ASSESSING GRAND STRATEGIES
HOW THE EU AND NATO ROCK THE STRATEGIC BOAT

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ABSTRACT

The European Union and NATO develop grand strategies. To demonstrate this proposition contrary to predominantly accepted ideas, this paper first develops a theory to identify grand strategies. The theory is composed of a set of six criteria that is a sufficient condition to identify grand strategies. Then, the study tests the theory using the grand strategy of the United States. Finally, the author uses the six criteria to conduct a comparative analysis to what he identified as the strategies of the European Union and NATO.

The main contribution of this work interests the practitioner and the theorist of strategy. The former can rely on the theory herein developed to identify grand strategies, and the latter can use this tool to compare and contrast different grand strategies.

In addition, this study interests the political scientist inasmuch as, by proving the existence of the grand strategies of the EU and NATO, it demonstrated that grand strategy is not the privilege of states; supranational organizations can develop strategic processes. These findings and the study have potential implications for the international order. The author examines some of these implications in the conclusion.

Keywords:
European Union (EU), NATO, United States, strategy, grand strategy, theory, history of, characterization, international order, international relations.
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Preface

Background and Significance of the Study

*War is both a cause and effect of broader social change.*

—Peter W. Singer

Throughout history, war has consistently been a bloody process to resolve human conflicts. To be sure, violence is not the only way in which differences can be reconciled. Nevertheless, historical records show that men have often resorted to war to settle their disagreements. Most of the time, as Peter Singer indicated, conflicts are both a determinant cause and a major consequence of social change. In Singer’s usage, one should understand “social” in a broad sense as it relates to societies and their organization. Therefore, one could expand the scope of the sentence by adding the implied political dimension. Such rephrasing would give “War is both a cause and effect of broader social [and political] change.”¹ War, as an agent of change, has been one of the most important and consistent factors having shaped the international order.²

The current international order and geopolitical equilibrium seem to transit from the state system inherited from the Peace of Westphalia to a new kind that so far eludes consensual characterization. Some scholars, such as Professor Mary Kaldor, think so.³ In *New and Old*

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3. For another example, see Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 57. See also David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford
Wars, Kaldor argued that the metamorphosis of war, from classical wars to the new form of wars, which she strove to delineate, was dramatically challenging and changing the present international order. She foresaw three possible responses to this evolution. The first was a return to a bipolar system similar to the one existing during the Cold War. The second reflected a return to a neo-medieval anarchy. For the third, she foresaw a new normative approach based on global values and institutions taking into account globalization and particularism, the two prescriptive phenomena of our time.

Such views question the pertinence of modern conceptualizations. Classical analytical and political tools might no longer be appropriate for explaining and studying the international order. In fact, whether these tools are diplomatic, economic, informational, military, or cultural in character, the Western ways of dealing in the international arena are already shattering. Some recent examples illustrate and support these views. The economic crisis of 2008 and its aftermath call into question the economic structures created by Western Civilization. The protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan marked the limits of Western military efficacy. The enduring problem of terrorism, mostly promoted by Islamic fundamentalist currents, challenges the ability of military forces to address the new problems facing the international community.

Rare are the authors who, like Kaldor, offer a constructive assessment and propose credible alternatives to the present trend of the international order. However, if suggestions are lacking, at least some entities in the political landscape might offer, through their empirical experience, accurate examples of what could be a way forward.

References:
European Union and NATO might be of this kind.

Indeed, the European Union and NATO are unique actors on the international stage and elicit considerable attraction. They are neither states nor non-governmental organizations. Rather, they are supranational entities that enjoy only some of the attributes of a state while surpassing all of their members at the same time. The influence of each institution has increased over time and both are now inescapable actors that regularly intervene to address international issues. It has not always been the case, and since their inception both NATO and the European Union have exceeded their initial strategic horizon.

Analyzing the reasons of this change for both NATO and the European Union might help assess Kaldor’s last hypothesis, namely, the European Union and NATO are potential alternatives to the post-Westphalian international order. One needs first to understand the EU and NATO strategic direction. To this extent, the examination of the European Union and NATO grand strategies offer a sound starting point. Such is the objective and the utility of this study.
Introduction

La paix mondiale ne saurait être sauvegardée sans des efforts créateurs à la mesure des dangers qui la menacent.

[Global peace could not be safeguarded without creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it.]

—Robert Schuman

NATO and the European Union are two entities that came about because of World War II. According to America’s official history, the United States, Canada, and their European partners created NATO to protect Western Allies from further Soviet expansion.¹ NATO argues that its creation also originated from the will to prevent the resurgence of dangerous nationalism in Europe and to encourage political integration.² Alternatively, the European Union is the latest development of the European economic and political integration conducted to prevent the recurrence of Europe’s bloody history. The EU grew out of an economic cooperation that turned into interdependence.³ After years of evolution,
NATO is still security oriented, while economics and politics drive the European Union.

Over the last 15 years, a myriad of studies, books, and articles have addressed questions related to the European Union and NATO grand strategies. Such prolific analyses reveal a tangible issue, namely strategy in Europe is two sides of the same coin. On one side, many of these published works suggest that the EU should develop a grand strategy, implying either that the EU has no grand strategy, or that it has an inadequate one. The military dimension of the European strategy is the recurrent contention in these commentaries. On the other side, the media provide wide coverage of NATO’s grand strategy, but the existence of NATO grand strategy seems less subject to contention. In other words, it appears commonly assumed that the European Union lacks strategy while NATO has one.

This particularity raises questions and challenges the traditional Western pattern of civil-military relations. Indeed, in the Western world, the military traditionally does military strategy, and political bodies do grand strategy. The opposite seems true in the case of the EU and NATO, leaving aside that the EU and NATO are not encompassing exactly the same members, and that NATO has a political dimension. This study started by observing this peculiarity.

To fulfill the objective of the study, this observation naturally led to three related problems, each covering one aspect of the initial reflection. First, what is grand strategy? Is it possible to define it? If not, can one characterize grand strategy, and, if so how? Second, what are the EU and NATO? Are they only supranational actors made of nation-states? Alternatively, are they *sui generis* organizations embodying the advent of a post-Westphalian international order? Third, do they really have a secure lasting peace.”

grand strategy? If yes, then what are the strategies of these two organizations and what do they tell us about their worldviews?

In order to apprehend grand strategy, it first appears necessary to understand strategy. If such reasoning does not allow defining grand strategy precisely, at least it will help find metrics or criteria to characterize it. Elaborating a model to characterize grand strategies will ultimately be the objective of the first part of this study. To address this question, the present work will rely on investigations into the nature and history of strategy, and will buttress its finding with the works of recognized authorities.

In the second part, the project uses a relevant case study to verify the validity of the model and to complete and strengthen it, if necessary. As the greatest power of the post-World War II era, the United States offers a prime choice for this case study. Indeed, the ideas and theories of grand strategies are prevalent in the United States today. Additionally, American strategies are traceable because records and analyses have existed since the founding of the country. These documents will constitute the core evidence supporting this part of the study.

In the third part of the study, the author successively applies the model to the EU and NATO with the ultimate design of assessing their strategies to determine if they qualify for the label of grand strategy. As with the United States case study, quantities of official documents and academic works on these two institutions are available. These documents and scholarly writings will offer authoritative evidence to support the analysis.

Finally, the conclusion will offer a synthesis of this study and will outline some implications. It will particularly estimate, based on the lessons from Chapter 3, whether the strategies of NATO and the European Union are cultivating the idea insinuated in the preface. In other words, the conclusion will assess whether the European Union and NATO are cognizant that they might be proposing by their very example
practical alternatives to the current international order.
Chapter 1

Leveraging Theory:
Elaboration of Criteria to Identify Grand Strategies

Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy.

—Carl von Clausewitz

Theory serves a useful purpose to the extent that it can collect and organize the experiences and ideas of other men, sort out which of them may have a valid transfer value to a new and different situation, and help the practitioner to enlarge his vision in an orderly, manageable and useful fashion – and then apply it to the reality with which he is faced.

—J.C. Wylie

Strategy is a challenging word, a challenging concept, and more importantly a challenging field of study. Scholars, theorists, and practitioners have debated and are still debating about strategy. The current profusion of books and articles on the topic is but a striking emanation of this lasting phenomenon. It is realistic to predict that future generations will continue the discussion. Given the persisting character of this question, the present essay does not pretend to settle any contention. Rather, this chapter aims at acknowledging some of the existing approaches; understanding their validity and limits; and

1. The bibliography of this study gives an idea of the phenomenon, especially because it includes only the representative works that the author chose to use, and not all the documents that might have been relevant to the topic.
offering, if not a definition, at least the characteristics of strategy.³ The goal is to establish common grounds for the sake of the argument, not to solve this persistent question. 

An etymological analysis of the term strategy is the point at which to start the discussion.⁴ After that, the chapter continues the thematic approach with a historical and an epistemological analysis. It then shifts to detail the modern taxonomy and contemporary developments of strategy before finally focusing on grand strategy. The chapter concludes in synthetizing the findings in a model made of a set of criteria that aims at characterizing and identifying grand strategies.

**Etymological Approach and Early Taxonomy**

Etymology is not only the study of the roots of words, but is also the study of the evolution of their meaning. The evolution of the meaning of the term strategy is contentious. Linguists, pundits, and historians equally debate about it. Colin Gray, one of the most renowned academics specialized in strategy, epitomized this reality in his book, *The Strategy Bridge*. In Appendix C of this book, he challenged the claim that strategy is eternal and universal.⁵ Indeed, some historians and linguists

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assert that it is incorrect—even anachronistic—to apply the word strategy to phenomena from eras and locations where and when the term did not exist. For them, the meaning given today to this term does not apply to the way people understood it in the past.\textsuperscript{6} If he acknowledged that the term strategy has not, and never had, an eternal and universal meaning, Gray explained that the function of strategy stemmed from enduring and consistent needs or requirements.\textsuperscript{7} He went further to refute the thesis of anachronism and eventually argued that, if considered as a function, strategy is universal and eternal.\textsuperscript{8} In his book \textit{Introduction à la Stratégie}, General André Beaufre, one of the most influential French strategists of the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century also attributed a universal character to strategy.\textsuperscript{9} The insistence with which eminent specialists advocate for the timeless and universal essence of strategy provides the first characteristic.

—The first characteristic of strategy is the eternal and universal nature of its function—

However, it is not because the requirements and the function of a notion are persisting that its comprehension and the uses made of it are. Like any other field of study, strategy developed because of the accumulation of wisdom and practices inherited from past generations.

\textsuperscript{6} For his edited book \textit{Grand Strategies}, Paul Kennedy solicited various eminent authors to discus some of the wide interpretations of grand strategy that existed throughout history. Undeniably, these relevant case studies show that strategy was not necessarily understood, interpreted, and applied homogeneously. However, as Kennedy put it, there are some “features of grand strategy, which exist at all times, and in all countries.” Paul M. Kennedy, ed., \textit{Grand Strategies in War and Peace} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 6–7.

\textsuperscript{7} That is not to say that strategies can always be the same. For an account of the required versatility of strategy, see the first paragraph of the historical approach.

\textsuperscript{8} Gray, \textit{The Strategy Bridge}, 273.

Sometimes, events or individuals might also have altered the linear transmission, and some concepts and understandings might have disappeared along the way. To capture past wisdom, examination of the origins of strategy and the prevalent historical traits is necessary.

Historians and linguists alike admit that the roots of the term strategy are Greek. The term strategy originates from the word *stratos*, which means army in ancient Greek. The verb *agein*, meaning to lead, supplemented *stratos* to give the verb *stratagein*, often literally translated in the verbal locution to be a general. Some other words such as *stratēgia*, *strategikê*, *stratēgos*, or *stratēgêma* subsequently derived from *stratos*. *Stratēgia* and *strategikê* meant generalship, the art of the general, then called the *stratēgos*. *Stratēgêma*, translating today as stratagem, designated the plan or scheme resulting from the *stratēgos*’s application of his art. Understanding the conceptual origins of this term helps one understand this next feature of strategy.

—Strategy as an art of generals and strategists is the second characteristic—

Regrettably, neither the literal translation nor the educated explanation captures the whole reality of what took place in Athens. It took Western Civilization centuries to recapture in full scope both the significance and the meaning of the term strategy. Athenian generals occupied elected positions and were still part of the decision-making body of the city. Their influence and authority were not restricted to


the battlefield. On the contrary, their recommendations often exceeded not only the limits of the battlefield, but also those of the engagement and the preparation for the engagement. Some of the generals’ decisions represented long-term strategies containing a political dimension.

Pericles, who was one of the most influential and successful figures and who led Athens during its Golden Age, epitomized these practices. In a speech before the Athenians Pericles recommended not going to battle against Sparta in Attica and relying instead on economics, wealth, and resources to subsist, flourish, and wait for Sparta to erode her resources and eventually exhaust herself. Such an approach was beyond the realm of a strict interpretation of the military dimension—the disregard for the opposition offered an alternative pathway to violence. Pericles’s prescriptions compared in scope with those of the Spartan King Archidamus. Archidamus was more a statesman than a general. Here, one can see how Western Civilization lost the political dimension of strategy in Ancient Greece. It would not recover this political dimension until the second half of the 20th century. This discussion leads to the next two characteristics of strategy

—The third finding is that strategy exceeds, or should exceed, military action—

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13. As Azoulay, explained, even if Pericles legacy has been and is still challenged, his detractors only show that his legacy did not provoke unanimity, and their arguments cannot credibly deny Pericles outstanding accomplishments both for himself and for Athens’ grandeur. See Azoulay, Pericles of Athens, 1–14.
15. See Thucydides, Strassler, and Crawley, The Landmark Thucydides, 45–8. See particularly note 1.81 attached to section 432.
16. Another argument well supports this point, but is beyond the scope of this paragraph and even beyond the limits established for the feasibility of this study unfortunately constrained by a tight schedule. It
The fourth characteristic is that strategy is not limited to opposition—

The French reintroduced both the term and the notion of strategy into Western Civilization in the 18th century. After the advent of the term in antiquity and despite some sporadic uses, particularly in the Byzantine Empire, strategy fell into disuse in the Western world until after the Renaissance. In 1771, Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy (1719-80) translated \textit{The Taktika} from the Byzantine Emperor Leo VI (865-912). Maizeroy revived the notion of strategy and coined the cognate \textit{stratégique} in French to qualify the art of the general and, most importantly, to differentiate it from tactics, the subordinated art of the military. From then on, the term and the distinction from tactics spread across Europe and gained a rapid eminence. As a result, the origins of the term refocused strategy as a military matter in the Western world, strategy being the art of the general, and tactics being somehow ancillary to strategy.

However, the political dimension of strategy remained forgotten in the West, while the competitive character of strategy persisted to our days. Was it the case elsewhere? How did the political dimension of strategy resurface in the West? The first question will be the object of the historical analysis presented in the next section while the second question will remain pending until later. Both efforts contribute to the

\[17\]. The development in this paragraph stems from the synthesis of the works of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Beatrice Heuser conducted with the help of the Merriam-Webster’s collegiate dictionary. Coutau-Bégarie, \textit{Traité de Stratégie}. Heuser, \textit{The Evolution of Strategy}.
development of the characteristics of strategy. This discussion of
strategy and tactics, however, leads one to the next feature of strategy.

—The fifth characteristic is that strategy is different from tactics—

**Historical Approach**

The meaning of strategy has changed in places over time and is
still evolving today, not only because of local refinement, but also thanks
to external influence. To quote but one of the most renowned external
influences of the Western World, one should refer to Sun Tzu’s *Art of
War*. In this treatise, elaborated before the Christian era between the
fifth and the fourth centuries BC, Sun Tzu distilled some principles of
wisdom that remain relevant some 2,500 years later. As Samuel Griffith
stated in his translation entitled *The Illustrated Art of War*, the first
publication of the work in Europe occurred in 1772. Some speculate
that it received immediate attention and might have even influenced
Napoleon. However, no valid evidence exists to support this
assertion. Nevertheless, even if it took time to spread, Sun Tzu brought
to the Western World a global vision about strategy, making of war a
political problem as much as a military one. He undeniably contributed
to the restoration of the neglected political dimension of strategy. More
importantly, he underlined the potential of the indirect approach,
stressing that it often favors economy of force. Therefore, even if the
strongest side in a conflict might resort favorably to it, the indirect
approach particularly suits the party deemed inferior. Finally, Sun Tzu
emphasized the importance of intelligence and analysis in the elaboration

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Press, 2005), 11.
20. Couderc, Yann. *Napoleon a-t-il lu Sun Tzu?* Florilège stratégique.
http://www.ihedn.fr/?q=content/reflexions, or
of strategies because strategies are context-dependent and, therefore, should be flexible and adaptive. In terms of renown, Sun Tzu compares with the Prussian philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz, and he gives this study its next two features of strategy.

—The sixth characteristic is that strategy can be direct and indirect—

—The seventh is that strategy requires flexibility and intelligence—

In his seminal book On War, Clausewitz offered a timeless philosophical analysis. He clarified the differences between strategy and tactics, extensively commented on their different properties, and examined offense and defense at both tactical and strategic levels.21 His most famous, widely spread, and lasting legacy remains his description of war as an instrument of politics. However often quoted, Clausewitz is almost as often misunderstood.22 Clausewitz did not acquire in his lifetime the allure he enjoys today. On the contrary, in his time, other schools of thought were prevalent in Europe and Prussia.

These currents led to a distinction between peace and war, as well as between war and politics as if each pair presented discrete phenomena. Epitomized by the theories of Helmut Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, these currents were prevalent in the second part of the 19th century. They advocated a strict separation of the political and military phases of a conflict such that, after political leaders decided to resort to war, they handed off the reins to the military commanders and relied entirely on military judgment and choices.23


22. For the development in this paragraph, see Michael Howard’s essay The Influence of Clausewitz in Clausewitz, On War, 27–44.

23. It is worth noticing that these currents of thought also praised unconditional recourse to the offense, which worsened the traits of their approach and greatly contributed to the strategic paralysis in World War
Moltke’s disciples rediscovered Clausewitz in this context and used his work to justify their views during the first half of the 20th century. However, employing Clausewitz’s ideas in such ways is wrong. For instance, the English translation “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means” of the adage “Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln” does not encompass the whole meaning of Clausewitz’s writing. First, Politik translates as either policy or politics, depending on the context, and sometimes even means both. Second, mit means as much “with” or “alongside of” as it means “by.” Therefore, even if war occurs when political leaders resort to violent means, war and politics coexist.

Clausewitz developed this idea further in the passages that follow. “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” Likewise, war is not an end in itself. “The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace.” This conception is fundamental to strategy. Even reduced to its military dimension, strategy cannot escape its political direction.

—the eighth finding is that there is no discrete dichotomy between politics and strategy—

I that led to the endless gruesome trench warfare.

24. The author would like here to extent its appreciation to his dear colleague Thorsten Tanski for acquainting him to this peculiarity. See Clausewitz, On War, 87. The original German version is, for instance, available at https://ia600404.us.archive.org/16/items/Clausewitz-Carl-Vom-Kriege/ClausewitzCarlVon-VomKriege1832462S..pdf, 19.

25. Clausewitz, On War, 87. For this sentence, the English language allows a more accurate translation. In this case, both German and English are less subject to misinterpretation.


27. At “the highest realms of strategy . . . there is little or no difference between strategy, policy and statesmanship.” Clausewitz, On War, 178.
As bright as he was, Clausewitz was not always right. For Clausewitz, “The original means of strategy is victory . . . its ends . . . are those objects which will lead directly to peace.” One could argue that Clausewitz stated here that strategy exists only in times of war, but such an argument would not be correct. As noted previously, Clausewitz was well aware that war and policy are intimately intertwined, just as are strategy and policy. However, since he focused his work on war, Clausewitz limited the scope of the study, which led to this reductionism.

What is disturbing in Clausewitz’s assertion is that he made of victory the exclusive aim of strategy, which is overly simplistic. In Pure Strategy, Everett Dolman explains why “strategy is not about winning.” That is not to say that strategy discards victory. What Dolman suggested is that, at times, victory might not be the best means to achieve the goal that the strategy is pursuing; in some instances, it can even be detrimental. Therefore, pursuing victory dogmatically might very well generate a negative outcome. Edward Luttwak’s position expressed in Strategy, the Logic of War and Peace, concurs with Dolman’s argument. Luttwak went even further by proposing that if the victor were not to exploit the victory, a reversal would occur favoring the initially defeated party. In addition, Dolman made clear that victory is a means for the strategist and considering it as an end was paradoxical. Besides, he

28. Clausewitz, On War, 143.
30. Especially true when the goal pursued renders unachievable the desired outcome. The de-Baathification policy pursued in Iraq was achieved but led to the quagmire of insurgency. Other paragraphs pp. 22-30 offers further explanations concerning the difficulty of matching short-term with long-term goals.
33. Dolman, Pure Strategy, 6.
pointed to a conundrum. Victory is an end at the tactical level, and a
means at the strategic level, leading one to the ninth characteristic of
strategy.

—The ninth finding is that strategy does not aim only at victory—

**Epistemological Approach**

The etymological and historical approaches adopted herein
provided the study with the first nine characteristics of strategy. As
useful as they are, they do not settle the question of the nature of
strategy. Epistemology reminded us that the Greeks made of strategy an
art. Clausewitz indirectly opted for the same conclusion when he wrote,
“The art of war in the narrower sense must now in its turn be broken
down into tactics and strategy.”\(^{34}\) Indeed, as part of an art, strategy
becomes an art itself.

The art to which Clausewitz was alluding is often confused with
the art of the artist, which refers to the expression of an aesthetic. When
he used the word art, Clausewitz referred to a skill learned through
practice, which an artisan usually implements. This art contrasts with
science. In fact, other authors tried to propose a scientific approach to
war and strategy.

Influential in their time, Antoine Jomini and John Fuller
endeavored on this risky path. Each of them obtained rapid success
initially. However, their canon did not resist the test of time. Indeed,
experience proved that one could not reduce strategy to a set of
formulas.\(^{35}\) The context in which strategy operates is too important and
so intricate and protean that any attempt to narrow it brings about

\(^{34}\) Clausewitz, *On War*, 132.

\(^{35}\) Even if it was expressed in a context of persuasion and
campaigning, the statement from Ricker quoted by Freedman offers a fair
illustration of this point: “There is no set of scientific laws that can be
more or less mechanically applied to generate successful strategies.”
oversimplification.

As long as one pays attention to it, the English language offers a precise vocabulary when it comes to evoking a meaning for strategy. A theorist studies strategy in order to understand, characterize, and explain it, not to apply it. The methods adopted by theorists are often scientific. To this extent, one can consider as a science the theory of strategy or strategy as a theory. The domain of theorists remains abstract and is not the domain of application.

In contrast to that of the theorist, the realm of the strategist is that of application. Strategists elaborate strategies with the idea to apply them, whether immediately or as a contingency providing the fulfillment of certain conditions. Strategists are craftsmen of reality, artisans in the use of strategy. In this case, strategy is the art of the strategist and elaborated with the idea of application.

As a result, strategy possesses a dual essence; it is both a science, a human science to be precise, when considered from the theorist’s standpoint and an art from a strategist’s perspective. It is therefore not surprising that pundits consistently fall short of resolving the question about the nature of strategy. Now, what people often oppose to the present explanation is that to refine his judgment, the strategist ought to have sufficient knowledge of major theories.

Philosophical thinking offers a suitable means for the strategist to bridge theory and practice. Beaufre explicitly stated that strategy is an art and not a science.\(^{36}\) However, he also acknowledged that strategy required a particular thought process.\(^{37}\) For instance, unlike what the application of doctrine requires, strategic thinking should be flexible and

\(^{36}\) “C’est ce qui fait que la stratégie est un art, et non une science. (That is what makes of strategy an art, and not a science.)” Beaufre, *Introduction à la stratégie*, 67.

foster analysis and prioritization. Furthermore, in the epistemological section of his introduction, he regretted that in his time, strategy and philosophy were outmoded and neglected fields of studies among the humanities. His parallel between strategy and philosophy is not trivial. Strategy is indeed close to philosophy in many respects.

For a start, learning strategy follows the property that Kant attributed to philosophy in *The Critique of Pure Reason* “Philosophy—unless it be in an historical manner—cannot be learned; we can at most learn to philosophize.” By analogy, in as much as it is illusory to consider learning philosophy exhaustively, it is also inconceivable to hope learning strategy comprehensively. Although, as Kant argues, one can approach strategy historically, which offers obviously valuable returns, the most profitable method is to learn how to think strategically.

In becoming familiar with the canon of fundamental theories that constitute both the prerequisite and the basis of strategic thinking—history, but also other humanities such as economics, political science, or sociology—and applying them to chosen case studies—one humbly learns how to think strategically. This idea of making a parallel between philosophical thinking and strategic thinking is congruent with Eisenhower’s remark, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.” To this extent, the science the strategist needs for application is that of a philosophy of strategy. As such, the discussion leads one to yet another feature of strategy that deals with perspective.

The tenth characteristic is that strategy is an art, a science, or a philosophy, depending on the perspective adopted—

The present study has no prescriptive ambition. It aims, on the contrary, at understanding and characterizing the strategies developed by both NATO and the European Union. Therefore, the stance necessary to conduct the present analysis is that of the theorist and, in some instances, that of a critical practitioner embarking on a philosophical exploration of his art.

Given the historical and technical debates, it is not surprising that strategy consistently eludes consensual description and definition. Appendix 1 offers a compendium of definitions established by some of the more renowned theorists and specialists of strategy. After the etymological, the historical, and the epistemological approaches, it is time to analyze the thoughts of modern schools of strategy. Understanding the sequence of events that produced these modern thoughts is a prerequisite for this analysis.

**Modern Taxonomy**

Associated with the policy of balance of power, the aforementioned historical development of strategy led to one of the most dreadful periods in human history, the first half of the 20th century. It culminated in unspeakable atrocities during the two world wars. The next section of this discussion develops three additional characteristics of strategy.

The advent and the development of events leading to World War I stemmed from the failure of the strategic thinking of the era leading up to the conflict. When the European countries embarked in hostilities, they all thought that the war would be brief and hardly expensive,

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42. “It is difficult to find two eminent works of military strategy that define strategy in the same way, much less look for consensus in its definition.” In Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 11.

blinded as they were by their illusions and the strategic paradigm of offense and decisive victory.\textsuperscript{44}

Reality proved tremendously different from their predictions. The static, long, and ugly trench warfare developed over hundreds of miles across Europe and engulfed human lives by the millions as well as a large portion of national treasures. Experts estimated that over 14 million people died during or as a direct result of the conflict, over 21 million soldiers ended up wounded or disabled, and that the combatant nations spent over 282 billion of dollars to attain this gruesome result.\textsuperscript{45} However, despite such vertiginous records, World War I did not turn out to be the envisioned war to end all wars. It did not resolve the conflicts crippling Europe. The underlying causes of World War I remained and continued to destabilize Europe and beyond.

The consequences of World War I were disastrous. The Great Depression essentially resulted from the destabilization of the market that, in turn, originated in the debts the belligerents contracted to finance the hostilities and their aftermath.\textsuperscript{46} World War II sprang from the unsatisfactory conditions under which the belligerents started,

\textsuperscript{44} “Men went gladly to war in August 1914 in the more urbanized parts of Europe. Almost everyone assumed that fighting would last only a few weeks. In anticipation of decisive battles, martial enthusiasm bordering on madness surged through German, French, and British public consciousness. Disillusion, when it came, was correspondingly profound, yet for four long, dreary years the will to war continued to prevail even in the face of massive casualty lists and military stalemate on the Western Front.” In William Hardy McNeill, \textit{The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000} (Chicago [IL]: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 307.


\textsuperscript{46} “Mounting war debts . . . bedeviled postwar international relations.” “The uncollectible war debts that had blighted international relations between the wars.” In McNeill, \textit{The Pursuit of Power}, 321, 352.
fought, and particularly terminated the First World War. Indeed, these conditions offered a fertile terrain for political leaders, such as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, to develop and promote their extremist political ideas and programs. World War II surpassed in atrocities all the records of World War I.

The outcomes of the two world wars destabilized, worried, and preoccupied strategists, politicians, scholars, and the military community. As a result, they challenged the strategic ideas that were prevalent before World War I and which led to the hostilities. They particularly questioned the role of the military in the conduct of the war. As French Président du Conseil during the second part of World War I and its aftermath, Georges Clémenceau captured these qualms when he stated, “war was too important to be left to the generals.” From these reflections reemerged some forgotten ideas and new ones arose. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart dynamically contributed to the debate by promoting the concept of grand strategy.

However, the concept of grand strategy existed before and contemporarily to Liddell Hart. First, some earlier works set the stage for the advent of grand strategy. As mentioned in Note 16 to this

51. Dr. Harold Winton deserves credit for reminding the author about this reality too easily forgotten.
chapter, Alfred Thayer Mahan and, before him, the unnamed French
gentleman to whom he attributed the idea, felt the limit of the admitted
conception of strategy in the 19th century when it came to apply it to sea
power.\textsuperscript{52} Second, building on Mahan’s work, Julian Corbett might have
been the first to use the locution, albeit probably unwittingly.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed,
when Corbett used “grand strategy” in the first version of his \textit{Green
Pamphlet}, written in 1906, he used it as a substitute for “major
strategy.”\textsuperscript{54} The terms “grand strategy” disappeared from the second
version of the pamphlet that Corbett wrote in 1909 and only the locution
“major strategy” subsisted.\textsuperscript{55} John Fuller, a contemporary of Liddell Hart
used “grand strategy” in \textit{The Foundations of the Science of War} that he
wrote in 1926.\textsuperscript{56} Corbett’s “major/grand strategy” and Fuller’s “grand
strategy” are quite similar notions; they both encompass ground and
naval strategies, which both theorists confine to times of war.
Additionally, the two authors stressed that grand strategies “[included]

\footnotesize{52. Mahan, \textit{The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 - 1783}, 22.
Jon Sumida supported this thesis in one of his works. See Jon Tetsuro
Sumida, \textit{Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic
Press, 1997), xi–xii, 5.

53. While it is correct to establish a spiritual inspiration between
Mahan and Jomini and between Corbett and Clausewitz as Beatrice
Heuser suggested in \textit{The Evolution of Strategy} (105), it is also undeniable
that Mahan inspired Corbett. Indeed, as the reference that Corbett made
to Mahan in \textit{Some Principles of Maritime Strategy} suggests, Corbett
sometimes abided by Mahan’s ideas and sometimes refined them. In any
case, the qualifier “a weighty critical authority” with which Corbett refers
to Mahan suggests consideration and respect. See Julian Corbett, \textit{Some
Principles of Maritime Strategy}, Introduction and Notes by Eric J. Grove


55. Comparison of pp. 308 and 327 in Corbett, \textit{Some Principles of
Maritime Strategy}, 327.

all the forces which [were] to be expanded in the struggle” and was “a branch of statesmanship.”57

In *Strategy*, Liddell Hart revitalized the political dimension of strategy forgotten for so long in stressing more fully than Corbett and Fuller the articulation and subservience of the military to policy, even in times of war.58 For Liddell Hart, “as tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane of ‘grand strategy’. While practically synonymous with the policy, which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy, which should govern its object, the term ‘grand strategy’ serves to bring out the sense of ‘policy in execution’. For the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.”59 The following characteristics result from this discussion.

—The eleventh finding is that strategy is divisible into grand strategy and military strategy—

—Twelve, grand strategy is the overarching strategy of a state that encompasses all other areas of strategy—

—Thirteen, military strategy is the variation of grand strategy in the military realm and the strategy of military bodies—

Before scrutinizing with sustained effort the notion of grand strategy, it is first necessary to assess some of the other modern views regarding strategy because they may conceal valuable characteristics.

**Contemporary Developments**

Debates following the two world wars coupled with the previous characteristics influenced strategic thinking until the current day and

considerably broadened the scope of strategy. Now businesses and private corporations resort to strategies for various fields of their activity. They have articulated, for instance, an economic strategy, a recruiting strategy, and even a development strategy. This vulgarization led to the now widespread definition, which reduces strategy to a plan established to achieve some goals, independent of the field of application.

In the military since the 1980’s, the model developed by Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr. illustrates this tendency to view strategy as a mechanical process. In his model, Lykke equated strategy to the management of ends, ways, and means. Valuable for planning although it lacks the notion of risk, this conceptual approach is also useful for the strategist. However, it lacks explanatory power for the theorist. With regard to this, Dolman provided some insightful and convincing explanations in his work entitled *Pure Strategy*.

Dolman took a more holistic view of strategy and planning. He made his view clear stating: “a plan is not strategy, though strategy without a plan is absurd.” He went further by explaining “To have a plan is to have made a decision or decisions regarding the means available to achieve a specified result (a tactical plan) or condition (a strategic plan), and the manner in which those means shall be employed.” In Dolman’s explanation, the locution “result or condition” corresponds to Lykke’s “ends,” and the “manner” corresponds to his “ways.” Both authors used the same word for “means.” Therefore, using Dolman’s statements, one can qualify Lykke’s conceptual approach as

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planning more so than strategy. These ideas lead one to the next characteristic of strategy.

—The fourteenth finding is that a strategy is not a plan—

Dolman further explained, “To have a strategy is to have a plan that sets into motion a series of actions or events that lead the state or the group toward a desired condition or policy.”

Therefore, according to Dolman, the difference between a strategy and a plan is that strategy sets conditions for an action or a series of actions—the plan—to happen, rather than aiming at a precise outcome. Dolman was deliberately cautious not to define too precisely any outcome, which would undermine his argument. Indeed, for Dolman, strategy should provide a “continuing advantage.” In other words, a strategy is an enduring endeavor and, as such, cannot aim at a finite design. By contrast, a plan, as well as Lykke’s approach, aims at a finite goal—the ends, which could be detrimental to the fulfillment of the strategy. These insights lead one to the next feature of strategy.

—The fifteenth finding is that strategy is not a finite process—

Valuable and insightful, Dolman’s notion of continuing advantage, nevertheless, contains one tension. The term “advantage” produces if not opposition, at least competition that seems to stem from the aforementioned Western propensity to associate strategy with the military. Indeed, many Western states such as Switzerland and Sweden chose to be neutral. This choice reflects a strategy that goes beyond the idea of competition, confirming and broadening the fourth finding, that strategy is not limited to opposition or competition.

Since the study of the works of Lykke and Dolman brought to the fore the goals that strategies pursue, it is now time to introduce the notion of vision. Explaining vision is almost as difficult as explaining

63. Dolman, Pure Strategy, 11.
64. This idea of “advantage” antagonizes the fourth finding and this study disagrees on this point. Dolman, Pure Strategy, 18.
strategy. Peter Schwartz, who used to work in civilian business, offered some valuable insights concerning the concept of vision in his book titled *The Art of the Long View*. From Schwartz’s work, one can infer that a vision is an educated foresight that one—the visionary—elaborates despite the context of short-term intricacies and contingencies and whose long-term significance by far exceeds traditional consensual views and guesses.

Remembering Dolman’s argument, one recalls that strategy does not aim at a finite goal. Therefore, the vision possesses a dynamic character. As time passes, the vision requires update and refinement just as does the strategy. The current vision is always as far ahead as the visionary can see, at least it should be. In other words, one can fulfill an old vision, but will never fulfill the current one that enlightens the way forward. Although not static, a vision does not need to be as dynamic as a strategy.

There is another slight difference between vision and strategy. Vision is less a tributary of present contingencies than is strategy. A vision should be pragmatic and achievable, not idealistic—even though ideals and inner values are an inexhaustible source of inspiration for visionaries—but that does not mean it cannot be grandiose. One of the roles of strategy is to set the conditions that will direct the collective endeavor towards the vision. Strategy bridges the present to this hypothetical future the visionary designs.

Where it gets tricky is that in some cases the vision that some people defend—one might argue by lack of vision—is the status quo. Associated strategies strive, therefore, at maintaining a static situation in a certain realm. The static situation can be a standard of living, a geopolitical equilibrium, or, as Dolman proposed, a continuing advantage, be it over adversaries, competitors, and even partners.

However one views the concept of vision, its interactive role with strategy leads to the next characterization.

—The sixteenth finding is that visions drive strategies—

One could continue to expand this analysis of strategy with the examination of other influential authors and specialists, perhaps leading to additional characteristics of strategy. However, prolonging this investigation in order to augment the level of detail of the characterization would only offer diminishing returns. Therefore, the attention of this study can now confidently shift towards grand strategy.

**The Advent of Grand Strategy**

Grand strategy is a contemporary development of strategy that requires special attention because it is central to this study and has provoked frenetic enthusiasm since its inception. Most importantly, grand strategy offers precious explanatory power in international politics. Because it is so central, one might legitimately wonder why not focus the study more narrowly on only grand strategy. Suffice it here to remind the reader that, first, grand strategy originates from strategy, especially the deficiencies of the early 20th-century strategic approach uncovered during the two world wars periods. Second, the analysis of strategy offered a useful basis to introduce and understand grand strategy—particularly how events, tensions, and choices impacted its development—which was one of the only ways allowing us to distance ourselves from these constraining influences. Ultimately, the knowledge obtained from the analysis of strategy is a guarantee of a broader and


68. For further detail about the advent of grand strategy, the reader should refer to the section entitled “Modern Taxonomy” in this chapter.
more objective synthesis about grand strategy and a more accurate choice of the criteria that will constitute the model of grand strategy.

Some excellent studies facilitate the analysis of grand strategy. John Collins wrote a seminal book in 1973 that explored grand strategy in depth. More recently, expanding on a paper he wrote for the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute in 2012, Hal Brands published in 2014 a fresh and synthetic work. They both deserve thorough examination.

Collins’ *Grand Strategy, Principles and Practices* was the first quality study dealing ostensibly and exclusively about the topic of grand strategy. The argument is superior, though tinged by the bias the author inevitably developed during his 30-year military career, from which he retired as a colonel just a year before the publication. It is, therefore, no surprise that Collins regarded the military as the prevalent tool of national security.

Collins defined grand strategy as “the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to exert desired degrees and types of control over the opposition through threats, force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying national security interests and objectives.” Furthermore, according to Collins, grand strategy was the compilation of national security strategies that, in turn, he described as “the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances, during peace and war, to attain national objectives.”

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Congruent with Liddell Hart to whom he referred, Collins, however, expanded the scope of grand strategy, and did not limit it to war. Additionally, Collins defined the object of grand strategy as interests and objectives that he restrained to national security considerations. Indeed, and one might think regrettably, even if Collins expounded on the concept of restraint and alluded to ideas being as lethal as bullets, Collins never ventured to examine grand strategy beyond the horizon of competition.73

Comparatively, Brands provided a fresh study that well complemented Collins’ perspective, the bias that he shared with the latter notwithstanding. Brands stated, “Grand strategy is the highest form of statecraft.”74 The rank he attributed to grand strategy in the portfolio of statecraft is debatable. However, it is more challenging to argue that grand strategy is not related to statecraft. Brands proceeded further and defined grand strategy “as the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy,” and acknowledged that, “at its best... grand strategy represents an integrated scheme of interests, threats, resources, and policies.”75

To clarify his definition, Brands elaborated on seven characteristics related to grand strategy.76 These features were, first, “grand strategy is not any one aspect of foreign policy, nor is it foreign policy as a whole.” Second, “grand strategy provides the crucial link between short-term actions and medium- and long-term goals.” Third, “grand strategy is obsessed with the relationship between means and ends, objectives and

74. Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy?, 1. This not only resonates with Collins, but also with Corbett, Fuller, and Liddell Hart. See reference in notes 50 to 59 and 69.
capabilities.” Fourth, “grand strategy is as much a process as it is any single principle.” Fifth, “grand strategy is an inherently interactive endeavor.” Sixth, “its often competitive nature notwithstanding, grand strategy operates no less in peacetime than wartime.” Seventh, “While grand strategy certainly requires a purposeful approach to policy, it does not necessarily have to be formalized, detailed, or labeled as grand strategy in official speeches and documents.” These seven points are useful in the present analytical exercise; they will indubitably enlighten our synthesis and help outline some determining criteria in the last part of the present chapter. However, before turning our focus towards the synthesis, the precisions Brands offered the third and seventh points demand further consideration.

In the development of the seventh point, Brands insisted on the tension existing between resources and interests, a dilemma exacerbated by the scarcity of resources diametrically opposed to the diversity, if not the profusion, of interests. In the competitive context of international politics, this difficulty embodies the challenging balance between short-term and long-term interests.

To supplement the third point, Brands explained that grand strategy involved “combining all aspects of national power,” which is “inherently multidimensional,” ranging from national military power, to “economic strength, internal cohesion, ideological appeal, and a variety of other factors.” Nevertheless, it is disappointing that Brands did not explore further the variety of instruments of national power. For instance, unlike Collins, and unlike Paul Kennedy in Grand Strategy in War and Peace, Brands did not underline the importance of diplomacy. Similarly, he did not utilize the list provided in Joint Publication 1 (JP1), which catalogs the US instruments of power in conformity with their

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79. Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace.
employment in the latest National Security Strategies. Continuing further with this exploration will be the object of the next chapter. Before that, and in order to test our model against US grand strategies, it is now time to synthesize the fruits of the previous analysis and to determine the criteria that will allow identification and assessment of grand strategies.

**Synthesis: the First Set of Criteria**

**Characterization of Strategy and Grand Strategy**

The characteristics determined herein, complemented by Brands’ ideas, favor a division into three groups. The first set concerns the taxonomy of strategy. The second relates to the nature of strategy. The third deals with the attributes of strategy. Each of these groups generates criteria against which one can measure the actions and policies of states or groups of states to estimate how they compare to grand strategy.

**Taxonomy Revisited**

The notion of military strategy includes the initial meaning of strategy (finding 13) and is still different from tactics today (finding 5). Originally the art of the general (finding 2), strategy now encompasses grand strategy, military strategy (finding 11), and other particular strategies. From Brands’ definition, it follows that grand strategy is a form of statecraft different from foreign policy (Brands’ first characteristic), is comparable to the overarching strategy of a state, and supersedes all other forms of strategy (finding 12).

In addition, there is no rigid dichotomy between politics and strategy (finding 8). This refined taxonomy will channel the research in the following chapters, acting as a safeguard to prevent the investigation from going astray in mixing the different domains and varieties of

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strategy. Hence the first criterion, which is threefold:

*Grand strategy operates at the central political level, is distinct from foreign policy, and encompasses all other forms of national strategies.*

**The Nature of Grand Strategy**

As strategy, grand strategy is a timeless and universal function (finding 1) that operates consistently in wartime and peacetime indiscriminately (Brands’ sixth characteristic). Depending on one’s standpoint, grand strategy appears as an art, a science, or a philosophy (finding 10). Different from a plan (finding 14) and any single principle (Brands fourth characteristic), strategy is an enduring process (finding 15) that does not necessitate formalization (Brands seventh characteristic). These elements combine to give the second criterion, which permits us to identify the nature of grand strategy:

*A timeless function of a state, grand strategy is an enduring process—neither a plan nor a principle—that does not require formalization.*

**The Attributes of Grand Strategy**

Admittedly, the most unexpected findings this study revealed are that strategy and, therefore, grand strategy are not limited to opposition, competition (finding 4), and military action (finding 3), and that they do not aim only at victory (finding 9). In terms of attributes, this analysis also demonstrated that strategy requires intelligence and flexibility to operate directly or indirectly (finding 6), anchor adequately its effects in the present (finding 7), and use them for the fulfillment of the vision (finding 16). Two criteria stem from these attributes:

*A grand strategy is broader than opposition, competition, the use of force, and the sole pursuit of victory.*

*A grand strategy is flexible, informed, pragmatic, and pursues a vision.*

From Brands’ second and seventh characteristics—his elaboration of the seventh as well—it follows that grand strategy balances short-term
actions and medium- and long-term goals. In fact, grand strategy pursues long-term designs despite short-term contingencies. To a certain degree, the dilemma between the scarcity of resources and the spread of conditions to be set constantly challenges grand strategy (Brands’ third characteristic).

Grand strategy involves combining all aspects of national power (Brands’ elaboration of his third characteristic). Starting with the ones listed in JP1, and taking into account Brands’, Collins’, and Kennedy’s perspectives, one can propose to include in the basic list of instruments of power, diplomacy, the military, economic strength, internal cohesion (that is resiliency), ideological appeal (or culture), and the use of information.\textsuperscript{81} Two criteria result from this last synthesis:

\textit{In order to mitigate the impact of short-term imperatives and contingencies on long-term goals and interests, grand strategy balances the scarcity of resources and the myriad of conditions it should set.}

\textit{To fulfill its requirements, grand strategy can use all instruments of power, be they diplomacy, information, military, economy, culture, resiliency, or any other one.}

These six criteria should allow assessing, comparing, and contrasting grand strategies. Before adopting them however, validating them against the American grand strategy appears a sound and safe approach. The next chapter takes on this task.

\textsuperscript{81} Brands’ fifth characteristic did not fit in this synthesis. Indeed, the interactive characteristic implies a reciprocal action with a partner or an adversary that limits the present approach to the relative nature of strategy. Such view appears to suffer from the aforementioned Western bias. Likewise, the characterization of grand strategy elaborated in this study could not partake of the remark Brand made in his sixth characteristic, because he attributed a competitive nature to grand strategy.
Chapter 2

The American Grand Strategy as an Enlightener

Wars are, of course, as a rule to be avoided; but they are far better than certain kinds of peace.

—Theodore Roosevelt

The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme . . . For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove.

—Woodrow Wilson

The goal of this chapter is to test the criteria elaborated in Chapter 1 by seeing how they fit the grand strategy of a great power. The United States in the 21st century undeniably is, so far, a great power and offers a germane case study. Moreover, the United States takes great care to record its institutional documents and to make them available to the public, which is no small advantage in the present endeavor. So, what shall one expect from this comparison? If the grand strategy of the United States displays the six criteria, then one significant case will have validated the theory. Will this confirm that the characterization is a necessary and sufficient condition to identify a grand strategy? Certainly not.

If a strategy displays all the attributes of our theory, then it would be a grand strategy and would confirm that the theory represents a

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1. In this chapter, the word theory simply refers to the standard definition available in any dictionary and not to the scholarly understanding that Harold R. Winton elaborated. See Chapter 1, Note 3.

2. Here the text refers to the meaning of the terms necessary and sufficient as used in logics and mathematics.
sufficient condition to determine what is, or is not, a grand strategy. Yet, the real world does not always permit the fulfillment of this condition. Grand strategies can exist that do not fulfill all criteria—which negates the possibility of the necessary condition—and, to be sure, there have been and will continue to be scores of them. As the adage goes, no one can be expected to do the impossible. Indeed, many grand strategies are imperfect, despite the great effort that their devisers expended in creating them. Applying the present theory to a grand strategy allows one to appraise the strategy. For instance, is it too narrow or too focused? Is it excessively short-term in its orientation? More importantly, the theory presents a reference to compare and contrast strategies, which will be useful in the last chapter.

Alternatively, if the US grand strategy does not display all attributes of the characterization, the latter would require some serious explanations, precisions, or refinements. Finally, if the US grand strategy presents very few of the criteria, or none at all, one could reject the theory in its entirety.

This chapter features four sections to achieve its goal. The first examines the methodological alternatives available to estimate the American grand strategy and supports the choice of the interpolation technique. Following the precepts of this technique, the second section offers historical background of the American grand strategy. The next section analyzes contemporary US strategic choices to assess how they articulate with the historical findings. The last section concludes by determining the level of confidence of the model elaborated in Chapter 1, given the finding of the present chapter.

**Methodology**

In order to conduct the assessment, it is first necessary to establish common ground and describe the US grand strategy because
no official document labeled “US Grand Strategy” exists. This absence is not very surprising given the second criterion of the characterization: A timeless function of a state, grand strategy is an enduring process—neither a plan nor a principle—that does not require formalization. To this extent, this criterion suits the US grand strategies. This allusion, however, needs further development. The assessment at the end of this chapter takes on this task.

While in the case of the United States, it is feasible to infer the grand strategy from history, existing policies, public statements, and published documents, it is not easy to define it precisely notwithstanding because, again, no official record adequately expresses it. Indeed, as Richard Hooker remarked, “Grand strategy transcends the security pronouncements of political parties or individual administrations. Viewed in this light, American grand strategy shows great persistence over time, orienting on those things deemed most important—those interests for which virtually any administration will spend, legislate, threaten, or fight to defend.” The current American grand strategy is

3. The adjective “official” is paramount in this context. Indeed, unofficial documents exist but the US government does not endorse them. For an example of such unofficial document, see for instance the next note.

4. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. “The Grand Strategy of the United States,” National Defense University Press, accessed March 1, 2015, 1. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/grand-strategy-us.pdf. If it does not officially endorse Hooker’s work, the US administration nonetheless seems to accept the description that Hooker made about grand strategy as illustrated the recent removal of the term grand strategy in official documents such as the national security strategies and the joint doctrines. This is not a trivial distinction. Serious scholar works on the topic fell into the trap of equating US grand strategy with the foreign policy or the national security strategy in effect. See for instance John J. Kohout et al., “Alternative Grand Strategy Options for the United States,” Comparative Strategy 14, no. 4 (October 1995): 362–3, doi:10.1080/01495939508403043. Bruno Colson noticed the propensity that the United States displayed to use the concept of strategy to designate its foreign policy, which the recent changes in the
the legatee of its predecessors and the expression of American strategic culture. As a result, one cannot rely on a single source to interpret the American grand strategy.

In a sense, this is regrettable because it would be much easier and more convenient to reduce the American grand strategy to recurrent documents such as the national security strategies (NSSs). However tempting, for this study to adopt this shortcut would be a mistake.\textsuperscript{5} Indeed, each NSS only provides a snapshot of how a given administration has interpreted and then tried to orient American grand strategy during its tenure. Furthermore, while it would be better than relying on a single NSS, the combination of all the NSSs would still offer an incomplete picture. Indeed, the sum of the NSSs does not equate to the American strategy. While assembling the NSSs and studying the set with a comparative analysis of political science has the potential to give a partial idea of the grand strategy and its trends, it would remain an incomplete view.\textsuperscript{6} Indeed, the result would indubitably be limited to the scope of the dataset encompassing the NSSs. In fact, making sense of these scattered and incomplete pictures requires an interpolation, a method that mathematicians frequently use, and whose result is not limited to the


\footnotesize{5. It is surprising to see how many authors equate NSSs with American grand strategy. Colson fell also into this trap, even though he identified that American often mix strategy and foreign policy (see note 4). Indeed, he is astonished that Clinton’s NSS defined several specific modus operandi expressing political ends without even mentioning them. See Colson, \textit{La Stratégie Américaine et l’Europe}, 37.}

\footnotesize{6. In addition, we all experience difficulties when it comes to analyzing current phenomena and events. Since we live at the pace of the actuality, we often deem significant some irrelevant details while we sometimes do not even notice authentic game-changers. When we, therefore, scrutinize actuality unintentionally, we tend to see dichotomies where there are only minor contending strains in a broader trend.}
In the case of American grand strategy, such procedure requires adaptation. It would consist of an approximation of American grand strategy and then confirmation that some of the latest NSSs corroborate it. A brief historical analysis of American grand strategy will permit the elaboration of a theory. Indeed, it will allow for better understanding of the country’s course and behavior through the identification of enduring trends, milestones, and pivotal influences. This method appears representative of American grand strategy, yet less complicated than a strict interpolation of the NSS and constitutes the basis of this study. Again, the discussion starts with a brief historical background.

**Historical Background**

In terms of strategy, United States history is divisible into two notable periods. The first is the internal buildup and enrichment of the country relying on a strategy focused on national security and economy. It extends from the time the idea of independence germinated in the British colonies until 1898. It witnessed first the settlement and the securing of the Republic, and second, the consolidation of the institutions and the emergence of the country as a regional hegemon.

In the second period, the United States converted its wealth into power and, while relying on a strategy still focused on national security and economy, adopted a more indirect approach. The approach was indirect in the sense that the United States pursued and ensured security—national and collective—and wealth through external and

7. See Appendix 4 for a detailed explanation on the method.
8. We should recall that, as Gray demonstrated (cf. Chapter 1, note 4), and even though the term did not exist as such during the whole history of the United States, strategy was a necessary function to which statesmen resorted nevertheless.
global institutions and not solely through direct unilateral actions. This period extends from 1898 to the present and witnessed the irresistible rise of the United States from a major actor in the international arena, to one of the world’s superpowers since 1945, and to the sole superpower since the collapse of the Soviet Union.\(^{10}\) The change occurred from the first to the second period during the presidential tenures of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Each period requires a dedicated yet broad examination to allow for the elaboration of a theory representative of American grand strategy.\(^{11}\)

During the early years of the American Republic, the chief concerns of the Founding Fathers were to understand the nature of the republic and create stable and just institutions that could ensure the tranquility; the security; the wealth; and, implicitly, the survival of the new nation.\(^{12}\) They expressed these concerns in the preamble to the

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10. James Kurth defined three periods for American grand strategy and foreign policy that he split at the Civil War and at the Second World War. As compelling as Kurth argument was, and although he inspired the present reflection, Kurth choice in term of periods did not seem to fit reality and could not, therefore, serve as a reference for the present work. Indeed, first Kurth discounted the first period adopted in the herein defined. Second, Kurth did not account for the change that occurred during the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, neither in terms of scope nor in terms of vision. Finally, Kurth decided to portray two starkly different periods before and after the civil war while, as he admitted, the United States continued its expansion in North America after the Civil War. See James Kurth, “America’s Grand Strategy: A Pattern of History,” *The National Interest* no. 43 (Spring 1996): 3-19. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the rapid emergence of China might complement this description with a new phase, if not reshuffle the world order altogether.


12. In an article entitled “To the edge of greatness: The United States, 1783-1865,” Peter Maslowski remarked the problem that the Founding Father faced: “Washington and other nationalists not only had a vision, but also a problem. Under the Articles of Confederation adopted during
Constitution. As a reminder, they wrote: “We, the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

This prioritization of national action has endured to the present day.

After the impulse for emancipation from Britain led to the birth of the United States, the Confederation initially, and then the federal government, strove to establish a strategy that allowed for the internal development of the United States and kept European powers checked without taking excessive risks in so doing. George Washington applied such guidelines during his two terms and advised the country to follow suit in his Farewell Address. He recommended that the country remain free of permanent alliances in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.

The succeeding administrations abided by Washington’s recommendations, inspired by his charisma, august nobility, and wisdom.

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The Monroe Doctrine was the catalyst that set the United States on the track to become the prevalent polity in its sphere of influence, that is, the regional hegemon of the Americas.\footnote{15}{Eliot, American Historical Documents, 277-9.} Actors on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as Russia, have mostly respected the three core concepts of the Doctrine, namely separate spheres of influence for the Americas and Europe, non-colonization, and non-intervention.\footnote{16}{“Monroe Doctrine, 1823, 1801–1829 Milestones,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed March 1, 2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe.} Very few examples existed that then flouted these precepts, and the Monroe Doctrine allowed the United States to thrive economically.\footnote{17}{Counter examples count the creation of Liberia and more glaringly the attempt of the Soviet Union to base missiles in Cuba in 1962 that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis.}

What is particularly interesting in the Monroe Doctrine is that the Congress never ratified it and that it only depended on the ability “of the United States to enforce it.”\footnote{18}{Note of the editor, Eliot, American Historical Documents, 277.} Before the Civil War, the European powers were too busy dealing with their indigenous problems to meddle seriously in American affairs.\footnote{19}{The aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars were not easy to deal with given the profound changes and turmoil that the French Emperor caused in whole Europe.}

After the Civil War, the European powers were more active internationally, and the United States had to negotiate and compete to assert its interests vis-à-vis Europe.\footnote{20}{The modus vivendi that the Europeans found under the Pax Britannica allowed them to start a second wave of colonization that was more focused on India and Africa. The Suez Canal that the French engineered and build is the result of this fad for the Orient and Africa to a lesser extend.} Inspired by the success of British strategies, the theories that Alfred Thayer Mahan promoted contributed to sway the political debate and prompt the US government to embrace a more assertive maritime strategy that led the American grand strategy to
transition to its second period. Mahan’s idea grew on the fertile soil of America’s character seasoned during the completion of its expansion to the West. The United States not only lacked territories on which to continue its historical expansion at the dusk of the 19th century, but, as Frederick Jackson Turner argued, it also acquired an adventurous character prone to embrace Mahan’s ideas.

Mahan’s prescription resonated with and strongly influenced President Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt developed an acute inclination for naval affairs at an early age. As an undergraduate at Harvard, he wrote a history of the War of 1812, which received public and scholarly acclamation. He adopted Mahan’s ideas and after a brief tenure as Undersecretary of the Navy, put them into practice as President of the United States by launching the Great White Fleet. Even if some scholars such as Sebastian Lukasik have eloquently questioned the significance of this initiative, many acclaimed it. A large cohort of supporters is still nostalgic today about Roosevelt’s strategy, which they see as the epitome of American grandeur. Undeniably, Roosevelt’s political guideline mingled nicely with the Open Door Policy advocating free commerce with China and other economic orientations to set the United States on the course to global power.

The stark change of style and vision that the induction of Woodrow


Wilson into the presidency brought about did not alter the inexorable rise of the United States to world power. To be sure, Wilson championed the idea of Kantian Peace through the promotion of democracy and worldwide institutions such as the League of Nations, which contrasted sharply with Roosevelt’s views. Roosevelt openly focused on short-to-medium-term American interests, while Wilson encouraged the country to look beyond toward much longer-term interests. However, despite appearing very different to the public, arguably the most different successive presidents, Wilson and Roosevelt steered American strategy in the same direction. The quotations chosen for this chapter’s epigraph, illustrate that both presidents wanted peace, peace on their terms, and that they were ready to fight for it.24 In short, even if their strategies were different, they ended up pursuing similar goals, albeit with distinctly different styles; and Wilson added a global liberal dimension that was resolutely more long-term in orientation.

Even the two world wars punctuated by the Great Depression did not alter the course of history. In 1945, the United States entered its latest period of evolution, progressing toward the status of global power that we know today. Indeed, in 1945, because of the two world wars, the world order changed tremendously. European Powers lost their position among the dominant nations, particularly the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and in Asia, Japan experienced a similar fate.

After World War II, the United States emerged as a major global actor alongside the Soviet Union. The antagonistic ideals of the United States and the USSR destabilized their parallel rise to power and produced the bipolarity that led to the Cold War. In the United States,

this period generated institutional tools and guidance that are still influential for the US grand strategy. The structural reforms the successive administrations introduced in the post-World War II era were normative for the United States government and its international relations.

First, the National Security Act of 1947, which established the US Air Force, also created the National Security Council (NSC). Although initially a weak institution, over time, the NSC asserted itself as an essential organ of the administration and one of the prime instruments of American strategy’s decision-making process. NSC’s resolutions would set the guidelines for governmental decisions and policy making.

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Second, the Marshall Plan, which was very beneficial to European countries, also brought to the United States returns beyond expectations. Of course, in line with the political guidance, it contributed to the fight against communism. More importantly, as John Ikenberry argued, the plan helped the United States retain its nascent primacy for a longer period. In essence, in helping Europeans recover from the throes of World War II, the United States built up its European partners, relinquishing, to a degree, some of its dominance. Trading power for prestige is what Ikenberry qualifies as trading short-term gains for long-term advantage, and that is precisely what the Marshall Plan achieved in its execution.

Third, the government established the strategy of nuclear deterrence that it adapted over time. The presumed difference in terms of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union, the orientations of the successive administrations, as well as the theories with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, contributed to the development of deterrence strategy in the United States. The strategy shifts from Massive Retaliation, to Mutual Assured Destruction, and to Flexible Response do not need a detailed study here. Suffice it to remark that the US deterrence strategy moved in the direction of détente with the Soviet Union, that is, toward an embryonic solution to the Cold War.

Finally, the United States supported the creation of international institutions that shaped a new world order more apt to ensuring global stability and promoting democracy. The heir of Wilson’s aborted project of the League of Nations, the United Nations, has been and still is the

cornerstone of these institutions. Many are those who overtly and frequently criticize the United Nations. However, if nothing else, the United Nations is the conveyor of liberal ideas and a forum that always ensures an open medium of communication between states, whether they are at peace or engaged in hostilities. Fortunately, as peacekeeping operations have proven, the United Nations is often more than that.

Other multinational organizations sprang from the same dynamic. The conference of Bretton Woods gave birth to the International Monetary Fond, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade in 1944. Like the United Nations, these organizations are also guarantors of a stable international order through international interdependency or community of interests and the dissemination of liberal values and practices. Alliances such as NATO and those to which the United States committed itself in the Pacific “sustain and defend established democracies” and stem from the idea of collective defense.\(^{31}\) The creation of the United Nations and these other major supranational institutions embodied the American willingness to avoid world conflicts and champion liberalism.

From this historical background, one can draw five recurrent and persisting trends in American grand strategy. First, security is an enduring national priority that encompasses the protection of the American way of life. As Hooker put it, “the protection of American territory, citizens, our constitutional system of government, and our economic well-being.”\(^{32}\) Second, since its creation, the United States counted on economy to provide security and internal stability. Third, since the Monroe Doctrine, the United States enforced what John M. Collins labeled, in his *Grand Strategy*, the “Western Hemisphere Defense.” Fourth, since Roosevelt, the United States has intervened

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globally, both to enlarge economic opportunities and to address potential threats before they reached the American continent. Fifth, since Wilson, the United States promoted international liberalism and furthered collective defense.

Combining these five trends leads to a characterization of American grand strategy. The American grand strategy mostly relies on its thriving economy, but also on other instruments of power, such as an active diplomacy and a credible military. The goals are to promote American-led international liberalism and multinational collective defense, and ultimately to prevent potential threats from interfering with national security and the American way of life.

It is now time to check this theory against some NSSs.

**Current US Grand Strategy**

In order to determine whether some of the NSSs verify the proposed theory of American grand strategy, the project narrows the study to two different administrations like those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. This choice offers a sound nonpartisan approach. With the same concern and to avoid any prejudice, since each president produced two NSSs, one in each of their terms, the choice should go to

33. The skeptics vis-à-vis this approach, could read extensively all the NSSs and refer to the many scholarly studies or pundits’ article on this topic. To confirm the selection chosen in this study, Colson referred, for instance, to Clinton’s, Reagan’s, and Bush’s NSS in the following terms “En février 1995, la Maison Blanche publia un document, préfacé par le président Clinton, exposant la stratégie américaine de sécurité. Les versions précédentes avaient été celles de Ronald Reagan en janvier 1988 et de George Bush en août 1991. Le texte de février 1995 reprend les deux notions d’engagement et d’élargissement pour les traduire en termes stratégiques dans les trois dimensions militaire, économique et culturelle.” In February 1995, the White House published a document exposing the American security strategy prefaced by President Clinton. The previous versions were those of Ronald Reagan in January 1988 and George Bush in August 1991. The text from February 1995 reiterated the to notions of commitment and enlargement to translate them in strategic terms in the three military, economic, and cultural dimensions,” in Colson, *La Stratégie Américaine et l’Europe.*
the first or the second iteration for both presidents. Bush’s 2006 and Obama’s 2015 NSSs meet these requirements.

Unsurprisingly, the 9/11 bombings influenced President Bush’s NSS. The natural emotional and contingency reaction that permeated through the whole strategy should not hamper the research for more enduring elements. In his campaign against terrorism, Bush insisted that Americans “fight [their] enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in [the] country.” That said, the central point that President Bush addressed is the liberal determination to promote democracy actively and “shape the world.” What is striking is not so much the theme than the central place it occupied and Bush’s determination to actively spread it. This point worked in line with Bush’s defiance of fear, isolationism, protectionism, retreat, and retrenchment that he saw as impediments to American economic development, security, and grandeur.

Bush stated he founded his strategy on two pillars. The first was the promotion of liberal values, including free markets and democracies. The second was deliberate actions against all kinds of challenges, preferably accomplished by collective action of democracies led by the United States. As his statement indicated, Bush intended to pursue the goals that these two pillars represented through resolute action. Such agenda required the expansion of “national strength,” which, in turn, necessitated to maintaining “a military without peer.” The NSS integrated the approach that Bush qualified as “idealistic about . . . national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them.” To

35. United States, 2006 NSS.
36. United States, 2006 NSS.
37. Unless indicated otherwise, all the elements discussed in this paragraph originate from United States, 2006 NSS, iii.
paraphrase Colin Dueck’s words, the Bush NSS presented the characteristics of what could be a marriage between realism and liberalism.\textsuperscript{38} Dueck’s work contains further valuable insights with respect to Bush’s strategy.

In his book, \textit{Reluctant Crusaders}, Dueck explored American orientations in terms of strategic culture. In addition, he compared and contrasted it with the Bush Administration’s strategy. Dueck noted “The conduct of American grand strategy has long been shaped, to a greater or lesser extent, by a set of beliefs that can only be called ‘liberal.’”\textsuperscript{39} Dueck also argued that Bush’s policies and positions were “well within the mainstream American tradition of liberal internationalism” that, for instance, Wilson, Roosevelt, and Clinton adopted “out of the belief that such system would [make] . . . the United States more prosperous, influential, and secure.”\textsuperscript{40} While such policies came about mostly because of the 9/11 attacks, Dueck conceded “The George W. Bush administration came to power in 2001 with a somewhat less liberal internationalist and more realist approach toward U.S. grand strategy.”\textsuperscript{41}

Indeed, what distinguished George W. Bush from his predecessor or other liberals such as Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, or Franklin Delano Roosevelt was that he embraced an “aggressive promotion of American primacy overseas.”\textsuperscript{42} Despite that “supporters and critics of the Bush administration alike regularly [asserted] that its foreign policy [was then] under ‘neoconservative’ influence,” this particularity of Bush approach is what other authors identified as the Bush administration’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{39} Dueck, \textit{Reluctant Crusaders}, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Dueck, \textit{Reluctant Crusaders}, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Dueck, \textit{Reluctant Crusaders}, 165.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Dueck, \textit{Reluctant Crusaders}, 1.
\end{itemize}
demarcation from the neoconservative tradition. If this attitude pleased a fringe of the American population, it also, according to Dueck, fueled the national and international criticisms of the Bush administration.

To conclude this discussion of Bush’s strategic orientations and as a transition to Obama’s, it is worth mentioning Dueck’s final remarks about President Bush. He wrote, “The United States, together with its allies, can either take up the burden of truly acting on its own internationalist rhetoric, or it can keep the costs and risks of foreign policy to a minimum. It cannot do both. That is the U.S. strategic dilemma.” It seems that the Obama administration correctly understood and aimed at alleviating this difficulty in sharing the burden with its allies. If it succeeded in also sharing the costs and risks, Obama’s administration might have found a way to address Dueck’s conclusions successfully. It is time to determine whether Obama’s


44. “One of the conventional criticisms of the Bush administration’s grand strategy is that it is excessively and even disastrously unilateralist in approach.” Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders*, 1.


second NSS confirms what this last statement asserted.

In the 2010 NSS, with the exception of the safeguard of the national interest, the Obama Administration introduced the instruments of power before the goals at which they aimed. It presented the economy as the cornerstone of American security. The economy is a bridge between internal and external factors and interests. The factor appearing second in importance is the dynamism of demography and population. The entrepreneurial character is a particular catalyst of the energetic demography. The military augmented by technology constitutes only the third priority, which contrasts with the preeminence that Bush attributed to it. The fourth, diplomacy needs further details.

In his inaugural letter to the NSS, President Obama took great care in detailing the three variants of diplomacy to which he envisaged resorting. He first declared, but skillfully as an understatement to soften the announcement, that he was willing to act unilaterally, should the necessity arise. However, he rapidly refocused on cooperation and collective action, whether through global institutions or bilateral alliances. The text detailed these positions and referred to sharing the burden with international partners, as his previous NSS did.

In terms of the goals pursued, security is the premier concern. A rapid reading of the table of contents shows that the other objectives that


48. “Abroad, we are demonstrating that while we will act unilaterally against threats to our core interests, we are stronger when we mobilize collective action.” United States, 2015 NSS, iii.

the nation is following are, in order of priority, prosperity, values, and international order. They correspond to the goals, which sum up the American way of life, that is security, liberty, prosperity, and the pursuit of happiness. A closer look at the subheadings and the text itself confirms that these three goals are supporting the prevalent aim, which is national security.

Overall, President Obama’s strategic vision is not starkly different from that of President Bush. They are both well in line with American traditional universal institutionalism and its cultural corollary that Dueck called “limited liability.” In fact, as was the case for Roosevelt and Wilson, the contrast between Bush’s and Obama’s NSSs appears not so much in the content than in the way to say it. Theodore Roosevelt might have agreed that while both carried a big stick, Obama spoke more softly.50

So, did the strategies of these two presidents verify the theory proposed for American grand strategy? As a reminder, the theory proposed stated: The American grand strategy mostly relies on its thriving economy, but also on other instruments of power, such as an active diplomacy and a credible military. The goals are to promote American-led international liberalism and multinational collective defense, and ultimately to prevent potential threats from interfering with national security and the American way of life.

Both presidents agreed on the central role of the economy, but also on the function of the other instruments of power. They also both fostered liberalism and collective defense to defend American interests and way of life. However, Bush’s administration defended interventionism while Obama’s advocated burden sharing. This is just

the consequence of political choice and does not constitute a sufficient divergence to refute the theory. Overall, given the analysis conducted heretofore, it is the position of the author that the two NSSs verify the theory that he will now use as the basis to characterize American grand strategy.

Before checking whether American grand strategy verifies the theory elaborated in Chapter 1, it is worth noting that President Obama concluded his opening statement on two notes. The first is the time span necessary to implement the agenda fixed by the NSS. Obama acknowledged that this program would necessitate a longer time than the duration of his tenure. The second is the bipartisan consensus required to implement the agenda over time. In a sense, through this last statement, Obama recognized that American strategy superseded the political orientation of each party and the political game. In addition to the extension of the periodicity of the NSSs, this might signify that the United States is moving from an NSS purely political towards an NSS much more strategic. Such an evolution would constitute a substantial change in American strategic culture.51

Obama’s last remark confirms that it was wise not to rely on either a comparative analysis or a strict, non-augmented interpolation of the NSSs. Indeed, such method would have suffered from a myopic look at the partisan alternation that would have disproportionally magnified it, as opposed to the broader stance that allowed the historical analysis.

Assessment of the Theory

Thanks to the theory that gives a precise idea of American grand strategy, assessing the characterization developed in Chapter 1 requires answering two questions. First, given the elements herein, does the US

grand strategy meet the six criteria? Second, is it necessary to modify, reduce, or augment the criteria?

As a reminder, the first criterion stated *Grand strategy operates at the central political level, is distinct from foreign policy, and encompasses all other forms of national strategies.* Since 1947, the National Security Council advises the inner circle of the President and the President himself. By law, the Senate can propose, and the President has the authority to adopt policies of strategic significance. In addition, the Constitution makes provision for checks and balances and, for instance, without getting into legal details, presidential resolutions are subject to controls from the Senate. Hence, the core of the government elaborates the nation’s grand strategy.

Moreover, as Colson’s work showed, Americans tend to merge the notions of foreign policy and grand strategy. However, the two fields are different. Foreign policy is only one of the components of American grand strategy. Indeed, as the analysis of the NSSs showed, diplomacy, and consequently foreign policy, is only one of the instruments of power the government uses to conduct its strategy. The US grand strategy supersedes and encompasses the NSS, the military strategy, the foreign policy, as well as all the other particular strategies inherent to the proper application of the remaining instruments of national power.\footnote{52. Again, many fell in the trap of equating grand strategy with foreign policy, some renowned scholars included. See note 4.} The first criterion suits, therefore, the US grand strategy.

The second criterion established that *a timeless function of a state, grand strategy is an enduring process—neither a plan nor a principle—that does not require formalization.* Assessing for this criterion starts with the allusion made in the introduction to this chapter. Indeed, there is no official document stating the American grand strategy. However, as the historical analysis confirmed, the US grand strategy has long existed. Inspired by former strategies that shaped the national strategic culture,
the refinement of US grand strategy stems nowadays from the successive National Security Strategy, the political decisions, and the moves the United States makes in the international arena.\textsuperscript{53} It is never rigid, and the successive administrations periodically adjust it. Thus, the US grand strategy verifies the second criterion.

\textit{A grand strategy is broader than opposition, competition, the use of force, and the sole pursuit of victory} was the third criterion. The different dynamics, which exist in the United States, ensure that the American grand strategy remains broader than opposition. The tradition of liberal internationalism engrained in American strategy for more than a century epitomizes this idea. The fact that American grand strategy is broader than opposition, however, might neither appear accurate at any given time, nor seem a steady trend, but in the end, the change of administration regulates any excess.

Indeed, if some administrations are more inclined to use force, others work to foster cooperation. This political alternation blurs the reflection about whether or not American strategy is broader than opposition, and this phenomenon is particularly acute since the United States attained the status of the sole superpower. For some people, even the rare example that did not directly foster opposition might appear doing so. Some argue, for instance, that despite its philanthropic impetus, the Marshall Plan antagonized communism and, as Ikenberry’s thesis supported, promised the extension of American hegemonic power over time. This argument is difficult to refute, and one can only oppose personal convictions adorned by Winston Churchill’s qualifier, “the most un-sordid act in history.”\textsuperscript{54} Besides supporting the criterion, this trait

\textsuperscript{53} “The grand strategy of the United States has already been composed by the historical tradition and trajectory of American foreign policy and by the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of the American nation.” In Kurth, “America’s Grand Strategy,” 3.
shows that American grand strategy can favor long-term interests.\textsuperscript{55} Objectively, overall, the US grand strategy verifies the third criterion.

The fourth criterion declared that \textit{a grand strategy is flexible, informed, pragmatic, and pursues a vision}. In this regard, the United States clearly follows a vision, which President Reagan encapsulated in his introductory statement to the 1987 National Security Strategy: “Freedom, peace and prosperity . . . that’s what America is all about . . . for ourselves, our friends, and those people across the globe struggling for democracy.”\textsuperscript{56} The internal focus the United States displayed during the two initial phases of its strategic development shifted when Roosevelt adopted a global focus and was confirmed when Wilson first set the liberal vision of Kantian peace that requires external benevolence.

This liberal vision coexists in the United States with a more realist

\textsuperscript{55} This characteristic deserves elaboration. Surprisingly enough, many American lament that, due to the rather rapid rate of renewal of administrations, the United States can neither plan for nor pursue long-term interests adequately. This sentiment seems particularly acute recently since the American public often compares the American strategy with the Chinese one, which appears much longer-term in orientation. To this, one can oppose that the frustration the American might experience is certainly the price to pay for stable institutions that support human rights and individual liberties. Indeed, the Chinese institutions are not yet meeting these standards. In addition, this questioning might stem from the exaggerated feeling that American developed in thinking that they are a young nation by comparison to some others in the world. This relative youth is not meaningful since, in terms of political regime, the United States is one of the oldest continuous regimes on Earth. Despite the Civil War, it demonstrated a rare stability since the independence that very few state on Earth enjoys.

and pragmatic one. The resulting debate between the two allows for a flexible strategic culture that political alternation energizes. There is no strict relation between the political parties in power and liberal or realist strategies. However, Republican administrations tend to be more realistic in defending strategic approaches that Christopher Layne labeled preponderance, whereas Democrat administrations generally adopt more nuanced collaborative approaches like the “offshore balancing,” which Lane advocated, and which resembles Obama’s orientations.\(^{57}\) In addition, despite some inescapable historical counterexamples, the United States is remarkably well informed, and, consequently, so is its grand strategy. In short, the American grand strategy is informed, flexible, and pragmatic, and follows a vision, which satisfies the fourth criterion.

The fifth criterion established that, \textit{in order to mitigate the impact of short-term imperatives and contingencies on long-term goals and interests, grand strategy balances the scarcity of resources and the myriad of conditions it should set.} To start with resources, those of the United States do not escape reality and are limited, as wealthy as the country might be. Arguably, the ambition of the United States, like that of most countries, often exceeds what reasonable budgets alone can achieve. Now, the real question remains: how well does the US grand strategy mitigate this paradox? Is it in balancing short-term imperatives, or long-term goals and interests?

The title of Dueck’s work, \textit{Reluctant Crusaders}, captures and explains the dilemma resulting from the balancing between short-term imperatives and long-term goals.\(^{58}\) Dueck identified two competing strains in the United States that address this dichotomy. The


\(^{58}\) Dueck, \textit{Reluctant Crusaders}.\)
competition between the two ensures, in fact, a proper balance between immediate and future needs. Indeed, whereas the first strain, the liberal vision of internationalism, aims at serving long-term security, liberty, and prosperity, the second strain, “limited liability,” intends to satisfy short-term economic and security concerns. Political pundits and politicians on both sides debate the opposing ideologies. Consequently, political alternation is an intrinsic attribute of the elaboration process of American grand strategy. Because they take part in the debate, lobbies, political parties, foreign allies, public opinion, the media, and the government all have a role in this strategic process. Therefore, quite naturally through the institutions and the openness of its society, American grand strategy satisfies the fifth criterion.

Finally, the last criterion was To fulfill its requirements, grand strategy can use all instruments of power, be they diplomacy, information, military, economy, culture, resiliency, or any other one. In the case of its grand strategy, the United States fulfills this last criterion without difficulty. Through the examination of two recent NSSs, the study of the current grand strategy showed that the instruments of national power are all contributing to serve the national strategy, even if the succeeding administrations do not assign the same relative priority to each of them. Some might argue that, contrary to the tradition of keeping small militaries and governments, the United States has considerably increased, relatively to the other instruments, the priority of the military in the last 70 years. Nevertheless, the military industrial complex, which President Eisenhower warned about in his farewell address, gained a tremendous political influence. However well served it is by the Department of Defense, it does not suppress the key roles the other instruments of power play in American grand strategy.59

59. For Eisenhower reference, see "The Farewell Address," Eisenhower Presidential Library, accessed March 21, 2015,
The American grand strategy verifies the characterization requirements in the six criteria. At this point, the study answers the first research question, leaving one with the second question: Is it necessary to modify, reduce, or augment the criteria? The answer here must be “no.” While it is true that the American grand strategy does not fit the characterization established in Chapter 1 perfectly, the adage “perfection is the enemy of the good” justifies alone that the characterization does not require any modification.

Now that the characterization of grand strategy passed at least one empirical filter, it is time to use it to assess the strategies developed by the EU and NATO.

Chapter 3

Assessment of EU and NATO Strategies

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm . . . their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

—Washington Treaty/North Atlantic Treaty
April 4, 1949

[The parties,] Confirming their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law . . . Determined to promote economic and social progress . . . Resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy . . . Have decided to establish a European Union . . . on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.

—Treaty on the European Union
Consolidated Version, 2012

The European Union and NATO do not pretend to have grand strategies. The European Union published in 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS), which displays the same limits as the American National Security Strategies.1 Indeed, the ESS provides a snapshot of how, during this time, the EU understood and then tried to orient European strategy. The European Union also published some even more focused and regionally dedicated strategies.2 However, no document

1. See p. 39 of this study.
exists that represents or encompasses what one would call “the grand strategy” of the European Union.

This observation holds true for NATO as well. Since December 1, 1949, NATO periodically published an official paper called the Strategic Concept. NATO defines it as the “official document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces.”3 As Gregory Pedlow synthesized in his synoptic diagram entitled Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1999, scores of other measures, guidance, and directives complement the Strategic Concept.4 However, once again, despite this relative profusion and consistency, no single document presents what one might call a NATO grand strategy. At first glance, it seems that neither the European Union nor NATO has a grand strategy.

Sharing this widespread yet superficial view, many scholars and pundits offer prescriptive ways to elaborate grand strategies for the European Union and NATO. This observation is particularly acute in the case of the European Union. For instance, Sven Biscop, a renowned and prolific European academic, advocated through various venues for a more ostensible European grand strategy.5 With former Belgian Air

Force General Jo Coelmont, he argued for a Europe more conscious of its power; and he recommended that the European Union embrace power politics with an enhanced, more coherent military component.\(^6\) On NATO’s side, after the debate experienced an active period in the wake of the fall of the Eastern Bloc, the discussion is now less marked. Some rare studies, such as *NATO, in Search of a Vision*, edited by Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca Moore, advocate that the NATO Strategic Concept constitutes a NATO grand strategy more ostensibly.\(^7\)

These disparate analyses merely reflect the Western bias identified in Chapter 1. Indeed, these views, while not starkly realist, reveal the Western propensity to consider grand strategy as competitive in nature and to feel the need for military preponderance when addressing security considerations. In addition, these views fail to see grand strategy as an enduring process. On the contrary, they focus on single documents such as European Union’s ESS or NATO’s Strategic Concept and regret that such documents do not outline grand strategies. As was the case for the United States, and in congruence with the second criterion of the characterization established in Chapter 1, it is not abnormal for no document to exist that contains the possible European Union or NATO grand strategies. Thus, although they are not hasty, these analyses would at least benefit from an enhanced scrutiny.

Indeed, a closer look offers a different result and reveals the evidence to support that both NATO and the European Union develop a

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7. “A new Strategic Concept must not only serve as political-military guidance for how it should meet these new challenges—that would be nothing more than another in a series of reactive documents. Instead, a document that embodies NATO’s long-term strategic vision is necessary.” In Gülnur Aybet, *NATO in Search of a Vision* (Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 250.
grand strategy. Doing so, that is, proving the existence of these grand strategies and determining what they are is the object of the next section.

**EU and NATO Grand Strategies**

The creation of the EU and NATO resulted from top-down willpower and processes initiated by national elites who sought to avoid bloody conflicts through the creation of strategic institutions. By way of comparison, the creations of the American and French Republics originated from bottom-up movements led by the bourgeoisie. NATO and the European Union are, therefore, the fruits of a deliberate series of strategic choices made by the governments of the participating nations. These strategic choices coalesced in part to constitute the embryos of the European Union and NATO grand strategies briefly illustrated in the extracts presented in the epigraph. These embryos gestated over time becoming de facto grand strategies for these institutions. Applying the characterization of grand strategy elaborated in Chapter 1 to the identified strategies of NATO and the European Union, this work defends the proposition that both NATO and the European Union have developed a grand strategy, albeit without recognizing or even realizing it.

**NATO Grand Strategy**

Different entities, operating at different levels, comprise NATO. NATO is, primarily, the Alliance made up of the 28 member countries.\(^8\) The Alliance seeks to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means.\(^9\) As the inter-governmental organization expression of the Alliance, NATO has, therefore, a political and a military dimension. On one hand, the national delegations, the

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8. The detail of NATO member states is available in appendix 3.
North Atlantic Council; the Nuclear Planning Group; and quite a few
diverse political oversight groups, offices, committees, and agencies work
at the political level.\textsuperscript{10} Each member state keeps a delegation led by an
ambassador at NATO Headquarters to represent the country and its
interests in the decision-making process.\textsuperscript{11} Chaired by the General
Secretary, the North Atlantic Council is the principal political decision-
making organ.\textsuperscript{12} The Nuclear Planning Group is the equivalent of the
North Atlantic Council for nuclear matters; it consistently elaborates and
reviews NATO’s nuclear policies.\textsuperscript{13}

On the other hand, the NATO military structure comprises two
strategic commands, one for operations, and the other for
transformation.\textsuperscript{14} The Military Committee links the military structure to
the political structure.\textsuperscript{15} As advisor to the North Atlantic Council, the
Military Committee contributes to the elaboration of policies and
doctrines. Responsible for translating the political guidance into military
terms, the Military Committee also advises NATO with respect to its

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{10} It would be fastidious detailing here all these other entities. The
author limited the enumeration to what NATO presents as the essential
political structures in “What Is NATO?” For further information, see

\textsuperscript{11} “National Delegations to,” \textit{NATO}, accessed April 15, 2015,

\textsuperscript{12} “The North Atlantic Council,” \textit{NATO}, accessed April 15, 2015,

\textsuperscript{13} “The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG),” \textit{NATO}, accessed April 15,
does not take part in the Nuclear Planning Group.

\textsuperscript{14} Detailing the respective roles of these commands would be
superfluous here. For deeper information, see “Allied Command
Operations (ACO),” \textit{NATO}, accessed April 15, 2015,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52091.htm. See also “Allied
Command Transformation (ACT),” \textit{NATO}, accessed April 15, 2015,

\textsuperscript{15} Unless mentioned otherwise, references to the Military Committee
originate from “The Military Committee,” \textit{NATO}, accessed April 15, 2015,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49633.htm.}
strategic direction and thus assists the Allies in elaborating the Strategic Concept, which lays down “the Alliance’s core tasks and principles, its values, the evolving security environment and the Alliance’s strategic objectives for the next decade. The 2010 Strategic Concept defines NATO’s core tasks as: collective defence, crisis-management and cooperative security.”

These political and military structures are a form of governance that operate at and constitute the core of the Alliance. Additionally, they consistently elaborate a canon of policies, doctrines, directives, and concepts that, over time and building upon the Washington Treaty, shape and constitute NATO Strategy. From this point forward, the text will refer to this NATO Strategy by capitalizing its first letter. Such precaution will facilitate the assessment of this product to determine if the NATO Strategy matches the characteristics of a grand strategy; in other words, submitting NATO Strategy to the test of the six criteria.

**Criterion 1:** *Grand strategy operates at the central political level, is distinct from foreign policy, and encompasses all other forms of national strategies.*

The elaboration of NATO Strategy takes place at the central political level of NATO. Indeed, even the Military Committee, the highest military body, serves as an advisor to the political level in the process. Additionally, NATO maintains relationships with non-member nations and other organizations. These relations compare to the foreign

17. The word Strategy capitalized will refer to the phenomenon that will be submitted to the test of the criteria. For a glimpse on this canon, see “Strategic Concepts,” NATO, accessed April 12, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm.
relations that states establish, and while the Allies align them to and
guide them by NATO Strategy, they remain different. Finally, NATO does
not produce any strategy higher than that stemming from “the canon”
identified in the previous paragraph. Thus, one can see that the Alliance
operates at the central political level and develops a distinct foreign
policy within a multi-national “grand” strategy, substantiating the first
criterion.

Criterion 2: A timeless function of a state, grand strategy is an
enduring process—neither a plan nor a principle—that does not require
formalization.

NATO consistently refines its policies, doctrines, and concepts.
The periodic revision of the Strategic Concept validates this claim on the
political side. The existence and actions of the Allied Command for
Transformation support this assertion on the military side. As the
Command states on its website, “ACT is NATO’s leading agent for change,
driving, facilitating, and advocating continuous improvement . . . of the
Alliance.” Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that NATO Strategy is
an enduring process. Furthermore, as seen in the foreword to this
chapter and supported by scholarly debate, NATO Strategy is neither a
formalized plan nor a principle. The only slight divergence from the
second criterion results from NATO’s not being a state; rather, it is a
supranational organization. Nevertheless, this difference is acceptable in
as much as the process of elaboration of this Strategy, as seen for
criterion 1, is occurring at the supranational level. In short, NATO
Strategy verifies the second criterion.

Criterion 3: A grand strategy is broader than opposition,
compliance, the use of force, and the sole pursuit of victory.

NATO Relations,” NATO, accessed April 16, 2015,
20. “Mission,” Allied Command Transformation, accessed April 26,
Assessing NATO Strategy against this criterion necessitates a closer examination of several NATO’s texts and actions. The first informative document is the North Atlantic Treaty.\(^{21}\) Article 1 shows that the signatories abide by international laws, customs, and habits. More importantly for this argument, the parties affirm that they will seek to solve conflicts without endangering global security and world peace through unnecessary threat or use of force. In other words, the parties are committed to searching for non-conflictual ways to resolve disputes. Article 2 reinforces these ideals and adds the dimension of the promotion of peaceful and cooperative relationships, particularly economic ones. Article 5, certainly the most discussed of the articles, focuses on collective defense and mutual assistance. It stipulates, “An armed attack against one or more of [the signatory parties] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”\(^{22}\) While being the article that is most directly oriented towards the possibility of military action, its provisions allow members to respond only in case of an aggression against one of the members, according to the principle of self-defense. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the treaty provides for additional states to join the Alliance.

The second informative document is the current version of the Strategic Concept released in 2010.\(^{23}\) The full title of the document, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence - Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, illustrates the reforms the Alliance has undertaken since its inception. Indeed, the concept is based on collective defense; prevention, management, and stabilization of crises; global partnerships;

\(^{22}\) “The North Atlantic Treaty,” Article 5. 
denuclearization; maintaining the door open to potential new members; and political-military reforms. These priorities confirm that NATO Strategy is broader than opposition, competition, the use of force, and the pursuit of victory, which validates the third criterion.

**Criterion 4:** A grand strategy is flexible, informed, pragmatic, and pursues a vision.

The tempo of NATO reforms and the pace at which concepts and policies are revised support the flexibility of NATO Strategy. For example, the readjustment of NATO Strategy that the Alliance adopted after the collapse of the Soviet Union is indicative of this flexibility. Indeed, as Stephen Wright established in *NATO in the 1990s: Redefining Alliance Theory*, NATO managed to rejuvenate its strategic direction by interacting with its environment despite the disappearance of its historical raison d’être. In both adapting itself to and shaping its environment, NATO managed to surpass its original strategic horizon. Indeed, NATO added members from the ranks of its former adversaries.

In addition, NATO Strategy is informed and pragmatic. NATO Strategy stems from a thorough analysis of the world environment. The Comprehensive Political Guidance, which is the document dedicated to orienting NATO’s priorities, relies on the analysis of the current strategic framework and estimations of the probable future security environment. The multiple partnerships and contacts that NATO maintains around the world are valuable sensors by which NATO can feel the evolution of the security environment.

NATO’s strategic vision emerges naturally from the rationale that guided its creation, found in the terms of the Washington Treaty, and the

objectives laid out in the Strategic Concept. NATO pursues the idea of “Europe whole, free and in peace,” and a stable and secure international environment.\footnote{See “Strategic Concept 2010,” 30.} All member states share this vision, which has remained consistent since the creation of the organization, yet with a strategy that is flexible in its articulation an implementation.

As a result, the NATO Strategy confirms the fourth criterion.

**Criterion 5:** In order to mitigate the impact of short-term imperatives and contingencies on long-term goals and interests, grand strategy balances the scarcity of resources and the myriad of conditions it should set.

The Harmel Report offers a germane means to start understanding how the Alliance has historically fulfilled the condition of the fifth criterion. This seminal document, elaborated in 1967, examined what, at the time, could be NATO’s future tasks. As NATO assesses it in the present, the report “reasserted NATO’s basic principles and effectively introduced the notion of deterrence and dialogue, setting the scene for NATO’s first steps toward a more cooperative approach to security issues that would emerge in 1991.”\footnote{“The Harmel Report,” NATO, accessed April 17, 2015, \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm}.} A paragon of a long-term move, the report proposed resisting the excruciating pressures of short-term security concerns and embarking on a policy that would open the door to détente.

Article 5 of the report is particularly telling. In it, the authors clearly weighted what they considered NATO’s two functions.\footnote{This paragraph, the quote at the end included, refers entirely to “The Future Tasks of the Alliance: Report of the Council (The Harmel Report),” NATO, accessed April 17, 2015, \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm}.} The first was to maintain a sufficient military apparatus to deter aggression on all members and, should deterrence fail, to protect them. During the Cold War period, it seemed to the Western powers that no military build-up
was superfluous given the military strength of the Soviet Union, the most potent possible aggressor. The second was to escape the escalation resulting from the realpolitik calculus. Indeed, beyond economic considerations, this unbridled military build-up potentially endangered the long-term peace or NATO’s raison d’être. The authors of the Harmel Report clearly understood the necessity to balance short-term imperatives and long-term goals and interests. Their statement “Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary,” renders their bright prospective thought.

In the present, NATO perpetuates the insights applied in the Harmel Report. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is, for instance, a way to foster medium- to long-term stability and security without prohibitive investments. NATO entice non-member states, which might be interested in joining the Alliance in the future, to adopt measures and values aligned with NATO’s long before they eventually become members of the Alliance. The integration of former Soviet satellites illustrates how this process of alignment proved economical yet effective.

NATO also balances the scarcity of resources and its goals on a short- to medium-term timeframe. The Alliance created a dedicated entity to fulfill this task. “Since the mid 1990s, under pressures to optimise the allocation of military common-funded resources, member countries have reinforced NATO’s management structure by promoting the development of capability packages and by establishing the Senior Resource Board (SRB) which has responsibility for overall resource management of NATO’s military resources.” Based on its assessment of the requirements of NATO military commanders, the SRB elaborates for the North Atlantic Council the Medium Term Resource Plan, which sets

the maximum amount allocated to capability packages for the next four years.\textsuperscript{32} Furthermore, NATO enforces a strict financial management in order to control the expenditures and verify they follow the established guidance.\textsuperscript{33}

The Harmel Report showed that NATO Strategy historically verified the fifth criterion by mitigating the impact of short-term imperatives and contingencies on long-term goals and interests. The recent examples of the MAP and SRB confirmed that NATO balances the scarcity of resources and the myriad of conditions it should set. In brief, NATO Strategy verifies the fifth criterion.

**Criterion 6:** To fulfill its requirements, grand strategy can use all instruments of power, be they diplomacy, information, military, economy, culture, resiliency, or any other one.

The instruments of powers at NATO’s disposal are less numerous than at a state level. Indeed, to use the framework DIMEC that Stephen Wright advocated to complement the one in use in the Department of Defense of the US government, NATO has, by definition, political and military instruments.\textsuperscript{34} The political one is comparable to the diplomatic one at the state level, and the General Secretary is a real emissary of NATO’s positions. In addition, NATO has a cultural dimension. NATO lives by and, therefore, projects its values. Furthermore, the professionalism of its agents and its military forces is a real vector of renown. The Standard Agreements are not only a guarantee of


\textsuperscript{34} The acronym DIMEC stands for Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, and Cultural instruments of national power. In conversations and seminars at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Dr. Stephen Wright liked to emphasize the cultural dimension usually confined in the Informational instrument by augmenting with a “C” the acronym DIME in usage in the military vernacular. For an explanation of each but Cultural, see "Joint Publication 1," DTIC Online, accessed April 16, 2015, I-11 to I-13, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf.
interoperability, but also a vector for the Alliance of a tangible normative military power.35

Conversely, NATO does not enjoy the use of an independent economic instrument. Indeed, the Alliance has no autonomous financial resources. That does not mean that its budget is fixed; only the direct contributions are.36 Indeed, the indirect contributions of member states are scalable tools that each state adjusts as it deems necessary, particularly when unintended events occur or when NATO launches new operations.

Concerning the informational instrument of power, NATO made a leap forward during the Wales Summit in 2014. Recognizing that “cyber threats and attacks will continue to become more common, sophisticated, and potentially damaging,” the heads of states “have endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, contributing to the fulfillment of the Alliance’s core tasks.”37 Furthermore, they affirmed “that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence” and that “a decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.”38 This decisions and statements add on previous tools and venues by and through which the Alliance influences information beyond the scope of the diplomatic dimension aforementioned.

The NATO instruments of power herein examined occupy a prominent place in NATO Strategy. The equivalents of the diplomatic

and cultural instruments serve the policies of dialogue, openness, and cooperation. The military instrument benefits both the collective defense and the cooperation policies. Consequently, if NATO Strategy does not enjoy a large spectrum of instruments of power, it still relies on several ones. This last observation verifies the sixth criterion.

**Assessment.** Overall, the analysis determined that NATO Strategy verifies the six criteria and is, therefore, a grand strategy. The minor discrepancies that the examination revealed were not sufficient to challenge the evidence. As a reminder, the differences were that NATO is not a state and that NATO does not possess all the instruments of power traditionally owned by a state. The limitation to the diplomatic, military, informational, and cultural instruments of power gives NATO grand strategy a texture that is NATO’s signature and that is neither as broad nor as intricate as that of a state. However, the Alliance compensates for this relative lack of variety by the magnitude of each of the instruments at its disposal, a magnitude with which very few states can vie.

**EU Grand Strategy**

Like NATO, the European Union has its origins in the aftermath of World War II. Some European elites, feeling compelled to avoid the recurrence of atrocities, proposed an alternative to the political-military answer offered by NATO. The first ideas to drive this endeavor were to create a community of interest and, for the same reason, ensure greater transparency in terms of members’ military status. The result was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) signed in 1951 and entered into force in 1952. The second “idea [was] that

39. One might argue that European project began even earlier. Indeed, following a proposal from Winston Churchill dating from 1946, 10 countries signed the London Treaty on May 5, 1949, that presaged the creation of the Council of Europe, which entered into force on August 3, 1949. The Council of Europe still exists in 2015 and is distinct from the European Union. See “The Council of Europe in Brief - Council of
countries who trade with one another become economically interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict. The result was the European Economic Community (EEC), created in 1958,” with the promulgation of the Treaty of Rome signed on March 25, 1957.  

Since then, the initial community has evolved continuously to admit new members and broaden its responsibility and influence. It turned into the European Union in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht, signed on February 7, 1992. In 2015, the European Union included 28 member states, many of which share the same currency, the Euro, or enjoy the so-called Schengen Space, providing for the free circulation of people, services, capital, and goods.

The European Union counts numerous organs having a large variety of responsibilities. Among the most important ones figures the European Council, which comprises heads of the member-states and directs the Union; the European Parliament, which represents the people and participates in the elaboration of European laws; the Council of the European Union representing the governments of each member state; the European Commission, which guarantees the interests of the whole Union and is its figurehead; the Court of Justice, which supersedes all national judicial bodies; the Central Bank; and the European Defense Agency. Given this profusion of unique institutions, many consider the European Union an abstruse administration, despite the effort expended

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40. “Allied Command Transformation.”
42. Appendix 3 offers a synthetic view of the EU members.
to simplify and explain its intricacies.\textsuperscript{44}

Understanding the boundary of responsibility of all components and their relationships is no elementary task. The European Union is the fruit of patient and persistent efforts, the aggregate of consecutive implementations of decisions, one after another, and the periodical integration or creation of new actors. As Biscop and Coelmont remarked, the Monnet Method guided the advance of the European Union “with very small steps at [a] time.”\textsuperscript{45} Such a pragmatic approach, adapted to the enormity of the task, favored functionalism over constitutionalism and preferred unrelenting action and the accumulation of small results to perpetual ideological debate.\textsuperscript{46} To this extent, it echoes the useful concept of “garbage can model” promoted by Cohen, March, Olsen, and Kingdon.\textsuperscript{47} Despite its inelegant name, the model shows how some organizations “discover preferences through action more that [they act] on the basis of preference.”\textsuperscript{48} The Monnet Method sublimates the model by fostering what is possible given the stakes and interests at play rather than simply pushing what people would like to see put on the agenda.

The Monnet Method proved an effective tool to balance between federalism and nationalism, the two antagonistic poles that have driven


\textsuperscript{45} Biscop and Coelmont, \textit{Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces}, 123.


the European project.\textsuperscript{49} The Monnet Method is now ingrained in European institutions and is certainly no stranger to the adoption of the European Union motto “United in Diversity.”\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, the European Union as a whole, emulating Monnet’s prudence and pragmatism, is more oriented toward action, integration, and toward maintaining if not cultivating differences, rather than planning too far ahead what the next steps of the project might be.

In terms of strategy, while the European institutions genuinely reflect the original will of their early promoters who sought peace and stability through the interdependence of European nations, the European strategy is more than that. Indeed, the European Union is not only internally focused, but it also understands that its security relies on its ability to shape its immediate environment, as well as the international environment. The European Union does so via its policy of enlargement, the promotion of norms and values, and by providing an alternative to classical interstate relations through its unique organization. Various avenues convey these goals and the canon of strategy of the European Union includes the treaties, the promulgated policies, the enacted laws, the ESS, and the numerous actions taken, particularly the development aid of which the European Union’s contribution represents more than half of the world total.\textsuperscript{51}

The concatenation of the measures mentioned in the previous paragraphs is the expression of a coherent strategy and constitutes a

\textsuperscript{49} For a deeper understanding about what federalism and nationalism represent for the European project, and how the two approaches influenced it, refer to David P Calleo, \textit{Europe’s Future: The Grand Alternatives} (New York: Norton, 1967).
logical candidate for what might be the European Union grand strategy. To conduct the analysis of the six criteria, the text will refer to the EU’s strategy amalgamation by using the label EU-Strategy.

**Criterion 1:** *Grand strategy operates at the central political level, is distinct from foreign policy, and encompasses all other forms of national strategies.*

The decision-making process of the European Union is undeniably complex. The EU-Strategy is the fruit of a wide cooperative effort. The European Council guides the Union and establishes its strategic direction and, as pointed out earlier, the European endeavor remains a top-down initiative.\(^5^2\) Thus, the EU-Strategy operates at the central political level of the Union.

Additionally, the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) constitutes the foreign policy of the Union and the European External Action Service (EEAS) is the dedicated incumbent on the matter.\(^5^3\) In contrast with the EU-Strategy oriented by the European Council, the CFSP is definitely operating at a subservient level. In fact, the EU-Strategy includes but is broader than the CFSP. That is, the EU-Strategy is distinct from the European Foreign Policy.

Finally, as defined above, the EU-Strategy encompasses the canon of strategy of the European Union and includes the treaties, the promulgated policies, the enacted laws, the ESS, and the numerous actions taken by the Union. Therefore, the EU-Strategy includes all other forms of strategy of the European Union.

In brief, the EU-Strategy verifies the first criterion.

**Criterion 2:** *A timeless function of a state, grand strategy is an enduring process—neither a plan nor a principle—that does not require*

\(^{52}\) “EU institutions and other bodies,” European Union
formalization.

The European Union is an ongoing project and, ipso-facto, the EU-Strategy presents the same characteristic. The European Union’s history summarized earlier, the policy of enlargement and the multiplication of European institutions and actions worldwide support this claim.

On one hand, the European Union has grown from 6 to 28 members since its creation and is still pursuing negotiations with several other applicants. The process of accession of applicants implies they accept certain political values, economic requirements, and legal practices.\textsuperscript{54} Such precaution favors the dissemination of European norms, initially within the neighborhood of the Union, but also later worldwide. The accession of new countries always gained them improved standards at the social, economic, and political levels.\textsuperscript{55}

In addition, since its members promulgated the Treaty of Amsterdam on May 1, 1999, the European Union has created many new organs to facilitate its international influence and the application of both the CFSP and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Since 2002, the European Union Institute for Security Studies shall “contribute to the development of the CFSP, including the ESDP, by conducting academic research and analysis in relevant fields.”\textsuperscript{56} To foster the integration of a European military industrial base fulfilling European security needs, the European Union founded the European Defence


\textsuperscript{55} Avery Graham, Anne Faber, and Anne Schmidt, \textit{Enlarging the European Union: Effects on the New Member States and the EU} (Brussels: Tariatex, 2009), 125–6.

Agency in 2004. The European External Action Service is in charge of implementing the external policy of the European Union. The number and pace of these measures show that the EU-Strategy is an enduring process.

Despite such dynamism and abundance, the formalization of the EU-Strategy does not exist. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union might cover some of the ideas of the EU-Strategy, but not the totality. European law incorporates also some concepts of the EU-Strategy, but again, not all of them.

Finally, while, like NATO, the European Union is not a state, it still possesses most of the attributes of a state. Compared to NATO, the EU has for instance a parliament, which is a central peace of any democratic governance. Therefore, even more so than it was the case for NATO, the discrepancy regarding the criteria is minor and insufficient to invalidate the conclusion that the EU-Strategy satisfies the second criterion.

**Criterion 3:** A grand strategy is broader than opposition, competition, the use of force, and the sole pursuit of victory.

The EU-Strategy verifies criterion 3 in as much as the European Union precisely stems from these reasons. To elaborate on this terse statement, one can note that the EU-Strategy primarily proceeds from the avoidance of conflict or any use of force through the promotion of cooperation. In addition, the EU-Strategy also derives from the related will to elicit adhesion and cohesion rather than competition. These measures nullify the need to pursue victory.

**Criterion 4:** A grand strategy is flexible, informed, pragmatic, and

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pursues a vision.

As seen, the Monnet Method is practical, favoring action and the accumulation of results over time. While the European Union strives to work and progress faster, the Method is still one of the most efficient approaches in the Union, be it when operating as a whole, in smaller groups, or at differentiated paces. This method gives the European Union flexibility by allowing it to adjust the trajectory at each step, making sure actions are not only consensual, but also, and more importantly, tailored to the situation. Furthermore, the slow pace favors the analysis of the circumstances; some argue that it is often excessive, to the point of hindering progress. The information originates from each member states and from what the Union gathered itself, thanks to its emissaries deployed worldwide.\(^{59}\)

Finally, the vision of the European Founding Fathers is still driving the European adventure and, at the same time, the EU-Strategy. As a reminder and as stated in Article 3, indentation 1 of the last version of the Consolidated Treaty on the European Union, “The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.”\(^{60}\)

Thereby, the EU-Strategy verifies Criterion 4.

**Criterion 5:** In order to mitigate the impact of short-term imperatives and contingencies on long-term goals and interests, grand strategy balances the scarcity of resources and the myriad of conditions it should set.

\(^{59}\). “The European External Action Service is responsible for running 139 EU Delegations and Offices operating around the world... They also analyze and report on the policies and developments of their host countries and conduct negotiations in accordance with given mandates.” See “EU Delegations' websites,” European Union, accessed April 20, 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm.

 Criterion 5 recalls the tension existing between what the will wants to accomplish and what the resources might allow. While money is often the limiting factor in term of resources, some other factors such as time can be equally influential. In the case of the European Union, it appears that money is less an issue than time. That is not to say that Europeans do not have the time to do what they want, rather Europeans need time to agree and determine what they want to do collectively, and they take their time. As a result, the European Union rarely acts in reaction and routinely plans in a systematic, yet lengthy temporal manner. This patient process allows the European Union to choose carefully which long-term goals to pursue, given the current constraints, and slowly but surely augment the spectrum of its influence rather than having to be selective. In other words, the weighting of long-term against short-term goals is entrenched in EU-Strategy processes.

Thus, the EU-Strategy verifies criterion 5.

**Criterion 6:** To fulfill its requirements, grand strategy can use all instruments of power, be they diplomacy, information, military, economy, culture, resiliency, or any other one.

The EU-Strategy can and uses all the instruments at its disposal, and it has many. Indeed, the European Union can rely on diplomacy. It can employ direct tools, belonging organically to the Union, and indirect ones, through a member state. By contrast, theorists lack in their development of the informational instrument, at least in the sense the United States gives to this instrument. Indeed, while the European Union released the “EU Cyber Security Strategy,” the union does not focus on information itself; rather, it uses norms and diplomatic channels. Hence, The European Union pursues openness, freedom,

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61. See note 46 referring to the 130 EU delegations.

62. Although the European Union has not yet adopted it by law, at least it has published it openly. See “EU Cyber Security Strategy – open, safe and secure,” European Union, accessed April 10, 2015,
and security on the Internet through the promotion of international cooperation and legislation.

The military instrument is developing slowly but surely, just as the European Union is, and is also displaying and conveying the same values and priorities as the European Union does. For a long time, the military instrument was almost inexistent.\(^{63}\) Now it is an inescapable tool in the security landscape, albeit neither comparable nor competing with NATO or member states’ militaries. In fact, it is a complementary tool. First, “national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State” and, second, the European Union focuses on peace building, peacekeeping, and reconstruction missions.\(^ {64}\) For instance, “since 2003 the EU has launched some 30 peace missions and operations contributing to stabilisation and security in Europe and beyond.”\(^ {65}\)

The economic and the cultural instruments are undeniably the most powerful strategic advantages of the European Union. According to the data of the World Trade Organizations, the European Union was the largest trader of goods and services in the world in 2014.\(^ {66}\) Additionally, the European Union projects norms, values, and culture that are


additional and complementary assets of its economic power.

Finally, the European Union enjoys another unique instrument of power, which is the subsidiarity of the member states. Such panel ensures the Union and the member states make informed and tailored choices to address an issue. Having the luxury of diversity or the possibility to operate via the Union or the national channels produces versatility.

Consequently, the EU-Strategy verifies the sixth criterion.

**Assessment.** The fulfillment of the six criteria warrants the attribution of the label of grand strategy to the EU-Strategy. As was the case for NATO, the slight differences to the characterization do not invalid the conclusion. Indeed, first, the fact that the European Union is not a state does not appear a hindrance and, retrospectively, the replacement of the term “state” by the term “polity” might appropriately amend the wording of criterion 2 to account for entities such as NATO and the European Union. Second, in terms of the attributes of the European grand strategy, the relative importance of the different instrument of powers is unique in the international landscape. While the European Union is a tremendous power economically, it chooses not to develop an integrated military tool. In doing so, the European Union appears as a new kind of actor on the world stage.

**Synthesis**

The study conducted in this chapter showed that the European Union and NATO developed a grand strategy, even though neither of the institutions would recognize it. This finding is significant inasmuch as it demonstrates that supranational organizations can and do develop grand strategies.

In addition, the analysis also underlined that EU and NATO grand strategies do not rely on the same agency to follow quite similar goals. On one hand, NATO seeks a Europe “free and in peace” whereas, on the other hand, the European Union looks for the promotion of “peace, its
values and the well-being of its peoples.” Meanwhile, given the tools at their disposal, the European Union and NATO do not play the same game, not even on the same field. As a result, they are not competitors as some argued; they do not even overlap. On the contrary, they appear complementary, and so do their grand strategies.

This last observation is not revolutionary inasmuch as the member states of the European Union and NATO shaped these institutions to be complementary. Given that 22 states are member to both the EU and NATO, the precaution simply confirms the economic and pragmatic concern of these states. However, the implications of the finding are more interesting, particularly for the European Union. If the EU opted to strengthen its military component as many scholars recommend and as some pressure groups advocate, members would be acting contrary to the European Union’s historical and current strategic direction. Doing so would imply a move towards power politics, which the EU founder strove to avoid by offsetting it. Furthermore, such move would have a destabilizing component for the international order.

The magnitude and the consequences of this destabilization are a pressing and chief follow up question. Indeed, opening the Pandora Box goes with risk, most of which is not evaluable beforehand. While one can understand what are the European Union’s and NATO’s strategic directions and envision most of the implications of these directions—it is the opinion of the author that these directions are sound and beneficial—based on the empiric historical evidence, foreseeing what would be that of a starkly new approach is a much more challenging task. Taking such

67. See notes 24 and 47 in this chapter.
risk is a political choice that one must weight against the possible gains and in the present case, the most certain losses.
Conclusions

Alternative Models?

As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew.

—Abraham Lincoln

One finds that strategy in Europe is two sides of the same coin. On one side, a profusion of scholarly works and articles lament the fact that the European Union is not developing a grand strategy. They recommend the EU develop such a strategy and include a military dimension. These views imply either that the European Union has no grand strategy or that it has an inadequate one. On the other side, pundits argue that NATO has a grand strategy, at least in the security realm of strategy. Such conclusions do not fit existing conceptions regarding grand strategy.

However, these observations and their potential implications for the international order inspired and initiated this study. They led to the two following questions that guided the analysis. Do the European Union and NATO have grand strategies? If yes, what are these grand strategies and the possibility that they provide alternative models for state and non-state interaction within the international order?

Answering these questions required, first, an understanding of grand strategy.

Summary

In Chapter 1, the study began by scrutinizing the concept of grand strategy, which theorists and practitioners have historically intertwined with the concept of strategy. Rigorous investigations into the nature and history of strategy combined with the different lenses used by authorities in the field of strategy supported the analysis. The etymological, historical, and epistemological lenses applied to strategy provided the
basis to assess the dominant schools of thought, understand the contemporary developments, and ultimately comprehend grand strategy. This analytical method identified some significant characteristics of strategy and grand strategy. The synthesis of these features revealed the following six criteria that are critical to the recognition of a grand strategy.

**Criterion 1:** Grand strategy operates at the central political level, is distinct from foreign policy, and encompasses all other forms of national strategies.

**Criterion 2:** A timeless function of a state, grand strategy is an enduring process—neither a plan nor a principle—that does not require formalization.

**Criterion 3:** A grand strategy is broader than opposition, competition, the use of force, and the sole pursuit of victory.

**Criterion 4:** A grand strategy is flexible, informed, pragmatic, and pursues a vision.

**Criterion 5:** In order to mitigate the impact of short-term imperatives and contingencies on long-term goals and interests, grand strategy balances the scarcity of resources and the myriad of conditions it should set.

**Criterion 6:** To fulfill its requirements, grand strategy can use all instruments of power, be they diplomacy, information, military, economy, culture, resiliency, or any other one.

Together these criteria constitute a sufficient characterization of a strategy that deserves the label of grand strategy. However, before using this sufficient condition to assess the strategies of the EU and NATO, it was first necessary to test it with a noteworthy example of a grand strategy. Such was the task in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2 used a case study to demonstrate the validity of the theory elaborated in Chapter 1. Being the dominant power of the 20th
and 21st centuries, the United States offered an obvious choice. However, while many documents and studies exist to record and comment on the American grand strategy, the nature of grand strategy is still subject to discussion. Therefore, the study had to define US grand strategy. To this end, the study employed a technique of interpolation based on a historical analysis of American strategies coupled with recent National Security Strategies. The interpolation resulted in the following definition of the US grand strategy:

*The American grand strategy mostly relies on its thriving economy, but also on other instruments of power, such as an active diplomacy and a credible military. The goals are to promote American-led international liberalism and multinational collective defense, and ultimately to prevent potential threats from interfering with national security and the American way of life.*

As defined above, the American grand strategy validated each of the six criteria. The precaution of using a case study for verification strengthened the confidence in the theory and permitted its application to the strategies of NATO and the European Union in the third chapter.

Chapter 3 began with a sequential examination of NATO and the European Union, which aimed at understanding the functioning of the two organizations and at establishing potential candidates for what one can consider their grand strategies.

Historically, the strategies of NATO and the EU resulted from the top-down direction of national elites who sought to avoid, through strategic maneuvers, the resurgence in Europe of bloody conflicts such as the two world wars. The strategic choices made by the governments of the nations participating in the creation of NATO or the EU merged to constitute the first grand strategies of these institutions.

With respect to NATO, the Washington Treaty aggregated and encapsulated the national strategies and constituted the initial NATO
grand strategy. Since then, the organization regularly produced policies, doctrines, directives, and concepts that, over time, defined NATO grand strategy. Since its inception, NATO consistently pursued through its deterrent engagements of collective defense and mutual assistance, the idea of Europe free and at peace in a stable and secure international environment. This overarching strategy evolved over time, and after the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, NATO redefined its strategic horizon and emphasized the principle of prevention.

With respect to the EU, the Treaty of Rome set the basis for European integration. The EU’s Founding Fathers sought peace and stability in Europe through the interdependence of European nations. They constructed a community of interests based on a close economic cooperation. Consequently, the EU has always aimed at fostering peace, its values, and the well being of its peoples. In other words, the European Union is not only internally focused, but also is an active actor on the international stage. The EU strives to shape its immediate environment, as well as the international environment through its policy of enlargement, the promotion of norms and values, and by providing the example of its unique organization as an alternative to classical interstate relations. The media conveying these measures build upon European Union treaties, policies, laws, strategies, and actions to constitute the grand strategy of the EU.

Chapter 3 then assessed the EU and NATO to determine if they possessed grand strategies. Both NATO and EU grand strategies, as defined, passed the test of the six criteria and, therefore, deserved their label of grand strategy. This finding is significant because it confirms that supranational organizations can and do develop grand strategies, which was not evident beforehand. In retrospect therefore, the second criterion might employ the term “polity” or “power” instead of the word “state” to account for entities such as NATO and the European Union.

**Principal Findings**
The analysis revealed some particularities for each organization. The limitation to the diplomatic, military, informational, and cultural instruments of power gives NATO grand strategy a texture that is NATO’s signature and that is neither as broad nor as intricate as that of a state. However, the Alliance compensates for this relative lack of variety by the magnitude of each of the instruments at its disposal, a magnitude with which very few states can compete.

The attributes of the European grand strategy and the relative importance of the different instrument of powers are unique in the international landscape. While the European Union is a significant power economically, it chooses not to develop an integrated military tool. In doing so, the European Union appears as a new kind of actor on the world stage, that is, a non-neutral supranational organization active in the international arena without deliberately using and even possessing any coercive military means. It is, however, not surprising that the EU developed a particular grand strategy. Indeed, as Biscop and Coelmont put it, “as the EU is a sui generis construction, its grand strategy is likely to be as well.”

Given the tools at their disposal, the European Union and NATO do not play the same game. They do not even play on the same field. NATO relies mostly on political and military tools whereas the EU counts on its economic, diplomatic, and cultural attributes. As a result, they are not competitors, and their actions do not overlap. On the contrary, they appear complementary, and so do their grand strategies.

**A Corollary Finding and Possible Ways of Elaboration**

The study also revealed a corollary finding. Chapter 1 demonstrated that Western Civilization displays a bias for competitive strategies. Since antiquity, the West seems to see strategy in terms of

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competition and often considers that the military is an inescapable means to resolve international issues. This bias contributes to explaining the surprising proposition that neither the European Union nor NATO seems willing to acknowledge that it is developing a grand strategy. One can surmise that the EU and NATO do so because they project their biases onto other actors and, therefore, fear that opponents as well as partners might interpret such acknowledgment as a move towards power politics and destructive competition. This bias deserves further scrutiny and substantiation and presents a possible avenue for elaboration on this study. It might also offer an opportunity for rejuvenating the field of strategy.

Indeed, this bias offers strategists an opportunity to broaden their analytical spectrum as well as the variety of tools at their disposal. For example, they could acknowledge that the threat of or use of force might not be the only ways to coerce a third party, be it for deterrence or compellence. For instance, in an international regime favoring cooperative relations, the threat of diminishing economic cooperation or of diplomatic sanctions, which can range from minor actions to complete isolation, might produce similar effects. The works of Robert Axelrod are remarkably inspiring in that regard, especially the ideas in his book *The Evolution of Cooperation*. In it, Axelrod showed that cooperative strategies are more likely to bear fruit over a long period than are non-cooperative strategies. The incorporation of such cooperative tools in the Western strategic culture promises to affect the Western bias aforementioned.

It is also possible to expand the scope of this work in another direction. This research confined its argument to the Western strategic

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paradigm because the European Union, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the United States belong to Western Culture. The study would require case studies from singularly different strategic cultures like, for instance, the Chinese, Indian, or Russian to offer a broader and universal scope in terms of strategy.  

**Implications**

The implications of this study are two-fold. They concern, on one hand, the field of strategy in general and the field of grand strategy in particular. On the other hand, they should be of interest to specialists in the field of international relations.

To start with the field of strategy and restate the aforementioned conclusions, it is necessary to stimulate and expand the scope of strategic studies. Strategy is not limited to military matters; even military strategy integrates with greater strategic processes designed to serve national or organizational interests. Strategy and grand strategy are not limited to binary approaches, and new practices in the art of strategy offer greater promises than basic opposition. It is paramount for scholars and practitioners to integrate these realities and use them extensively in their activities.

Michio Kaku, author of the international bestseller *Physics of the Future* and co-discoverer of String Field Theory that expanded Einstein’s works on the theory of everything, offered some insights into the future. He argued, “Nations will weaken but still exist in 2100.” However, he

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continued, significant regional and global economic actors will supplant their power.\textsuperscript{6} He did not necessarily give credence to the idea of a world government, but clearly envisioned the decreasing influence of the nation-state system. A corollary to this statement is Kaku’s assertion of the growing influence of the economy to the point that he foresaw that “economic might, not weapons, [could become] the new criterion for superpower.”\textsuperscript{7} Kaku’s argument might appear far-fetched; however, it echoes the sentiments of a growing number of theorists, scientists, and practitioners in the community of international relations specialists.

If scientists and a growing number of international relations scholars are right, then the European Union is on the right path. If they are wrong, NATO offers a familiar alternative. NATO remains a powerful military and political tool; one that has passed the test of time and would most likely continue to be capable of dealing with unexpected conflict situations in the future. In other words, the nations, which are members of the two institutions, enjoy a position with a portfolio of possibilities and capabilities ensuring advantageous moves in an unknown future. This is what Courtney, Kirkland, and Viguerie christened “non-regret moves.”\textsuperscript{8} Such variety of possibilities is unique and jeopardizing it would be a waste at best. This point relates to the argument of equipping the European Union with coercive military means. The study shows such a course would increase risk and reduce opportunities for cooperation, leading, potentially, to unprofitable outcomes.

Increasing the military dimension of the European Union as some promoters vehemently advocate would affect the balance and cooperation

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\footnotesize{
\bibitem{7} Kaku, \textit{Physics of the Future}, 385.
}\end{thebibliography}
existing between the EU and NATO and the rest of the international community. In addition, such a shift toward power politics has the potential to disturb the international order, especially if the European Union relinquished its leadership role in cooperative politics, diplomacy, and economic policy. Moreover, the EU would most certainly force states such as Russia to reconsider embracing the politics of balance of power even more than it does today in the face of the NATO Alliance. Russia has indeed historically and regularly shown defiance towards military neighbors it deemed too strong relative to itself.

As Mary Kaldor argued, the world order is evolving towards something new and Lincoln’s recommendation, used as an epigraph, is good advice in this case. Reproducing old schemes of thoughts to address novel situations is not the most effective thing to do. One should prefer modern ideas such as those conveyed by the EU and NATO.

**Recommendation**

The European Union and NATO do not seem to realize, and are even less willing to acknowledge, that they are already developing grand strategies. This trait is particularly acute in the case of the European Union, which, when advocating or working to develop military coercive means, exposes its current strengths. Pericles advised the Athenians not to embark on campaigns against the Peloponnesian League and, instead, cultivate their strengths. This study recommends that the European Union and NATO continue to focus on what they do best, namely, for NATO, providing security through political and military means, and for the European Union, concurring with the same goal through cooperative means. As such, they provide credible, practical

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alternative models to the current international order and its focus on the nation state.

**Concluding Thoughts**

This study demonstrated that the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance have developed grand strategies. For the same reason, it demonstrated that grand strategy is not the privilege of states and that supra-national organizations can develop strategic processes. While this insight interests the political scientist, the main contribution of this study interests the practitioner and the theorist of strategy. The former can rely on the theory herein developed to identify grand strategies, and the latter can use this tool to compare and contrast different grand strategies.
Appendix 1: Definitions

Beaufre, André:

**Strategy** is, “l’art de la dialectique des volontés employant la force pour résoudre leur conflit. (The art of the dialectics of the wills using force to solve their conflict.)”¹

“*Au sommet des stratégies, immédiatement subordonnée au gouvernement—donc à la politique—règne la ‘stratégie totale’ chargée de concevoir la conduite de la guerre totale. Son rôle est de définir la mission propre et la combinaison des diverses stratégies générales, politique, économique, diplomatique et militaire.* (At the summit of [all other forms of] strategies, immediately subordinate to the government—therefore to politics—reigns the ‘total strategy’ [i.e. grand strategy] entrusted to conceive the conduct of total war. Its role is to define the individual mission and the combination of the various general strategies: political, economic, diplomatic, and military.)”²

Brands, Hal:

*Grand strategy* is the highest form of statecraft, but it can also be the most perplexing.”³

“I define grand strategy as the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy . . . Rather, a grand strategy is a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about doing so.”⁴

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Clausewitz, Carl von:
“Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.”

Collins, John M.:
“Authorities generally agree that grand strategy as we know it today—the application of national power to satisfy national security objectives under all conceivable circumstances—was an unusual commodity in older times.”

Grand strategy is “the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to exert desired degrees and types of control over the opposition through threats, force, indirect pressures, diplomacy, subterfuge, and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying national security interests and objectives.”

Dolman, Everett C.:
Strategy is “a plan for continuing advantage.”

“Grand strategy is the process by which all the means available to the state are considered in pursuit of a continuing political influence. These means are myriad, to be sure, and are routinely aggregated into categories for analysis. A typical scheme would include diplomatic, information, military, and economic power, at least.”

5. Clausewitz, On War, 177.
Earle, Edward M.:

“Strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.”

“The highest type of strategy—sometimes called **grand strategy**—is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.”

Gray, Colin S.:

**Strategy** is “The direction and use made of means by chosen ways in order to achieve desired ends.”

**Grand strategy** is “The direction and use made of any or all among the total assets of a security community in support of its policy goals as decided by politics. The theory and practice of grand strategy is the theory and practice of statecraft itself. In the words of John Lewis Gaddis, it is ‘the calculated relationship of means to large ends’.”

“**Grand strategy** is the direction and use made of any or all the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.”

Howard, Michael E.:

“Strategy concerns the deployment and use of armed forces to attain a given political objective.”

“In the West the concept of ‘grand strategy’ was introduced to cover those industrial, financial, demographic, and societal aspects of war that have become so salient in the twentieth century.”

Kennedy, Paul:

Grand strategy is the process by which powers “integrate their overall political, economic, and military aims and thus to preserve their long-term interests.”

For grand strategy, Kennedy relies on the definitions proposed by Earle and Liddell Hart.

Liddell Hart, Basil H.:

Strategy is “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”

“As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane of ‘grand strategy’. While practically synonymous with the policy, which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy, which should govern its object, the

17. Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ix.
term ‘grand strategy’ serves to bring out the sense of ‘policy in execution’. For the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.”\textsuperscript{20}

Luttwak, Edward N.:
Luttwak embraced Beaufre’s definition of strategy herein presented.\textsuperscript{21}

“Grand strategy may be seen as a confluence of the military interactions that flow up and down level by level, forming strategy’s ‘vertical’ dimension, with the varied external relations among states forming strategy’s ‘horizontal’ dimension.”\textsuperscript{22}

Joint Doctrine of the United States:

National Security Strategy — A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (JP1)

Strategy — A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0)

Wylie, Joseph C.:

\textsuperscript{21}. Luttwak, \textit{Strategy}, 269.
\textsuperscript{22}. Luttwak, \textit{Strategy}, 209.
Strategy is “A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.”

Appendix 2: The Six Criteria used to Characterize a Grand Strategy

**Criterion 1:**
*Grand strategy operates at the central political level, is distinct from foreign policy, and encompasses all other forms of national strategies.*

**Criterion 2:**
*A timeless function of a state, grand strategy is an enduring process—neither a plan nor a principle—that does not require formalization.*

**Criterion 3:**
*A grand strategy is broader than opposition, competition, the use of force, and the sole pursuit of victory.*

**Criterion 4:**
*A grand strategy is flexible, informed, pragmatic, and pursues a vision.*

**Criterion 5:**
*In order to mitigate the impact of short-term imperatives and contingencies on long-term goals and interests, grand strategy balances the scarcity of resources and the myriad of conditions it should set.*

**Criterion 6:**
*To fulfill its requirements, grand strategy can use all instruments of power, be they diplomacy, information, military, economy, culture, resiliency, or any other one.*
Appendix 3: The Method of Interpolation

In mathematics, to understand a notion that eludes the elaboration of a formula, which would allow complete labeling and prediction, one can resort to the collection of empirical estimations followed by an interpolation. The first degree of estimation is a single point. Two points give a straight line; three give some segments. One can multiply the estimations indefinitely; the more points, the better the overall estimation of the notion. Once this first phase is complete, the second phase consists in interpolating, that is inferring a rule that, for lack of an exact formula of the notion, provides a sufficient approximation and allows for educated understanding and predictions.\(^1\) The difficulty of this technique is that its accuracy is dependent on the expanse and the density of raw data as well as on the iterations of the interpolation.

To refine the interpolation and have a better idea of American grand strategy, one could resort to two different methods. Suggested by the mathematical tool, the first one would consist in refining the interpolation by either augmenting the density and the area of the data, that is multiplying and broadening the observations, or by extending the duration of the analysis. In the case of the American grand strategy, one way of broadening the data would be to supplement the NSSs with presidential speeches, policies, and actions. However, doing so would not be satisfactory because it would preclude keeping this study at a reasonable length. Likewise, extending the duration of the data analysis would cause this paper to suffer the same undesirable outcome.

Therefore, this first solution does not suit the present work.

The second technique to improve the approximation of a limited set of data consists of proposing a theory and checking that the theory verifies as much data as possible, allowing one to distill the key elements of US grand strategy. In the case of American grand strategy, such procedure would consist in proposing an approximation of American grand strategy, and then confirming that some of the latest NSSs corroborate it. A brief historical analysis of American grand strategy will permit the elaboration of a theory. Indeed, it will allow for better understanding of the country’s course and behavior through the identification of timeless trends, milestones, and pivotal influences.2 This second method appears more representative of American grand strategy, yet less complicated than a strict interpolation of the NSSs, whether or not augmented by additional documents and will constitute, therefore, the basis of this study.

2. One should recall that, as Gray demonstrated (cf. Chapter 1, note 4), and even though the term did not exist as such during the whole history of the United States, strategy was a necessary function to which political leaders resorted nevertheless.
### Appendix 4: Details of EU and NATO Members

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Glossary

ACO   Allied Command Operations
ACT   Allied Command Transformation
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP  Common Security and Defense Policy
DIME  Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic instruments of power
DIMEC Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, and Cultural instruments of power
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community
EEAS  European External Action Service
EEC   European Economic Community
ESDP  European Security and Defense Policy
ESS   European Security Strategy
EU    European Union
FAF   French Air Force
JP    Joint Publication
MAP   Membership Action Plan
NAC   North Atlantic Council
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPG   Nuclear Planning Group
NSC   National Security Council
NSS   National Security Strategy
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SRB   Senior Resource Board
US    United States
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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Official and Legal Documents


**Speeches**


**Additional documents**

Although they are not quoted in this work, the following documents offered pertinent views for the research phase.


