It initiated operations on September 21.\textsuperscript{81} Also on September 20, Brigadier General Castellaw’s staff arrived in Australia to assist in planning and directing USFI missions.

As INTERFET began conducting operations, a request came to USFI for support in conducting port surveys. The surveys would provide important intelligence on the facilities and certify the port installations for future operations. USFI requested support from the 599\textsuperscript{th} Transportation Group, which was already in Australia supporting Exercise CROCODILE ’99. The 599\textsuperscript{th} responded with a deployment support team (DST), which successfully conducted surveys of the ports at Karabela (Baucau) on September 26 and Dili on October 1. During each of these surveys, INTERFET provided force protection for USFI personnel with either New Zealand special forces or Australian troops.\textsuperscript{82}

The force protection of USFI personnel in East Timor became a major concern during the opening phase of the operations. Since USFI was in a supporting role, the U.S. military relied on Australian and
other international combat units for force protection. Many coalition countries did not have the same force protection standards as USFI. During the initial stages of Operation STABILSE, Commander (CDR) USFI would not allow any personnel to remain ashore in East Timor until facilities with the proper force protection measures were in place. This caused delays in the deployment of some U.S. forces and disrupted the operational timetable. Major General Cosgrove and Brigadier General Castellaw, as well as their staffs, demonstrated professionalism in working through this challenge and developing a methodology for ensuring adequate force protection. The approach consisted of first conducting surveys to identify potential locations and facilities for USFI units and then determining the force protection requirements for each site. Next, force protection personnel worked with the respective multinational force leadership that had responsibility for the site to ensure that adequate measures were in place. Once standards were met, unit personnel deployed to East Timor to begin operations. USFI continued to assess site force protection measures on an ongoing basis to ensure they remained adequate.

As operations progressed, USFI did not always follow the doctrinal pattern of U.S. joint operations. The limitations on personnel meant the USFI staff members bore responsibilities across several functions, with many individuals wearing “multiple hats.” As Brigadier General Castellaw stated, “The same folks who did the planning as J5 types traded hats and became J3 executors. No union rules, we all did the particular job that needed doing.”83 Instead of producing detailed operations orders, the staff either produced fragmentary orders or provided direction over secure phone or by e-mail. Much of the USFI support provid-
ed to COMINTEFET “was the result of a handshake with Cosgrove rather than a formal document.” This informal process worked because of the limited nature of operations and the professionalism of the forces involved in the effort.

The Second Wave

As USFI forces continued to arrive at Darwin, the TNI began to pull out of East Timor on September 25. Within a matter of days, the TNI reduced its forces from 25,000 to 1,500. Despite the TNI withdrawal, the militias were still active, and there were periodic clashes with INTERFET. With force protection still a concern, Brigadier General Castellaw flew to Dili and selected the location for the USFI Headquarters Forward. Military personnel soon began the process of preparing the compound to support the U.S. mission in Dili.

On October 5, the USS Belleau Wood arrived off the shores of East Timor carrying the 31st MEU and four heavy lift helicopters. Although the Marines were not allowed to conduct combat operations, their presence had a psychological impact on the TNI and the militias. The MEU had significant combat potential and provided a visible sign of the U.S. commitment to the success of INTERFET. Major General Cosgrove took advantage of this psychological deterrent by making another crucial decision that would alter the course of the campaign. As the TNI withdrew from East Timor, Major General Cosgrove realized that the militias’ only remaining source of support would be in West Timor. If he secured the western border early, he could cut off the militia supplies and force them to retreat into West Timor. He decided to move one third of his combat
force from Dili to secure the western border on October 10, a full three weeks ahead of schedule. This bold move forced the militias to retreat to West Timor and essentially eliminated the militia threat in most areas of East Timor. The operation had the desired effect; it significantly reduced the militia threat and accelerated efforts to establish security. While the employment of the 31st MEU in combat would have required approval from Washington D.C., its use as a deterrent achieved the desired effect.

In addition to its psychological impact on the TNI and the militias, the MEU contributed badly needed capabilities to the operation. Four Marine CH-53 helicopters provided support to both INTERFET and the relief agencies operating in East Timor. The helicopters quickly moved personnel and supplies, bypassing potential threats on the ground and saving valuable time—particularly when compared to the days of travel required to traverse the severely impaired roads. Besides helicopters, the MEU’s MSQ-126 JTF Enabler communications package provided non-secure and secure internet access and phone service to coalition forces in Dili. Additionally, the USS Belleau Wood provided hospital services and other facilities to USFET personnel.

Soldiers from the 96th CA Battalion arrived in Australia and began operations in Dili on October 8. A portion of their unit had to wait in Australia until adequate force protection measures were in place. Upon arrival in Dili, the 96th CA Battalion personnel assisted in establishing and running the Australian-led INTERFET CMOC. The Australian civil affairs personnel performed their responsibilities as an additional duty and had limited training in comparison to their specialized U.S. counterparts. As a result,
INTERFET leaders highly valued the experience and training of the U.S. CA personnel. The CMOC was critical to coordinating efforts among INTERFET, the U.N. agencies, and the NGOs. One major function was coordinating heavy lift helicopter support from the Marines, because the demands of both INTERFET and the relief agencies often exceeded the available air transport capacity.

On October 8, the two Trojan Spirits and the intelligence augmentation team arrived in Australia, and shortly thereafter moved on to Dili. The Trojan Spirits provided an important link to the worldwide intelligence resources of the U.S. military, enabling USFI to receive the information collected through the EP-3 and providing a reach-back capability to USPACOM. The intelligence augmentation team provided analytical support to the INTERFET C2 (Intelligence) staff and facilitated counterintelligence support to enable operations in East Timor. However, force protection concerns limited the ability of these personnel to conduct activities beyond the confines of Dili.

The Final Deployments

One of the unique capabilities the United States employed during Operation STABILISE was its strategic airlift. There were over 20 countries contributing forces to the coalition. Some had limited resources to move their national contingents or could not move them quickly. These countries often benefitted from U.S. support. One case in point was the movement of 1300 military personnel from Thailand, which was an important contributor to INTERFET. On October 1, the Thai prime minister requested assistance to move his forces. Within a week, Strategic Airlift Command
provided the aircraft to move them to Australia. Soon thereafter, the Thai forces were on the ground helping to secure Baucau. In addition to the coalition contingents, strategic airlift was essential to the deployment of TF Thunderbird. This unit required twelve C-5 and one C-17 sorties in October to move from its base in Fort Huachuca, AZ to the intermediate staging base in Australia.

The situation began to evolve rapidly after October 10. The militia threat was significantly reduced, and Major General Cosgrove aggressively executed his ink spot strategy. As units and personnel spread out across East Timor, the need for up-to-date information at INTERFET headquarters and the headquarters in Darwin increased. INTERFET relied on a robust, long-range communications network to connect with each of the national contingents. TF Thunderbird personnel had conducted a thorough mission analysis before deploying and were prepared to support all 20 INTERFET national contingents, notwithstanding their non-compatible systems. In order to ensure access to the network, TF Thunderbird purchased 100 computers for the various national contingents. Unit personnel also provided satellite communications support to the Thai forces based at Baucau. This freed Australian satellite communications to support their own forces along the western border.

In late October, the USS Peleliu with the 11th MEU (SOC) replaced the USS Belleau Wood and the 31st MEU. The newly arrived forces continued the air and sea transport support for the INTERFET forces and delivered supplies during the final phases of Operation STABILISE, while also helping to secure the Oecussi Enclave and Atauro Island. The 11th MEU also assisted in the return of displaced persons.
United States Government Support to INTERFET

In addition to DoD personnel under USFI, other U.S. government officials supported Operation STABILISE and the East Timorese people. The U.S. Department of State took the lead in coordinating efforts amongst U.S. government departments and agencies. U.S. officials undertook diplomatic efforts to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, ensure continued cooperation from Jakarta, and obtain the approval of U.N. Security Council resolutions dealing with the East Timor crisis.

In September 1999, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen met with President Habibie in Jakarta. Secretary Cohen expressed support for the Indonesian elections scheduled for November 1999. He also challenged the government and the TNI to assist in stopping the violence and furthering the peaceful transition of East Timor. Cohen stressed the need to disarm the pro-integration militias and cooperate with the investigation and punishment of the perpetrators of the violence.²

Shortly after INTERFET began operations, Assistant Secretary of State Julia Taft from the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration organized and led a multinational humanitarian mission to East and West Timor.³ The mission assessed the status of refugees and internally displaced civilians, and determined humanitarian relief needs. The group met with Indonesian government representatives to press for greater security and access to the camps with displaced persons in West Timor. The mission also discussed Jakarta’s support for the return of civilians to East Timor.
One of the most critical tasks on the diplomatic front was the development and passage of UNSCR 1272, which established the U.N. Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET). It set the conditions for the eventual termination of Operation STABILISE. These continued diplomatic efforts contributed to Indonesia’s eventual acceptance of East Timor as an independent nation.

U.S. diplomatic support had direct effects on operations in East Timor. The Australian battalion on the West Timor frontier conducted armed patrols to secure the poorly defined border. Coalition troops had a series of incidents with the TNI forces operating in the area. On November 22, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard Holbrooke sponsored a meeting between the TNI and INTERFET to discuss the issue. The resulting “Memorandum of Technical Understanding” established coordination mechanisms between the two parties to control the border.\textsuperscript{94} The arrangements reduced the potential for incidents and helped to curtail pro-integration militia activity emanating from West Timor.

On the humanitarian front, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) sent an assessment team to East Timor shortly after Operation STABILISE began. In part, this resulted in U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Robert Gelbard re-issuing a disaster declaration for the region on October 4, 1999.\textsuperscript{95} The declaration opened the door for additional humanitarian funding from the United States. Following the assessment, USAID provided funding for humanitarian relief operations in East Timor. The assistance included the purchase of food, blankets, and water containers—and funding for the transportation and distribution of relief supplies. USAID provided
most of the financial support, supplies, and distribution of aid through local and international humanitarian partners that were already in East Timor. In October, USAID hired local staff to establish an office in Dili. Through this office, USAID provided micro-loans to local businesses to begin the process of rebuilding the economy. After the transition to UNTAET, the agency remained active in East Timor. On June 6, 2000, it published an 18-month planning framework to support the East Timor transition to independence. The framework outlined several objectives for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, which included: 1) revitalizing the local economy, 2) strengthening democratic development, and 3) improving relations with Indonesia.

**Transition and Redeployment**

As the pace of military operations intensified, political events began to pick up as well. On October 19, the Government of Indonesia recognized East Timor’s independence. The following day, Indonesia’s National Assembly officially revoked the decree that incorporated East Timor into Indonesia. At the international level, the UNAMET mission ended on October 25, 1999, as the U.N. Security Council passed UNSCR 1272 (see Appendix H). This new resolution established UNTAET with a governance and administration structure, an international police element, and a humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation component. The resolution was a critical next step in the peace process because it created a framework for transitional governance. By October 31, the TNI, Indonesian police, and government officials had departed East Timor. Since the East Timorese had no role in the local administration up to this point, the former
province was left with no governing body or ability to address civic needs. In a series of reports to the U.N. Secretary General, the Government of Australia emphasized the fact that INTERFET did not have the capability or capacity to provide the necessary transitional governance. There was an urgent need to introduce such a capability. UNSCR 1272 would help address this requirement. Of equal importance to INTERFET, the resolution established a U.N. military component to maintain security within the new country. As the U.N. assumed responsibility in East Timor, most of the INTERFET military forces would transition to UNTAET.

Admiral Blair’s planning guidance understood the importance of developing an exit strategy from the start. The basic concept was for USFI to work itself out of a job by either concluding lines of effort or finding a workable replacement to carry on critical activities. In mid-October, USFI developed a detailed transition and redeployment plan for each of its capability areas. USFI briefed and gained approval of the plan from Major General Cosgrove.

**Helicopter Support**

As mentioned earlier, in October, the U.S. Navy was looking for a means to replace the Marine heavy lift helicopters that were supporting operations. The USPACOM J-4 (Logistics) turned to the Army Material Command and LOGCAP, which provided civilian contracts to support U.S. forces. LOGCAP worked through a civilian contractor, DynCorp, to provide heavy lift helicopters. DynCorp provided four Russian-made helicopters (two Mi-8s and two Mi-26s), their crews, and support. In addition, DynCorp
worked with its engineering partner, Flour-Daniels Federal Services, to build helipads at the Komoro airfield. By November 23, two aircraft were on station and providing support, and in early December, all four contracted helicopters were fully operational. This allowed the USS Peleliu to depart East Timor by November 28.

**Tactical Airlift**

The 613th AEG’s exit criteria from the East Timor Theater was the transition to a primarily sea-based flow of personnel and supplies. By the middle of November, the arrival of most of the international forces to East Timor and the increased stability in the former province reduced the requirement for tactical airlift and enabled a reliance on sea-borne transportation. With this transition completed, the 613th AEG began redeployment.

**CMOC Support**

Initially, the 96th CA Battalion personnel were replaced by Army Reserve soldiers from the 322nd CA Battalion out of Hawaii. The plan was to train INTERFET personnel to take over responsibilities completely as soon as possible. The training program began shortly after coalition forces established the CMOC. Non-U.S. INTERFET personnel finalized their training by the end of November and completely assumed CMOC responsibilities by December 5, 1999.
Intelligence Support

The transition of the intelligence support functions had two parts. First, the Australians deployed their Joint Intelligence Support System (JISS), and by early November, the system was operational. However, to ensure a complete transition, the JISS underwent a 14-day reliability test. By November 15, the JISS was certified and completely replaced the Trojan Spirit systems.

Simultaneously, the U.S. intelligence augmentation team provided training to their Australian counterparts. While the Australians had the technical expertise in counterintelligence and human intelligence, the U.S. team provided training in collection and request for information (RFI) management. By November 30, the Australian personnel had completed their training program and assumed all intelligence functions. Shortly thereafter, both the Trojan Spirit systems and the intelligence augmentation team redeployed, with the exception of a small intelligence cell that remained at the USFI headquarters.

Communication Support

Ensuring the continuation of communications support was one of the most difficult aspects of the transition plan. The militia rampage had completely destroyed the limited East Timor communications infrastructure. The Australians took the lead in facilitating the transition of communications by contracting a commercial vendor to provide a phone and data communications network. Although this new system did not have the capability to replace the entire East Timor network, it was adequate for the needs of INTERFET.
As the vendor built critical commercial nodes, they replaced the U.S. systems that had facilitated communications up to this point.\textsuperscript{103} By December 15, the commercial communications were sufficiently capable to replace the TF Thunderbird network. In addition, TF Thunderbird provided technical training during the period of transition. By January 12, 2000, all TF Thunderbird equipment had departed the theater by aircraft and ship.

**USFET and USFI Headquarters**

As other capabilities transitioned or were no longer required, the USFET headquarters began to redeploy personnel. By mid-December, the Dili headquarters was no longer required and shutdown on December 17.\textsuperscript{104} As of December 18, military leaders had reduced the number of personnel on the USFI staff, leaving in place the necessary individuals to oversee the remaining support operations and the redeployment of USFI members. At the end of January 2000, USFI began the transition with its replacement, the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET). On February 1, 2000, USFI was officially disestablished. On February 23, UNTAET assumed responsibility from INTERFET.

**U.S. Support Group East Timor**

Establishing stability in East Timor was a long term program. Under UNSCR 1272, the concept was to transition from INTERFET, centered on immediate stability and security needs, to UNTAET, which would focus on longer-term efforts to assist the fledgling East Timorese nation with its development, institution building, and security needs. USPACOM understood
that the United States did not want the responsibility of rebuilding East Timor, but a U.S. presence and commitment were still important. As a result, Admiral Blair established USGET to provide “command, control and liaison functions” for any U.S. support provided to UNTAET. USGET was a separate entity from UNTAET and fell under the direct control of USPACOM. On February 1, 2000, USGET assumed responsibilities for providing U.S. support. Over the next two years, USGET coordinated deployments by U.S. forces that provided support to reconstruction and humanitarian relief operations.

Assessment and Insights on Joint Planning and Operations

Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace Operations, describes the fifteen fundamentals of peace operations. This section utilizes these fifteen fundamentals to assess the conduct of Joint Force operations during Operation STABILISE.

Consent: Under Article 42, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, consent of the host nation is not a requirement for the conduct of peace enforcement operations. However, strategic considerations made Indonesian consent to INTERFET a prerequisite before Australia would accept the role of lead-nation. It is also clear that Washington prioritized its relations with Jakarta and did not want to see adverse impacts from the INTERFET operation. The use of diplomatic and economic tools, as well as military-to-military engagement, on the part of the United States were part of a whole of government effort to obtain Indonesia’s consent for Operation STABILISE. U.S. influence was critical in persuading the Government of Indonesia to request international assistance.
At the operational level, Major General Cosgrove’s visit with General Syahnakri in Dili was key to obtaining the consent and cooperation of the TNI in East Timor. Although it did not immediately end the violence, the visit did improve communications between INTERFET and the TNI, which assisted in avoiding potential confrontations.

The CMOC also played a role in gaining the consent and collaboration of relief organizations, NGOs, and the local population. USFI provided expertise, which was generally lacking among INTERFET partners, to establish and support the CMOC.\textsuperscript{107} CMOC coordination efforts ensured military support to humanitarian relief efforts and helped gain the cooperation of the East Timorese people. However, force protection constraints often limited the ability of CMOC personnel to actively collect information regarding civil needs.\textsuperscript{108} This required the CMOC to gather information from other organizations, which can sometimes lead to concerns among NGOs that they are being used for information collection to support combat operations. USFI could have provided a dedicated force protection element throughout the entire operation to help the CMOC fully identify the needs of the population.

Once actors give their consent to peace operations, the Joint Force needs to foster continued good relations from the national down to the lowest level. A key USFI contribution came in the form of its deterrent capability. The arrival of USS Belleau Wood and the 31\textsuperscript{st} MEU had a psychological impact on the militias and the local TNI, making their consent more likely. Public affairs officers used a variety of information channels to make sure various audiences understood the combat potential of the 31\textsuperscript{st} MEU. The effect was to assist in deterring potential aggressive actions. The
visible presence of the USS Belleau Wood and the 31st MEU demonstrated to TNI commanders the high level of U.S. commitment to establishing security.

**Impartiality:** Peace operations require that the Joint Force “act on behalf of the peace process and mandate, and not show preference for any faction or group over another.”\(^\text{109}\) The use of force can often have unanticipated consequences; many people may perceive that the Joint Force and its partners are not impartial if they apply force against one particular party. Therefore, the friendly forces communications strategy should focus on developing themes and messages to counter these perceptions.

The mere presence of INTERFET in East Timor benefited the pro-independence forces and worked against the parties that favored integration with Indonesia. While INTERFET sought security for all parties on the ground, its presence was not entirely impartial—since it enabled the movement towards independence. In this regards, the strong pro-independence sentiment among the East Timorese population favored INTERFET. Had public sentiment been different, INTERFET might have encountered stronger opposition on the ground. The low level of popular support for integration is confirmed by the fact that the militias were heavily dependent on sustainment from the TNI and West Timor. INTERFET established an information campaign to ensure all parties fully understood its purpose and intent to establish stability and security for all inhabitants. However, there is no doubt that actors in the environment saw the INTERFET presence as favoring the movement towards East Timor’s independence. This fact is evident in FALINTIL’s decision to continue its self-imposed confinement in cantonment areas, even during the pe-
riod of the militia rampage against local inhabitants. FALINTIL understood that the international presence would further the group’s political objectives. While INTERFET sought to promote stability and security for all inhabitants, it is possible that efforts to ensure the safety of pro-integration supporters might have been especially important—perhaps allowing these persons to feel that they could have a stake in an independent East Timor. The protection and reintegration of pro-Indonesia supporters, especially former militia members, was an important challenge for UNTAET in the aftermath of Operation STABILISE. While political neutrality was not possible, the coalition could, however, apply an even hand while protecting all citizens from acts of violence, even those who were part of the minority that favored integration with Indonesia.

**Transparency:** The Joint Force, during the conduct of peace operations, “should make the parties and the populace aware of the operational mandate, mission, intentions, and techniques used to enforce compliance.” Transparency serves to reinforce legitimacy and impartiality.

The INTERFET headquarters played a key role in shaping information operations (IO) during Operation STABILISE. It helped to inform the local population, the TNI, the militias, and the international community regarding INTERFET’s mission, activities, capabilities, and determination to counter aggression and restore security. The IO campaign utilized a variety of media to inform target audiences. These included radio, leaflets, loud speakers, publication of the *New East Timor* newspaper, and regular news conferences.

The USFI contribution to transparency was through a combination of public affairs and CMOC efforts. The USFI public affairs officer, in coordination with
Brigadier General Castellaw, briefed reporters on U.S. activities and, in one noteworthy instance, coordinated a press tour of the USS Belleau Wood. These activities demonstrated U.S. capabilities and support for the operation. They were done in a manner that did not overshadow the Australian leadership role or the contributions of other countries. The USFI-supported CMOC kept NGOs and U.N. agencies informed of the security situation around the country. These organizations, for their part, provided a means of communicating the INTERFET capability and intent to the population, during the course of frequent interactions.

**Credibility:** The Joint Force and its partners must preserve their credibility to ensure relevant actors in the environment cooperate during the conduct of peace operations. The Joint Forces must ensure that parties on the ground understand that actions have consequences. Key to promoting credibility is to ensure friendly forces align “words, deeds and images.”

One way that INTERFET sustained its credibility was by continuously demonstrating its capabilities to provide assistance or impose cost on parties in the environment. INTERFET demonstrated its capabilities, beginning with the establishment of its lodgment. On September 20, 1999, through a combination of air assault and airlift operations, INTERFET inserted more than 1,000 troops into Dili. The continuous flow of aircraft and the appearance of helicopters on the first day of operations sent an immediate signal to potential adversaries and the population that INTERFET was a capable force that could carry out its commitments.

USFI enhanced INTERFET’s credibility in numerous ways. The presence of the Aegis cruiser, USS Mobile Bay, strengthened INTERFET naval forces in securing the sea and air lines of communication. The
employment of U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships and the Marines provided a deterrent effect; enhanced INTERFET’s capability to secure Dili, the Oecussi Enclave, and Atauro Island; and demonstrated a commitment to ensuring the success of humanitarian relief operations. The CMOC assisted in coordinating humanitarian assistance operations, promising and then delivering on efforts to support NGOs and relief organizations. Finally, TF Thunderbird enabled the continued expansion of INTERFET across East Timor as part of Major General Cosgrove’s ink spot strategy. In each case, INTERFET preserved its credibility by carrying through on commitments with a robust set of military capabilities.

**Freedom of Movement:** The success of peace operations will often hinge on the Joint Force and its partners being at the right place and time to create desired effects. For this reason, freedom of movement is essential. Establishing freedom of movement for relief organizations and the civilian population provides a measure of the success of peace and stability operations. There were several limiting factors that constrained freedom of movement in East Timor, including the overall geography and weather, the local terrain, the poor roads and transportation infrastructure, and the threat. INTERFET leaders were frequently concerned with ensuring the security of the sea and air lines of communications and access to the Oecussi Enclave and Pulau Atauro Island.

USFI support was essential to retaining freedom of movement throughout the conduct of Operation STABILISE. During the early stages of the operation, INTERFET transportation enabled a range of coalition partners, NGOs, and relief organizations to be at the right place and time to carry out their missions. Im-
proved security enabled the return of displaced civilians with support from U.S. airlift and sealift. USFI’s heavy lift helicopters assisted in the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies, which, through the conduct of information operations, further encouraged the return of displaced persons. Finally, USFI LCACs and LCUs enabled operations in the Oecussi Enclave and Palau Atauro Island. The ability to demonstrate unhindered freedom of movement made it clear to potential adversaries that INTERFET could react quickly to any hostile actions.

**Flexibility and Adaptability:** In order to demonstrate flexibility and adaptability, the Joint Force and its partners must have a measure of situational understanding and the means to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Military forces will frequently develop their situational understanding by drawing on firsthand knowledge, intelligence assessments, and information from local partners, adjacent units, and higher headquarters. USFI provided airborne collection, counterintelligence, human and signals intelligence, and multidisciplinary analysis to assist in building the situational awareness and understanding of commanders. The Trojan Spirit provided a reachback capability to U.S. national intelligence assets and enabled the flow of classified information to those that needed it. There were challenges with the distribution of classified information. Some coalition force members did not have access to sensitive U.S. intelligence. This did not prevent the success of the mission, but it did complicate some interactions with coalition partners. Developing information sharing arrangements among members of the coalition, including procedures for declassifying critical information, is essential to build trust with coalition partners and develop a common understanding across the area of operations.
USFI provided key communications nodes that enabled the sharing of information, maximizing the flexibility and adaptability of the coalition. The communications network allowed Major General Cosgrove to talk with coalition partners and his national headquarters on an ongoing basis. This dialogue facilitated the development of a common operational picture and assisted in maintaining unity of effort across INTERFET.

Trust engenders flexibility and adaptability. As commanders gain trust in their subordinates, they provide mission orders and articulate intent instead of highly detailed and restrictive instructions. Commanders tell subordinates what to do, not how to do it. USFI benefited from a positive command relationship with INTERFET and with units internal to the U.S. contingent. These relationships allowed USFI to react quickly, plan operations effectively, and provide needed support in response to little more than a phone call or e-mail.

Civil-Military Harmonization and Cooperation: A central feature of peace operations is civil-military harmonization and cooperation, which helps to enhance the credibility of the Joint Force and its partners. Civil-military cooperation persuades actors to consent with peace operations, strengthens the legitimacy of friendly forces, and encourages the parties to the conflict to work toward a peaceful settlement, thereby facilitating the transition to civil control and governance.113

Civil-military cooperation among U.S. Government departments and agencies was evident even before the actual start of Operation STABILISE. At the strategic level, the National Security Council system provided an effective venue for civil-military deliberations, allowing the Pentagon to articulate its res-
ervations with assuming a leading role in East Timor, given the high level of U.S. commitments worldwide. Collaboration was especially evident in gaining Indonesia’s acquiescence and international support for Operation STABILISE. From U.S. congressional action to cut military cooperation with the TNI, to the Chairman of the JCS and CDRUSPACOM dialogue with the Indonesian Defense Ministry, to President Clinton’s engagement at the APEC summit, it is clear that there was unity across the U.S. Government in support of a clearly articulated national policy towards the East Timor situation. This collaboration carried through when departments and agencies undertook activities on the ground.

At the tactical level, USFI operations were in synch with USAID’s efforts to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, revitalize the local economy, and enable democratic development. USFI provided a team of twelve trained and experienced civil affairs personnel, led by a lieutenant colonel, to support Operations STABILISE. The team played an important role, as part of the Australian-led CMOC, in sharing information and coordinating INTERFET (and USFI) support for U.N. agencies and NGOs. These actions contributed to a shared understanding of the security situation and provided much needed help to the relief organizations in their efforts to support the population. Without the cooperation engendered by the CMOC, there is a possibility that military operations and relief efforts might have conflicted and hindered each other.

**Restraint and Minimum Force:** A misuse of force can have a negative impact upon the legitimacy of the peace operation. On the other hand, the appropriate use of force to prevent disruption of the peace process and promote security can strengthen the consent of various actors in the environment.
USFI was never directly involved in any incidents that required the use of force in East Timor. However, a contributing factor to the success of Operation STABILISE was the discipline and restraint of the INTERFET forces that took part in the effort. There were a number of incidents involving the TNI forces and the militias, which had the potential to escalate into international crises. INTERFET forces were successful during efforts to deescalate situations involving the TNI. Coalition forces adhered to their commander’s intent and understood the tactical and strategic impacts associated with a violent exchange. Alternatively, confrontations with the militias, involving the effective and disciplined use of force, served notice that INTERFET was willing to take necessary action to achieve security and facilitate the peace process.

U.S. joint forces, down to the lowest level, must be well trained and disciplined—and fully understand the potential adverse impact on operational and strategic goals that may result from an inappropriate use of force. Commanders and their staffs should pay extraordinary attention to the rules of engagement (ROE), ensuring that they do not hinder the ability of military personnel to act. Commanders should provide guidance to enable leaders and service members to make informed decisions that are appropriate to the situation. The ROE requires constant review, given the continuously changing operational environment.

**Objective/End State:** The Joint Force and its partners should direct every operation toward clearly defined, decisive, and achievable objectives and the desired end state. The INTERFET and USFI objectives and end state were clear from the start of Operation STABILISE. Establishing security was paramount. USFI was focused on ensuring the success of
the Australian-led effort, furthering the peace process, and avoiding a confrontation with the TNI and a deterioration of U.S. relations with Indonesia. A question arose during the operation regarding who would decide when USFI had achieved its end state. Although it had a direct U.S. chain of command, USFI was under the operational control of INTERFET. As a result, the final decision rested with Major General Cosgrove. USFI planners developed a methodology that clearly defined the end state conditions, identified the means to achieve them, and outlined the criteria for determining when various elements of the force had attained their transition objectives and standards. The USFI staff briefed Major General Cosgrove on the exit criteria and gained his approval for the transition plan. This identified a clear end to USFI responsibilities in East Timor and ensured continuity with follow-on efforts.

**Perseverance:** The Joint Force and its partners should prepare for the measured and protracted employment of capabilities in support of the peace operation’s mandate and directive. Implementation of a peace process will require a sustained effort employing all instruments of national power.

Military leaders did not envision Operation STABILISE as a long term effort. The intent was to quickly establish security and then transition to UNTAET. There was strong support for the operation within the U.S. Congress and among the public given the level of violence against civilians in East Timor. It is difficult to assess the possible consequences if the militias had conducted a protracted guerrilla campaign or USFI had sustained casualties. However, as INTERFET transitioned to UNTAET, USPACOM established USGET to coordinate continued access to U.S. capa-
bilities to support international efforts in East Timor. USGET demonstrated U.S. resolve and perseverance in providing continued U.S. support. While the end state for the U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations should be well defined, the United States may find it necessary to plan for follow-on operations and initiatives to provide continued support.

Unity of Effort: The Joint Force and its partners must continuously emphasize the need for ensuring that all means are directed to a common purpose. While the chain of command for U.S. military forces remains inviolate, command arrangements among multinational partners may be less well-defined or may not include full command authority.  

Major General Cosgrove had operational control of all national contingents. He assigned specific areas of operations for each nation’s combat forces. Command and control arrangements enabled him to direct operations across the various areas of operation and with the different national contingents towards a common goal. USFI was not assigned its own area of operations. Instead, it received direction from COMINTERFET to execute support operations and enable the various national contingents when and where necessary. The United States played a key supporting role during Operation STABILISE, providing capabilities based on the needs of the coalition partners. Although U.S. forces generally have a clear chain of command to the U.S. President, peace operations and other integrated efforts with international partners and non-Defense U.S. Government departments and agencies will require collaboration with individuals and groups outside of the military command structure. Unity of effort is necessary, even in situations when unity of command does not exist. A good exam-
ple of this collaboration was the INTERFET support for the NGOs and multinational relief organizations focused on providing aid to needy and often isolated communities.

Legitimacy: Interested audiences perceive legitimacy as the legality, morality, appropriateness, or fairness of actions and the actors responsible for them. During the conduct of Joint Force operations, key audiences may include the U.S. public, the U.N., foreign nations, civil populations in the operational area, and other forces participating in the effort. If relevant actors perceive a peace operation as legitimate, it will have a better chance of long-term success.116

The legitimacy of Operation STABILISE had several underpinnings: the decision by President Habibie and the Indonesian Congress to allow a popular consultation in East Timor, the conduct of the subsequent referendum that permitted the people of East Timor to choose independence, a series of U.N. resolutions that provided international support to the peace process, and the multinational character of the intervention force—all contributed to the legitimacy of the undertaking. The high standards of conduct and impartiality of the security forces on the ground and the provision of badly needed relief supplies to the population, in collaboration with NGOs and multinational relief organizations, further contributed to legitimacy.

Security: The Joint Force and its partners need to establish and maintain protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. The security of the population is often a critical consideration during peace operations.

While USFI forces did not directly participate in security operations on the ground in East Timor, they did enable other INTERFET contingents to do so. The
USFI logistic, air and sea transportation, communications, and intelligence support played a key role assisting coalition forces to establish security during Operation STABILISE. The presence of overwhelming U.S. combat power, as demonstrated by the arrival of the USS Belleau Wood and the 31st MEU, deterred threats and contributed to coalition efforts to establish security.

U.S. force protection in East Timor was initially an issue. INTERFET had overall responsibility for the security of USFI and other coalition forces. Differing views on what constituted proper force protection resulted in delays in the deployment of USFI personnel. As INTERFET helped to meet USFI force protection requirements, the issue was resolved. In part, the limited number of personnel that Washington allowed on the ground and the prohibition on a U.S. combat role in East Timor, contributed to the force protection challenge during the early stages of the operation. Eventually, CDRUSPACOM authorized USFI to deploy a limited number of Marines ashore to assist with force protection. A decision from the start to provide limited combat forces for the purpose of force protection could have ameliorated some of the delays. The earlier provision of a force protection element would have enhanced counterintelligence, HUMINT, and CMOC activities during the initial stages of Operation STABILISE.

**Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness:** The Joint Force must develop trust and mutual respect with mission partners and demonstrate cultural awareness during interactions with local actors in the environment. These efforts often take time, patience, and the concerted efforts of leaders at all levels of command. High standards of professional conduct, particularly
during interactions with the local population, are critical.

Many of the senior military leaders during Operation STABILISE had preexisting relationships with each other and with TNI officers, developed during military engagement and security cooperation activities in the years leading up to the intervention. US-PACOM conducted numerous joint and combined exercises throughout its AOR on an annual basis. There were officer exchange programs in place with a number of countries in the region, and officers from around the AOR habitually attended U.S. military schools. These programs began the process of establishing the relationships and mutual respect necessary for successful coalition operations.

USFI had limited contacts within East Timor at the start of the operation. However, USFI personnel worked diligently to establish rapport with relevant actors in the environment. INTERFET, as a whole, exhibited discipline and respect for the local population—and was openly welcomed by the inhabitants of East Timor.

**Current and Sufficient Intelligence:** Intelligence is critical to the conduct of Joint Force operations. Intelligence assessments inform strategic through tactical decisions, the formulation of guidance, and the development and execution of plans. Intelligence plays a key role in determining what Joint Force capabilities to deploy and how to employ them.

USFI’s unique intelligence capabilities—like the Trojan Spirit terminals and the EP-3 surveillance aircraft—made an important contribution to the success of Operation STABILISE. USFI supported the collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence within INTERFET, enabling decision-making and operations.
Intelligence professionals during Operation STABILISE had to continually assess the motivations and potential actions of the TNI, the pro-integration militias, the pro-independence FALINTIL, and a range of civil leaders and communities across East Timor. One challenge that arose during the operation centered on the U.S. ability to share classified intelligence with all members of the coalition. It is critical that military leaders develop intelligence sharing arrangements prior to the conduct of joint or combined operations.

While intelligence efforts often prioritize collection regarding an adversary’s order of battle and intentions, peace and stability operations demand insight into the motivations, priorities, and interests of a range of relevant actors in the environment. The Joint Force must analyze and understand the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that influence behavior. Intelligence plays a key role during efforts to identify and evaluate relevant actors and anticipate and influence their decisions and behavior.

Conclusion

Operation STABILISE was a success. INTERFET worked with a range of partners to establish security, address the humanitarian needs of the population, and enable the necessary political actions that were part of the peace process. Coalition forces facilitated the secure environment necessary for the successful transition to UNTAET and to begin the process of establishing a new political system within East Timor. This process would later result in the founding of Timor Leste as an independent country.
The U.S. contribution to Operation STABILISE played a key role in the overall success of the undertaking. The United States helped establish the political conditions necessary for the largely unopposed international effort in East Timor and aided Australia in building a “coalition of the willing” in support of the operation. In terms of the U.S. military contribution, USFI: 1) provided critical capabilities that were not available within the forces of the other contributing countries, and 2) furnished additional capacity, beyond what was made available by others, to meet mission requirements. After the termination of Operation STABILISE, the United States continued to provide political, economic, and military support to international assistance in East Timor. USGET coordinated for the periodic deployment of Joint Force capabilities that enabled humanitarian relief, aided in reconstruction efforts to repair damaged infrastructure, and provided a visible presence to demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve.

The U.S. experience during Operation STABILISE reinforces the need for a whole of government approach to create the necessary conditions in the environment that will accomplish policy goals and create enduring effects. The United States employed the range of instruments of national power to address the humanitarian crisis in East Timor, preserve its strategic partnership with Indonesia, and limit the commitment of U.S. troops at a time when other global obligation weighed heavily on U.S. policymakers. At the strategic level, U.S. national interests in East Timor were limited. However, leaders in Washington had significant interests in Indonesia and Australia. Concurrently with participating in the international operation in East Timor, the United States continued
its support for the Indonesian democratization process, in the aftermath of Suharto’s rule, and economic recovery, following the recent global financial crisis. Despite the fact that Washington did not contribute forces in a combat role, as Australia at one point wanted, the United States demonstrated its support for the coalition by providing key enabling capabilities.

Shaping the operational environment is critical prior to and during joint operations. USPACOM exercises and military-to-military engagements, leading up to the East Timor intervention, enhanced the U.S. ability to understand and work with key leaders in the TNI and among the armed forces of the coalition members. Participation in joint and combined exercises and military exchange programs, allowed U.S. and regional military officers to develop trust and a shared understanding of developments in the environment. Security cooperation and military engagement activities also enabled some level of interoperability, especially with Australia. In addition to trust, USPACOM activities assisted in providing access within the area of operations; this was the case when CDRUSPACOM re-tasked forces that were about to participate in Exercise CROCODILE ’99.

Operation STABILISE demonstrated that the United States does not need to take the lead in all operations. Regional partners with the requisite desire, leadership, and military capability provide other options. Australia was and is a respected U.S. ally. Frequent interactions between U.S. and Australian forces, during the conduct of combined training exercises, played a key part in developing the foundational partnership for the East Timor operation. The ability of a competent partner to assume the lead role enabled the United States to avoid over committing its military, at
a time when a range of global obligations were also demanding U.S. attention.

Leaders must have a clear understanding of joint capabilities across the services. During Operation STABILISE, USPACOM made use of assigned forces in theater and reach-back capabilities in the United States, which became available as part of Global Force Management and the Secretary of Defense orders process. Military leaders need to understand the impact of drawing small force packages from larger, individual units. This challenge became apparent when the potential deployment of a key enabling capability threatened to degrade the readiness of the entire 25th ID. The employment of a portion of the division’s signal battalion could have resulted in an inability to react to other major contingencies.

The study of Operation STABILISE provides an opportunity to examine a Joint Force operation as part of a small-scale contingency, with an ally fulfilling the role of lead nation. No two operations are entirely the same. However, Operation STABILISE provides insights into many of the challenges of peace and stability operations that may recur as part of future efforts. The Joint Force experience in East Timor provides a variety of insights that may assist military leaders and planners in overcoming challenges in the future. Above all, Operation STABILISE demonstrates the flexibility and adaptability of the Joint Force to meet demands and challenges in a complex operating environment.
Operation STABILISE: Best Practices for Peace Enforcement

The best practices listed below are from the perspective of a small scale contingency operation. In most cases, they apply to all peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, whether the United States is the lead nation or a regional partner fulfills this role.

Strategic Guidance

- Conduct peace enforcement operations with international support under a U.N. or comparable mandate and with regional/multinational partners to ensure the legitimacy of the operation.
- Ensure the U.N. mandate provides strong wording that gives the military commander the necessary authority to accomplish assigned tasks, while minimizing risk to the joint or multinational force.
- Advise U.S. civilian leaders to articulate clearly the strategic objective and desired strategic effects.
- Coordinate with all relevant elements of the U.S. Government and with coalition partners to develop a strategic approach that sets the political and military conditions for a successful intervention.
- Clearly state the mission, intent, military and political objectives, and the end state of the operation, contributing to unity of effort and creating enduring outcomes.
- Provide detailed guidance on the conditions necessary to meet the end state and drawdown
U.S. forces, while enabling post-intervention follow-through efforts.

- Avoid placing unnecessary constraints on the Joint Force commander that limit freedom of action. The Joint Force or multinational commander requires the flexibility to identify and employ all necessary capabilities to accomplish the mission.
- Maintain situational awareness of possible conflict areas and provide or obtain planning guidance to assist in the development of contingency plans.

**Planning and Preparation**

- Establish the Joint Force around a standing, combat-capable, service-provided headquarters and provide augmentation as necessary from other units and services.
- Conduct contingency planning for potential conflict areas to provide multiple options for U.S. and coalition leaders.
- Conduct parallel planning among the anticipated or designated Joint Force headquarters and units as early as possible during the premission process.
- When the United States is not the lead nation, employ joint planning cells and liaison officers to facilitate the lead-nation planning efforts, provide information on U.S. Joint Force capabilities and how to best employ them, and identify requirements.
- In small scale contingencies, identify the capabilities required, the impact of tasking specialized capabilities from larger formations, and
limit, to the extent possible, the reduction in readiness to the parent organization.

• Incorporate force protection in all planning efforts to facilitate freedom of action. Provide all necessary capabilities and resources, to include combat elements, services, and supplies to meet U.S. force protection requirements. When the United States is not the lead nation, coordinate with the lead nation to ensure a clear understanding of Joint Force requirements.

• Educate and train deploying forces on cultural awareness, rules of engagement, the objectives of the parties involved in the conflict, and how to interact with the various actors in the environment.

Operational Employment

• Establish the lodgment rapidly and with overwhelming combat power to maximize the credibility of the intervening force, gain a psychological advantage over potential adversaries, and reassure the population.

• Incorporate information operations as part of all operations to inform and gain the consent of the local population and the international community, and to influence the actions of potential adversaries, neutral parties, and international partners.

• Take actions based on a thorough understanding of the situation to affect or defeat the adversary’s center of gravity.

• Establish security and protect the population, while employing force for maximum psychological effect and to ensure compliance with the
peace process.
• Treat all parties with dignity, respect, and impartiality during peace operations.
• Ensure leaders, down to the lowest level, understand the rules of engagement, the commander’s intent, and the potential impact of their actions on local, regional, and international audiences and stakeholders.
• Issue mission type orders and allow leaders to develop plans and execute operations based on the commander’s intent and the operational situation and environment.
• Establish a CMOC to coordinate humanitarian relief information, requirements, activities, and support with NGOs and other relief organizations.

Transition

• Plan for a deliberate and event-driven transfer of responsibility for the area of operations to a legitimate and competent authority.
• Sequence the departure of units and staff members to preserve situational awareness and the continuity of operations.
• Do not transfer responsibility until the new authority is fully capable of performing the mission.
Appendix A: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Terms

**Joint Task Force** – A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02)

**Multinational force** – A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

**Operational control** – The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02)

**Peacebuilding** – Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 1-02)

**Peace enforcement** – Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 1-02)

**Peacekeeping** – Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02)

**Tactical control** – The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of move-
ments or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP 1-02)

**Stability operations** – An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)
Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25th ID</td>
<td>25th Infantry Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEG</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFFOR</td>
<td>Air Force Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Operational Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>APODETI</td>
<td>Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFOR</td>
<td>Army Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Association of Timorese Social Democrats (Associação Social Democrática Timor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Guided Missile Cruiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNRM</td>
<td>National Council of Maubere Resistance (Conselho Nacional Resistência Maubere)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRT</td>
<td>National Council of Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional Resistência Timor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMINTERFET</td>
<td>Commander INTERFET</td>
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<tr>
<td>DJFHQ</td>
<td>Deployable Joint Force Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>DJTFAC</td>
<td>Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>Deployment Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (<em>Forças Armada de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (<em>Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>III MEF</td>
<td>III Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Forces East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICPAC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>JISS</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Support System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPME</td>
<td>Joint Professional Military Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF TSO</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Timor Sea Operations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
KOPASSUS  Indonesian Special Forces
(Komando Pasukan Khusus)

LCAC  Landing Craft Air Cushioned

LCU  Landing Craft Utility

LHA  Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose)

LNO  Liaison Officer

LOGCAP  Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program

MARFOR  Marine Forces

MARFORPAC  Marine Forces PACOM

MEB  Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEU  Marine Expeditionary Unit

NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVFOR  Naval Forces

NGO  Nongovernmental Organizations

PACAF  Pacific Air Force

PKSOI  Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

PMESII  Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure

RFI  Request for information

ROE  Rules of Engagement

SOC  Special Operations Capable

SRSG  Special Representative to the Secretary General

TALCE  Tanker Airlift Control Element

TF  Task Force

TNI  Indonesian National Armed Forces
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia)

TOR  Terms of Reference
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Timorese Democratic Union (União Democrática Timorese)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>United States Army Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFET</td>
<td>United States Forces East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFI</td>
<td>United States Forces International Forces East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>USGET</td>
<td>United States Support Group East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNS</td>
<td>United States Naval Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: References

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United States Pacific Command, INTERFET Peacekeeping Operation: USCINCPAC Perspective 15 Sep 99 –


## Appendix C: Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 25, 1974</td>
<td>Carnation Revolution in Lisbon, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1975</td>
<td>UDT and FRETILIN form political alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 11, 1975</td>
<td>UDT attempted coup d’état in Dili; leads to fighting with FRETILIN; Portuguese Governor flees Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 24, 1975</td>
<td>UDT forces withdraw from East Timor into West Timor; FRETILIN effectively controls East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 28, 1975</td>
<td>FRETILIN unilaterally declares East Timor independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 7, 1975</td>
<td>Indonesia invades East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17, 1976</td>
<td>Indonesia incorporates East Timor as its 27th province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 20, 1978</td>
<td>Australia recognizes Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 12, 1991</td>
<td>Santa Cruz Cemetery massacre reestablishes international interest in the plight of East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21, 1998</td>
<td>Indonesian President Suharto resigns as a result of protests stemming from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis; he is succeeded by President B.J. Habibie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 19, 1998</td>
<td>Australian Prime Minister Howard sends a letter to President Habibie recommending East Timor independence after a period of autonomy under Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 27, 1999</td>
<td>Habibie offers a Timorese referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1, 1999</td>
<td>MARFORPAC directed to begin planning contingency operations for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 5, 1999</td>
<td>Agreement between Indonesia, Portugal, and the U.N. to conduct popular consultation in August 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 1999</td>
<td>UNSCR 1246 establishes UNAMET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9, 1999</td>
<td>III MEF CONOPS brief to CDRUSPACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 31, 1999</td>
<td>• East Timorese reject autonomy via democratic election (popular consultation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• USFI liaison officers deploy to Brisbane</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 4, 1999</td>
<td>• UNAMET announces popular consultation results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pro-integration militias begin campaign of violence in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 6, 1999</td>
<td>Australia executes Operation SPITFIRE and begins evacuation of UNAMET from Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 10, 1999</td>
<td>CJTF TSO on station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11, 1999</td>
<td>USPACOM DJTFAC deploys to Brisbane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13, 1999</td>
<td>Indonesian President Habibie requests international peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12-13, 1999</td>
<td>APEC Summit takes place in Auckland, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13-22, 1999</td>
<td>USPACOM conducts Exercise TEMPO BRAVE, Okinawa, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 15, 1999</td>
<td>• UN Security Council approves UNSCR 1264 establishing INTERFET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• USPACOM establishes USFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16, 1999</td>
<td>U.S. President Clinton announces decision to provide military support to INTERFET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 17, 1999</td>
<td>Brigadier General Castellaw arrives in Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 18, 1999</td>
<td>USFI Darwin and Sydney headquarters established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19, 1999</td>
<td>• Major General Cosgrove appointed as COMINTERFET</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• COMINTERFET Major General Cosgrove travels to Dili to meet with TNI Major General Syahnakri</td>
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<td>• MSQ-126 arrives in theater</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• EP-3 arrives in theater</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 613th AEG arrives in theater</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| September 20, 1999  | • INTERFET begins landing in Dili  
                     • LNOs from USFI land in Dili with deploying forces on D-Day  
                     • USFI staff arrives in Darwin, Australia                      |
| September 21, 1999  | 613th AEG and EP-3 begin support operations                         |
| September 22, 1999  | INTERFET secures Baucau airfield                                     |
| September 25, 1999  | TNI begins withdrawal from East Timor                                |
| September 27, 1999  | USFI Dili HQ established                                             |
| September 28, 1999  | UNAMET reestablishes its headquarters in Dili                        |
| October 3, 1999     | INTERFET expands operations outside Dili                              |
| October 5, 1999     | • USS Belleau Wood/31st MEU arrive in East Timor                    
                     • JTF TSO departs                                                  |
| October 8, 1999     | • Trojan Spirit arrives in theater                                   
                     • Intelligence Augmentation Team arrives in theater             
                     • CMOC arrives in Dili, East Timor                               |
| October 10, 1999    | INTERFET moves to Inter-Timor Border (ITB)                           |
| October 13, 1999    | EP-3 departs RAAF Tindal                                            |
| October 19, 1999    | Government of Indonesia recognizes East Timor’s independence         |
| October 20, 1999    | • Indonesian Presidential and Vice Presidential elections held       
                     • Indonesia’s National Assembly revokes 1978 decree incorporating East Timor into Indonesia  
                     • Final USFI unit (TF Thunderbird) deploys to East Timor; staff commences development of retrograde plan |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 21, 1999</td>
<td>• Xanana Gusmão returns to East Timor</td>
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<td>• USFET established</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 22, 1999</td>
<td>INTERFET forces deploy to Oecussi Enclave</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 25, 1999</td>
<td>U.N. passes UNSCR 1272 ending the UNAMET mission and establishing UNTAET</td>
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<td>October 26, 1999</td>
<td>USS Peleliu/11th (SOC) MEU arrives in theater replacing the USS Belleau Wood/31st MEU</td>
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<td>October 31, 1999</td>
<td>TNI completes withdrawal from East Timor</td>
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<td>November 2, 1999</td>
<td>U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia visits East Timor</td>
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<td>November 15, 1999</td>
<td>Australian JISS replaces Trojan Spirit systems</td>
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<td>November 16, 1999</td>
<td>Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) Sergio de Mello arrives in Dili, East Timor</td>
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<td>November 21, 1999</td>
<td>INTERFET secures Atauro Island</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 22, 1999</td>
<td>• Air Component and USAF C-130s retro-grade to home stations</td>
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<td>• U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., COMIN-TERFET, SRSG De Mello and staff meet with senior TNI representatives and sign ‘Memorandum of Technical Understanding’ at Motaain on control of the Inter-Timor Border</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 23, 1999</td>
<td>LOGCAP contract helicopters begin providing support</td>
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<td>November 28, 1999</td>
<td>• USS Peleliu/11th MEU (SOC) departs</td>
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<td>• U.S. contracted helicopters arrive and begin executing missions in Dili</td>
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<td>December 1, 1999</td>
<td>General Shelton Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff visits Darwin and East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 5, 1999</td>
<td>INTERFET assumes full responsibility for CMOC activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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| December 7, 1999   | • COMINTERFET, COMWESTFOR, Chief UNMO and Mr. Gusmão meet with West Timor officials at Batugade to discuss border issues  
|                    | • Intelligence Augmentation Team leaves Dili                                         |
| December 15, 1999  | • Australian contracted commercial network replaces the TF Thunderbird network  
|                    | • CMOC and TF Thunderbird depart from Dili                                           |
| December 17, 1999  | Disestablishment of U.S. Compound in Dili, East Timor                                |
| December 18, 1999  | USFI staff of 52 remain behind in Darwin/Dili                                        |
| January 1, 2000    | Shit to commercial vendor for communications complete                                 |
| January 26, 2000   | Transition of USFI to USGET begins                                                  |
| January 26-31, 2000| USS Juneau supports operations off Oecussi enclave                                    |
| February 1, 2000   | • USGET assumes responsibility to support UNTAET  
|                    | • USFI disestablished                                                                |
| February 23, 2000  | INTERFET transitions authority to UNTAET                                             |
Appendix D: Key Leaders and Organizations

United States

**President Bill Clinton:** As the President of the United States since 1992, Bill Clinton had directed numerous peacekeeping efforts including Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. On May 3, 1994 he ordered the publication of Presidential Decision Directive 25, which outlined the role of peace operations in U.S. policy. The directive stated that the United States would participate in international peacekeeping efforts when it advanced U.S. interests, the objectives were clear, there was a well-defined end state for U.S. forces, and U.S. participation was necessary for the success of the operation. His assessment that Indonesian efforts were insufficient to stop the violence in East Timor and decision to support Australia, set in motion U.S. support for Operation STABILISE.

**U.S. Department of State:** As the diplomatic component of the U.S. Government, the Department of State coordinated and led the efforts to pressure Indonesia to live up to its responsibilities under the May 5 Agreement. Once it became evident Jakarta would not or could not end the violence, the Department of State led the drive to encourage Indonesia to request international assistance. The department conducted continuous diplomatic engagement throughout Operation STABILISE, working with Australia and other international partners to build the coalition, pass UN-SCR 1264 and 1272, and urge Indonesian leaders to continue the post-Suharto transition to democracy and support INTERFET operations in East Timor.
Admiral Dennis C. Blair: As the Commander of USPACOM, Admiral Blair established USFI and designated Brigadier General Castellaw as the commander. Admiral Blair was in favor of limiting the U.S. forces committed to Operation STABILISE and allowing the Australians to lead the effort. His previous relationship enabled access to the Indonesian Defense Minister and Commander of the TNI, General Wiranto. This access enabled Admiral Blair to assist in diplomatic efforts to pressure Indonesia to accept a multinational force in East Timor.

US Forces INTERFET (USFI): A designated Joint Force, which included the U.S. military component of INTERFET. USFI provided logistical, communications, transportation, and intelligence support during Operation STABILISE. It included elements from III MEF, 613th AEG, the 11th Signal Brigade, the 31st MEU, the 11th MEU (SOC), the 96th CA Brigade, and several U.S. naval vessels.

Brigadier General John G. Castellaw: Prior to Operation STABILISE, Brigadier General Castellaw (USMC) was the Deputy Commander of III MEF and the Commander, 3rd MEB. Admiral Blair selected Castellaw as Commander, USFI on September 15, 1999. Castellaw formed the USFI staff, drawing personnel from the III MEF. He recognized he had limited time available to form the USFI staff and needed a team of individuals he knew and trusted. His preexisting relationship with Major General Cosgrove—and efforts to maintain the trust of COMINTERFET—allowed USFI to work effectively with minimal guidance.

Colonel Randolph P. Strong: Prior to the start of Operation STABILISE, Colonel Strong (USA) was the newly assigned Commander, 516th Signal Brigade under USARPAC. Upon deployment with USFI, he
was triple hatted as the Deputy Commander USFI, Commander USFET, and Commander ARFOR. His appointment was unusual given his background as an Army signals officer. However, his past experience in peacekeeping operations and his technical expertise proved fortuitous, given the key role of TF Thunderbird in providing communications support for INTERFET.

**USGET:** USGET assumed responsibility for providing continued U.S. support to UNTAET after the disestablishment of USFI. USGET operated under U.S. command, separate from the U.N. peacekeeping force. USGET coordinated deployments by U.S. military units to support stability and reconstruction efforts until East Timor’s official independence in 2001.

**East Timor**

**Jose Alexandre Xanana Gusmão:** Rose to lead FRETILIN and FALINTIL in the early 1980s. His efforts to reform FRETILIN’s political agenda and re-shape the FALINTIL into a true guerrilla force, supported by the East Timorese population, were critical to the continuation of the independence movement. His reforms eventually led to the development of a unified political front to oppose the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. His arrest, trial, and detention in 1992 drew international attention and highlighted the plight of the East Timorese people. Mr. Gusmão proved an able partner to UNTAET in helping to stand up an East Timorese government. He was elected the first president of East Timor in 2001.

**Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN):** An East Timorese party that espoused Democratic Socialism. It was driven under-
ground during the Indonesian occupation and eventually was led by Xanana Gusmão. In 2001, the group won a plurality of seats within the East Timorese parliament, during the country’s first free election. The FRETILIN’s armed wing was the FALINTIL.

**FALINTIL:** The most prominent armed resistance group in East Timor from 1975 through 1999 and the armed wing of FRETILIN. During the popular consultation and Operation STABILISE, the FALANTIL remained in cantonment areas during the pro-integration militias’ campaign of violence. After East Timor gained its independence, the FALINTIL became the basis for the country’s security forces.

**Pro-Indonesian militias:** A collection of East Timorese groups, supported and in some cases led by the TNI, who violently opposed an independent East Timor. They were originally established in the late 1970s and early 1980s as part of the TNI approach to counterinsurgency. Most militias disbanded during the 1990s. In response to President Habibie’s proposed independence vote, the TNI reestablished the militias. Prior to and after the popular consultation, the militias were responsible for much of the violence against the East Timorese population.

**Indonesia**

**President Suharto:** The president of Indonesia from 1967 to 1998. He resigned as a result of pro-democracy protests in Jakarta during the Asian financial crisis. He directed the invasion and annexation of East Timor, ostensibly to counter any possible communist expansion within Indonesia’s sphere of interest.

**President B. J. Habibie:** He succeeded to the presidency of Indonesia after President Suharto’s resigna-
tion. In January 1999, following a letter from Australian Prime Minister Howard, Habibie surprised the international community and members of his own government by offering the East Timorese either autonomy or independence. After the announcement of the popular consultation results, he reluctantly agreed, under international pressure, to the deployment of a multinational force in East Timor to help end the violence and establish security.

**TNI:** The Indonesian military forces that invaded and occupied East Timor in 1975 to prevent a possible communist takeover. Over the next 30-years, the TNI conducted a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, which garnered significant international condemnation. In 1998, the TNI reestablished and supported the pro-integration militias, who were responsible for much of the pre- and post-popular consultation violence. There are some reports that postulate the post-consultation violence was part of a preconceived plan by the TNI; the objective of the campaign was to deter other groups that might consider seeking autonomy from Indonesia. The TNI did not interfere significantly with INTERFET during operations and withdrew from East Timor by the end of October 1999.

**KOPASSUS:** The Indonesian Special Forces command responsible for some of the more violent acts of repression against the East Timorese. Allegedly, the KOPASSUS trained the pro-Indonesian East Timorese militias. The KOPASSUS played a significant role in Operation KOMODO, which established conditions for the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.
United Nations

**UNAMET:** Established under UNSCR 1246 on June 11, 1999. It was responsible for planning and executing the popular consultation in East Timor. Although it registered over 460,000 voters and successfully conducted the popular consultation, it proved unable to halt the violence by pro-integration groups. In early September 1999, UNAMET evacuated East Timor under Operation SPITFIRE, but returned after INTERFET reestablished security. UNAMET’s mission ended on October 25, 1999 with the establishment of UNTAET.

**Secretary General Kofi Annan:** A key negotiator during the lead up to the May 5 Agreement, which set East Timor on the path towards independence. He led efforts in the U.N. Security Council to gain approval for INTERFET and UNTAET.

**UNTAET:** Established under UNSCR 1272, UNTAET was responsible for establishing the transitional administration in East Timor, leading reconstruction efforts following the pro-integration militia violence, and maintaining security following the departure of INTERFET. UNTAET successfully established a transitional authority, which led to elections and the emergence of Timor Leste as an independent country in 2001.

**International Partners**

**INTERFET:** The U.N. sponsored, Australian-led peace enforcement mission that established security in East Timor following the pro-integration militia’s campaign of violence. INTERFET consisted primarily of Australian troops with contingents from Thai-
länd, New Zealand, South Korea, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Jordan, the United States, and at least 12 other countries. It arrived in Dili on September 20, 1999, and, using what was known as an ink-spot strategy, eventually spread out to secure the rest of East Timor. INTERFET ended its operations and transitioned authority to UNTAET on February 23, 2000. Most of the international troops that supported INTERFET became part of the peacekeeping forces under UNTAET.

**Australian Prime Minister John Howard:** In December 1998, Prime Minister Howard sent a letter to Indonesian President Habibie suggesting a period of autonomy, leading to East Timorese self-determination. In July and August 1999, Howard signaled Australia’s willingness to lead a multinational force into East Timor, if the Government of Indonesia requested it and the U.N. provided a mandate. In March 1999, Howard directed the ADF to bring a second brigade to a high state of readiness in preparations for what many saw as actions in East Timor.

**Major General Peter Cosgrove:** The Commander, 1st Australian Division and the DJFHQ, which was Australia’s contingency force. He directed his staff to plan contingency operations for the evacuation of Australian and UNAMET personnel and potential peacekeeping operations in East Timor. Cosgrove was appointed Commander INTERFET on September 19, 1999. During Operation STABILISE, he undertook two actions that ultimately led to its success. He met with the TNI commander in East Timor prior to the arrival of coalition troops to ensure Indonesian forces would not impede operations. Cosgrove also secured the East Timor border with West Timor. After Operation STABILISE, Major General Cosgrove became
a national hero. He rose to command the ADF and eventually became Governor General of Australia.

**ASEAN Countries:** The ASEAN countries provided almost half of all forces to INTERFET. This contribution was significant considering their general policy of staying out of member country’s internal affairs. In addition, the ASEAN commitment was key to providing legitimacy to INTERFET.
1. The Security Council will be aware of the efforts which, since 1983, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal have undertaken through my good offices to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor. These efforts have culminated with the signature, on 5 May 1999, of an overall Agreement, attached herewith (annex I), between the two Governments entrusting me with the organization and conduct of a popular consultation for the purpose of ascertaining whether the East Timorese people, both inside and outside the Territory, accept or reject a proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia, which is appended to the Agreement. The Agreement requests me to establish immediately a United Nations mission in East Timor for the purpose of conducting the popular consultation.

2. The Council will note that, under article 5 of the Agreement, in the event of the popular consultation resulting in the approval of the proposed special autonomy by a majority of the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia would initiate the constitutional measures required for the implementation of the autonomy framework, and the Government of Portugal would initiate within the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal of East Timor
from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the
General Assembly and the deletion of the question of
East Timor from the agendas of the Security Council
and the General Assembly. Article 6 of the Agreement
provides in parallel that, should the popular consulta-
tion result in a majority of the East Timorese people
rejecting the proposed special autonomy, the Govern-
ment of Indonesia would take the constitutional steps
necessary to terminate Indonesia’s links with East
Timor, thus restoring under Indonesian law the status
that East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and that
the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal would
agree with the Secretary-General on arrangements for
a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East
Timor to the United Nations, which would then initi-
ate a process enabling East Timor to begin a transition
towards independence.

3. I should further point out that, under article 7 of
the Agreement, it is foreseen that the United Nations
will maintain an adequate presence in East Timor dur-
ing the interim period between the conclusion of the
popular consultation and the start of the implementa-
tion of either the special autonomy or the assumption
of authority by the United Nations. Also, in the event
that the East Timorese people approve the special au-
tonomy framework, I am authorized under article 56
of the framework to establish in East Timor such of-
ices as I may deem necessary in order to carry out my
responsibility to monitor and verify compliance with
its provisions.

4. The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal
have also signed, on 5 May 1999, the two attached sup-
plementary agreements, on the modalities for the pop-
ular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct
ballot (annex II) and on security arrangements (annex
III), which, inter alia, stipulate that 8 August 1999 will be the date for the ballot to take place, both inside and outside East Timor, that a secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair popular consultation, that the appropriate Indonesian authorities have the responsibility to ensure such an environment as well as for the maintenance of law and order, and that the United Nations will ascertain whether the necessary security exists for the peaceful implementation of the consultation process.

5. Under the terms of the supplementary agreements, I have been requested by the two parties to deploy, immediately upon signature, United Nations personnel adequate for the execution of the various phases of the consultation process. I have also been requested, in paragraph 4 of the Agreement regarding security, to make available a number of civilian police officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian police in the discharge of their duties and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites.

6. I do not wish to minimize the logistical and other problems that the United Nations will face in carrying out the consultation in such a short time-frame. The Security Council will be aware of the high level of tension and serious incidents of political violence that have recently occurred coupled with the reported opposition to the proposed consultation by some political elements in East Timor. I have emphasized to the parties the main elements that will need to be in place in order to enable me to determine that the necessary security conditions exist for the start of the operational phases of the consultation process. These include the bringing of armed civilian groups under strict control
and the prompt arrest and prosecution of those who incite or threaten to use violence, a ban on rallies by armed groups while ensuring the freedom of association and expression of all political forces and tendencies, the redeployment of Indonesian military forces and the immediate institution of a process of laying down of arms by all armed groups to be completed well in advance of the holding of the ballot. I intend to report to the Security Council periodically on the evolution of the situation, the status of the United Nations presence and other matters regarding the implementation of the Agreements.

7. Given the limited period of time between the signature of these Agreements and the date of the ballot, I have opened a trust fund to which Member States may channel voluntary contributions, which would enable me, without waiting for the assessed budgetary process, to proceed as soon as possible with the establishment of a United Nations presence in East Timor.

8. Once the logistical and personnel requirements of the mission have been identified, I shall report them to the Security Council and to the General Assembly. I shall also be presenting to the Council, for its approval, my recommendations regarding the deployment of civilian police personnel.
Annex I

Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor

The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1541 (XV), 2625 (XXV) and the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of East Timor;

Bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor;

Recalling the agreement of 5 August 1998 to undertake, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor without prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective Governments on the final status of East Timor;

Having discussed a constitutional framework for an autonomy for East Timor on the basis of a draft presented by the United Nations, as amended by the Indonesian Government;

Noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that the proposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an end solution to the question of East Timor with full recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor;

Noting the position of the Government of Portugal that an autonomy regime should be transitional, not
requiring recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly, pending a final decision on the status of East Timor by the East Timorese people through an act of self-determination under United Nations auspices;

Taking into account that, although the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal each have their positions of principle on the prepared proposal for special autonomy, both agree that it is essential to move the peace process forward, and that therefore, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal agree that the Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people on the constitutional framework for autonomy attached hereto as an annex;

Bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal requested the Secretary-General to devise the method and procedures for the popular consultation through a direct, secret and universal ballot;
Agree as follows:

Article 1
Request the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot.

Article 2
Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission in East Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation.

Article 3
The Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side.

Article 4
Request the Secretary-general to report the result of the popular consultation to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as to inform the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the East Timorese people.

Article 5
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that, the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government
of Indonesia shall initiate the constitutional measures necessary for the implementation of the constitutional framework, and the Government of Portugal shall initiate within the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal of East Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor from the agendas of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Article 6

If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.

Article 7

During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United Nations presence in East Timor.

DONE in New York, on this 5th day of May, 1999.
For the Government of Indonesia

/s/
Ali Alatas
Minister for Foreign Affairs
For the Government of Portugal

/s/
Jaime Gama
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Witnessed:

/s/
Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General
United Nations
Appendix
A constitutional framework for a special autonomy for East Timor

PART ONE
RESPECTIVE AREAS OF COMPETENCE
Chapter I
The Indonesian (Central) Government
Section A: Foreign Relations

Article 1
The Indonesian Government, hereinafter, referred to as the Central Government, shall have responsibility for and competence over the foreign affairs of the Special Autonomous Region of East Timor (SARET). It shall consult the Government of the SARET for the purpose of taking into account the views of the Government of the SARET on issues of particular relevance to the SARET.

Section B: Defence

Article 2
The Central Government shall have responsibility for and competence over the external defence of the SARET, as part of the territory of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 3
For such purpose, the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia ñ TNI) shall maintain a military presence in the SARET in the context of defending and safeguarding the external security of the SARET.
Article 4
In the event of an external armed attack, or an imminent threat of such an attack, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) may be deployed outside their bases or normal areas of operation in the exercise of its duty to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.

Section C: Economic and Fiscal Policies

Article 5
The SARET shall be a part of the Indonesian monetary and customs unit subject to those national monetary and fiscal policies, and laws and regulations of Indonesia which are consistent with this Agreement.

Article 6
The Central Government will continue its assistance to the development of the SARET.

Article 7
The Central Government shall have exclusive competence over national taxation and the Government of the SARET shall have exclusive competence over local taxation, in conformity with the relevant laws and regulations.

Article 8
Natural resources in the SARET, except those considered to be strategic or vital under national laws, shall be under the control of the Government of the SARET. In the exploitation of all natural resources, the Central Government and the Government of the SARET may establish cooperative or joint undertakings.

Article 9
For the purposes of its overall development, the
Government of the SARET may receive foreign assistance which is to be channeled through the Central Government.

Article 10

The Government of the SARET can enter into domestic loans to finance part of its budget, with the consent of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET.

Section D: Continuity of Indonesian Laws

Article 11

Indonesian laws in force upon the date of the entry into force of this Agreement that fall within the competence of the Central Government, as defined in this Chapter, shall remain in force for the SARET.

Chapter II

The Government of the Special Autonomous Region of East Timor

Article 12

All matters, other than those listed within Chapter I of Part One, and as provided in other relevant provisions of this Agreement, shall be within the responsibility and competence of the Government of the SARET.

Article 13

The powers of the Government of the SARET shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, and also in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 14

The Government of the SARET shall not:

a. restrict the rights of workers as recognized by law; and

b. reserve any occupation or public office solely to persons with East Timorese identity.
Chapter III
Jurisdictions of the Central Government and the Government of the SARET

Article 15
The Government of the SARET shall have jurisdiction over crimes committed in the SARET with the exception of those related to treason and terrorism, narcotics and other international crimes, over which Indonesian laws and jurisdiction shall prevail.

PART TWO
EAST TIMORESE IDENTITY, RESIDENCE AND IMMIGRATION
Chapter I
Definition

Article 16
Any person,
   a. who was a lawful resident of East Timor prior to or in December 1975,
   b. whose father, mother, grandfather, or grandmother was a lawful resident of East Timor prior to or in December 1975, or
   c. who has permanently resided in East Timor for a period of at least five years at the time of the entry into force of this Agreement,

shall be considered to have East Timorese identity, irrespective of nationality, and have the right to permanent domicile in East Timor.
Chapter II
Acquisition of Identity, Residence and Immigration

Article 17
The Government of the SARET shall have the exclusive right to establish the rules and procedures under which persons who do not have East Timorese identity may acquire such identity.

Article 18
The Central Government shall have the power to apply immigration controls on entry into and departure from the SARET of persons who are neither citizens of Indonesia nor have East Timorese identity, pursuant to its authority under Article 1 of this Agreement.

Article 19
The SARET shall have the authority to issue documents to individuals in order to identify those who have East Timorese identity.

Chapter III
Symbols of Identity

Article 20
The SARET may adopt its own coat of arms. The Indonesian national flag and Indonesian national anthem Indonesian Rayaî shall be flown and performed at such places and occasions as required by the existing laws and practices.

Article 21
The SARET may participate under its own name, with the concurrence of the Central Government, in international cultural and sports events in which other non-state entities participate.
PART THREE
POWERS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE SARET
Chapter 1
Legislative Powers and Institutions of the SARET

Article 22
The legislative power of the SARET shall extend to all matters not within the jurisdiction of the Central Government, as defined in Chapter I of Part One. This power shall include, the establishment of political, economic, and social policies in the SARET; cultural and educational matters; designation of a second language or languages in addition to the official language, Bahasa Indonesia; the establishment of courts of first instance pursuant to Article 40; rules of family law and succession; and public order, including the creation of an East Timor police force that shall be responsible for enforcement of all laws and regulations in the SARET, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 23
The SARET may adopt legislations regulating or restricting the ownership of property by persons who do not have East Timorese identity without contravening legitimately acquired rights.

Article 24
The SARET shall have the authority to establish a Land Claims Commission, whose members shall be selected in accordance with the manner prescribed for the selection of judges in Article 42, which shall make recommendations in order to decide on all disputed claims to title over real property through the court.

Article 25
The Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET

1. The legislative power of the SARET shall be vested in and exercised by the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET, elected by persons of East Timorese identity as defined in Part Two, on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The implementation of elections for the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET shall be further determined by the SARET and need not coincide with national elections.

2. Members of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET shall be persons who fulfill the eligibility requirements for membership. No racial, ethnic, religious, nationality, or other requirement unrelated to the exercised of the functions of a member of the Council shall be imposed.

3. Members of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET shall be immune from legal action in respect of their oral or written statements or actions relating to the business of the Council, or made or taken in their capacity as members of the Council.

Chapter II
Executive Powers and Institutions of the Government of the SARET

Article 26
The executive power of the Government of the SARET shall be exercised by a Governor who will be assisted by an Advisory Board whose members shall be appointed by the Governor upon the recommendation of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET.
Article 27
The Government of the SARET shall have the competence to design, guide and implement policies, and programmes and issue executive decrees and regulations within the scope of the laws of the SARET. It shall also be responsible for ensuring that all laws and regulations applicable in East Timor are faithfully administered and enforced.

Article 28
The Governor of SARET shall be elected by a majority of the members of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET and responsible to it. The list of candidates for the post of Governor of the SARET shall first be consulted with and approved by the President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 29
The Governor-elect shall be formally confirmed to the post by the President of the Republic of Indonesia and shall be formally invested before the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET.

Article 30
The Governor shall designate officials who shall be in charge of the executive services and other bodies of the SARET.

Article 31
The Government of the SARET shall have responsibility for the maintenance of public order in East Timor and for the administration and enforcement of all laws and regulations within the SARET.

Article 32
There shall be a Police Force of the SARET which shall be organized in accordance with regional laws.

Article 33
The Police Force of the SARET shall be subject to the authority and control of the Government of the
Article 34
Members of the Police Force of the SARET shall be recruited, without discrimination on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds.

Article 35
The primary functions of the Police Force of the SARET shall be:

a. To preserve internal peace and good order in East Timor; and

b. To maintain and, as necessary, enforce the law in an impartial and objective manner.

Chapter III
Judicial Powers and Institutions of the SARET

Article 36
The judicial power of the SARET shall be vested in and exercised by an independent judiciary.

Article 37
The judiciary of the SARET shall have jurisdiction over all civil, criminal, administrative and other matters that fall within the competence of the SARET.

Article 38
In any civil suit, with the consent of all of the parties to such suit, the judiciary can apply any customary law applicable between such parties and recognized as such by the judiciary of the SARET.

Article 39
The judiciary of the SARET shall consist of such Courts of First Instance as may be established by regulations of the SARET, a Court of Appeal, a Court of Final Appeal and a Public Prosecutor.
Article 40
Courts of First Instance
1. There shall be Courts of First Instance in the SARET for the administration of justice. Such courts shall have such original civil, criminal and administrative jurisdiction as may be necessary to administer the laws in force in the SARET.

2. The Courts of First Instance shall consist of such judges as may be required for the proper administration of justice.

Article 41
The Court of Appeal
1. There shall be a Court of Appeal, consisting of a President and as many other judges as may be required, which shall have appellate jurisdiction from judgments of the Courts of First Instance.

2. The Court of Appeal also shall have original and appellate jurisdiction over all cases that concern the interpretation of Indonesian laws applicable to the SARET or the interpretation of Parts One, Five and Six of this Agreement.

3. The President of the Court of Appeal shall be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, upon the recommendation of an independent Judicial Commission, which will be established in accordance with procedures adopted by the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET.

Article 42
Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the Court of Appeal shall be selected by the Judicial Commission.

Article 43
The Judicial Commission also shall be responsible for disciplinary and other issues related to judicial
performance, as specified by the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET.

Article 44

Court of Final Appeal
1. The court of final appeal of the SARET shall be the Supreme Court of Indonesia.
2. An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Indonesia which is the right of the disputing parties:
   a. in all cases concerning laws and regulations of Indonesia applicable in the SARET;
   b. in all cases concerning the interpretation of this Agreement, provided that the Supreme Court shall establish a special chamber to hear such cases composed of an odd number of judges drawn from the Supreme Court of Indonesia and ad hoc judges drawn from the Supreme Court of Indonesia and ad hoc judges drawn from the East Timor Court of Appeal of the SARET.
3. An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Indonesia with the leave of the Court of Appeal:
   a. in all cases concerning the interpretation of the regional laws and regulations of the SARET;
   b. on questions of law arising in criminal and civil cases.

Article 45

The Public Prosecutor shall be appointed, and shall have such duties, as provided for the regional laws and regulations of the SARET.
PART FOUR
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

Article 46
The Central Government and the Government of the SARET shall promote, protect and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination of any kind, as set forth, inter alia, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights and the Decree of the People’s Consultative Assembly No. XVII/MPR/1998 Concerning Human Rights. These rights and fundamental freedoms include:

a. freedom of thought, conscience, and religion;
b. the right to life, liberty, and security of person;
c. freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile;
d. the right to a full and fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of any civil rights or obligations or any criminal charge;
e. freedom of expression in all its forms, association, and peaceful assembly;
f. the right to form political parties specific to East Timor without restrictions of any kind and subject to the provision of Article 57;
g. the right to participate in government without discrimination, through free periodic elections and non-discriminatory access to public service, subject to the provisions of Article 25;
h. the right to participate in Indonesian national political life, including the right to vote in general elections and to be elected as a member of the Indonesian national Parliament or be appointed as a member of the People’s Consultative Assembly.
i. the right to participate in Indonesian public and administrative services without discrimination on any grounds;
j. freedom of movement throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia;
k. the right of everyone to enjoy and participate in his or her culture;
l. the right to own property and not to be arbitrary deprived of it;
m. the right to protection for family life, privacy, home and correspondence;
n. the right to education, including, as a minimum, the right to a free primary education for all;
o. the right to an adequate standard of living, subject to available resources and capabilities;
p. the right of women to full and equal participation in political, civil, economic, social, and cultural life;
q. the rights of the child, without discrimination of any kind, as set fourth in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

PART FIVE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SARET

Article 47
The Central Government shall take into account the views of the Government of the SARET in the adoption of laws, regulations and policies within the competence of the Central Government that may have a direct effect in the SARET.

Article 48
In the implementation of those laws, regulations or policies of the Central Government that are applicable in the SARET, as set forth in Chapter I of Part One, the Government of the SARET shall coordinate, with the relevant offices of the Central Government.

Article 49
The Central Government shall appoint a senior official, who shall reside in Dili, to exercise the competences of the Central Government in the SARET, and to coordinate and supervise such Central Government officials the SARET as may be necessary to assist the Government of the SARET in the implementation of laws, regulations and policies within the competence of the Central Government, as set forth in Chapter I of Part One, and to perform the functions provided for in Article 50 below.

Article 50
The Central Government and the Government of the SARET may create bodies or other arrangements to facilitate consultation, cooperation and coordination on such matters as police matters, tourism, transportation, telecommunications, education, health and the environment.

Article 51
In the performance of its duties, the Police Force of the SARET shall consult and cooperate with the Central Government authorities with respect to the enforcement of Indonesian national laws in the SARET.

Article 52
The Police Force of the SARET shall take the necessary action, at the request of the Indonesian National Police to apprehend persons in the SARET accused of having committed crimes outside the SARET.

Article 53
The Indonesian National Police shall take the nec-
necessary action, in cooperation with the Police Force of the SARET, to apprehend persons outside the SARET accused of having committed crimes in the SARET.

Article 54

In exceptional cases the Indonesian National Police will assist the Police Force of the SARET in the performance of its functions.

PART SIX
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SPECIAL AUTONOMOUS OF EAST TIMOR AND OTHER ENTITIES

Article 55

Without prejudice to the responsibility and competence of the Central Government, as set forth in Article 1,

the Government of the SARET may, with the consent of the Central Government enter into agreements and engage in cultural, economic, trade, environmental, transportation, scientific, technical, tourism, and sports activities with regional governments/cities of foreign countries and international organizations;

the Government of the SARET may seek and obtain international development assistance with the consent of the Central Government;

foreign governments may open, with the consent of the Central Government, nondiplomatic representative offices in the SARET.
PART SEVEN
THE UNITED NATIONS

Article 56
The United Nations Secretary-General shall have the responsibility and authority to monitor and verify compliance with this Agreement. This authority includes monitoring the election of members of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET and verifying that such elections are free and fair. For this purpose, the United Nations Secretary-General may establish in the SARET such offices as he deems necessary which would operate within a specific time-frame to be further agreed upon between the United Nations and the Indonesian Government.

PART EIGHT
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 57
The special autonomy for East Timor as provided in this Agreement is granted within the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

PART NINE
BASIC LAW OF THE SARET

Article 58
The SARET shall be governed by a basic law, enacted by the first elected Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET and which shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
PART TEN
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 59
The following provisions shall be in effect during the time between the entry into force of this agreement and the election and assumption of office by the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET and the Executive Council of the SARET:

There shall be a broadly representative Transitional Council, composed of no more than 25 persons of East Timorese identity, whose members shall be appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General in consultation with relevant individuals and groups within the SARET and with the Government of Indonesia.

The Transitional Council can enact the regional laws and regulations for the election of the first Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET and for such subjects as may be agreed upon by the parties to this Agreement, in accordance with existing laws, while maintaining the smooth functioning of the general administration, public services and public order.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Transitional Council shall engage in consultations to ensure the effective implementation of this Agreement, and the smooth and peaceful process of transition in the SARET.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Governments of Indonesia and the Transitional Council shall establish as working group that will address transitional security arrangements.
ANNEX II
Agreement regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot

The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Agree as follows:
Immediately following the conclusion of the agreement between the two Governments requesting the Secretary-General to consult the East Timorese people on whether they would accept or reject the proposed constitutional framework for autonomy, the Secretary-General will, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, begin preparations for the popular consultation by deploying in East Timor such personnel as will be adequate for the purpose of executing the various phases of the consultation process. Preparations for the vote outside East Timor will also begin at locations of major East Timorese concentration outside East Timor.

A. Date for consultation

The ballot will take place on Sunday, 8 August 1999, both inside and outside East Timor.

B. Question to be put before the voters

The question that the Secretary-General will put to the voters is:

“Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?”
OR

“Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?”

The United Nations logo will appear on the ballot papers. The ballot papers will include symbols to facilitate voting by illiterate persons.

C. Entitlement to vote

The following persons, aged 17 years or above, shall be eligible to vote in the popular consultation:

(a) persons born in East Timor,
(b) persons born outside East Timor but with at least one parent having been born in East Timor, and
(c) persons whose spouses fall under either of the two categories above.

D. Schedule of the consultation process (in overlapping time periods)

The schedule for the operational stages of the consultation process will be approximately as follows:

Operational planning/Deployment
10 May-15 June
Public information programme/
10 May - 5 August
Voter education
Preparation and Registration
13 June - 17 July
Exhibition of lists and challenges/
18 July - 23 July
  Decisions on challenges and complaints
  Political Campaign
20 July - 5 August*
  Cooling off period
6 August - 7 August
  Polling Day
8 August

*Subject to revision

E. Operational Phases

a) Information Campaign

The United Nations will make available the text of the main Agreement and the autonomy document to be voted on in the following languages: Tetun, Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese and English.

The United Nations will disseminate and explain the content of the main Agreement and the autonomy document in an impartial and factual manner inside and outside East Timor.

The United Nations will explain to voters the process and procedure of the vote, and the implications of an ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ vote.

The radio stations and the newspapers in East Timor as well as other Indonesian and Portuguese media outlets will be utilized in the dissemination of this information. Other appropriate means of dissemination will be made use of as required.

b) Registration

Registration inside and outside East Timor will
take place for a continuous period of 20 days.

Two hundred registration centres will be opened in East Timor for this purpose.

Outside East Timor, special registration centres will be opened in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Denpasar, Ujung Pandang, Sydney, Darwin, Perth, Melbourne, Lisbon, Maputo, Macau, New York with adjustments to be made as appropriate. The United Nations may utilize the services of the Australian Electoral Commission for the balloting in Australia and of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Portugal and elsewhere.

The registration lists will be exhibited for five days at the end of the registration period at the respective registration centres, regional offices and at Dili headquarters. Challenges to the lists shall be submitted to the regional offices for a final decision by the Electoral Commission prior to polling day.

c) Campaign

Supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal will campaign ahead of the vote in a peaceful and democratic manner during the period designated for this purpose.

There will be a Code of Conduct for the campaign, to be proposed by the United Nations and discussed with the supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal.

The United Nations will devise the means to provide equal opportunity for the two sides to disseminate their views to the public.

Officials of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal will not participate in the campaign in support of either option.
East Timorese government officials may campaign in their personal capacity. All such campaigning will be carried out strictly according to the Code of Conduct without use of public funds and government resources or recourse to pressure of office.

d) Balloting in East Timor

Voting in East Timor will take place in approximately 700 registration/polling stations located in 200 polling centres.

e) Balloting outside East Timor

Voting will take place in polling stations set up in the same locations as the registration centres mentioned above.

f) Observers

Indonesia and Portugal shall be entitled to send an equal number of representatives to observe all the operational phases of the consultation process both inside and outside East Timor.

International observers will be able to observe the consultation process under terms to be developed by the United Nations to regulate their presence.

F. Funding

The Secretary-General will seek the approval of the Security Council for the operation in order to ensure assessed budgetary funding. Voluntary contributions will be channeled through a Trust Fund established for this purpose.
G. Security

The Indonesian authorities will ensure a secure environment for a free and fair popular consultation process and will be responsible for the security of United Nations personnel. A number of United Nations security guards will be deployed to ensure the security and safety of United Nations personnel and property. A number of international civilian police will be available in East Timor to advise the Indonesian Police during the operational phases of the popular consultation and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from polling sites.

DONE in New York on this 5th day of May, 1999.

For the Government of Indonesia

/s/
Ali Alatas
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the United Nations

/s/
Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General
For the Government of Portugal

/s/
Jaime Gama
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Annex III

East Timor popular consultation

The Government of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary General of the United Nations,

Agree as follows:

1. A secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair ballot in East Timor. Responsibility to ensure such an environment as well as for the general maintenance of law and order rests with the appropriate Indonesian security authorities. The absolute neutrality of the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) and the Indonesian Police is essential in this regard.

2. The Commission on Peace and Stability established in Dili on 21 April 1999 should become operational without delay. The Commission, in cooperation with the United Nations, will elaborate a code of conduct, by which all parties should abide, for the period prior to and following the consultation, ensure the laying down of arms and take the necessary steps to achieve disarmament.

3. Prior to the start of the registration, the Secretary-General shall ascertain, based on the objective evaluation of the UN mission, that the necessary security situation exists for the peaceful implementation of the consultation process.

4. The police will be solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The Secretary-General, after obtaining the necessary mandate, will make available a number of civilian police officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in the discharge of their duties and, at the time of the consultation, to su-
pervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites.
DONE in New York on this 5th day of May 1999

For the Government of Portugal
/s/
Jaime Gama
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Portugal

For the United Nations
/s/
Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General
United Nations

For the Government of Indonesia
/s/
Ali Alatas
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Indonesia
RESOLUTION 1246 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4013th meeting, on 11 June 1999

The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions on the situation in East Timor, in particular resolution 1236 (1999) of 7 May 1999,
Recalling the Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor of 5 May 1999 (the General Agreement) and the Agreements between the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the same date regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot and regarding security arrangements (the Security Agreement) (S/1999/513, annexes I-III),
Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the Question of East Timor of 22 May 1999 (S/1999/595),
Noting with concern the assessment of the Secretary-General contained in that report that the security situation in East Timor remains “extremely tense and volatile”,
Taking note of the pressing need for reconciliation between the various competing factions within East Timor,
Welcoming the fruitful cooperation of the Government of Indonesia and the local authorities in East Timor with the United Nations,
Taking note of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations to
the President of the Security Council of 7 June 1999 (S/1999/652),

Welcoming the conclusion of consultations between the Government of Indonesia and the United Nations on the deployment of military liaison officers within the mission established by this resolution,

Bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor,

Welcoming the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the East Timor Popular Consultation, and reiterating its support for the efforts of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for East Timor,

1. Decides to establish until 31 August 1999 the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organize and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for 8 August 1999, on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia or reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia, in accordance with the General Agreement and to enable the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibility under paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement;

2. Authorizes until 31 August 1999 the deployment within UNAMET of up to 280 civilian police officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in the discharge of their duties and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites;
3. **Authorizes** until 31 August 1999 the deployment within UNAMET of 50 military liaison officers to maintain contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces in order to allow the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibilities under the General Agreement and the Security Agreement;

4. **Endorses** the Secretary-General’s proposal that UNAMET should also incorporate the following components:
   (a) a political component responsible for monitoring the fairness of the political environment, for ensuring the freedom of all political and other non-governmental organizations to carry out their activities freely and for monitoring and advising the Special Representative on all matters with political implications,
   (b) an electoral component responsible for all activities related to registration and voting,
   (c) an information component responsible for explaining to the East Timorese people, in an objective and impartial manner without prejudice to any position or outcome, the terms of the General Agreement and the proposed autonomy framework, for providing information on the process and procedure of the vote and for explaining the implications of a vote in favour or against the proposal;

5. **Notes** the intention of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal to send an equal number of representatives to observe all the operational phases of the consultation process both inside and outside East Timor;

6. **Welcomes** the intention of the Secretary-General to conclude with the Government of Indonesia, as soon as possible, a status-of-mission agreement and urges the early conclusion of negotiations with a view
to the full and timely deployment of UNAMET;

7. **Calls upon** all parties to cooperate with UNAMET in the implementation of its mandate, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its staff in carrying out that mandate in all areas of East Timor;

8. **Approves** the modalities for the implementation of the popular consultation process scheduled for 8 August 1999 as set out in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 May 1999;

9. **Stresses once again** the responsibility of the Government of Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East Timor, in particular in the present security situation referred to in the report of the Secretary-General, in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way and in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side and to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and other international staff and observers in East Timor;

10. **Welcomes in this regard** the decision taken by the Government of Indonesia to establish a ministerial team to monitor and ensure the security of the popular consultation in accordance with Article 3 of the General Agreement and paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement;

11. **Condemns** all acts of violence from whatever quarter and calls for an end to such acts and the laying down of arms by all armed groups in East Timor, for the necessary steps to achieve disarmament and for further steps in order to ensure a secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation, which is a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair ballot in East Timor;

12. **Requests** all parties to ensure that conditions
exist for the comprehensive implementation of the popular consultation, with the full participation of the East Timorese people;

13. Urges that every effort be made to make the Commission on Peace and Stability operative, and in particular stresses the need for the Indonesian authorities to provide security and personal protection for members of the Commission in cooperation with UNAMET;

14. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council closely informed of the situation, and to continue to report to it every fourteen days on the implementation of its resolutions and of the Tripartite Agreements and on the security situation in East Timor;

15. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 1246 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4013th meeting, on 11 June 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the situation in East Timor, in particular resolution 1236 (1999) of 7 May 1999,

Recalling the Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor of 5 May 1999 (the General Agreement) and the Agreements between the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the same date regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot and regarding security arrangements (the Security Agreement) (S/1999/513, annexes I-III),

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the Question of East Timor of 22 May 1999 (S/1999/595),

Noting with concern the assessment of the Secretary-General contained in that report that the security situation in East Timor remains “extremely tense and volatile”,

Taking note of the pressing need for reconciliation between the various competing factions within East Timor,

Welcoming the fruitful cooperation of the Government of Indonesia and the local authorities in East Timor with the United Nations,

Taking note of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council of 7 June 1999
Welcoming the conclusion of consultations between the Government of Indonesia and the United Nations on the deployment of military liaison officers within the mission established by this resolution,

Bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor,

Welcoming the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the East Timor Popular Consultation, and reiterating its support for the efforts of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for East Timor,

1. Decides to establish until 31 August 1999 the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organize and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for 8 August 1999, on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia or reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia, in accordance with the General Agreement and to enable the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibility under paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement;

2. Authorizes until 31 August 1999 the deployment within UNAMET of up to 280 civilian police officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in the discharge of their duties and, at the time of the consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites;

3. Authorizes until 31 August 1999 the deploy-
ment within UNAMET of 50 military liaison officers to maintain contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces in order to allow the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibilities under the General Agreement and the Security Agreement;

4. **Endorses** the Secretary-General’s proposal that UNAMET should also incorporate the following components:

   (a) a political component responsible for monitoring the fairness of the political environment, for ensuring the freedom of all political and other non-governmental organizations to carry out their activities freely and for monitoring and advising the Special Representative on all matters with political implications,

   (b) an electoral component responsible for all activities related to registration and voting,

   (c) an information component responsible for explaining to the East Timorese people, in an objective and impartial manner without prejudice to any position or outcome, the terms of the General Agreement and the proposed autonomy framework, for providing information on the process and procedure of the vote and for explaining the implications of a vote in favour or against the proposal;

5. **Notes** the intention of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal to send an equal number of representatives to observe all the operational phases of the consultation process both inside and outside East Timor;

6. **Welcomes** the intention of the Secretary-General to conclude with the Government of Indonesia, as soon as possible, a status-of-mission agreement and **urges** the early conclusion of negotiations with a view to the full and timely deployment of UNAMET;
7. **Calls upon** all parties to cooperate with UN-AMET in the implementation of its mandate, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its staff in carrying out that mandate in all areas of East Timor;

8. **Approves** the modalities for the implementation of the popular consultation process scheduled for 8 August 1999 as set out in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 May 1999;

9. **Stresses once again** the responsibility of the Government of Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East Timor, in particular in the present security situation referred to in the report of the Secretary-General, in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way and in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side and to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and other international staff and observers in East Timor;

10. **Welcomes in this regard** the decision taken by the Government of Indonesia to establish a ministerial team to monitor and ensure the security of the popular consultation in accordance with Article 3 of the General Agreement and paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement;

11. **Condemns** all acts of violence from whatever quarter and **calls** for an end to such acts and the laying down of arms by all armed groups in East Timor, for the necessary steps to achieve disarmament and for further steps in order to ensure a secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation, which is a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair ballot in East Timor;

12. **Requests** all parties to ensure that conditions exist for the comprehensive implementation of the
popular consultation, with the full participation of the East Timorese people;

13. **Urges** that every effort be made to make the Commission on Peace and Stability operative, and in particular **stresses** the need for the Indonesian authorities to provide security and personal protection for members of the Commission in cooperation with UNAMET;

14. **Reiterates** its request to the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council closely informed of the situation, and to continue to report to it every fourteen days on the implementation of its resolutions and of the Tripartite Agreements and on the security situation in East Timor;

15. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 1272 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4057th meeting, on 25 October 1999

The Security Council,


Recalling also the Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on the question of East Timor of 5 May 1999 and the Agreements between the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the same date regarding the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot and security arrangements (S/1999/513, annexes I to III),

Reiterating its welcome for the successful conduct of the popular consultation of the East Timorese people of 30 August 1999, and taking note of its outcome through which the East Timorese people expressed their clear wish to begin a process of transition under the authority of the United Nations towards independence, which it regards as an accurate reflection of the views of the East Timorese people,

Welcoming the decision of the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly on 19 October 1999 concerning East Timor,

Stressing the importance of reconciliation among the East Timorese people,
Commending the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) for the admirable courage and determination shown in the implementation of its mandate,

Welcoming the deployment of a multinational force to East Timor pursuant to resolution 1264 (1999), and recognizing the importance of continued cooperation between the Government of Indonesia and the multinational force in this regard,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 4 October 1999 (S/1999/1024),

Noting with satisfaction the successful outcome of the trilateral meeting held on 28 September 1999, as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General,

Deeply concerned by the grave humanitarian situation resulting from violence in East Timor and the large-scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians, including large numbers of women and children,

Reaffirming the need for all parties to ensure that the rights of refugees and displaced persons are protected, and that they are able to return voluntarily in safety and security to their homes,

Reaffirming respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia,

Noting the importance of ensuring the security of the boundaries of East Timor, and noting in this regard the expressed intention of the Indonesian authorities to cooperate with the multinational force deployed pursuant to resolution 1264 (1999) and with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor,

Expressing its concern at reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have been committed in East Timor, stressing that persons
committing such violations bear individual responsibility, and calling on all parties to cooperate with investigations into these reports,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Determining that the continuing situation in East Timor constitutes a threat to peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to establish, in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General, a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice;

2. Decides also that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist of the following elements:

   (a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;

   (b) To establish an effective administration;

   (c) To assist in the development of civil and social services;

   (d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance;

   (e) To support capacity-building for self-government;

   (f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development;

3. Decides further that UNTAET will have objectives and a structure along the lines set out in part IV of the report of the Secretary-General, and in particular that its main components will be:
(a) A governance and public administration component, including an international police element with a strength of up to 1,640 officers;
(b) A humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component;
(c) A military component, with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to 200 military observers;
4. Authorizes UNTAET to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate;
5. Recognizes that, in developing and performing its functions under its mandate, UNTAET will need to draw on the expertise and capacity of Member States, United Nations agencies and other international organizations, including the international financial institutions;
6. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative who, as the Transitional Administrator, will be responsible for all aspects of the United Nations work in East Timor and will have the power to enact new laws and regulations and to amend, suspend or repeal existing ones;
7. Stresses the importance of cooperation between Indonesia, Portugal and UNTAET in the implementation of this resolution;
8. Stresses the need for UNTAET to consult and cooperate closely with the East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate effectively with a view to the development of local democratic institutions, including an independent East Timorese human rights institution, and the transfer to these institutions of its administrative and public service functions;
9. Requests UNTAET and the multinational force deployed pursuant to resolution 1264 (1999) to cooperate closely with each other, with a view also to the replacement as soon as possible of the multinational
force by the military component of UNTAET, as notified by the Secretary-General having consulted the leadership of the multinational force, taking into account conditions on the ground;

10. **Reiterates** the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and **calls upon** all parties to cooperate with humanitarian and human rights organizations so as to ensure their safety, the protection of civilians, in particular children, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid;

11. **Welcomes** the commitment of the Indonesian authorities to allow the refugees and displaced persons in West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia to choose whether to return to East Timor, remain where they are or be resettled in other parts of Indonesia, and **stresses** the importance of allowing full, safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations in carrying out their work;

12. **Stresses** that it is the responsibility of the Indonesian authorities to take immediate and effective measures to ensure the safe return of refugees in West Timor and other parts of Indonesia to East Timor, the security of refugees, and the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, in particular by curbing the violent and intimidatory activities of the militias there;

13. **Welcomes** the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund available for, **inter alia**, the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure, including the building of basic institutions, the functioning of public services and utilities, and the salaries of local civil servants;

14. **Encourages** Member States and international agencies and organizations to provide personnel,
equipment and other resources to UNTAET as requested by the Secretary-General, including for the building of basic institutions and capacity, and stresses the need for the closest possible coordination of these efforts;

15. Underlines the importance of including in UNTAET personnel with appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination;

16. Condemns all violence and acts in support of violence in East Timor, calls for their immediate end, and demands that those responsible for such violence be brought to justice;

17. Decides to establish UNTAET for an initial period until 31 January 2001;

18. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council closely and regularly informed of progress towards the implementation of this resolution, including, in particular, with regard to the deployment of UNTAET and possible future reductions of its military component if the situation in East Timor improves, and to submit a report within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter;

19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Appendix I: Charter of the United Nations,
Chapter VII (Articles 39-51)
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO
THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE
PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or de-
cide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.

Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation,
the Security Council may, before making the recom-
mendations or deciding upon the measures provided
for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems
necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures
shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or po-

tion of the parties concerned. The Security Council
shall duly take account of failure to comply with such
provisional measures.

Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be em-
ployed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of commu-
nication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Appendix J: List of Units Assigned to USFI

- JTF Timor Sea Operations, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet
  - USS Mobile Bay, CJTF TSO (CAPT Edward Rogers, USN)
- USNS Kilauea
- USNS San Jose
- EP-3 Detachment
- CINCPAC Planning Team
- USF Australian Logistics Planning Staff, Brisbane and Sydney (Colonel George Borowsky, USA and later Colonel Mark Dean, USA)
- Civil-Military Affairs Operation Center, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, US Army Special Operations Command (Lieutenant Colonel Jose Uson, USA)
- MSQ-126, Pacific Fleet (Chief Warrant Officer Scott Griffin, USN/Major Charles Peabody, USMC)
- 613th Air Expeditionary Group, 13th Air Force, Pacific Air Forces (Colonel Robert Sheekly, USAF)
- Trojan Spirit II, Intelligence Brigade, US Army Pacific (1st Lieutenant Jason Farrell, USA)
- USS Belleau Wood Task Element, Amphibious Squadron Eleven, Amphibious Group One, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Lee Touchberry, USN)
- USS Belleau Wood, Amphibious Group One, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Thomas Parker, USN)
- 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, III MEF, Marine Forces Pacific (Colonel David Fulton, USMC)
- USS Peleliu Task Element, Amphibious Squadron One, Amphibious Group Three, 3rd Fleet,
Pacific Fleet (Captain William Hopper, USN)
• USS Peleliu, Amphibious Group Three, 3rd Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Larry Watson, USN)
• 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, I MEF, Marine Forces Pacific (Colonel Thomas Moore, USMC)
• C-12 Detachment, Marine Corps Bases Japan (Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Houser/Lieutenant Colonel William Grace/Lieutenant Colonel Sam Collins)
• Task Force Thunderbird, 11th Signal Bde, Army Signal Command (Lieutenant Colonel Michael Yarmie, USA)
• USS Juneau, Amphibious Squadron Eleven, Amphibious Group One, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Joseph Miller, USN)
End Notes

1. Because of the International Date Line the exact dates of events vary among different sources based on their country of origin.

2. There is debate about whether Operation STABILISE should be considered a peacekeeping operation or a peace enforcement operation. An agreement was in place to end the dispute. Indonesia and the majority of the East Timorese population consented to the employment of INTERFET. However, the pro-integration militias, supported by elements of the Indonesian military, created a situation in which the application or threat of military force was necessary to implement the agreement. As such, Operation STABILISE is referred to as a peace enforcement operation throughout this document.

3. The acronym for United States Forces INTERFET varies significantly between sources. USFI is used throughout this document based on its use in the United States Forces INTERFET After Action Report.

4. A “popular consultation” is the equivalent of a plebiscite. As part of an accord signed on May 5, 1999 between Indonesia, Portugal, and the U.N., the Government of Indonesia would not agree to the term plebiscite, referendum or independence vote and the language was settled as a popular consultation.


7. Ballard, p. 4-5.

8. A contingent of 400 Dutch and Australian commandos occupied East Timor on December 17, 1941, initially landing at Dili. During the ensuing guerilla campaign over 1500 Japanese soldiers were killed.
9. Ballard, p. 5-6


11. FRETILIN was originally founded as the Association of Timorese Social Democrats (*Associacao Social Democratica Timor, ASDT*).


13. Robinson, p. 16.

14. Ballard, p. 9


17. Robinson, p. 17.


24. On November 12, 1991 Indonesian troops opened fire on unarmed civilians at the Santa Cruz Cemetery. The massacre was videotaped and distributed worldwide which prevented the Indonesian Government from completely dismissing the incident. Official Indonesian figures indicate 85 individuals were killed. Non-governmental organizations reported more than 600 killed.
25. In 1996 the FRETILIN permanent Representative to the U.N. Ramos-Horta and the Bishop of Dili Monsignor Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the East Timor situation.


28. The popular consultation put two questions before the East Timorese: 1. “Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?” 2) “Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?”


30. In 1999 combatant commanders were referred to as commanders in chief of their respective commands. In 2002, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld changed the designation to commander. Throughout this document the U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) is referred to as the Commander U.S. Pacific Command (CDR USPACOM).

31. Robinson, p. 46.


33. Cosgrove, p. 160.


36. UNSCR 1264

37. PMESII: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure.


41. Geoffrey, p. 31.


44. Weitz, p. 756.


47. Weitz, p. 778.

49. Weitz, p. 780.


54. Ballard, p. 57.


56. MG (ret) Randolph P. Strong, USA, former Commander, United States Forces East Timor, Telephonic Interview with author on November 9, 2015 (hereafter Strong).
57. Glynn, p. 18.

58. USCINCPAC Perspective, p. 3.

59. USCINCPAC Perspective, p. 4.

60. LTG (ret) Edmond Smith, USA, former Commander, United States Army Pacific, Telephonic Interview with author on November 9, 2015.

61. USFI AAR, p. 3.

62. Strong.

63. Strong.


65. USCINCPAC Perspective, slide 4.

66. USFI AAR, p. 17.


68. United States Army Pacific, East Timor – USARPAC Officer Professional Development Briefing, provided by MG (ret) Randolph P. Strong USA, November 30, 2015 (hereafter USARPAC OPD), p. 21.


70. USARPAC OPD, p. 29.


72. USARPAC OPD, p. 9.

73. USARPAC OPD, p. 11
74. *USARPAC OPD*, p. 10


76. *USARPAC OPD*, p. 14-16


78. Cosgrove, p. 179.

79. USFI AAR, p. 5.

80. USFI AAR, p. 4.

81. USFI AAR, p. 5.


83. LtGen (ret) John Castellaw, USMC, former Commander, United States Forces International Forces East Timor, Telephonic Interview with author on November 13, 2015 (hereafter Castellaw).

84. Castellaw.

85. USFI AAR, p. 5.

86. USFI AAR, p. 7.

87. Castellaw

88. USFI AAR, p. 7.


91. McPherson, Bill, The ‘East Timor Tapes’: Interview with COL Randolph Strong, commander of U.S. Forces East Timor, provided by the USPACOM Historian, p. 3.


94. Ryan, p. 75.

95. The original disaster declaration was issued in May 1999 and included various regions in Indonesia to include East Timor.


100. *Final Redeployment Brief*, p. 4.


102. *Final Redeployment Brief*, p. 11.


104. USFI AAR, p. 11.

105. USFI AAR, p. 11.


108. Glynn, p. 28.


