Briefing Agenda

- Problem Definition
- Vision of Success
- DoD SwA CONOPS
- Policy and Guidance Recommendations
- SwA CONOPS Assessments
- SwA Business Case Status
- Industry Outreach
- FY06 Plans and Way Ahead
Software Assurance (SwA) Problem

- **Scope**: Software is fundamental to the GIG and critical to all weapons, business and support systems

- **Threat agents**: Nation-state, terrorist, criminal, rogue developer who:
  - Gain control of IT/NSS/Weapons through supply chain opportunities
  - Exploit vulnerabilities remotely

- **Vulnerabilities**: All IT/NSS/Weapons (incl. systems, networks, applications)
  - Intentionally implanted logic (e.g., back doors, logic bombs, spyware)
  - Unintentional vulnerabilities maliciously exploited (e.g., poor quality or fragile code)

- **Consequences**: The enemy may steal or alter mission critical data; corrupt or deny the function of mission critical platforms
Vision of Success

Strategic Level:

The SwA CONOPS is integrated into existing Dept processes, such that decision makers balance Software risk (threat) with affordability, technical feasibility and operational capability.

Tactical Level:

DoD systems’ ability to provide intended capabilities is not compromised by attempts to create and exploit software vulnerabilities.

_DoD implements a balanced strategy for managing risk from software vulnerabilities to achieve mission effectiveness (Success)_
What does success look like?

- The requirement for assurance is allocated among the right systems and their critical components.
- DoD understands its software supply chain risks.
- DoD systems are designed and sustained at a known level of assurance.
- Commercial sector shares ownership and builds assured products.
- Technology investment transforms the ability to detect and mitigate software vulnerabilities.
The strategy components interact with military operations, acquisition, and industry to produce assured systems.
Policy and Guidance Update

- **Final Draft Directive for SwA Executive Agent**
  - Establish NSA as the Executive Agent for Identification and Mitigation of Software Assurance Vulnerabilities
  - Establish a Center for Assured Software to facilitate the EA role

- **Draft Instruction for Supplier Assurance**
  - Use all source information to identify high assurance suppliers
  - Beginning broader community coordination

- **Develop a policy memorandum**
  - Delineate the roles and responsibilities to implement the DoD SwA strategy
  - Initiate transition to system assurance

- **Develop or update specific policy/guidance as required to implement the strategy elements (e.g. updates to 5000.2, 8500.2)**
Objective: Pilot SwA CONOPS with DoD programs prior to issuing DoD SwA Policy and Guidance

Scope:
- Assess cost and schedule burden of the SwA CONOPS on 3 Programs of Record (POR): 1 weapon system, 1 space/C4ISR system, 1 ubiquitous system
- Pilots will perform retrospective assessment of the CONOPS (not the POR), to assess potential impact of SwA policies and procedures

Expected Output
- Report containing impact assessment and recommendations; used to refine the SwA CONOPS
- POR gains insight on potential SwA risks
- Vetted SwA policy and guidance that better reflects reality

Status
- Nominations currently in progress
- Assessments expected May-Sep 06
Software Assurance Business Case Analysis

- Institute for Defense Analysis tasked to develop a business case for the SwA CONOPS
  - What are the fixed costs of this strategy?
  - How much do the cost and protection increase as coverage increases?

- Progress to date:
  - Modeled fixed costs: Prioritization, Supplier Assurance, S&T
  - Modeled recurring costs: Supplier Assurance, Engineering-in-Depth

- Plans:
  - Update cost projections by participating in Pilot Assessments
  - Finalize business case in FY06
Industry Outreach

- 2 May 05: USD(AT&L)/ASD(NII) memo to Industry
  > Requested participation in an Executive Roundtable
- Subsequent Activities:
  > OMG leveraging ongoing standards activities of ADM to apply meta-model concept to assurance problem
  > NDIA hosted SwA Summit and chartered the System Assurance Committee
  > GEIA will share lessons and collaborate to develop new processes
  > AIA will help integrate SwA processes into mainstream integration activities
- DoD/Industry Executive Roundtable held in December 2005
NDIA System Assurance Committee

- Extend community to engage in system assurance strategy
  - Start bridging the gap between:
    - Weapons systems and enabling technologies communities
    - Traditional DoD industrial base and commercial industry
    - DoD and critical infrastructure (e.g. telecom, finance, energy, medical)

- Vet and comment on emerging DoD strategy
- Develop a *System Assurance Handbook*
- Leverage standards activities

**Chairs**
- Paul Croll, NDIA SED
- Kristen Baldwin, OUSD AT&L
- Mitchell Komaroff, OASD NII
How to allocate requirements for assurance
  - Identification of critical components
  - Sensitivity analysis

Elements of a robust design
  - How do you engineer for system assurance?
  - Leveraging dependability (reliability, availability, maintainability)

Life cycle considerations

Demonstration of assurance properties
  - Verification and Validation
  - Certification and Accreditation
  - Test and evaluation

Supporting engineering practices
  - Risk management
  - Configuration management

Other….

Identify Opportunities to Enhance Systems Engineering Guidance to Reflect System Assurance Practices
Way Ahead

- Conduct Pilot Assessments of the CONOPS
- Develop and staff policy/guidance
- Transition focus from software assurance to system assurance
- Develop resource implementation plan for FY07 and beyond
- Continue outreach activities

*Working together to build a competitive market for assured products*