CULTURAL MOMENTUM: THE IMPACT OF AGENCY ON FOREIGN AREA OFFICER SUPPORT TO THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS

BY

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Lieutenant Colonel Robert O'Keefe graduated from the Georgia Institute of Technology in 2000 with a Bachelor of Science in International Affairs. After commissioning through the Reserve Officer Training Corps, he earned his wings and distinguished graduate honors at Joint Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training. His flying career includes three operational assignments as an instructor navigator and mission commander in the C-130E/H Hercules, including deployments in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Lieutenant Colonel O'Keefe went on to graduate from the Naval Postgraduate School with a Master of Arts in Security Studies in 2011, certifying as a Regional Affairs Strategist for the western hemisphere. His subsequent assignment was as a joint staff officer at Headquarters, United States Southern Command. Lieutenant Colonel O’Keefe is the Commander of the 621st Mobility Support Operations Squadron at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey.
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ABSTRACT

Department of Defense policy states that in order “to achieve national security objectives and success in current and future operations,” the Military Departments are to develop a cadre of Foreign Area Officers. This cadre is to maintain a knowledge of regional, cultural, linguistic, and political-military affairs in support to the Combatant Commands and other Joint and Interagency organizations. Foreign Area Officers subsequently represent the Department of Defense to foreign governments and military organizations in conducting military-diplomatic missions. The Military Departments, in turn, developed and implemented independent Foreign Area Officer programs in response to the 2005 policy (Department of Defense Directive 1315.17, Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs) and subsequent implementing guidance (Department of Defense Instruction 1315.20, Management of Department of Defense (DoD) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs). Distinct Service cultures, combined with relatively autonomous Service programs, however, result in differentiated force development and force presentation. This differentiation ultimately causes variations in Foreign Area Officer quality, capability, and availability in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands. Combatant Commanders rely heavily on Foreign Area Officer expertise, whether contributing to Operational Contingency Planning or representing the Commander and Secretary of Defense before Partner Nation strategic leadership. Peter Feaver’s agency theory provides a framework for identifying and analyzing the varying degrees of alignment between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and the Geographic Combatant Commands. Given a supporting-supported relationship within the hierarchical Department of Defense structure, a further developed Joint FAO Program at OSD’s level would more closely align the Services’ preferences and the Geographic Combatant Commands’ requirements for fully qualified, regionally conversant, strategically minded Foreign Area Officers when and where they are required.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Therefore I say:  Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.

Sun Tzu

On January 12, 2010, a massive 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the Caribbean island nation of Haiti, killing 230,000, injuring tens of thousands more, and leaving millions homeless. This devastating force of nature rendered helpless a country with a weak democratic government and regarded the poorest in the western hemisphere.1 The instant global response was overwhelming, as aid and assistance in all forms flowed to Hispaniola from governments, non-governmental organizations, and private institutions.2

Central to the international response were two organizations, the United Nations’ Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and U.S. Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H). Commanded by Brazilian Army Major General Floriano Peixoto, the MINUSTAH military mission had maintained a presence in Haiti since its establishment in 2004, charged to “support a secure and stable transitional government, the development of a political process focused on the principles of democracy, and the defense of human rights.”3 The U.S. military responded through U.S. Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) JTF-H, established to “mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to the Government of Haiti, the UN, and USAID.”4 At the JTF’s helm was USSOUTHCOM Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Ken Keen, and the two commanders immediately set to work, coordinating operational and organizational relationships to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid and to rescue the Haitian people from disaster. Their agreement placed responsibility

4 Keen et al., “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” 8.
for security and stability with MINUSTAH while JTF-H provided humanitarian assistance; however, the greater goal combined UN and U.S. forces to the maximum extent possible.\(^5\) To that end, by the end of May 2010, JTF-H’s Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE dedicated over 22,000 U.S. military personnel to the overall relief effort, delivering more than 17 million pounds of food, providing shelter to more than 1.1 million Haitian citizens, and treating nearly 10,000 medical patients.\(^6\)

The international response in Haiti is a well-documented narrative known to many. Less familiar is the specific account of U.S. military integration into the combined effort, a story based on the professional rapport, personal friendship, cultural understanding, and international acumen of the two soldiers at center stage. Generals Keen and Peixoto found themselves thrust together as a matter of circumstance in Port-au-Prince. Yet, fortunately for them, their respective organizations, and the people of Haiti, the exigencies of the situation rested upon a relationship cultivated during the preceding 26 years.\(^7\)

After completing multiple assignments in Latin America as a Special Forces officer, Captain Keen first met Captain Peixoto in 1984 as brigade pathfinder instructors during an international exchange program in Rio de Janeiro, from which they forged a long-standing friendship. Their paths continued to cross as Major Keen became a Latin American Foreign Area Officer, returning to the Brazilian Command and General Staff College in 1987 to deepen his understanding of the language, culture, and military.\(^8\) In turn, Captain Peixoto attended the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1988, where Major Keen served on staff. Almost a decade later, Lieutenant Colonel Peixoto received an appointment to West Point as a Portuguese instructor, allowing him to further his association with Keen. In the

\(^5\) Keen et al., “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” 8.
\(^8\) Keen et al., “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” 4.
meantime, Keen progressed as a Latin American expert, earning a master’s degree in Latin American Studies and completing subsequent assignments as Commander of the U.S. Military Group, Colombia, and Commander of U.S. Army South, the ground component of U.S. Southern Command. These repetitive opportunities allowed the two officers sustain their personal and professional rapport.

Reflecting on their shared experience in Haiti, the two senior leaders credited their success not only to the professionalism of their respective forces, but also to the trust and understanding they fostered with each other long before the crisis. General Keen recalled, “Knowing Major General Peixoto was the commander, I knew I had a friend, ally, and partner to assist us in delivering humanitarian relief to the people of Haiti. Since we had known each other for years, we didn’t have to go through the standard protocols and introductions that usually occur when military leaders of two nations meet for the first time.” General Peixoto added, “You increase the speed of achieving results by facilitating, forming, and reinforcing relationships.” The linguistic fluency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness each general developed over extensive and highly successful military careers started in this personal and professional relationship, directly contributing to the humanitarian aid and disaster relief success in Haiti.

This vignette provides a context for the following considerations: how is it General Keen amassed such specialized knowledge, skills, and abilities that eventually underpinned his strategic and operational leadership? To what effect does the U.S. military identify and foster this international focus among its officers? Is it possible to cultivate and replicate the linguistic fluency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness these senior leaders exhibited in 2010? It is the purpose of this thesis to explore exactly how the Defense

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9 “Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken) Keen” (United States Southern Command, 2010).
10 Keen et al., “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” 5.
11 Keen et al., “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” 11–12.
12 Keen, “The Power of Partnerships.”
13 Keen et al., “Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti,” 11.
Department deliberately develops an officer cadre exhibiting this international acumen.

**Research Problem**

Since 2005, Department of Defense policy has directed that in order “to achieve national security objectives and success in current and future operations,” the Military Departments are to develop a cadre of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs). This cadre is to maintain a knowledge of regional, cultural, linguistic, and political-military affairs in support of the Combatant Commands and other Joint and Interagency organizations. FAOs subsequently represent the Department of Defense in military-diplomatic missions, liaising with foreign governments and military organizations. The Military Departments, in turn, developed and implemented independent FAO programs in response to this policy.

Autonomy afforded by OSD guidance combined with distinct Service cultures, however, results in differentiated force development and presentation. This differentiation ultimately drives variation in FAO quality, capability, and availability in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). GCCs rely heavily on FAO expertise across a spectrum of roles and responsibilities, whether engaged in Operational Planning or representing the Combatant Commander and Secretary of Defense to Partner Nation strategic leadership. Yet, data from FY06-FY13 reveal that the GCCs are not receiving the quantity and quality of FAOs critical to their regional missions.

In quantitative terms, as early as 2007 the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) set a 95-percent requirement against which Services are to assign qualified officers to designated FAO billets. Since incorporating this requirement into its annual reporting, in no single year has

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14 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODD 1315.17, Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs” (Department of Defense, April 28, 2005), 2.
16 Primary source data comes from the Department of Defense Annual Foreign Area Officer Reports and the individual contributing reports provided by Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the Services. At the time of this writing, the most recent DoD Annual FAO Report is FY11, the Joint Staff/Combatant Command Report is FY13, and the Army is FY13.
the Joint FAO Program met this goal, and on just one occasion has any individual Service met or exceeded it.\textsuperscript{18} In turn, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff related to OSD, “Because FAOs’ knowledge, experience, and linguistic, regional, and cultural acumen take years to develop and simply cannot be replaced or replicated, Combatant Commands have reported that manning FAO billets at less than the DoD goal significantly degrades their ability to effectively engage in their areas of responsibility.”\textsuperscript{19} This perspective underscores GCCs’ cumulative discontent during the Joint FAO Program’s first decade.

In qualitative terms, FAO foreign language deficiencies and the use of “best-fit” officers in lieu of fully qualified FAOs undermine their role in national security. First, the governing FAO directive, DoDD 1315.17, stipulates that foreign area officers are to have “professional proficiency in one or more of the dominant languages in their region of expertise,” in listening and reading modalities, with the goal of a professional speaking capability, defined by the Interagency Language Roundtable as a score of ‘3’.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{19} The Joint Staff, Joint Staff and Combatant Command Foreign Area Officer Report Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 31, 2014), 2.

\textsuperscript{20} The Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) is an interagency organization established for the coordination and sharing of information about language-related activities at the Federal level. The ILR language skill level descriptions are used by U.S. Government agencies to measure language proficiency. The ILR ‘3’ is defined as follows: Able to participate successfully in most social, practical, and professional interactions, including those that may require a range of formal and informal language and behavior. Can adapt to a variety of individuals and groups without being misconstrued and transition smoothly from informal to formal styles of communication. Controls nonverbal responses, such as gestures, and handles unfamiliar situations appropriately, including those involving taboos or emotionally-charged subjects. Rarely misreads cultural cues, and can almost always repair misinterpretations. Can understand and make appropriate use of cultural references and expressions, and can usually discuss a variety of issues and subject matter that refer to the culture, such as history, politics, literature, and the arts. Can interpret reading materials and recognize subtleties, implications, and tone. Able to communicate via social media. In professional contexts, the individual can interact appropriately during meetings and provide detailed
manning trend, Joint commands repeatedly testify that only a minority of FAOs (45 percent) achieve and maintain this language standard.\textsuperscript{21} The imperative for professional fluency, particularly oral proficiency, is one not lost on the Combatant Commands and remains a recurring issue reported to policy makers.

Secondly, and complementary to the quantitative shortfall, Services rely on “best-fit” officers, individuals not certified as FAOs but perhaps possessing at least one requisite skill, to varying degrees in order to pay their Joint manpower bills. The Joint Staff has highlighted the insufficiency of this practice on multiple occasions, stating the “Combatant Commands appreciate the Services’ effort to provide officers who have the ‘best fit’ for the position but continue to report degraded mission capability due to a lack of fully trained personnel to support requirements.”\textsuperscript{22} Personnel mismatches in the FAO community not only fall short of meeting the GCC’s needs for international acumen of the kind employed to great success in Haiti, but they also offer a pressure release valve for the Services when prioritizing personnel requirements competing against the Joint FAO Program.

**Research Question**

This thesis aims to answer the question, “Does the current Joint FAO Program model provide the required linguistic and regional expertise to the Geographic Combatant Commander?” The hypothesis is that the autonomy afforded the Services by OSD under Joint FAO policy combined with the GCCs’ relative lack of authority to affect this relationship results in differentiated FAO forces not fully prepared to support the regional missions. Distinct Service cultures influence the respective Service’s vision and approach to the FAO explanations or reports both in person and in writing. Social behavior and interactions reflect significant knowledge and understanding of cultural expectations. “Interagency Language Roundtable,” accessed January 19, 2015, http://govtlr.org/; Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODD 1315.17,” 2, 4; Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODI 5160.70, Management of DoD Language and Regional Proficiency Capabilities” (Department of Defense, June 12, 2007), 2.


\textsuperscript{22} Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *DoD 2009 Annual Foreign Area Officer Report*, 2.
community in the absence of requirements that are more stringent and oversight in order to produce a universal capability to Joint organizations.

**Scope and Assumptions**

In order to scope this project with proper focus, research begins in 2005 with the release of DoDD 1315.17, *Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs*, which functions as the first Department-wide requirement for all Services to develop comprehensive, deliberate FAO programs. Only a brief, scene-setting narrative on the foreign area officer origins reflects on the community prior to this date, but the intent was not to provide an exhaustive historical precursor to today’s FAO. Instead, the reader may consider this an evaluation of the first decade of the Joint FAO Program writ large. The U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer is the first of two cases reviewed, the second being the Air Force Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS). Although this thesis will not directly compare these programs, they provide contrasting examples of Service perspective and represent the oldest and the newest iterations within the current FAO construct.\(^{23}\)

Additionally, this thesis considers only regionally trained officers and excludes personnel considered part of Service international affairs programs but lacking explicit FAO credentials. This translates to the Army FAO and the Air Force RAS exclusively, and omits the Air Force Political-Military Affairs Strategist (PAS). Last, although much of the literature on the current Joint FAO Program incorporates all Joint stakeholders, this analysis focuses on the Geographic Combatant Command as the primary customer of Service FAO programs. Given the Combatant Commander’s authority over all regionally assigned forces and the similar themes across the Joint community concerning

\(^{23}\) The U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps also maintain independent FAO programs. The Navy program, started in 2005, follows the Army’s single-track model for language-enabled officers. The Marine Corps’ program pre-dates the 2005 OSD policy and shares some similarities with the Air Force dual-track model. Akin to the Air Force RAS and Political-Military Affairs Strategist (PAS), the Marines also develop two types of regional experts: the FAO, with extensive language and regional immersion, and the Regional Affairs Officer (RAO), which does not require foreign language skills. Marine FAOs tend to serve at the tactical or operational level, focusing on support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In the interest of analytical focus, time, and space, this thesis studies the FAO career field to the exclusion of the Navy and Marine Corps. While these Services also warrant similar treatments, the broad framework and conclusions may serve to assist the reader in studying similar organizational phenomena in the maritime Services.
the FAO role, this scoping method serves to limit an exhaustive review of each organization, yet simultaneously offers generalizable analysis and recommendations across the Joint FAO community.

**Organization and Investigation**

Before delving into the specifics of the Joint FAO Program, it is important to identify its relevance to national security. Chapter 2 begins with a concise historical review of the FAO roots, which segues into a contextual look at how and where the FAO fits into the existing national security narrative. Chapter 3 uses Peter Feaver’s agency theory as a framework for identifying and analyzing the varying degrees of alignment between the primary actors in the Joint FAO Program: OSD, the Services, and the GCCs. These relationships present unique challenges relating to exactly how FAOs are accessed, trained, sustained, and utilized.

Chapters 4 and 5 apply the outcomes of the agency-theory analysis to the Army FAO and the Air Force RAS. Viewing the respective Service approaches to the FAO through the lens of Service culture within the agency-theory construct paints a clearer picture of how and why parallel programs operating under the same policy vary, resulting in force differentiation. Finally, Chapter 6 renews the agency theory discussion by applying stylized monitoring mechanisms to the issue within the OSD-Service-GCC Joint FAO relationships. The result is a set of recommendations that seeks to align more closely the Services’ preferences and the GCCs’ requirements for fully qualified, regionally conversant, strategically minded FAO personnel.
Chapter 2

The Importance of Foreign Area Expertise for National Security

Operating in partnership with host-nation security forces and among local populations puts a premium on foreign language skills and regional and cultural knowledge. Today’s operating environment demands a much greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years, not weeks, of training and education, as well as a greater understanding of the factors that drive social change.

Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010

The role of today’s foreign area officer originated in an incremental process of increased international U.S. military activity during the last century, coupled with current national strategies asserting American leadership on the world stage. One appreciates the strategic importance of the FAO in today’s U.S. military only through an examination of its historical roots and existing U.S. national strategic guidance, which provides the foundation for the subsequent analysis. This chapter briefly recounts the development of linguistic and cultural expertise among U.S. armed forces, beginning in the late 19th century. Next, an assessment of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) describes the increasingly interconnected international environment for which the FAO is specifically trained and educated.

Historical Precedence

In the broader context, one can cite individuals, such as Sun Tzu and Marco Polo, as having identified long before the contemporary military application the necessity of cultural and linguistic expertise to gain an understanding of a foreign civilization. Placed within today’s strategic context, “the concept of equipping military officers with regional expertise, language skills, and knowledge of U.S. and foreign political-military relationships dates back to 1889 when the U.S. sent permanent military attachés to London, Vienna, and Saint Petersburg.”1 Both the U.S. Army and Navy subsequently developed language-training programs immediately following World War I,

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primarily for military attachés. The attaché network expanded, claiming military, air, and naval diplomats in 45 capitals by 1945. However, the military institution accomplished little else during the interwar period toward deliberately developing linguistically and culturally competent officers.

Instead, individuals like Joseph Stillwell, William “Wild Bill” Donovan, Aaron Bank, Edward Lansdale, Vernon Walters, and Thomas White were the early 20th century’s “soldier-statesmen,” marrying personal interest with professional opportunity.

**Origins of U.S. Army Foreign Area Expertise**

As a result of the World War II experience, specifically wartime demand for linguists and the post-war global-leadership role the nation would assume, the U.S. Army established its Language and Area Training Program (LATP) in 1947. The LATP included one year of language training followed by a second year of regional and cultural academics at one of several prestigious civilian universities. The final complement involved one to two years of country immersion. By 1953, the Army turned LATP into the Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST), which, over the course of the next twenty years, expanded from an intelligence-centric program to encompass additional mission areas such as advisor duty, special warfare, and staff functions. The Army continued to wrestle with delineating intelligence- and operations-based FAO skills, separating the operational missions into the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) in 1969. Ultimately, the Army merged FAST and MAOP in 1972 as the

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Foreign Area Officer Management System, forming the core of the Army’s current construct.8

**Origins of U.S. Air Force Foreign Area Expertise**

In general, literature on the U.S. Air Force in the years following World War II emphasizes its imperative to establish Service independence from the other branches, which manifested primarily through Strategic Air Command’s strategic bombing and nuclear deterrence. Joseph Piontek’s comprehensive FAO history remarks that, “History indicates that the services were responsive to the demands of foreign area expertise, but the delays in the services’ responses were chronic. With the exception of the Army, the services repeatedly assigned the development of foreign area expertise programs a low priority.”9 Yet by the 1960s, the Air Force recognized, at least superficially and, arguably, as a result of the early Vietnam advisory mission, the need for “understanding people on their own terms [so we] can become really effective in dealing with them and in communicating our beliefs and ideals to them.”10 The result was the 1969 USAF Area Specialist Program (ASP), which “develops area specialists who can combine an understanding of a foreign language with a comprehensive knowledge of the culture, government, economics, and geography of an overseas area.”11 Unfortunately, ASP vanishes from the literature until 1984.

The U.S. Air Force Foreign Area Specialist Program (FASP), established in August 1984, marks the recognized beginning of the Service’s foreign area officer program.12 Lacking both a proponent office and training funds, the FASP relied upon personnel possessing a regional or foreign-policy education, a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) listening score, and any Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) qualification.13 The FASP underwent a revision in 1987,

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11 Austin, Jr. and Mitchell, “USAF Area Specialist Program.”
aligning its linguistic, educational, and experiential qualification requirements to those established by the Army 40 years earlier. Of greatest consequence, however, the FASP remained unfunded.14

**Origins of Joint Foreign Area Expertise**

Over the next decade, U.S. foreign policy expanded President Nixon’s security-cooperation initiative from 1971. Although aspects of this plan incrementally developed in the intervening years, the watershed event of the Soviet collapse concurrently offered the U.S. an opportunity to alter the character of international relations and explore new avenues for its military to contribute to mutual security. This expansion prompted the Defense Department to issue its first department-wide directive in 1997, DoDI 1315.17, *Service FAO Programs*, which “established policy and assigned responsibilities for the development of FAO programs within the military services.”15 This document initiated FAO paths across all Services, a process still maturing nearly 20 years later. Understanding the historical lineage of foreign area expertise places the FAO within the national strategy and conveys the importance of cultivating, maintaining, and developing this role.16

**Contemporary Relevance: The FAO in National Security**

Justification for specific programs across the Department of Defense is easy when considered in seclusion. Instead, substantiation within a broader strategic context is essential, particularly given defense-resource constraints. Joseph Piontek observed, “Ideally, national interests drive the formulation of foreign and security policy and the objectives contained therein. Likewise, the requirements and expenditures for development of foreign expertise and awareness should support these objectives. If the foreign policy is one of isolation, there should be minimal support for developing expertise, while the opposite applies if the policy involves frequent interaction abroad.”17 Given the FAO’s security and foreign-policy nature, this section examines key strategic guidance to ascertain the FAO’s relevance for national security.

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16 For a comprehensive historical rendering of the Foreign Area Officer community through 1999, see: Piontek, “A Century of Foreign Military Interaction.”
The President’s National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defense Secretary’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s National Military Strategy (NMS) form the foundation for U.S. foreign policy and the Department’s strategic approach to it. The Congressional Research Service reports that, “In theory, these documents and review exercises are all nested with each other.”\textsuperscript{18} However, this nesting exists in theory, not in practice. Instead of a chronological sequence of strategies flowing from the White House and the DoD, policy makers’ lack of adherence to U.S. Code results in these four pillars spanning nearly a decade, two presidential administrations, and four Defense Secretaries with disparate foreign policy perspectives.\textsuperscript{19} In the interest of applying the most current strategic approaches to foreign policy, the following analysis examines the 2010 NSS, the 2012 DSG, and the 2014 QDR. Though less congruent than U.S law intends, these documents embody the enduring themes sufficient to justify the military FAO in national security.

**The National Security Strategy, 2010**

The National Security Strategies the Bush administration published after September 11, 2001, reflected two complementary perspectives on the international environment. First, after a decade of wrestling with the United States’ role in the post-Cold War era, a new threat emerged in Islamic fundamentalism, endangering liberal democratic ideals. Second was an aggressive strategy promoting U.S. action against terrorism, a reaction stemming from the new threat. This approach sought to unify like-minded nation-states, but created a dichotomy of those “with us or against us” in which the U.S. would act single-handedly, if necessary, to stem the tide of this emerging menace.


\textsuperscript{19} At the time of this writing, the current national strategic documents are: President Obama’s National Security Strategy (May 2010), Secretary Gates’ National Defense Strategy (June 2008), Secretary Hagel’s Quadrennial Defense Review (March 2014), and Admiral Mullen’s National Military Strategy (February 2011). In addition, Secretary Panetta published his Defense Strategic Guidance *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (January 2012) at President Obama’s direction, which provides a more current, though less detailed, perspective on the Defense Department’s priorities than the existing NDS and NMS.
President Obama’s sole NSS, published in 2010, advocates a clean break from the unilateral tone of President Bush’s foreign policy and a belief in the efficacy of diplomacy based upon the strength of international institutions. Kugler summarizes the 2010 NSS as a call for

The United States to remain in a leadership role in global affairs, rather than retreat into disengagement and isolation. Furthermore, it calls upon the United States to harness a wide array of civilian and military instruments, to continue meeting its security commitments to allies, to work closely with many other nations and international institutions. By any measure, this is a strategy anchored in both hopeful goals and commitment to an activist foreign policy and diplomacy, but often in ways that differ from those of the past.

Evoking a neoliberal perspective, the NSS emphasizes comprehensive, strategic engagement, stating, “Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”

Though the NSS addresses military roles in principle rather than in substance, its treatment of national interests in the realm of the Security and International Order clarify the character of military engagement.

The Obama administration describes our security as dependent upon the military to foster international cooperation through global leadership. “Abroad, we are strengthening alliances, forging new partnerships, and using every tool of American power to advance our objectives—including enhanced diplomatic and development capabilities with the ability both to prevent conflict and to work alongside our military.” This deterrent capability manifests itself

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20 “The NSS is a report on the national security strategy of the United States from the President to Congress. It is required to be submitted annually. The Obama administration has submitted one so far, in May 2010.” Dale, National Security Strategy, 3.
through tailored approaches to regional challenges while increasing our international partners’ capacity to contribute to regional and global security.25

Underwriting U.S. national security is an international order seeking to prevent conflict and promote peace through cooperation. The president views enduring relationships across the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres as crucial to advancing this order. He believes in sustained outreach to cultivate key cooperative relationships in order to confront mutual future regional and global threats. “Our ability to sustain these alliances, and to build coalitions of support toward common objectives, depends in part on the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces. Similarly, the relationships our Armed Forces have developed with foreign militaries are a critical component of our global engagement and support our collective security.”26 The president therefore acknowledges the credible use of force as underpinning our national security, yet seeks a foreign policy founded on the focused military diplomatic capacities to broaden the aperture through which the U.S. pursues and consolidates a secure international order. The Defense Secretary’s Strategic Guidance and Quadrennial Defense Review report venture further into presidential policy by outlining the Department’s response to these tenets of the National Security Strategy.

**Defense Strategic Guidance, 2012**

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) provides a distilled perspective on the NSS aimed at delineating the DoD’s priorities in support of the president’s vision. In a mere eight pages, the Secretary describes the global security environment, the priority missions for DoD, and the Joint Force of 2020. Out of this document, three core ideas help frame how and where the FAO fits into the Department’s strategy.

- “Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.”27

“Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives.”

“U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad. These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence.”

Working within the cooperative context of the NSS, the DSG further delineates a military role that provides an enduring, constructive, economical approach to national defense founded upon mutual interests.

In essence, the relational aspect of defense cooperation emerges, a core competency of a deliberately developed officer appreciative of partner nations’ cultural characteristics and security strategies. The DSG details force-based missions as the bedrock of our national security; however, the ideas above signal a demand for military diplomats cognizant of the strategic environment and steeped in this nation’s priorities and objectives. This combination of the capacity to use force and diplomacy functions as the day-to-day currency of defense cooperation and forms the wheelhouse within which the FAO advances U.S. national security interests. In this regard, the U.S. military’s decade-long experience in Afghanistan and Iraq provided a strong impetus to formalize its FAO program, one in which language, cultural, and regional understanding expands to confront contemporary politico-military challenges. In the final analysis, the QDR draws upon the DSG, further contextualizing U.S. national security and defense policy.

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2014

In the 2014 QDR, the Defense Secretary recognizes the dynamic nature of the global environment. “Global connections are multiplying and deepening, resulting in greater interaction between states, non-state entities, and private citizens. The United States’ sustained attention and engagement will be important in shaping emerging global trends, both positive and negative.” In so doing, the QDR echoes the NSS and DSG by emphasizing international

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cooperation based on shared norms of behavior achieved through proactive engagement.\textsuperscript{31}

To this end, two statements explicitly capture the importance of cultural and strategic understanding in the military. First, “A key element of the Department’s strategic commitment to innovate and adapt includes working with allies and partners to facilitate greater contributions to their own defense and to facilitate greater security contributions across regions.”\textsuperscript{32} In this regard, awareness and experience foster close, productive relationships. True awareness evolves from deep, persistent education and exposure to the intricacies and nuances of culture, experiences germane to a profession explicitly cultivating such expertise. Second, “To most effectively prepare for wartime engagements, Combatant Commanders will invigorate their efforts to adjust contingency planning to reflect more closely the changing strategic environment.”\textsuperscript{33} Herein lies the foreign-area-expertise value-added: developing theater strategies, contingency plans, and country-support plans grounded in the existing political, economic, and cultural context of the Geographic Combatant Commander’s mission.

Although the two statements above exhibit competing approaches to national security, one collaborative and one bellicose, united they highlight the inherent need for regional expertise and communication skills. In the first instance, cultural expertise and ability to communicate with foreign military and diplomatic representatives culminate through enduring, relations-based cooperation. In the second instance, knowledge of complex political, military, economic, and regional contexts provides the basis for military strategy and planning. In both cases, the need for tailored, selective engagement resonates with the NSS, drawing upon the DSG’s call for low-cost, small-footprint approaches, and defining objectives using FAO expertise.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Against the historical and national strategy backdrops, this study explores both bureaucratic and organizational-culture realities of the current

\textsuperscript{31} Hagel, \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review 2014}, iii, 6, 11.
\textsuperscript{34} Hagel, \textit{Quadrennial Defense Review 2014}, 39.
Joint FAO Program. To this end, the next chapter describes the FAO construct in terms of the principal-agent problem. Feaver’s agency theory offers a useful framework to evaluate diverse Army and Air Force approaches to organize, train, equip, and provide foreign area expertise to the Joint community. Distilling agency theory into its core assumptions and corrective prescriptions, the focus is on resolving the persistent challenge of aligning preferences among distinct actors, in this case OSD, the individual Services, and the Geographic Combatant Commands. These complex relationships offer fertile ground for identifying and explaining variance among Foreign Area Officer programs.
Chapter 3

Agency Theory: Defining Principals and Identifying Preferences

When I took a decision or adapted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant — and many irrelevant — factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards — all were at my finger-end. The enemy I knew almost like my own side.

T.E. Lawrence

At its core, the principal-agent problem centers on alignment of action and expectation. In any relationship, a principal constitutes the party requesting a service, enlisting an agent to perform it. Each exhibits certain preferences, what they seek to gain or accomplish, and certain tendencies, behaviors either serving to bolster or undermine the relationship. Economists refer to this phenomenon as information asymmetry: neither the principal nor the agent has perfect information and, therefore, cannot guarantee his counterpart will meet both the letter and the intent of the contract. Deborah Avant tailors this disparity for the military:

When leaders delegate authority over portions of security policy to military organizations, however, they create new political actors and the problem of agency. The organizations may not do what civilian authorities want them to. Because the agent has more information about his or her capabilities and performance than the principal, this information asymmetry can prevent the leader from choosing the best option (adverse selection) or cause the agent to devote more effort to the indicators of his or her behavior (emphasis added) that the leader monitors, rather than the behavior itself (moral hazard).

This chapter first explores the agency theory heuristic to explain variations between the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer and U.S. Air Force Regional Affairs Strategist programs. An outcome of this application is defining the principals, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Geographic Combatant Commands, along with their respective preferences for FAO and RAS forces.

2 Brauer and Van Tuyll, Castles, Battles, & Bombs, 84–85.
This analysis serves as the basis for Chapters 4 and 5, which attribute Service tendencies to either ‘work’ or ‘shirk’ principals’ demands for foreign area expertise.

**Agency Theory: Shaping Behavior**

In his book, *Armed Servants*, Peter Feaver challenges traditional U.S. civil-military relations theories by characterizing the relationship as a strategic interaction between principals and agents. According to Feaver, agency, or “how political or economic actors in a superior position (principals) control the behavior of political or economic actors in a subordinate position (agents),” has the propensity to produce dual outcomes: the agent ‘works’ or ‘shirks.’

The agent is said to work perfectly when it does what it has contracted with the principal to do, how the principal has asked it to, with due diligence and skill, and in such a way as to reinforce the principal’s superior role in making the decisions and drawing the lines of any delegation. The military agent is said to shirk when, whether through laziness, insolence, or preventable incompetence, it deviates from its agreement with the civilians in order to pursue different preferences, for instance by not doing what the civilians have requested, or not in the way the civilians wanted, or in such a way as to undermine the ability of the civilians to make future decisions.

Agency theory identifies specific conditions that anticipate and assist the principal’s response to agent (mis)behavior. Principal intrusiveness, in Feaver’s estimation, shapes agent conduct and offers a spectrum of monitoring and punishment regimes to deal with contract deviations.

From an institutional perspective, agency theory identifies that divergent preferences and information asymmetry between actors contribute to relational and functional disparities. This approach incorporates several assumptions

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6 Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 68.
7 Drs. Adam Stulberg and Michael Salomone also identify rewards for “vigilant compliance” with regard to principal-agent strategic interaction in situations of organizational transformation. Feaver tends to focus on the punishment regime in the expectation that agents will shirk and, perhaps, that maintaining a contract is in itself a pure enough incentive or reward for working.
8 Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 54. The institutional approach views the principal and agent as singular, rational organizations while recognizing that more diverse and complex entities, individuals, processes, and interests exist within each respective actor.
when establishing a contract. First, the principal-agent relationship is hierarchical, defining the strategic interaction, and the principal delegates a measure of authority to the agent. The principal must maintain the will and the ability, however, to guide, direct, or change the relationship in order to meet its original goals in a dynamic environment. Next, the theory assumes the principal knows specifically what it wants to achieve and is able to communicate those expectations to the agent clearly. This assumption places the burden on the agent to receive the intended message accurately and carry out its charge effectively as the principal envisions. Lastly, agency theory primarily assumes an exclusive relationship in which one principal is the sole recipient of a service provided by one agent. As we will see, the Joint FAO community complicates this dichotomous structure as a third party enters the relationship.

Strategic interaction between a steadfast, superior principal and a singular, expert agent is a three-part process. Upon establishing the contract, the principal monitors (with some degree of intrusiveness) those actions delegated to the agent. The agent, based on the convergence or divergence of interests and the expectation of punishment by the principal, decides whether to work or shirk. This calculation is two-fold: will the principal detect shirking and, if so, what is the probability (or severity) of punishment? If the agent chooses to shirk and the principal does indeed detect it, the final decision rests with the principal: whether or not to exact punishment. To the extent each actor does not fully know or comprehend the other’s stated and ulterior preferences and tendencies, agency theory anticipates this iterative exchange to drive closer principal-agent alignment.

Two primary influences factor into this interchange. One fundamental issue is the principal’s monitoring cost. The first preference of the principal is that the agent’s preferences and behaviors naturally align with those of the

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10 Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 58.
principal, thereby minimizing any deleterious effects.\textsuperscript{13} However, the greater the agent’s shirking, either expected or observed, the greater the cost in terms of resources (e.g., time, manpower, money, efficiency) to the principal. On the other hand, military organizations value autonomy—“policy autonomy, the ability to decide what to do, and implementation autonomy, the ability decide how to do it.”\textsuperscript{14} Absent perfect alignment, the nature of principal intrusiveness contradicts agent autonomy.

Feaver’s solution lies in devising the optimal monitoring scheme, since the expectation is that the agent will shirk when subject to weak or non-existent observation.\textsuperscript{15} In keeping with principal interests, oversight demands minimizing principal cost while maximizing agent work. Therefore, monitoring mechanisms follow a spectrum of increasing intrusiveness and cost, from contract incentives to principal intervention. These are scalable mechanisms, seeking the lowest relative cost producing the greatest relative benefit.\textsuperscript{16} The balance of principal-agent subject matter expertise, in combination with the degree to which shirking is expected or observed, also factors into the oversight calculus.

Should punishment of the agent become necessary, agency theory offers a framework of increasingly coercive punishments. Assuming the relationship remains viable, punishment mechanisms offer the principal a means to forcibly (re)align agent behavior conducive to the contractual expectations.\textsuperscript{17} Closer examination of these regimes resumes in Chapter 6. First, the subsequent discussion answers two foundational questions:

- Who are the principals in the Joint FAO community?
- What are their respective interests or preferences for the Joint FAO?

**Principal-by-Statute: Office of the Secretary of Defense**

The Department of Defense is a hierarchical organization, one in which each command is responsible to its parent authority with the principal mission to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. Traditional military hierarchies exist to ensure unity of command, efficiency of

\textsuperscript{13} Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 56.
\textsuperscript{14} Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 64.
\textsuperscript{15} Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 56.
\textsuperscript{16} Brauer and Van Tuyll, *Castles, Battles, & Bombs*, 122–123.
\textsuperscript{17} Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 87–94.
communication, and effectiveness of control over armed forces. In the context of the Joint FAO Community, the 2005 DoD Directive 1315.17, *Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs*, and its 2007 corollary DoD Instruction 1315.20, *Management of Department of Defense (DoD) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs*, statutorily appoint the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as principal at the apex of this pyramid, responsible for policy and governance of the Military Departments’ FAO programs.\(^\text{18}\)

As a staff organization, OSD’s core functions are to design and establish policy at the Secretary’s direction in support of the NSS, providing guidance and oversight to the military components. Officially, “OSD is the principal staff element of the Secretary of Defense in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal and program evaluation and oversight, and interface and exchange with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, foreign governments, and international organizations, through formal and informal processes.”\(^\text{19}\) Specifically, the Joint FAO Program charges OSD Personnel and Readiness (OSD(P&R)) with coordinating, monitoring, and reviewing Service FAO programs through standardized accession, education, and utilization policy and metrics in conjunction with OSD Policy and OSD Intelligence (Figure 1).\(^\text{20}\)

Drawing on the three-pronged approach created by the U.S. Army in the 1940s, OSD policy requires the following to certify as a FAO:\(^\text{21}\)

1) A principal military specialty qualification and a selective process to identify FAO candidates

2) A graduate-level education pertaining to a designated region

\(^{18}\) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODD 1315.17, Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs” (Department of Defense, April 28, 2005) 1.

\(^{19}\) Director of Administration and Management, “DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components” (Department of Defense, December 21, 2010), 2, 8–13.


3) Duty experience in the designated region, involving significant host-nation interaction for a minimum of six months

4) A professional level of foreign-language proficiency in at least one dominant language of a designated region.²²

Beyond these initial qualifications for individual officers, OSD mandates the Services ensure career-advancement prospects to General/Flag Officer and provide sustainment education and training throughout a career.²³ In coordination with Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and other Joint stakeholders, the Services are to self-report annually on a set of criteria to inform OSD of the health and progression of each respective FAO program. These reports aggregate into DoD’s Annual Foreign Area Officer Report to the Service Assistant Secretaries, the Director of the Joint Staff, and Defense Agencies party to the FAO community. The Service case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 evaluate the effectiveness of OSD(P&R) designed metrics to identify working and shirking.

Returning to the principal-agent paradigm, the policies outlined above constitute the service contract OSD, as statutory principal, enters with its agents, the Services. Due to the military hierarchy, this contract is essentially a mandate rather than a negotiated agreement, and OSD(P&R) expects the Services to abide by its requirements.²⁴ OSD’s preference is that the Services comply not only with these specific, measurable requirements, but also with the following stated intent:

The Combatant Commands shall have the requisite war fighting capabilities to achieve success on the non-linear battlefields of the future. These critical war fighting capabilities include foreign language proficiency and detailed knowledge of the regions of the world gained through in-depth study and personal experience. Additionally, these capabilities facilitate close and continuous military-diplomatic interaction with foreign governments and, in particular, with their defense and military establishments, which


is essential to developing and maintaining constructive mutually
supportive, bilateral and multilateral military activities and
relationships across the range of operations.\textsuperscript{25}

A compelling aspect of this statement is that OSD, as the statutory principal, is
not the direct recipient of this capability (or supported command in DoD
parlance). In essence, OSD created a policy based on an internationally
focused national strategy, levied the requirements on a group of agents (the
Services), in order to provide a product (Joint FAOs) to a tertiary set of actors,
the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) (Figure 1). In so doing, and
based on the nature of assignments and environments in which FAOs
primarily operate, OSD designates the FAO a Joint Officer first, a viewpoint not
every Service shares.\textsuperscript{26}

To close this section of analysis, the three assumptions of agency theory
do not entirely pertain to OSD as the Joint FAO principal. A positive aspect of
this strategic interaction is that OSD inherently sits atop a military hierarchy;
therefore, it has the authority to direct and alter its relationship with the
Services through bureaucratic processes. Yet OSD has a preference and a
tendency to charge the Services with a task (develop and maintain FAO
programs that provide capability to the Joint force) and expect that both the
letter and the intent of the task are carried out satisfactorily absent intrusive
monitoring.\textsuperscript{27} The fact that competing OSD(P&R) priorities usurp attention
and political capital from the Joint FAO Program contributes to a minimal
oversight structure.\textsuperscript{28}

Second, given the stated intent to meet the GCC’s war fighting
requirement and that a majority of FAO billets resides in Joint commands,
OSD’s lack of a direct feedback mechanism magnifies a crucial information

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\textsuperscript{25} Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODD 1315.17,” 2.
\textsuperscript{26} Amy A. Alrich, Joseph Adams, and Claudio C. Billoc, \textit{The Strategic Value of Foreign
Area Officers} (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, August 2013), iii, 49;
Michael A. Vane and Daniel Fagundes, “Redefining the Foreign Area Officer’s Role,”
\textit{Military Review} 84, no. 3 (June 2004): 16.
\textsuperscript{27} Rouse, Perspective from the Defense Language and National Security Education
Office (DLNSEO) on the Joint FAO Program.
\textsuperscript{28} Specific contemporary issues with which OSD is dealing include Sequestration, DoD
budget reductions and personnel drawdown, the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” and
sexual assault/harassment within the military. The political, economic, and social
attention these issues receive rightfully demand a higher concentration of DoD policy
makers.
asymmetry to monitor satisfactory contract fulfillment regarding the Services.\textsuperscript{29} The three-way relationship skews OSD’s information accuracy of Service working or shirking. The staff responsibilities outlined at the beginning of this section highlight that OSD’s interests lie in policy, not force provision or projection. Although its directive is clear, the fact that OSD is not the primary supported command undermines its ability to know exactly what is required of the FAO in order to adjust the contract or clarify the requirements to meet dynamic and strategic regional realities. Instead, staffing the DoD Annual Report provides the behavioral indicators Avant identified above, acting as a measureable yet lagging and indirect indicator of FAO capability upon which OSD relies for oversight.

Last, the introduction of a third party into the dichotomous principal-agent construct immediately complicates the relationship, namely the monitoring and punishment regimes among three parties with distinct preferences. A 2013 study commissioned by OSD(P&R) concisely encapsulates this complication by concluding, “Compliance with the current DoD Directive and Instruction has varied across the Services and organizations identified therein.”\textsuperscript{30} OSD has more punishment mechanisms at its disposal, but higher priorities and deficient indicators fail to produce the will necessary at a policy level to alter the contract. An alternative perspective on the principal-agent framework considers the GCC’s unique role in this relationship.

\textsuperscript{29} For the purposes of this paper, and in the interest of both time and space limitations, Defense Agencies other than the GCCs proper (DIA, DSCA, and DTRA) are considered as under the purview of the GCC. In terms of argumentation, the trends within the FAO community resonate similarly across all three organizations. Additionally, the DIA and DSCA missions largely support the regional missions of the GCCs both at the headquarters level and within the Defense Attaché Offices (DAO) and Security Cooperation Offices (SCO) located in U.S. Embassies in allied and partner nations. In both cases, the CCDR maintains COCOM over these forces, hence their aggregation. See: Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2010” (Department of Defense, March 11, 2011).

\textsuperscript{30} Alrich, Adams, and Biltoc, \textit{The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers}, viii, 51.
Principal-in-Practice: Geographic Combatant Commands

Within the context of the Joint FAO program, GCCs form the third leg of a principal-agent triad. In one regard, GCCs are an agent of OSD, as Combatant Commanders report directly to the Secretary and carry out the guidance and directives issued through his staff. In another regard, the GCCs are the primary customer for which the Services organize, train, and equip their FAOs. This section will explore this challenging dichotomy and define the GCCs’ preferences for Joint FAOs.

As operational warfighters, “The Commanders of the Combatant Commands (CCDRs) are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority over assigned forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense,” exercising combatant command authority, direction, and control over forces assigned and provided by the Military Services.31 The Geographic Combatant Commanders, responsible for missions in their areas of responsibility (AORs), have a two-fold function.32 First, geographic AORs organize the globe and provide a basis for coordination among CCDRs.33 Second, distinct geographies allow for specific regional military focus. Activities such as Theater Campaign Planning (TCP), Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), and Key Leader Engagement (KLE) manifest in differentiated strategies, operations, and relationships across politically, economically, militarily, and culturally diverse regions of the globe.34

An outflow of President Obama’s collaborative NSS is that the country must “leverage the military as a legitimate diplomatic force,” for not doing so risks regional stability.35 Combatant Commanders and subordinate Joint

31 Director of Administration and Management, “DODD 5100.01,” 2, 21; Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (Department of Defense, November 8, 2010), 37.
34 Feickert, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands, 2.
Force Commanders (JFCs) will increasingly interface with agencies representing other U.S. instruments of national power, foreign governments, and non-governmental and international organizations. The literature identifies language ability and regional expertise as “the two most important contributing factors to success as military diplomats.”

FAOs logically function as the military representative of the Combatant Commander, not only to foreign armed forces, but also to the U.S. interagency in accordance with the combined diplomatic, economic, and military vision of strategic guidance.

In terms of military hierarchy, the GCCs reside below the policy level of OSD and on par with the Services. In a traditional principal-agent framework, one would characterize OSD as principal and the GCC as agent, each executing its respective policy and operational missions assigned in a singular relationship. In reality, however, there exists a tripartite relationship as the Services, as supporting commands, serve the GCCs, as supported commands, under the CCDRs’ responsibility to carry out regionally aligned missions for the Secretary of Defense (Figure 1). This relationship does not override the standing military hierarchy concerning GCCs’ lack of authority to direct the Services: how and when the Services develop and provide FAO capability. The GCCs and the Services remain accountable to OSD and maintain a working peer relationship with one another. In this regard, two of agency theory’s assumptions founder: the principal’s hierarchical and exclusive relationships with its agent.

On the other hand, the GCCs are in a better position relative to OSD, as statutory principal, and the Services, as agent, to determine the requirements of the Joint FAO Program. First, we have already characterized the Joint FAO Program as specifically designed to support the Joint and foreign missions under the CCDR’s purview. The OSD-Service contract therefore legitimizes the distinctive Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) capabilities of the FAO in demand by GCCs to enhance the regional focus across diverse

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nations. Since the Joint FAO Program’s inception, the GCCs overtly recognize the FAO’s inherent value as possessing a unique skill set of language proficiency, regional expertise, and country perspective. The Joint Staff captures this sentiment in its 2013 FAO report to OSD, stating “Their depth of experience and unique understanding of politico-military relationships and cultural norms and their familiarity with Defense Attaché Offices, security assistance, the U.S. Country Team, and U.S. interagency processes make FAOs invaluable” to the GCC.

GCCs emerge, then, as “principal-in-practice:” a principal with the preference, will, and doctrinal charge to employ FAO expertise, yet lacking the structural hierarchy or statutory authority to affect contractual obligations and behaviors of its agent, the Services (Figure 1). In short, the GCC represents the inverse of OSD in terms of agency theory’s contractual assumptions. The result is OSD’s weak oversight, primarily through the bureaucratic monitoring mechanism of the DoD Annual FAO Report, that permits Service cultures to

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39 The LREC acronym refers to the three primary skill sets exhibited by a FAO as outlined in DoDD 1315.17 and DoDI 1315.20. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODI 1315.20,” 2.
40 The Joint Staff, Joint Staff and Combatant Command Foreign Area Officer Report Fiscal Year 2013, 2.
create a pattern of mixed FAO capability. However, this differentiation results in disparate forces available to the GCCs. Instead, GCCs prefer that FAOs maintain a common, Joint set of LREC expertise driven by evolving mission requirements over agency interests or funding streams; in essence, OSD’s stated intent.\footnote{William E. Ward, “An Open Letter to FAOs,” \textit{International Affairs} XIV, no. 1 (February 2011): 16.}

**Conclusion: Issue Framing**

To summarize, this analysis views the Joint FAO Program through the lens of agency theory, a relationship between a service requestor (principal) and a service provider (agent) as an issue of aligning preferences and behavior based on the costs of the principal's oversight. Three core assumptions underpin the theory. First is the principal's hierarchical superiority to its agent. Second, the principal maintains not only the authority but also the will to alter the service contract to adjust to a dynamic strategic environment, based on the principal’s intimate knowledge of what it wants and needs from the agent. Last, the theory assumes a one-to-one contractual relationship.

However, Joint FAO policy establishes a three-way relationship with OSD as the statutory principal. OSD(P&R) sits atop the military hierarchy, responsible for designing and overseeing the Secretary's policies. The fact that the Services primarily provide FAOs to Joint commands rather than OSD inhibits the principal-by-statute's ability and interest in closely monitoring the Services’ behavior to satisfy the contract. OSD, then, prefers the Services abide by its directive in support of the GCCs with minimal oversight. The DoD Annual FAO Report indirectly monitors programmatic mechanics rather than providing accountability for Service effectiveness.

Additionally, GCCs constitute a third party, complicating the relationship. The GCCs function as a “principal-in-practice” a service contract end-user of the Joint FAO but lacking the authority or exclusive relationship with the Services to alter directly their behavior towards aligning FAO capability with the GCCs' regional mission. The GCC prefers a FAO possessing a consistent set of LREC capabilities, regardless of service, to serve as a military diplomat in support of the interagency-focused NSS and complex
regional politico-military affairs. While purporting the strategic importance of the FAO, the theme since the first FAO Report in 2006 is that the GCCs have not received a consistent FAO capability in either quantity or quality.\textsuperscript{42}

The observation that the Services have not optimized their respective FAO programs in support of the GCC is not new.\textsuperscript{43} Yet the primary discussion regarding how to improve the FAO community from the Service perspective revolves around the single-track versus dual-track career path.\textsuperscript{44} The central issue remains that the demand for fully qualified FAOs exceeds the supply.\textsuperscript{45} At the same time, a former Geographic CCDR recounts that OSD is “positive and appears to promote the Service initiatives as the path to ultimate success.”\textsuperscript{46} The intent for the remainder of this paper is to disaggregate how two of the Services, the Army and Air Force, address this disparity.

The next two chapters build upon agency theory’s underlying arguments and focus on the resultant FAO products each Service develops rather than delving into the well-tread debate over career tracking. Chapter 4 explores Army Service culture as a contributing factor in determining how that Service regards its FAO. Chapter 5 continues this exercise in a review of the Air Force RAS program. The question agency theory offers is, “What can and should the principals do to (re)align the Services’ programs more closely with the GCCs’


\textsuperscript{44} Currently, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy follow the single-track method and the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force follow the dual-track method. For further background on career tracks, the Foreign Area Officer Association journals (FAO Journal, 1997-2010; International Affairs, 2010-Present) contain numerous articles articulating the costs and benefits of each approach.


\textsuperscript{46} Ward, “Rethinking Foreign Area Officer Management,” 50.
need for FAO expertise?” This thought provides a context from which to consider OSD’s and the GCCs’ options for Joint FAO Program monitoring, which will provide the basis for the recommendations in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4

Cultural Momentum and the U.S. Army FAO

A key phrase describes FAOs as "regionally focused experts in political military operations with advanced language skills and cultural understanding." Yet your training, education and cultural awareness are not standardized. We need to rethink this. All FAOs should have a common set of required skills in order to operate in a foreign country. This should not be driven by agencies and funding streams, but by the mission.

General William “Kip” Ward, February 2011

The word ‘culture’ is exceedingly broad, conjuring up diverse images and meanings to anyone invoking the term. Within the culture concept, a vibrant literature exists addressing the factors and impacts of organizational culture on such things as international relations, bureaucracy, and politics. A general tendency among scholars, however, is to limit discussion of military organizational culture to an aggregation of the separate Services as a single, monolithic establishment displaying a homogenous identity and set of preferences. Feaver also falls victim to this trend, developing agency theory through the dichotomy of civil-military relations.1 To the contrary, “there is no uniform professional military ‘self-interest’ or creed to use as a benchmark,” necessitating further disaggregation of the individual Services to an extent that exposes their underlying preferences and tendencies in the absence of more stringent oversight.2 The purpose of the next two chapters is to reveal specific Service cultures influential on the Joint FAO Program, nested within the structural framework of agency theory.

Cultural Momentum

In a review of organizational-theory literature, RAND researcher Carl Builder’s The Masks of War persists as the cornerstone on military culture. Published in 1989, Builder’s ideas endure, largely because he is one of few scholars to expose the distinct aspects contributing to each Service’s

worldview. Feaver acknowledges, “organizational culture serves to provide mutual conceptions of behavior, allowing actors in a political game to have shared expectations of what the other will do. These cultural factors had great explanatory power in determining when subordinates would work or shirk.” Builder’s argument clarifies why and how the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, as distinct agents, perceive and pursue their respective foreign expertise. The importance of Service disaggregation is that culture bias in the Joint FAO Program is as significant an impediment to supporting the GCCs as any resource constraint.

Explicitly defining Service culture is an important first step in this analysis, and is one area Builder’s concept lacks. Despite a thorough examination, his research speaks to various aspects of culture without offering a definition. For this, other scholars provide the context for the military-culture argument. Edgar Schein, for example, defines group culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” In her dissertation surveying cultural impact on military doctrine, Elizabeth Kier views organizational culture as “the set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, and the forms, or practices whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed, and communicated to the members of an organization...the collection of ideas and beliefs about armed force—both its conduct and its relationship to wider society.” Similarly, Adam Stulberg and Michael Salomone, in their study on military technological change as a

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reflection of organizational culture, describe culture as “those norms and values that are widely shared and intensely held throughout the organization—for the effectiveness of organizations at performing tasks in stable environments.”

Jeffrey Donnithorne concisely encapsulates the preceding current in his thesis on military culture by defining it as “the prevailing personality of an organization, rooted in its collective history, enduring over time, and comprised of assumptions from which it forms a basis for future action.” Despite their differences, each characterization shares common features, namely an enduring mindset among an organization’s personnel and an influence on decision-making.

Personality is a characterization of the Service, a simplification that represents certain profound, pervasive, and persistent traits embedded in the institutional psyche. Builder asserts this personality shapes how the Services “perceive war and then plan and buy and train forces,” making them the most powerful institutions in American national security. To that end, Builder constructs five “faces” of Service personality, highlighting each respective branch’s cultural differences:

- **Altars for Worship** identify the Service’s most revered principle(s) or ideal(s)
- The tendency to **Measure Themselves** against some institutional standard
- The ways in which the Service devotes and prides itself concerning **Toys** (tangibles) versus the **Arts** (intangibles)
- **Intraservice Distinctions** describe the internal cleavages across distinct subordinate units and subcultures
- **Institutional Legitimacy and Relevancy** refers to the Service’s self-perception and need to distinguish its missions and capabilities

Examining how each of these aspects pertain to the Army and the Air Force sets the stage for how closely each adheres to its institutional personality against minimalist Joint FAO Program requirements. Before delving into the cases,

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9 Donnithorne, “Culture Wars,” 23.
however, one final point regarding organizational culture requires attention: the concept of cultural momentum.

Although the emphasis of this analysis is on the impact of Service culture within the agency-theory construct, it is important to note that it is simply one of several possible intervening variables. Organizational culture, while influential, is not exclusive in its ability to determine in every instance how and why the Services act as they do. Borrowing from the literature on military technology and innovation, the term that best captures this idea is ‘momentum.’ In response to determinism, a school of thought in which people perceive technology as controlling social behavior, Thomas P. Hughes, an American technology historian, coins the idea of technological momentum. Momentum asserts that over time, as artifacts, ideas, and processes grow, so do their ability (versus inevitability) to influence decision-making and action.\textsuperscript{12} The key difference between determinism and momentum lies in the degree of freedom individuals or organizations retain in order to alter a course of action.

Modified for the organizational approach, cultural momentum accounts for those aspects of Service personality significantly affecting decision-makers’ worldview while recognizing a level of agency and freedom of action in the face of tremendous historical institutional bias. In short, Service culture shapes how and why the Army and Air Force design their respective FAO programs within the framework established by OSD. With this discussion of Service culture and cultural momentum now complete, the first case in the Joint FAO Program examines the Army FAO through the lens of Service culture.

\textbf{The Army FAO as a Reflection of Army Culture}

Builder’s “five faces” expressly capture the foundational elements of Army culture, which will help determine the extent the Army FAO is a product of its Service. The current QDR offers some insight into Army character: “Since their inception, Army forces have been employed to win and safeguard our freedom, deter and defeat aggression, render aid to civilian populations, build and sustain alliances, develop the security forces of other nations to enhance collective security and respect human rights and civilian governance, and

\textsuperscript{12} Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., \textit{Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 101–113.
defend our national interests.”\textsuperscript{13} The essence of the Secretary’s statement suggests a personal and, when possible, collaborative quality to the Army mission. Builder’s explanations further this notion.

**Altar**

Army altars for worship center on trust. Builder writes, “Of all the military services, the Army is the most loyal servant and progeny of this nation, of its institutions and people.”\textsuperscript{14} Above all, Army leadership prioritizes a respect for human relations, a trait closely related to the enduring, relational nature of international cooperation.\textsuperscript{15}

**Measurement**

When measuring itself, the Army’s primary focus is the health of the force, which translated means personnel numbers rather than equipment.\textsuperscript{16} As the largest of all Services, and having the longest-running FAO program, the Army can measure the health of its FAO component, in part, based on its size.\textsuperscript{17} As of 2013, 1,304 Army FAOs accounted for more than 50 percent of the entire Joint FAO force.\textsuperscript{18}

**Arts over Toys**

How the Army values the art of war over the toys of war links closely to the health of its force. Largely, soldiering skills take precedence over the number, type, or technological innovation of combat hardware. “For the Army officer, other officers, NCOs, and soldiers are all valuable resources to be respected for the expertise and experience they bring to the officer’s warfighting

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] Builder, *The Masks of War*, 22.
\item[17] In Army parlance, combat arms specialties belong to a branch, to which personnel directly access, train, promote, and advance in their given career path. Functional Areas (FA) comprise a career track to which personnel may only access after obtaining a primary branch qualification. Once transferred into a functional area, personnel progress in that career field independent from their original branch designation.
\end{footnotes}
task,” reflecting, according to one political scientist, a universal appreciation for the human interaction central to the FAO’s vocation.19

**Intraservice Distinction**

Disaggregation within the Army would reveal intraservice distinctions, primarily along the “traditional combat arms and all others, who are seen in (and fully accept) support roles.”20 The FAO designation allows combat-proven soldiers to pursue a dedicated path independent of their original branch, and to remain professionally competitive without reducing combat capability. In fact, “the Army FAO program provides a longstanding tradition of trained regional experts, a foundation and model from which other Services adjust to meet their own needs.”21 The Army’s 1997 change came about explicitly to correct a negative promotion trend, allowing foreign expertise to flourish.22

**Institutional Legitimacy and Relevancy**

As the oldest and largest branch, the Army tends not to question its own legitimacy or relevancy, believing war ultimately is decided on the ground.23 One analyst observes that “Regardless of administration, policy, strategy, military budgets, or doctrine, the Army supported a foreign area expertise program. The fact that the Army continuously maintained a program and routinely modified it for greater effect indicates the reasonable prioritization of the program.”24 As early as the 1940s, the Army unilaterally legitimized a role it continues to view as pertinent to its mission absent external guidance to develop this capability.

Builder’s five faces of military culture offer a basis to understand Army-specific values and beliefs. Applied to the Army FAO, the underlying appreciation for human interaction lends itself to a robust program seemingly independent of external oversight. In short, Army Service culture, functioning within the structural autonomy of agency theory outlined in Chapter 3, should

favor ‘working,’ or closely abiding by both the letter and the intent of OSD policy. The following section considers the primary monitoring metrics reviewed by OSD(P&R) through its Annual FAO Report as well as several areas in which oversight does not exist. The intent of this study is to test Feaver’s agency theory and Builder’s military-culture argument in addressing GCC FAO needs.

**Monitored: Work or Shirk?**

As part of its own policy, OSD(P&R) requires that it “review, as part of the DoD FAO review and reporting process, the standardized metrics for monitoring DoD FAO accession, retention, promotion, and utilization rates,” further defining the reporting requirements in an enclosure to DoDI 1315.20. As Avant observed, these metrics serve as proxies to gauge the effectiveness of Service programs and the Joint program as a whole. This section delves into the metrics reported by the Army from FY06-13 to determine the extent to which the Service works or shirks.

**FAO Selection Criteria and Accession Process**

Army soldiers voluntarily enter the FAO program between seven and nine years of service after grounding themselves in a combat-arms branch. The Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP) solicits qualified officers directly, accepting applicants from all career fields. This accession process, jointly managed by Army Headquarters’ Strategic Leadership Division (HQDA G3/5/7) and Human Resources Command (HRC), does not set quotas particular to any combat-arms branch and accepts 100 personnel annually in order to meet a sustainment goal of 88 FAOs per year group. The intent is to abide by a “best person concept,” recruiting those individuals uniquely suited for the academic,

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26 “The FAO Functional Area seeks officers with demonstrated language skills, graduate study experience, and regional/international professional experience as a civilian, student, or Soldier. Officers who have previously received master’s degrees in a regional or international discipline and have shown, through a Defense Language Proficiency Test or Defense Language Aptitude Battery an ability to learn a foreign language will be given special consideration during the accessions process.” Department of the Army, “Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management” (Department of the Army, December 3, 2014), 27–3.

professional, and personal rigors of the FAO career, rather than designing an artificial allocation based on occupational specialty.  

**FAO Qualification Education and Training**  
Adhering to the most direct guidance OSD stipulates, the Army maintains a robust path in qualification, training, and education to FAO certification. Upon selection, potential FAOs typically complete language training at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), followed by a one-year In-Region Training (IRT) within their designated region, and end with a regionally focused Master’s Degree. Two characteristics of the Army model make it “largely regarded by both supervisors and FAOs alike as the ‘ideal’ or benchmark compared to all the other Services:” the IRT model and civilian-based education.

In-Region Training constitutes an immersion experience incorporating training objectives designed by the foreign area officer in coordination with the Functional Area (FA) staff. Given a budget within which to obtain housing, transportation, additional language courses, and professional-development opportunities, the individual is responsible for planning and completing his yearlong engagement to maximize his professional experience and expertise as well as his personal growth inclusive of his family. IRT frequently includes participation in Host Nation professional military education (PME) courses, allowing the FAO to forge individual relationships with his foreign counterparts, practice his language in a professional setting, and gain the perspective of a military with which he is likely to work in the future.

Upon return to the U.S., the Army sends its FAOs to civilian universities for their regional education. Studying under some of the top academics for the designated region involves two primary tradeoffs. First, and of primary concern to OSD, is the higher cost associated with civilian institutions. On average, the Army pays 41 percent more for its graduates than the Air Force. Second, and

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28 Franklin, The U.S. Army FAO and the Joint FAO Program.  
30 Headquarters Army Strategic Leadership Division (G3/5/7), “In-Region Training (IRT)” (Joint FAO Course, Phase I, Monterey, CA, January 12, 2015).  
outside OSD’s purview, is the fact that nearly all other Joint FAOs attend the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, where they begin to forge relationships with their regional U.S. peers in expectation those connections pay dividends in future assignments. Although external networking broadens the officer’s professional network, the balance lies in pursuing education through leading regional-studies institutions at the expense of early professional military peer networking.

These intangibles are difficult for OSD to quantify. In their place, training-completion rates and costs substitute for metrics to indicate the health of the Army’s FAO force. Army FAOs historically complete their qualification prerequisites at a rate above 90 percent, sufficient to maintain 88 FAOs per year. The table below reflects the Army FAO training budget, funded entirely by Army Headquarters. Of particular importance, however, is the fact that OSD does not require the Services to track sustainment education and training completion or costs. The last section of this chapter addresses FAO sustainment directly, but herein lies one of the fundamental flaws in the Joint FAO Program: OSD’s expectation of a “fire-and-forget” capability, which in fact requires a continuous maintenance of language and regional expertise.


33 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DoD 2010 Annual Foreign Area Officer Report, 25.
Table 1: U.S. Army FAO Initial Training and Education Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language Training</td>
<td>$45.0</td>
<td>$51.0</td>
<td>$51.0</td>
<td>$122.9</td>
<td>$123.0</td>
<td>$131.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Region Training</td>
<td>$85.0</td>
<td>$85.0</td>
<td>$85.0</td>
<td>$85.0</td>
<td>$85.0</td>
<td>$103.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Education</td>
<td>$13.0</td>
<td>$15.6</td>
<td>$16.2</td>
<td>$14.8</td>
<td>$21.7</td>
<td>$25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average cost per FAO</td>
<td>$143.0</td>
<td>$151.6</td>
<td>$152.2</td>
<td>$222.7</td>
<td>$229.7</td>
<td>$259.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DoD Annual FAO Reports FY06-11

FAO Promotion

Having completed the certification process, Army FAOs compete for assignment, command, and promotion within the Functional Area. Prior to 1997, FAOs retained their basic branch qualification and navigated two careers, and promotion rates suffered as a result of the Functional Area’s subordination to combat arms.34 The dedication of FAOs to a single path generated higher promotion rates, sustaining the FAO force necessary to develop senior and, potentially, general officers.

Table 2: U.S. Army Promotion Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-5 FAO</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5 Avg</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-6 FAO</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-6 Avg</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DoD Annual FAO Reports, FY06-11

The metrics shown in the table reflect relatively consistent performance in comparison to the combat arms. Not shown in the table is the fact that, even in years in which FAO promotions fell below Service averages, the ebbs and flows of promotion coupled with attrition balanced out to meet the Army’s calculation to meet anticipated demand for O-5 and O-6 FAOs. Additionally,

34 Franklin, The U.S. Army FAO and the Joint FAO Program.
the Army remains the sole service as yet to promote FAOs to general officer, most recently in FY13.\textsuperscript{35}

**FAO Utilization**

The utilization metric marries Service FAO supply with Geographic Combatant Command demand. As mentioned earlier, the *quantity* of FAOs the GCCs receive consistently falls short of their requirements for language and regional expertise, whether in an Embassy or on staff. The Army formally recognizes the nature of this demand and unilaterally lays out a progression for the FAO in its career-management document. According to this guidance, “FAOs should successfully complete at least one assignment from three of the following five categories before promotion to colonel.”\textsuperscript{36}

(a) *Overseas* U.S. *country team*. Assignments include Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attachés, Army Attaché, Assistant Army Attaché, and security cooperation/assistance positions in a Security Cooperation Organizations.

(b) *Army operational*. Assignments include positions at the 162\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Brigade, Army Service Component Command, Corps headquarters, and Army Staff.

(c) *Political-military*. Assignments include OSD Staff, Joint Staff, National Security Staff, Department of State, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and combatant commands.

(d) *Institutional*. Assignments include HRC, Defense Language Institute, U.S. Military Academy, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Armed Center Fort Leavenworth, Army War College Carlisle Barracks, and Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.

(e) *Contingency support*. FAOs deploy in support of overseas contingency operations. Deployed FAOs provide unique skill sets for senior Army and Joint, Interagency, and Intergovernmental, and Multinational leaders at the tactical, operational, and strategic level.

From the OSD perspective, the utilization metric that matters is its 95 percent goal for filling FAO-coded billets, which is not formally regulated, yet first appears in the inaugural FAO Report in 2006.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} Strategic Leadership Division (G3/5/7), “United States Army Foreign Area Officer Annual Report - Fiscal Year 2013,” 19.

\textsuperscript{36} Department of the Army, “DA PAM 600-3,” 27–3.

To that end, the table below reflects the Army’s measurements against that standard since 2007. It is the only Service that approached the 95-percent threshold (FY07), otherwise averaging approximately 90-percent. In response to this gap, the Strategic Leadership Division prefers to leave a FAO position open rather than filling it with an unqualified officer. However, as indicated by the “FAO qualified fills,” the Army is substituting for fully qualified FAOs a number of “best-fit” officers (12-18 percent), which the GCCs explicitly allege undermines the FAO mission. On the other hand, committing to the FAO’s Joint nature, 82 percent of Army FAO jobs are in Joint commands, minimizing the need to recapture personnel for Army-centric jobs apart from the FAO community. The remainder of those needs derive from Service support directly to the FAO community (categories b and d above) and war-fighting deployments, which the Army considers its primary mechanism for keeping FAOs tied to the operational Army, as competence in the profession of arms remains the most cited detractor from the single-track FAO construct. All this is to say that in response to GCC requirements, the Army has a dedicated FAO force focused predominantly on support to the regional mission, though in terms of quantity the Service falls short in meeting the OSD mandate.

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38 Franklin, The U.S. Army FAO and the Joint FAO Program.
40 Franklin, The U.S. Army FAO and the Joint FAO Program; Alrich, Adams, and Biltoc, The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers, 8.
Table 3: U.S. Army FAO Utilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GCCs' Army FAO Supply &amp; Demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA FAO billet allocation  237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA FAO billet fills        210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA FAO-qualified fills     0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA FAO total fill rate    88.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DoD Annual FAO Reports FY06-11, Joint Staff/CCMD Annual Reports, FY06-13, U.S. Army FAO Report FY13
Note: FAO-qualified fill data only available for FY12-13

**Unmonitored: Work or Shirk?**

In contrast to those areas specifically monitored by OSD, additional areas remain unmonitored yet integral to the success of the Army FAO. These areas are either qualitative and, thus, challenging to measure, or fall within the realm of measurable yet unenforced by the principal-by-statute. In either case, the Service philosophy, the approach to sustainment education and training, and the need to maintain the military specialty also warrant consideration.

**Service FAO Philosophy**

The Army philosophy for its FAO program centers on the individual and his contribution to the Joint mission.

Army FAOs are Soldiers grounded in the profession of Arms; deliberately accessed, trained, educated and developed to provide leadership and expertise in diverse organizations in joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environments; who advise senior leaders as regional experts; and who offer unique warfighting competencies — cross-cultural capabilities, interpersonal communications, and foreign-language skills — that are critical to mission readiness of the Army in today’s dynamic strategic environment.⁴¹

⁴¹ Department of the Army, “DA PAM 600-3,” 27–1a.
The expectation is for the foreign area officer to immerse himself in the development of National Military Strategy, Joint doctrine and policy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations, serving under a unified command, spending extended periods away from the Army proper. The career timeline below reflects this vision and is a guide for individual officers to plan their professional development and progression.

The goal for Army FAO development is to have a bench of senior officers with regional and language expertise. On one hand, O-6 FAOs will have proven themselves experts and be positioned to advise the Combatant Commander directly. On the other hand, the Army remains the only Service to promote FAOs to general officer, and these senior leaders are currently serving in leadership positions across the globe. In general, the Army outlines a deliberate vision and expectations for what a FAO is and what he is to do. Army philosophy reflects an institutional appreciation for this role in national strategy, which one would expect of a Service historically vested in the concept.

![FAO Career Timeline](image)

**Figure 2: U.S. Army FAO Career Timeline**  
*Source: U.S. Army FAO Branch Brief, HRC, 2015*

42 Department of the Army, “DA PAM 600-3,” 27–2.
43 At the time of this writing, Army FAO general officers include: MG Charles Hooper serves as SDO/DATT in Cairo, Egypt; MG Simeon Trombitas serves as SDO/DATT in Mexico City, Mexico; BG Matthew Brand serves as Deputy Chief, Strategic Plans and Policy, NATO Allied Command Transformation; BG Mark Gillette serves as SDO/DATT in Beijing, China.
Sustainment Education and Training

Having discussed the metrics reviewed by OSD relating to FAO quantity, sustainment education and training denote the quality a GCC expects. Unfortunately, as quality measurements tend to be subjective, this is an area OSD generally avoids. Having set the basic qualification requirements of a FAO, OSD’s perception is that the Services will design and implement their respective programs as they see fit without the statutory principal needing to delineate further guidance for personnel development. According to agency theory, this constitutes a monitoring gap the Services will exploit to their advantage. How they go about doing so reflects their particular Service cultures. With regard to the Army, the discussion centers on language capability and the Joint FAO Course.

Army doctrine states, “Fully trained FAOs are required to conduct a structured self-development program to continue to refine and further develop the FAO core competencies and skills. The FAO proponent, the office responsible for Service FAO policy, structures self-development program guidance that will assist fully qualified FAOs in shaping their own programs. These programs should be a combination of self-study, resident and virtual training, as well as a variety of assignments that will add breadth and depth to their FAO experience within their assigned region.” In large part, this places the burden of sustaining skills on the individual.

In terms of language proficiency, Army G3/5/7 unilaterally reduced its FAO standard, requiring a minimum of ‘2’ in two modalities and a ‘1+’ in the third. In Interagency Language Roundtable nomenclature, this equates to a linguist with elementary to limited proficiency, well short of the professional capability necessary for strategic dialogue. As a result, 66 percent of Army

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44 Rouse, Perspective from the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) on the Joint FAO Program.
45 The U.S. Army’s FAO Proponent is Headquarters Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training (HQDA G3/5/7). The Strategic Leadership Division is the HQDA Office of Responsibility.
46 Department of the Army, “DA PAM 600-3,” 27–3.
47 Headquarters Army Strategic Leadership Division (G3/5/7), “Foreign Area Officer (FAO) MEL-4 Training and Education Standards” (Department of the Army, July 12, 2013).
FAOs fail to meet the OSD contract of ‘3’ listening and reading with a speaking goal of ‘3’.

Additionally, the FAO Proponent does not require Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) testing beyond the requisite DLI graduation exam.

The Army incentivizes language maintenance on an individual level through Foreign Language Pay, which ties directly to the best two out of three Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) and OPI scores. For non-native or heritage speakers, this incentivizes testing in only listening and reading as the easiest of the three modalities for a foreign speaker to master. In fact, the Strategic Leadership Division advocates reducing the threshold across the community to ‘2+’ in order to allow more individuals to certify as FAOs per regulation. Additionally, the automated process of scheduling, taking, and scoring the DLPT proves a simpler process than conducting an OPI for both the tester and the interviewer(s).

Conversely, Army FAOs complete repetitive in-country assignments, which remain the proponent’s primary means of maintaining language capability. The expectation is cumulative learning and mastery of at least one language, if not more, native to the region through continual exposure. This approach reflects the Army’s culture that emphasizes the importance of the individual and the necessity of human interaction, but ultimately masks the fact that a majority of FAOs do not meet minimum language requirements in support of Joint agencies.

The Army’s Joint FAO Orientation Course, Phase I (JFAOC), however, demonstrates an unparalleled commitment to sustainment education and training. Managed by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the JFAOC is a deliberately planned course for all Joint FAOs. Offered twice a year in Monterey, the 40-hour seminar includes FAOs and their families and incorporates presentations from ambassadors, general and flag officers, combatant command representatives, and senior FAOs to prepare junior officers for their careers. Army initiated and funded, JFAOC is unique in that the senior Service autonomously pursued a way to help professionalize the

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48 Strategic Leadership Division (G3/5/7), “United States Army Foreign Area Officer Annual Report - Fiscal Year 2013,” 34.
49 Franklin, The U.S. Army FAO and the Joint FAO Program.
Joint FAO force, independent of external pressure or direction.\footnote{Franklin, The U.S. Army FAO and the Joint FAO Program.} Given OSD’s absence of sustainment requirements and resources, the Army partially filled the gap.

**Military Specialty**

As mentioned throughout this chapter, the Army transitioned from a dual- to a single-track career in 1997. Though the Service is required to report on maintenance of the primary military specialty to OSD, this metric proves moot for the Army, as FA48 is the only relevant qualification for the FAO.\footnote{The Army’s personnel and manpower designation for the Foreign Area Officer Functional Area is FA48.} This analysis has already highlighted the benefits of this construct: a focused skill set, increased competitiveness for promotion, command, and assignment, and a dedicated force for the Joint environment.

The difficulty of keeping FAOs grounded in the profession of arms is a tradeoff the Army chose in order to cultivate a corps of internationally adept officers. At each grade, the FAO completes a Key Development assignment, inclusive of those in the career timeline, which validates the individual’s professional qualification.\footnote{Department of the Army, “DA PAM 600-3,” 27–4.} Relying on his foundational combat-arms experience and operational deployments, the Army opts to strike a balance in favor of the dedicated FAO.

**Conclusion**

Within the agency theory framework, OSD’s contract with the Services requires reporting certain behavioral indicators as proxies for the health of the Joint FAO Program. Simultaneously, OSD affords the Services a large measure of autonomy, allowing organizational cultures to influence how and why they pursue the courses of action they do. The preceding analysis detailed the Army’s response to OSD through its FAO program, considering the areas OSD monitors and areas it does not.

Drawing on Builder’s Service culture construct, the Army FAO program reflects Army personality in a number of ways. The FAO proponent relies on the “best person concept,” recruiting the most qualified soldiers available for the challenging personal and professional path ahead. The trust the Army bestows
on foreign area officers reflects its understanding of human relations and the importance it assigns to international cooperation.\textsuperscript{53}

The health of the Army FAO force derives, in large part, from its size and proportion to the Joint force.\textsuperscript{54} Additionally, the Army takes pride in the fact that its program sets the Department standard for how stakeholders believe the Joint FAO program ought to run and the fact that it is the oldest in the business. Numbers also reflect, however, that even when OSD is watching, the areas of most concern to the GCCs, FAO personnel quantity and quality still fall short despite spending the most of any service on FAO training. Although the Army FAO construct appears healthy, there are areas in which it must improve if the Service is going to meet the principal-in-practice’s needs.

The distinctive ‘art of the FAO’ in the Army rests on three factors: the fact that IRT lasts a year, twice the basic OSD requirement, the Joint FAO Orientation Course, and consecutive assignments. Emphasis on individual experience and sustaining that experience, both through continual regional exposure and the Army’s own version of FAO PME, reveals a commitment to the extensive time necessary to develop linguistic and regional expertise. At its core, the program conveys an appreciation for the expertise FAOs bring to the war fighting commands.

In terms of intraservice distinction, the establishment of the FAO Functional Area, separate from combat arms branches, in fact manifested in greater prestige within the Army. Although the FAO role cannot replace those of operational warfighters, a sense of mutual support exists between the combat arms and operational support institutionalized through promotions and FAO general officers.

All of these ‘faces’ combine to legitimize a role the Army deliberately carved out for itself. Having recognized the value of language fluency and regional expertise, by World War II the Service sought to institutionalize this capacity. The cultural momentum the Army began to foster in the 1940s manifested by 2005 as the Army FAO program had consolidated its

\textsuperscript{53} Mastroianni, “Occupations, Cultures, and Leadership in the Army and Air Force,” 84.
organizational structure around an institutional appreciation for linguistic and regional acumen. This period of prolonged growth culminated in a clear vision and set of goals for the FAO, particularly with respect to his role in the Joint environment. The freedom of action the Army enjoyed throughout the first six decades of its foreign-expertise development not only built a robust capability within the Army, but its momentum also served as the template for all other Services and as the basis for the Joint Program itself. OSD guidance in 2005 closely followed the Army lead in order to codify a similar role for the Joint force.

The evidence, as offered by the Army, OSD, and the GCCs, shows that the Army predominantly ‘works’ in the Joint FAO Program. Many intangibles outside the realm of annual metrics reflect a cultural momentum favoring the pursuit of a robust corps of officers wielding international insight. The two areas in which the Army could be regarded as shirking are in meeting the 95-percent manning threshold and adhering to professional language standards. Chapter 6 will address oversight mechanisms OSD should consider to bridge the preference gap between the Army and the GCCs in these two critical areas. The next step, however, is to examine the Air Force RAS program through the lens of Air Force Service culture as another case to test both Feaver and Builder prior to concluding with recommendations for the Joint FAO Program.

Chapter 5

Cultural Momentum and the U.S. Air Force RAS

We must deliberately develop a cadre of Air Force professionals with international insight, foreign language proficiency and cultural understanding—Airmen who have the right skill sets to understand the specific regional context in which air and space power may be applied.

General John Jumper, May 2005

The U.S. Air Force Regional Affairs Strategist program offers an analytical counterbalance to its Army peer. Emerging from a FAO-like predecessor, the RAS program became a new path for the Air Force in 2005, making it one of two new Service FAO concepts and purposefully differentiated from its failed precursor as reflected in General Jumper’s introductory statement. The Air Force pursues its foreign and linguistic expertise through the dual-career model, which has certain deterministic outcomes evident throughout this examination.

In his thesis exploring Air Force Service culture, Jeffrey Donnithorne observed, “National security policies consonant with a service’s long-standing organizational culture will likely generate cooperation, while a policy inconsistent with the culture’s basic assumptions will set the conditions for resistance.”¹ When viewed through Builder’s “five-faces” framework, Air Force Service culture begins to shine through the Joint FAO principal-agent construct, particularly in those areas counter to the organization’s preferences and in areas relevant but unmonitored by the principal-by-statute. George Mastroianni concisely captured this tendency when he commented, “In the Air Force, the brotherhood of pilots is necessarily somewhat separated from the experiences of others by virtue of the specialized nature of the task…the myth of the solitary and heroic single-combat warrior is important to Air Force culture, and it conditions the understanding of Air Force leaders about the essential nature of leadership.”² Institutionally, the Air Force hesitates to

disperse the tactical and technical prowess of its fighting forces for fear that doing so might dilute their proficiency in missions it deems more important.\textsuperscript{3}

This chapter explores specifically how and why the Air Force resolves this dichotomy of technical specialty with the human-relations nature of the RAS. Founded upon Builder’s culture framework, this chapter explores pertinent behavioral indicators, both monitored and unmonitored, in order to paint a full picture of Air Force Joint FAO support. This case is the final element for the observations and recommendations to amend the Joint FAO contract between the principals and agents to improve Service support to the GCCs.

\textbf{The Air Force RAS as a Reflection of Air Force Culture}

Just as Builder delineated the five faces of the Army, he describes the Air Force’s personality through the same analytical tool. This section outlines Air Force culture and the RAS as its product. Using the 2014 QDR as an identical reference point as in the Army analysis, the Secretary’s perception of the Air Force states:

\begin{quote}
Airpower is vital to the Department’s ability to project power globally and to rapidly respond to contingencies. The Air Force brings capabilities critical to national security in the air, in space, and in cyberspace and will continue to improve performance in each. We will incorporate next-generation equipment and concepts into the force to address sophisticated threats. Key priorities include continuing plans to field a new generation of combat aircraft and making advancements in cyber capabilities, avionics, weapons, tactics, and training.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{quote}

The report’s focus on next-generation threats, equipment, and doctrine in air, space, and cyberspace reflects a belief in the Air Force’s technological prowess rather than on skillful human interaction. Builder’s framework explores this technical basis for Air Force culture.


Altar

Builder claims the Air Force worships at the altar of technology, founded upon the genesis of the airplane as the basis for an independent air arm. This technological bias echoes Douhet’s theory of war, in which the national defense could be assured only as a result of acquiring command of the air, viewed as both necessary and sufficient to bypass and nullify the enemy’s defenses. At its very core, the Air Force worships technological superiority in the expectation of foregoing unnecessary human relations in favor of quick and decisive operations.

Measurement

A consequence of Air Force technological bias is an ingrained need to measure performance. Valuing quality over quantity manifests itself in a continual interface with the acquisitions process to identify and upgrade combat aircraft and systems. OSD’s annual requirement for quantifiable data as a measure of RAS performance (if not effectiveness) falls squarely within the Air Force’s wheelhouse.

Toys over the Arts

Continuing the technology trend, Air Force culture gives primacy to the ‘toy’ embodied by the airplane and its future capabilities. Those who fly and maintain the aircraft are viewed within the context of the machine itself. Jeffrey Donnithorne explicitly identifies this phenomenon when he states, “This is not to say that all Airmen are uninterested in the political purposes of war, but it indicates a trend that shapes the prevailing personality of the service.” Dominance of machine over man creates a steep impediment to a career path grounded in low-tech human relations.

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Intraservice Distinction

As an outflow of Air Force technological primacy, intraservice distinctions revolve around which combat platform an individual flies, maintains, or supports. As Builder puts it, “The division is between pilots and all others. Pilots are collectively on a plateau quite far removed from all others,” a distinction that resonates through all career opportunities, from promotion to professional development to senior leadership positions. The trickle-down effect is an institutional valuation for foreign expertise only as a supplementary skill set to an individual’s primary career and the mission to fly, fight, and win.

Institutional Legitimacy and Relevancy

Lastly, “as the newest of the three services and the one whose separation from the others had to be justified within living memories, [the Air Force] has always been most sensitive to defending or guarding its legitimacy as an independent institution.” Arguments surrounding the extent of air support to ground and maritime forces compel the Air Force to distinguish its roles and missions from the other Services. Perhaps second to technology might be an organizational value of autonomy, “otherwise, the Air Force serves an enabling and supporting role in which it is easily taken for granted.”

Mirroring the cultural examination in the previous chapter, this section utilizes Builder’s five faces to comprehend Air Force personality. Considering the Air Force RAS, the idea of generating a low-tech capability to leverage personal, ground-based human interaction thus seems anathema to Air Force culture. The following section surveys those areas monitored and unmonitored by OSD(P&R) to evaluate how the RAS meets GCC preferences for linguistic and international acumen. The program faces an uphill battle within its own Service, bearing in mind James Wilson’s observation that “tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended to with the same energy and resources as are devoted to tasks that are part of it.” In sum, Air Force Service culture should favor ‘shirking,’ or loosely abiding by OSD’s Joint FAO guidance.

Monitored: Work or Shirk?

As a continuation of the analysis on Service culture, this section reviews those areas of the Air Force RAS program explicitly monitored by OSD(P&R). According to agency theory, agent (Air Force) preferences ought to be observable through its degree of adherence to the standards set by the statutory principal (OSD). The following examination mirrors its corresponding section in Chapter 4: RAS selection criteria and accession process, qualification education and training, promotion, and utilization.

**RAS Selection Criteria and Accession Process**

Air Force officers typically enter the RAS program between seven and ten years of service, well after having fully qualified in a primary Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). The Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, Policy Branch (SAF/IAPA), convenes a board annually to select qualified nominees to meet its estimated need for 63 new RAS officers per year.\(^{15}\) In conjunction with SAF/IA, HAF/A1 levies a ‘fair share’ quota across all AFSCs for candidates, giving due consideration to personnel and manpower issues such as force shaping and imbalances due to attrition. For example, in 2014 and 2015, the fighter pilot career field was exempt from any new RAS levies.

Similarly, certain senior developmental education (SDE) programs designate O-6 graduates as RASs. This measure seeks to address the dearth of senior officers resident to a growing program, but also brings with it unique developmental challenges.\(^{16}\) For the officer, whether junior or senior, having met the basic qualifications, time in service, and Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) requirements, the final arbiter in the nomination process remains the primary-career-field manager at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC). In short, an individual officer interested in and qualified for RAS duty may self-identify as a candidate; however, the primary-career-field manager

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\(^{15}\) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *DoD 2011 Annual Foreign Area Officer Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 2012), 6. The U.S. Air Force’s RAS Proponent is the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (SAF/IA). The Director of Policy (SAF/IAP) manages policy and plans and serves as the Functional Manager. The International Affairs Specialist Branch (SAF/IAPA) manages the day-to-day administration.

\(^{16}\) Extensive research particular to the SDE-graduate RAS is largely beyond the scope of this thesis, but may be found in the following Air War College thesis: Thad A. Hunkins, “Regional Affairs Strategist: Deliberate Development for Senior Officers?” (Air University, 2009).
retains final authority to determine whether a given officer will be permitted to
pursue the secondary career path in international affairs.17

**RAS Qualification Education and Training**

Deriving its requirements from OSD’s directive and taking its lead from
the long-standing Army model, RAS qualification consists of three elements:
language training, graduate education, and regional experience. RAS designees
typically begin training at DLI, completing the basic language course.
Immediately upon graduation, the officers complete the first of two Regional
Affairs Strategist Immersions (RASI) for approximately three months. The RAS
then returns to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to complete an advanced
degree, followed by a second RASI to round out his initial training and
education.18 Of the three certification components, the RASI is unique to the
Air Force.

Initiated in 2009 and fully implemented in 2010, the RASI provides the
officer an immersion experience comprised of professional, linguistic, and
cultural components intended to satisfy the minimum six-month experience
stipulation.19 The immersion follows a “hub and spoke” concept, in which the
initial RASI takes place in a single country and the second allows for travel
across a number of countries within the designated region. The officer is to
complete additional language courses at local schools and work under the
supervision of the U.S. Air Attaché in order to familiarize himself with Embassy
and Interagency operations, with each element constituting approximately half
of the RASI. Throughout the immersion, the officer resides with local host
families as part of a home-stay in conjunction with existing language-school
offerings. Intended to immerse the RAS in the language with the expectation of
higher DLPT scores upon RASI completion, the RASI is an unaccompanied TDY.

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17 Gregory Christensen, The U.S. Air Force RAS and the Joint FAO Program, telephone,
January 28, 2015.
18 Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs International Affairs Program
(SAF/IAPA), “Regional Affairs Strategist Immersion (RASI),” n.d.. In addition, the Air
Force uses several PME programs like Foreign IDE, Olmstead Scholarships, and
Mansfield Fellowships to access a small number of officers into the RAS program.
19 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODI 1315.20,
Management of Department of Defense (DoD) Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs”
(Department of Defense, September 28, 2007), 8.
The Air Force excludes families from the immersion, arguing that family members would detract from the RAS’s linguistic and cultural experience. Currently overseen by SAF/IAPA, responsibility for the RASI will soon shift to the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) at Maxwell Air Force Base. In both cases, SAF/IAPA funds the immersion, provides overall objectives, and ensures policy compliance. Rather than assigning training objective design, planning, and execution responsibility to the RAS, however, SAF/IAPA contracts with companies whose responsibilities are to provide all services for the officer, from obtaining housing and transportation to scheduling language courses and cultural experiences, as approved by SAF/IAPA.20

The RASI construct creates two lost opportunities for the RAS. First, although the Air Attaché contributes to the officer’s professional experience while in the Embassy, the contractor manages nearly all aspects of training (formal cultural experiences), education (language classes), travel, and housing thereby usurping important learning and growth opportunities. Rather than allowing the officer to develop an agenda based on professional and personal objectives, a third party handles day-to-day activities key to learning and understanding a region, particularly when the officer must manage these aspects once assigned to a RAS billet.21 This construct flattens an important learning curve, resulting in the RAS coming away with an experience inferior to that of their FAO counterparts. Second, the expediency and financial benefits of excluding the officer’s family detract from the overall experience, as future assignments in the region inherently demand familial adaptability and familiarity with the language and culture. Inability to complete an in-country assignment successfully could just as easily result from familial concerns as much as the RAS’s professional competence, and the RASI program forestalls early screening of this possibility.22

20 Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs International Affairs Program (SAF/IAPA), “Regional Affairs Strategist Immersion (RASI).”
21 This construct introduces another principal-agent problem that is especially important to the RAS program yet outside the scope of this paper. Additional research might consider the specifics of RASI management to maximize its utility.
Again, quantifying RASI intangibles is difficult for OSD, and training completion and costs substitute for qualification indicators. Air Force training completion rates to certify new RASs from 2009 through 2011 fall just under 100 percent indicating a high competency rate for those nominated by their primary-career-field managers. The training costs in the table below indicate two trends in comparison to its sister Service; lower spending for both the RASI and graduate education. The lower RASI cost corresponds almost directly to immersion length: six months versus one year. In reality, the RASI expenses are for a single individual rather than an entire family, indicating that the contract option costs more per trainee in exchange for a lesser experience. As discussed in Chapter 4, NPS offers the opportunity for RASs to begin their U.S. military network upon beginning the new career path, with the added benefit that the Air Force pays up to 60 percent less for education compared to civilian institutions.

Table 4: U.S. Air Force RAS Initial Training and Education Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(thousands of dollars)</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language Training</td>
<td>$55.0</td>
<td>$55.0</td>
<td>$55.0</td>
<td>$155.5</td>
<td>$128.8</td>
<td>$132.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RASI</td>
<td>$6.7</td>
<td>$6.7</td>
<td>$12.4</td>
<td>$12.4</td>
<td>$55.0</td>
<td>$48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Education</td>
<td>$9.0</td>
<td>$9.0</td>
<td>$12.6</td>
<td>$12.6</td>
<td>$16.0</td>
<td>$16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average cost per RAS</td>
<td>$70.7</td>
<td>$70.7</td>
<td>$80.0</td>
<td>$180.5</td>
<td>$199.8</td>
<td>$196.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DoD Annual FAO Reports FY06-11

RAS Promotion

Another important dimension is promotion, a metric used by OSD to determine career viability in generating senior officers. The 2008 through 2011 Air Force metrics indicate consistently higher than average promotion rates to O-5 and O-6, which at face value should indicate a healthy RAS cadre on the rise. As mentioned in the 2006 Annual FAO Report, however, “one issue with the Services using a dual-track system is that, because officers compete for promotion against the total general officer population as a group, it is difficult

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to track year to year if sufficient officers are being promoted to fulfill the requirements for the FAO Program.”24 The details behind the metrics reveal those difficulties.

The first deliberately developed year group of RASs began training in 2006, meaning they would meet their in-the-zone O-5 selection boards in 2010-2013 and O-6 selection boards 2016-2019.25 For the O-5, this means that 2008 and 2009 promotion statistics consist of either a very small sample size (tending to skew the data) of legacy Air Force FAOs or the Air Force reported on a group of officers somehow otherwise categorized as RASs since the initial RAS assession group had not yet reached promotability. For O-5s in 2010 and 2011, as only the most senior of the 2006 year group reached in-the-zone promotion, RAS O-5 promotions normalize compared to the Air Force average.

Similarly, the inaugural RAS class has yet to reach promotability to O-6 as of this writing, yet the Air Force reported for four years on RAS O-6 promotions. This may be a reflection of grandfathered FAOs and SDE-certified officers, but creates a false sense of advancement for the deliberately developed RAS force. RAS promotion statistics represent a case of Avant’s behavioral indicators, in which the Air Force reports data OSD requested without due regard to the metrics’ significance. In his article rolling out the IAS program to the security cooperation community, Colonel Robert Sarnoski, then-SAF/IAPA Chief, stated, “While IAS implementation is proceeding at an aggressive pace, the full benefit of the transformation will take a decade or more to achieve.”26 Truth-in-advertising would explicitly indicate the complexity of tracking and attributing field-grade promotions to the RAS career field, particularly before 2019.

Last, considering the RAS’ dual-track nature, the officer competes for promotion within his primary AFSC. Promotion boards consist of senior officers representing all career fields, so specific AFSC influence is not as important as command boards and school selections, where the career field managers make

the decisions. However, if promotion is based on past job performance in light of future potential for leadership in a given functional area, the primary career takes precedence over the secondary. Recalling Wilson’s observation regarding the disparity of energy and resource devotion to subsidiary tasks, the Army can attest to FAO career subjugation to more highly valued missions.

**Table 5: U.S. Air Force Promotion Comparison**

![RAS vs. AF Promotions](chart)

*Source: DoD Annual FAO Reports FY07-11, Note: RAS-promotion reporting began in FY07 but actual statistics only available for FY08-11*

**RAS Utilization**

Revisiting the argument that the GCCs consistently make regarding the insufficient *quantity* of FAOs they receive on an annual basis, the table below represents the Air Force’s reports from 2006 through 2013. If the OSD goal of 95 percent fills for FAO positions remains valid, then the RAS program is slowly trending toward that mark as it continues to cultivate its cadre, now ten years matured. However, in light of balancing Service-wide personnel and budget reductions along with managing two career paths for a single officer, SAF/IAPA and AFPC developed their own set of assignment-fill goals completely independent from the OSD standard. In general, the Air Force goal is to fill 85 percent of all RAS billets by 2019, which conforms with the Service’s standard headquarters-staff assignment rate. In the meantime, AFPC fills 100-percent of attaché positions at the expense of all other Joint RAS assignments, which
receive some lesser percentage of RAS officers in an attempt to balance out the 85-percent goal.  

Yet even the reduced manpower numbers tell only part of the story. SAF/IA, based on managing career milestones such as PME, command, and attrition for two career fields, estimates a force-planning factor of between 2.3 to 2.8 per RAS billet. As of 2014, the Air Force had 361 fully certified RASs for 318 RAS billets, 76 percent of which resided in Joint commands. Using this data, assuming all else equal without any changes in RAS demand, the Air Force needs on the order of 730 to 890 qualified RASs to meet Joint requirements. Recognizing the program is still growing and just emerging from the first decade to which Colonel Sarnoski referred, the Air Force is only halfway there. 

In the interim, SAF/IA relies upon “best-fits” to fill the gaps. There is not a standard for best-fit officers, but SAF/IA works with the primary-career-field managers to identify individuals who may need a certain developmental tour (e.g., staff), but whom the career field is unwilling to release for recurring RAS assignments. From the Service perspective, SAF/IA fills a Joint position, the individual gets a needed assignment for career broadening, and the primary career field obtains a career milestone for the individual without long-term commitment to the RAS program. From the GCC perspective, this inward-focused Service culture saps the Joint community of the war-fighting capability for which the Joint FAO Program is intended. Although specific data is available only for 2006 (as the program’s first year) and 2012-2013, the metrics show that the Air Force uses best-fits heavily in lieu of officers linguistically and culturally qualified to support the GCC. Given that the RAS alternates between primary career and RAS positions (driving the 2.3-2.8 factor), and the Air Force meets less than one-half of GCC demand for RAS, the RAS-qualified measures (44 and 33 percent) reflect the incomplete commitment of the RAS program to the Joint force.

27 Christensen, The U.S. Air Force RAS and the Joint FAO Program. 
Table 6: U.S. Air Force RAS Utilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USAF RAS billet allocation</th>
<th>USAF RAS billet fills</th>
<th>USAF RAS-qualified fills</th>
<th>USAF RAS total fill rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY06</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY07</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY08</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY09</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY10</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY11</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY12</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY13</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DoD Annual FAO Reports FY06-11, Joint Staff/CCMD Annual Reports, FY06-13
Note: FAO-qualified fill data only available for FY06, 12-13

Unmonitored: Work or Shirk?

In keeping with the framework of Chapter 4, this section exposes several areas unmonitored by the principal-by-statute yet integral to the success of the Air Force RAS. Coupled with the measures discussed above, the following behavioral indicators flesh out Air Force performance within the Joint FAO Program’s principal-agent construct. A review of the Service philosophy, the approach to sustainment education and training, and military specialty competence, reveals that Air Force Service culture fills OSD(P&R)’s monitoring gaps.

Service RAS Philosophy

The stated SAF/IA mission is to “deliberately develop a corps of professional Airmen who have the international insight, foreign language proficiency, cultural understanding, and political-military savvy to execute the full range of Department of Defense and Air Force mission requirements” in order to produce, sustain, and project Air Force warrior-diplomats.29 Yet a

29 Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs International Affairs Program (SAF/IAPA), “International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program.”
2000 study of the Defense Department’s foreign language and area proficiencies describes a Service struggling to define how this skill set fits into a technologically focused mission. The study concludes that “For many years the Air Force has grappled with an assessment of the utility of a foreign language and area expertise among its commissioned officer corps. Although the Air Force leadership has never sanctioned area proficiencies as vital ingredients of an officer’s education or career development, it nonetheless recognizes that these skills provide at least ancillary contributions to air operations.”

Although the RAS program grew out of a fledgling FAO program after this study was published, the prevailing current of Air Force culture persists. The force-development concept is to prepare officers to fill internationally oriented jobs while maintaining their technical competency. The technological focus of the Service and the view that it changes more rapidly than other Services results in more frequent touch points with the primary career to ensure the RAS remains a good Air Force representative. Service philosophy places the value in the relevance of the RAS not in his contribution to the Joint community, but rather in his technical competency in other Air Force mission sets.

Only recently did the Chief of Staff direct SAF/IA to develop a path to pinnacle jobs for the RAS. As it currently stands, the career pyramid below culminates as an SDO/DATT or Division Chief, assuming the officer completed an adequate number of RAS assignments and gained sufficient expertise to warrant Combatant Commander consideration for such a posting. Bearing in mind the relative youth of the deliberately developed RAS force, the Chief’s direction is the first iteration from senior Service leadership to animate the discussion regarding potential RAS general officers.

31 Christensen, The U.S. Air Force RAS and the Joint FAO Program.
SAF/IA is now attempting to identify high-potential officers (HPO)\(^\text{32}\) and a way to track and manage them separately from the main force. The next step is to identify specific jobs in which an HPO RAS could potentially serve, such as in one of the rotational general officer attaché positions, within SAF/IA, or as a director of a policy and strategy staff (A5 or J5). The residual issue is that, as an institution, the Air Force will not set aside a general-officer job for a RAS.

Adam Stulberg and Michael Salomone, professors at Georgia Tech’s Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, specifically discuss the matter in their examination of technological change. With regard to establishing a new career pathway on top of an existing Service culture, they conclude:

> In practice, the creation of billets associated with the performance of new tasks may simply compete at a disadvantage with more established pathways. This is especially problematic when new assignments are merely grafted onto traditional billets and duties.

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\(^{32}\) The term high potential officer (HPO) refers to those selected for below-the-zone promotion. In the Air Force, this may occur 1 or 2 years before the primary promotion zone for O-5 and/or O-6.
with more established constituencies and powerful patrons within the service. Ultimately, material motivations for agency compliance with new directives are affected by where professional pathways are situated within the broader institutional incentive structure of the service.\(^\text{33}\)

To resolve this incentive disparity, Stephen Rosen, in *Winning the Next War*, argues a Service’s theory of victory ultimately determines its approach to win the next war based on the anticipated character of the war. This theory drives innovation through an organizational struggle over critical missions and concrete tasks contributing to success in peace and war. He writes, “Without the development of new critical tasks, ‘ideological’ innovations remain abstract and may not affect the way the organization actually behaves.”\(^\text{34}\) His solution is for politically powerful senior officers to create a new promotion pathway to the senior ranks. The officers’ legitimacy as members of the Service, as opposed to external civilian intervention, inherently validates the new skill set and paves a way for junior officers to rise to the rank of general or admiral. Rosen admits this process occurs through generational, not instantaneous, change due to the fact that control within the military stems from the influence particular communities wield over the promotion system. Until the new paths promote officers possessing the new skill set into powerful positions within the Service, it requires the political protection of those innovative senior officers and their civilian supporters in order to integrate the critical mission into the organization.\(^\text{35}\)

The Air Force case counters Rosen’s assertion that a minority group of innovators within the Service will succeed in creating an independent RAS pathway on par with established promotion pathways. Although starting the process to develop a bench of possible candidates for pinnacle RAS jobs, SAF/IA cannot earmark general-officer positions for the RAS.\(^\text{36}\) It appears the intent exists but the possibility of promoting RAS general officers remains

\(^{35}\) Rosen, *Winning the Next War*, 18–22.
\(^{36}\) Christensen, The U.S. Air Force RAS and the Joint FAO Program.
slight. This stems from the high level of control senior officers from other well-established communities have over the personnel and promotion system, reflecting a technologically based theory of victory and subservience of international acumen. In general, the Air Force is pursuing a linguistic and regional expertise capacity within its officer ranks, yet its Service culture reflects a theory of victory that prioritizes the technical roles and missions to project airpower over a stand-alone capability to foster Joint operations and international cooperation.

**Sustainment Education and Training**

RAS sustainment concerns itself with the *quality* of the officer throughout a career. Again, OSD’s contract with the Services specifies only initial requirements to certify a RAS, leaving continuing education and training to the Air Force to figure out. Agency theory anticipates the Air Force will shirk, pursuing its own interest. Builder would argue that interest echoes the Service’s technological bent.

An October 2010 memo from SAF/IAPA requires each RAS officer to “participate annually in a minimum of 40 hours of skills maintenance training in language, region, or a combination of the two.” The intent of the policy was to provide funding for RAS officers to attend language improvement or regional conferences and courses. In reality, much of the policy appeared as unfunded requirements. The first priority became initial education and training, but even within this category, SAF/IAPA does not have funds to execute all required RASIs. Sustainment education and training is secondary, with the onus being on individuals to complete their requisite 40 hours when able.

On one hand, this empowers the RAS to determine the areas in which he needs to improve most and pursue that type of training. On the other hand, and in keeping with its technological bent, the expectation is largely that no-cost online resources (courses, training modules, and podcasts) suffice to maintain professional language and cultural expertise in the absence of

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37 Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs International Affairs Program (SAF/IAPA), “RAS Officer Skills Maintenance Training Policy” (Department of the Air Force, October 8, 2010).
38 Christensen, The U.S. Air Force RAS and the Joint FAO Program.
adequate funding. Additionally, for most opportunities requiring travel, SAF/IA defers to the RAS’s unit to pay the bill rather than draw on its own budget to sustain the capability for which it is the proponent. Last, SAF/IAPA itself underwent manpower cuts that now undermine its capacity to manage and monitor effectively its own sustainment-training policy. As a result, there are neither any reporting nor enforcement mechanisms between SAF/IA and the RAS to ensure the force is in fact sustaining a professional skill set. In short, RAS sustainment time and financial burdens are to be borne by the operational unit rather than the RAS proponent, an arrangement for which no oversight mechanism exists.

In terms of actual capabilities, Air Force Instruction 16-109, International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program, stipulates the RAS will maintain a ‘2’ DLPT score in listening and reading and does not require a speaking score. Similar to the Army, this unilateral reduction from a professional to an intermediate language skill is inexplicable. Although specific data regarding the language capabilities of the RAS force writ large were not available, the RAS proponent suggested that OSD requirements were unrealistic. Instead, Air Force recommends reducing standards to a ‘2’ for listening and reading and a ‘1+’ or ‘2’ for speaking, mirroring the Army’s standard. The only incentive remaining is the Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus, which incentivizes language sustainment on the individual level, provided the RAS could balance primary duties with RAS demands.

Considering the International Affairs Specialist (IAS) program’s intent to keep the RAS officer competitive and relevant in two career fields simultaneously, the impetus for an even stronger sustainment apparatus remains than if RASs served in consecutive assignments. From the Joint and FAO communities’ perspectives, one would expect a robust, intentional rubric for a dual-career officer to pursue and maintain highly perishable skills.

39 As an example, for FY15, SAF/IAPA programmed $600,000 to sustain 200 RAS officers (out of 361 total). Unable to execute that sum of money, the amount was reduced to $100,000 for opportunities in the second half of the FY; Christensen, The U.S. Air Force RAS and the Joint FAO Program.
40 Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs International Affairs Program (SAF/IAPA), “AFI 16-109, International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program” (Secretary of the Air Force, September 3, 2010), 8.
41 Christensen, The U.S. Air Force RAS and the Joint FAO Program.
particularly when serving in positions that do not utilize them. From the agency-theory perspective, the Air Force appears to shirk in an area essential to the regional mission of the GCCs. From the Service-culture perspective, the Air Force’s budget and manpower cuts of SAF/IA in favor of other air-centric missions, and its inability to support OSD’s or its own mandates, is not surprising. The fact that sustainment education and training remain an individual responsibility, mostly unfunded by the RAS proponent, results in an officer jumping in and out of assignments every few years, having to play catch up in order to remain relevant to the GCC and on par with his FAO counterparts.

**Military Specialty**

In 2006, OSD immediately recognized the challenges of the dual-career path by stating,

In a dual-track program, a designated FAO would ideally serve alternately between their [sic] primary career field and FAO assignments. In the review of the FAO reports, the main impact and differences of the two tracks is time available for training and the possibility of repetitive assignments. Dual-track officers have a more limited opportunity (time available) for training to be a FAO due to the requirements of their other career field. On the other hand, their opportunities to remain well-grounded in their basic military skill or designation may be greater.\(^{42}\)

This statement pinpoints the crux of career tracking. As mentioned earlier and based on experience with the dual path, the Army opted to vest its regional expertise at the expense of continued grounding the profession of arms. In contrast, Air Force “officers’ career progression will be carefully managed so that they, while developing a strong foundation in international affairs, will remain viable and competitive in their primary career fields.”\(^{43}\) The Air Force instead chose to maintain the primacy of the technical career, adding the international skill set as a career-broadening opportunity.

One of the RAS program’s central propositions is that it created a way to manage two career paths centrally. The creation of the RAS, in contrast to its FAO predecessor, certainly increased attention at the management and

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assignments levels. SAF/IA designed the International Affairs Specialist Advisory Panel (IASAP) to mirror the existing AFPC Developmental Teams (DT), responsible for tracking, vectoring, and providing career oversight to officers by functional area. The IASAP is not an authorized DT, but works in a similar fashion. The panel reviews records, recommends subsequent RAS assignments for consideration alongside concurrent DT vectors, and conducts command boards.

Although the IASAP and the SAF/IAPA representative at AFPC work closely with the primary DTs and primary-career-field managers, the IASAP does not have the authority of its counterpart. The IASAP recommends action for RAS career development; whereas, through their respective career managers, the DTs take action for the same officer’s development. By fixing the primary AFSC to the officer, the Air Force intentionally vests its interests in the technical occupation over the international one. In short, similar to the RAS selection process, the officer’s primary career field makes the final determination as to what the RAS will do, whether in favor of the RAS program or not. There does not exist a central manager for an officer’s career field, but rather two managers with one having leverage over the other.

The RAS thus remains accountable to his primary career field throughout his career. Sands observed, “non-FAO assignments must benefit FAOs to the maximum extent to retain perishable language skills and expand their knowledge base in areas of expertise.” The ability to make this happen inherently through discrete assignments, however, is low. In addition, the high operational tempo of tactical and operational-level units and the immediate need for the officer to execute his primary job erode his ability to maintain an entirely separate set of skills concurrently under significant time and resource constraints.

Similarly, departing the primary career periodically inhibits the RAS’s ability to maintain professional competency and legitimacy. The RAS career pyramid above shows a seamless flow in and out of two disparate careers, all the while progressing at a normal rate in both. In reality, consideration for

positions of leadership and command in a given career field demand the technical expertise and experience the Air Force culture embodies. Although a RAS may have done an outstanding job serving as an attaché or security-cooperation officer, decision makers within the operational forces value measures like flying hours, operational deployments, and progression within the airframe (e.g., instructor and evaluator qualifications) and flying wing as test beds for future success and leadership.

Of particular relevance to the RAS program, Rosen maintains: “Since innovation in a bureaucracy means actually doing something differently, not just having new ideas.” Hence, the cultural momentum perpetuating technical specialties over international competence fails the test of true professional innovation. Despite the prevalence of military diplomacy throughout recent national strategy guidance, Air Force cultural momentum propels a theory of victory infused with technical prowess. Rather than Rosen’s model of military professionalism driven by the strategic environment bearing out, Stulberg and Salomone’s predicament of grafting the new skill set onto existing pathways remains the Air Force model for career progression. Professional rapport, recency of experience, and the opportunity to groom an officer for positions of increasing responsibility still carry a lot of weight in a tribal Air Force.

Conclusion

In a similar fashion to the analysis in the preceding chapter, the RAS program flows from Air Force culture in a number of ways. The Service’s technological drive appears to impede an outright commitment to the Joint community in the area of linguistic and foreign expertise. Although a full decade into the RAS construct, the cultural factors Builder identified explain a momentum that directly impacts the RAS contribution in the absence of more rigorous OSD oversight.

Visions of airpower's inherent technological dominance espoused by Douhet and Mitchell continue to ring true. The primacy and centrality of the airplane as the bedrock of airpower and an Airman’s career far exceed the valuation of missions deviating from air superiority. The momentum of this theoretical construct continues to dominate the institutional mindset a century

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later, demonstrating the strength of an idea over significant changes in the character of war since the early 20th century. The RAS’s dependence on expertise in human and international relations, despite the fact those relations define the context in which airpower succeeds or fails, founders in a high-tech culture.

The fact that OSD requires the Services to measure performance annually is an area coincident with Air Force culture. Having an affinity for developing acquisition milestones, capability metrics, and reportable data in order to create direct and immediate feedback loops favors the type of information currently used by the statutory principal to determine the RAS contribution to the Joint FAO Program. Unfortunately, the preference to quantify these measures of performance does not directly translate into measures of effectiveness in supporting the GCC. Rosen recognizes this phenomenon when he states, “Redefinition of the strategic measure of effectiveness tells the organization what and how it should be learning...inappropriate strategic measures of effectiveness may lead an organization to mistakenly increase its efforts, in a vicious circle, at a time when increasing the effort put into old methods only draws the organization deeper into failure.”46

OSD’s existing criteria allow the Air Force to bureaucratize the measurement process, leading the Service to focus its efforts on aspects of its program that present well but do not completely answer the question, “Are we doing the right thing?” As described throughout this chapter, the Air Force RAS falls short in the areas of greatest concern for the GCCs: RAS quantity (availability) and quality (language and regional expertise). The unwillingness or inability for OSD(P&R) not only to monitor but also to enforce the measures it deems essential to cultivate the Joint FAO force allows for divergent preferences emerging from Service cultures at odds with the principals’ demands.

In viewing itself through its ‘toys’ of war, the Air Force naturally relegates the art of war to a secondary consideration. Airmen grow up in their Air Force learning and mastering the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to

46 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 35–36.
carry out their respective functions that project airpower. The stability and certainty of established and measurable performance standards deceives a culture generally uncomfortable with ambiguity. The nature of the RAS is one necessarily concentrated on the uncertain and often messy world of international relations and diplomacy. As a Service, the Air Force would prefer to avoid getting involved in the intricacies of policy and the purposes of war in favor of “executing the mission” and leaving the politics to someone else.

Air Force intraservice distinctions cleave to the difference between the pilot and all others. To take it a step further, the RAS rates below all other career fields by nature of its secondary-career-field status. Although the RAS role cannot replace those of the operational missions, the Air Force views the RAS strictly through a career-broadening lens, and even then going off the beaten path can have adverse career implications. Institutionally, the RAS is at a disadvantage in overcoming the professional demands of two occupations, often dissonant with one another, in order to remain competent, relevant, and competitive.

Finally, the Air Force appreciates the distinctive character of its program as meeting its own Service needs. Although recent comments by SAF/IA reflect that even the term ‘RAS’ is to differentiate it from its Air Force FAO predecessor, early marketing of the program equally billed the RAS as fundamentally different from its sister-Service counterparts. Whether semantics continue to play a role, Service culture reflects a need to differentiate rather than integrate the RAS into the Joint FAO Program, for if the RAS and the FAO carry out the same mission, why duplicate effort? The answer lies in the convergence of varied combat and professional expertise, encompassing the Services’ roles and missions, into a unified and integrated international acumen capable of advancing Joint and U.S. military interests abroad.

The evidence, as offered by the Air Force, OSD, and the GCCs, shows that the Air Force predominantly ‘shirks’ in the Joint FAO Program. Weak oversight by OSD and absence of authority by the GCC over the Air Force

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47 Nicole Gaudiano, “Air Force Replaces FAO Program: Service to Develop International Affairs Specialists,” Air Force Times, May 2, 2005; Christensen, The U.S. Air Force RAS and the Joint FAO Program; The SAF/IA narrative from 2005 to the present with regard to the term and function of a RAS has changed, with the early officials championing a “strategic” role of the Air Force RAS and its dual-career track as significantly distinctive.
allows for each of Builder’s ‘faces’ to create a cultural momentum that defines the Air Force’s approach to the Joint FAO Program. The demand signal from OSD and the Air Force’s tendency to compile data overshadow the qualitative aspects of what is required to cultivate robust linguistic and regional expertise. Only when considered in light of the more pressing demand for technical expertise within the Service do senior leaders value the RAS contribution. Established professional and promotion pathways controlled by culturally determined bureaucratic processes outweigh the potential for an independent RAS career. Despite some support for a dedicated pathway, at least at the Chief of Staff’s level, the institutional technological bias dominates the Air Force’s theory of victory and worldview. As a result, the principal-in-practice, the GCC, lacks a deep, enduring air perspective when it comes to carrying out its own regional mission.

Having evaluated two of the Joint FAO components, the next chapter addresses the ‘shirking’ commonalities: shortfalls in FAO and RAS quantities and qualities. Chapter 6 returns to the earlier question, “What can and should the principals do to (re)align the Services’ programs more closely with the GCCs’ need for FAO expertise?” Feaver’s oversight mechanisms for the Joint FAO principal-agent triad will receive scrutiny there.
Chapter 6

Bridging the Preference Gap

The ability to speak the language...an understanding of local
customs and a deep-rooted grasp of a country’s or region’s
history...the ability to put historical religious, political, and military
events into analysis and understanding of current events...the
strategic skills to apply these strategic scout capabilities to good use
as a thoughtful advisor to senior leaders – these several skills are
easily recognizable to the modern Foreign Area Officer as those
requisite to be successful in one’s chosen field of professional
military endeavor.

Rob Propst

The preceding chapters contextualized the historical precedence and
strategic importance of the foreign area officer, then placed that military
competency within the analytical framework of agency theory. Feaver’s model
predicted that the Services would work where principal and agent preferences
aligned and would shirk where preferences diverged, absent intrusive
monitoring within the Joint FAO Program. Carl Builder’s The Masks of War
provided an additional departure point from which organizational-culture
theory described both how and why the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force uniquely
pursue their respective FAO programs nested within the weakly monitored and
minimally enforced Joint FAO contract. These case studies provided a deeper
understanding of why the Geographic Combatant Commander, as the principal-
in-practice, continues to experience differences in Joint FAO quality and
quantity a full decade into OSD’s established program. The intent of this
concluding chapter is to address the question posed at the end of Chapter 3:
“What can and should the principals do to (re)align the Services’ programs more
closely with the GCCs’ need for FAO expertise?” Several policy
recommendations emerge from agency theory’s oversight mechanisms adapted
for the Joint FAO community.

To summarize the common preference gaps identified in both the Army
and Air Force cases, the GCCs persistently cite under-manning (quantity) and
deficient language and regional expertise (quality) as significant detractors from
successfully carrying out their regional missions. The inaugural Annual FAO
Report stated that “all [Services] are now building new FAOs with a set of
common training guidelines, developmental experiences, language, cultural, and regional expertise standards," through a common set of skills.¹ Yet a decade of data proves definitively that FAO capabilities are as diverse as the Services to which they belong. The following review of Feaver’s oversight mechanisms emphasizes enforcing linguistic standards, specifying regional proficiency, and establishing realistic, achievable personnel and manpower parameters in order to bridge the preference gap.

The principal must retain the will and the authority to alter its contract with the agent to mitigate the risks inherent in delegation. The nature of the hierarchical DoD structure, in essence, removes that capacity from the principal-in-practice (the GCCs) and places it in the hands of the principal-by-statute (OSD) at the expense of effectiveness. The existing organizational DoD structure is unlikely to change these command relationships, therefore, unless something changes within the relationships themselves (such as the incentive or punishment regime), the GCCs’ problems will persist along the same trendline as the past ten years. Yet Feaver states, “Control or monitoring mechanisms are ways of overcoming the information problems...by shaping budget or doctrine in a certain way, the principal can know something about the likely activity of the agent, even without directly observing him.”²

The answer to resolving the information asymmetry evident in the Joint FAO principal-agent triad is more stringent monitoring by OSD, restricting the scope of delegation to the Services.³ The GCCs, in order to break the trend and gain the FAO capability they claim to have needed for the last decade, must find a way to advocate effectively that OSD take the next logical step to create a vigorous Joint FAO force. The Annual FAO Report appears to fall victim to bureaucratic and cultural momentum, with the GCCs ending up short-handed.

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³ Feaver, Armed Servants, 76.
Table 7: Joint FAO Program Oversight Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring Mechanism</th>
<th>OSD-Service analog</th>
<th>GCC-Service analog</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract incentives</td>
<td>Broad FAO policy establishing autonomous service programs</td>
<td>Joint credit (Joint Duty Assignment List billets)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Screening & selection         | DoDD/DoDI initial qualification requirements                                       | • Establish individual billet requirements (e.g., DLPT scores)  
|                               |                                                                                     | • Leadership nominations (e.g., SDO/DATT)               |
| Fire alarms                   | • IDA (Aug 2013 report)                                                            | • FAOA journal                                         |
|                               | • FAOA journal                                                                     | • Academic works                                        |
|                               | • Academic works                                                                    |                                                        |
| Institutional checks           | • Civ-mil oversight                                                                 | Authority to change billet’s service designation         |
|                               | • Annual DoD FAO Report                                                            |                                                        |
| Police patrols                 | • Government Accountability Office (GAO)                                           | None                                                   |
|                               | • Congressional Inquiry                                                            |                                                        |
| Revising delegation decision  | More intrusive standards & reporting requirements:                                  | Direct delegation authority does not exist              |
| (intervention)                 | • DLPT & OPI                                                                        |                                                        |
|                               | • Cultural expertise                                                                |                                                        |
|                               | • Joint sustainment training                                                        |                                                        |

Source: Adapted from Armed Servants, Feaver, 2003, 75-86.

Strengthening the Monitoring Regime

The above table identifies some of the existing oversight mechanisms, increasing in principal intrusiveness from top to bottom. Feaver grounds the principal-agent relationship in the incentive structure, stating, “The principal-agent perspective suggests that contractual incentives should be at the heart of the control relationship.” Incentives are the ‘carrots’ principals use to align agent behavior. In this case, OSD grants the Services autonomy to cultivate FAOs according to Service interests. This favors each actors’ interests in that OSD impels some modicum of working behavior in exchange for minimal exertion while the Services preserve their independence to proceed, in large part, as they deem appropriate. From the principal-in-practice perspective, although the GCCs do not own the Joint Officer Qualification process, they do have the power to assign or retract the joint-duty modifier to specific billets in coordination with Joint Staff. In this vein, the GCCs receive a capability crucial to their mission, substantiated by a well-developed vetting-and-assignments

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4 Feaver, Armed Servants, 78.
process, while the Services, if ‘working’, comply with the joint provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

Slightly more interventionist, screening and selection mechanisms seek to identify the right person to carry out the mission by defining minimal entry conditions. The Joint FAO requirements surface primarily in OSD’s policy documents, delineating officer qualification prerequisites and certification. As noted earlier, these mechanisms represent the only existing, quantifiable standards, effective or otherwise, against which to gauge Service compliance. It is here the oversight regime centers; those elements of the LREC triad that substantiate the Services’ contract, yet the GCCs continue to highlight as insufficient.

With respect to the principal-in-practice, recurrent calls for greater FAO capacity indicates the screening and selection mechanisms ought to demarcate the basic barriers to entry, with additional maintenance levies to advance the Joint force’s capabilities. The GCCs’ oversight in this category manifests itself in two ways. First, it must specify language requirements according to billet. The ease by which the community tests and tracks DLPT scores facilitates this screen. Second, for high-visibility positions, such as the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT), Services often submit individual nomination packages to the GCC for consideration and selection based on experience and suitability for a specific posting. These two measures remain the only direct authority the GCC retains to accept or decline a Service’s FAO.

Incrementally increasing principal intrusiveness, fire alarms act as external checks on the agent. Parties outside the principal-agent triad with a vested interest in the FAO profession “watch the agent and report on key outputs.” In this case, OSD and the GCCs share similar fire alarms. For example, the Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) is an independent professional organization composed of active and retired foreign area officers. Created in 1995, it provides a venue for networking and the exchange of ideas and experiences, primarily through meetings and its periodical, *International Affairs*. Although the organization itself does not promote any particular stance on the state of the FAO career, many of the issues raised in the present

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analysis, to include the FAO’s contribution to the Joint community, professionalization, and differences among training and education policies, sample the continual dialogue within the profession. The current examination incorporates many of those opinions and perspectives, collectively calling for improved development opportunities.

Another example of a FAO fire alarm is The Institute for Defense Analyses’ (IDA) 2013 report, “The Strategic Values of Foreign Area Officers.” It is the most recent example of an independent, strategic evaluation of the Joint FAO writ large. IDA conducted both qualitative and quantitative analyses, interviewing and surveying FAOs and non-FAO supervisors and senior leaders, culminating in a report to Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) with a number of key findings and recommendations to improve FAO professionalism. The researchers concluded that the FAO primarily contributes to the Joint and Interagency environments, and it is there he is most effective and where his mission is best understood. In contrast, Service parochialism may adversely affect an officer’s advancement or cause the devaluation of the program, resulting in a greater tendency to use “best-fit” officers.\(^6\) The report identified the Army program as the “gold standard” of the community, but made the caveat that assignment-preparation, training, and family inclusion in regional and language familiarization lack continuity and uniformity across all Services and postings.\(^7\) The conclusions highlighted the FAO shortage, recommending the Department revisit its directive and instruction, as well as conduct a Department-wide evaluation to examine critically how to improve FAO proponency, utilization, and validation.\(^8\) Overall, IDA emphasized the strategic value of the FAO, particularly in regions with minimal U.S. presence, and sought to lay out specific, measurable goals for OSD to consider and implement in order to bolster its existing program. In keeping with the theme of the present research, IDA supports the GCCs’ preference for the FAO and his importance to the GCCs’ mission from a third-

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\(^7\) Alrich, Adams, and Biltoc, *The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers*, 47.

\(^8\) Alrich, Adams, and Biltoc, *The Strategic Value of Foreign Area Officers*, 50–51.
party perspective. The bureaucratic and cultural momentum of OSD and the Services have impeded action on IDA’s recommendations.

Additionally, OSD has the benefit of the GCCs acting as a fire alarm within the DoD hierarchy. The foundation of this argument rests on the GCCs’ lack of authority to bridge the gap between its mission requirements and the Services’ force-provision methods. As the next rung in the monitoring ladder describes, OSD’s response to the GCCs’ input into the Annual FAO Report does not appear to weigh as heavily as those of the force providers.

The DoD Annual FAO Report represents the major institutional check commissioned by OSD. Feaver defines an institutional check as “a separate agent, established by the principal and empowered with a veto to block action of the other agent.” It provides regular feedback across the community, though contrary to Feaver’s definition, does not impart any such veto power. The lack of authority for the GCCs to effect change through this process negates the true power of this check as an enforcement mechanism. To reiterate the definition provided in Chapter 2, OSD’s function as a staff element is in “coordinating, monitoring, and reviewing” the FAO programs. Actually taking punitive or corrective action to close the capability gap on the GCCs’ behalf appears to carry with it a cost — financial, bureaucratic, or both — exceeding OSD(P&R)’s threshold.

The only viable means for wielding GCC power in this respect is its capacity to change a given FAO billet’s Service designation. If the GCC does not receive the FAO support it needs, it can alter the contract in order to acquire the required expertise from another Service. This is unlikely to occur on a regular basis but remains an option for those high-visibility postings like the SDO/DATT or Security Cooperation Chief. Although this sends a signal to the offending Service, it also relieves said Service of its obligation to provide forces. In essence, the contract for that specific posting is absolved between the Service and GCC.

Related to the institutional check, police-patrol monitoring provides specific checks, such as audits, on the agents. A police patrol “involves regular

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investigations of the agent by the principal.”10 One would consider the Annual FAO Report such an intrusion had OSD vested in it any punishments to deter moral hazard. Instead, a series of Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigations and Congressional testimonies conducted between 2008 and 2010 constitute just such an inspection.11 These third parties called the Defense Department to testify to its policies, objectives, and plans to cultivate language and regional expertise measured against its stated requirements in light of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), justifying its associated federal funding. However, these proceedings concentrated on the broader topic of language and cultural competency for general-purpose forces. Although tangentially impactful to the FAO community in terms of driving the Defense Department to implement its Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and subsequent Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities; the weight of GAO and Congressional attention has not yet brought consequences to bear directly on the Joint FAO Program.

Each of these monitoring mechanisms already exists. Together they represent established bureaucratic and, to a lesser extent, external checks on the Joint FAO Program. The relatively non-intrusive character of OSD’s contract with the Services shapes the organizational behaviors uncovered in each case study. On the other hand, the GCCs, as the primary recipients of Joint FAOs, possess little recourse to effect the change they need and expect from the Services. These two conditions allow the Services to deviate from the contract and create the preference gap this thesis seeks to resolve. To this end, the GCCs ought to champion OSD intervention into Service FAO programs,

10 Feaver, Armed Servants, 84–85.
promoting the last and most intrusive of Feaver’s methods, revisiting the delegation decision.

Considering the existing oversight mechanisms have yet to resolve the GCC-Service gap, revisiting the delegation decision means evaluating the contract to which the principal-by-statute initially agreed. Revising the delegation authority lies at the most intrusive end of the spectrum and “would be a decision to revisit the original decision to delegate authority to the military agent in the first place.”\(^{12}\) This level of principal intervention cuts against the Services’ highly valued autonomy, and lies solely in the authority of OSD. The GCCs, as the DoD hierarchy and the principal-agent triad exist (without any expectation either will alter significantly), do not possess the authority to revise the principal-agent contract. However, the consequences of the current level of Service autonomy and weak OSD oversight through minimally intrusive measures demonstrate the validity of strengthening standards and the monitoring regime. Redesigning the contract involves tightening the standards of language fluency, regional proficiency, and Joint assignments.

**Language Fluency**

Effective communication is almost always difficult, and it forms the basis for the military diplomacy outlined in the NSS. The Interagency Language Roundtable acknowledges that, “Competence in intercultural communication is the ability to take part effectively in a given social context by understanding what is being communicated and by employing appropriate language and behavior to convey an intended message.”\(^{13}\) Yet the Army and Air Force repeatedly falter in meeting the robust linguistic expectations of OSD. In fact, each Service recommends lowering the standard rather than increasing the capability. Not only does this diminish the Defense Department’s effectiveness in politico-military affairs, but FAOs lacking professional fluency also pale in comparison to their Interagency partners across the globe (e.g., Foreign Service Officers, USAID representatives), with whom they work alongside daily. “All U.S. Government agencies adhere to the ILR Definitions as the standard measuring stick of language proficiency,” therefore unilaterally lowering DoD

\(^{12}\) Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 85.

standards undermines a FAO’s standing within the Country Team, let alone in the eyes of the Partner Nation.\textsuperscript{14}

The recommendation here is two-fold. First, reinforce the ILR ‘3’ Professional Competence criterion for the Joint FAO force in all three language modalities: listening, reading, and speaking. Additionally, professional fluency ought to be the minimum threshold rather than a desired goal that lacks a specific, measurable plan, on either an individual or Service level. Second, the Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) justifies an annual testing requirement to match that of the DLPT. Speaking-ability warrants at least as much importance, arguably more, than listening and reading. Yet due to the existing Service language-pay structures and the absence of an explicit requirement, the OPI generally receives short shrift. The institutional check for professional fluency would include the incorporation of a provision for the GCC to accept or decline a given FAO designated for assignment without prejudice based on language capability. The Services, in turn, would need to provide a suitable replacement that meets the proficiency standards. Institutionalizing the process by which the Defense Department “trains, sustains, and manages its language professionals is key” to the Services’ and GCCs’ effectiveness.\textsuperscript{15}

These recommendations are not without additional cost. Existing graduation requirements from the basic language course at the Defense Language Institute do not include professional competence, an issue OSD and the Army (as DLI’s executive agent) should contemplate, at least for FAO students.\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, as the Department’s language focal point, an institutionalized annual OPI requirement would necessitate increased funding, technical resources, and faculty at DLI in order to handle increased exam volumes. Stringent language criteria would decertify a large portion of the current FAO community upfront, so the Services would first need to provide definitive measures to rectify this drop in readiness. If the true intent of the

\textsuperscript{14} “Interagency Language Roundtable.”
\textsuperscript{15} Jean-Paul Chaussé, “Impact of Language Immersion Programs on Foreign Language” (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2008), 15.
\textsuperscript{16} The majority of DLI-FLC students are crypto-linguists across all Services. The nature of their job differs from that of the FAO, requiring a shift in focus and balance of effort in relation to listening, reading, and speaking abilities. DLI-FLC conducts “special projects” basic language courses tailored to FAOs, but these courses do not cover all FAOs.
Joint FAO Program is to supply the GCCs with “the requisite war fighting capabilities to achieve success on the non-linear battlefields,” then the Services have thus far faltered in equipping the Joint force with the requisite language skill set. Finally, in order to drive the Services to ‘work’ in favor of the Joint FAO program’s language requirements, OSD should restructure foreign language pay to favor individual pursuit and maintenance of professional fluency in all three abilities across the Department. Although the Services currently exercise control over their respective Foreign Language Pay structures, the fact that the FAO is a Joint officer first necessitates consideration by Defense policy staff to level the incentive structure across all Services.\textsuperscript{17}

**Regional Proficiency**

The second aspect of FAO quality needing attention is sustaining and monitoring regional proficiency. As mentioned already, this area is difficult to quantify, which partially explains its relative absence from the Joint FAO principal-agent construct once an officer earns his degree and completes his In-Region Training. As a result, this facet of the LREC triad remains less definitive in terms of prescribing a set of solutions. In an effort to facilitate such a dialogue, two possible options follow: expanding the Joint FAO Sustainment Course, Phase II, and adoption of the Regional Proficiency Assessment Tool.

Introduced in 2009, the Joint FAO Sustainment Course “is an advanced education and skills enrichment initiative developed and implemented specifically to sharpen the skills and enhance the knowledge of FAOs across the U.S. Department of Defense.”\textsuperscript{18} Originally intended to complement the Army’s Joint FAO Course, Phase I, DLNSEO designed Phase II to meet the professional needs of experienced O-5 and O-6 FAOs. Based at the Naval Postgraduate School, what began as a two-week in-residence seminar, split between Monterey, California, and an in-region focus area, is now a two-and-a-half-day

\textsuperscript{17} Recognizing FAOs constitute only a portion of all personnel receiving foreign language pay, this recommendation would require further research into the greater language incentive system beyond the scope of this paper.

\textsuperscript{18} Joint Foreign Area Officer Program, “Joint Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Course Phase II Program Description and Learning Objectives” (Naval Postgraduate School, n.d.).
seminar in either Washington, D.C., or in-region. Attendance is optional and requires unit funding for the FAO to participate.\textsuperscript{19}

If the FAO is truly a Joint asset, as OSD’s policy implies, then expanding and institutionalizing the FAO Sustainment Course appears a logical step. The foundational concept and structure already exist to progress toward a common professional-development milestone cutting across Service lines. Not to detract from internal initiatives that keep FAOs grounded in Service doctrine and policy, requisite attendance for senior FAOs in the Sustainment Course, as originally designed, represents a truly Joint achievement to support the Joint community. This particular measure serves to hedge against Service variation related to FAO sustainment and aims at developing a more robust professional and Joint development system. As differing Service cultures and fiscal realities result in disparate FAO development throughout their careers, OSD needs to take the reins in an effort to mature the FAO force in support of the GCCs. Additionally, other existing opportunities that build upon the FAO skill set, such as Joint Professional Military Education II (JPME II), Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) classes, DoD Regional Center courses, and Foreign Service Institute offerings, should not just be optional but rather deliberately coordinated professional-development objectives to deepen and broaden the Joint FAO base.

In order to determine the depth and breadth of this capability, a project underway at the University of Maryland’s Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL) is to develop a standardized tool to determine and track DoD personnel’s regional proficiency. Commissioned by DLNSEO in 2011, the Regional Proficiency Assessment Tool (RPAT) measures an individual’s experiences and abilities against the Regional Proficiency Skill Level Guidelines defined in the Defense Language Program.\textsuperscript{20} Rather than assessing a FAO’s regional expertise solely based upon a subjective review of his past assignments

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{19} Rouse, Perspective from the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) on the Joint FAO Program.
\end{footnotesize}
and educational credentials, the RPAT incorporates multiple factors that “represent an individual’s awareness and understanding of the historical, political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of a foreign country or specific global region.” Currently undergoing validity testing by DLNSEO, this tool is intended to provide commanders unit-level information for general-purpose forces’ regional proficiency prior to deployment.

The current scheme does not explicitly incorporate the RPAT into the Joint FAO Program to monitor professional competency. However, DLNSEO admits the tool provides the ability to do so. The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) records an individual’s results, taken from an extensive questionnaire, in the same system used for DLPT scores and other personnel information. Once a FAO initiates his RPAT questionnaire, the system maintains that data, to be updated by the individual as his personal education, training, and experience progress. Similar to the DLPT rubric, the RPAT scores an individual’s regional proficiency on a scale of 0+ (pre-novice) to 5 (expert) in accordance with the Department’s Skill Level Guidelines. In short, language, culture, and cognitive-psychology experts are close to quantifying the qualitative attributes that have evaded OSD’s attention and the Services’ dedication thus far.

Integrating the RPAT into the Joint FAO standards, to include an incentivized enforcement mechanism for FAOs to keep their data current (e.g., annual updates in conjunction with DLPT and OPI testing), OSD, the Services, and the GCCs could soon have a more holistic assessment of a given FAO, extending beyond DLPT scores and an assignment listing. The principal-in-practice would have the enhanced ability to identify a FAO’s capabilities for a specific mission, to include adding RPAT scores to existing DLPT scores associated with FAO billets. The Services would have the ability to identify, at


22 Rouse, Perspective from the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) on the Joint FAO Program.

23 This information is reportable on a unit level through the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).
an individual or aggregate level, where they need to focus efforts to sustain and improve the forces they train and equip. Finally, OSD would have the ability to identify the regional proficiency of the Joint FAO force writ large, by Service, or by region.

**Joint Duty Assignments**

This third and final recommendation attempts to rectify the repeated call from the GCCs to OSD and the Services to increase the FAO supply to meet Joint demand. DLNSEO assists the GCCs to develop their requirements and code FAO billets as a demand signal to the Services. Unfortunately, as previously noted, OSD’s arbitrary 95-percent metric lacks substantiation in any policy document or regulation. As a result, the Services meet FAO demand as they see fit, typically using internally developed assignment baselines or simply as forces become available, resulting in the “best-fit” methodology. The preceding analysis of monitoring mechanisms reveals that the GCCs have little recourse to compel the Services to adhere to the unsubstantiated OSD criterion.

One approach would be for GCCs to collaborate with OSD on an attainable manpower factor to which the Services would agree. This might address the growing appetite for FAOs from the demand side while eliciting buy-in from the suppliers. Yet this method seems to have already been tried and failed. The leverage the Services wield stems from the fact they own the personnel and, without a defined forcing function, have other priorities concerning where and when they assign those personnel to competing missions. Additionally, the record implies that OSD(P&R), as the statutory lead agency, does not have the will to expend further political capital on formalizing an independent system of FAO personnel and manpower allocation for the Joint community.

In the eyes of DLNSEO, the Joint Program as it exists today meets the policy intent for politico-military functions as outlined in strategic guidance, therefore any operational modification ought to propagate from the Services themselves. 24 Other FAO stakeholders, such as OSD-Policy and OSD-

24 Rouse, Perspective from the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO) on the Joint FAO Program.
Intelligence, introduce further complexity into the principal-agent construct at a level that disaggregates the statutory principal into additional components. Through agencies like the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), these stakeholders do wield additional FAO-policy influence particular to their specific functions. Yet two facts remain: these Joint agencies’ yearly feedback mimics that of the GCCs, and regulatory proponency responsibilities lie with OSD(P&R). The issue of FAO supply and demand falls within its sphere of influence.

An alternative to the former approach would be to nest Joint FAO personnel and manpower policies within the existing Joint Officer Management Program. The focus would be on those FAO positions located in the GCCs, Joint agencies, and in-country in order to incentivize assigning officers to billets benefitting the Joint community over those internal to the Services. OSD recognized a predisposition as early as 2006, stating, “While not all FAOs will qualify as Joint Duty Officers, repeated Joint assignments will increase the likelihood that they will be so designated. Many FAOs will meet this requirement through their routine career assignments.” Though still politically daunting, particularly in an environment characterized by budget and personnel reductions, this tack has merit.

An outflow of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation was the Joint Qualification System (JQS), intended to ensure military officers receive education and experience in joint matters. U.S. Code defines joint matters in two parts concerning not only what a Joint officer does, but also with whom he does it. The former relates to the following issues:

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25 As mentioned in Chapter 3, DSCA and DIA, as programmatic entities of OSD(P) and OSD(I) have been considered under the purview of the GCC for the purposes of argumentation. Additionally, IDA’s 2013 report suggests consideration be given to where FAO proponency resides with respect to organizational interests within OSD and the differing perspectives and priorities of personnel and manpower versus policy and intelligence. Without a doubt additional research into the intricacies of OSD(I)’s influence on DIA’s Defense Attaché System (DAS) and OSD(P)’s DSCA’s Security Cooperation program as a subset of the Joint FAO Program would be a fruitful adjunct to the present examination.

26 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DoD 2006 Annual Foreign Area Officer Report, 6.

(A) national military strategy;
(B) strategic planning and contingency planning;
(C) command and control of operations under unified command;
(D) national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States; or
(E) combined operations with military forces of allied nations.\(^{28}\)

The last aspect concerns unified military forces, which 10 USC 668 specifies as not only more than one military department but also:

a military department and one or more of the following:
(i) Other departments and agencies of the United States.
(ii) The military forces or agencies of other countries.
(iii) Non-governmental persons or entities.\(^{29}\)

Combine these two characteristics and one quickly recognizes that the work a FAO does and those he works with daily, particularly while assigned to a Joint command or U.S. Embassy, inherently qualify under joint matters.

Under the direction of OSD(P&R), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages the JQS to establish qualification criteria and authorize the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL).\(^{30}\) The JDAL consolidates validated positions in which “a preponderance of a position’s responsibilities must meet the definition of joint matters,” commensurate with U.S. Code.\(^{31}\) The Joint Staff validates these Standard Joint Duty Assignments (S-JDA) on a five-year cycle and publishes the list annually, reviewing every Joint organization’s positions through the JDAL Validation Board.\(^{32}\) “Attaining expertise in joint matters is a career-long accumulation of experiences,” and the OSD(P&R) developed a three-level qualification system, from O-4 through General/Flag Officer, that systematically progresses an officer through increasing echelons of experience, education, and responsibility.\(^{33}\)


\(^{29}\) United States Congress, “10 U.S. Code.”

\(^{30}\) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODI 1300.19,” 9, 11–12.

\(^{31}\) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “CJCSI 1330.05, Joint Officer Management Program Procedures” (The Joint Staff, June 14, 2013), B–1, D–1.

\(^{32}\) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODI 1300.19,” 20; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “CJCSI 1330.05,” B–3–B–5.

U.S. Code stipulates that the Secretary of Defense will “ensure that approximately one-half of the joint duty assignment positions in grades above [O-4] are filled at any time by officers who have the appropriate level of joint qualification.” 34 Within this category, the Defense Secretary’s and Chairman’s guidance state that Combatant Command Headquarters positions automatically qualify for the JDAL, yet in recent years budget and personnel constraints caused the Validation Board to withhold Joint credit from many GCC positions. 35 Additionally, for those FAO positions residing outside GCC Headquarters (e.g., attachés and security cooperation officers), guidance further specifies Organizational Positions encompassing joint matters and consisting of a “majority of duties that directly deal with creating or distributing national military strategy, joint doctrine, joint policy, strategic plans or contingency plans, commanding and controlling operations under unified command, national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States, or combined operations with military forces of allied nations,” also warrant joint-credit consideration. 36

Without delving too much farther into Joint Officer Management, which could merit an examination all its own, OSD(P&R) and the Joint Staff created a rigorous assignment system in response to Congressional mandates regarding officer development. In addition to stringent education and experience standards, this system serves to ensure quality officers with potential for promotion are available when and where they are needed for Joint duty. Interestingly, this system parallels many aspects of the Joint FAO Program: selectively identified field grade officers, a deliberate development and management structure, primacy of duty in the Joint arena, and a delineated path toward General/Flag Officer. The issues the GCCs currently experience in obtaining the requisite quantity of FAOs could potentially be remedied by inclusion within the existing Joint-duty construct, codifying and monitoring Joint FAO assignments. This approach presents three tiers of benefits to the FAO community.

35 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODI 1300.19,” 19133; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “CJCSI 1330.05,” D–1–D–2.
First, earning Joint-duty credit serves the FAO as a career distinguisher. The competitive character of officer advancement relies upon singularly distinctive accomplishments that differentiate him from his peers. Additionally, becoming a Joint-Qualified Officer early in one’s career allows for future Joint-Qualified Officer (JQO) opportunities. Early Joint experience serves as a test-bed for future success as a senior officer in the Joint and Interagency world. If the FAO is a Joint Officer first, as this research reveals, then this step further advances that goal of qualifying and utilizing the FAO in that environment.

Second, the Services enter into a binding contract with OSD and the GCCs to fill Joint FAO billets at a rate commensurate with published policy in exchange for sacrificing a small measure of autonomy. Career broadening is an important developmental step in an individual officer’s career, but coalescing that experience within the Service among an influential group of officers can only serve to enrich the Service itself. No single Service will ever operate unilaterally again, either in peacetime or in war. To this end, the Services benefit through this adjustment intended to impart Joint experience among their personnel and enhance their comprehension of Joint policy, strategy, doctrine, and operations.

Third, the FAO community writ large benefits by balancing demand and providing quality personnel. OSD gets the kind of “fire-and-forget” monitoring mechanism it desires, the GCCs are guaranteed to receive trained and equipped individuals, and the Services know what they need to provide to the Joint FAO community. One added benefit to assigning FAOs to the Joint-credit system is that it signifies a concrete step toward potential promotion opportunities to general and flag-officer ranks. Appointment to brigadier general or rear admiral requires the Joint Qualified Officer designation, and incorporation of joint duty into FAO assignments positively serves this stated goal of Joint FAO policy.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{37} Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “DODI 1300.19,” 2.
Conclusion

The present research contributes to the ongoing dialogue within the Defense Department and across the FAO community writ large. However, it offers only a single perspective on program improvement largely scoped in the interest of focus, time, and space. Further research might build upon this. Several avenues appear promising. First would be expanding the existing framework to investigate the intricacies of agency within the maritime FAO programs. Although the recommendations and conclusions here are generalizable, each Services’ differences add to the discussion.

Second, would be a further disaggregation of principals and agents to elucidate additional layers of preferences and tendencies resident within the Department. Specifically, OSD-Policy and its protégé, DSCA, and OSD-Intelligence and its protégé, DIA, introduce additional variables into the FAO equation through their respective security-cooperation and attaché systems. How and why these organizations, as policy and strategic agencies, relate and advance their missions through FAOs would undoubtedly offer lessons for the greater organization, training, equipping, and utilization of FAOs.

Third, each of the recommendations asserted would first require in-depth analysis regarding its implementation at the policy, operational, and resourcing levels. This exercise principally focused on identifying the issues through a variety of analytical lenses in order to frame further intelligent thought and problem-solving. In no way is this examination exhaustive, but perhaps it presents a new perspective and potential options for consideration by OSD, the Services, and the GCCs.

Ten years into the Department of Defense’s Joint FAO Program, this thesis seeks to reveal some of the extant issues that, once corrected, will help the entire organization to cultivate a robust, thriving capability. The measures implemented thus far have brought FAOs a long way since 2005. However, bureaucratic process and institutionalized tradition should not stand in the way of turning a good idea into a great endeavor.

The Geographic Combatant Command must become the guardian and standard-bearer for effective FAO utilization. The argument here is not for the GCCs to become the principal-by-statute; that legislation would introduce an
entirely new level of organizational complication, considering the multiple GCCs with stakes in the FAO program and the relative prioritization of missions across the globe. Although this type of relationship exists to some degree between Special Operations Command and the Services, for the Joint FAO Program, the author considers it organizationally expedient that the Services receive their direction from a single organization already in an established hierarchy.

Rather, the recommendation is for the GCCs to concentrate on elevating their recurring issues within the Joint FAO Program to OSD in a proactive manner that compels action. The DoD Annual FAO Report has not been successful in doing so. One way would be for the GCCs to compose a “Joint FAO Vision” that lays out the specific language, education, training, and experience milestones they require from the Services, to be used as a baseline for OSD to modernize its existing model. This vision may perhaps serve as a means to close the principal-agent feedback loop, thereby reducing the information asymmetry at the policy level that appears to drive the recurring FAO shortfalls.

The needs of the regional commands and the capabilities of foreign area officers provide a natural juncture to execute the ultimate joint mission to uphold U.S. policy and global interests. In a globally interconnected environment in which DoD needs — and will continue to require — military diplomacy in the interest of national security, the foreign area officer remains a crucial component. As detailed throughout this thesis, the Combatant Commanders cannot stand idly by, awaiting OSD and the Services to generate the linguistic and regional expertise essential to the regional mission. The GCCs must actively play the role of champion, expending some political capital to bolster the education, training, and utilization of FAOs if they are, in fact, as crucial to regional military diplomacy as the GCCs repeatedly convey.

Contemporary foreign area officers play a unique role within the Defense Department, bridging the military and diplomatic instruments of power. Drawing their raison d’être from today’s internationalist national strategies,

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FAOs’ strengths lie in their abilities to operate in ambiguous environs, promote U.S. policies and strategy, and do so leveraging a set of skills vital to communication and understanding. This capability, as demonstrated throughout this argument, still has room for improvement, and the principal-by-statute maintains the power to do so. As Feaver points out, “The civilian principal establishes a military agent to provide the security function for the state, but then must take pains to ensure that the military agent continues to do the civilian’s bidding. Given the adverse selection and moral hazard problems endemic in any agency relationship, but particularly acute in the civil-military context, civilian oversight of the military is crucial.”

Likewise, General Dempsey underscores the aim of this argument: to select, educate, train, sustain, and employ Joint foreign area officers to the highest standard achievable. In the Chairman’s Strategic Guidance to the Joint Force he states, “We keep faith with the Nation and with those who serve by making sure the Joint Force is the best led, best trained, and best equipped in the world, ready to meet any mission.”

The common threads of the Joint FAO Program serve as a cornerstone for cultivating the linguistic and regional expertise demanded by today’s international environment.

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http://www.casl.umd.edu/RPAT.


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