CITIZENS, SOLDIERS, AND WAR:
COMPARING AMERICAN SOCIETAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE
USE OF FORCES ABROAD, 1975 - 2014

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the relationship between America’s societal-military relations and the use of its armed forces abroad. It begins its analysis in 1975, the period immediately following the Vietnam War and the start of the All-Volunteer Force. It ends in 2014, the most recent year for which data is available. The study asks: to what extent the American people may have become disassociated from the country’s armed forces since 1975? And, to what extent such a disassociation may have contributed to the willingness of political leaders to employ military force abroad over the same period? Demographic, representational, and other quantitative data form the bulk of the evidence. By collecting, coalescing, and comparing separate, but related, datasets over time an inductive case is built to answer the two related questions. For the first, military participation, veteran population, military eligibility, and veteran political representation rates depict an increasing disassociation between American society and its military forces. Reduced contact between the two social groups demonstrates that the American people have become disassociated from the country’s armed forces. For the second, data on decisions regarding the use of forces overseas, deployments, casualties, and defense spending depict an increasing use of military forces abroad. An increasing number of discrete engagements, as well as increases in the precursors and results of those engagements, demonstrate the increasing use of American military forces overseas. Statistical analysis compares the data and findings from each of the arguments to the other and presents numerical relationships between the two. Although striking correlations describe many of the relationships and parallel developments suggest a connection between the two empirically verified findings—the increasing societal-military disassociation and the increasing use of forces abroad—a causal connection was not determined. Nevertheless, the study does highlight a potential connection and determines that the two phenomena are not unrelated. It also offers insight into the relationships studied, encourages additional investigation into the overall topic, provides a rough model for how such an investigation might be undertaken, and materially contributes to the movement in the field of civil-military relations that endeavors to connect civil-military relationships to broader social and political matters.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Every war is begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations; without a nation, without a government, without money or credit, without popular enthusiasm which furnishes volunteers, or public support which endures conscription, there could be no army and no war—neither beginning nor end of methodical hostilities. War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, inseparable and interdependent; and to talk of military operations without the direction and interference of an Administration is as absurd as to plan a campaign without recruits, pay, or rations.

—John G. Nicolay and John Hay

From the Declaration of Independence through the Emancipation Proclamation of the Civil War, to the conflicts of the present day, war and politics in America have intermixed without any clear separation between them. The United States of America was formed in the cauldron of war and the revolutionary politics of the age of Enlightenment. It began with residents taking up arms to defend inalienable rights of citizenship. The nation’s founding fathers, as scholars, political leaders, and generals, represent examples of enlightened citizenship and statesmanship.

George Washington is widely known as one of the preeminent founders. What is not widely known is that after serving as President of the United States, Washington was recommissioned and died as an officer on active duty, having reassumed the duties of Commander in Chief of the Army. Upon departing the presidency, Washington composed a farewell address that continues to inspire and advise future generations. In the address, he alerted the nation to the threatening forces of political factionalism and foreign adventurism. His guidance to avoid unnecessary intervention abroad leads one to question what may have changed to encourage the opposite proclivity today. Does the

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growth of the United States from the infant nation of Washington’s time into the superpower it is today imply that it must increasingly intervene around the world?

The early American ethic of the citizen-soldier provides a historical perspective that is currently overshadowed by a belief in the efficacy of modern military professionals. Recent American presidents have been precluded from emulating Washington’s example entirely, and most citizens will not become the archetype citizen-soldier of the past. Nevertheless, Washington provides a counterbalancing standard from which to view contemporary social and political relationships and how they affect decision making on the use of military force abroad. Moreover, by demonstrating that campaigning and statecraft are inseparable and interdependent in American politics, he leads us to examine the field of civil-military relations from a wider perspective of American experience than the modern, post-World War II era of military professionalism encourages.

**Background**

Over the last two decades United States Armed Forces have been continuously engaged overseas. The Global War on Terror originated after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, but its precursors have been in place since at least 1991. Designed to preclude Afghanistan as a base for terrorism and Iraq’s use of weapons of mass destruction, the American invasions of both countries resulted in extended occupations, long counterinsurgency campaigns, and expensive nation-building efforts. Supporters contend that such interventions have been necessary to prevent additional attacks on American soil. But, critics argue that American citizens are no safer from terrorism in 2015 than they were in 2002. Interestingly, the majority of American society has been

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4 The recent decision to keep troops in Afghanistan longer, deploy forces to Iraq to combat the Islamic State, and Congressional discussion on a new authorization for the use of force use the continued threat of terrorism to justify deployments and inform the viewpoint that Americans are at risk in 2015. Leo Shane III and Andrew Tilghman, “Obama Says More Troops Will Stay in Afghanistan Next Year,” Military Times, accessed 27 Mar 2015, available at www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/03/24/afghanistan-troop-drawdown-to-slow-
supportive of the troops, yet indifferent to their continuous employment abroad. Neither high costs, nor uncertain benefits have so far stimulated significant public scrutiny of the use of military force in the country’s counter-terrorism efforts.

The literature on civil-military relations raises several important questions that illuminate the underlying antecedents of the current situation. How well is American society connected to its military institutions? Is there a significant civil-military divide? What are the social and political consequences if such a divide exists? How might the relationship of citizens and soldiers in society affect national decision making and the politics of going to war?

The burden of recent conflict falls on a relatively small number of volunteers and their families. A Defense Manpower Data Center report indicates that from 2001 to 2010, a little over 2 million service members served in Iraq or Afghanistan. This is out of approximately 300 million American citizens, which equates to .7 percent of the American population over the period. The majority of Americans carry on their daily lives unaffected by the current campaigns. The public tacitly supports the funding of ongoing military operations, but withdraws from serious discussion about long-term consequences. Yellow ribbon campaigns and expressions of gratitude to service members indicate the moral support of the American people, but they could also point to a lack of personal involvement in the nation’s security and the current campaign against terrorism.

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Research Questions

The contemporary lack of citizen involvement in the ongoing Global War on Terror provides the environmental context for the present study. Literature from the field of civil-military relations provides the background and inspires both the following questions and the structure of the examination. *To what extent have the American people become disassociated from the country’s armed forces since 1975? And, to what extent has such a disassociation contributed to the willingness of political leaders to employ military force overseas?* The first question examines the connection between American society and the armed services since 1975, the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force, and illuminates changes in the civil-military relationship. The second question examines the employment of American military force abroad over the same period and illuminates changes in governmental decision making regarding the use of force. Comparing the association of American society with its military institutions and the proclivity of political leaders to use force may reveal a relationship between the two phenomena.

The relevant literature refers to the societal-military connection by its absence, calling it a civil-military gap, or civil-military divide. This paper refers to the opposite side of this concept using a positive construct, calling it a civil-military connection. Essentially, a stronger connection is the same as a smaller gap. Both manners of speech seek to explain the convergence or divergence between a society and its military institutions. Because many perceive a decreasing connection between American society and the armed forces, this social relationship is a widely studied phenomenon in the field of civil-military relations. Physical characteristics, political affiliations, perceptions, beliefs, values, and interests are different dimensions by which the connection can be measured, depending on the behavior one seeks to explain. Regardless of the type of connection examined, most results are compared to internal matters of civil-military concern, such as civilian control. Rarely, however, do results explain behavior outside of the field of civil-military relations, such as military effectiveness or frequency of use.

The period from the institution of the All-Volunteer Force in the United States to the present serves as a relevant time-frame for this type of examination. The years from 1975 to 2014 were selected for four primary reasons. First, data in similar form is available for most of the period. Second, a thirty-nine year span sufficiently depicts
changes and trends. Third, the period avoids the civil-military turbulence of the Vietnam War by beginning in 1975. Fourth, it does include the early emergence of the All-Volunteer Force through its maturity in the post-Cold War period. There is no intention in the present study to compare the era of the All-Volunteer Force with its immediate predecessor, which was characterized by large-scale conscription. Thus, the period under examination begins at the completion of the Vietnam War and ends with the most recent year for which data is available.

**Research Design**

Employing a data-driven design, the study builds answers to the research questions by constructing two parallel arguments and then attempting to link them. The bedrock of the analysis is limited to the physical component of civil-military relationships, which can be understood as the opportunity for contact and exchange between civilians and soldiers, as well as quantifiable aspects of engaging in war. The criteria for data collection includes the requirement for consistency over the period. The data must be comparable, reliable, and verifiable. Additionally, the data used herein is coalesced and reconciled by the Department of Defense, rather than reported separately by the different military services. The study does not distinguish between the services, but evaluates the military institutions of the country as a single entity composed of many individual members. Similarly, society is composed of many individual citizens, some military and many non-military.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the field of civil-military relations. It surveys the relevant literature, points out pertinent aspects of the contemporary environment, and situates this work in the context of what already exists. Because the discipline of civil-military relations since 1957 has been overwhelmingly influenced by the theory of Samuel Huntington, the chapter starts with Huntington’s work. Nearly all contemporary civil-military scholars begin with his normative prescriptions and vary theirs from that point. Chapter 2 explains this necessity and progresses through some of the relevant thinking on military professionalism, civilian control, comparative aspects, and soldierly ethos and ethics.
The first part of the analysis resides in Chapter 3, which establishes means to depict the connection between American society and its military institutions. It uses demographic, population-based data to measure the overlapping social groupings of individual citizens and soldiers and thereby establish a connection on physical grounds. The evidence comes mainly from census reports and other descriptive demographic data on soldiers and veterans. The chapter evaluates whether American society and its armed services are becoming more connected, less connected, or staying about the same. By coalescing the relationships between citizens and soldiers in society as political influence on decision making, the chapter establishes the first part of the argument on terms that permit comparison with the second.

The second part of the analysis resides in Chapter 4, which establishes a means of illustrating the amount the government uses military forces abroad. First, it uses quantitative metrics from three separate organizations to determine the number of discrete military engagements that have occurred annually. Second, engagement counts combine with overseas force-deployment numbers, casualty statistics, and defense-spending figures to create a comprehensive assessment. It evaluates whether the use of military force abroad is increasing, decreasing, or fluctuating within an average band throughout the period. Deployment information is Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) data compiled in a Military Times report; casualties are also from DMDC; and the data on spending comes from the Office of Management and Budget.

Chapter 5 compares the findings of the previous two chapters to determine if there is a significant relationship between them. It endeavors to depict the extent to which a civil-military connection or lack thereof may have affected governmental decision making on the use of military force abroad. The extent of the relationship between the findings of Chapters 3 and 4 is either significant, meaning that there is an established correlation; insignificant, meaning that the two variables are not related; or indeterminate, meaning that a significant relationship cannot be established one way or another. Regardless of the final determination, the analysis develops insights into the association between American society, the armed forces, and the use of forces abroad.
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and presents prognoses and recommendations. It also suggests implications for policy and promotes the utility of the methodology used in the study.

Attempting to widen the analytical scope beyond the contemporary threat environment and reach back to foundational tenets embraced by the founders of the nation, this examination uses the structure of civil-military relations to investigate a domestic political relationship that may contribute to the United States remaining militarily engaged around the world. War and politics are as intertwined today as they were in the Revolutionary era. Yet, the citizen-soldier ethic embraced by America’s founders waned as the Cold War demanded standing, professional military institutions. This paper questions the consequences of Huntington’s civil-military theory, as well as the implications of the All-Volunteer Force, in light of the contemporary proclivity for intervention. By asking the extent to which the American people may have become disassociated from the country’s armed forces and the extent to which such a disassociation contributed to the willingness of political leaders to employ military force overseas, this paper seeks to determine the connection between civil-military relations and broader political consequences. While a causal connection would have significant implications for policy, even a potential link between American society’s disassociation with its military and its acceptance of long military campaigns abroad may inform the debate on one such external effect of civil-military relations.

The next chapter describes civil-military relations theory and examines the contemporary environment. It forms a civil-military structural base and a modern environmental perspective as a foundation for the data-based examination in the following chapters.
Chapter 2

How Challenges in the Discipline of Civil-Military Relations and Signs in the Contemporary Environment Have Influenced This Study’s Perspective

There is a common assumption, an unreflecting belief, that it is somehow ‘natural’ for the armed forces to obey the civil power. Therefore instances which show civilian control to have broken down are regarded, if at all, as isolated disturbances, after which matters will again return to ‘normal’. But no reason is adduced for showing that civilian control of the armed forces is, in fact, ‘natural’. Is it? Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise.

—Samuel Finer

Challenges in the Discipline of Civil-Military Relations

According to Thomas Bruneau and Cristiana Matei, two main problems plague the discipline of civil-military relations. First, there is a dearth of overarching theory to bind the field together.¹ Second, there is a lack of accessible quantitative data on interconnected civil and military issues.² Mature fields of political science such as comparative politics are not limited by these factors. Although a number of civil-military researchers have attempted to carve out niches and investigate important issues, there has been little effort to relate findings to central questions, such as what arrangement of civil-military relations is compatible with American democratic values. In fact, only one main focus emerges from the vast majority of the existing literature—how to ensure civilian control of the military. This has been the discipline’s guiding question since Huntington. Without any other agreed upon overarching framework or a solid basis of empirical data from which to build, Bruneau and Matei argue that the modern discipline of American civil-military relations has been unable to advance.³

The Theory of Civil-Military Relations

Most contemporary civil-military theorists focus on ensuring that a military establishment powerful enough to protect society does not rule it. In 1957, Samuel Huntington published *The Soldier and the State* a norm-based theory of ideal civil and military relationships, grounded in the state of American security affairs in the late 1950s and his particular interpretation of history. The seemingly permanent Soviet threat and the need for a large military establishment to counter it was then a new problem for America. Huntington offered a solution that promised civilian control of a large, powerful standing military establishment.

Without an appealing rival, Huntington’s theory continues to influence the field of civil-military relations, but it does so problematically according to Bruneau. “Virtually all scholars who research and write on civil-military relations begin with Huntington, review his argument, and then reject it to a greater or lesser extent.” After almost 60 years, despite considerable disagreement with Huntington’s theoretical prescriptions, logic, and evidence, no scholar has fully supplanted his theory’s place in the field. Aside from Peter Feaver, few have even proposed well-developed theories. Feaver states that Huntington’s theory is “best considered a point of departure rather than a stopping place in the study of American civil-military relations.” I argue that despite the efforts of Feaver and others, the focus on civilian control as the central question in the field has limited the scope of research and helped ensure Huntington’s place of prominence.

The chain of causality in Huntington’s theory has aspects of a tautological argument. According to Huntington, civilians should implement objective control of the military by granting the military autonomy to conduct operations within a separate military sphere. Such autonomy will bolster professional expertise, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty. Professionalism will lead to political neutrality and will prevent military leaders from becoming a force in domestic politics. Political neutrality reinforces the principle of military subordination to civilian leadership. Thus, civilian control of the

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The key agent in this logic is the civilian, and the instrument is objective control. Huntington claims “The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man.”\(^8\) Everything hinges on his definition of professionalism as political inerterness, which is little more than a corporate ethic of keeping soldiers out of politics.

Huntington’s theory has found widespread appeal among American officers. The armed forces of the United States institutionalize Huntington’s ideals of professionalism, objective control, and autonomy. As Eliot Cohen says, “A simplified Huntingtonian conception of military professionalism remains the dominant view within the American defense establishment.”\(^9\) In his view, Huntington’s ideals continue to resonate with approving audiences. In 2010, General Martin Dempsey released an Army White Paper entitled, “The Profession of Arms.”\(^10\) Huntington’s construct of the military as a profession and his normative prescriptions for civil and military interaction guide this paper. The Army uses the construct of a profession as the framework for determining its corporate identity. Warfare requires martial skill and knowledge, just as other professions require legal and medical skill and knowledge. By describing military service as a profession, the paper reinforces the notion of a separate military sphere.

By describing military practitioners as skilled professionals, Dempsey emphasizes their expertise in their separate sphere rather than other aspects of their identity. He claims, “An American professional Soldier is an expert...in the Army Profession of Arms. Foremost, the Army must be capable of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Thus, the Army creates its own expert knowledge, both theoretical and practical, for the conduct of full spectrum operations inclusive of offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations.”\(^11\) An alternative viewpoint might consider the Army as one of many components of the government, a larger sphere united by common purpose, and jointly participating in policy formulation and execution. It might also espouse the longstanding ideal of the citizen-soldier serving alongside the professional. Instead, the dominant

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\(^8\) Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 7.
themes coursing through this paper relate to the normative prescriptions of professionalism and autonomy. War and politics are as distinct and separate for Dempsey in this paper in 2010 as they were for Huntington in 1957.

Samuel Finer disputes the inferential leap between military professionalism and political neutrality. He presents the Japanese and German cases leading up to World War II as undeniable instances of professionalized officer corps intervening in politics. He also presents the French during the Dreyfus period and the mutiny within the British Army at the Curragh as less extreme, but pointed, examples. Finer argues that the nature of professionalism “often thrusts the military into collision with the civil authorities. In the first place, the military’s consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power.” From Finer’s perspective, professionalism does not inexorably lead to political neutrality, and in some cases can lead to political intervention.

The American oath of office for commissioned officers indicates the possibility of such a situation. The operative part follows, “…that I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same…” The oath does not say commissioned officers will support and defend the existing executive authority. It refers to the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. By avoiding an oath to a leader or an office, it guards against the assumption of individual power. Conversely, it offers the possibility that different interpretations of the Constitution may arise. If officers were to understand the national interest in opposition to or in a significantly different way from the government’s conception of national interest, they might envision the government as violating the Constitution. Political interference becomes rational and seems to be sanctioned by the oath of office. General Douglas MacArthur’s conduct during the Korean War represents a case in point.

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However, through the separation and allocation of powers, the Constitution provides unambiguous authority over the armed forces by designated civilian institutions. It clearly details which branch of the government is provided with which governing powers. No authorities are provided to military leaders. The President is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, which represents undeniable civilian command authority.\textsuperscript{17} The Congress raises and supports armies and provides and maintains a navy. Congress also makes rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces, and also organizes, arms, and disciplines the militia.\textsuperscript{18} By these specifications, Congress funds, equips, and provides the normative guidelines within which the military establishment must function. Thus, military officers are subject to both the President and Congress by the Constitutional delineation of responsibilities. There is thus no textual grounds in the Constitution for military officers to claim that their Constitutional allegiance dictates a course of action contrary to either branch. Supporting and defending the Constitution requires military officers to obey both Congress and the President.

Finer also presents military syndicalism and political reluctance as two other motives for intervention derived from professionalism.\textsuperscript{19} By syndicalism, he means that military institutions want to manage their own affairs. As experts, military professionals feel that their opinions on military matters are the ones that should matter most. However, while internal expertise may inform aspects of the size of military forces, recruitment policies, organization, equipment procurement, and the promotion of officers, such areas are not of exclusive military concern. They are also important matters to the nation. It is thus not easy to determine where the military and political spheres exist autonomously, if at all, and where they intersect. Some military officers may perceive military matters as being exclusively military and under their sole purview. Civilians, who see the political consequences of such matters, place them under their own broader purview.

To the extent they are politically reticent, most military officers do not want to be used by the sitting government for party politics or domestic political purposes. The military sees its purpose as fighting wars against adversaries who are almost exclusively external, not as a pawn in the disputes of political actors. A contemporary example of

\textsuperscript{17} United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2.
\textsuperscript{18} United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
\textsuperscript{19} Finer, \textit{The Man on Horseback}, 26, 27.
Both military syndicalism and political reluctance is found in the debate over the fate of the A-10 and the Air Force’s close-air-support (CAS) function. The Air Force wants to be able to decide how it can best accomplish this military mission. It decided that the new F-35 was sufficient for the CAS mission. Several United States Senators do not want to lose the A-10 production and basing from their districts. They are thus inclined to argue that the A-10 is the superior CAS platform, a legitimate argument considering it was designed specifically for CAS, and attempt to discredit the Air Force’s judgment on this matter. Politically reluctant, the Air Force makes its case in terms of best military advice, modernization, and affordability. It does not want to become involved in the political maneuvering of Senators, nor to take sides in an arena it considers beyond its purview. Although active on the issue, political reluctance limits Air Force advocacy within the narrow boundaries of military advice it deems appropriate. Nevertheless, the Air Force refuses to relent on its main point of argument—the F-35 is the better close-air-support platform, and the Air Force feels it should be afforded the ability to make this judgment. Professionalism leads to military syndicalism in areas the military deems part of its autonomous sphere, and political reluctance in areas it considers outside of its sphere. These boundaries, however, are self-determined and transitory. This example supports Finer’s critique of Huntington’s concept of professionalism and demonstrates that professionalism does not automatically lead to political submission.

To gain some historical perspective on this issue, it is helpful to recall Allen Guttman’s argument that American military officers were representative of American society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and shared society’s democratic values. Military officers were not the conservative lot that Huntington described, nor did they have the European sense of “punctilious chivalry” he ascribed to them. Instead, they were stubbornly pragmatic. From Guttman’s perspective, Huntington’s view of military officers was flawed; and, thus, so was his interpretation of

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21 Cohen, Supreme Command, 246.
American history.\(^{22}\) By disputing the historical basis on which Huntington grounded his argument, Guttman exposed flaws in Huntington’s clear distinction between military officers and the rest of society.

Sociologist Morris Janowitz argued for a constabulary concept to adapt the military profession to the Cold War security environment.\(^{23}\) By constabulary, he meant a military not only trained for police duties in the conventional sense of the word, but also across the spectrum of military operations. The idea is to be capable of both strategic deterrence and limited war. This necessitates education in international relations and political-military affairs “to sensitize military officers to the political and social consequences of military action.”\(^{24}\) Such sensitization inevitably results in a politicization of the officer corps. For Janowitz, however, there is no divergence, nor Huntingtonian tension, between conservative military and liberal civilian values. Societal control results from the military’s integration with society.

Although Janowitz relied on Huntington’s idea that self-imposed military professionalism ensures civilian control, he describes a dynamic form of professionalism that aligns with civil society. Janowitz critiques Huntington’s concept of objective control and replaces it with social integration. He provides insight into how the military and society interact and affect each other, as well as a detailed description of the soldier in the 1960s. But, other than socially-aligned professionalism, there is no significant difference between his theory and Huntington’s. Janowitz merely relies on a different kind of professionalism to produce political neutrality.

In his article on the civil-military problematique, Peter Feaver describes the fundamental problem of civil-military relations.\(^{25}\) Feaver traces democratic social contract relationships back to their origin as problems of agency. The first problem is how elected leaders implement the will of the population. The second problem is how soldiers implement the instructions of their civilian leaders. Democratic theory articulates that the people must maintain control while elected agents conduct the business of


government. Similarly, civil-military relations theory articulates how civilians can maintain control while military agents conduct the security of the nation. Thus, Feaver establishes the central civil-military problem as one of civilian control. How can the state possess a military establishment strong enough to protect the population from external enemies, but obedient enough to do whatever civilian leaders ask? He proposes a theory of civil-military relations that explains military working and shirking as a function of material incentives. In other words, Feaver adapts the economic-rationalist, principal-agent framework for the study of civil-military relations.  

Although elegantly parsimonious and unintended for broad purpose, Feaver’s agency theory is limited in its application as an overarching framework for the discipline of civil-military relations. It moves the debate from Cold War conceptions of professionalism to modern, economic contract considerations; but it does not explain outcomes beyond how they relate to control. Feaver argues that in advanced democracies military shirking is the operative problem of civil-military relations. His theory rests on a fundamental belief that civilians have the right to rule, no matter the consequences.  

He states, “The republic would be better served by foolish [civilian assigned] working rather than enlightened [military] shirking.” This is a strongly stated perspective based on a very normative prescription—that absolute civilian control is always good, even when unwise. By characterizing the debate along strict lines of superiority and subordination, Feaver does not account for the rich spectrum of interaction between civil and military leaders that produces strategy and policy. The wide aperture of elected civilian leaders enables a more clear perspective of strategic and political consequences than the limited viewpoint of military leaders, but they do not necessarily grasp the practical considerations of the military actions they are ordering. Civilians therefore must, to some extent, rely on military officers for cogent advice. Conversely, good generals can envision battlefield success and articulate operational realities, but are unable to translate such considerations into desired political outcomes. Although civilian control of the military is a widely accepted norm and positive component of democratic theory as

outlined by Feaver, its attainment is not the endpoint of civil-military relations. Rather, the object of civil-military relations is to provide an agreed level of security for the nation at the financial cost it is willing to incur and under the social conditions it is willing to accept. This objective demands a cooperative effort between policy makers and policy executors beyond the absolute nature of civilian control described by Feaver that defines any contrary military activity as shirking. It invites policy executors further into the debate over policy formulation in order to procure their unique expertise and gain the efficiencies only they can provide. From this perspective, democratic civilian control is desired as much for its positive outcomes as for its procedural correctness. Agency theory succeeds in its purpose of describing the role of material incentives on individual decision makers. Unfortunately, as one of the few well-developed civil-military theories after Huntington, it fails to provide utility as an overarching theory for the field.

Moreover, Feaver explains elite behavior without reference to the role of the people in the same democratic theory he cites as the origin of his deductions.\(^{29}\) Agency theory provides explanations for elite behavior on rational-material grounds, but it does not incorporate the fundamental source of power that underpins democratic theory. Although Feaver cites Thomas Hobbes and Plato as his inspirations, John Locke, an Enlightenment philosopher whose work inspired the American Revolution, argues that a democracy occurs when people unite into a society and give a majority the whole power of the community. The people employ that power to make laws and appoint officials to enforce the laws.\(^{30}\) Political power is the right to employ the force of the community to enforce such laws and defend the commonwealth from external attack for the public good.\(^{31}\) Therefore, the source of power is a majority of citizens united by common cause. The object of their organizing is the public good. Such democratic theory relies on the influence of citizen majorities more than it does the interactions of elites. By focusing on civil and military leaders and how they interact to control the military, Feaver omits the interactions of society, i.e., citizens and military personnel on each other, as well as how those interactions influence both civilian and military elites.

\(^{31}\) Locke, Second Treatise, 3.
A comprehensive conception of civil-military relations based in such theory would account for democratic majorities as primary drivers of political decision making. Civil society influences political leaders. Political leaders influence the military. The military influences civil society. Civil society, the government, and the military interact with each other as parts of a greater national whole. Political and military spheres thus cannot be definitively differentiated. The individuals that compose society and its institutions have overlapping roles and identities. Members of the military forces and government are also citizens. Some members of the government are active-duty service members, reservists, or veterans. Feaver’s contractual relationship between civil and military decision makers reflects a limited aspect of this larger social relationship. To ignore the primary drivers of democratic influence limits the applicability of the theory.

A comprehensive measure of civil-military relationship effectiveness that resonates politically beyond the degree of civilian control of the military is therefore needed. Exclusively focusing on control obscures the more complex relationships concerning the democratic masses, elected leaders, and the armed forces. A measure of effectiveness incorporates the greater social and political objectives of any policy decision, such as enhanced security from external threats or economic prosperity.

Toward this end, Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei propose a rudimentary, but relevant, comparative framework for conceptualizing civil-military relations. 32 Their framework enables applicability to developing democracies in which coups d’état is a primary concern and consolidated democracies in which coups d’état is unlikely. 33 As American advisors to allied and coalition partner defense-institution-building efforts, these two scholars have extensive on-the-ground experience attempting to implement American civil-military values in developing democracies. With first-hand knowledge of the unique challenges associated with developing democracies, they do not deemphasize civilian control, but find it insufficient as the sole civil-military standard. To such control, they add the standards of effectiveness and efficiency. 34 But, these new concepts are difficult to measure and are not yet fully developed in the literature.

Conceptualizing control in terms of institutional mechanisms, Bruneau and Matei emphasize civilian oversight and the inculcation of professional norms.\textsuperscript{35} Institutional control emphasizes the emplacement of laws and regulations, as well as the creation of civilian-led oversight organizations with professional staffs such as ministries of defense, intelligence agencies, legislative budget and policy committees, and well-defined chains of organizational command. Civilians must have mechanisms to determine and enforce roles and missions. Oversight involves maintaining awareness of what the military forces are doing. It involves internal government agencies with civilian executive authority, but also external watch groups such as the media, think tanks, and international organizations. Under their construct, professional norms are established legally and transparently by implementing democratic policies for recruitment, education, training, and promotion.\textsuperscript{36}

Because Bruneau and Matei contend that effectiveness is measured by the military’s preparedness to fulfill assigned roles and missions, and actual performance is limited to times of conflict, they propose three conditions that must be in place to measure effectiveness.\textsuperscript{37} First, development of a plan, strategy, or doctrine. Second, establishment of structures and processes to implement the plans. Third, commitment of resources such as political capital, manpower, and funding.\textsuperscript{38}

Efficiency is measured by the armed forces’ ability to fulfill the above assigned roles and missions at optimal cost. Oversight of budget spending by auditing institutions enable efficiency to be monitored, measured, and improved.\textsuperscript{39} These mechanisms are necessary in societies that do not have the robust civilian oversight organizations present in the United States. As a rudimentary framework, the combined perspectives of control, effectiveness, and efficiency, help to illuminate a more comprehensive structure to examine the external effects of different types of civil-military relations.

In his book, \textit{Soldier and Politics Transformed}, Donald Abenheim examines American civil-military relations from the perspective of the ethos and ethics of the

\textsuperscript{35} Matei, “A new conceptualization,” 30.
\textsuperscript{36} Matei, “A new conceptualization,” 30, 31.
\textsuperscript{37} Matei, “A new conceptualization,” 31.
\textsuperscript{38} Matei, “A new conceptualization,” 31-32.
\textsuperscript{39} Matei, “A new conceptualization,” 32-33.
soldier, as affected by the beginning stages of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. He compares and reflects on American and European traditions of the past few hundred years and the conditions of war and politics that have affected the ethos of the soldier. As a contemporary and historical comparison, his examination does not offer an overarching framework, but it does present an alternative viewpoint for examining civil-military relations. Abenheim asserts that the ethos and ethics of the citizen-soldier, versus the professional soldier, is the operative link between soldiers, citizens, the state, and military effectiveness. The nature of the questions he asks helps to uncover the greater social and political effects of civil-military relations in the current security environment.

How can a western, postmodern democracy provide its soldiers with the constitutional basis for strategy and operations in a twenty-first century that more resembles combat of the nineteenth or even the seventeenth century? Further, how can a democratic state and society organize itself for the needs of war in remote parts of the globe and internal security at home against an inchoate enemy that defies accepted norms and conventions on the use of military force for limited political ends? Finally, and surely most urgently for those who reflect on democratic civil-military relations, how can democratic nations, in the proliferation of internal security measures and counterinsurgency operations in the twenty-first century, avoid the worst abuses of the past that in the past two centuries perverted the ethos and ethics of the soldier?

Using the history of European conflict as a point of reference, Abenheim points to the increasing evidence for concern about civil-military relations in pluralistic, democratic societies such as the United States. He posits that professional soldiers, as well as senior civilians, have loosened the connection between military institutions and the forces of actual war. Professionals have overestimated the strategic effects of technology and discounted the political, social, and cultural sources of organized violence. Actual war, as opposed to war in theory, conducted by democratic society, needs “reinforcement of its foundations, namely anger and hatred, as well as reason and

41 Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed, 145-146.
42 Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed, 145.
43 Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed, 177.
political purpose.” Essentially, he argues that war should be connected to the people fighting it by a rationale that arouses appropriate emotions. The democratic process must produce a popular political purpose for war that suitably prompts citizens to take up arms in defense of their nation. He reveals changing perspectives on the ethos and ethics of the soldier in the context of the current security environment and argues that the type of wars faced today have “ruptured the necessary balance of soldierly discipline and political rationale” of the past. His work reinforces the aspect of civil-military relations that relates individual soldiers to society and warns of the adverse effects of fighting unconventional wars in socially disconnected ways.

This section has briefly reviewed the state of contemporary civil-military theory from the dominant influence of Huntington through the various disputations, modifications, and alterations of his seminal work in order to demonstrate the challenges of connecting civil-military relations to political outcomes beyond control. Despite the articulated issues, no all-encompassing substitute has displaced Huntington’s theory as a central organizing component of the field. As a result, even if one disagrees with Huntington, it remains convenient to begin with his theory as the starting point. Eliot Cohen calls Huntington’s theory, the “normal” theory of civil-military relations because it set the terms of debate about civil-military relations in the United States and because it has become the accepted theoretical lens by which the contemporary environment is viewed. Although Huntington is widely accepted, Cohen fundamentally disagrees with him and says, “if the boundaries between political ends and military means are more uncertain than Huntington suggests, civilian control must take on a form different from that of “objective control,” at least in its original understanding.” Cohen argues for a more hands-on form of control by civilians than Huntington’s objective control. He refers to his approach as an “unequal dialogue.” Civil-military theory today mostly revolves around control, rather than the procurement of politically agreed “public goods.” It remains difficult to examine civil-military relations in terms of its external outcomes. The

44 Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed, 175-178.
45 Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed, 176.
47 Cohen, Supreme Command, 264.
statistical and comparative analysis of data should assist in moving this process along, were it to be available.

**Civil-Military Data**

There is a paucity of quantitative data on civil-military relations. There is no statistical database of American civil-military metrics accepted by the research community in the field. Considering the discipline is most developed in the United States, it is surprising that no central repository for civil-military information exists here. For related issues such as war, it is difficult to find an established database with civil-military concerns in mind. As a result, the statistical analysis of key variables is challenged with first collecting, sorting, and reconciling relevant data from a variety of sources. Ensuring the consistency of data that enables accurate comparison is also a barrier.

In more mature fields of study, such as social science and comparative politics, researchers have access to myriad quantitative data collected by international organizations, interest groups, and financial institutions such as the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank. Due to self-imposed restrictions, many of these institutions do not collect data on national security or defense.\(^48\)

This lack of a comparison-capable database inhibits a data-based approach to the study of civil-military relations. A central database or repository organization facilitates collection, dissemination, and the use of reliable quantitative data. It provides for ease of replication and proof of findings. Accumulating and categorizing data around the central concerns of the field also accommodates peripheral issues as they become known. The databases on financial metrics or international studies of war, such as the Correlates of War project are examples of existing models. Appropriating the tools available in other disciplines for civil-military relations would enable a more robust debate on definitions, measurement standards, and areas of concern within the field.

Civil-military progress does not depend on a data-based approach. However, incorporating a method that is grounded in data could diminish conceptual and theoretical challenges. Data, measurements, and explanation of data assist in grounding abstract concepts. Non-data and other types of empirical studies have been limited to historical

\(^{48}\) Bruneau and Matei, “Introduction,” 2.
and sociological interpretations. This type of observation is challenged by its subjectivity. Data-based empirical studies have been limited to extremely focused questions. Thus far, a data-based approach has not been used to expand the central questions of the field.

An exception to this trend is the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, which used survey data in its project on the civil-military gap in the United States. Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn edited and compiled the final work of a Triangle Institute study as a series of essays. Prior to the start of the Global War on Terror in 2001, they concluded that there were several civil-military gaps, only some of which were troubling, and offered a few, broad policy recommendations to address them. Their combination of data and explanation, as well as historical and sociological interpretation, serves as a useful model for future work on civil-military relations. Moreover, if captured, sorted, and formed into a central repository for further examination, such work could be used to formulate explanations for the effects of different types of civil-military conditions in the future. To address the civil-military gap Feaver and Kohn prescribe the following: “increase military presence in civilian society; improve civilian understanding of military affairs; and strengthen civil-military instruction in professional military education.” All three recommendations are designed to increase physical contact and understanding between civil and military groups. An expanded approach beyond what Feaver and Kohn attempted might address the social and political effects of a civil-military disassociation by examining the physical basis that forms the heart of their recommendations.

The Contemporary Environment

Several opinion pieces and events that have recently appeared in the media provide subjective, anecdotal indicators of an uneasy relationship between American society and the armed forces that provide for its defense. After fourteen years of war, some non-military civilians choose to convey their gratification to service members, yet

49 For the most influential examples, see Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, and Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*.
remain absent from democratic debate on the current conflicts. While intending to be sincere expressions of support for the troops, untinged by judgment on the Global War on Terror, such expressions can be interpreted as being generally disingenuous. The following excerpt is from a recent *New York Times* article entitled, “Please Don’t Thank Me for My Service,” which describes the way some veterans feel about citizens thanking them for serving.

To some recent vets — by no stretch all of them — the thanks comes across as shallow, disconnected, a reflexive offering from people who, while meaning well, have no clue what soldiers did over there or what motivated them to go, and who would never have gone themselves nor sent their own sons and daughters. To these vets, thanking soldiers for their service symbolizes the ease of sending a volunteer army to wage war at great distance — physically, spiritually, economically. It raises questions of the meaning of patriotism, shared purpose and, pointedly, what you’re supposed to say to those who put their lives on the line and are uncomfortable about being thanked for it.52

Hunter Garth, the protagonist of the article, conveys that it feels self-serving for those doing the thanking, implying that he served for them. “I pulled the trigger,” he said. “You didn’t. Don’t take that away from me.”53 His statement unambiguously clarifies the fact that he acted, and they did not.

Another recent article describes the peculiar nature of public support for the troops. The “Tragedy of the American Military” by James Fallows expresses this point eloquently. He says, “The American public and its political leadership will do anything for the military except take it seriously. The result is a chickenhawk nation in which careless spending and strategic folly combine to lure America into endless wars it can’t win.”54 Fallows cites the satirical novel, *Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk*, by Ben Fountain, to make the point that everyone supports the troops, but no one knows anything about them.55 Described as a takedown of empty “thank you for your service” rituals, it is the story of a front-line unit that is flown back to the United States from Iraq to be thanked during a football game halftime show. The unit is paraded around briefly,

making the fans feel as though they had done their patriotic duty by showing support for the troops. Then, after seeing everything they are missing at home, the unit is promptly shipped right back to war in Iraq. The cruelty of it all for the front-line unit goes entirely unnoticed.

Other manifestations of this unease involve civilians misrepresenting their military involvements. Notable recent examples include two public figures who exaggerated military-related exploits. The first was Brian Williams, a news anchor for the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), who said that he had been aboard a military helicopter that was forced down by rocket-propelled grenade fire during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when in fact no such thing happened. The fabrication had been repeated by the network until it was recently proven untrue.\(^56\) The second was the Secretary of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Robert McDonald, who recently apologized publicly for misrepresenting facts about serving in the Special Forces.\(^57\)

Such occurrences as the above may be symbolic of underlying problems in American civil-military relations. As some civilians have sought to replicate the status they associate with the military, or perhaps assuage their guilt for not volunteering to serve by conspicuously thanking military members for having done so, they have revealed a widespread ignorance of military motivations and culture, but more importantly, their role as citizens in political decisions about the nation’s wars.

**Where This Work Fits in the Context of the Existing Literature**

This paper relates a question of civil-military relations to greater social and political matters. It does not solve the critical conceptual problem in the field, a lack of unifying and guiding theory beyond Huntington’s normative framework and broader than Feaver’s rational-material civilian control. It also does not develop the comprehensive database needed to stimulate statistical comparison and data-grounded foundations for expanded findings. Instead, it works in the absence of these enablers and attempts to

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demonstrate their usefulness with a research design that would have benefitted from their existence. It addresses a challenging conceptual question by breaking it down into parts and using collected data from related fields, explanation from other civil-military research findings, and observations about the data to arrive at a defensible answer.

The study of war and strategy finds its fundaments in civil-military relations. From this perspective, any examination that isolates war at a particular level of analysis such as tactical, operational, or strategic, without a connection to the society that sanctioned it, is flawed. Especially in democracies, the origin of national power, i.e., citizens who provide the money, materiel, and manpower, must be connected to the war effort, or the true source of national power is excluded. Such perversion may have social consequences beyond the immediate conflict. War is fundamentally a social phenomenon, and as such it is the business of the people. Decision making on the use of military force is, or at least should be, a profoundly civil-military affair.

This viewpoint is primarily informed by the work of Andrew Bacevich, Eliot Cohen, Donald Abenheim, and Emile Simpson. Each of these authors expresses similar outlooks on the challenges of civil-military relations and the necessity of connecting military operations to greater political purposes. Bacevich’s most recent work traces the civil-military gap in America to the abandonment of the citizen-soldier ideal and the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force. He blames the American people for avoiding the mantle of responsible citizenship and the government for waging unnecessary wars. Cohen denounces the idea of a separate military sphere by examining extraordinary civilian leaders who led their country’s military forces in war. He contends that the relationship between the soldier and the statesman is at the heart of strategy. He argues that war policy, strategy, and oversight are the responsibilities of supreme civilian leaders, and not the exclusive spheres of generals. Donald Abenheim espouses the guiding beliefs, ideals, and sense of right conduct of the citizen-soldier in contrast to what he sees as the politicization and perversion of the professional soldier. Considering the similarity of recent conflict to those of the 17th and or 19th centuries and its significant

59 Cohen, Supreme Command, XII.
60 Cohen, Supreme Command.
influence on the societies waging it, he expresses two concerns: be aware of the dangers of this type of war on democratic values, and be aware of its consequences on the ethos and ethics of the soldiers fighting it.61

Emile Simpson and Donald Abenheim emphasize the ascendance of the operational level of war to the realm of policy, rather than the dominance of policy over strategy and operations.62 Simpson does this by examining the current security environment and arguing that conventional-war mentalities have warped the view of what is actually occurring on the ground. His personal experience in Afghanistan informs his viewpoint that contemporary conflict is different than conflict as it is depicted in theory.63

The following excerpt of his work describes the political character of war in Afghanistan and Simpson’s view that civil-military relations both affect war and are affected by it.

In today’s context Huntington’s argument would have the military in contemporary conflict pursue exclusively military goals in the name of professionalism—this would not work in mosaic conflicts, in which tactical actions have a political quality: to refuse to engage in politics would just mean not knowing what political effect one is having, or refusing to discriminate between military courses of actions on a political basis, leading to chaotic outcomes. Huntington’s ideas taken literally today, outside their legitimating Cold War context, isolate the military from the wider society. This frustrates, rather than balances, strategic dialogue.64

Simpson asserts that contemporary conflict is not only multi-dimensional, with changing actors and loyalties, but resembles armed politics more than other conceptions of war.65 He says military actions have direct political effects whether or not such effects are intended.66 Soldiers must be aware of these effects and use them to advantage. Simpson, a former British soldier, blames Huntington for the lack of political awareness on the part of American military officers.

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61 Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed.
63 Simpson, War From the Ground Up, 2.
64 Simpson, War From the Ground Up, 115.
65 Simpson, War From the Ground Up, 11.
66 Simpson, War From the Ground Up, 115.
Conclusion

This chapter has described the contemporary study of civil-military relations from the perspective of its theoretical and empirical challenges. Although Huntington’s theory continues to influence and guide the field in the absence of any other all-encompassing conceptual underpinning, almost every other civil-military theorist since has disputed or modified his original ideas. Nevertheless, United States military institutions continue to embrace his prescriptions of professionalism, autonomy in a military sphere, and objective control by civilian leaders, rather than seek citizen-soldier based structures, accept a higher degree of interaction with policy makers, and seek a more progressive conception of civilian control that encourages collaboration and mutual understanding. Also, despite considerable progress using survey and other data along with multivariate descriptive methods, as employed by the Triangle Institute study on the civil-military gap, no effort has been made to construct a viable statistical database, nor to relate data-based examinations to the attainment of greater social and political “public goods” such as increased security or stability for economic prosperity. Finally, the contemporary environment exhibits indications of discomfort between non-military citizens and some of the service members who have been fighting in the Global War on Terror. Although it is not the objective of this paper to determine if this a general trend or a few isolated incidents, the unease provokes the question of whether citizens can genuinely support the troops, while avoiding engagement for or against the wars they have been fighting in? It also points to the importance of the phenomenon investigated in the next chapter. Has American society become disassociated from the military even as it holds the military in such high esteem?
Chapter 3

The Connection Between American Society and its Military Establishment

*To be loved, but not known is comforting but superficial. To be known, but not loved is our greatest fear.*

—Timothy Keller

*Citizen armies had waged the wars that made the nation powerful... war was the people’s business and it could not be otherwise. For the state to embark upon armed conflict of any magnitude required informed popular consent. Actual prosecution of any military campaign larger than a police action depended on the willingness of citizens in large numbers to become soldiers.*

—Andrew J. Bacevich

With all the fanfare at football games, yellow ribbons, and positive media attention, why should anyone be concerned that the mass of American citizens may not know their soldiers?\(^1\) Or that the distance between American citizens and American soldiers is growing wider? Likely, any soldier of the Vietnam generation would trade the public opposition of that period for the adulation bestowed on members of the armed forces today.

The relationship between citizen and soldier has a long tradition in America that goes back to the nation’s founding. The two identities have been interrelated as citizen-soldiers for most of American history. Only recently, has the advent of professional soldiers and a changed relationship to society begun to take hold.\(^2\) While public demonstrations during the Vietnam era may have facilitated the end of conscription in

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1 For some examples of yellow ribbon campaigns to support the troops see the following: [http://www.yellowribbonfund.org](http://www.yellowribbonfund.org), and [http://www.yellowribbonsupport.com/yellowribbonsupportfoundation/yellowribbonsupportcenter/](http://www.yellowribbonsupport.com/yellowribbonsupportfoundation/yellowribbonsupportcenter/), [https://www.facebook.com/YellowRibbonCampaignCommittee](https://www.facebook.com/YellowRibbonCampaignCommittee), and [http://wp.yellowribbonamerica.org/about/](http://wp.yellowribbonamerica.org/about/).

2 In a campaign speech on November 16, 1967 presidential candidate Richard Nixon stated, “What is needed is not a broad based draft, but a professional military corps.” Quoted from Bernard Rostker, *I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), 35.
America, the purported withdrawal of interest and criticism of military matters by the mass of American citizens calls for a renewed investigation into this social relationship.³

This chapter illustrates changes in the physical connection between American society and its armed services since 1975. First, it establishes a rationale for connectedness in a civil-military context and presents a data-based method for its measurement. Second, it presents and explains collected data on four different metrics. Third, it evaluates the data as a whole and attempts to create a coherent picture of the relationship between American society and its military institutions on physical grounds, and how that relationship has changed over time. Fourth, it reflects on the significance of the findings for the purposes of the overall argument.

**Societal and Military Connectedness**

What determines the connectedness of the military establishment to the American public? This paper argues that the connection can be depicted based on two physical, largely demographic, factors. The first factor involves the intertwining of the two groups in terms of their overlapping membership. The second involves the geographical proximity of the two groups. Each of these factors reflects the opportunity for regular and meaningful interaction to take place between civilians and military members. This type of connection is not based on imagined affinity, such as that illustrated by surveys of public approval. It is also not based on public sentiment, such as expressions of gratitude. This connection is based on the physical component of having “skin in the game.” Those citizens who are close to current or former service members such as family, friends, and acquaintances best comprehend the life of the soldier. Those who get to know service members on a human, individual level understand the effect of the government’s foreign policy decisions on service members and their families.

Intergroup contact theory provides a foundation for these claims. A key finding of several researchers is that contact between social groups can improve intergroup attitudes

³ Speaking of opposition to the Vietnam War and citizen reluctance to be drafted, Senator Sam Nunn stated to Congress in 1978 “The All-Volunteer Force is to a large extent a political child of the draft card burning, campus riots, and violent protest demonstrations of the late 1960s and early 1970s.” Quoted from Rostker, *I Want You!*, 15-16.
with subsequent effects on intergroup relations. Contact, for example, reduces group-based prejudice. Social connectedness to a member of a different social group sparks interest in that group’s culture and fate. Individuals acquire interests from others, even members of different social groups, to whom they are socially connected. This results in the internalization of the goals and motivations of those others. Physical contact between social groups is the basis for understanding, appreciation, and learning.

Active-duty military members and, to a lesser extent, reservists and family members incur the physical, tangible risks derived from the government’s foreign policy objectives. Veterans who have experienced these risks while serving understand the impact. Friends and acquaintances who have a connection to service members have an interest in what happens to them and why they deploy. Absent a strong interest and involvement in politics, citizens not personally connected to the armed forces do not necessarily consider military affairs part of their business. As James A. Donovan claims, “The nation’s defense is everybody’s business, yet it has become so vast and complicated—with its own terminology, secrets, technology, and propaganda—that most people have difficulty comprehending even a few facets, to say nothing of the many sides of the subject.” One potential result of the complexity and secrecy of the nation’s defense is that the uninvolved become indifferent to the debate. Today, few segments of the population seem acutely concerned about decisions deploying troops overseas and employing force abroad.

The physical separation of military activities from most of the population, and the lack of opportunity for regular, meaningful interaction hinder citizens from being personally involved. This separation is evidenced by the lack of service-based requirement for citizenship and lack of military education for young citizens in school.

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5 Tiffany Brannon and Gregory M. Walton, “Enacting Cultural Interests: How Intergroup Contact Reduces Prejudice by Sparking Interest in an Out-Group’s Culture,” *Psychological Science*, published online 7 August 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0956797613481607, accessible at [http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/08/07/0956797613481607](http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/08/07/0956797613481607).


Other than joining a military service or working with military members in some professional capacity, the means for an average American citizen to come in contact with military personnel depends on his personal interest or location of residence. Only those that live near military bases have the regular opportunity to interact with military members or see military activity taking place. Without having a personal stake, intimate knowledge of the military, or profound interest in national security, most citizens will not come in regular contact with military personnel. As a result, healthy political debate, informed discourse, and dissent among the population on military affairs may be obstructed by a lack of experience and personal involvement.

Learning about the military comes from contact and interaction. Being a member of the active-duty armed forces or reserves, being in a military family, having been in a military service, or having close friendships with military members enables such engagement. Entertaining the prospect of joining the armed services or having a close family member join the armed services invokes an interest in learning about them. Living close to a base or in an area with a high concentration of veterans offers the opportunity to develop close personal contacts with military people. The physical conditions that promote contact, interaction, and personal involvement spark the interest to learn and know more about military service. This informs individuals of the human consequences of war in a personal, understandable manner.

**The Rationale**

Connectedness is a measure of if, and how closely, two things are linked to each other. If two things are connected, they are also linked components of another all-encompassing entity. Although the two things have a separate and detached existence, their mutual bond defines their shared relationship and is representative of their connection. The way to connect two separate things is to bring them into contact with each other. The link that emerges from this contact constitutes their connection. To disconnect two things that have become joined, the connection between them must be severed so that they become two completely separate things. The way to do this is to remove one from contact with the other. A connection, from this perspective, is enabled by the physical ability for contact between things to take place, or the means for
meaningful and regular interaction. Americans being social creatures, some connections are likely to take place wherever and whenever there is opportunity to do so.

**Envisioning Connectedness Between Social Groups With Overlapping Membership**

Social connectedness results from people meeting together and interacting with each other. From an individual perspective, the quality and quantity of an individual’s relationships with family, friends, and acquaintances is a measure of that individual’s social connectedness. This is represented by the interactions of an active-duty military member and his civilian neighbors. From a group perspective, the quality and quantity of interactions between social groups in an extended community is a measure of a group’s social connectedness. This is represented by the interactions of a group of active-duty military members from a particular base and local civilians associated with a civic organization. In the group case, the individuals may change, but the group contact remains. Individual contacts coalesced together form group-based social relationships that depict a connection on those terms.

Social connections are enhanced by several factors. One set of factors includes physical capability, such as frequency and duration of contact, and proximity. Other factors that help to establish and build connections include knowledge and interest in the other, social exchange of information, and familiarity with group-based social networks. For example, initial interactions do not occur if individuals are not in the same place at the same time. Social connections are difficult to establish if physical interactions are infrequent or too short for exchange of personal information to take place. Similarly, social connections are not established without a willingness to engage others, seek information, and share experiences. Social connections are enhanced when individuals share contacts and introduce known connections from different groups to each other. Social connectivity reflects a process of mutual sharing, understanding, and improving of social relationships that develop from initial contact to acquaintanceship, and potentially beyond.

Social connectedness is a key component of community cohesion and important in a civil-military context. Without a connection between American society and its military institutions, the two can become disparate groups and a gap can increase between
them. The growth of a professional military class, or caste, such as occurred in Imperial Japan is a striking example of the perversion that can result. De-politicization, codes of conduct, and professional ethics were designed to insulate societies from the domestic dangers of military classes. Citizen militias were an alternative means of ensuring society’s interest and the military’s interest remained perfectly aligned. Although both of these are extreme examples, they demonstrate the social and political significance of the connection between society and the military.

**Measuring Connectedness**

How can we measure the connectedness of American society and the military in a way that provides useful information for comparison? What statistical data is available? Can multiple forms of statistical data in conjunction with explanatory material depict this relationship adequately? What are the limitations of a data-based approach? This paper argues that the connection can be measured using the two physical factors previously introduced, intertwinement and proximity. The specific metrics combined together endeavor to depict the opportunity for regular and meaningful interaction and how it has changed over time.

The first factor, the intertwinement of the two groups, includes the degree to which the groups intermix and how much of one the other encompasses. It is a measurement of overlapping membership, potential contact, and representation on different levels. This paper uses the rate of current participation, past participation (veterans), eligibility for participation, and political representation as varied dimensions with which to estimate the first factor. The first factor measures the degree to which those who are, or have been, directly affected by the overall military establishment comprise the overall population.

The second factor includes the degree to which the groups have an opportunity for regular, meaningful interaction. From a physical perspective, meaningful interaction is defined as in-person contact. This limits the scope of the measurement to physical proximity as opposed to psychological space, social networking, or other less explicit criteria. The measurement of this factor incorporates the distribution of military personnel within diverse civilian population centers. It endeavors to represent quantitatively and
geographically, the degree to which military members and civilians have the opportunity to make connections with each other because they inhabit the same area. Unfortunately, the data collection to a level of precision on a city or local level is beyond the scope of this work. In its place, the data is evaluated on a national level, and the local variance is not considered.

The military is a difficult institution to know and understand without participating in it. Service members understand the challenges of military life because they experience them. No other American institutions compel members with a particular lifestyle as forcefully and comprehensively as do the armed services. Military members are subject to an additional body of law, called the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that is more restrictive than civilian statutes. The UCMJ includes articles that prevent absence from duty without permission, contemptuous speech against officials, failure to obey lawful orders, commissioned officer conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen, and any comportment that prejudices good order and discipline or brings discredit on the armed forces.\(^8\) Military members serve fixed terms or commissions that once agreed become compulsory and are enforced by law. This means that even if conditions change these people cannot leave the service until they have fulfilled the terms of their voluntary agreement. Furthermore, members of the military are acutely sensitive to foreign policy, the use of force abroad, and any prospective overseas intervention because they will be the ones to deploy, leave their loved ones, and employ force to attain the government’s objectives. The average American citizen is not affected in any direct or material way by such conditions. Without any other forcing function, the manner in which citizens familiarize themselves with military institutions is by being a part of them, or being so close to them, that their life is somehow affected by them.

It takes effort to get to know active-duty military members. Service members are less available for social interaction than are civilians. Deployments, permanent change of station moves, overseas basing, short tours, family separations, and constant change characterize some of the limitations. Deployments, especially in combat, are tumultuous periods for military families. They normally include intense training periods of long hours and reduced availability for interacting with family and friends. As a result, social

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interaction outside the family or workplace is lessened during workups and absent during deployment.

Military members conduct frequent moves of their families and belongings. This causes an interruption in social interaction and forces military members to start over at new locations. Anticipation of frequent moves inhibits socialization because members know they will be leaving soon and are not strongly inclined to invest the time in establishing relationships that will soon sever. Civilians, unaccustomed to newfound friends departing so frequently, may be disinclined to establish military contacts, especially when an individual is likely to be departing.

Those military members that choose to live apart from their family in order to prevent the change-of-location interruption in the lives of their spouses and children also suffer from socialization challenges. They frequently spend much of their free time communicating with their family and traveling to see them. They are not highly likely to establish civilian contacts on their own. Contacts that are established are likely to be not very intense without the wholeness of their family structure to support the social interaction.

None of the aforementioned precludes the establishment of relationships for those who desire them and are willing to make the effort. Some people are always able to overcome such challenges. It does, however, clarify a few of the challenges, difficulties, and considerations involved in the formation of close relationships between civilians and military members. “Close” here means sufficiently close that a civilian understands and becomes psychologically attuned when their friend, or friend’s family member, is sent to fight the nation’s wars. This is the metric of understanding that takes effort, closeness, and regular contact for civilians to establish. This kind of understanding is very strong for active-duty military members and their families. Reservists not on active-duty and veterans are indirectly, but significantly, affected.

Another complicating factor is the distinguishing of group membership. The main identifiable distinguishing mark of a service member is his or her uniform. If an individual is not wearing a uniform, he or she is not necessarily identified as military. Considering that the active-duty military and reserves are subgroups of the overall population, social interactions in which their overlying military identity is not revealed,
preclude connections from being formed on those terms. For example, two individuals may develop an initial connection; but if the civilian characterizes it as an acquaintance with another regular citizen, rather than with a member of the armed forces, a civil-military connection has not been established. If the connection develops into a lasting relationship of some sort, the opportunity for revealing of information materializes; and a genuine civil-military connection may occur. Not recognizing service members as members of the military establishment may preclude connection’s being established on civil-military terms. Thus, regular and meaningful interaction is necessary to ensure that cursory, intermittent contacts mature into genuine civil-military connections.

The Data

This section presents and explains the collected data on military participation, veteran population, military eligibility, and veteran political representation.

The Military Participation Rate

The military participation rate is a physical, demographic metric of how much of the American citizenry participates in the military services by becoming a part of one of them. It is premised on the assumption that the larger the military is, as a percentage of the overall population, the greater is its ability to connect with the remaining part of the population. Participation in this sense breeds familiarity. The active-duty military, those who deploy and fight, is the most relevant of several military related sub-groups for this purpose. The other sub-groups include the reserves, military families, veterans, and Department of Defense civilians. Each of the sub-groups could also be depicted if the data were readily available and consistent over the period.

Because members of the military services are also members of the American citizenry, there is overlapping membership. The military participation rate depicts how much of the overall group is in the subgroup. It is calculated by dividing the active-duty force by the total population of the United States. While the active-duty participation rate

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9 Members of the military must be citizens, or legal permanent residents, i.e. green card holders, “To be eligible for enlistment in the Army or Army Reserve, an individual must be an American citizen or lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence [10 United States Code, Section 3253(c), 8253(c)]” US Army Recruiting, accessed 2 Apr 2015 at http://www.usarec.army.mil/support/faqs.htm#citizens
is indicative of a civil-military relationship in purely physical terms, some civil-military theorists have claimed a direct relationship between the rate of participation and social representation. Lower rates of participation result in a less socially representative military.\textsuperscript{10} Michael Desch avers that professional, standing military forces, especially in prolonged periods of low threat to the nation, are inclined to diverge culturally and politically from society over time.\textsuperscript{11} Jonathan Alford claims that volunteer military forces tend to become irrelevant, self-serving organizations increasingly separate from the society that supports them, particularly in times of peace.\textsuperscript{12} Because of these diverging tendencies, social representation is important.\textsuperscript{13} A measure of overlapping membership is indicative of participation, familiarity, and social representativeness.

The military participation rate is useful as a point of comparison. Measured annually over the period of study, it depicts how the relationship changes over time. Although a case could be made that a particular participation rate would yield a specific social benefit, or the right level of participation should be sought to maintain a consistent level of relationship, spending amount, capability, etc., based on population changes, that is not the point here. Instead, the way in which the rate has changed since 1975 indicates one aspect of the connection between American society and the military.

What does the data depict? The two variables that define the military participation rate have moved in diverging directions, both contributing to a steadily decreasing rate over time. The United States population has increased at approximately 1% annually. The size of the active-duty military establishment has generally decreased, although there were small surges in the 1980s and in the mid-2000s. Neither surge reversed the general downward trend, but delayed the decline with incremental increases. Because the


\textsuperscript{11} Desch, “Explaining the Gap,” 302-303.


\textsuperscript{13} Desch, “Explaining the Gap,” 303.
population grew at 1%, the military would have to have grown commensurately to have maintained the same rate over time. It did not. Instead, the Cold War drawdown of the 1990s encouraged the government to rely on a smaller active-duty military force. During the Global War on Terror, the size of the military increased a small amount, but is forecast to decrease to 1.3 million in 2016, the smallest force since 1975.

Overall, the data depicts a decreasing military participation rate over the period. From 1975 to 2014 the active-duty participation rate declined from about 1% of the population to .43% of the population. It is forecast to decrease even further in the next few years. This means that in 1975 a higher percentage of citizens were also soldiers than in 2014. It shows that the military is becoming not only a smaller institution, but a less socially influential one as well. Because a smaller percentage of Americans are personally experiencing active-duty military service in any given year, the resultant effect of their participation on the mass of American citizens is less pronounced.

![Figure 1: United States Population](http://www.census.gov/compendia/statstab/cats/population/estimates_and_projections_by_age_sex_raceethnicity.html)

**Figure 1: United States Population**

Figure 2: Active-Duty Population


Figure 2: Active-Duty Population

Military Participation Rate

The Veteran Population Rate

The veteran population rate is a physical, demographic metric that exemplifies the potential influence of veterans on non-military citizens. Specifically, it measures how much of the American citizenry are also military veterans. It is calculated by dividing the veteran population by the total population of the United States. Its relevance is based on the assertion that the larger the veteran population is, as a percentage of the overall population, the greater effect it has on the overall population. Because the overall United States population has been growing steadily the veteran population rate is a better indicator of veteran influence than overall veteran numbers. Subgroups that do not maintain their percentage of the overall group decline in terms of their effect on the social and political affairs of the overall population.

As another case of overlapping identity, veterans are also citizens. Thus, it is not an indicator of a current civil-military relationship, but of a civil to past-military relationship. This causes a slightly different result as veterans accumulate and become a larger population over time. Although the veteran population rate is reinforced by smaller numbers of active-duty members because of the previously mentioned decreases in the size of the overall military establishment, it reflects the accumulation of past military participation rates and should be more resilient to changes over time. While a more precise estimate of localized influence could be made if smaller geographic areas were analyzed instead of the whole country, for the purposes of this analysis the federal boundary is sufficient. The rate stands as a rough measure of veteran influence nationally. Since the data is not available annually, but every 5 – 10 years, only a general trend can be depicted.

Veterans are also citizens, but without the problems that active-duty members have developing lasting connections in the surrounding civilian community. Veterans do not deploy, they are not compelled to move every few years, and they do not necessarily work on inaccessible military bases. Potentially more geographically stable and socially available than active-duty members, veterans have greater ability to interact with non-
military citizens. Not always identifiable as veterans, their status as veterans can be elusive. However, military service is often such a strong component of a person’s identity, and invokes such a positive sentimentality of past accomplishments and experiences that many veterans can be identified by their wearing of old insignia, participation in veterans associations, or their topics of conversation.

Veteran contact with the population is a strong social force. The presence of veterans in a community may influence the community to a considerable degree with exposure and knowledge of military people. In a study of military recruiting using 1990 data, the number of veterans within a county was the single strongest indicator of increased enlistment rates.\(^{14}\) Considering these veterans were primarily in the age range of 40 to 65, they were likely to be parents, grandparents, and influencers of youth in the prime recruiting markets.\(^ {15}\) They were also likely to be socially active in the community and available to engage in relationships with interested non-military citizens.

The veteran population rate is useful as a measure of the important social dynamic that enables non-military members of a community to be exposed to former, experienced military members. Measured approximately every five years over the period, it shows how the relationship has changed over time. There is no perfect veteran population rate to maintain; however, a consistent change over time indicates a changing social dynamic. For example, if the number of veterans that encourage young people to enlist decreases dramatically, it may indicate that military enlistments will become more challenging and require more resources to advertise, educate, and incentivize with signing bonuses. The way the rate has changed over the period indicates one aspect of the connection between American society and its military institutions.

What does the data depict? Similar to the military participation rate, the two variables that define the veteran population rate have generally moved in opposite directions. Both have contributed to decreases over time. The veteran population in 1975 was a little over 28 million. It did not drop noticeably until 2000, when it declined into the 26 millions. There was a small increase from 1975 to 1985, but it was insignificant. In


\(^ {15}\) Boyer and Schmitz, “Socio-demographics and Military Recruiting.”
2010, the veteran population dropped considerably to 22 million. In 2014, it is estimated
to be below 22 million. Although the overall veteran population did not drop
tremendously until the late 2000s, its percentage of the overall population has declined.

Overall, the data depicts a decreasing veteran population rate over the period. From 1975 to 2014 the veteran population rate dwindled from about 13% to 6.9%. An almost 50% reduction, it is forecast to continue its downward trend. The decreasing rate demonstrates that the effect of military veterans on the population as a whole is becoming less pronounced. Coupled with the declining military participation rate, the decreasing veteran population rate adds to the difficulty of the average American citizen knowing or coming in contact with citizens who have served in the armed forces. The armed services and the veteran population are becoming smaller, while the total population is growing. Military institutions are thus decreasingly able to influence American citizens by contact, familiarity, and regular interaction. Equally important, many American citizens are precluded from interaction with current or former service members by population numbers alone.

**Figure 4: Veteran Population**

Figure 5: Veteran Rate
Source: United States Census. The veteran rate was calculated by dividing the annual veteran population by total United States population.

The Eligibility Rate

Eligibility is a reflection of potential entwinement between non-military citizens and military institutions. While actual service, or close contact, with the armed forces, provides the strongest opportunity for learning about military affairs, the potential for military service indicates an almost equivalent sense of interest. For example, knowing that a son or daughter is eligible and will potentially serve in the military may raise a parent’s level of interest in military affairs. The main difference is that the interest arises before the enlistment occurs, as parents attempt to mold and shape their offspring in ways they find suitable.

As long as it is possible, potential “skin in the game” can be nearly as influential as actual service. President Nixon’s 1968 campaign promise to end the draft was designed in part to undermine antiwar protests. Knowing that they would not have to serve in the Army during a time of war, individuals became less invested in protesting against the war. By promising to end the draft, Nixon was able to prolong the war until he
could end it on his own terms. Potential service influences interest, opinion, and behavior. If military service is likely, citizens will be interested in military affairs even before they are sure they will serve.

Military eligibility is important in this regard. If most of the population is ineligible for the military, it will have little interest in military affairs and national security. Military eligibility conveys a subtle but strong message about the connection of the people to the government. Ranging from the extremes of universal conscription, to the participation of a highly selective few, the implications are quite different.

Universal conscription stipulates that everyone serves in some capacity and that all are therefore important to the overall war effort. A national mobilization harnesses a “whole of nation” approach. Surely, not everyone can or will join. Civil support, industrial production, agriculture, and other domestic matters require workers. However, the message is clear—absent a more important support function, all should seek direct participation in the national effort.

A highly selective, professional force in which most of the population is not eligible, not intellectually capable, not physically fit, or not morally sound to join presents a different message. It tells the population that military business is the exclusive concern of a very selective group. War also, from this perspective, is not communicated as being the business of the people. The logic of this exclusivity of eligibility tells citizens that if they do not possess the strict criteria for military service, they should not worry about what the military does to secure the nation. On the other side of the argument, war has become a highly technical affair. The military needs highly educated, fit, morally sound members in order to conduct modern combat effectively and efficiently.

American society, however, increasingly fails to produce interested young adults who meet the stringent requirements of modern military service. A 2009 report by a group of retired military leaders calls on the government to invest in high-quality early education as a means of providing increased young Americans for participation in the

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armed forces. They claim that Pentagon statistics report 75% of young people ages 17-24 are unable to enlist. The three most common barriers are a failure to graduate from high school; a criminal record; and physical fitness deficiencies, especially obesity. The retired military leaders cite statistics about the youth population that together produce the 75% figure. Twenty-five percent of young Americans lack a high school diploma, and even with a diploma about 30% fail to pass the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Ten percent of young adults have a prior felony or serious misdemeanor conviction. Twenty-seven percent are too overweight to join, with the rate of obesity versus overweight climbing. Thirty-two percent of all young Americans have disqualifying health problems other than weight. Finally, many are ineligible for other reasons such as their status as a single parent with custody of a child or appearance features that disqualify such as visible tattoos on the face, hands, neck, or face, or visible holes in their ears. The retired general officers and other military leaders that produced this report claim that America is not producing enough young people that meet the necessary physical, mental, moral, and appearance requirements of modern military service. Those that do meet the standards are getting harder to recruit, because they are the same population that other employers and colleges are attempting to attract.

Between these two perspectives of military eligibility, this section presents a metric that is symbolic of the overall problem but grounded in physical, demographic data. The eligibility rate is calculated by dividing an estimate of the eligible population by the overall population. The ideal enlistment age range of 18-24, which is readily accessible with demographic census data, depicts the percentage of the population that is eligible to enter the armed forces based on ideal age. This is a rough estimate that does not account for education (high school graduate/GED), ASVAB scores, gender, physical fitness requirements, obesity and other medical issues, moral disqualifiers, and physical appearance disqualifiers like tattoos and piercings. It also does not account for those

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18 For current enlistment standards see Army.com at http://army.com/info/usa/eligibility.
enlistment-age standards vary among the services, have changed over time, and like other enlistment standards have been waived during times of need. Using an ideal enlistment age range serves as a suitable estimate of enlistment eligibility based on demographic data alone. It is estimated that most enlistments occur in this age range, and it includes the age range targeted by recruiters.

What does the data depict? The data shows that the ideal age range included about 27.7 million citizens in 1975, decreased to 25.1 million in 1995, and is estimated at 30.8 million in 2015. However, considering the overall United States population steadily increased, the percentage of the population in the ideal age range decreased from a high of 13.2% percent in 1980 to 9.5% in 2015. The steepest decline occurred from 1980 to 1995 when the ideal age group decreased considerably. As the group recovered from 1995 to 2014, eligibility leveled off in the 9-9.5% range. Forecast increases in 18-24 year olds are not enough to counteract the effects of steadily increasing population. As a result, eligibility based on ideal age range will continue to decline.

The main point about eligibility has little to do with the absolute value of the numbers. Rather, the numbers indicate that by demographic age-based data alone, eligibility to join the armed services decreased from 1975 to 2014. All the other factors and anecdotal evidence except gender, point to a further restriction in eligibility. Overall, the combined effect of decreasing enlistment opportunity due to reductions in the overall force size causes a significant portion of the ideal age range to become ineligible for service. This has influenced popular perception that it is getting more difficult to join the armed services. Generally speaking, the services have not wanted to accept waivers for educational, physical, moral, or other enlistment standards. They have done so to meet short-term goals during periods of expansion, such as in 2006. Overall eligibility has generally decreased due to professionalization, smaller numbers needed, and an effort to

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Gender, however, provides the main counterargument to decreasing eligibility. It does not dispute the trend depicted in the ideal age eligibility graph because the eligibility rate includes data for both genders as though women in 1975 were as eligible as men to join the military in 1975. In theory this is accurate, but in reality there were few job specialties open for women in 1975. That fact changed over the period in question, and so in a sense, a higher proportion of the overall population became increasingly eligible as opportunity for women increased. However, because women were theoretically as eligible as men for the few positions they could occupy, the chart estimates the overall trend accurately in terms of pure age-based eligibility, which is the most relevant factor.

To account for the changes over time relating to Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores, medical issues, moral issues, appearance issues, etc., is well beyond the scope of this study. For the purposes of this examination, it is enough to say that enlistment standards and the overall United States population have increased, while the active-duty population has decreased. The effect of these demographic and qualitative changes over time is a decreasing trend in military eligibility. Less and less of the United States population is eligible to join the armed forces.

The effect of reduced eligibility to join the armed services is to further isolate a larger component of the population from the potential effect of enlisting. If decreasing spots to be filled continue to result in higher qualitative enlistment standards, (higher ASVAB scores needed to be competitive, etc.,) the likelihood of any particular individual joining the military services decreases. On a personal level, if there is less chance that an individual will be able to join the armed services, he is less likely to be interested in military affairs. Visualizing their lives in other endeavors, ineligible citizens are also less inclined to be interested in the fate of military personnel. Absent other motivations or opportunities for involvement, with decreasing eligibility comes decreasing interest in military and national-security affairs.
Figure 6: Ideal Enlistment Age Range Population and US Population

Figure 7: Ideal Age Eligibility Rate
Source: United States Census. The ideal age eligibility rate was calculated by dividing the ideal age range population by the total United States population.
The Veteran Political Representation Rate

Political leaders must balance two competing spending requirements, overseas and domestic. Overseas spending involves foreign policy, national security, and defense. Domestic spending involves production, redistributions, and entitlements among others. This dynamic is typified by the classic “guns or butter” metaphor, wherein the correct balance between long-term national security and wealth is perceived as a function of spending between the two primary categories. The “guns” part of the equation makes military service a desirable prerequisite for high political office. The decision whether or not to take the nation to war at any given time, because of the cost, risk, and overall gravity of the impending situation, is arguably one of the most important governmental functions. Inherent in the democratic social contract is the protection of the state and its inhabitants. A critical part of governing involves the preparation for and employment of force to this end.

According to John Nagl, author of *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, for most of United States history, a critical prerequisite for assuming high political office was to have served in the armed services because fighting was a regular part of the American experience.\(^2^3\) Fighting in the nation’s battles was a means of demonstrating leadership and commitment when it mattered most. Seventy-four percent of American presidents have served in the armed forces.\(^2^4\) Besides the two World Wars and interwar period, in which five presidents in a row did not have prior military service, for nearly every other period, military service was almost a requirement for office.

William T. Bianco and Jamie Markham conducted a study documenting implications of the decline of military experience in the United States Congress up to


They compared veteran political representation with expected representation based on the number of veterans in the population. They concluded that from 1900 to the mid-1990s, veterans have been overrepresented in Congress, and in the history of the United States only from the mid-1990s to the present have they been underrepresented. Their study was completed in 1999, but the trend they depicted continues to 2014. Although many have decried the decline of veterans in Congress, this study was the first to identify the under representation of veterans in recent Congresses and point to something beyond demographic factors as the explanation. Bianco and Markham point to three possible causes of this development. The decline may represent a widening ideological or attitudinal division between military personnel and political leaders. The decline may also result from the end of conscription, resulting in an “asymmetric decline in the probability of military service for the high-education, high socio-economic status individuals who typically run for Congress.” Because their analysis did not find veteran status affecting voting behavior, they also suggest that veterans’ Congressional influence is indirect and results from changes in congressional agendas, or the kinds of information and experience available to legislators.

The political representation rate is a metric that measures the amount of veterans as a percentage of the overall membership of the Congress, including both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The data on the Presidency is also presented for comparison, but not included in the rate. The metric is designed to demonstrate the degree to which the public values military service as a prerequisite for political leadership. While this rate has fluctuated throughout American history from as low as 20% to as high as almost 80%, from World War II until the beginning of the period examined it has been in the upper end of that range.

The rate is calculated by dividing the number of veterans in Congress by the total number of seats. This presents a percentage that depends only on the number of veterans elected. Because the seats in Congress are set at 535 and do not change as the population increases, each member represents an increasing portion of the population. This

calculation does not account for that increase in representation, nor does it attempt to control for the total number of veterans in the population. It is a pure percentage representation of veterans in Congress that has value as the establishment of a trend over time. Comparing veteran representation in 1975, 1995, 2000, and 2014, for example, displays the changing dynamic of this civil-military relationship on pure terms.

What does the data depict? Because one of the variables has remained constant and the other has decreased, the data reflects a decreasing rate that matches the decreasing values in absolute terms. As the number of elected veterans has decreased from a high of 412 out of 535 in 1977, to a low of 106 out of 535 in 2013, the rate has declined from 77% to less than 20%. As a rather steep decline, the rate decreased rapidly from 1977 to 1979, but then bounced back up in 1981. From 1981 to the present, the rate declined steadily and steeply. Although forecast to continue decreasing due to the declining veteran population, the rate has the potential to change dramatically at any point. Even the traditionally low veteran numbers of today offer innumerable opportunity for veterans to run for only 535 elected seats. Why the decline has been so steady, when it could have changed considerably every two years, is the operative question to ask in relation to the data presented.

Probably, non-demographic issues play a large role in explaining the decline. Because the decline in congressional representation is much steeper than the decline in the overall number of veterans over the same period, something other than demographic factors, such as the three explanations offered by Bianco and Markham, probably explains the trend. Regardless of the cause, however, the result depicts the decreasing importance of veteran status for civilian voters. Clearly, veteran status is less important for the vast number of American voters in 2014 than it was in 1977. This trend depicts a decrease in the civil-military connection between American voters and those they choose to elect.
Figure 8: Total Veterans in Congress

Figure 9: Veterans as President
Figure 10: Veteran Political Representation Rate
*Source: The Brookings Institute. The veteran political representation rate was calculated by dividing the annual number of veterans in Congress by the maximum number of seats, 535.*

**Evaluation**

All trends point to a decreasing civil-military connection in America. From 1975 to 2014, the participation rate declined by 57%, the veteran population rate declined by almost 48%, ideal age range eligibility declined by 28%, and veteran political representation declined by 75%. For the most part, all metrics showed consistency with regular decreases over the period. Although the amounts differed from year to year, they depicted lower annual values from the year before with only two exceptions. The veteran population rate exhibited a steep decrease followed by an increase back on slope in 1979, and eligibility exhibited a significant decrease from 1980 to 1995, and then fluctuated in a narrow band for the remaining part of the period. All four trends depicted less of a physical connection between American society and its military institutions every year from 1975 to 2014. That means each year the connection was lower than the previous year.

What explains the consistency? Considering that the United States population is a factor in three of the four metrics, and that it grew by approximately 1% annually, it is
the largest contributor to three of the four trends. The growing population magnified the
effect of smaller military services, decreasing amounts of veterans in society, and
decreases in ideal age range populations. The growing population did not affect the
veteran political representation rate, and cannot explain the significant decreases in that
rate.

The primary governmental decisions that caused the declines in participation and
veteran population rates were the reductions in force. By reducing the size of military
institutions while the population was growing, the government further decreased the
military participation and veteran population rates from what they would have been if the
overall military force size remained constant. A growing population should have been
able to support growing military institutions at an equivalent rate; however, as ideal age
range eligibility demonstrated, there was a decrease in the most important demographic
age range for military enlistment. This factor does not explain the decreases exclusively,
as there were ample 18-24 year olds to draw from to support a 1% growth rate. However,
it does point to the fact that population variances occur and, if unmitigated, can
potentially change trends. Absent a policy tying military size to population growth, even
a stable active-duty population size will result in participation and veteran population
rates decreasing over time.

While military institutions that vary in size based on their percentage of the
overall population may represent an ideal case for a consistent civil-military connection,
there are many other factors that play into decisions about the size of the military
establishment. The key point here is that a secondary effect of smaller military
institutions by percentage of the population is that they become more distant and less
socially influential. The declining veteran political representation rate may depict this
decreased influence over time, as American voters have elected fewer Congressional
members with military experience. The Bianco and Markham study suggested a widening
ideological division as one explanation for this occurrence, but provided little evidence
for this assertion.27 Were their claim to be accurate, the physical distance between the
military and society that was increased by the first three trends may be a contributing

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27 Bianco, “Vanishing Veterans.”
factor in the widening ideological division. As populations reduce contact with each other, they tend to grow apart.

**Conclusions**

This chapter answers the first of the research questions: *To what extent have the American people become disassociated from the country’s armed forces since 1975?* It argues that the extent of the disassociation is the extent of the decreasing physical connection between the two groups. Over the period 1975 to 2014, the four metrics evaluated pointed to an increasingly less connected civil-military relationship.

For the near future, all metrics are likely to continue their declining trends. Because the first three of the four metrics are based primarily on demographic data and a singular governmental decision relating to the size of the military, demographic forecasting and policy inclinations dictate continued decline. The fourth metric, the political representation rate, can change significantly every two years. However, it has not depicted noteworthy variation over the period, and is likely to maintain its decline or stabilize at a low level in the future.

While other civil-military theorists focused on other less tangible civil-military gaps, such as the different attitudes and beliefs of civilian and military elites, differences of opinion, cultural gaps, and political gaps, this examination anchored its argument in the physical ability of civil and military groups to interact. The coalesced data on military participation, veteran population, military eligibility, and veteran political representation rates, all metrics that measure overlapping identity or potential physical contact, provided the evidence. The rationale section explained the basis for this type of data and comparison as a determination of connectedness. Each of the metrics symbolize operative components of civil-military relationships on their own. Together, they combine to form a composite picture of a society less-connected to its armed forces.

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So what? There has been an outpouring of support for the troops by the American public since at least the beginning of the Global War on Terror. Given such support in light of a less connected relationship, about what present or future concerns should the nation be apprehensive? Perhaps the effects of societal-military disassociation are latent, or difficult to detect? The Global War on Terror began a trend of high operational tempo and employment that has not yet relented. The use of military force abroad has been a central component of the nation’s efforts to defeat terrorism. Considering that the length of recent conflict has stretched beyond historical precedent and the rationale for several interventions have occurred on newly established grounds, such as protecting other nation’s civilians from their government, perhaps a comparison of two contemporary phenomena involving the military will yield insight about a potential relationship between them.

The following chapter is constructed in parallel with this one. It attempts to conceptualize and measure the use of military force abroad by the United States over the same 1975 to 2014 period. By coalescing physical data on various components of war activity and comparing each of the metrics on an annual basis, the chapter establishes a series of trends that point to war proclivity or likelihood. The trends are combined into a composite picture of American use of military force. The data sets and the overall picture are then evaluated in light of those in this chapter.
Chapter 4

The Use of American Military Forces Abroad

*It’s become just too easy to go to war.*

—Admiral Mike Mullen

Considering that the war in Afghanistan is winding down in 2015 and most American ground troops have been redeployed to the United States or their overseas bases, why should anyone be concerned about the likelihood of continued American engagement overseas?¹ Or, why should anyone be concerned that the United States will persist in using military means to pursue terrorists, quell insurgencies in foreign countries, depose dictators, or otherwise assist allied and partner nations in the conduct of police actions? What can the past 39 years tell us about the proclivity of the government to go to war in 2016 or later? There are conflicting contemporary signposts pointing in both directions. As some forces return from Afghanistan, many stay; and deployments begin anew to Iraq.² As sequestration demands reductions in force, the threat of the Islamic State, the civil war in Syria, and Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq provoke

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discussions in Congress over a new authorization for the use of military force. The Director of the Joint Staff calls 2014 the most complex year since 1968, but critics question whether this is merely the result of having a larger staff to engage on more issues. Either way, key components of the government perceive that providing security for the nation is becoming more complicated. Are they increasingly relying on the employment of armed force to simplify the task of providing for the common defense?

While military leaders, Congress, and the President have conveyed the urgency of the situation to the nation since 2001, none have called upon the American people to take up arms against this imminent and continuing terrorist threat to American freedom. If the security situation demands a new authorization for the use of force, as is being discussed by political leaders in 2015, why has the nation not been warned that it may have to assume a war posture? Does the threat not warrant some increased level of mobilization? Most military planners accept the reality that war is unpredictable, uncertain, and exists in an environment of friction that makes accomplishing even simple objectives extraordinarily difficult. However, despite this understanding, over the last 14 years, war has been consistently chosen as the principal means with which to defeat terrorism. Does polarizing political groups into friendly and enemy camps, as conventional war-based frameworks necessitate, actually solve this problem? Or are the roots of terrorism too localized and complicated for external actors to understand? What domestic political relationship contributed to the choice of war, and for how long will it continue into the future? Although it is unanswerable, this far-reaching question underlies the examination in this chapter—the quantification of American military engagement abroad since 1975.

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The Quantification of War-Related Activities

How can war, low-level conflict, uses of force abroad, and the preparatory activities that enable military engagements be quantified in a simple and understandable manner? How can the threat and employment of force be measured in ways that provide a useful means of comparison? What are prudent and objective data-based measures of military involvement overseas that indicate the amount of war-related activities the nation engages in? What factors can be examined to develop a comprehensive picture of American proclivity to conduct foreign intervention? Sometimes war comes to a nation. However, for most of its history since at least 1898, the United States has gone somewhere else to war. Because of this particular situation, the quantity of United States military engagement can be conceptualized using a combination of physical data about decisions regarding use of forces overseas, deployments abroad, casualties incurred in foreign lands, and overall defense spending. A descriptive picture of American use of military force can be coalesced based on separate, but related, contributing variables, all of which can be measured consistently and compared over time.

The overall amount of war-related activities the United States has engaged in from 1975 to 2014 can be depicted using two measurable factors: engagements and cost. The first factor includes the number of discrete events. It also includes engagement magnitude, as a factor of type, size, length, and importance. However, magnitude is beyond the scope of this analysis. The number of annualized discrete engagements serves as a sufficient estimate of the first factor. The second factor includes the costs to the nation in terms of deployed forces, casualties, and spending.

Each of these factors reflects aspects of decision making about war. The choice to prepare for and employ force abroad is the operative factor, given that since 1975 no war has been imposed on the United States by foreign invasion. Instances of war-related activities are revealed by the occurrence of actual events. Those events, concrete observable incidents, are counted and combined in different ways by different organizations. Therefore, this chapter employs multiple methods to measure this dimension. The second factor represents indirect aspects, such as precursors and effects, of the decision to prepare for, and in some cases, engage in conflict. It includes tangible antecedents in terms of positioning deployments and budget allocations. It also includes
measurable results in terms of casualties incurred, dollars spent, and troops stationed abroad. The combination of all factors depicts a composite picture of the amount of overseas military engagement in which the nation has engaged. Other dimensions would thicken and alter the results a bit, but the point is not precise measurement as much as it is annual comparison and the revelation of trends over time.

This chapter illustrates the conceptual amount of war-related activities the United States has engaged in annually from 1975 to 2014. First, it establishes the rationale behind the methodology and the measurement basis for military engagement. Second, it presents and explains the collected data on the four different metrics. Third, it evaluates the data as a whole and depicts a composite picture. Fourth, it reflects on the significance of the findings.

**The Rationale**

War, as a state of armed conflict between political entities, is difficult to measure. For most of the United States population, it is an external, foreign affair. Other than the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 and a few other isolated events, war has not occurred on the territory of the United States for a long time. War in foreign lands is idealized and conceptual in the minds of those that do not have to fight it. It exists on television news programs and in photos. Most American citizens do not expect to experience the in-person trauma of blood-curling sounds, weapons, and killing; the sights of human ruin; or the smell of death, armament chemicals, and the concrete dust of demolished buildings. Most of America is spared from participating in this social mayhem and thus there is no driving research agenda to measure the precise amount of it the nation conducts.

**Measuring War and the Use of Military Forces Abroad**

Measuring the amount of war depends on how it is defined. One method breaks war into contributing components that depict distinct, concrete, measurable aspects of the overall concept. For the purposes of this paper, the term “war” is used loosely, but it generally accords with Clausewitz’s first definition of war, “an act of force to compel our
enemy to our will.”

Although the components examined may not independently reach an individual’s threshold for what constitutes an act of force, as contributing variables they help to measure the quantity of military forces utilized in war-related activities. For example, deployments do not constitute war on their own, but American military involvement in a foreign land is unlikely without service members deployed. Deployments, as concrete measurable facts, indicate aspects of war intention, preparation, and likelihood.

Another aspect of measuring war involves the decision to engage in it. This decision can be looked at from several viewpoints. The one taken here measures the number of distinct engagement decisions in any given year. In order to facilitate a time-based year-over-year comparison, cut-off points must be established. For example, if an intervention starts in December and does not finish until January of the following year, it will be counted as two occurrences because it crossed the end of calendar year cut-off point of 31 December. There are inaccuracies with this approach, but it does not need to be perfectly precise to provide a basis for an annual trend analysis.

The key factors that determine quantity in terms of the decision to engage in conflict are number of discrete events, and magnitude. Each of these factors can be looked at from several perspectives, defined in specific or indeterminate ways, and can be categorized to change the accounting. The number of discrete events can be counted based on the country the event occurred in, or events that cross country lines can be counted together as one event. Events can be distinguished by the deployment of additional forces, or they can be counted as one event for the whole year. If annualized, an event of one day counts as much as an event that consists of 365 days, as long as it spans only one calendar year. The size of each discrete event can be measured by the number of forces deployed, its cost, the amount of equipment dedicated, or by some other measurable aspect. The length of each event can be counted in days, months, or years. Events can be categorized by type, such as major combat, minor engagement, or a show-of-force using military equipment. The methodology could increase the value of events

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that last several years by multiplying them by a continuity factor. This would make longer engagements count more than shorter events.

While these problems of methodology are not easily resolved, they are simplified and mitigated by a time-based comparison of the collected data that reduces variation. For example, it is less important exactly how the data is accounted for as long as it is accounted for in the same way across the period of time. Consistency enables a comparative assessment of the data to itself over each year it is collected. It also enables sufficient fidelity to reveal trends.

Using three separate sources for the raw data also mitigates the variation in this type of accounting. Each of the sources incorporates its own threshold criteria for which events count. For example, for a war to count in the Correlates of War (COW) Interstate War database 1,000 battle deaths must have occurred. For it to count as reportable conflict in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database, the threshold is 25 battle deaths. No deaths are necessary for an engagement to count in the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute database or the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on instances of use of military forces.

This chapter uses the Congressional Research Service, the Correlates of War combined databases, and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program database to inform the analysis as to number of military engagements. For the purposes of this chapter, there is no minimum threshold to determine if an event counts as war or not. If by one of these organizations counting methodologies it counts, it counts. The idea is that each data stream is based on the same methodology over the time examined. There is no need to invent new criteria or compare the data from one to the other. Instead, by comparing each to itself over time, the trends can be discerned.

Geography separates the United States from most of the rest of the world. Two vast oceans complicate any potential invasion by European or Asian forces. Only the intercontinental ballistic missile nuclear threat of the 1960s, which was conceptual in nature and has significantly diminished since the fall of the Soviet Union, has had the ability to concern the public significantly.\(^7\) Because this threat was mitigated by a

\(^7\) For an in-depth analysis of the decision making that ameliorated the closest point at which the United States came to a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, and thus the widespread belief that the threat was
technological arms race and comprehensive strategy and reduced by economic prowess, the nation has not had to face a peer competitor on man-to-man terms.\(^8\) Thus, the predominance of armed forces have been deployed abroad.\(^8\) This has incurred cost, but has not caused any widespread feeling of vulnerability or lessened defense capability of the homeland. This is not the case for most other countries. The United States, and perhaps Great Britain, have depended on a forward-based deployment of forces to conduct police actions and a few large-scale conventional wars.\(^10\) As technology, transportation, and communication advance, this condition may not last, and it may not accurately reflect the cost of forward-deployed forces. Nevertheless, the current situation must account for these forces differently than those that reside in the continental United States (CONUS). This chapter argues that forward positioning of troops, whether to declared combat zones or postured for other purposes such as security cooperation, constitutes one aspect of the amount of war activities in which the nation is engaging.

The Cold War involved the forward deployment of United States ground forces in Europe even though battle did not occur. As such, the deployment of forces abroad can be used as an indicator of increased likelihood to conduct military intervention. In that sense, its measurement permits the comparison of changes in deployments over time and illuminates increases or decreases in this dimension of war proclivity.

One of the most indisputable measurements of war for any society is the number of its own forces killed or injured. Casualties are rigorously tracked and observed.\(^11\) American families are concerned with losing loved ones, and considerable effort is made to account for every single soldier. In modern times, very few become missing-in-action or otherwise unaccounted for.\(^12\) Casualties represent the human cost of providing security real, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2\(^{nd}\) Ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

\(^8\) This is the widely recognized Soviet and American nuclear arms race which resulted in a considerable amount of defense spending by both countries and contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989.

\(^9\) This will be evident in the deployment section.

\(^10\) For a brief history of war on the continent of Europe which both Britain and the United States participated in as forward-deployed forces, see Michael Howard, *War in European History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).


for the nation. They are the embodiment of selfless sacrifice for the greater good. American casualties contributed heavily to the public uprising and demonstrations against the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{13}

Since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force, casualties of war have taken on a new meaning, but they nevertheless command the attention of the government. Modern medicine has reduced the number of deaths, but resulted in the assignment of considerable wards to the state. Those that are significantly injured while fighting their nation’s battles are rightfully provided with lifetime healthcare. This is a difficult cost to forecast when the decision to go to war is made. The United States only recently finished paying the last injured survivor of World War I a few years ago, and some veterans benefits have been extended to family members as well.\textsuperscript{14} Casualties, especially deaths, represent the physical costs of the decision to go to war. Although financial considerations and equipment loss may have significant effects, the loss of human life is the most personal and troubling result of war. Technological superiority often promises to reduce one’s own casualties, but its secondary effects may contribute to additional ones, as it seems to make war less risky. This chapter argues that the number of casualties incurred is an important dimension of the amount of war in which the nation is engaging.

There is no agreed number of casualties that dictates an action is a war or something else. If casualties are incurred, the most significant costs are already accumulating. The way in which casualties increase or decrease from year to year is an important indicator of whether the nation is engaging in more or less war at any given time.

\textsuperscript{13} For a pointed study of how casualties affect opinion see Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura, “Race, Casualties, and Opinion in the Vietnam War,”\textit{The Journal of Politics}, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), 115-146. Available at \url{http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647600}. Also, for an example of popular perception regarding casualties and the Vietnam War see \url{http://thevietnamwar.info/vietnam-war-protests/}. “The protests against the war started to shoot up when body bags returning to American kept increasing.”

Government spending on overseas contingency operations is another dimension of the amount of war activities in which the country is engaging. Logically, as spending goes up, more war can be conducted. As spending goes down, less can be conducted. Although this might seem simple, because of changes and overlaps in war-related specific funding such as overseas contingency operations, the overall budget simplifies the accounting of spending. It accurately reflects items such as the monetary costs associated with increased logistics and supply, combat replacement, transportation, and the increased consumables of engaging in combat or conducting presence operations abroad.

Spending on military preparation, operations, and presence abroad is not free. It comes from taxes levied on the American people. The United States armed forces do not have the ability to fund major or continuous overseas operations from existing budget allocations. Deployments, combat operations, major movements of forces, and other war-related costs must be covered by funds beyond the normal operating allocations. Congress provides these additional funds in different ways. The financial cost of war is evidenced by increased defense spending, whether it is accounted for in the increased base budgets of the military services or the newly established overseas contingency operations funding mechanism. Either way, overall defense spending serves as a rough estimate that compared to itself on an annual basis, results in a trend.

**The Data**

This section presents and explains the collected data on number of engagements, deployments, casualties, and spending.

**The Engagement Rate**

The engagement rate is a numerical accounting of the separate uses of military force each year. What counts as a use of military force? How are uses separated into distinct countable categories? These questions are answered by different organizations in different ways. The Congressional Research Service; the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute, Inter-state war, and Extra-state war databases; and the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program database contribute the data for this examination. They all collect and coalesce data under different assumptions and guidelines.

In the 20th century, researchers began to accumulate systematic data on war and conflict. Kristine Eck of UCDP cites Pitirim Sorokin in 1937, Quincy Wright’s *A Study of War* in 1942, Lewis Richardson’s *Arms and Insecurity* and *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* in 1960, as well as what became the seminal conflict data effort, J. David Singer and Melvin Small’s Correlates of War project, which began in the mid-1960s. She describes how the emergence of databases has led to debates on what the definition of war and armed conflict should be and how different organizations have adopted different approaches for different purposes. These developments have also led to debate regarding how to collect and coalesce data on this subject. Eck also describes the main uses of war databases for policy. The first is to construct lists of ongoing conflicts. The second, and the use of data in this paper, is to create trend lines to understand conflict patterns.

**Congressional Research Service.** The Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides authoritative, objective, and nonpartisan analysis to the United States Congress, committees, and members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, regardless of party affiliation. It works exclusively for Congress and has been in existence for over 100 years. Congress relies on CRS to assemble, evaluate, and present resources that encourage their critical thinking and help them form sound policies. Because Congressional decisions guide the nation, CRS utilizes a variety of perspectives and attempts to examine all sides of issues. CRS is a credible source that provides useful reports.

The CRS report entitled, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2014” is an annual report that lists “hundreds of instances in which the United States has used military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential

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conflict to protect United States citizens or promote United States interests.”

It does not include deployments for occupation, security cooperation activities, or overseas basing of troops. It differs in regard to the instances included from other lists because of differing judgments about what constitutes a military action, where it occurred, and how actions are counted. The judgment and methodology used to produce the report has changed over time, as researchers have changed. However, since 1980 most instances have been reported in the summaries provided to Congress by the President as a result of the War Powers Resolution. This requirement has resulted in greater consistency. The author of this report used additional resources to marshal information about instances of military use including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the White House.

The 2014 CRS report is the work of one named researcher, although it builds on the work of previous reports. The information it provides is based on public reporting by various agencies and is in a narrative list format. The instances reported vary in size, significance, duration, and authority. Some were large operations, such as World War II, and some were small actions involving only a few sailors and Marines to protect American lives and property. No consistent accounting of these factors is made in the list, although some are reported in great detail and some are listed without any detail at all. Because it covers the years 1798-2014, and includes all reported instances of the use of military force abroad, the report serves as a suitable source to count the annual number of United States military engagements that occurred in the period of study, 1975-2014. However, because of the way the data is presented, counting is not simple.

The data set derived from the CRS report reflects the following assumptions. It includes an accounting of instances by country and by year. It excludes multiple reports

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of use in the same country during the same year. By so doing, it amalgamates any use in
the same country as part of the same usage, and separates out uses in multiple countries
as distinct instances. It prioritizes counts by country more than by operation. By so doing,
it attempts to control for multiple reports of the same event in a particular country in the
same year. It also counts titles of operations that were country-ambiguous, such as
“terrorism threat,” as one instance. Over the years 2006 to 2011, countries were not well
indicated. Instead, a line was inserted such as the following: “combat equipped and
combat-support forces were deployed to a number of locations in the Central, Pacific,
European, and Southern Command areas of operation.” In such cases, each region was
counted as one instance, assuming that each listed region included an instance in at least
one country. Also, if maritime interdiction operations were specifically identified but not
tied to a country, they were counted as one instance. Also, Iraq and Afghanistan were not
mentioned in a few years when it was common knowledge that there were ongoing
operations in both. Three additions were made in order to account for this deficiency:
Afghanistan was added in 2006, and Iraq was added in 2007 and 2008.

The data overall reflects the biases of the researcher, her sources, and her
methodology, as well as this method of quantifying it. Counting the reported instances
consistently was challenging. The level of precision is not high, but it nevertheless
demonstrates a rough depiction over time from the perspective of the United States
government and how it views the number of instances of the use of armed force abroad.

**Correlates of War.** The Correlates of War (COW) project facilitates the
collection, dissemination, and use of data related to war. It adheres to standardized
principles of data collection including replication, reliability, documentation, review, and
transparency. The COW website is an interactive forum for the correction of errors, for
the posing of questions, and for international relations scholars to contribute to the project
in various ways. It is an exemplary data collection enterprise that supports war-related
data research and the application of such research to scholarly disciplines. The present
study of civil-military relations utilizes the same cumulative-science approach that COW promotes in international relations.\textsuperscript{20}

COW not only measures the temporal and spatial variation in war, but also attempts to systematically identify factors that explain the variation. It measures national features such as capability, alliances, geography, and polarity, among others. By defining war, establishing clearly defined concepts, common variable usages, and permitting research to be replicated, COW datasets support international-relations study, as well as other forms of scholarship.\textsuperscript{21}

COW datasets are available on a wide variety of war-related topics. This chapter uses the Militarized Interstate Dispute, Inter-state War, and Extra-state War datasets to count the number of military incidents the United States has been involved in since 1975. Because the counting methodology used in this chapter combines the three datasets into a single stream, counted incidents range from small-scale employments of military force to participation in wars that have incurred 1,000 battle deaths.

The assumptions differ between the datasets. Inter-state wars occur between state members of the international system. COW defines inter-state war as “sustained armed combat between two or more state members of the international system which meets the violence threshold…[of] sustained combat involving regular armed forces on both sides and 1000 [military] battle fatalities among all of the system members involved. There is no fixed time in which these deaths must occur.”\textsuperscript{22} Extra-state war takes place between a state and a non-state entity. COW defines it as “sustained combat between a state member of the international system and a political entity (not a system member) outside of its territorial boundaries that meets the violence threshold of 1000 [military] battle-related fatalities per year.”\textsuperscript{23} The Inter-state and Extra-state War databases include the COW definition of war as: “sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities…within a twelve month

\textsuperscript{22} Eck, “Beginner’s Guide to Conflict Data,” 29.
period).”\textsuperscript{24} The Militarized Interstate Dispute database does not have that requirement. “A militarized interstate dispute involves the threat, display or use of force short of war by one state, explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property or territory of another state.”\textsuperscript{25} Both types of datasets are typically used for “occurrence” studies.\textsuperscript{26} The datasets also include a number of other variables such as dates, duration, fatality estimates, participants, regime type, etc., but those are beyond the scope of this analysis. Because COW data is prepared for statistical analysis, counting distinct events is simple. It involves differentiating United States events from other country events and counting them over the period, 1975-2014.

**Uppsala Conflict Data Program.** The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is another one of the preeminent data sources for studying global armed conflict. Its purpose is similar to that of the Correlates of War, “to collect information on selected variables relating to armed conflict for research on various aspects of the origins, dynamics, and resolution of conflict.”\textsuperscript{27} Its accuracy and frequent use by contemporary researchers indicate that it meets the strict standards of scholars around the world. Its definition of armed conflict is less strict than COW’s definition of war and is becoming a standard, as low-level conflict research is becoming more prevalent. UCDP provides a variety of datasets on organized violence and peacemaking, which can be accessed from their interactive website. Some are updated annually. UCDP data on armed conflicts is published annually in several reports including *States in Armed Conflict*, the SIPRI Yearbook, the Journal of Peace Research, and the Human Security Reports.\textsuperscript{28} UCDP researchers conduct theoretically and empirically based analyses of armed conflict, as well as its causes, escalation, spread, prevention and resolution. Similar to the COW project, UCDP data supports a cumulative-science approach that enables replication.

\textsuperscript{27} Eck, “Beginner’s Guide to Conflict Data,” 58.
\textsuperscript{28} Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Data Publications, accessed 14 Apr 15, available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/publications/data_publications/.
According to the UCDP website, the studies conducted by their researchers and those that use their data are regularly featured in international journals and books.29

The UCDP dataset used in this section is the UCDP/PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo) Armed Conflict Dataset, which includes information on armed conflict where at least one party is the government of a state. It covers the period 1946 to 2013. It defines armed conflict as “contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”30 UCDP data is maintained in a presentation suited for statistical analysis. Counting the relevant instances of United States use of military force in armed conflict required only that the records with United States participation were sorted and counted for the years 1975-2013.

While the counting of CRS data depended on the subjective criteria and the assumptions previously outlined, both COW and UCDP data counting is without bias. Both precisely reflect the assumptions of the datasets. COW reflects a high standard for war definition, inclusive of a 1,000 battle-death requirement. Since COW began as a data collection tool to study war in the 1960s, rather than armed conflict or low-level violence, some of its datasets remain influenced by this high standard. However, by combining the COW war-based datasets with the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset, a comprehensive dataset that includes both minimal uses of military force and those that reflect the high standard can be created. The resultant COW data stream in this section includes both types of instances of the use of military force. The UCDP dataset reflects a relatively contemporary and less-stringent definition of armed conflict. It does not cover the full spectrum of the use of military force because it omits any use that does not reach the 25 battle-death standard. Because each data stream consists of a comparison against itself over time, the value of the data is determined by the significance of trend lines. The counting methodologies are sufficiently similar that the range of occurrences reported in any given year is within a narrow band (0-20). The three trends are illustrated on one graph so that the similarities and differences between them can be seen visually.

29Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Program Overview, accessed 14 Apr 15, available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/program_overview/.
Figure 11: CRS, COW, and UCDP Instances of Use of Military Force Abroad


Table 1: CRS, COW, and UCDP Period Averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CRS</th>
<th>COW</th>
<th>UCDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975–1990 average</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–2000 average</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 – End average</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period average</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Congressional Research Service, Correlates of War Project, Uppsala Conflict Data Program. The averages in this table were calculated by arithmetic mean. The values for each sub-period were added and then divided by the number of years in each sub-period. While the sub-periods are not equal, the points that were chosen were natural breaks in the data that also corresponded within a year of one, or several, major world events in international affairs.

What does the data show? Dividing the overall period along the natural points in the data, which also correspond to significant real-world events, permits an analysis of averages over three sub-periods. The significant developments that mark the end of the sub-periods include the fall of the Soviet Union beginning in 1989 and completing in 1991, as well as the Gulf War with deployment of American forces beginning in 1990 and redeployment occurring after combat operations the following year. 1991 is the natural point of transition to the 1990s, which reflect a decade of behavior different than the decade and half sub-periods post and prior. The 1990s end in 2000. The 2000s commence in 2001 with the 11 September terrorist attack on the United States. 2001 to the present reflects the sub-period of the ongoing American Global War on Terror. Changing the dividing years by one year forward or back would not change the relationship of the data. The numbers could be a little less stark, but the overall trends would be nearly the same.

CRS data demonstrates peaks just before or during initial combat engagements, such as in 1983, 1991, 2003, and 2011. It demonstrates valleys afterwards, when ongoing operations in the same theater continue. The former tendency is most evident in the 2006 to 2008 period when counterinsurgency operations in Iraq required a surge of additional
troops and ongoing operations in Afghanistan steadily but slowly increased. Overall, CRS depicts an increasing trend which is strongest in the 2000s.

Because the source of CRS data is internal government reporting, it tends to be skewed toward new events and occasionally foregoes the reporting of ongoing operations. If initial reporting had already mentioned deployments and engagements in a particular region and no significant developments occurred, the ongoing operations may not be reflected in subsequent years in the CRS report. The data shows that most events are reported every year, but the notable absences of Afghanistan in 2006 and Iraq in 2007 and 2008, (reconciled in the data used for this paper) indicate that there may have been other ongoing instances that did not make the reporting and were not caught by the researcher.

CRS averages depict a steady increase over the whole period, with 1975-1990 below average, 1991-2000 about average, and 2001-2014 almost double the period average. There is considerable variation in each sub-period. Overall, however, the averages signify a steadily increasing trend.

COW averages depict very little change over the entire period. 1975-1990 is average, 1991-2000 is just above average, and 2001 to 2010 is just below average. Average variation is only .5 to .6. As a result, COW does not indicate a significant increase or decrease in military engagements over any sub-period, or the whole period of examination.

COW also shows some notable peaks in some of the same years as CRS, but has a few others as well. Strangely, COW seems to demonstrate two main high points, 1983 and 2000, but otherwise illustrates a steady average across peaks and valleys. COW does not indicate an increasing or decreasing trend.

One peculiarity from COW assumptions evident in the data, especially in the 2000s, is the lack of accounting for extra-state conflicts that do not have 1,000 battle-deaths. COW data includes militarized interstate disputes between states that do not have the 1,000 battle-death requirement, but those must occur between two states. The extra-state war category must have 1,000 military battle-deaths annually, which neither Iraq or Afghanistan has reached, in order to reach the threshold for reporting in that category. Thus, because of the COW assumptions developed in the 1960s and only modified for
new datasets, rather than being completely renovated, there remain significant categories of conflict that are unaccounted for in the COW methodology. While COW data indicates a steady number of engagements over the period examined, were the COW assumptions to be modified with a less stringent definition of war, such as the use of military force for any purpose, the data would surely show an increase in the 2000s, if not before.

UCDP data exhibits small peaks in 1983, 1989-1991, 1999 and then rises for the remainder of the 2000s. Visually, its increasing trend toward the end of the period is clear. UCDP averages also depict an increase, evident in the final sub-period, and therefore an increase overall. However, no increase is detected until the 2000s. 1975-1990 indicates about one-fifth the average number of instances, while 1991-2000 indicates one-sixth the average number of instances. 2001 to 2013 indicate an increase of almost three times the overall period average.

UCDP illustrates the increasing number of engagements in the 2000s that have included battle deaths. Because the counting methodology of UCDP requires 25 battle deaths, a small number, but a number nonetheless, it does not account for all significant military engagements. No American troops died in the effort to protect civilians in Libya from March to October 2011. Thus, UCDP does not report this significant military event. Overall, UCDP reflects an increasing trend which is most evident in the 2000s, even considering the known omissions as a result of the necessity for 25 military battle deaths.

Because two out of three counting methodologies demonstrate that the number of reported engagements is increasing since 1975, such an increase constitutes the principal conclusion. None of the organizations’ counting methodologies is ideal for the purposes of this examination. The assumptions under which each operate include cut-off points that accord with the particular interests of the organization. COW is influenced by its definition of war, CRS is inclined towards new developments because it is based on governmental reporting, and UCDP incorporates a small number of battle deaths with no mechanism to account for conflict that does not meet that requirement.

Also, the number of annual engagements is only one metric demonstrating one dimension of quantity. As can be seen in the data, the number of distinct engagements does not indicate the magnitude in terms of size of deployment, length of conflict, type of engagement, or importance of event. A more comprehensive examination would
investigate each instance on multiple dimensions at the same time and in so doing more precisely determine quantity. However, such an effort is beyond the scope of this work. A rough estimate that points to a defensible trend is sufficient. Overall, the data strongly suggests that the number of American military engagements have increased steadily from 1975 to the present.

**The Deployment Rate**

The deployment rate is a physical metric of how much of the active-duty force is deployed abroad. It includes foreign-based troops, a presence of which has remained in Europe, Japan, and Korea since the end of World War II and the Korean War. While hostilities are not necessarily ongoing, the basing of American troops in foreign locations involves presence, posture, and preparation for potential engagement. It also indicates a level of war anticipation that is potentially only precluded by the presence of troops as an indication of an intent to defend by fighting. Foreign basing, regular deployments on ships, rotations to austere bases, and the numerical changes in such deployments over time indicate another aspect of military engagement abroad.

Because some foreign basing remains constant over the period, this component of the deployed force contributes to a baseline deployment rate. Above this constant baseline rate, changes depict a trend. Although some foreign basing decreases and combat deployments fluctuate over the period, for the purposes of this examination only the rough trends are needed. Therefore, different types of deployments are not specified or weighted in importance in the quantitative data. Only the overall number of deployed forces is tracked.

The United States has forward-deployed forces for all of its engagements since 1975. Because deployed forces were mainly the ones engaged, the number of forces deployed at any given time is an indicator of likely engagement. Although the baseline includes permanent overseas basing, the changes in that baseline as a result of additional deployments for combat or other purposes over time indicate the trend that establishes the slope of the deployment rate. The trend reflects a dimension of potential war quantity and proclivity.
The total number deployed is presented next to the total number of active-duty service members in order to illustrate the rate in absolute terms before it is calculated in relative terms. The deployment rate is calculated by dividing the number deployed by the total number of personnel on active-duty. As a rate, it indicates the percentage deployed at any given time. It also indicates the utilization and the operational tempo of the armed forces.

The deployment rate constitutes a useful point of comparison. Because it is measured annually over the period, it depicts change over time. Although one might argue it represents either over or under utilization at particular periods, the primary value of the deployment rate in this study is in the way the rate changes. Increasing deployment rates indicate increased utilization of potential for use of active-duty forces. Decreasing deployment rates indicate less deployments per service member, less utilization, and thus, less likelihood of engagement in conflict.

Deployments are indicators of war proclivity. For deployed service members, they constitute time away from the United States under orders. If they take place on the territory of another state, deployments are either conducted under politically agreed status of forces agreements, or by force.\footnote{R. Chuck Mason, “Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?,” Congressional Research Service Report, March 15, 2012, accessed 14 Apr 15, available at \url{http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf}.} However or wherever deployments take place, they are conducted under strict legal and political guidelines and involve orders normally signed by the Secretary of Defense.\footnote{Charles A. Stevenson, \textit{SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense}, (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2006), 88.} Deployments, however low in intensity, regular in occurrence, or normalized they have become, are considered preliminary steps in conducting a forward defense. Thus, deployments are not only an indicator of potential war, they constitute the first physical manifestation of the decision to use military forces abroad for any purpose.

What does the data depict? From the 1975 to 1990 Cold War period, the size of the active-duty force was a little over 2 million service members with approximately 500,000 deployed at any given time. This yielded a constant deployment rate of about 25\%, with most forces stationed in Europe, Japan, or Korea on presence missions. From 1991 to 2000, the size of the active-duty force decreased with the post-Cold War
drawdown, but so did the number of forces deployed. Thus, even with the reduction in force the deployment rate declined to an average of about 17%. From 2001 until 2011, the active-duty force remained at similar manning levels of about 1.4 million, but the deployments increased back up to Cold War levels of 500,000 annually. This caused the deployment rate to spike between 2002 and 2003 with rates between 35% to 40% from that point until 2011. Additionally, the deployments during that period were primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan as combat deployments rather than presence missions.

Overall, the data shows an increasing proclivity to use a smaller number of forces at a higher utilization rate for a longer period of time. This trend may indicate an increase in the likelihood of continuing to use military force abroad. Although quantity declined in the 1990s, the types of deployments in the 1970s and 1980s, with a few minor exceptions such as Grenada, were primarily presence missions. The 1990s demonstrated a lower number of presence missions as a result of the end of the Cold War. There was a small spike in the number of deployed troops in 1990-1991, which should be represented as a larger spike in the data; but the way the deployments were counted seems to deemphasize short-term deployments such as those for the Gulf War. 33 The 2000s exhibit the high deployment rate of the Global War on Terror, where a force about half the size of the Cold War military establishment conducted a higher (10-15%) and more combat-intensive deployment rate over a period of 9-10 years. 2011 marks the last year of greater than 30% deployment rates in the late 2000s. The trend declined to 22% in 2014. The decreasing trend of the last three years examined is due to the pullouts of large formations of ground forces in Iraq in 2010 and Afghanistan in 2013-14.

Recent debate about maintaining more than the agreed upon 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan, new deployments to Iraq in 2014 and 2015, and shows of force in Europe as a result of Russian annexation of Crimea and unconventional war in Ukraine

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33 Approximately 700,000 troops deployed for the Gulf War, but the data doesn’t depict this surge. An excerpt from another study on troop deployments highlights a similar anamoly in different data, “Even the Gulf War of the early 1990s barely registers much of a change in troop numbers, simply because the hostilities were over quickly and U.S. forces went home rapidly after Iraqi forces were pushed out of Kuwait.” Tim Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005” The Heritage Foundation Website, National Security and Defense Research, accessed 14 Apr 15, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2005.
complicate confidence that the decreasing trend will continue. Overall, data on deployments exhibits an increasing trend over the period with especially high rates in the 2000s and with some evidence of decline in the last three years.

Figure 12: Active-Duty Population and Total Personnel Deployed

Figure 13: Deployment Rate

Source: US Census, Military Times, and Defense Manpower Data Center. The deployment rate was calculated by dividing the total deployed each year by the active-duty population that year.

The Casualty Rate

Casualties are the manifestation of the violence of war. Battle deaths are an essential component of the definition of war and armed conflict. As described in the analysis of engagement rates, different conceptions of war incorporate different ideas about casualties. Two scholarly organizations define particular conceptions of war and armed conflict with a specific number of casualties as one side’s military battle deaths. The Correlates of War project uses 1,000 battle deaths and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program uses 25 battle deaths. Used in a broad sense, casualties can refer not only to fatalities, but also to wounded and displaced, whether friendly, enemy, military, or civilian. When used in a specific sense, casualties sometimes denote only military killed or wounded in action. For the purposes of this statistical comparison, the figures on United States military deaths by hostile action or terrorist attack are used. For the qualitative explanation, additional casualty figures with specifying nomenclature add amplification and depth.

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35 The Correlates of War project uses 1,000 battle deaths and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program uses 25 battle deaths.
The casualty rate is a physical metric that represents the human cost of war. On the friendly side, the objective is to keep casualties as low as possible. Regarding the enemy, body counts have been used as evidence of success in attrition warfare. The logic therein is that if enemy die at a faster rate than can be replenished, time will eventually determine victory. Another way of looking at attrition involves the comparative aspect of strength. If enemy die faster than friendly, time will dictate victory once friendly strength exceeds enemy strength by some factor. Regardless of the exact way in which it occurs, body counts have been used as metrics of success in all types of warfare. Although the importance of tracking this attritional component as a telling outcome of battle has waned in popularity in the current era, it remains an important aspect of war. Friendly casualties are meticulously tracked and made available to the public.36

Casualties are presented in two forms. First, the absolute numbers are illustrated. This graph depicts the annual amount of United States forces killed in combat. It does not represent the number of deployed military deaths, which also include death by other means such as accident, sickness, and suicide. It also does not include deaths in the continental United States from training accidents or other events relating to deployment preparation. Instead, the numbers represent the annual military deaths that occurred as a result of hostile action or terrorist attack.

Casualties are also presented as a percentage of number of deaths by hostile action per 100,000 service members on active duty in each year. This presentation accounts for the decreasing size of the active-duty force. It displays the data in a manner that increases the effect of battle deaths as a factor of the size of the force. Larger forces can absorb more casualties, while smaller forces will be more affected by fewer deaths. Graphing battle deaths as a percentage of force size attempts to control for the decreasing size of the active-duty force and depict the increasing degree losses have on the force.

The casualty rate is useful as a point of comparison. Measured annually over the period, it depicts change over time. Although Libya in 2011 demonstrated that it is possible for war to occur without friendly deaths, it is the exception rather than the

Mortal combat seeks to kill adversaries. Neither side is immune. Battle deaths indicate the undeniable evidence of war occurrence. Although numbers of friendly casualties are extraordinarily important to families of active-duty service members and thus the domestic war effort, they are not necessarily a direct reflection of intensity. High-intensity military operations have been conducted with an unexpectedly low number of casualties, such as the Gulf War in 1991. And, terrorist attacks such as Beirut in 1983 have claimed hundreds of lives, when it was not anticipated that large-scale loss of life was imminent. The casualty rate indicates the cost in blood, more than the intensity of combat. The way in which the casualty rate has changed over time depicts the costs of engaging military forces in conflict, and is thus an indication of the amount of the use of military forces abroad.

What does the data depict? The two presentations do not differ in shape. This indicates that the amount of deaths in relation to the size of the active-duty force is not significant. The number of deaths spiked in 1983 with Lebanon and Grenada, in 1991 with the Gulf War, and again in 2001 with the 11 September terrorist attacks on American soil. The pre-2000 spikes evidence short-term conflicts and their limited casualties. Between 2002 and 2003 the line turns almost vertical due to combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It rises to an annual total of 735 in 2004. It maintains an annual high in the 700 to 800s until 2007 when it declines by approximately half over

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37 There is no public reporting of any American battle deaths regarding the coalition and NATO military operations in Libya from March to October of 2011.
38 For an example of one quotation among many by the CENTCOM Commander regarding the anticipation of high casualties in the Gulf War in 1991, “There had been speculation that in those initial waves of aircraft, our casualties could have been as high as 20%. Which given the type of operation it was, compared to the type of operation that had occurred in other wars, would not have been extraordinarily high casualties. So when the reports are coming back in from Chuck Horner saying, you know, 100% of all the aircraft to date have returned, and we have only lost one aircraft of so many aircraft, the thousands of sorties that were going out that night, I mean you know, there was just a feeling of wonderment.” General Norman Schwarzkopf, The Gulf War: Oral History, Public Broadcast Station Website, accessed 15 Apr 15, available at [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/schwarzkopf/1.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/schwarzkopf/1.html).
the 2008 to 2010 period. There is not a steadily increasing trend over the whole period. The most significant increase occurs from 2002 onward. Using battle deaths as the primary metric for this dimension of war quantification, the 2000s demonstrate the costs of an increasing American proclivity to engage in the use of military force abroad.

While total casualty data is available coalesced by operation and type (total, killed-in-action, non-hostile, pending, and wounded-in-action), and updated by the Department of Defense daily, annual and other specific data is not as easily obtained.\textsuperscript{40} The Defense Manpower Data Center also maintains a comprehensive website with casualty data, but its annual breakdown has only been updated to 2010.\textsuperscript{41} Nevertheless, a brief recounting of total casualties for recent operations adds to the comparative value of annual data on death by hostile action. Despite the lack of annualized data on wounded in action for statistical comparison, overall figures are provided as qualitative evidence.

In Iraq and twelve surrounding areas, total United States military deaths for Operation Iraqi Freedom (17 March 2003 to 31 August 2010) and Operation New Dawn (1 September 2010 to 15 December 2011) were 4,491. Total killed-in-action were 3,529. Total wounded in action were 32,244. After three-and-a-half years away from Iraq, Operation Inherent Resolve (7 August 2014 to 23 March 2015) began anew with operations against the Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria. It has incurred only three non-hostile deaths and one wounded in action so far.\textsuperscript{42}

Total military deaths in Afghanistan, but also inclusive of fifteen other geographically diverse areas under Operation Enduring Freedom (7 October 2001 to 31 December 2014), and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (1 January 2015 to 23 March 2015) are 2,355. Total killed in action are 1,845. Total wounded in action are 20,067.\textsuperscript{43}

In summary, since war began in October 2001 until 23 March 2015, a total of 6,846 military service members have lost their lives in operations. 5,374 have been as a result of hostile action. Additionally, 52,311 service members have been wounded in

\textsuperscript{40} The Department of Defense maintains a casualty statistics website that is updated daily. It is available at \url{http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{41} Defense Manpower Data Center, Defense Casualty Analysis System at \url{https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties.xhtml}.

\textsuperscript{42} Department of Defense Casualty Website, 23 Mar 2015, \url{http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{43} Department of Defense Casualty Website, 23 Mar 2015, \url{http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf}.
From the year 2000, until September of 2014, there were 128,496 cases of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 307,282 cases of Traumatic Brain Injury, and 1,573 major limb amputations. Over the previous 20 years (prior to 2000) that the annual data covers, only 602 active-duty deaths have been attributed to hostile action or terrorist attack. Notable years include 1983 when 263 lives were claimed by terrorist attack and 1991 when the Gulf War claimed 147 active-duty lives.

Figure 14: Total US Service Member Deaths by Hostile Action or Terrorist Attack
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center. The figures were generated by adding the number of United States service members killed by hostile action and by terrorist attack. These two categories preclude counting the deaths in the accident, homicide, illness, self-inflicted, pending, and undetermined categories. Comparison with other reports would likely yield differences due to some using total annual military death numbers. Defense Manpower Data Center, Defense Casualty Analysis System, Summary Data, Active Duty Military Deaths by Year and Manner, accessed 15 Apr 2015, available at https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_by_year_manner.xhtml.

Figure 15: Number of Active Duty Deaths by Hostile Action or Terrorist Attack per 100,000 Service Members on Active-Duty

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center and US Census. The casualty rate was calculated by dividing the number of active-duty deaths by hostile action or terrorist attack, by the active-duty population divided by 100,000.

The Spending Rate

The spending rate is a numerical metric of how much the nation spends on its defense and overseas operations. It represents the monetary cost of both potential and actual war. It also indicates the tradeoffs in future wealth and domestic quality of life that the nation is willing to make for the purposes of security. The governmental appropriation process is complicated, changes over time, and includes myriad overlapping considerations of what counts as war funding versus regular military operations.\(^{47}\) No attempt is made to extract war funding from regular defense funding in

this study. Instead, only Office of Management and Budget total figures for overall
defense spending are used to estimate a rough trend since 1975.

This data is presented as total defense billions of dollars, total as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and total spending per service member. The first
presentation depicts absolute values, the second relative values, and the third shows
values as they relate to the number of military personnel on active duty.

Three transformational factors characterize the data over the period. The first is
the emergence of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973 through the present, the second is the
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the third is the Global War on Terror. Each of
these policy choices increased defense spending despite the drawdowns after the Vietnam
War and the Cold War. Although the nation has grown in size and wealth, the military
establishment has decreased in personnel. This tendency has been compensated by other,
potentially more expensive, means. Similarly, although state-based and other existential
threats to United States security have decreased, terrorism has increased, and along with it, the will to intervene abroad has increased as well.

The All-Volunteer Force requires recruiting, ample pay, and bonuses to attract
and retain personnel. Coupled with an increasing requirement for skilled operators due to
the reliance on high technology, recruiters must attract high-quality recruits who are more
educated and have higher moral standards than were necessary in the past. This costs
money and manpower to find, screen, process, and prepare high-quality recruits from a
smaller pool of eligible potentials. These high-quality recruits require higher pay. The
military competes with industry for manpower and must maintain comparable salaries or
risk losing talent to higher-paying employers.

The Revolution in Military Affairs is the overarching construct used to describe a
transformation that began in the 1980s and continues to the present day. The RMA
exploits high technology for military advantage. Instead of using mass, manpower, and
attrition, the RMA advocates employing technological superiority of speed, precision,
intelligence, and communication to outfight and outmaneuver any adversary. It was
arguably used to great effect in Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003.\textsuperscript{48} Although the

\textsuperscript{48} For well-balanced and concise description of the RMA see, Gary Chapman, “An Introduction to the
Revolution in Military Affairs,” Paper Presented at the XV Amaldi Conference on Problems in Global
insurgencies that developed after 2003 became problematic for this new American way of war, the RMA continues to offer military advantages. However, the cost of technical superiority is high. As a result, funds are spent on advanced equipment rather than investing in additional personnel. The RMA has contributed to the increasing cost of military forces over the period under review. In 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld built support for his budget requests, and thus his technological approach to war, with an article in *Foreign Affairs.* The following excerpt describes the increased costs associated with this effort:

Over the next five years, we will increase funding for defense of the U.S. homeland and overseas bases by 47 percent; for programs to deny enemies sanctuary by 157 percent; for programs to ensure long-distance power projection in hostile areas by 21 percent; for programs to harness information technology by 125 percent; for programs to attack enemy information networks and defend our own by 28 percent; and for programs to strengthen U.S. space capabilities by 145 percent… defending the United States requires prevention and sometimes preemption. It is not possible to defend against every threat, in every place, at every conceivable time. Defending against terrorism and other emerging threats requires that we take the war to the enemy.

Fighting the Global War on Terror using the advanced equipment of the RMA is expensive. As of 1 January 2014, Congress approved funding appropriations for 13 years of war that total 1.6 trillion dollars. These funds include military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and Iraqi security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veteran’s health care. Most of the funds were allocated to

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49 The following quotation serves as the challenge and solution as the United States Secretary of Defense perceived the RMA. “Our challenge in the twenty-first century is to defend our cities, friends, allies, and deployed forces -- as well as our space assets and computer networks -- from new forms of attack, while projecting force over long distances to fight new adversaries. This will require rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint forces, capable of reaching distant theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly and with devastating effect. This will also take improved intelligence, long-range precision strike capabilities, and sea-based platforms to help counter the "access denial" capabilities of adversaries.” Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, accessed 15 Apr 2015, available at [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58020/donald-h-rumsfeld/transforming-the-military](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58020/donald-h-rumsfeld/transforming-the-military).

support Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn, with only 5% for war-designated funding that was not directly related to the wars. The 1.6 trillion dollar figure does not include the new requests submitted in November 2014 for Operation Inherent Resolve and efforts against the Islamic State.\textsuperscript{51}

Advocates of the technological perspective on warfare argue that over the long run, a high technology force is cheaper and more effective than a large manpower force. High-tech precision attack from long distances can destroy key nodes and achieve greater effects at lower levels of risk than large formations of troops. Also, when ground personnel are absolutely necessary, elite Special Operations Forces are capable of quick strikes and avoid the prolonged commitment of large force packages.\textsuperscript{52}

The spending rate is useful as a point of comparison. Measured annually over the period of study it depicts how much the government is willing to spend on defense. Total dollars indicate absolute changes in overall defense spending, unadulterated by what percentage was incorporated in base budgets, versus emergency supplements. Percent GDP indicates how the same defense spending numbers relate to the overall economic performance of the country. Per-service-member spending figures indicate defense spending represented by the number of service members on active duty, which shows the cost per person. Changes in these trend lines point to increases or decreases in war-related activities.

What does the data depict? Total defense spending increased from 96 billion dollars in 1975 to 313 billion dollars at the end of the Cold War in 1990. Percent GDP increased from a low of 4.5% in 1979 to a high of 6% in 1983 and then declined to 5% in 1990. Over the same period, defense spending per service member increased threefold, from $46,000 to $153,000. From 1991 to 2001, total defense spending increased only marginally, $289 billion to $322 billion, while Percent GDP declined from 5% to 2.9%. Spending per service member increased from $153,000 to $225,000. From 2001 to 2014, total defense spending increased from $321 billion to a high of $751 billion in 2011 and


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then decreased to $650 billion in 2014. Similarly, Percent GDP increased from 2.9% to 4.7% and then declined to 3.5%. Per-service-member spending more than doubled from $231,000 to $527,000 in 2011. It remained at approximately $500,000 thereafter.

In absolute terms, the spending data illustrates an increase in spending associated with the Cold War, a leveling off during the 1990s, and a steep increase in the 2000s with the Global War on Terror. Considering that the overall economic performance of the country did not increase at a faster rate than the increase in defense spending of the 2000s, there is a corresponding increase in spending as a percentage of GDP in that period. However, the lower percent GDP of the 2000s versus the 1980s, indicates that the economy was producing at a higher rate in the 2000s than it did in the 1980s, when lower total levels of defense spending occurred at a higher rates of percent GDP. In absolute terms, the spending rate depicts increases in spending over the period, with indications of the rate lowering or leveling from 2011 into the future. This is offset, however, when GDP is considered. Although there was a rise in the mid-1980s and again in the mid-2000s, the overall trend from 1975 to 2014 has been down from roughly 5% to roughly 3.5%.

![Figure 16: Total Defense Expenditures in Billions of Dollars](image-url)
Figure 17: Defense Outlays as a Percentage of GDP
Source: Office of Management and Budget. The White House, Office of Management and Budget Website, Historical Tables, Table 8.4—Outlays by Budget Enforcement Act Category as Percentages of GDP: 1962-2020, accessed 15 April 15, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals/. The differences between outlays and expenditures vary by up to .4 in a few years. Nevertheless, the trends in the data follow the same pattern.
Evaluation

With the notable exception of the sub-category of defense spending as a percentage of GDP, all four rates increased over the period 1975 to 2014, but not all exhibited consistency in their increases. A general upturn occurred between 1975 and 2014, but there were downturns and leveling patterns in components of several individual rates, especially in the 1990s. The data points to a composite increasing trend in the use of American military forces overseas that it is best represented by the sub-period breakdown corresponding to major international events.

From 1975 to 1990, engagements increased incrementally, deployments were high, casualties were relatively stable at a low rate with one spike in 1983, and spending increased, especially as a function of GDP. During the 1990s, engagements were level, deployments declined, casualties were stable with one spike in 1991, and spending leveled off in absolute terms, but declined as a percentage of GDP. From 2001 to 2014, all rates increased considerably until 2011, and then leveled off or exhibited small declines.
Evaluating each of the rates independently over the period as a whole, projecting them into near future, and then combining them together results in a similar finding as the initial judgment—an overall increase. For engagements, CRS and UCDP exhibited increasing trends with the most consistent numbers in the 2000s. The COW engagement rate did not exhibit an increasing trend, although it may have if it factored in extra-state war that did not incorporate the 1,000 battle-death standard. Although there is no way to forecast new engagements in the future, high numbers of ongoing engagements reflect a possibility of continuation. Indicators of some forces remaining in Afghanistan and new deployments to Iraq could presage a continuation of high engagement numbers for the near future. These new deployments could slow the decline that was indicated in the latter portion of the 2000s. The deployment rate exhibited an increasing trend over the period, but with lower rates in the 1990s and especially high rates in the 2000s. Although there is evidence of decline in the last three years of deployments, there are also contemporary indications of new deployments growing. The casualty rate exhibited a few spikes during notable conflicts and a significant increase from 2002 onward. There is no increasing casualty trend over the whole period, but the significant increase in the 2000s is notable, as are the high numbers of wounded in action and traumatic brain injuries. The spending rate depicts an increase in spending associated with the Cold War, a leveling off during the 1990s, and a steep increase in the 2000s with the Global War on Terror. The especially steep increase in spending per service member evidences the impact of increased spending on equipment rather than additional personnel.

What explains this finding? The Global War on Terror began shortly after the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 and is the main unifying theme that ties the number of distinct engagements, deployments, casualties, and spending together with the significant increases exhibited by all rates in the 2000s. Although simplistic in explanation, this campaign is unlike any previous war. Considering the campaign has almost no geographical boundary nor timeframe, it has the potential to continue to absorb threats under its banner of fighting terrorism for the near future.

The primary governmental decisions that caused the increases relate to the decision to deploy forces for the purposes of preparing, threatening, or engaging in conflict. 1983, 1991, and 2001 to 2014 are all critical periods that reflect the decision to
use force in a material way. Although each of those periods do not reflect a spike in all of the rates, they do reflect spikes in engagements and casualties, indicating the employment of forces in combat. Spending and deployment decisions take longer to materialize and sufficiently explain the character of the decade sub-periods as unique periods of particular military activity different from each other, i.e. Cold War, 1990s drawdown, and Global War on Terror.

**Conclusions**

This chapter was constructed in parallel with the previous chapter. It has sought to measure the use of military forces and quantity of war-related activities the United States engaged in from 1975 to the present. By collecting and compiling data on preparations and results, which included the number of military engagements undertaken, deployments of troops, casualties incurred, and defense expenditures, the chapter illustrated a series of trends that were evaluated on an annual and a periodic basis. Coalescing the trends into a composite picture of the use of military forces abroad, the chapter found that most but not all indicators have increased over the period 1975-2014.

Measuring war is a difficult enterprise. The rationale section explained the series of metrics used to quantify physical aspects of the use of military forces overseas. Additionally, it argued that a measurement of war quantity on such terms was also a measure of war proclivity. The argument followed the logic that by counting and comparing component parts, i.e. antecedents and results, one could combine different, but related, data streams together to develop an overall quantification of war. Comparing the data over time yielded trends that pointed mostly to increases, although decreases and stasis were also evident. Coalescing the data streams together produced a composite picture that depicted a generally increasing trend, most evident in the 2000s. A more comprehensive examination would have incorporated additional components, reached a higher level of precision, and revealed further insight. However, it is unlikely that additional metrics would have fundamentally changed the trend that was revealed.

This chapter generated a basis for an answer to the second research question by establishing the second leg of the overall argument. It permits the comparison of the findings in this chapter with those of the previous chapter. Chapter 3 concluded that
American society has become increasingly disassociated with its military over the period 1975 to 2014. Chapter 4, this chapter, concluded that the likelihood of the United States to use its military forces also increased over the same period. By establishing this second component, it prepares the ground for the following chapter, Chapter 5, to conduct an evaluation of the potential relationship between these two empirically established observations.
Chapter 5

Evaluating the Relationship

*What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?*

—Madeleine Albright to Colin Powell

When making decisions on the use of military forces abroad, political leaders are charged with an immense responsibility. The nation’s wealth, security, moral bearing, and international standing are all at risk. Preparatory deployments of ready forces to overseas locations reassure allies of American support, but they also risk more facile employment of American forces in crises or conflicts. Elevated defense spending may influence the nation to use the expensive forces it has invested in for purposes beyond their original charter.¹ Forces designed for national defense can be employed to conduct crisis action abroad as an additional means of justifying their cost. Innumerable factors play into political decision making on the use of military forces overseas. While isolating a causal variable in the civil-military realm related to such decision making would be a major contribution to the study of political science and to civil-military relations, it is beyond the scope of this analysis. Instead, this chapter focuses on whether a relationship between any of the examined datasets exists and whether it is sufficiently significant to warrant additional research. Does the increasing lack of social relationships between citizens and soldiers indicated in Chapter 3 relate to the increasing ease with which political leaders use military forces abroad indicated in Chapter 4, or are they unrelated phenomena that merely happen to be trending in parallel?

Thus far, the paper has established two empirically supported findings, answered the first research question, and established a basis on which to answer the second. The first finding is that American society has become increasingly disassociated from its

¹ Reference the title quotation for an example. Speaking with other political leaders regarding the crisis in Bosnia, Madeline Albright is known to have made the statement to Colin Powell, “What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?” Michael Dobbs, *Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth-Century Odyssey*, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), 360.
military institutions from 1975 to the present. This result was supported by evaluating the changes in demographic data over time and illustrating the changing connection on physical grounds. The second finding is that over the same period political leaders have increasingly used military forces overseas. This finding was supported by data depicting changes in the number of American military engagements over time, as well as antecedents and results of such use of military forces. The first two findings establish the basis for investigating the second research question.

The second research question guides the evaluation in this section and attempts to link the two legs of the overall argument. To what extent has a disassociation between the American people and the country’s armed forces contributed to the willingness of political leaders to employ military forces overseas? Comparing the data from Chapter 3 with the data from Chapter 4 is one way to identify a potential relationship between the two phenomena. Statistical analysis assists with this process. Bivariate regression analysis estimates the empirical relationship between two variables. Multivariate regression analysis estimates the empirical relationship between one dependent variable and several independent variables. Logic and reason must be applied to statistical analysis to ensure that any identified correlations are not spurious. Even if a causal connection can be logically inferred from two variables and statistical analysis estimates a high correlation between them, both could be explained by a third variable that was not part of the analysis. Because it is virtually impossible to examine all possible variables or isolate experiments from external forces in social science, statistical comparison estimates potential relationships between variables; but it cannot explain the nature of the connection between them. Statistical tests will identify the direction and strength of correlations between the data, but logic is required to make the connection.

The following section presents the findings of a statistical regression analysis of the data from Chapters 3 and 4. While only the suggestive results are presented, it evaluates whether any correlations between the data are significant, insignificant, or indeterminate. It also explains why such correlations may be meaningful. By doing so, it answers the second research question and links the previous two chapters together.
Statistical Analysis

Several key correlations link the data from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Using a bivariate regression model to compare the individual data streams to one another, Figure 19 presents binary relationships, direct or inverse, and the numerical strength of correlation between datasets. The correlations estimate the amount that the movement in one dataset predicts movement of another dataset. The range of possibilities are from -1 to 1. The closer to 1 on either side, the stronger the correlation between the data. The closer to +1 the stronger the positive or direct correlation. The closer to -1 the stronger the negative or inverse correlation. As an example, the veteran rate and eligibility rate exhibit a strong positive correlation of .802. This means that as the veteran rate decreases, so does the eligibility rate. The veteran rate and defense spending rate exhibit a strong negative correlation. This means that as the veteran rate decreases, the defense spending rate increases.

While bivariate analysis cannot link the datasets to one another, it can indicate that they move together. As two rivers heading downhill seem to be related, it takes determining the source of each river to detect whether they are separate flows or two legs of one greater river. Comparing the movement of the two streams to one another cannot reveal a common origin or a causal relationship, but it can measure how closely their movement is aligned. Identifying a causal factor is especially difficult in analyzing social phenomena in which it is nearly impossible to isolate variables or analyze all possibilities. However, discovering that data streams move together in significant ways is nevertheless an important finding.

Figure 19 depicts a significant amount of high correlations between the data. The data from both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are positively correlated with much of the other data from each chapter respectively. For example, each of the data streams from Chapter 3 is positively correlated with the other data streams from Chapter 3 (highlighted in yellow in Figure 19). This indicates not only that they move in the same direction, as illustrated by the charts in Chapter 3, but validates the chapter’s argument that they explain different components of the same phenomenon. Chapter 3 established the logical

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2 The statistical regression analysis was conducted by Ms. Sophie Ryan, Air University, Barnes Center Program Manager. Additionally, interpretation of the results was informed by her expertise. Ms. Ryan utilized the Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS).
basis for the argument and the regression results confirm expected relationships by exhibiting strong statistical correlations. If the chapter’s data streams were not positively correlated, one might question how well they relate to the phenomenon they aspire to explain, the increasing disassociation between American society and its military.

Similarly, the data from Chapter 4 exhibit comparable results. The data streams are positively correlated with the chapter’s other data streams (highlighted in yellow in Figure 19). This furthers the logical inference that much of the chapter’s data explains the increasing use of military force. Again, the strong statistical relationship does not establish this fact; but it adds support to the explanation demonstrated in the chapter.

Many of the data streams from Chapter 3 are significantly and inversely correlated with the data streams from Chapter 4 (highlighted in green in Figure 19). This indicates that the data pointing to a declining relationship between American society and its military institutions correlates with data depicting an increase in the use of military forces abroad. The inverse relationship was expected as a result of the trends depicted in each chapter. However, even though the analysis attempted to connect the variables from Chapter 3 with Chapter 4, the strength of the statistical correlations between many of the datasets was striking.

Two anomalies in the data warrant mention. The Correlates of War engagement rate exhibits extremely low and insignificant correlations with all of the rest of the data (highlighted in pink in Figure 19). It does not move in conjunction with other indicators of the use of military forces and it does not move inversely to indicators from Chapter 3. Previously mentioned challenges with this dataset, i.e. the COW use of a high standard of battle deaths for war, especially the type of extra-state war that has characterized much of American conflict since 1975, the low standard for militarized interstate disputes, and no accounting for low-level conflict between states and other political entities that does not reach the 1,000 battle-death standard, has probably caused a COW dataset to be created that does not well describe the use of American military force abroad. Logical problems in the assumptions underlying the collection of data are further illuminated by statistical comparison. The COW engagement rate is surprisingly different from both the CRS engagement rate and the UCDP engagement rate as evident in Figure 11, Chapter 4. The statistical analysis further indicates that the COW engagement rate is problematic and
potentially inaccurate. To prevent it from biasing the data, it is not considered in additional statistical analysis.

Another anomaly that was removed from the statistical analysis to prevent it from skewing the data was the participation rate. The participation rate and the veteran rate exhibited multicollinearity in preliminary statistical tests. An indicator of this is a Pearson Correlation above .90—the value for this pair is .937. Collinearity statistics from a multiple regression (Figure 20) also validate this finding. Tolerance should be above .1 and VIF should be below 10 for the variables to be used as distinct estimators. Multicollinearity means that the variance in the data is so close that they are statistically nearly the same variable. Because there is a chance that both variables may explain the same phenomenon, it is wise to separate them or remove one from further analysis. For this reason, the participation rate was removed from the analysis in Figure 19 and from all subsequent regressions.

The veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rate all exhibit strong correlations with the CRS engagement rate, the UCDP engagement rate, the casualty rate, and the defense spending rate. This means that three of the metrics from Chapter 3 estimate the movement in four of the metrics from Chapter 4. This bears out the hypothesis that the data may be related. It does not establish how the data are related. Only rational inference, i.e. a logical chain of potential causality can achieve the higher standard of explanation related to how the data are related. Still, high correlations add to the evidence that there may be a relationship between the data that further study could reveal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation Significance</th>
<th>Veteran Rate</th>
<th>Eligibility Rate</th>
<th>Veteran Political Rep Rate</th>
<th>CRS Engage Rate</th>
<th>COW Engage Rate</th>
<th>UCDP Engage Rate</th>
<th>Deploy Rate</th>
<th>Casualty Rate</th>
<th>Spending Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Veteran Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.802** .000</td>
<td>.956** .000</td>
<td>.797** .000</td>
<td>0.079 .645</td>
<td>.680** .000</td>
<td>-.354* .029</td>
<td>-.629** .000</td>
<td>-.925** .000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.823** .000</td>
<td>.675** .000</td>
<td>0.200 .272</td>
<td>-.289 .109</td>
<td>.056 .762</td>
<td>-.259 .160</td>
<td>-.547** .001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran Political Rep Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.816** .000</td>
<td>0.014 .935</td>
<td>.745** .000</td>
<td>-.360* .027</td>
<td>-.634** .000</td>
<td>-.873** .000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS Engage Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.126 .473</td>
<td>0.645** .000</td>
<td>.162 .331</td>
<td>.381* .035</td>
<td>0.637** .000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COW Engage Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.044 .295</td>
<td>0.342 .134</td>
<td>-.262 .134</td>
<td>.286 .200</td>
<td>-.183 .286</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP Engage Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.722** .000</td>
<td>0.822** .000</td>
<td>.886** .000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.838** .000</td>
<td>.607** .000</td>
<td>0.763** .000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.763** .000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending Rate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Figure 19: Bivariate Regression Model with Pearson Correlations and Significance
Source: Statistical Analysis

Figure 20 represents the first multiple-regression analysis. It used the deployment rate as the dependent variable with the participation rate, veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rate as independent variables. As previously noted, the regression identified multicollinearity between the participation rate and the veteran rate variables (highlighted in red). While the participation rate has been removed as an independent variable, the veteran rate should have the same explanatory power. Though the veteran rate and the veteran political representation rate (highlighted in green) look problematic, the high correlation is due to strikingly similar patterns of representation over the years—they both descended at about the same rate.
Figure 20: Multivariate Regression Model with the Deployment Rate as the Dependent Variable

The second multiple-regression analysis used CRS engagements as the dependent variable with the veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rate as independent variables. An ANOVA model, or Analysis of Variance model, tests the “overall fit of a linear model. In experimental research this linear model tends to be defined in terms of group means and the resulting ANOVA is therefore an overall test of whether group means differ.” It utilizes an F-Ratio, which is the “ratio of the average variability in the data that a given model can explain to the average variability unexplained by the same model.” In other words, an ANOVA test determines the explanatory power of the model itself. In the ANOVA results for this regression the usage shows how well the model fits the data. The Significance of .000 (the lower the value, the stronger the result) and the high F-ratio speak to the overwhelming explanatory power of the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients^a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 21: ANOVA with CRS Engagements as the Dependent Variable with Veteran Rate, Eligibility Rate, and Veteran Political Representation Rate as Independent Variables

The second multiple-regression analysis used CRS engagements as the dependent variable with the veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rate as independent variables. An ANOVA model, or Analysis of Variance model, tests the “overall fit of a linear model. In experimental research this linear model tends to be defined in terms of group means and the resulting ANOVA is therefore an overall test of whether group means differ.” It utilizes an F-Ratio, which is the “ratio of the average variability in the data that a given model can explain to the average variability unexplained by the same model.” In other words, an ANOVA test determines the explanatory power of the model itself. In the ANOVA results for this regression the usage shows how well the model fits the data. The Significance of .000 (the lower the value, the stronger the result) and the high F-ratio speak to the overwhelming explanatory power of the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANOVA^b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 21: ANOVA with CRS Engagements as the Dependent Variable with Veteran Rate, Eligibility Rate, and Veteran Political Representation Rate as Independent Variables

4 Field, Discovering Statistics, 786.
Further, the linear combination of the veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rates account for .596 (or 60%) of the variance in the CRS engagements (Figure 22). This is evident in the R Square value, (highlighted in green) which represents how close the data are to the fitted regression line and thus how well the data fit the model. In this regression, the linear combination of veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rate account for 60% of the reason for CRS engagement frequency.

![Figure 22: Multivariate Regression Summary for CRS Engagements as the Dependent Variable with Veteran Rate, Eligibility Rate, and Veteran Political Representation Rate as Independent Variables](source: Statistical Analysis)

A further review of the regression results shows that of the independent variables, the veteran political representation rate is individually statistically significant (Figure 23). With a significance of 0.048, there is a less than 5% chance that the variations in the CRS engagement rate are not being influenced by changes in the veteran political representation rate.

![Figure 23: Multivariate Regression Correlations for CRS Engagements as the Dependent Variable with Veteran Rate, Eligibility Rate, and Veteran Political Representation Rate as Independent Variables](source: Statistical Analysis)

The third multiple-regression analysis used UCDP engagements as the dependent variable with the same three predictors of veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran
political representation rate as independent variables. Again, the ANOVA indicates the model is a good fit for the data with a Significance of .000 (Figure 24).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Regression</td>
<td>48.122</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.041</td>
<td>35.655</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>12.597</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60.719</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), VPOLREP, ELIGRATE, VETRATE  
b. Dependent Variable: UCDP Engagements

Figure 24: ANOVA with UCDP Engagements as the Dependent Variable with Veteran Rate, Eligibility Rate, and Veteran Political Representation Rate as Independent Variables

Source: Statistical Analysis

The R Square value of 0.793 is even more striking. It indicates that the linear combination of veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rate account for .793 (or almost 80%) of the variance in the UCDP Engagement rate (Figure 25). In other words, these three variables, taken together, explain 80% of the reason for UCDP Engagement frequency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Summary</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
<th>R Square Change</th>
<th>F Change</th>
<th>df1</th>
<th>df2</th>
<th>Sig. F Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.890</td>
<td>.793</td>
<td>.671</td>
<td>.783</td>
<td>35.655</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), VPOLREP, ELIGRATE, VETRATE

Figure 25: Multivariate Regression Summary for UCDP Engagements as the Dependent Variable with Veteran Rate, Eligibility Rate, and Veteran Political Representation Rate as Independent Variables

Source: Statistical Analysis

A further review of the regression results shows that of the independent variables, veteran rate and eligibility rates are individually statistically significant (Figure 26). With a significance of 0.007 and 0.000, respectively, there is a very small chance that the variations in UCDP engagements are not being influenced by changes in the veteran rate and the eligibility rate.
In summary, the various statistical analyses yield striking correlations. Most of the data follows the predictable patterns expected from the analysis in the previous chapters with the exception of two anomalies and surprisingly strong correlations. The participation rate is statistically problematic because it is so highly correlated with the veteran rate that it may skew analyses with both variables included in the same model. Additional testing beyond the scope of this paper is required to determine why this might be the case and how to mitigate it in further statistical tests. The COW dataset is problematic, as was suspected by the flaws in its counting methodology identified in Chapter 4. It neither corresponds to the other engagement rates, nor exhibits consistency in comparison with any of the other data. As for the strong correlations, three datasets from Chapter 3 exhibit strong correlations with four of the datasets from Chapter 4 in the bivariate regression analysis. The veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rate all correlate strongly with the CRS engagement rate, the UCDP engagement rate, the casualty rate, and the defense spending rate.

Three significant findings resulted from the three multivariate analyses conducted. The first identified multicollinearity between the participation rate and the veteran rate. The second identified the veteran political representation rate as the strongest predictor of CRS engagements within a linear model of veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rate that together account for 60% of the variance in CRS engagements. The third identified the veteran rate and the eligibility rate as strong predictors of UCDP engagements within a linear model of veteran rate, eligibility rate, and veteran political representation rate that together account for 80% of the variance in UCDP engagements. Overall, three of the predictors from Chapter 3 exhibit statistically
significant relationships with four of the data streams in Chapter 4. Much of the data that
depicts an increasing relationship between American society and its military is related to
most of the data that depicts an increasing use of military forces overseas.

**Conclusions**

What does this mean in terms of the second research question? *To what extent has a disassociation between the American people and the country’s armed forces contributed to the willingness of political leaders to employ military forces overseas?* The statistical analysis yields significant correlations between the two groups of data. However, such correlations are insufficient to establish causality or rule out other explanations. Correlational relationships on their own are an insufficient basis to link the data from the two chapters together. Nevertheless, the surprisingly strong correlations demonstrate the validity of the arguments previously made in both chapters and support the potential for a connection between them.

The collection, evaluation, and logical presentation of data determined defensible cases for an increasing disassociation between American society and its military institutions, and an increasing use of American armed forces abroad. Statistical analyses compared the data from both cases and produced a strong indication that there could be a connection between the cases. However, a third, yet undiscovered variable, might better explain all of the data collected thus far. Because of an inability to isolate dependent variables from innumerable independent variables, and the lack of a logical causal chain from the data in Chapter 3 to the data in Chapter 4, a clear answer to the second research question remains elusive. Thus, it is indeterminate whether the increasing disassociation between American society and its military has contributed to the willingness to use military forces overseas.

Social phenomena are difficult to evaluate. Nevertheless, they can be powerful political forces that explain national proclivities. Nationalism is widely cited as the force that resulted in the levée en masse and the million-man army of France’s Napoleon Bonaparte. It is the force credited with influencing newly established citizens to take up
arms voluntarily in World War I.\textsuperscript{5} It is suspected that the lack of personal connections between American citizens and soldiers contributes to public apathy and thus uninformed but implied consent regarding the government’s increasing use of military forces in limited conflicts abroad. In the past, such uses of force called for conscious agreement and participation of the much of the nation’s population. This paradigm perceives the lack of involvement by large portions of the population as a contributing factor in the increasing use of force. While a past paradigm informs this viewpoint, this chapter has not demonstrated evidence to support the relationship’s being a causal factor. Instead, it serves as only one possibility among many, that coupled with the strong statistical relationships between the data, support the conclusion that the chapters could be related. In other words, they are \textit{not unrelated}.

This analysis has not conclusively established a connection between the data from chapters 3 and 4 that is supported by logical chain of causality. Therefore, the connection between the argument that American society is increasingly disassociated with its military and the argument that military forces are increasingly used abroad, remains indeterminate. Such a connection cannot be discarded, as there is strong statistical evidence that there could be a relationship between the two phenomena. There is, at minimum, a strong statistical relationship between the data that support the two arguments. But, tracing the connection between social occurrences is more involved than the depth of the analysis in this paper. As a result, the conclusion that remains is indeterminate. Nevertheless, as noted above, they are \textit{not unrelated}.

Chapter 6

Conclusions, Prognoses, Policy Implications

In formulating basic military policy and in deciding when and how to employ force, the state no longer requires consent, direct participation, or ongoing support of citizens. As an immediate consequence, Washington’s penchant for war has appreciably increased, without, however, any corresponding improvement in the ability of political and military leaders to conclude wars either promptly or successfully.

—Andrew J. Bacevich

Conclusions

This paper asked two main questions. First, it asked to what extent the American people may have become disassociated from the country’s armed forces since 1975? Second, it asked to what extent such a disassociation may have contributed to the willingness of political leaders to employ military force abroad over the same period? The approach attempted to tie the study of a key civil-military relationship, the societal-military connection between citizens and soldiers, to a broader political matter, the use of American military forces overseas.

The study began with two observations. The first involved a significant change in civil-military relationships that occurred in the post-World War II era. From the founding of the nation until the Second World War, citizen-soldiers were the nation’s principal armed servants. Conscription was employed, especially in times of war, to man the force. From World War II until the end of Vietnam, conscription ensured legislated levels of Manning. Then, due to the opposition to the Vietnam War by part of the citizenry and especially their forced participation in it, conscription was ended and a new kind of force was built. The institution of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, considered a positive development for the professionalism and effectiveness of the American military establishment, fundamentally changed the citizen-soldier dynamic.

The second observation involved the frequency with which the nation has used its armed forces abroad. The Global War on Terror, which began in 2001 and has not yet
ended, provoked the initial investigation. However, many of this war’s antecedents go back to 1991, or even before. Three sub-observations characterize the troubling nature of this consistent state of military intervention abroad: the citizens fighting have been few; a large portion of society has been uninvolved; the overall cost to the nation has been high; and the strategic effectiveness of military forces to accomplish desired political objectives has been questionable. On this last point, American military forces have demonstrated tremendous tactical prowess and operational savoir faire in the conventional portions of recent campaigns. But the efforts to counter terrorism and insurgency and to stabilize volatile regions of the world has been disappointing. The irregular components of warfare have not been mastered. Whether that has been a political failure of resourcing and overly optimistic objectives, or a military problem of failure to reorganize for unfamiliar kinds of war, is yet to be determined. Either way, the decision to engage in this type of campaign takes place at the nexus of civil and military affairs, and it has been made with increasing frequency since 1975.

These two main observations led the author to an investigation of civil-military relations, which uncovered four main findings: the dominance of Samuel Huntington’s theory; a focus on “civilian control” as the main problem in the field to the detriment of other aspects of civil-military relationships; the lack of data-based research, and indications of discord in the contemporary environment, despite overt expressions of support for service members by non-military citizens.

Chapter 2 explained Huntington’s theory and its effects on contemporary thought, especially military service members. Huntington emphasized military professionalism and the existence of a separate military sphere of activity. He claimed that civilians should institute “objective control,” wherein the military is afforded a degree of exclusivity in its sphere. Huntington argued that professionalism would keep military officers from engaging in other political matters. Despite the contemporary adherence to this line of thinking, it is in many ways a contrary viewpoint of Washington, the founding fathers of the nation, and almost two-hundred years of civil-military entwinement in American political affairs.

Since Huntington, several civil-military relations scholars have critiqued his argument and his viewpoint. Their critical analyses provided much of the context for the
Theoretical challenges in the field and illuminated the primary focus of civil-military relations, which has been almost exclusively control, or more specifically—how to maintain civilian control of military institutions. By reviewing several relevant critiques, the chapter traced the argument over military professionalism from Huntington’s assertions, through Finer’s disputation, Janowitz’s refinement, and Feaver’s modification, to the point at which it intersects military effectiveness or the social, political, and cultural sources of organized violence.

The investigation also revealed that civil-military relations lacks available databases for empirical research on a central component of the field, civil-military relationships. More mature fields of political science have well-established data repositories. The lack of civil-military data challenges researchers to start from the beginning. While opinion surveys are used prolifically, the lack of data on civil-military relationships, such as the rough datasets created in Chapter 3, probably explains the low use of inductive research designs. Finding, collecting, and coalescing data in a consistent way is time-consuming, but necessary for the fidelity and precision needed to conduct comparative analysis. While this was identified as a challenge in the overall field, this study attempted a way forward by utilizing a rough, but data-grounded, design.

Chapter 2 also placed this study in the context of similar work that has already been done. The themes used throughout the paper are credited to Andrew Bacevich, Eliot Cohen, Donald Abenheim, and Emile Simpson, among others. These four scholars questioned the utility and consequences of Huntington’s effect on civil-military policies in the United States, especially in the current environment. The lack of external consequences for United States military intervention since 1991, such as those that were undeniably present during the Cold War, may have exacerbated the effect of a form of civil-military relations that has served to further disconnect war from the people.

Chapter 3 established a means of measuring the association between American society, primarily non-military civilians, and the United States military establishment, namely the individual soldiers that serve in the armed services. It argued that such a relationship could be measured by collecting data on two physical factors and comparing that data over time. Because military activities are separated from the rest of society, the two factors that characterize the physical connection between the two groups are
The intertwining and proximity. The overlapping social groupings of individual citizens and soldiers provide the main opportunity for contact and exchange. The percentage of those that have experienced military service is a key metric in this regard, as it measures the degree to which members of a sub-group make up the overall group. Contact and exchange are necessary for members of social groups to make meaningful associations and identify with members of other groups. This takes place when members of the two groups are in the same place at the same time and have the chance to get to know each other. Thus, this study attempted to collect data on the physical closeness of civilian populations and military bases at a level below the continental United States. Unfortunately, the data could not be collected and coalesced in the time available. As a result, all demographic, population-based data was measured on a national scale. This reduced the level of precision, but did not noticeably reduce the significance.

Data streams on military participation, the veteran population, military eligibility, and veteran political representation in Congress were used to represent different dynamics of the physical association between American society and its military personnel. The findings include the following: over the period studied, the participation rate declined as a result of better policy decisions reducing force size, coupled with population growth. The same policy decisions and population trends caused a declining veteran rate as well. Military eligibility, as a function of ideal enlistment age, declined because the ideal age range did not grow at a corresponding rate as the overall population. Other related evidence on eligibility also pointed to the increasing qualifications (higher levels of education, physical fitness, medical qualification, and moral soundness) desired as force sizes were reduced and recruiters could be more selective. According to several recruiting studies, much of America’s youth population exhibits contrary characteristics to those desired by the military services, so the preferred population in the ideal age range is estimated to be only 25% of those in the range. Veteran political representation in Congress declined steadily since 1975. Current levels of military veterans in Congress are among the lowest the nation has ever seen. Demographic data alone does not explain this occurrence. Military service may no longer be an important prerequisite, nor necessarily a desirable quality, for high political office.
Evaluating the four decreasing trends resulted in a defensible answer to the first research question. On the physical grounds evaluated in Chapter 3, American society has become increasingly disassociated from its military institutions since 1975. In absolute terms, and especially as a percentage of the population, fewer American citizens have experienced military service. As a result, fewer American citizens will come in contact with either active or past service members. In percentage terms, fewer citizens will experience service in the near future due to increasing eligibility requirements and smaller force sizes. Fewer political decision-makers have personal military experience in peacetime or wartime. They are increasingly in a less informed position to legislate on such matters. By answering the first research question in Chapter 3, the study enabled an examination of the second research question beginning with Chapter 4 and finishing with Chapter 5.

Chapter 4 established a means of measuring the amount of use of American military forces abroad from a wide perspective of what equates to such use. It presented and measured distinct engagements from three separate sources, as well as the other indicators of deployments of forces, casualties, and defense spending. The chapter argued that the combination of different quantitative dynamics, actual uses of forces in both war and lower-level engagements, combined with the precursors and effects of usage, would suffice to depict an overall comprehensive conception of the use of military forces abroad. Measuring the different dynamics over time would result in findings of increases, decreases, or stasis. The data and results could then be compared with the data and results of Chapter 3, in order to provide a basis on which to answer the second research question.

Engagements were measured using the data from three organizations. The Congressional Research Service resulted in clear increases over the period. The Correlates of War data was problematic due to definitional problems and categorization. It depicted fluctuation without a decipherable trend and later was found uncorrelated with any of the other data in the study. It was dismissed for further analysis. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program data depicted an increasing trend most striking in the 2000s. In sum, two of the three metrics supported the overall finding that distinct engagements increased over the period.
The supporting metrics of deployments, casualties, and spending depicted mostly increasing trends, but there were a few notable exceptions. The deployment rate decreased during the 1990s and then increased considerably during the 2000s. This was easily explained by the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Global War on Terror. A key distinction is that the combat deployments of the 2000s were of a different kind than the presence deployments of the 1970s and 1980s. The casualty rate increased during the use of forces in combat. This occurred a few times prior, but was most evident in the 2000s. Spending increased in absolute terms, but fluctuated in percent GDP. A contrary indication of the main finding, spending in percent GDP terms decreased when viewed over the period as a whole. While important, it does not reduce the significance of the majority of the data, which pointed to an increasing use of American forces abroad over the period of study. This data-supported finding enabled its comparison with the declining societal-military association of Chapter 3 in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 5 employed a commonly used method of comparing numerical data. Statistical regression analysis reveals relationships between datasets. Unfortunately, it cannot link cause and effect. Instead, it determines levels of correlation and relatedness of movement between different datasets. Causal connections must be explained by logic. Chapter 5 analyzed the data from Chapter 3 with the data from Chapter 4, in order to assist in the answering of the second research question: to what extent has the disassociation between American society and its military institutions contributed to the willingness of political leaders to employ military force abroad?

Describing the results of a series of bivariate and multivariate regression analyses, Chapter 5 revealed three main findings. First, it exposed anomalies in the data that were hinted at in previous chapters. The analysis found multicollinearity between the participation rate and the veteran rate, indicating that they may explain the exact same phenomenon. Logic tells us they do explain a similar social relationship, but on a slightly different timeframe—current and past military participation. The analysis found almost no relationship between COW data and every other data set. The explanation in Chapter 4 detailed the definitional and categorical challenges with the COW dataset and the statistical analysis confirmed its outlier quality. Finally, the analysis revealed strikingly strong statistical correlations between three of the datasets from Chapter 3 with four of
the datasets from Chapter 4. This finding is significant, but it does not firmly tie the phenomena together. Thus, the chapter concludes that a strong statistical relationship exists between the data but the overall relationship is indeterminate. All other variables would have to be discarded or a logical chain of causality would have to explain the link between the data, in order to reach a more definite conclusion. Because the statistical methodology used to examine the data was insufficient to determine such a causal chain, the conclusion remains indeterminate. However, despite the lack of concrete evidence establishing the basis on which the two relationships affect each other, the study depicted surprisingly parallel behavior, visually evident trends, strong statistical correlations, and has determined that the two phenomena are not unrelated. An important finding, it leads to the following sections on what future trends will probably look like and a few factors decision-makers may want to consider in forming future policies.

Prognoses

All four metrics depicting the decreasing association between American society and its military establishment will probably continue their established trends. An increasing number of American citizens will not participate or be eligible to serve in the armed forces. An increasing number will also be unfamiliar with the military establishment, will have less opportunity to know someone who has served, will not live near a military base, and thus, will not have the opportunity for regular and meaningful contact with active or past military personnel. The steadily increasing American population is the primary driver of this forecast. The policy decisions maintaining the size of American military institutions is another factor. The demographic trends that have enabled the approximately one percent annual growth of the population, and the policy decisions that maintain small, technologically advanced military forces instead of larger, more manpower intensive forces, are unlikely to change anytime soon.

Considering that the military services are unlikely to increase in size at a rate that approximates population growth, the participation rate will in all likelihood continue to decline. As the larger veteran populations of the larger military establishments of the past die off, the veteran rate will also continue to decline. Present participation rates are unable to produce the number of veterans necessary to counteract population growth.
Although eligibility standards change regularly, eligibility as a function of ideal age range will continue its decline due to the lack of growth in the ideal-age range population in comparison to the steady growth of the overall United States population. All three of these metrics depict a relationship between the population and the military that is dependent on the potential for contact and exchange between non-military citizens and military members. As the size of the population grows faster than the size of the military establishment, numbers alone dictate that the opportunity for this contact between social groups will continue to deteriorate.

The evidence on the final metric from Chapter 3, the veteran political representation rate, is less explanatory. Because the rate can change drastically in any election year, projecting the rate’s likely behavior in the future is less definite. Nevertheless, it exhibits potential for continued decline. The Bianco and Markham study cited previously provides several plausible explanations which also point to a potential attitudinal divide between American society and its military establishment and thus, provide a basis on which to forecast. All of the explanations they give reflect an emerging divergence in attitudes between veterans and politicians. They cite Thomas Rick’s argument that veterans are less likely to enter a profession they see as represented by chaos and dishonesty. They question whether veteran status has become a less politically valuable characteristic for candidates. They suggest that political party leaders may be less likely to select veterans as candidates. And, they contend that the All-Volunteer Force may have made it harder for career-oriented military officers to also build the public career necessary to win a seat in Congress. These explanations support the contention that the veteran political representation rate will continue to decline or maintain low levels of representation, not because of the demographic characteristics reducing the number of veterans in society, but because of the attitudinal divide that makes veterans less desirable Congressional candidates.

The metrics depicting the increasing use of military forces abroad are less telling for the future. There are contradictory signs in the contemporary environment. There is

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potential for both an increased and reduced number of engagements using American military forces. However, a data-informed prediction carries forward a number greater than the period average, but less than the high average over the mid-2000s. Using the methodology of CRS, this number ranges from 7-12 engagements a year. For UCDP, it ranges from 1-3 engagements a year. These numbers are probably less important than the understanding that similar conditions will probably drive similar levels of intervention in the future. Although conditions can change drastically at any point, broadly speaking, that level of intervention will probably be less than it was during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid-2000s, but more than the engagements of the 1980s and 1990s.

The deployment rate exhibits a trend approaching 25% of the force deployed at any given time. Because many of those deployments are ongoing presence operations and security cooperation with long-term basing agreements, the deployment of forces abroad is likely to continue similarly as it has in the past few years. However, a significant policy change could easily change this dynamic. Forces could be withdrawn from Europe, Japan, or Korea and stationed in the continental United States, for example.Were the overall force size to decrease, the number deployed would have to decrease as well, or the rate would increase. Nevertheless, continuing the 25% rate forward probably serves as the most reasonable estimate.

Casualties fluctuate with the type of engagements and deployments that occur. More specifically, combat engagements are the biggest contributor of casualties. Large-scale terrorist attacks have also killed significant numbers of service members, most notably in 1983. As American forces stay involved in limited engagements that are less intense than the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of annual deaths is likely to remain at the lower levels of the past few years, rather than the higher numbers of the mid-2000s.

Defense spending exhibits a clear upward trend in absolute terms, but with a downward correction in the last few years, and an overall period decrease in percent GDP. The significant upward trajectory of the 2000s seems to have leveled in the near $600 billion range. The FY 2016 Department of Defense budget request is $585 billion
and the forecasts through FY 2020 increase steadily to almost $600 billion.\(^4\) Also, spending as a percentage of GDP may decline to approach the 3% range, depending on the performance of the economy. While it is unlikely that defense spending would rapidly decrease, it is a policy potentiality that could occur at any time.

Overall, the evidence examined in Chapter 3 can be better extended into the future than the evidence from Chapter 4. Many of the trends that were used to explain the increasing disassociation of American society with its military establishment are based on solid underpinnings difficult to amend in the short term. Fixed underlying factors improve predictive power. Therefore, it is reasonable to forecast the increasing disassociation with higher confidence. The evidence from Chapter 4 is descriptive over the period, but does not exhibit the same degree of short-term firmness. The number of annual engagements is illustrative of what occurred in each year. Each subsequent year may exhibit similar conditions and therefore a similar number of engagements. However, the number in any given year is not dependent on the number that occurred in any past year. On the contrary, the size of the United States population in 2014 is very much based on its size in 2013.

In sum, the data from Chapter 3 provides a defensible basis on which to forecast future trends. On the other hand, the data from Chapter 4 provides an unstable basis on which to forecast future trends. Chapter 4 trends are based on short-term decision-making factors, and are thus more likely to change from one year to the next. Major policy changes will probably affect all Chapter 4 trends more than any Chapter 3 trends. Any significant change in policy or the security environment will alter forecasts regarding the use of forces abroad, especially engagements and casualties. As a result, the prognoses reflect high confidence in an increasingly disassociated societal-military relationship and less confidence in an increasing use of military forces abroad in the future. The policy implications of the following section will be oriented more toward the increasing civil-military disassociation.

Policy Implications

Three years ago, Ike Skelton, a renowned military expert and United States Congressman, wrote a short article recommending how the civil-military gap in America could be prevented from becoming a chasm.\(^5\) Because Skelton, the Chair of the House Armed Services Committee was familiar with the nexus of civil, military, and political matters his perspective is particularly poignant. The following section extends his suggestions to the physical dimension of the civil-military relationship outlined in Chapter 3 after expanding on the theme of his insight. It also recommends a decision making consideration on the use of military force that may assist in improving the civil-military relationship.

Skelton ended his article with the following statement, “The American people and members of the Armed Forces should be reminded that the military is composed of men and women who are both Servicemembers and citizens.”\(^6\) The responsibilities of citizenship unite soldiers and non-military civilians in their civic roles in communities and in the nation. Emphasizing citizenship as a higher value in the military establishment and in society at-large may prevent the tenets of military professionalism and the separate military sphere of Huntington’s “objective control” from accentuating divisive moral and cultural differences between citizens and soldiers. Emphasizing citizenship may also offer clarity to navigate the interconnected nature of military and political affairs in a manner that does not compromise civilian control but enables effective military input into the broader political decision making process.

Accepting this natural intertwining—a civic responsibility for service members, as well as a military/national security responsibility for citizens—may encourage efforts to promote interaction and learning between civil and military social groups. For example, if civilians perceive that the military deals with all armed conflict and they have little influence or personal link to decisions regarding such matters, they are likely to become disinterested and uninvolved. However, if they are requested to vote, asked for an opinion, made to sacrifice, or called to serve, they will probably become interested in military matters to a higher degree. Interest leads to learning about the other,

understanding, appreciation, and more informed opinion forming. Similarly, if military officers understand that their responsibility extends to strategic thinking on how military matters can influence domestic affairs, they will be more inclined to learn about and understand the wide-ranging considerations that civilian political leaders must balance when they make decisions on the use of force abroad. Emphasizing citizenship, civic responsibility, and appropriate political involvement as proper and professional military behavior may help reduce the separation, lack of understanding, and disassociation between civilian and military groups. How such a perspective might be implemented when many civil and military leaders remain influenced by Huntington’s paradigm of professionalism remains a critical question. This paper offers the historic version of civil-military relations espoused by Washington as a counterweight.

Speaking about the growing gap, Skelton stated that it could not be halted or reversed without getting to its source. He pointed to the same finding that Chapter 3 depicted with data—the armed services are getting smaller and the United States population is getting larger. The demographic reality of a growing population and current policy trajectory of a small, technologically advanced military establishment reduces opportunities for citizens to experience military service, know a service member, or know someone who knows one. Fewer Americans will have the opportunity to know military service through personal experience. Secondarily, fewer Americans will have the opportunity for contact and exchange with active or past service members. These two verified observations are the critical source of the current civil-military relations disassociation. The final paragraphs offer some ways forward.

Two factors illuminate the conceptual foundation of the following recommendations. Both involve the importance of tying military institutions to their supporting civil society, but the first involves individual relationships between soldiers and non-military citizens. Efforts should be made to ensure the two types of citizen groups overlap and interact enough that they do not become disparate and distinct from one another. The second involves the importance of political decisions on the uses of military forces in a way that aligns with civil society, guarantees public involvement, and

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ensures public social and moral support for any military intervention. The next few paragraphs address the first factor and the final few paragraphs the second.

The size of the uniformed military should be examined not merely from its ability to handle threats to national security or its maintenance of various tactical capabilities, but also from its long-term consequences on its ability to relate and interact with the domestic non-military population. For an example of this societal imperative, Dolman’s *The Warrior State* provides a compelling argument. Although he focuses on how military service results in the provision of rights for individuals, the work serves as a case in point of how military institutions affect domestic social and political affairs. Military forces affect society and are affected by it in significant ways. Professional military forces may fight and finish limited engagements, but they do not normally win wars on their own. They are bolstered by citizen-soldiers, as well as public contingency funds, equipment, civilian production, and other forms of domestic support. If the size of the military establishment is small, exclusive, and its commitments entail such a high operational tempo that its relationship to its supporting civil society is compromised due to separation, secrecy, and lack of opportunity for meaningful interaction, there is a civil-military problem taking root. Opportunities for contact and exchange between soldiers and civilians should be considered in decisions on the size, makeup, basing, and contractual nature of raising military forces. Contact and exchange may mitigate the effect of the expected future trend—fewer Americans personally participating in the armed services—and help to ensure informed public involvement in political decisions involving military forces.

Overlap can most easily be bolstered by increasing the active-duty force as a percentage of the population. This permits the subgroup to makeup a larger proportion of the overall group. Because this is unlikely considering recent policy trends, the following suggestions attempt to improve the relationship by making other changes besides adding to the force without taking something away. Increasing participation can be reinforced by changing the makeup of the force in efficient ways such as expanding the Reserves, replacing civilian contractors with uniformed personnel, or by providing for shorter terms.

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of service. While each of these initiatives can be difficult considering the dominant perspective on professionalism and rigid career path progression, they offer other benefits. The Reserves are the operative link between careerists and part-time service members. With solid ties to their community, those that serve part-time regularly balance the competing demands of both civilian and military roles. Expanding this component of the armed services will necessitate accommodating it to a higher degree in military operating methods, which may change the civil-military dynamic away from an exclusive focus on professionalism and more toward citizen-soldiers. Inflexible manpower planning requirements and other economic reasons support the trend toward an increasing reliance on contract support for even traditional military functions. Instead of providing flexibility to the manpower planning system or reducing cost in another manner, the Department of Defense relies on an increasing amount of civilian contractors. This trend could be reversed and would free funds for more uniformed personnel, although it would demand an improvement in the personnel system. Also, shortening the terms of initial service commitments would encourage more individuals to experience military service. Even if those that agree to shorter commitments attend minimal training such as “boot camp” and basic occupational on-the-job training, individuals will probably depart the military services as better citizens and more informed members of society. Shorter service commitments do not require high pay, lush accommodations, or excessive educational benefits. Rather, individuals receive training, education, and a military experience that will improve their understanding of military affairs and influence those around them in positive ways.

Contact and exchange between soldiers and civilians can also be bolstered by distributing military bases in more communities, opening those bases to civilian activity, and changing the military entitlement system that incentivizes military personnel to stay on base. By reversing the trend of base consolidation and expanding smaller bases to more communities, the opportunity for more non-military civilians to meet and interact with service members would improve. By opening bases to the community instead of closing them off, a similar effect could be achieved. Community support, involvement, and access must be prioritized over secrecy, security, and separation. Exclusive military benefits such as commissaries, exchanges, discounted gas stations, Department of
Defense schools, and military housing may contribute to a psychological divide between military personnel who enjoy such benefits and members of the surrounding civilian community who do not; but, more importantly for this study, they provide a disincentive for military personnel to interact in the community in normal everyday ways. Removing exclusive military entitlements and adding the corresponding monetary value into basic pay may nudge service members off bases to shop, live, and interact in meaningful ways in local communities. Aligning military pay and benefits with typical civilian pay and benefits systems may remove a psychological disassociation between the two groups related to military entitlements. It may also encourage military support of local businesses, schools, etc., rather than government-run base organizations.

Political decisions on the use of force abroad are among the most important leaders make. Wars may adversely affect the societies that wage them. For the individuals fighting in state-sanctioned military interventions, many of the actions they conduct are unjustified without the wholesale social support of the greater national community. For military personnel, the rightful support of the nation includes the social backing and group-based ethical justification that underpin the otherwise immoral acts in which they engage. Without this validation, they kill without social purpose, a personally problematic, psychologically troubling, and morally indefensible act. Recent trends related to morally-grounded rules of engagement, the imposition of strict collateral damage estimates intended to prevent civilian casualties, centralized staff decision making procedures designed to ensure risk decisions are made at high levels of command, and other legal, technical means to control war are insufficient to ensure such a blunt instrument is made morally acceptable to the public, especially for limited war activities such as counter terrorism that do not present a significant threat to national security. This movement to control the adverse effects of war and make its conduct more acceptable, in combination with the separation of military personnel from the public, serve to increase political pressure on leaders to employ force as a potential solution to conflict. The pressure to “do something” is overwhelming absent any counterbalancing

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political pressure, such as the imperative to justify the use of force to the public in terms that necessitate their involvement and sacrifice.

While reducing the use of military forces abroad appears easy at first glance, there are innumerable factors that play into deployment, engagement, and spending decisions. Perceptions of threats to the nation that can be mitigated with short-term uses of military force present alluring options for political leaders to attempt. However, without an astute ability to forecast second-order effects or long-term obligations, such short-term uses can easily turn into long wars. Presence operations are often demanded by alliance or partner agreements. Impending security situations seem to require only a demonstration of will or a show of force to attain desired political leverage. The attraction for political leaders to use military forces in their effort to attain desired foreign policy objectives is appealing, however, even small deployments and minor engagements can increase the likelihood of enduring conflict.

Before forces are committed, policy makers should endeavor to build overwhelming national support and public involvement for any military intervention that could lead to war. Were the employment of military forces directly connected to the public in easily understood terms, public support would be ensured or intervention would not occur. If the justification for a military intervention is sufficient to convince a majority of Americans to send their own sons and daughters to fight, not someone else’s sons and daughters but their own flesh and blood, then such a sound basis for national support and involvement would ensure any use of force was grounded in a popular political purpose for war. Military interventions abroad should be tied to the public in an intimate and meaningful way so that the true power of democracy can fortify national strategy. Three phrases from the pledge of allegiance to the flag of the United States, “to the Republic for which it stands…one Nation…indivisible” outline this sentiment. The strategic power of a democratic government is rooted in its representative structure, nationalism, and its ability to motivate large numbers of people for singular purpose. Decisions on the use of military forces abroad have the ability to divide and separate the nation on civil and military lines as well as on others; they also have the ability to unite it.

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10 “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”
From the perspective outlined in this paper, how such decisions on the use of force are made and how well they are aligned with the democratic foundations of American government are equally important considerations as the short term tactical effectiveness of removing a known threat to the nation. It is hoped that the long-term strategic consequences of prospective military interventions are considered as carefully as the decision of whether one would send one’s own son or daughter into harm’s way to conduct such efforts.
### Appendix A

#### Chapter 3 Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Participation Rate</th>
<th>Veteran Rate</th>
<th>Eligibility Rate</th>
<th>Vet Pol Rep Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0.99%</td>
<td>13.02%</td>
<td>12.826%</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
</tr>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
<td>12.89%</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
<td>12.76%</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>0.93%</td>
<td>12.63%</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>12.49%</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>12.55%</td>
<td>13.213%</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.91%</td>
<td>12.43%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
<td>12.31%</td>
<td>13.020%</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
<td>12.799%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.91%</td>
<td>12.09%</td>
<td>12.493%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>11.98%</td>
<td>12.148%</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.90%</td>
<td>11.87%</td>
<td>11.755%</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>11.77%</td>
<td>11.430%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
<td>11.66%</td>
<td>11.189%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
<td>11.55%</td>
<td>11.002%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
<td>11.01%</td>
<td>10.796%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.79%</td>
<td>10.86%</td>
<td>10.412%</td>
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<td>0.70%</td>
<td>10.71%</td>
<td>10.112%</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>10.57%</td>
<td>9.873%</td>
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<td>0.61%</td>
<td>10.44%</td>
<td>9.601%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
<td>10.32%</td>
<td>9.431%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>10.20%</td>
<td>9.222%</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<td>0.51%</td>
<td>9.96%</td>
<td>9.235%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.50%</td>
<td>9.85%</td>
<td>9.322%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>9.36%</td>
<td>9.620%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
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## Appendix B

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