SEVENTEENTH
INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

Report of the Proceedings
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Edited by

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Editor’s Note

The editor has made every attempt to establish a clear and accurate record of the symposium proceedings, one that faithfully records the opinions and views of the participants. In establishing the printed text from speaking notes, transcripts, seminar notes, and tape recordings of speakers or of the official English-language simultaneous translators, the editor has silently corrected slips of grammar, spelling, and wording. He has inserted full names and ranks when omitted by the speaker, and occasionally a word or phrase in square brackets to clarify the text.

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Good morning. It is my great pleasure to welcome the delegates to the Naval War College, and to the CNO’s Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium. Last night was a great kick-off, and I hope to be able to get to know each of you even better during the course of the next few days.

In the audience are forty-nine Chiefs of Naval Operations, six Commandants of Coast Guards, twenty-seven War College Presidents, and many senior representatives from the United States and our most trusted allies and friends.

I am particularly pleased to note that nearly 36 of our delegates are alumni of this college, having graduated from our Naval Command College or Naval Staff College. Welcome back to Newport!

You are leaders of the finest navies of the world. Although we have a few differences in uniform, in language, in culture, we all share the brotherhood of the sea and a set of common bonds that forever link seafarers together: shared experiences, mutual respect, honor, and a commitment to work together for peace.

This desire to work together lies at the heart of this Symposium. For over three decades, the leaders of the world’s seafaring nations have gathered on the shores of this historic bay to share ideas, strengthen alliances, and plan for the future. We can all certainly agree that much water has passed underneath the keel since ISS-1 in the fall of 1969—and that we face significant new challenges.

The title of the Symposium is “A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons.” ISS-17 is about looking at ways for maritime forces to participate in voluntary networks to increase mutual security in areas that align with individual national interests. We will look at the many ways navies around the world help ensure the peace, promote prosperity, and provide maritime security for their nations, and, together, in coalitions. We are interested in harnessing the power of trust, friendship, and cooperation in ways that will benefit us all.

I have no doubt that this will be a stimulating, rewarding, and impactful three days. Throughout its history, the ISS has been an intellectual gathering of friends and shipmates. Former U.S. CNO Admiral Arleigh Burke said it best when he noted: “Most important among peoples or among navies or among nations are friends.”

It is now my pleasure to introduce your official host for ISS-17: We are very lucky to have the Navy’s Senior Sailor here with us today—Admiral Mike Mullen, the recently installed Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Mullen is a member of the Naval Academy Class of 1968. He is proud to call himself a sailor, and he grew up at sea, matured at sea, and led at sea at all levels. He has commanded three ships: the replenishment ship USS Noxubee, the guided missile destroyer USS Goldsborough, and the Aegis cruiser USS Yorktown.
As a Flag Officer, he commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two and the George Washington Battle Group. His last command at sea was as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet/Commander, NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic. Ashore he has served in leadership positions:

- At our Naval Academy
- In our Bureau of Naval Personnel
- In the Office of the Secretary of Defense
- On the Navy Staff as Director of Surface Warfare
- As the N8—the Deputy for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments, and
- As the 32nd Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Mullen’s most recent operational assignment was Commander, Joint Force Command Naples/Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, where he had operational responsibility for NATO missions in the Balkans, Iraq, and the Mediterranean.

We know him not only as an accomplished naval officer, but also as a sincere and generous man, a friend and a mentor. The first time I met Admiral Mullen—he won’t remember this, but I do—was right here in Newport. I was en route to my commander command and a young Captain Mullen was en route to take command of the cruiser Yorktown, and the schedule had the senior course and the junior course coming together. During the course of the discussions, the comments that I heard from this captain were so insightful and on the mark, I had to think to myself at the time, “This officer has potential.” Delegates, friends, join me in welcoming the Navy’s twenty-eighth Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen.
Keynote Address:
A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons

Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations

Well, good morning. It is a real pleasure for me to be here in Newport with all of you in such a distinguished group, with, as Admiral Shuford said, forty-nine chiefs and seventy-two different countries. Thank you, Jake, for your kind introduction and for hosting this event. I believe it is an event of consequence. I know your staff has devoted a great deal of time, as have many on my staff in Washington, and a great amount of energy to make this a success, and certainly from what I can see we’re off to a great start. Newport is the intellectual capital of our Navy. And I’m proud to say that we in America have no finer venue to host such a discussion on international sea power, enlightened by the participation of world leaders like each of you.

To my peers and colleagues, welcome to this important Symposium, the seventeenth of its kind and spanning a history that coincides with many of our personal careers. For some of you, welcome to Newport for the first time, and hopefully not your last. For others of you, who participated in this Symposium two years ago, welcome back; it’s great to have you here again to build upon that event. And for those of you who have lived here as students in your younger days at one of our War Staff Colleges, welcome home.

For all of you, thank you for being here. I know you have taken a considerable amount of time out of what is a busy schedule in a hectic life, and that most of you have traveled thousands and thousands of miles. Many of you haven’t slept much in order to be here this week, and I truly thank you for that level of commitment. No matter your service, your language, or your flag, this week we all serve under the banner of maritime security. Your decision to be here today is significant. I don’t know of any other international body, organization, or conference that brings together this many different nations all working together, short of the United Nations itself. It was a real pleasure meeting many of you last night and reconnecting with others. You represent personal friendships and the human dimension of building security—the strongest dimension, in my opinion—often stronger than security built on treaties or technology.

I want to take a few minutes to discuss the theme of this year’s symposium, to set the stage by assessing the maritime environment today and figuring out how we can best increase the level of maritime security for all. For me it’s a timely theme. And this shared objective has been chosen carefully. Our theme, A Global Network of Nations
for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons, is about voluntarily harnessing the power of the international community in ways that are in the interest of individual nations in order to effectively and efficiently confront the challenges we all face today.

I mentioned that the International Seapower Symposium started at roughly the same time as many of our own careers. When we were junior officers the world was truly a different place. From our perspective then, maritime security generally began and ended with our national borders. Threats were well defined, and I would go so far as to say that maritime security was relatively simple. Those days are long gone. I think we all realize that these are times of great change. I’m fond of saying, and I truly believe, that the only constant in our future is change. And change is hard, make no mistake. But for leaders like us, change often means opportunity and new visions for where we are headed.

When our careers began, nobody spoke of the threats from transnational networks, environmental attack, human trafficking, and failed states. Yet these are just a few of today’s challenges, shared by all of us, that now flow almost seamlessly from the sea over, around, and through our borders, challenging our governments, our national prosperity, and, probably most importantly, our children’s future. And what noticeable effects are these threats having? One consequence of today’s security challenges is the realization that the ungoverned and undergoverned parts of the maritime domain can no longer be ignored. Whether on the high seas or in coastal regions, today’s threats reverberate throughout the global maritime commons.

The most serious threat I think all nations share is the threat of irregular and unrestricted warfare—warfare with no rules, with nothing forbidden. Irregular and unrestricted war is fought primarily to send a message and is viewed by proponents as particularly useful against open, transparent democracies, to prevail against the public will and to convince citizens that the cause of freedom is not worth the pain it will cost. They are wrong. They will not prevail. They will not succeed. Their message of despair and fear and hatred will in the end sway no one. Theirs is a small world of small-minded ideas. They offer nothing in return for the sacrifices they seek, not even the hope of hope itself.

The chief problem, of course, is that their goals are global. Piracy, for example, can no longer be viewed as someone else’s problem. It is a global threat to security because of its deepening ties to international criminal networks, smuggling of hazardous cargoes, and disruption of vital commerce.

Imagine a major seaport or an international strait that handles the flow of hundreds of ships and thousands of containers each day. Imagine that critical node of the world’s economy crippled or disrupted for days or weeks or months. We in the United States don’t have to imagine this. This is in fact what we’ve seen this month with the ports of southern Louisiana and New Orleans—the United States’ largest ports by tonnage and the fifth largest port in the world.

Today navies need tools that are not only instruments of war but also implementations of peace in order to improve maritime security. And as you’ll see shortly during our U.S. Navy strategy discussions, the U.S. Navy is being reshaped to accommodate this new era we find ourselves in.

Perhaps the most profound effect of today’s challenges is the increased value of cooperation between friends, allies, coalition partners, and like-minded nations. Despite differences in the size or structure of our navies, cooperation today is more
necessary than ever before. And cooperation is growing. But we need more, much more. Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and our need for security of this vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity.

Today’s reality is that the security arrangements and paradigms of the past are no longer enough for the future. And today’s challenges are too diverse to tackle alone; they require more capability and more resources than any single nation can deliver. Compounding the complexity of addressing these challenges is that, no matter how large or small your navy or coast guard may be, we all face similar internal constraints, like shrinking budgets, aging equipment, and populations that may not be attracted to military service. All this results in incentives for additional cooperation, not isolation. Our level of cooperation and coordination must intensify to adapt to our shared challenges and constraints. We have no choice in this matter, because I am convinced that nobody, no nation today, can go it alone—especially in the maritime domain.

One lesson I still revere today lies in the worth of naval engagement. Many here in America extol Theodore Roosevelt for his advocacy of a strong navy. Yet few remember his strenuous diplomacy in helping to resolve the Russo-Japanese war—exactly one hundred years ago this month—for which he earned the Nobel Peace Prize, the first ever for an American citizen. We have learned that the proactive cost of security is far more affordable than the reactive cost of war. I believe navies can help prevent war, an effect that I’m sure we all desire. The question becomes, how do we prevent war by extending the peace? How do we secure the maritime domain together?

First, it’s important to recognize that, unlike the past, in today’s interconnected world acting in the global interest is likely to mean acting in one’s national interest as well. In other words, exercising sovereignty and contributing to global security are no longer mutually exclusive. There is no inherent conflict between a country’s national interests in maritime security and the greater security of the global commons. They are mutually reinforcing and inextricably linked. They are two sides of the same coin in today’s globalized world.

But acting in national and thereby global interest is more than just words. It requires both a maritime capability and the political will, something that not all countries share equally. Sometimes a nation has one but not the other. Sometimes it has neither. But I believe there is a solution.

I am thinking about a global network that focuses on making the maritime domain safer for everyone’s use, in most every nation’s self-interest, by leveraging the unique capabilities that all your organizations bring, no matter how large or small. Maritime forces can shore up the underpinnings of stability, undermining the factors that lead to conflict, increasing cultural awareness, improving community relations, protecting sea lines of communications that bring economic aid, and fostering enduring relationships.

And let’s not forget that cooperation must exist not only in a region but also within a nation, integrating the military, coast guard, and law enforcement. That’s why I’m pleased to see so many of our coast guard, war college, and other maritime organizations represented here.
I think that a model for the future of maritime relationships and security can also be seen today in programs like the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. What makes PSI different from arrangements in the past is that it is characterized as having—and needing—no formal support structure, no secretariat, no headquarters, no chairperson. Rather, it consists of a simple agreement between participating states to take concerted action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These nations agree to work together by employing cooperation among a network of law enforcement agencies, militaries, and foreign ministries.

Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan has applauded the work of all the countries active in PSI and has pointed to this initiative as an example of the type of cooperation necessary to counter today’s threats: nations acting in their own interest but also for the common good. I couldn’t agree more.

Ultimately, the decision to participate in maritime operations, security assistance, or other initiatives remains sovereign for each state. But each state has a place to participate and contribute if it so desires. In other words, there’s a lot of water and a lot of coastline to cover, a lot of moving parts, and a lot of seams to close. Consequently, the U.S. Navy cannot by itself preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain. It must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use for others that threaten national, regional, or global security. In this regard, the changed strategic landscape offers new opportunities for maritime forces to work together—sometimes with the U.S. Navy, but oftentimes without. In fact, a greater number of today’s emerging missions won’t involve the U.S. Navy. And that’s fine with me.

There are times to lead, and there are times to listen and times to learn. I’ve come to Newport this week to listen and to learn. How or whether nations choose to participate alongside U.S. forces is up to their leadership. What is important is that nations choose to participate at some level alongside partners they choose, even if that activity is limited to their own territorial waters. As I said at the outset, our theme is about voluntarily harnessing the power of the international community in ways that are in the interest of individual nations, in order to effectively and efficiently confront the common challenges and threats in the maritime domain.

I am truly looking forward to the days ahead, to hearing your opinions and to talking with you about how we can best increase cooperation and understanding. No one has all the answers. But collectively, we can chart a course that is beneficial to most everyone. And that is our goal here at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium.

Humbly I would offer these shared challenges for us to consider over the coming days, over the coming months back in our headquarters, and over the next year or so, until we meet in regional seapower symposia in different parts of the world:

First, that over the course of the next few days we explore how to increase security in the maritime domain and develop concrete recommendations to take back to our headquarters and begin to implement where they make sense.

Second, that each navy and coast guard participating in this Symposium ask itself, “How can we participate in this global network of maritime nations? Are we in a position to recommend to our governments that we provide security and security assistance? Or is it in our interest to seek assistance from a trusted partner to increase our own maritime security?”
Third, what can be done regionally, either by strengthening existing forums’ efforts to address increasing security in the maritime domain or by beginning to build new regional security initiatives? And for new regional security initiatives, who is willing to take the first step toward sponsorship?

Last, I would solicit your support in including as an agenda item in your regional seapower symposia how we’re doing at improving security in the maritime domain, what we’re learning from this effort, and where we need to change how we collectively support this initiative, with another global assessment of our efforts as part of the Eighteenth ISS here in Newport two years hence.

As I said earlier, no nation can go it alone. It is through the synergy of us collectively acting in our own national interests that we can leave our mark on the world, our nations, and our families’ futures.

Before turning the podium over, I want to comment about this group, and our profession and what it means to me. I mentioned that we are a unique body here, not just because of the size or shared interest but also because of our calling. At sea we all share the largest global commons, and as such we all share a long history of cooperation and mutual respect—no matter the country, flag, or political differences. Our profession relies on customs and traditions such as diplomacy, sovereignty, and assistance at sea—norms that are older than any nation here today.

I think about how navies and coast guards cooperated in responding to the recent tsunami disaster. Countries sent money and assistance, but they also sent their navies—trained, ready, responsive.

I think about the cooperation shown last month when seven Russian sailors were in peril, trapped in their submarine at the bottom of the sea. Every nation with resources responded without hesitation or formal arrangements.

And, of course, in response to Hurricane Katrina, the United States has felt the same, with maritime assistance from Canada, Mexico, and the Netherlands in addition to the millions of dollars in aid offered for assistance and support from all over the world. And we greatly appreciate that support.

As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea—advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty—to win wars and defend borders. We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain we collectively are responsible for.

Because of the importance of the seas, our global dependence on the seas, our navies are in increasing demand. I think a profession such as ours, inherently global, cooperative, and connected, can be a large part of the answer to today’s security challenges.

As we combine our advantages, I envision a thousand-ship navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will—made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world. Can you imagine the possibilities if we work toward increased interoperability through more standardized training, procedures, and command and control protocols? This thousand-ship navy would integrate the capabilities of the maritime services to create a fully interoperable force, an international city at sea. This calls for a new—or maybe not so new, but very different—image of sea power, an image something like this:
Multinational medical teams sent from the sea, healing the sick; pipefitters and mechanics and electricians of every culture working together to repair a damaged infrastructure; construction workers literally and figuratively mending fences and building bridges.

Or this:
Small, fast watercraft of many nations, racing down rivers, containing the flow of illegal drugs, hunting down terrorists and pirates at their front door, keeping our ports and harbors safe.

Or how about this:
A fleet of ships, fully netted and connected, integrated with the international joint force as well as the multitalented civilian agencies of many nations—a world fleet spanning the full spectrum of operations. Just imagine the power that would reside in that kind of fleet. Imagine the depth and breadth of skills it would bring to the world, a world united by the power of the sea.

I am extremely proud to count myself among you. Thank you again for being here. Thank you for your commitment to our calling.
The U.S. Navy’s Strategic Plan

Rear Admiral (Select) Charles Martoglio, U.S. Navy

Navy Staff

Dr. James Giblin:

Once again, good morning. My name is Jim Giblin. I’m the provost here at the Naval War College. It is my honor and personal pleasure to introduce a long-standing friend of mine to be your next speaker, Rear Admiral (Select) Charlie Martoglio.

Charlie, like Admiral Mullen, is a sailor. Like most of us, and as in my previous life as well, he has trained crews of ships, taken those ships and crews to sea, conducted operations, and brought them home safely, having completed the task at hand. He has served mostly in destroyers and cruisers and commanded U.S.S. Fitzgerald and, more recently, Destroyer Squadron Twenty-Three—the Little Beaver Squadron, a squadron that is of some significance in our Navy’s history.

His tours ashore are no less impressive: he has served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and he now serves as the Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as well as the Commander of Fleet Forces Command. I am proud to say that Charlie is a graduate of this institution and also served as the senior member of the College’s Mahan Scholars Group a few years ago.

Charlie has two specific relationships with this Symposium. The first one is the more direct one: As the director of strategy and policy on Admiral Mullen’s staff, he is responsible for putting this Symposium together, along with his boss, Admiral Morgan, for the CNO. But more important than that, I believe, is his relationship, as COMDESRON Twenty-Three, to Admiral Arleigh Burke. Arleigh Burke was one of the first commanders of that destroyer squadron, in the 1940s, and he is famous for the way he operated that squadron, both tactically and operationally. But more significantly, and as was noted earlier in this morning’s session, Arleigh Burke was the founder of the international programs at the Naval War College. As such, he had a strong influence on how this Symposium was eventually put together back in 1969. His belief in friendship, trust, and confidence among the senior leadership of the navies of the world—like those of you who are sitting here today—creates an even more important linkage for Charlie and his responsibility as—if you will—a direct descendent, as COMDESRON Twenty-Three, of Arleigh Burke. My good friend, Charlie Martoglio.

Rear Admiral (Select) Charles Martoglio:

Thank you very much, Dr. Giblin. I am truly honored to be here today. One of the most enjoyable aspects of my job is working with many of you, the attachés assigned
to Washington, forming strong and enduring friendships; and I see many friends here in the audience. So it’s doubly an honor to address so many navy, coast guard, and maritime commanders here at the U.S. Naval War College, our center of strategic thought.

As Dr. Giblin mentioned, in addition to working closely with your attachés, I run the strategy office for Admiral Mullen and [Vice] Admiral John G. Morgan [Deputy CNO for Informations, Plans, and Strategy, N3/N5]. When we were discussing what we wanted to talk about at ISS, Admiral Mullen told me to provide the participants good insight into where the U.S. Navy is going, and to do this in a very forthright and transparent fashion. So for the next few minutes, I’d like to discuss with you the U.S. Navy’s strategic plan—a plan that focuses on the maritime component of the U.S. Joint Force and how we need to adapt that maritime component to keep it relevant to the very dynamic security environment we find ourselves in today.

We’re going to talk about three things briefly. We’ll take a look at the global security environment from a U.S. and U.S. Navy perspective. I would ask you to keep this in mind as I talk, because, following Admiral Mullen’s guidance, I am going to talk candidly and forthrightly, and some of you may disagree with some of the U.S. perspectives that we espouse. But it’s still important to get some of these ideas on the table so you’ll know why we’re doing what we’re doing in the U.S. Navy.

I’m going to talk a little bit about what our bosses—the U.S. president, the U.S. secretary of defense, or the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs—are telling us we ought to be doing. Then I’m going to discuss a strategy that facilitates organizing, training, and equipping the Navy to support a joint force and a global maritime network. And we’re going to talk about where the U.S. Navy is going under Admiral Mullen’s tenure as the U.S. CNO.

The day after Admiral Mullen became the CNO, he promulgated his vision for the U.S. Navy. This slide gives his words and his direction to us as to where we need to take the U.S. Navy. I would like to highlight two points.

CNO GUIDANCE

The vision we seek is: Americans secure at home and abroad; sea and air lanes open and free for peaceful, productive movement of international commerce; enduring national and international naval relationships that remain strong and true; steadily deepening cooperation among the maritime forces of emerging partner nations; and a combat-ready Navy—forward-deployed, rotational and surge capable—large enough, agile enough, and lethal enough to deter any threat and defeat any foe in support of the Joint Force.

The first point is that the U.S. Navy needs to be able to operate globally, in blue, green, and brown water—the open ocean, the littorals, and the close-in. The second is [coalition partners]; I hope you notice that in Admiral Mullen’s vision we talk about relationships with coalition partners twice. We talk about relationships that remain strong and true—the existing relationships; these are our allies, friends, and coalition partners around the world today. And we also talk about deepening cooperation among maritime forces of emerging partner nations. And that’s what
brings us to the theme of ISS: building a maritime domain that is secure, based on
the common interests of most nations.

Admiral Mullen has also told us that we will continue to be a forward-deployed navy. We are a
navy that is forward day in and day out. We’re going to do that by being rotational: we’ll deploy
forces from the United States and will also be surge-capable when necessary—in other words, we will
have the ability to get a large percentage of our fleet that is not deployed forward when that
becomes necessary. And we need to be large enough, agile enough, and lethal enough. We need
to be a big-enough navy that we can establish maritime dominance as necessary. This was Admiral
Mullen’s vision statement the day after he became the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.

We’ll have a question-and-answer period at the end, but if there’s some compelling
point that you’d like to make or you would like me to elaborate on, please feel
free to ask as we go along.

As we look to the future, we see a very dynamic security environment. It’s a
security environment unlike any we have experienced in at least the last fifty or sixty
years. And there are a lot of forces shaping this security environment. I would like
to touch on four key shapers of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Joint Force and where
we see this security environment going.

The first two shapers have to do with access, the ability to get into the battle
space that we need to get into in order to do whatever we need to do—most of the
time with the assistance of the people sitting in this room. Joint force infrastructure
access is all about our ability to get U.S. military forces into someone else’s sover-
eign territory. As you all know, the U.S. military does not go where we are not
wanted, so we need to work those partnerships and those relationships. This fac-
tor—shaping future infrastructure access—has a huge impact on armies and air
forces, because they are the ones that need that access to infrastructure ashore, to
put their troops ashore or to bed down their aircraft. So this driving force plays very
well for navies and naval forces, because we don’t need that same level of infrastruc-
ture access that armies and air forces do.

About every time I’ve talked about this to audiences, I’ve left this point right now
and moved on to my next one. But Katrina, the hurricane that hit the U.S. Gulf
Coast three or four weeks ago, also highlights what naval forces can bring to infra-
structure access.

As we saw in New Orleans and along our Gulf Coast, as the infrastructure is dev-
astated and there’s not even a way to get things into the area because the roads are
severed and the rivers are blocked, naval forces can give you infrastructure access
even in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenarios. Because what do na-
val forces bring with them? Everything they need. They bring the post office. They
bring showers. They bring communications.

We’ve always thought of infrastructure access in terms of going overseas and using
it either for maritime security or stability operations, or even fighting wars. But
one of the lessons we’ve learned from Katrina is that naval forces can bring a lot to
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. We always knew this, but we never knew
it so pointedly until we saw it—how it impacted the United States, and the fact that
when we brought our forces in we then had access to an area nobody else could get
to. It’s an interesting sidelight.
Now, if infrastructure access plays well for navies, to be fair and balanced to our army and air force brethren, this plays against navies: antiaccess strategies. These are all the ugly things that an adversary tries to do to keep navies out of the battle space that they need to get into in order to generate the effect they want to generate. Even for the United States, even for our aircraft carriers, to generate effective sortie rates we need to be somewhere between 150 and 250 miles from the target. Well, if an adversary builds submarines, builds cruise missiles, builds ballistic missiles, uses mines, uses coastal artillery—all those things make it hard for any navy to get into the battle space it needs to get into to do the mission it’s told to do. So one of the primary shapers for the U.S. Navy is that we always need to make sure that we invest enough to know with confidence that we can get into any battle space we need to get into.

It is especially important that we are investing in the right things to enable us to get into that denied-access battle space, and we do have the confidence that we can do it today, tomorrow, and ten years from now. So access really does shape the kind of U.S. Navy that we’re building, and it impacts virtually everybody in this room in exactly the same way.

As for coalition and interagency collaboration and coordination—twenty years ago, twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Navy went it alone, even with the U.S. Joint Force. Our Navy war plans were deep-water war plans that didn’t really involve even the Marines, let alone the Army and the Air Force. That has dramatically changed in the last fifteen or twenty years, and we are pretty good at U.S. joint operations—the synergy we get when we marry the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marines, and the U.S. Coast Guard. But we need to be more than that. In the future security environment, bringing in the international dimension—exactly what we’re doing here today—is absolutely vital. As Admiral Mullen said, no nation can go it alone. We need assistance. You need assistance. There’s a synergy that we can bring together that we’ll talk about toward the end here.

I think we are better at operating with many of your navies than we are at operating with other U.S. government agencies—with one exception, and that’s the U.S. Coast Guard. Navy–Coast Guard relationships are stronger today than they have ever been in the past. We work seamlessly with our Coast Guard because we understand what is at stake, and that’s the security of our nation. Where we need to get better is at working with the rest of the U.S. agencies—the other departments that play into homeland security and homeland defense, and some of our law enforcement agencies, like the FBI, the Department of Justice, Customs, and Border Patrol. It’s those interrelationships that we need to focus on and get a little bit better at than we are today.

Lastly, I’d like to talk about distributed and networked operations. I want to give you what I think is a neat mental model of how to think about the different security environments that we’re required to confront today. In big wars, in our major combat operations, the adversary is relatively easy to find but hard to kill, because he’s big. In irregular warfare or the Global War on Terror, it’s just the opposite. The adversary is really hard to find, but if you find him, he’s easy to do something with, because he’s small. They’re in small cells, widely distributed across the battle space. They’re not concentrated.
That has two implications for the U.S. Navy and for military forces globally. One is that irregular warfare, whether it’s on land or at sea, is sensor- or sensing-intensive. You’ve got to be able to find these guys. And the other is, maybe the United States is not packaging our forces right—because, how do we sail in the U.S. Navy? We sail in carrier strike groups, in expeditionary strike groups. We mass our combat power.

Why do we do that? Because although we’re engaged in an irregular war, we as the U.S. Navy can never lose sight of the fact that the reason the American taxpayers fund the U.S. Navy is for us to be ready to fight and win the big wars, major combat ops. So the idea of carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups is absolutely valid, and we still have to train as CSGs and ESGs, because that’s the high end of the type of combat we might find ourselves in.

But you don’t need to sail your forces around in CSGs and ESGs in theater. In fact, you don’t want to, most of the time, because you’re not going to find the adversary—your forces are too concentrated. You want to take those forces and starburst them. You want each ship to operate independently yet networked. You want to operate independently so that you are covering as much of the battle space as you can, trying to find adversaries and trying to bring stability to ungoverned or undergoverned portions of the maritime domain.

I don’t think you’re going to see the U.S. Navy change carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups, but I do think you’re going to see us change the way we operate them. We’ll train them to mass combat power, and we’ll sail them as mass combat power. When they get in theater, they’ll distribute, and they’ll conduct
irregular operations and the Global War on Terror, looking for extremists, looking to bring security to the maritime domain. They will occasionally come together, because we have to maintain that high-end proficiency—we have to be able to train to that high-end warfare. And after that training event, they’ll redistribute. So that’s just some of the operational change that you may see in the U.S. Navy over the coming years as we look to accommodate a very complex and dynamic security environment.

When we think of the strategic landscape that’s out there, we can liken irregular warfare and the Global War on Terror to the Cold War. It’s a little bit like a struggle. Like the Cold War, it’s always running in the background. Every time a U.S. Navy ship sails, it’s sailing in support of the Global War on Terror, because that’s always there, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, three hundred and sixty-five days a year.

Like the Cold War, we expect the Global War on Terror to be of long duration. The Cold War lasted fifty years. The Global War on Terror may last twenty or thirty years.

Like the Cold War, where there were two spikes of intense activity, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, we expect to see spikes of intense activity during the Global War on Terror. Afghanistan may have been a spike. Iraq is a spike. And, hopefully not, but we may fight a major combat operation sometime during that twenty- or thirty-year span as well. Also just like the Cold War, homeland defense and homeland security again are a big piece of what we do.

But as I said earlier, while we’re talking about the global war, we as a U.S. military and a U.S. Navy will not take our eye off the traditional threats that are out there, the conventional conflicts that are out there—and, as Admiral Mullen talked

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**Strategic Landscape from US Navy Perspective**

- Global War on Terrorism – struggle, like Cold War
  - Irregular warfare fought by decentralized groups of extremists
  - Homeland Defense/Homeland Security a key consideration for US
- Traditional Threats – still out there
  - Regional powers with robust conventional and (some) nuclear capability
  - Continued instability created by interstate conflicts
- Unrestricted Warfare – it’s all for sale
  - Weapons of Mass Destruction
  - Disruptive systems – high technology

**More competitors, complex contingencies, broader mission range for the US Joint Force**
about in his remarks, unrestricted warfare. This encompasses all the things that most nations will not do in warfare—like indiscriminately attacking civilian populations, using human shields, attacking civilian financial networks, or attacking civilian communications networks. And under that category we put two other challenges that we have to face.

One is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And why is that important? Why is that so changed? Twenty-five years ago, five years ago, ten years ago, you had to be a reasonably wealthy nation, with educated people and the political will and resources, to develop weapons of mass destruction. Today, as the slide shows, if you have money you can get WMD. So a small group of people unaccountable to anybody can generate a strategic-level effect if they have the money to get WMD. That’s pretty scary. And it ought to concern everybody in this room.

The other challenge is disruptive systems. These are the high-technology systems that are emerging today that can negate the effectiveness of large percentages of an adversary’s infrastructure. Whether you’re talking about taking down missile defenses on ships at sea, taking down financial networks, taking down transportation networks—these are all the sorts of things that high technology enables. Again, if it’s out there, it’s for sale.

So we think the banner at the bottom of this slide has it about right for the sorts of things we as a navy and as a U.S. joint force face in the future strategic landscape—and that is, more competitors and more-complex contingencies. There are no easy answers, and there’s a broader range of missions for the U.S. Joint Force.
I wanted to show this slide, which comes from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, because what I just talked about from the U.S. Navy perspective has to align with what our seniors are telling us—the president, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Here’s what they are telling us are the four security environment challenges for the future.

- The traditional threat, conventional warfare: armies-armies, navies-navies, joint forces–joint forces
- The irregular war or Global War on Terror type of threat
- The catastrophic challenges, which involve the challenge of weapons of mass destruction—what we do to control proliferation, and, God forbid, if an event happens somewhere, how we respond.
- Lastly, the disruptive technology that I talked about.

You can see that there’s an awful lot of gray in these four areas. No adversary says, “I’m a traditional challenge to you.” Adversaries try to be in as many of these challenge areas as they can. So as we’re doing our Quadrennial Defense Review—which is about two-thirds of the way done right now and will be the single biggest shaper of the U.S. Joint Force during this four-year time span—we need to address every one of these four challenges, and we need to make sure that we have the capabilities and the capacity to address them.

From a Navy perspective, if we don’t contribute in all four of those areas, we marginalize ourselves, and we can make ourselves irrelevant if other U.S. services or other U.S. interagency organizations can provide the protection our nation needs. So we must be flexible. We must be adaptable and agile. And we must embrace innovation and new thought in order to accommodate all four of these challenge areas.

Really quickly, on our Quadrennial Defense Review: we are looking at all aspects of U.S. military operations and even our Department of Defense. What gets the press is when we talk about force structure. How many things are we buying? What are the capabilities that we need?

But in addition to force structure, we’re also looking at what the roles and missions of each of the services and the U.S. combatant commanders and Department of Defense, DoD, organizations are, and how they all work together. We’re looking at manning. How do we man the U.S. military? Everybody thinks of the soldier or sailor in uniform on active duty, but we have active duty military, we have reserve military, we have civilians in the Department of Defense, and we have contractors in the Department of Defense. What’s the right balance among those people? Because right now the U.S. Navy pays about 50 percent of its budget for things related to manpower. Imagine that. Our budget is about $130 billion a year, and roughly half of it goes to manpower.

These are the same sorts of things that many of your navies are experiencing. How do you find the resources to recapitalize your navy, to afford your manpower, to ensure your current readiness? And these are the same challenges that we’re going through right now and that we’re addressing in the QDR.

We’re also looking at our business practices. How do we become more efficient? How do we deliver the same capability or the required capability in an effective manner that is efficient, with efficiency being effectiveness over cost? And lastly,
how does the U.S. Department of Defense tie in with U.S. interagency cooperation and with coalition partners?

These are the sorts of big-level things that we’re doing as part of our Quadrennial Defense Review, which we’ll deliver to the U.S. Congress in February of next year. As we talk about the strategy, we can begin to close in on what we think it’s going to be. But until some of these higher-level decisions are made, we need to preserve enough flexibility that we can accommodate whatever that last piece of higher-level guidance is that we get from the Quadrennial Defense Review.

**Vice Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand:**

May I ask a question?

**Rear Admiral Martoglio:**

Yes, sir.

**Vice Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand:**

I was just wondering whether [Hurricane] Katrina had any impact on the parallax set that you have up there, by adding environmental challenges as one of the risks you address in QDR.

**Rear Admiral Martoglio:**

Yes, absolutely. In fact, the Katrina situation could have some fairly significant impact for us as a nation. And now there is another hurricane bearing down on the U.S. Gulf Coast, perhaps in Texas, and economic consequences are going to come along against that.

One of the tenets of the QDR is that there will be no additional money for the U.S. Department of Defense appropriated by Congress. So as we look at what sort of force structure we need, we’re working with what we call a constant top line. We’re not going to get more money. We may find that it even becomes a declining top line as other fiscal pressures at the U.S. government level, not just the DoD level, begin to enter into this.

And I do think the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Joint Forces are taking a broader definition of the word *security*, partially including environmental security—although, to be quite honest, we comply with all U.S. environmental laws, but the people who really do that for the United States are law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard. But our definition of security certainly does include the things you do to keep from getting into wars. As Admiral Mullen said, the proactive cost of security is less than the reactive cost of war. So anything we can do, either collaboratively, regionally, or individually, that adds to maritime security or stability in the ungoverned or undergoverned maritime domain, we think certainly falls into the definition of security today. Did that answer your question?

**Vice Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand:**

Sure.

**Rear Admiral Martoglio:**

Yes, sir.
**Admiral Mullen:**

Let me take a crack at that from a different point. I think the two station areas for us in Katrina are going to be one. I agree with what Charlie said about how the environmental procedure will be handled. Our compliance with Katrina takes care of that. How much of an environmental disaster we have down there suggestively determines this, although it is generally [inaudible]. There is a scarcity of resources because of the expectation within the U.S. government that there is not a whole lot more cash to handle missions or handle capabilities that come out of the QDR.

The other big piece is, there’s going to be a great debate in this country over how much of this the military is going to do in the future, and you don’t get that for free and you need resources as well. We’re tracking lots of ways across the board—mostly, right now, the ground forces. But you may have read or seen that for a disaster of this proportion, you finally get to the point where the military has the ability to respond faster than other agencies can. So how much of that we get in the future is really a debate that is out there. I think those would be the two big pieces, at least for the foreseeable future, that we’ll be involved in with respect to the results of Katrina.

**Rear Admiral Martoglio:**

I’m going to press on through a couple of slides, because I’ve talked about most of the things on them. Here we just talked briefly about higher-level guidance—what our bosses are telling us.
And these are the sorts of things that we’ve mostly touched on, but everything that we’ve talked about is being reflected in what our bosses are telling us as well.

**Admiral Sir Alan West, United Kingdom:**
Could I just comment on that national strategic plan for terrorism?

**Rear Admiral Martoglio:**
Yes, sir.

**Admiral Sir Alan West, United Kingdom:**
It comes back to one of the points you made, I think. In light of developments, as we found in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and everywhere we have had our fingers, the things that are going to make the difference—we can’t ring entirely, but actually it’s the setting up of new structures: It’s the economic side of things. It’s actually setting up a new legal system, and legal systems that actually operate. There are a whole range of other things that the military can’t do.

**Rear Admiral Martoglio:**
Absolutely.

**Admiral Sir Alan West, United Kingdom:**
We have been given the task of doing it. Yes, we hold the ring. Yes, we stop things from getting worse possibly. But it’s those other bits, and those other bits relate across to working with other government agencies and things like that. I don’t think that it is in Admiral Mullen’s vision, but it’s difficult to incorporate that into it. But it’s such a crucial part of this new world we’re in. We did things differently back in 1969. I remember we used to get on board ships, take them over, do things, and not seem to worry. We’re in a different world now. And I do think we’ve got to be careful not to think we can resolve any of these things militarily, because we can’t.

**Rear Admiral Martoglio:**
Absolutely right. We are a portion of a diplomatic, informational, military, and economic approach to all of these problems. And one of the things we’re trying to get better at in U.S. government interagency relationships is determining what the roles and missions are between the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State: who does what, especially in the preconflict shaping of maritime security and the postconflict stability operations. And as the Admiral mentioned, we often get the finger pointed at us, because, as the military, we—everybody sitting in this room—are often the only organizations in our nations that have the capacity to do these tasks quickly. But the reality is that these tasks are a lot more than military, and they do require the diplomatic element of power and the economic element of power as well, because the military can’t address them alone.

**Vice Admiral R. Mudimu, South Africa:**
[inaudible]. If we are going to do that, we will find ourselves in a vicious circle of thinking that sea power alone can address the problems of today. So the definition of sea power must of necessity include homeland security, because if you don’t do
that you may [inaudible], but people who don’t have information [inaudible] that creates a problem. And hence the definition of terrorism itself needs to be defined, because if you don’t do that [inaudible].

*Rear Admiral Martoglio:*

Sir, good point.

I’m conscious of Vince’s red card there. I’ve got twenty minutes to go and thirty-five minutes of material. I can’t get the red card; it’s a manner of honor.

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**US Navy Focus Areas**

- Global War on Terror
  - Maritime Domain Awareness
  - Disrupting and attacking terrorist networks
- Maritime Shaping and Stability Operations
  - Coalition Partnerships and Capacity
  - Increased US Navy’s regional expertise
- Homeland Security/Defense
  - Active, forward, defense in depth
  - USN – USCG – USG Interagency
- Major Combat Operations
  - Assured Access... from the Joint Sea Base
  - Scalable, persistent, precision effects w/reach
  - Strategic Speed ... force posture, force packaging, sensing, decision making

*Forward, persistent, engaged ... and, if necessary, dominant*

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So where is the U.S. Navy focusing? To accommodate the dynamic security environment and focus on Admiral Mullen’s priorities, there are four places where we’re putting attention. The first is the Global War on Terror, or irregular warfare. The second is maritime security and stability operations—this is something that navies and naval forces are inherently good at. This is phase zero, preconflict, keeping the conflict from starting.

Why are we good at this? Because we’re self-sustaining; because we’re over the horizon—nobody sees us unless we want them to see us. So people ashore, the media, don’t see the fact that there are naval forces out working with each other, bringing security to the ungoverned and undergoverned portions of the maritime domain.

And those few times when we do come ashore, naval forces have a small footprint. They don’t bring large things with them. They send people ashore often for liberty, and then they go back to their ship, and they sail away. Navies don’t come to stay. So there’s a political acceptability dimension to navies that may not be there in other military forces or even government agencies.
And within maritime forces, there are levels of political acceptability. I would point to our U.S. Coast Guard, which has entrée to many nations that the U.S. Navy doesn’t, just because we’re the wrong size—we’re too big. So this idea of political acceptability as we work coalitions to accomplish common objectives is an important principle.

The third area that needs our attention is homeland security and homeland defense—that’s back in our lexicon again because we do need to think about defending our homeland, just as many of you do as well.

The last area is major combat operations. We will not take our eye off that ball, the ability to fight and win the big war. And we need to be able to get into the battle space without access to infrastructure ashore. We need to be able to do that with one ship, with two ships, with a carrier strike group, with an expeditionary strike force—with even larger formations, if necessary. We need to be persistent. We need to be able to stay in the area. We need to have precision effects. We need to be able to accomplish what we want to do very precisely, and we need to be able to do it from a long distance. We value the idea of strategic speed, but strategic speed isn’t just how fast the ship goes. It’s how we posture our forces forward; how quickly can we respond? It’s how we package our forces: do we concentrate power, or do we disperse power? It’s how quickly we can find the target. How quickly can we decide what we’re going to do about it? All these contribute to strategic speed, which contributes to our ability to conduct major combat operations.

Back when we were talking about the hider-finder competition, we talked about training our carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups for the big wars, the major combat operations. But when we sailed them, we would starburst them to cover as much real estate or ocean as possible, keeping them networked so if they needed to come back together for that scalable component of naval power they were able to do that—because one of the things all navies and maritime forces are good at is the ability to rapidly aggregate and disaggregate combat power. You sail one ship, and then you bring a second and it joins; you bring two more ships, and now you’ve got a task group. You bring an aircraft carrier, and now you’ve got a carrier strike group. You bring a second aircraft carrier; you now have a carrier strike force. You bring in a few amphibious ships, and you have an expeditionary strike force. We are really good at aggregating and disaggregating combat power. So, as we talk about distributed and networked operations, what we’re really trying to accommodate is this very broad spectrum of missions that we talked about when we discussed the strategic landscape—more competitors, more complex contingencies, and a broader range of missions for the joint force.

How do you leverage existing and planned investments? Eighty percent of today’s U.S. Navy will still be here fifteen years from now. How do you leverage that big war, that major combat ops investment to do this broader range of missions? How do you conduct a global war on a day-to-day basis while capitalizing on our ability to rapidly aggregate that combat power to be ready to do major combat operations? That’s what distributed and networked operations are all about. They are all about leveraging the self-deploying, sustainable, readily scalable combat power for the Global War on Terror while being postured for the major combat operations.

So what is the U.S. Navy’s story on a day-to-day basis as we embrace distributed and networked operations? The U.S. Navy is forward to develop maritime domain
awareness. MDA is anything in the maritime domain that affects security, safety, economics, or environmental. It’s knowing what’s going on in the maritime domain that affects any of those four areas. So the U.S. Navy is distributed across the environment, doing this hide-or-find competition to bring security to the maritime domain, along with the assistance of coalition partners.

Why do we want maritime domain awareness? To generate actionable information—we need to know that something is not right out there before we can do something about it. And if we get that actionable information, what do we do with it? We disrupt and attack terrorist networks. One of the reasons we’re all here is to talk about increasing security in the maritime domain, including increasing partner-nation capacity to provide that security, with or without the U.S. Navy.

Lastly, by being forward, by conducting the global war on a day-to-day basis, by being distributed across the battle space and being networked, we can aggregate that combat power to fight and win a major combat operation, if that becomes necessary.

So we’re forward to generate maritime domain awareness, to get to actionable information, and to be postured to disrupt and attack terrorist networks if we get that actionable information. Where we pull into port, we’re willing to assist nations in increasing their capacity to provide maritime security. And while we’re doing those four tasks in support of irregular warfare or the Global War on Terror, we’re also postured to rapidly respond to a major combat operation. That’s basically what this slide is intended to say.

And again, we get back to the political acceptability of naval forces, because we don’t stay when we come, and because we’re over the horizon.
Where do coalition partners fit into this naval strategic plan? For years now—certainly as long as I’ve been in the Navy—the U.S. military’s focus when we talk about allies and friends has been at the high end of conflict. It’s “Come fight alongside of me in the big wars.” That’s still important to us, speaking candidly. We want those kinds of friends, who are willing to come with us into the big wars if necessary, because there’s a deterrence component of international cooperation as well—again, keeping wars from ever starting. So please don’t leave here saying the United States is not thinking of having people come with them and support them in the big wars. That’s not the message. Those nations that are willing to do that are important.

But there are new opportunities in this changed strategic landscape that we genuinely believe are in most nations’ self-interests, in their economic interests. And those are missions like counterpiracy, counterdrugs, counter–human smuggling, maritime law enforcement—missions that for the most part are not controversial. They’re not political, and they’re in most nations’ interests to participate in. So we see a new niche for coalition partners, as Admiral Mullen said, with or without U.S. government or U.S. Navy participation. Quite honestly, in parts of the world where there are regional security initiatives or where there is a nation that credibly establishes maritime security by itself, we support that, because that allows us to be in other places of the world. That reduces the operational tempo on our forces. It reduces how much money we have to put into things. So it’s not that we’re being good and altruistic; it’s that this is a common need.

We talked about the maritime domain or the maritime commons, because all nations get the opportunity to use it. And all nations can contribute to its security,
because we believe that it is in most nations’ interests to do so, and it’s not political, and it’s less controversial than some of the other ways that you may partner with the United States. And we would ask other blue-water navies, and other navies that are capable of exporting security or exporting security cooperation, to assist in increasing partner-nation capacity, going to those nations whose navies or maritime law enforcement organizations could use assistance, so that they can begin to, or can improve on their ability to, provide security in their portion of the maritime domain—because, remember, we’re not looking to infringe on anybody’s sovereignty here. The best people to do maritime security in their areas are the nations that live there. They know what’s right, and they know what’s wrong, and they’re in the best position to do something about it.

So if you are a blue-water navy or a littoral navy and can participate in the international task force that’s operating today between the Bab el Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz or Operation Active Endeavour or Black Sea Harmony—any of those international or regional organizations that are looking to bring security to the maritime domain—that’s great. And if you can export security assistance to help a nation increase its capacity to provide security in its portion of the maritime domain, we would ask you to join us as we resource that within the U.S. Navy to be able to provide that capacity when we go overseas.

These are the sorts of things that we’re talking about. Most of these are noncontroversial and are in the common interests of many nations—certainly many of the nations that are here today.
This slide sums up what we mean by the global network. Don’t be put off by the word “global,” because “global” is just a tiny little cap piece. The power of the Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons is not the “global” part of it. It’s individual nations having the capability and capacity to provide for maritime security in their own backyard. And it’s a credible ability to surveille, being able to report, to respond in some way—interdiction, if you will.

Why is this important? Why is this the bedrock? Because nobody can get into another nation’s territorial waters without that nation’s invitation, and if that nation can provide that kind of security, that’s the best way for the global maritime environment to increase security in the maritime domain.

If you look up one level, to regional security initiatives—these are not meant to infringe on the sovereignty of a nation. They’re meant to catch those seams between the sovereign parts of the maritime domain, such as international straits, approaches to territorial water, regional waters, archipelagic waters—the people who exploit the maritime domain know exactly where these seams are and exactly how to exploit them.

The cap piece, if you will, is nothing more than some international agreements that provide some of the tools that allow us to do this. So, as we talk about a global network, we’re not really thinking about everybody in this giant network. We’re thinking about each nation acting in its own interest to bring security to the maritime domain in the nation’s own area.

My next slide is a definition of what we’re talking about.

Global Network of Maritime Nations
for a Free and Secure Maritime Domain

The purpose of a Global Network of Maritime Nations is to voluntarily harness the power of the international community, in ways that are in the interests of individual nations, in order to effectively and efficiently confront the common challenges and threats emerging in the maritime domain.

... increasing security in the Maritime Domain
Admiral Mullen referred to this in his remarks. We want to harness voluntarily the power of the international community in ways that are in the interests of individual nations, to confront the common challenges and threats of the future security environment, because no nation can go it alone.

So as I finish up here today, what would I ask you to remember? What are the key pieces of the U.S. Navy's strategic plan? First, that we value forward presence, persistence, working with allies and coalition partners, and, when and if necessary, the ability to generate maritime dominance to address a very challenging, dynamic, and uncertain security environment.

Second, that we leverage our big-war, major-combat-ops capabilities; how do we leverage those to also do the Global War on Terror and homeland defense and contribute to maritime security?

Third, that navies and maritime forces play a large role in maintaining peace and stability, and the U.S. Navy is focusing its resources in that area. We believe that the proactive cost of security is less than the reactive cost of fighting a war, and navies and naval forces and maritime forces play a very important part in that.

Fourth, that the U.S. Navy is committed to working with partner nations to increase security in the maritime domain, and we ask other like-minded, capable navies to do the same.

And fifth, that the U.S. Navy keeps, and will keep, a strong focus on major combat ops; that is the primary reason for the American taxpayer’s giving us money. There’s more to security today than big wars, and we can all work together to improve security in areas that are of common interest.

That concludes my remarks. I’d be very happy to take questions for as long as Vince allows me to before he shows me the red card. Thank you very much.

Admiral Sir Alan West, United Kingdom:

Thank you very much for that. It was very thought-provoking. If I could just make four points and then ask for your answer. You covered the terms flexibility and versatility, but you didn’t actually mention them, which I found surprising. In producing my sort of naval strategic plan, I put it firmly in everyone’s mind that the one thing you can absolutely guarantee is that, with all the scenarios we lay out with all our clever people, what will happen will be the one thing none of us actually allowed for. Unless that was encompassed in there, I don’t think it was specifically articulated, and that comes into the whole issue of strategic shock, whether it’s Katrina or one of the larger-scale things you were talking about. So I was interested about that.

I agree with everything you say about the capabilities of maritime forces. But we are in an environment, certainly in the United Kingdom, where everything is land-centric. I’m not quite sure how we get this message across to the opinion-formers and other people within our countries. I don’t know whether it’s true in the United States, but it’s very true in Britain that it’s land-centric; and I think it’s true in a number of European nations, because we’ve discussed it in the Chiefs of European Navies Forum. I think it’s an interesting issue as to how we actually get that message across. I don’t know if you have any thoughts on that, because all of those
flexibilities we talk about seem so apparent to us, but somehow they don’t seem to ring the willows when it comes to dishing out the money, which is rather difficult.

I would put a nuance on your short-access issue. Yes, for a major war, short access is a very important issue. But actually, for a lot of the operations we’re involved in, why navies are so good for them is that the sorts of people we’re up against cannot find, identify, locate, and attack forces at sea, even if they’re just out of sight over the horizon—almost even if you can see them. That is a huge strength. And host-nation support, overflying, no footprint ashore, and the need for more forces to protect forces you’ve got there—those are really crucial. I think that’s something we need to stress.

You said that for short access, the Army and the Air Force are better placed now. Well, they’re bloody well not. They’re about as movable as a brick, you have to provide God knows how much support when you put them ashore somewhere, and they’re open to terrorist attack and all of those sorts of things, which I think is a concern.

My final point is in the context of what we’re doing, and it’s really to do with the public’s perception of us, of the military. One has wars of survival, and they’re not a problem. Everyone will fight the war of survival—and fight like mad. And then there are wars of choice. Now, one could argue that in the world we’re in at the moment, there is no choice in terms of stopping the people who wish to destroy our society. But I think the perception of some of the public might be different. A classic example in the Cold War, which you gave us, was Vietnam, where there was a huge change in public perception. I think that is an issue we need to think about very hard in terms of what’s going on at the moment.

Now those are really four thoughts, and I don’t know if you have any reaction to any of those. I thought they were just interesting points to put across. Thank you.

**Rear Admiral Martoglio:**

And that they are, sir. On the flexibility and versatility piece, one of the things we see is that most of our platforms, although they’re large, are large because they have a lot of different capabilities. As we find ourselves in circumstances that we hadn’t anticipated, we are able to use those diverse capabilities in unanticipated ways, and yet the capacity is there to participate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

When you couple that with the different types of ships that we all have in our navies—in particular, aircraft carriers for a float-forward staging basis, or amphibious ships for a float-forward staging basis—and you bring out their multiple capabilities, you often are able to combine those disparate elements in different ways to achieve an objective. But that also means that the leadership needs to empower the people at sea and command positions and running those platforms, giving them the freedom to think and execute without having to go back and rapidly ask permission to do things that are not quite thought through.

As the First Sea Lord [Admiral West] mentioned, for many of the things we’ve found ourselves in—such as Katrina, with our amphibious ships—we did have to improvise, but the thought and the training we give our people allowed them to do that, and allowed them to do it pretty successfully. I think you’re spot-on on all your other observations, sir.
I probably have time for one more question, and then I’m going to get the red card. If there are no more questions, that’s fine, too; I know it’s coming up on lunch. Thank you very much. I hope you found it informative, and we genuinely look forward to working together in the coming years.
Building Capacity Through Cooperation

Ambassador Rose M. Likins

*Acting Assistant Secretary,*
*Bureau of Political Military Affairs, State Department*

*Reaching across the littorals and the open oceans to ensure the sanctum of our seas and the security of our borders*

**Acting Assistant Secretary Likins:**

Thank you, Admiral Mullen, for your introduction. I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak to such a distinguished audience on the issue of maritime security and to share some thoughts with you about the State Department in general, and how it supports and contributes to your efforts in developing this Global Network of Maritime Nations.

I would also like to thank our host, Admiral Shuford, for the outstanding hospitality that I have enjoyed since my arrival last night. Immediately upon entering the naval station, I got a sense of the Naval War College’s pride and commitment to developing the brilliant minds and characters of those who will lead our military forces in the 21st century. Thank you for leading this prestigious and purposeful institution.

My purpose here today is to talk about global alliances—in this case, the United States Navy and allied and coalition navies—and to offer a series of recommendations that you may want to consider as you proceed with your efforts in “Developing a Global Network of Maritime Nations.”

The core mission of the State Department is to “create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.” Our bilateral and multilateral relationships are integral to that mission—and many of those relationships are underpinned by strategic military alliances.

One of our principal undertakings in executing this mission is building coalitions or partnerships to resolve shared problems, whether those problems are security-related, like the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, or more social and development issues, like HIV/AIDS and trafficking in persons or building a community of democracy.

Despite the “discovery” of the phenomenon of globalization over the last several years, it has long been my belief that mariners were the first agents of globalization centuries ago and that our planet’s oceans were the first global commons. We tend to use that term today to refer to space, to the Internet, to the air we breathe, but in fact our oceans and seas were where it all started. And those who ventured out onto them—whether motivated by the thrill of discovery, the search for riches, routine commerce, or communications—were the pioneers in creating the ties that bind us.
Mariners from all corners of the globe quickly discovered that they faced common challenges and threats and developed a series of traditions and working procedures that superseded national boundaries. The imperative to rescue fellow sailors in times of distress, to mark hazards to navigation, to share food and water with those whose vessels are disabled, and common signaling methods are but a few examples of these maritime practices.

Today we again face common threats and challenges in the maritime domain, and it is time for us to strive for shared methods and techniques for defeating those threats. Those threats include use of our waters for illegal activities like narcotics trafficking or trafficking in persons, unauthorized exploitation of national resources, and contamination of the environment.

We all face constrained resources, and our national leaders are called upon to use those scarce resources to respond to a variety of national needs, from education to public infrastructure to national defense. We can all maximize the use of these resources by avoiding duplication of effort and cooperating to confront these common challenges.

It’s not always easy. There are a multitude of obstacles, ranging from the most basic, like communicating across language barriers or on different communications networks, to insufficient resources allocated to this mission, to the more complicated, like historic regional tensions over sovereignty. Together we can overcome many, if not all, of these obstacles. But we have to want to do that. It takes a conscious decision to work together.

Language and communications barriers can be overcome with technology and training. Resource constraints can be minimized by sharing missions and with the assistance of allies.

Sovereignty is perhaps the most difficult obstacle, because nationalism appeals to strong emotions in every one of us. But we need to remember that bad actors violate our sovereignty every day, causing enormous social and economic damage. They consciously exploit political tensions for their own ends. How many of you have seen a vessel suspected of carrying illicit cargo or conducting illegal operations duck into the waters of another nation when they detect the approach of your vessel? It literally happens every day, doesn’t it?

Let me be clear. I am not advocating dismantling borders. We have a saying in the United States: “Good fences make good neighbors”; and there is truth to that in many circumstances. What I am advocating is that we be more creative than the bad actors. That we find ways to cooperate by sharing information, by communicating clearly, by pooling our resources, and by resolving to deny our respective national territories to our common enemies.

Sounds easy, doesn’t it? We all know it’s not. But what the United States is offering you here today is a hand extended to begin the journey.

In his 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush stated: “The greatest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed.”

That statement could not be any truer than it is today. In numerous subsequent fora, President Bush highlighted the need for creating new and reinforcing
existing alliances and partnerships to engage in the struggle against the ideology of tyranny and terror. He and other like-minded leaders have emphasized that to confront the challenges of this malevolent entity, nations must come together to create a global vision, with a global boldness of thought and the courage to act.

Incidents at sea involving state-sponsored proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nonstate-sponsored acts of piracy on the high seas and the littorals requires us all, as free nations, to rethink our maritime strategy. The blurring of the lines between the illegal act of piracy and the illicit acts of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, not to mention narcotics trafficking and poaching on fishing grounds, demands that we look beyond our own territorial borders to find a solution to the malevolent threats to our individual and collective national security.

The sea lines of communication are the life blood of the world’s commerce. Despite technology, more than 80 percent of global trade still moves by sea, and our economies depend on the free and unimpeded movement of its share of that commerce. Further, with emerging power-projection land forces and seemingly unending commitments, the United States and its allies depend on access to the seas to ensure their security. Freedom of access now means more than just maritime supremacy; it also means awareness and control of the entire spectrum of the maritime domain. The concept of unimpeded sea lines of communication underpins the very meaning of an effective national security strategy—a strategy primarily based on global enlargement and global engagement.

During the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts, more than one hundred twenty-one countries and thirteen international organizations stepped forward and offered their assistance to the United States. These offers have ranged from humanitarian assistance and relief, rescue and salvage operations, and civil engineering assistance to infrastructure repair and medical support, to name a few. The cornerstone of facilitating, coordinating, and implementing that support came from U.S. and foreign naval assets.

Quickly assembling and operating at sea, the United States Navy put together a critical and complex sea-based command, control, and communications network to coordinate sea, land, and air resources to contain the effects and begin restoration operations. The seemingly seamless coordination of effort and the ability to integrate civil and foreign capabilities underscored the maritime components’ innate ability to operate at sea under the most challenging conditions. Without question, had it not been for the rapid response and presence of those navies, especially the Canadian, Dutch, and Mexican navies, the disaster would have been much worse and the list of casualties would have been significantly higher.

I mention this effort not just to pat you all on the back, but to highlight the importance and universality of global international maritime cooperation. Similar to the tsunami efforts, because of your maritime assets and capabilities, the global community was able to operate at sea when other land-based assets could not.

That same type of coordinated, integrated, and interoperable networking is needed on a broader scale to deliver the capability that the CNO proposes at this conference. So what is the United States doing to support this effort?

First off, the president emphasized the criticality of maritime domain awareness in a speech in January 2002. During that speech, he stated: “The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate information, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people, extending well beyond our tra-
ditional maritime boundaries.” Remaining true to his 2002 comments, he recently
signed a critical piece of legislation—the National Strategy for Maritime Security—
that underscores the importance of securing the maritime domain.

Although the strategy highlights the need for national efforts, it also strongly
emphasizes the vital importance of coordinating with foreign governments and in-
ternational organizations, and soliciting international support for enhanced
maritime security. Within the strategy, he stressed the need to develop an overarch-
ing plan that addresses all of the components of the maritime domain—domestic,
international, public, and private: a global, cross-discipline approach to the mari-
time domain, centered on a layered, defense-in-depth framework, if you will.

When Secretary Rice began her tenure at the State Department, she challenged
all of us to transform the way we think about diplomacy and consider how we might
best use our diplomatic tools to better target our responses to meet today’s threats,
not the threats of yesterday. As Secretary Rice told the department in her first town
hall meeting: “Transformational diplomacy is not easy. It means taking on new
tasks, breaking old habits, working with people who are also trying to make those
transformations themselves, and being partners with those around the world who
share our values and want to improve their lives.”

In a word, she was right. Diplomatic efforts dealing with the issues of
counterproliferation and conventional military threats have very little resemblance
to those of the past. During the Cold War era, we had the luxury of time to deliber-
ate and debate foreign policy and develop foreign policy–related measures. Those
days are past.

Today, we as diplomats and senior military planners must primarily work to
build a sound and enduring basis of support to rapidly coordinate and respond
when actionable proliferation-related intelligence and law enforcement informa-
tion become available, and we must be prepared to adapt and change when the
situation demands.

During a time of constrained resources, the United States realizes that not all na-
tions can readily invest human, intellectual, and financial capital in the concepts
needed to deliver the required capabilities. That is why the United States remains
committed to key military foreign assistance programs—International Military Ed-
ucation and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and Peacekeeping Operations
Account. In 2001 the United States contributed over $3.75 billion dollars to 114
countries, and in 2004 the United States contributed over $5 billion dollars to over
140 countries, in these three programs alone.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, a low-cost,
high-yield, effective component of U.S. security assistance, provides training on a
grant basis to students from over 140 allied and friendly nations. IMET not only
furthers U.S. national interests but also advances international interests by estab-
lishing beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased
understanding and defense cooperation.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) advances regional stability through coalition
partners that are equipped and trained to achieve common security goals. Funds
provided through this program enable our international partners to improve their
military capabilities. Related to FMF but distinct is the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program. FMS is the system that manages government-to-government military equipment sales. Although many countries provide their own finance for purchases through the FMS system, the FMF program provides grant financing for acquisition.

And finally, but not least, is the Peace Keeping Operations Account (PKO). These funds support multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not funded through the United Nations. They help to support regional peace support operations for which neighboring countries take primary responsibility. PKO is also used to enhance and develop peacekeeping capability so countries are better able to undertake these peace support operations. We are proud to be able to empower regional leaders to act on behalf of their neighbors in providing stability within their perspective regions.

In allocating these resources we place a premium on the wise use of resources and willingness to engage. In other words, we are willing to help those who help themselves. I’ll put gas in a boat before I’ll pay to paint it so it can look good sitting in the harbor.

So what are the challenges for you that lay ahead? First off, you must continue to make a strong case to your leaders to invest the resources and cooperate in regional security initiatives. This includes programs, operations, and exercises.

The Regional Maritime Security Cooperation (RMSC) initiative, previously known as the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), is an excellent example of countries developing initiatives and programs to counter specific threats within their region. The RMSC protects the critical choke points within the Malacca Strait and its littorals, through which more than half the world’s oil and a third of world trade transit.

On a broader scale, the Proliferation Security Initiative is a prime example of multinational initiatives to combat global threats. I know that Admiral Mullen mentioned PSI during his remarks, but allow me to echo his sentiment on this critical initiative, which addresses trafficking of WMD and their means of delivery by sea, land, and air.

“The WMD proliferation landscape is dynamic and flexible.” Our response to the threat must also be flexible, adaptive, and evolutionary, to not only keep pace but outpace those desiring and attempting to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. PSI is unique in that it taps into each participant’s national authorities and capabilities to create a global web of actions against the traffic in WMD.

PSI has fostered globally a basis for practical steps to quickly respond when we or our partners obtain information of proliferation shipments. The impact of states working together in a deliberately cooperative manner is far greater than that of states acting alone.

Currently more than 60 states have indicated support for the Proliferation Security Initiative—and we encourage others to endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, which creates the framework for PSI action.

In summary, let me say that harnessing the power of the international community in ways that are in the interests of individual nations will not be an easy task, especially given other competing domestic and national interests. That is why when you leave this symposium, I hope that you feel empowered to return to your leaders and emphasize how critical this collaboration is for the future of all nations.
It is also imperative that you engage, to the maximum extent possible, those initiatives within your regions that support global stability, by participating and, if necessary, hosting regional talks, exercises, and operations such as those previously mentioned. Finally, I encourage you to maintain an open dialogue with your counterparts here today and encourage your governments to do the same, particularly in their efforts in building international outreach programs for partnering with the global community.

So as you grapple with the issues of how to promote naval collaboration, build a common picture of maritime activity, and define the required maritime security capabilities, I hope that this event reinforces the United States’ commitment to assisting you in your efforts.

Let me close with a quote by our previous secretary of state, General Colin Powell, that sums up the situation that we find ourselves facing:

“There is no country on earth that is not touched by America, for we have become the motive force for freedom and democracy in the world. And there is no country in the world that does not touch us. We are a country of countries with a citizen in our ranks from every land. We are attached by a thousand cords to the world at large, to its teeming cities, to its remotest regions, to its oldest civilizations, to its newest cries for freedom. This means that we have an interest in every place on this earth, that we need to lead, to guide, to help in every country that has a desire to be free, open and prosperous.”

I’ll be happy to take your questions. I want to again thank Admiral Mullen for this opportunity, and [the] State [Department] looks forward to future opportunities to participate in similar fora. Thank you.
Panel Discussion One  
Collaboration Among Navies  

Moderated by Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Navy  
Panel Members:  
Admiral Jorge Ampuero Trabucco, Peru  
Admiral Sergio Biraghi, Italy  
Rear Admiral Ronnie Tay, Singapore  
Rear Admiral Gheorghe Marin, Romania  

Professor Robert Rubel, Naval War College:  

The panelists may take their places on the stage at this time. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome back from lunch. Admiral Mullen, distinguished visitors, I’m Professor Barney Rubel, chairman of the War Gaming Department here at the Naval War College. I would like to spend a few moments informing you of our professional program for ISS-17.

As you know, the topic of this year’s conference is A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons. We have a series of panels here in Spruance Auditorium, today and tomorrow in the afternoon, of regional seminar discussions to develop our understanding of this theme. On Friday morning, the seminars will report out to the ISS as a whole on the results of their discussions.

Our first panel, which will take place immediately after this introduction, is entitled “Collaboration Among Navies.” The moderator is Admiral Gary Roughead, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The second panel is entitled “Building a Common Picture of Maritime Activity.” It will be led by Admiral Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho of the Brazilian Navy and will address lessons learned from successful regional efforts to develop maritime pictures. Panel 3 will take place tomorrow morning, and its topic will be “Required Maritime Security Capabilities.” Its purpose is to examine the capabilities required by maritime forces to ensure a safe and secure maritime domain. The moderator will be Admiral Lutz Feldt, Chief of Staff, German Navy.

Tomorrow afternoon, from 1400 until 1700, we will conduct seminars that will permit discussions on regional maritime security challenges, as well as ways these challenges could be addressed through naval cooperation. The ISS has been organized into eight regional seminars. They will meet in McCarty Little Hall, the college’s research and wargaming center.

After lunch at the Officers’ Club tomorrow, buses will bring delegates back here to Spruance Hall, from which point you will walk over to McCarty Little Hall. I would like to emphasize the importance of seminars starting on time, as there is likely to be extensive discussion and the available time is limited.

Handouts with seminar assignments are available out in the Spruance lobby, and there will also be a board out there with seminar assignments posted on it. We ask
you to please turn off your cell phones and any other personal electronic equip-
ment when you enter McCarty Little Hall tomorrow. If you must make a phone call,
please go to one of the patios or out the front door of McCarty Little. The War Col-
lege staff can help you with any communications needs, so please don’t hesitate to
ask one of us.

Once in your seminars, a War College faculty member will act as your moderator,
to help discussions proceed in an organized manner. The moderator will be assisted
by two people, a facilitator who will build the seminar’s briefing slides and a techni-
cian who will ensure the computers and audiovisual equipment work properly.

The senior member of the seminar will be asked to act as spokesman for the semi-
ar’s out brief on Friday. However, if the senior member wishes, the seminar may
select an alternate spokesman. Moderators will focus on this task right away so that
the seminars can get down to substantive business.

There will be a break from 1515 to 1545 to allow for refreshment and stretching.
Please be back in your seminar rooms no later than 1545 so that the seminars can
finish on time. Buses will be available at 1700 to take you back to the hotel.

The moderator will work with the seminar spokesman to ensure that the out-
brief slides are acceptable. These will be printed out for the spokesman to take back
to the hotel. The slides will be available for electronic display for out briefs the next
morning. Dr. Ken Watman, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, will
moderate the out briefs in Spruance Auditorium on Friday morning. Each spokes-
man will have 10 minutes to summarize the seminar’s deliberations.

This concludes the introduction of the ISS professional program. However, if I
may be allowed a moment, I would like to tell you a little bit about the War Gaming
Center here at the Naval War College.

The College started war gaming in 1887, a hundred and eighteen years ago,
based on the research and leadership of Lieutenant William McCarty Little, after
whom the building is named. Over the years, war gaming has advanced from sim-
ple math exercises to highly technical network games supported by hundreds of
computers. McCarty Little Hall can support games of over three hundred players.
Your seminar rooms are also our war-gaming rooms. And speaking for the entire
war gaming department, we are honored to have you visit our facility.

I would also like to make an admin announcement. Our staff asks that, when
you have questions for our panelists, please use one of the three microphones,
and step up to it, because we are recording the proceedings and trying to make a
report of them.

With that, I will turn the microphone over to Admiral Gary Roughead, Com-
nander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, to introduce the first panel. Admiral Roughead,
the floor is yours.

Admiral Gary Roughead:

Thank you very much; and, Admiral Mullen, thank you for allowing me to serve as
the moderator for the Collaboration Among Navies Panel. As the Pacific Fleet
Commander, with a large maritime area of responsibility, clearly it’s an area of very
high priority for the United States and all the partner nations in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion; and I look forward to hearing the perspectives of my colleagues on the panel,
and also from all of you in the audience, on this very important topic this afternoon.
I would also like to thank Admiral Shuford for this setting and the great support that you have given all of us as we have arrived in Newport and, particularly, at the War College.

Asia-Pacific navies are making noteworthy strides in exploring and implementing ways to better work together to address the common threats in our region, such as trafficking in drugs and people, piracy, and terrorism. I anticipate that when we hear about the work of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, the opportunities and challenges faced in the region in which we work and where I focus my efforts will be strikingly similar to those faced by the Inter-American Naval Conference or the Regional Seapower Symposium or the Black Sea Force. In Southeast Asia, the navies of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have been conducting coordinated patrols in the Strait of Malacca for several months now and on the thirteenth of September began coordinated air patrols in the strait—a critical step toward enhancing maritime security for this very, very strategic transit point.

It’s fitting also that, I believe, this Symposium is being held at a time when we witness significant change in the global environment. Extraordinary growth in the global marketplace, leaps in technologies, continued global demographic change, and response to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts highlight mission implications for maritime forces in ways that we have not traditionally employed our navies before.

We have already cited, during the course of the conference this morning, a few examples over the past year that highlight that theme: humanitarian assistance operations, in which I was able to play a part, in South and Southeast Asia following last December’s disastrous tsunami; sustained operations in combating the Global War on Terrorism; the combined efforts of several militaries working to counter drug trafficking in the Caribbean and the Pacific; and, most recently, a race against time in which several navies came to the aid of the Russian Navy to save the lives of some sailors who were trapped on the ocean floor. Also, it’s important to recognize that there are significant developments taking place, and advances taking place, in intergovernmental coordination and nongovernmental organization coordination—and again, our own experience with Hurricane Katrina is an example of just that.

But in all cases, I believe, the themes are very, very clear: the need to operate seamlessly with navies of several nations across a wide range of operations; the need for enhanced maritime security in view of the proportional increase in world trade for international commodities, whether that’s oil, food, or clothing, with over 90 percent of that trade being carried on the world’s oceans; and a shift in emphasis from what we have traditionally seen as blue-water operations to employing agile, decisive, combat and noncombat capabilities in regional littorals.

This afternoon we have the pleasure and honor of hearing from four distinguished colleagues as they discuss their region’s strategic environment, opportunities and challenges to closer regional collaboration, and where they see common goals, objectives, and future efficiencies regarding maritime security for the aforementioned and other challenges. The objective of this panel will be to provide a forum to discuss ongoing and planned activity in already-established regional symposia. We have with us Admiral Jorge Ampuero, Commander in Chief of the Peruvian Navy, who will discuss and represent the Inter-American Naval
Conference. Admiral Sergio Biraghi, Chief of Staff, Italian Navy, will represent the Regional Seapower Symposium. Rear Admiral Ronnie Tay, Chief of Navy, Republic of Singapore, will represent the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and Rear Admiral Gheorghe Marin, Chief of Staff, Romanian Naval Forces, will represent the Black Sea Force. Each participant will have fifteen minutes to address the audience on each of the regional forums.

We ask that your questions be held until the end of the last panel member’s presentation. Staying on time is going to be essential, so we’ll hold the questions until the end of all of the presentations and then limit the questions to one minute and a very brief response.

So, without any further ado, I’d like to turn the program over to Admiral Ampuero, who will talk about his area of responsibility.

Admiral Jorge Ampuero, Peru:

[Simultaneous Translation from Spanish] Chiefs of staff and representatives of the navies and the delegations present at this world conference, admirals, and members of the U.S. Navy, first of all, I would like to greet all of you and thank Admiral Michael Mullen and Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford for organizing and inviting us to participate actively in this Symposium, which brings together the main naval and coast guard authorities of the world.

As Commander in Chief of the Peruvian Navy, it is a pleasure for me to contribute to this first panel, which deals with collaboration among navies. I will seek to explain briefly the effort being conducted in the Americas through the Inter-American Naval Conference. This presentation will be developed following a summary that covers a general description of the conference. This will be an introduction and will allow me to give you a quick overview of the strategic environment within the American continent. Then we will focus our attention on the threats to maritime security. In this context we can look at opportunities and weaknesses that the Inter-American Naval Conference is facing these days. And finally, we can make some contributions to this panel.

Since 1959, the Inter-American Naval Conference has been one of the international instruments established by the American states with the purpose of defining and reaching common objectives. These instruments created a forum to analyze and seek solutions to multiple aspects of shared interests, and also as an opportunity to share our traditional links of friendship among American navies. Currently, nineteen out of thirty-five countries on the continent participate in the Inter-American Naval Conference; these countries are listed on the slide being projected on the screen.

As you can see, the Inter-American Naval Conference’s areas of influence correspond to the areas of responsibility of each of its members. These are not limited to the two largest oceans in the world and their projections to the polar areas; rather, they also involve thousands of kilometers of navigable rivers and lakes, on borders and internationally, whose control and surveillance correspond to the responsibility of the respective navies or coast guards. This conference has been held
The conference’s first objective was to provide an opportunity to exchange ideas, knowledge, and mutual understanding of the maritime challenges facing the continent, with the purpose also of encouraging professional contacts and studying the common maritime-enabled problems of the continent, for which we feel that we need greater efficiency. The results of these conferences are the adopted agreements. These agreements are seen as recommendations, and adopting them is in the hands of each individual navy.

In this context and as a result of the agreements that have been adopted in the various conferences, specialized naval conferences have also been established for various areas of cooperation, and these are shown on these slides.

In all these specialized conferences, information sharing has facilitated the development of several operational and academic activities, from the exchange of publications and procedures to the establishment of the Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network, and up to the development of war games. In the last meeting, the Cooperative Inter-American Naval Intelligence System was established and approved, in order to share information about illegal use of the sea for terrorism, maritime drug trafficking, maritime transportation of dangerous or hazardous materials, fishing activities, ecological areas, security and control of sea communications, and others.

Initially the topics dealt with within these conferences focused on generating internal regulations through the basis of agreement and the roles of debate, and later meetings were planned for exchanging information in the framework of
General Description

- Specialized Inter-American Naval Conferences (SIANC)
  - HOSTAC
  - Science and Technology
  - Telecommunications
  - Directors of Intelligence
  - Directors of War Colleges
  - Naval Control of Shipping
  - Interoperability
- Cooperative Inter-American Naval Intelligence System.
Cold War planning. And then, by the 1990s, we began to analyze the modernization of institutions and the contribution of each navy to the development of its country. We began to evaluate new threats, and later on, after September 11, 2001, we began to focus on the war against terrorism and on the strategic environment in the hemisphere.

Before I continue, I should give you a brief description of the strategic situation of the American continent. Although it is true that the American continent is a heterogeneous region in which countries face different economic, social, and military realities, with different potential and different levels of competitiveness, all the states share the same geographical theater, and that forces them to work in a coordinated way—in particular, to fight the new threats that have transnational and multidimensional reach, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, and other types of transnational crime.

We have two serious conflicts in the region. First, in Haiti: this is the second time the United Nations Security Council has declared that the situation in this nation is a threat against peace and security. At the second intervention, the countries of the region played a leading role. Not only did the special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations say that he is from one of the countries in the region, but so also were most of the military personnel who were deployed. In this regard, we should mention that last year, for the first time, a multilateral exercise was carried out off the coast of Peru in which navies trained for different procedures related to the projection of sea power on land.

The second conflict we have is in Colombia. The conflict is more than fifty years old, and it was exacerbated by the arrival of rebels linked to drug dealers. Colombia is fighting against them with the support of the United States. Ironically, Colombia’s success in its war against narcoterrorism could mean the return of the drug-producing cycle to Bolivia and Peru, bringing back their terrorist groups, as they are allied with drug traffickers.

In terms of defense and at the continental level, the American states at the Defense Ministers Conferences have defined a framework for hemispheric cooperation in which each state has a sovereign right to identify its own national security and defense priorities, and to define the strategies, plans, and actions to deal with those threats to its security. However, the nature of terrorism, drug trafficking, illicit weapons traffic, and other types of transnational crime that our states face forces us to recognize them as nonstate actors that act within an asymmetric scheme and force our countries to adapt and change their main institutions in order to respond more effectively and efficiently.

At this juncture it is important to highlight the concept of enduring friendship proposed by the United States Southern Command, which seeks to protect common interest in the maritime domains and to prevent terrorist attacks and the criminal use of these common spaces. Despite this effort, however, at present the American hemisphere lacks binding strategies for defense and security that would allow us to face common threats.

At the current time, we are developing strategies at the level of cooperation and coordination, since there is a will to generate our interest and capacities in a way that will help us provide for individual needs. However, in many of our countries there is an intense debate about the role of the armed forces in fighting these new
threats. The involvement of the armed forces against these threats has several obstacles, depending on the country. Some of these difficulties are legal in nature—constitutional and regulatory impediments that do not allow the armed forces to participate in these tasks. In other cases, the obstacles are political in nature—hesitation in assigning the military to a task of a domestic nature. In other countries, it's the armed forces themselves who don't wish to carry out enforcement operations. And in other cases there are even technological difficulties.

There are three sources of threats to maritime security. First, we have the use of the sea for illicit activities, such as drug trafficking—an ally of terrorism, weapons smuggling, and the traffic of people. The second source of threats is the illegal exploitation of fishing, energy, or mining resources and pollution. The third source is the sea's own nature—particularly for the low-lying areas of various states, as we have recently seen with the Asian tsunami and Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast of the United States. These areas are vulnerable to serious damage. Allow me at this time to express our solidarity with the people of the United States of America and to our hosts for the many lives lost to this natural disaster.

In spite of the fact that not all the navies have direct responsibility to act against these threats, we can say that most navies have the mission of surveillance and control of the sea to prevent its illegal use. These challenges, as described before, in a framework of cooperation and coordination in the last few years, have led us to prioritize interoperability and the establishment of facilities for the exchange of information. The Inter-American Naval Conference has been the international mechanism that has allowed us to respond to this situation by creating venues for personal contact, dialogue, and decision making. Today, by means of the Specialized Inter-American Naval Conference on Interoperability, we have begun to develop doctrine and procedures for combined operation, and also to optimize our command and control systems to standardize our technological capabilities and to revise naval exercises that have been conducted and developed in our hemisphere in the last decade, in order to face the threats of the twenty-first century. Also, the Specialized Inter-American Naval Conference of Intelligence Directors and various bilateral meetings have facilitated the exchange of information, and this has resulted in the Inter-American Cooperative System of Naval Intelligence.

The Inter-American Naval Conference has the following opportunities:

First, the existence of a long tradition of regional naval exercises and operations, in which the Unitas exercises have evolved from bilateral to multilateral, with the participation of naval units of more than ten countries. Many Pass Exchange task force exercises and the Silent Forces exercises and, lately, the Panama Exercises, as well as a series of bilateral and multilateral naval exercises, which year after year have been increasing, have allowed the members of our navies to have contact with one another at different levels and in different specialties.

Second, the overcoming of the hypothetical potential for military conflict among the American states has allowed for the use of mechanisms for peaceful solutions that allow us at this present time to develop more ambitious goals that were perhaps unthinkable projects some decades ago. There is also a perception that threats go beyond borders and to fight them we will need to develop a shared security system.
Also, it is necessary to recognize the main challenges that the Inter-American Naval Conference faces. There is a difficulty in implementing adopted agreements because they do not have a binding nature and, therefore, the states are not forced to observe them. Budgetary restrictions are also increasingly a factor. Most navies face them, and this is a constraint in terms of facing our growing threats. Also, there is the need to have effective political support at home that will allow us to define clearly the roles and legal framework for their participation. We need to seek alternative ways to obtain the support we need in order to participate more actively; this should not be negatively affected by political issues that are not directly linked to our fight against our current threats. An additional concern is the need to have a quicker process for interoperability, and this will require human and material resources.

In conclusion, the Inter-American Naval Conference, which arose mainly as a mechanism to create an atmosphere that would foster interpersonal satisfaction before implementing an international security treaty, has allowed us to strengthen our ties among various countries, to define new threats, and to adopt mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts among states. This has allowed the Inter-American Naval Conference to increase our cooperation and our ties between navies, and currently we are seeking greater interoperability, thanks to this basis that has been created. Also, in this way we will face nontraditional threats. So now most of the American navies will be able to participate in naval exercises and some real operations, especially for controlling maritime traffic and protecting sea life. If our countries recognize the existence of common objectives, then that is our main reason for working together during these past forty-five years.

Final thoughts: as a response to the question of what future this organization will have, I will say that I am optimistic, but the success of the Inter-American Naval Conference and the other fora that have developed in the region will depend on whether they can face the challenge—and are up to the challenge—of joint work. I think we are committed to fighting our threats more actively. Integration is a good objective, as I have said, but it is more important for us to have joint operations under the framework of joint enduring friendships. This is especially for those countries whose legislation allows them to participate and who want to participate. For them we should develop concrete plans, multilaterally or bilaterally, so that together we can fight threats such as drug trafficking and international terrorism and also offer solidarity during natural disasters, which require a very specific and determined response. We should increase and improve our logistical support, optimize our information-sharing mechanisms at an interagency level, and facilitate access to technology.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about the topic that has brought us together today: cooperation among navies. It’s more than a wish. It’s a necessity. The threats of this century, which are transnational and multidimensional, go beyond the individual capabilities of each navy and force us to work together in establishing security structures, not only at the regional level but also globally. The Peruvian Navy reaffirms its commitment to work for peace, stability, and security for future generations, as well as outlining our commitment to contribute to cooperative security. Thank you.
Admiral Roughead:

Thank you very much, Jorge. Again, an example of a cooperative structure that began in 1959 but takes into account the national areas and interests, highlighting the need for information sharing as well as cooperation on a wide range of topics. And then in the early nineties it acknowledged the increase in technology, with the early century’s threat realities of nonstate, asymmetric actors being acknowledged and folded in. I thought the threats from illegal use of the seas and natural disasters are exactly what we discussed this morning, as well. And then highlighting the opportunities that exist, and exercises, and also the global perception of common threats—perhaps for the first time globally seeing the need to counter these common threats—yet tempered with the challenges that we all face with regard to budgets; but ending on an optimistic note and the need to approach issues in a joint way and with cooperation among navies.

What I would like to do now is to introduce Admiral Sergio Biraghi, the Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy, who will represent the Regional Seapower Symposium. Admiral.

Admiral Sergio Biraghi:

Thank you. Ladies, gentlemen—first of all, let me thank our host, Admiral Mike Mullen, for the opportunity to present my view on the viable contribution provided by regional initiatives to the growth of cooperation and maritime security.
Security and economic development in the countries that we’re looking at in the Mediterranean are tightly correlated with the safeguard of *Mare Nostrum* (our sea, as the Mediterranean has been called since Roman times), in terms of environmental protection and necessity of navigation. The strategic importance of the Mediterranean basin cannot be overemphasized. In fact, although it constitutes less than 1 percent of the world’s total sea surface, it washes the coasts of twenty-five countries of three different continents, with more than eighty internationally relevant ports and two thousand daily connections. Going to that concentration of the states, trade, and population, terrorist organizations view the Mediterranean as an ideal ground for their own proliferation. Therefore, it is in the best interest of all the littoral states to actively and strongly promote the widest possible forums of collaboration against this type of threat.

Naval forces are also collating by their respective governments to provide a growing capacity in monitoring and opposing all these phenomena. The Italian Navy is daily contributing in this traditional task of the surveillance of the High Seas, employing its assets with the aim of locating, identifying, and sharing [information on] suspect vessels. Nevertheless, the Italian Navy is well aware that such time-honored activities as presence and surveillance are by themselves insufficient to ensure the necessary level of security, as essentially being front-runner, performing at her best in a new and decisive strategic role, investing tangibly in the field of international cooperation. In fact, it [the Italian Navy] has traditionally been proactive in developing a deeper share of “our-ness” on security matters, proposing an understanding for combined activities with other navies of this region, including exchanges in the fields of education, hydrography, and operational support.

Lately, a series of bilateral training activities has been launched with Algeria, Croatia, Israel, Libya, Malta, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Tunisia. We are also promoting [cooperation] with the navies of Albania, Croatia, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, [and] Slovenia [in] the Adriatic-Ionian initiative, ADRION, while becoming partners in the development of maritime nations of the Five Plus Five initiative, involving countries of the western Mediterranean basin—France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain from the northern shores, and Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia from the southern flank. The ideal framework for the Mediterranean navies’ cooperation effort throughout is represented by the Regional Seapower Symposium of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Navies, organized for this on a biennial basis since 1996.

The last edition of this regional forum, in October 2004, the headline of which was The Security of Maritime Traffic, achieved the main goal of increasing mutual knowledge on both the challenges and opportunities in the wider Mediterranean area.

Moreover, it encouraged a common pledge to contribute to the development of the security, stability, and peaceful cooperation of the Mediterranean people. Twenty-five delegations and sixteen chiefs of staff of the twenty-nine invited navies took part in this fifth meeting of this symposium. The open and practical contributions made by all participants greatly contributed to the quality and value of the proceedings. Some projects launched in the previous meeting of the symposium have already successfully accomplished their objectives, while others, like the
struggle against pollution, the virtual-regional electronic navigational chart, and the hydrographic projector, are still alive and kicking.

Moreover, we took advantage of the privilege of the forum to present a new pilot project. This is a type of a virtual-regional maritime traffic center (V-RMTC).

The scope of this project is to build a virtual link connecting the operational centers of the participating navies in order to integrate the data which is available concerning maritime merchant traffic. The added value of this initiative is in its flexible and adaptive format, which allows navies belonging to different organizations and alliances not only to establish technically a link with ease but also to commit themselves to a matter they feel comfortable with.

The project has been supported so far by twenty-six navies. The formula for its success lies in the combination of pragmatism and transparency. We hope to be fully operational before the next Regional Seapower Symposium of the Navies of the Mediterranean and Black Sea, scheduled for October 2006, with the setup of a dedicated network and a graphic interface fed by an appropriate and powerful database.

The initial operational stage started last June in order to test system effectiveness and procedures. This phase focuses on establishing the link with the Naval Operational Centers via the Internet by using commercial off-the-shelf hardware and dedicated software developed by the Italian Navy. Of the twenty-six navies that have joined this project, twelve of them have already begun feeding data into the database. More are tuning up their procedures in order to join the net.

All in all, this is a simple project with very positive cost effectiveness. It offers new possibilities of development in the field of cooperation, and it is itself definitely a factor contributing to security in the Mediterranean. We have been able to achieve

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regionalseapowersymposium

26 NATIONS
INTERNATIONAL HQ and ORGANIZATIONS
(NATO, EUROMARFOR, IMO, IHQ etc.)
COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

VIRTUAL - REGIONAL MARITIME TRAFFIC CENTRE

KICK OFF MEETING

ROME, 9-10 FEB 2005

IOC - 15 JUN 2005

FOG - 2006

V-RMTC

IOC PHASE

- LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
- TIME: ZULU
- BACKBONE: INTERNET
- FORMAT: MERSIT (MERCHAND VESSELS SITUATION), DEVELOPED BY THE ITALIAN NAVY
- BACK UP AND SERVICE SUPPORT: VIA DEDICATED AREA IN THE ITALIAN NAVY WEB SITE (PASSWORD PROTECTED)
a good start, thanks mainly to the open and frank relations the Italian Navy has established with each of the regional partners.

After a very encouraging start, I am well aware that we are yet at the very beginning and that many other challenges lie ahead, of a political, organizational, and technical nature. As you can imagine, to draw a shared and common view from over twenty navies is never an easy task. Settling for a reasonable compromise solution, where each nation perceives its national interest as fully satisfied, is vital.

On a parallel track, we must try and assist those navies not yet standardized technologically with our CIAS and common support system. But here, too, it is necessary to assume a step-by-step approach. Through this, gradual progress will then be sure and continuous.

Finally, I believe that the establishment and the initiation of mutual trust, which stems from a lengthy and impassioned process of dialogue and confidence-building, is essential to overcome historical distance and solve common problems. The ideally profitable and trustworthy initiative will undoubtedly improve the quality and effectiveness of cooperation among navies from a political, military, and strategic perspective.

This concludes my presentation. I wish to thank you for your kind attention.

Admiral Roughead:

Thank you, Admiral—an example of a symposium based on an area of great strategic importance; but as you mentioned, with the extent of trade comes the potential for increased criminal activity and the threats that come from that. An example of expanding international cooperation, with exchanges and expanding membership defining areas of interests—and again, similar to Admiral Ampuero, the combination of threats, and also threats from the environment, that we face as well. The description of a virtual maritime traffic center based on a cooperative network—and the key words in there, mutual trust through dialogue and confidence-building. Thank you very much.

I’d like to now introduce Rear Admiral Ronnie Tay from the Singapore Navy, who will talk about the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.

Rear Admiral Ronnie Tay:

Thank you, Admiral Roughead. Good afternoon, CNO United States Admiral Mike Mullen, distinguished Navy and Coast Guard colleagues, ladies and gentlemen. I would first like to thank Admiral Mullen, Admiral Shuford, and the U.S. Navy for their very warm hospitality in hosting this most important International Seapower Symposium. I look forward to the next few days, which promise to be as professionally beneficial and enjoyable as the one many of us here attended two years ago. I also appreciate the honor and privilege of telling the distinguished audience here about the collaboration between the navies of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

As you well understand, the globalization of the world and the rise of global terrorism have brought about significant changes to our strategic environment and our way of life. The maritime environment that is vital to the security and prosperity of nations is not spared. Today, in carrying out their mission, navies face many challenges—contending with new threats, performing new tasks, operating in new
ways, working with new entities. This is certainly true for us in the Western Pacific. It is a vibrant maritime region through which vital sea lanes connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean pass, carrying international trade. Threats to the safety and security of shipping are a concern, especially in this neo-security environment, to countries both within and outside of the Western Pacific region. They pose challenges to navies as well as to nonnavy stakeholders—the coast guards, port authorities, customs, international organizations like the IMO, and shipping agencies. Hence, international and interagency cooperation is crucial, today and in the future. The theme of this ISS, A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons, is therefore a well-chosen one.

This theme also resonates well with the one we had for the Ninth Western Pacific Naval Symposium, held in Singapore last November, which had as its theme Coming Together in a Connected Community. Looking back, the WPNS has come a long way since the idea of establishing such a symposium was first raised in the Ninth ISS in 1987. When the Royal Australian Navy hosted the first WPNS Symposium in 1988, it was attended by twelve navies.

Since that first meeting, the grouping has grown from strength to strength. Its membership now comprises eighteen members and four observer navies. The most recent welcome addition is the Bangladesh Navy, last year.

Why is the WPNS still relevant and growing after almost two decades? The answer must be that the WPNS forum and its activities continue to benefit its members. To give a quick sense of what we have been doing in recent years, I’ll
briefly highlight some of these initiatives and benefits. For the sake of clarity, I’ve grouped them under three rather arbitrary headings:

- Increasing confidence and mutual understanding,
- Increasing competencies, and
- Building capacity for working together.

Firstly, the WPNS has served to increase the level of confidence and mutual understanding among its members. The forum provides the opportunity for regular dialogue and sharing of ideas and perspectives among navy leaders and senior staff. For sure, so much more can be done when people are comfortable with one another. This naturally leads to navies being inclined to look for more opportunities to work together and do more together, at a pace that’s comfortable to all.

The WPNS also recognizes that such interpersonal relationships should not be at the senior-most levels alone, but also outlast the current leadership. We ought to provide avenues for our officers and men at various levels to interact. In particular, our young officers should have the opportunity to meet their counterparts at an early stage. After all, they will one day hold important positions in their respective navies—thus recent initiatives, such as the Staff Officers of the Next Generation (SONG) Program, by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, and the Sea-Riding Program for junior officers, where the French and other WPNS navies are most helpful in building confidence and mutual understanding among the leaders of the future.

A second benefit of participating in WPNS is that navies are able to increase their competencies. This is important, as they need to grow their competencies to meet
the demands of today and at the same time develop capabilities to meet the challenges of the future. The scope and complexity of issues discussed in the WPNS have expanded. Initial issues like navigation and pollution control have progressed to more substantial exchanges on conventional maritime warfare, the role of navies in protecting sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and in-depth sharing on maritime interdiction, force protection, and regional maritime security. The discussions have not been limited to the annual workshops and symposia. Dedicated seminars on specific competency areas have been organized, such as those on disaster relief by the Chilean Navy and ship boarding by the Canadian Navy.

WPNS navies recognize that we navies alone do not have all the information and knowledge to perform our role well. We need to network with other organizations. Toward this end, the RSN [Republic of Singapore Navy] introduced the concept of Connecting Networks for the Enhancement of Knowledge Sharing (CONNEKS). CONNEKS seeks to engage agencies outside the WPNS navies to gain knowledge and experience in specific maritime security and safety areas in order to build competencies. It also demonstrates the forward-looking nature of the WPNS, being inclusive and striving to remain relevant in a changing maritime landscape.

Under CONNEKS, we had presentations by the IMO and the U.S. Coast Guard at a 2004 WPNS workshop, and the Indonesia Maritime Council and Foreign Department, as well as Singapore’s Maritime and Port Authority, at a 2005 workshop. The presentations gave us a better understanding of those agencies and their efforts in enhancing maritime security.

A third set of initiatives of the WPNS is building the capacity to work with one another, particularly in the area of multilateral exercises. This has seen increased momentum, significant in a region where multilateral exercises have not been a tradition. I shall just highlight three series of exercises. The first is mine countermeasure (MCM) activities. The RAN [Royal Australian Navy] initiated the first international MCM seminar, which paved the way for the Western Pacific MCM and Diving Exercise, organized by the RSN in 2001. This twelve-day exercise saw fifteen ships and one thousand five hundred personnel from sixteen navies exercising to meet the mine threat. They came from the far corners of the Western Pacific region, from India to New Zealand to Canada. Such an exercise is especially important since no one navy has sufficient MCM resources on its own to deal with any mine threat to the sea lanes as quickly as the international shipping community would like.

Following its success, the second exercise in 2004 saw increased complexity and participation. It was cohosted this time by the RSN and the Indonesian Navy—another clear example of collaboration between navies.

A second series of exercises is the Multilateral Tactical Training Centre Exercise (TTCEX) held biennially in Singapore since 2001. These exercises, conducted in shore tactical simulators, allow ship command teams to compile a surface situation picture, to control MPA [Maritime Patrol Aircraft] and helicopters for search, and to respond together to various contingencies developing at sea.

Thirdly, building on the interoperability developed in the TTCEX exercises, the RSN organized the inaugural WPNS Multilateral Sea Exercise (WMSX) this May [2005]. Establishing the procedures in practice ashore during a TTCEX enabled a smooth conduct of the two-day exercise in the South China Sea, which saw fifteen ships and operational staff from fourteen navies conducting a range of maritime security–
related activities, including minefield lead-through, search and rescue, maritime surveillance and tracking, and response to ships in distress. In all the above exercises, the WPNS adopted the EXTAC 1000 series sponsored by the U.S. Navy as a common operational procedure, which contributed to the smooth execution of the exercises.

There are indeed benefits in navies coming together for such large-scale exercises. Just to name three:

First, such exercises are opportunities for navies to train in different environments. They greatly increase their operational capabilities. For example, navies may not all have the opportunity to work in busy shipping lanes, shallow waters, or strong currents. Fortunately or unfortunately, such challenging environments are found in Southeast Asia, where some of these exercises have been held.

Second, such exercises foster comfort with and confidence in one another. Operators at the technical level become confident in one another, as they will be familiar with what everybody else is doing. This is especially important in areas like diving, MCM, and tactical maneuvers, where safety and speedy responses are critical.

Third, such exercises enable interoperability among navies when the need to work together arises. Living in an uncertain environment today, we can be quite certain that there will be times when we need to work together, at perhaps short notice. It is important that we be able to translate what we discuss and plan ashore to mission success in operations at sea.

A clear demonstration of this would be the Boxing Day tsunami disaster and relief operations, where navies came together to provide relief to the stricken. While there are many factors for the success of the various navies involved, certainly the relationships and interoperability built through bilateral and multilateral...
interactions are an important factor, and WPNS capacity-building activities are a part of that. Similarly, as a result of what WPNS has been doing we can be confident that we in our region are better prepared to deal with mine threats and other challenges to our maritime security, should they arise.

What are some of the challenges to collaboration among navies? Let me suggest three.

WPNS navies are diverse in many ways. Their equipment comes from different manufacturers. Their doctrines are developed differently. The languages they use are different, and in most cases the language is not English. While there will be difficulties in gelling forces together due to such differences, these difficulties can be reduced through frequent interactions and having SOPs [Standard Operating Procedures]. Examples of these are the WPNS MCM exercises procedure document [MCM EXPRODOC] and the EXTAC 1000 series, which standardizes messages and reports for use at sea. Having such procedures helps us to avoid revisiting past lessons learned and to overcome the tyranny of constant personnel turnover or rotation of participating units.

Good communications at sea is always a challenge. To enable greater shared awareness, speedy decision-making, and smooth coordination of action, some compatible and secure communications architecture is required. We can look to commercial off-the-shelf technologies for solutions. An example of this is the RSN’s Access C2 System, a simple, low-cost, portable setup consisting of not much more than a network of laptops to be fitted on participating ships.
For the first time in WMSX, it enables all the participants to build a common tactical sea picture and do basic text exchanges with minimal fuss. There are enhancements such as introducing some form of encryption and increasing textual capacity to strengthen command and control at sea and ashore.

Another challenge is the high operational load on navies that already have to do more with less in the current environment, not to mention escalating fuel prices. Harnessing technology is one alternative. Shore trainers can substitute ship deployment to conserve sea time while at the same time allowing any imaginative scenario to be tested.

When ships and people do gather, the activities should be synergistic. For example, exercise planning meetings can be held back-to-back with seminars, and WPNS activities can be dovetailed with other engagements in the same region. Based on this thinking, the TTCEX and WMSX were held in conjunction with this year’s IMDEX Asia exhibition [International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference].

Going forward, the WPNS can be optimistic that we will build on successes to promote even greater collaboration among navies. Overcoming some of the challenges I’ve just highlighted to build greater interoperability will be key among them. Another area to expand on is that of information sharing to build competency and capacity. We already have seminars to share areas of contemporary interest, and the CONNEX initiative now in place would hopefully help that type of learning and cooperation with the wider maritime community.

Clearly, maritime security is of keen interest to WPNS navies at the present time. In this regard, understanding where and how pirates and terrorists operate, and
what measures security agencies can take to counter them, would be most useful. Toward this end, the RSN organized the first WPNS Maritime Security Information Exchange Seminar [MSIES] this May. We are very appreciative of the navies of France, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines for sharing their experiences, which were most insightful to us naval professionals.

Encouraged by the positive response, we intend to organize a second seminar in the latter part of next year, probably about August.

Going into the future, we shall also build on the momentum to continue the multilateral exercises conducted in the region and expand the content to provide greater complexity and realism. Next year, the Royal Malaysian Navy will be hosting the third MCM and Diving Exercise, for which planning is well under way. As discussed at our recent workshop in Bali, the RSN will be organizing the second WMSX in 2007, in conjunction with the IMDEX Asia Exhibition in Singapore, where we look forward to even greater participation and a more challenging new series. I’m sure we will have other ideas for collaboration to discuss when the WPNS navies meet next year in the Tenth Symposium, to be hosted by the U.S. Navy in beautiful Hawaii. I can’t help but observe that somehow the WPNS events take place in very welcome venues.

In conclusion, the WPNS has achieved much in fostering collaboration among navies through building confidence and mutual understanding, building competencies, and building the capacity to work together. There are opportunities for naval cooperation, which we as a group will seize to help us meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.
Finally, I’d like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and thank my WPNS colleagues for their strong support and commitment. We can be confident that this culture of friendship and cooperation will continue to be the hallmark of our grouping as we continue to work closely together. WPNS will remain a vital part of the global network of nations to ensure a free and secure maritime commons. Thank you.

Admiral Roughead:

Thank you, Admiral Tay. Again, another example of a collection of navies that came together starting in 1987, but have clearly evolved; and I think one of the points that Admiral Tay mentioned is that, although the work of the WPNS—and of all of the symposia that we talked about this afternoon—is important to the region, really the benefits extend beyond, because of the global nature of the challenges we face today.

The importance of confidence building and mutual understanding; a point of highlight, I believe, is that the organizations we’re discussing this afternoon are not about people of our vintage working together. The real value is in the young people that can come together and build relationships and friendships that can last for years and decades.

Building of competencies and the need to connect through networks are important, and, as you saw, building the capacity through exercises and the growth of those exercises over time—the benefits being highlighted of being able to work in different environments are ones that may not be particular to our own country or our own bodies of water. The confidence-building and the interoperability; the challenges; the diversity of navies, the types of communications, architectures; and the high operational loads that we all face—but at the end, a great deal of optimism about the growth and the evolution that are possible by working together. Thank you very much.

I’d like to now introduce our final panelist, Rear Admiral Gheorghe Marin, Chief of the Romanian Naval Forces Staff, who will represent the Black Sea naval forces.

Rear Admiral Gheorghe Marin:

Admiral and distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen, my intention is to provide you with some information on the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group. Therefore, during the presentation I’m going to go over the following:

- General issues about cooperation among the Black Sea and littoral navies, focused to three subjects
- Annual meetings for chiefs of the navies, bilateral cooperation, and the Black Sea Force

The relationships among the littoral states within the Black Sea region have radically changed within the last decade. The current constant within the Black Sea region is to transfer it into an area of cooperation, development, and security connected to the extensive area of the Mediterranean Sea. Today cooperation within
this region has become a reality, proven by the notable relationships developed among the countries. For the first time in its history, the Black Sea region, which represents the crossroads of different political ideological and religious systems and [thought to be] permanently unstable, has now become a source of unity, development, and stability.

The cooperative relationships are focused on crisis prevention and the reducing of risk factors that can generate crisis situations with terrible effects on the stability and security within the region. In this respect, political, economical, diplomatic, and cultural relations are being developed, as well as military cooperation, in order to promote stability and confidence. Coincidentally, the littoral states’ naval forces contribute to promoting mutual confidence and maintaining peace within the region through deploying the following options.

The Black Sea Naval Commanders’ annual meeting has been organized, starting in 1997, to strengthen naval cooperation in different fields of activity. The domains have been established in specific areas, depending on each country’s expertise and experience and according to the possibilities of mutual support, in order to increase force abilities to serve new challenges, as follows:

- Education and training
- Search and rescue at sea
- Hydrographical survey
- Development of naval technology
- Naval logistics.

The results of the meetings constitute the basis for future development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation plans among the naval forces of the littoral states. In May this year, the meeting was organized in Romania. The agenda consisted of the following topics of common interest:

- Security and stability within the region
- Naval-military cooperation
- Interaction between international and national organizations with common goals within the area.

The Romanian naval forces annually [participate in] bilateral cooperation plans with the other littoral states and naval forces. The main objective for these activities is to increase confidence and security within the Black Sea. The bilateral cooperation plans include activities as follows:

- Participation in common exercises with ships and personnel
- Meetings and training activity in different naval fields
- Seminars and conferences on different subjects
- Exchanges of personnel, staff, or crew at the local level
- Attachment onboard training ships
- Ships’ port visits.
The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) is the most important of the concrete outcomes of the cooperation among the littoral navies. We each represent the total use by the naval forces involved in the process of promoting regional security, freedom, and stability within the common maritime space: the Black Sea.

The Black Sea Forum is a regional initiative to promote confidence and friendship among the littoral states as well as to develop cooperation and interoperability among the naval forces. The initiative was launched by Turkey in April 1998. The agreement was signed on April 2001 in Istanbul by the ministers of foreign affairs of the six littoral states: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey, and Ukraine. The first activation of this task force took place in Istanbul in September 2001.

According to the establishing agreement, BLACKSEAFOR is an all-local force that has a maritime group as an executive element. This group consists of the warships from all littoral states. These ships get together periodically twice a year, forming up the task group in order to conduct common training. The activations are scheduled for a period of two to five weeks. The principal activities are conducted according to the fundamental principles and objectives of the UN charter. The missions of the Black Sea Task Group are as follows:

- Conduct common maritime exercises
- Search and rescue operations
- Mine countermeasures
- Operations for humanitarian and environmental protection, and
- Visits in Black Sea ports.

The political and military decisions are taken at the level of higher national authorities—ministries of foreign affairs and ministries for defense. The Black Sea activities are conducted under the direct authority of the Black Sea Naval Commanders’ Committee. This year in May the meeting took place in Constanta [Romania]. The operational control authority, commanding officer, the chief of staff, and the staff officer in the Black Sea Forum are nominated on a rotational basis for one-year terms by the Commanders Committee, following the host-nation proposals. Each country has one or two officers participating within the Black Sea Force staff. According to the agreement, English is the official language within the Black Sea Force, and decisions are taken only on a consensus basis. Since 2001, the Black Sea Force has been activated five times, the host nations being Turkey, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Romania, and their respective naval forces have participated with ships and staff officers. As I said, on the 4th of August this year [2005], Romania was assigned a one-year term of leadership for the Black Sea Force, chairing the Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee, and the operational control authority. The Romanian Naval Forces have provided the commander for the BLACKSEAFOR task group and the flagship, one of Romania’s frigates.

During activations, the naval task group conducts specific maritime exercises in order to accomplish the Force’s missions, common exercises with the littoral naval forces units, and port visits. The exercises are conducted based on specific working documents and procedures. The work within the multilateral, multinational team
and participation of different ships in the missions have contributed to increased mutual understanding, as well as strengthened friendship, confidence, and cooperation, among our naval forces. This additional initiative has also strengthened cooperation activities, specifically the fight against dangers at sea, protecting human life, rendering of humanitarian assistance, and protecting the maritime environment. The outreach activity developed during BLACKSEAFOR port visits promoted the goals and the specific activity of the task group to the civilian population and local authorities and helped the development of the task with friendly relationships.

Within the last few years, like the Mediterranean area and globally, we are witnessing an evolution in the security environment—changes in the types of risk and threats to the old stability. The littoral states of the Black Sea are concerned by this phenomenon; for that reason, in 2004 we started annual organized meetings at the foreign affairs ministry level in order to analyze, according to our own national interests, the possibilities to better and more efficiently address the logistic and national challenges. Taking into consideration that the BLACKSEAFOR does not afford support to provide solutions for the entire spectrum of threats to national security, the meetings try to identify other methods to do so, such as cooperation by BLACKSEAFOR with additional and international organizations with common objectives within the area. By employing cooperation among the naval forces of the littoral states, the Black Sea Force represents an important contribution of the navies to increase the stability and security environment within the Black Sea region.

This military initiative, together with additional institutions and organizations, has an important role in discouraging potential risk within the area. The Black Seas Fora activity, along with consolidating other regional and international organizational activity within the region, as well as more activity or presence from NATO within the area, will ensure for the Black Sea region—being considered an extension of the Mediterranean Sea, and farther to the [Atlantic] ocean—a more secure and stable environment, within which maritime trade and other international exchanges may be safely developed, and the same time drastically reduce illegal activities. This concludes my presentation. Thank you for your attention.

Admiral Roughead:

Thank you very much, Admiral. Another example of new relationships that are coming together focused on improving stability, community, and development, striving for interoperability through areas of operations and hydrography, logistics, and humanitarian assistance. I think the point of the military interaction and the visits to the littoral states extending into the civilian population, enhancing security and being a dimension that in a way is an extension of other associations, is similar to what you described the Black Sea contributing to the structure that NATO has and the stability that comes from that.

What I’d like to do now is to open the floor for questions. We’ll call upon you in the order in which I see you put forth a question. Please move to the microphones, and I ask that your question or comment be limited to one minute. I know the panelists will be as efficient in their response as you are in your question. So without any further ado, the floor is open for questions. I would also ask that you identify yourself as you ask the question. Thank you.
Vice Admiral Jan-Willem Kelder, Netherlands:

I’m the Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy. I have a question for Admiral Biraghi. Your traffic center and your database that you're talking about—what are you doing with the information? Are you going to analyze it? Are you going to approach ships with aircraft on them, to shadow ships or those kinds of things? Can you dwell on that, please?

Admiral Biraghi, Italy:

Yes, of course. We have received data from, up until now, about fifteen different navies. But of course we also have information from my Coast Guard; the Coast Guard is under Navy control in Italy. I put the data all together, and we try to define a situation, and when there is some question mark, we task Italian aircraft or helos or ships, or on some occasions some friendly forces or other navies that are involved with this control, asking for more information about some special task that is unknown or is out of the area where it was planned. In real time, it’s a picture that builds hour by hour, and we try to complete it. Of course, we are just getting started with doing this. But Italy, fortunately, is in the center of the Mediterranean Sea, so we can have good information about all the ships moving from east to west and from west to east. And this is a good starting point. But with a larger number of friends, it will be possible to increase this picture and eventually to have, I hope, very good traffic control.

Vice Admiral Jan-Willem Kelder, Netherlands:

Thank you, Admiral. Is it also, the information, exchanged with ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, the operation in the East Mediterranean? Are you exchanging information with ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR?

Admiral Biraghi, Italy:

Yes, of course. The situation picture I produce is standard to all the navies participating in the original traffic conference center of the system. I receive information, I make the picture, and I send the picture to all the participants in the pool.

Vice Admiral Jan-Willem Kelder, Netherlands:

Okay, thank you very much.

Admiral Alain Oudot de Dainville, France:

It’s a question for all the panelists. After this quite interesting presentation, do you imagine it’s possible to have connections between all your original organizations—to have a worldwide approach to maritime security?

Admiral Biraghi, Italy:

Yes. You are speaking about the International Maritime Organization and with Europe or with a different organization, because, surely, in the future we need to have global control of the traffic, mutual traffic. This is a first step in this area, and I decided to start because it’s better to have a short step than nothing. But it’s a short
A step that is clear. We have to increase, to enlarge, and, if possible, to cover all the world with such a system.

Admiral Roughead:
Another question?

Rear Admiral Kadir Sağdıç, Turkey:
Starting from this morning and following with this afternoon’s session on Cooperation Among Navies is Admiral Mullen’s statement that proactive security is less costly than reactive war capabilities. But to implement this will require some preconditions, such as we have observed this afternoon from region to region. The level of cooperation differs.

The first precondition is that in a region there should not be some zero-sum-game type of conflict, such as territorial disputes or nondelineation of sea areas, etc. So for CNOs and heads of navies, since maritime cooperation is a reflection of political cooperation, I guess they have to take more effective roles in the definition of national security and the driving of policies at the policy level. Here maritime cooperation is a third-layer issue, beneath political cooperation and national prerogatives and the heads of the armed forces. So to be effective in maritime cooperation, we need to be part of political assessments, as navies will be much more successful in creating maritime domain effectiveness and more cooperation. This is one of my assessments—whether in the future the Navy can take part more in political ways, so that the third layer also could be effective. Thank you.

Admiral Roughead:
Thank you very much, Admiral. With regard to that, Admiral Tay mentioned the need for interagency and international cooperation. Ronnie, would you care to perhaps comment on your thoughts with regard to how you work through the various levels of cooperation?

Rear Admiral Tay, Singapore:
As I mentioned, and as we are all aware, in our respective countries we are all organized differently in the various agencies. Similarly, it is not just the Navy that has to be concerned with these issues. I guess different agencies and different countries do it differently, but at least at the Navy level, we have to find a way to cooperate and then subsequently network with our respective agencies, whether it is for expertise or for information in building a picture and so on. Of course, at the highest level there is a need for political direction to allow us to do what we are doing; but maybe to just comment on what the admiral said, that there are certain preconditions for having this scenario in wanting to come and cooperate: There will, of course, be disputes—territorial disputes, or whatever—between countries, but I guess it is a spirit of trying to find what we have in common, rather than what we have not in common or what we have in opposition, that will help us come together to work together, focusing on what are now common interests. Thank you.

Admiral Roughead:
Thank you very much. Was there another question over on this side? Yes.
Read Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand:

I’d like to follow up on the question asked by France, which as I understood it wasn’t actually answered. If the vision is to have a globalized network of nations, what we’ve actually heard this afternoon is a presentation from some of the nodes. So, is there an opportunity to create greater integration between the nodes, to exploit the activities of the regional nodes to bring greater alignment and integration of the work they’re doing, to greater benefit for us all? And is there a way in which we can perhaps better formalize a relationship between the ISS as a body and the regional forums? I guess that’s a question for you, sir, as the moderator.

Admiral Roughead:

Okay, and I think that’s exactly on the mark. We’ve seen examples this afternoon of great regional initiatives, but I also believe that we’ve seen a lot of commonality among all the regional initiatives, whether it’s in the perception of the threat or in some of the challenges that we face with regard to networking and the environment in which we work.

Not to dodge your question, David, but perhaps this is something for when we break into our regional discussions tomorrow; perhaps one of the questions that all of the groups should take on is: Given the fact that we see a forming and a better definition at the regional level, is it now time to move forward and look at how the regional initiatives can best come together and connect themselves globally, so that there are commonalities or procedures, standards with regard to architectures? I would suggest that we, as a Symposium and in the regional breakouts, look at what may be the way ahead to do just what was recommended and what was asked. If you’re okay with that, CNO, we’ll go ahead and put that down as something to charge at tomorrow.

Admiral Biraghi, Italy:

Coming back to the Mediterranean problems, of course it is natural that in the future we make alliances to cooperate. For example, for the Mediterranean area—with such different areas, if my friends working with us in the Mediterranean area say, “Yes, okay, we are interested in having much more information about the Middle East and so on,” and someone in the Middle East tells me, “Yes, we can exchange information,” there are no great difficulties, because now there is enough dedicated software to mix the two different situations—to enlarge the information and exchange the information of the two parties. So I think that in future there will be not a very great difficulty in arriving at global control of merchant traffic.

Admiral Roughhead:

Right, it appears that that is the end of the questions, and again I think we’ve touched on several issues, but one of the common threads that ran through was the nature of the threat. The threat itself is as old as the world itself, in the form of national disasters, or as new as some of the challenges that we face in a modern globalized society.

Other common threads: the need for cooperation, the need to look perhaps into the interagency and into other governmental organizations, to more fully realize the potential of our regional symposium organizations. The evolution of
technology and how that technology can be used to pass information back and forth, and to create, at least at the regional level, a picture of the maritime domain that can be used by all those contributing nations and those nations that are part of the organization, but also highlighting the need to begin to connect that information in a global way, as Admiral Marin pointed out—being able to be part of another grouping that allows that flow of information. The need to look for opportunities to operate in different environments, confidence-building, interoperability are all very, very key—but also the need to look at opportunities for standardizing practices and also be mindful of the future challenges that we may face.

But I think that again the opportunity exists for all of us to strive to optimize our operations, mindful of and accommodating the drivers that are a reality of today’s world and today’s environment. So on behalf of those on the panel, I thank you. And I guess, Vince, we’re now ready for another break?

Associate Dean Vincent Mocini, Naval War College:

Admiral, distinguished panelists, thank you very much. Delegates, please join me in expressing our gratitude to Admiral Roughead and the panel. We will have a thirty-minute break and reconvene at 1530, please. Thank you.
Panel Discussion Two
Building a Common Picture of Maritime Activity

Moderated by
Admiral Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho, Brazil

Panel Members:
Admiral Jorge Godoy, Argentina
Admiral Datuk Ilyas bin Hj Din, Malaysia
Admiral Sir Alan West, United Kingdom
Admiral Alain Oudot de Dainville, France

Associate Dean Vincent Mocini, Naval War College:

In our first panel, we examined collaboration among navies. We move now to Panel Two, which is entitled “Building a Common Picture of Maritime Activity.” You see before you your distinguished panelists, and we’ve asked them to describe the origins of the challenges they face and how they coordinate the responses and develop and execute them, paying particular attention to the technical aspects of interoperability and related issues. The chair for Panel Two is the commander of the Brazilian Navy, Admiral Roberto Carvalho, and I turn the panel over to him at this time. Thank you, sir.

Admiral Roberto Carvalho:

Thank you, Professor Mocini. As we can see on the board on my right side, we don’t have at this Symposium a translation service from Portuguese to other languages and vice versa. The last time I used my poor English was right here in Newport in 1987—a long time ago, during my year at the Naval Command College. So I have a problem. But all of you will have a bigger one in understanding me. As we are among sailors, or in other words among friends, I will take the risk.

I would like to thank Admiral Mullen for inviting me to serve as moderator of this panel. It’s an honor and a privilege for me and my Navy. To share with us some examples of how we are building a common picture of maritime activity, we will have four speakers: The heads of the navies from Argentina, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and France. Each one of them will have fifteen minutes to address his specific regional efforts or operations which have successfully begun to build a common picture in support of increasing maritime safety. After all these speakers have finished, there will be a period for comments, questions, and answers.

At this point I would like to introduce our first speaker, Admiral Godoy, Chief of General Staff of the Argentine Navy, who will address the Symposium on the topic CAMAS South Atlantic.
Admiral Godoy:

[Simultaneous translation from Spanish into English] Good afternoon to all. As an introduction I would like to say a few words first. I would like, on behalf of the Argentinian Navy and the Argentinean prefecture, with whom we share the tasks that I will be describing now, to also thank the U.S. Navy, in particular Admiral Mike G. Mullen and also Admiral Shuford, for this invitation to be a part of this Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium. And also I would like to thank you for giving me a chance to speak about the development of a common picture of maritime activity. This gives us a chance to describe to you the experience gained from a regional maritime security program that has been developed by Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina over a number of years in the South Atlantic area of our hemisphere.

This program is the South Atlantic Maritime Area Coordination (SAMAC), also known by its Spanish acronym, COAMAS. It is presently under the responsibility of an Argentine naval flag officer. If I had to put the most important lessons learned from COAMAS in a nutshell, I would not hesitate to say that they lie in the value of common effort, supportive commitment, mutual confidence building, shared awareness of risks and the need to face them en bloc, combined training, and complementation and coordination in operational tasks. On this basis I will now try to explain as clearly as possible the background, organization, and prospects of the CAMAS program.

Within the framework of the Inter-American Conference for the maintenance of continental peace and security held in 1947 [at Rio de Janeiro], the governments of the Americas signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the ITRA. Under this treaty the contracting parties undertook, among other duties and subject to reservations, not to resort to the threat or use of force in their international relations, to submit every controversy which might arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement, and to provide mutual assistance in meeting an attack against any state.

This treaty provided the framework for the Inter-American Defense Board to develop, in 1959, the plan for the Coordination of the Inter-American Defense of Shipping (CODEFTRAMI Plan). This plan, considering that protection of shipping has by its nature essentially regional characteristics, divided the Rio treaty security area into four coordination areas—the North Atlantic Maritime Area; the North Pacific Maritime Area; the South Pacific Maritime Area, with subareas in Ecuador, Peru, and Chile; and the South Atlantic Maritime Area, also known as SAMA, which is the only area in operation today.

This plan—the driving force behind our organization in our area—is primarily designed to coordinate efforts in the areas of management, control, and protection of continental shipping and is periodically subject to doctrine and procedure updating processes.

In order to provide for the organization of maritime areas in the Southern Cone, the Inter-American Committee for the Defence of Shipping was created during the Fourth Inter-American Naval Conference, held in 1964. In turn, the South Atlantic Regional Subcommittee was created from that committee, and it recommended the creation of the Board of Commanders in Chief of the South Atlantic Maritime Area Navies and the appointment of a peacetime coordinator of the South Atlantic Maritime Area who would become area commander in wartime. Thus, in 1966, in Rio de Janeiro,
Janeiro, the first meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief of the South Atlantic Maritime Area Navies took place, and here the current South Atlantic Maritime Area structure was established.

Over almost forty years of continued activity, tight bonds of cooperation and confidence have been forged, which proved essential for successfully accomplishing the mission. It is also worth noting that bilateral agreements with states other than SAMA states provided a further means to consolidate the current regional structure. Since then, in addition to the daily exchange of shipping information by relevant local agencies, which helps individual member navies to form their own maritime situation picture, we have also been developing our own doctrine and conducting regional and international exercises in the form of war games. Thus, regional SAMA or COAMAS exercises are carried out on a yearly basis between the navies of Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina, as well as transoceanic exercises, which, in spite of the Inter-American nature, provide for the participation of the South African Navy. Trans-American exercises, in turn, are conducted every two years exclusively by navies of American countries. This fluid, permanently active system enables our countries to receive valuable information that will help us protect our national and regional interests.

Our present times are leading us to face a new spectrum of threats posed by organizations or individuals who acknowledge no national limits and operate on a global scale. These so-called new threats are hovering not only over persons and vital objectives but also over sensitive geographical areas and may take the shape of terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, resource exploitation and environmental damage, or humanitarian disasters, as we have mentioned already in this auditorium.
South Atlantic Maritime Area

Organization

CHIEF OF NAVIES
AR, BR, PY, UY

SAWA COORDINATOR
(Flag Of.)
(rotates)

LOCAL COMMANDER
ARGENTINA
(Flag Of.)

LOCAL COMMANDER
BRAZIL
(Flag Of.)

LOCAL COMMANDER
URUGUAY
(Flag Of.)

LOCAL COMMANDER
PARAGUAY
(Flag Of.)

STAFF
AR, BR, PY, UY
(rotates)
To face such threats it is undoubtedly necessary to develop mechanisms that allow us to gain information superiority. This will be achieved by optimizing not only the information-gathering process but also the dissemination process, so that information may be shared by all members. So we need to act together to develop mechanisms that will allow us to gain information superiority, and we will need to have a better dissemination process.

Everything seems to show that shipping may be affected by such situations and that contingency and defense measures may not be adopted on an individual basis but will require coordination among all countries in the area. Cooperation in the region therefore appears to be essential to counter risks or ultimately to minimize damage. In this respect we may state that the tasks performed by the coordinator of the South Atlantic Maritime Area and the operational local commanders in each member country have represented a contribution toward enhanced bonds of friendship and cooperation among navies through the continued exchange of information on shipping in their respective areas of responsibility.

The current global situation, including the so-called new threats, is being considered in the context of problems that affect regional naval control of shipping and has already been incorporated into the planning of future South Atlantic Maritime Area exercises. This will provide our navies with a training opportunity that enables them to effectively and efficiently perform in this context, thereby contributing to the defense of our interests.

All we have described so far encouraged participants in the Sixth Specialized Inter-American Naval Conference on Naval Control of Shipping, held last year, to recommend that the basic concepts underlying the issue be updated to include both traditional and new threats. We are deeply involved in this task. We expect that in the course of the next year we will have a body of doctrine that considers contemporary issues as a whole, without disregarding conventional conflicts, as they were the original concern.

Naval control of shipping should be an agile, flexible system providing useful tools that may effectively be used in response to specific scenarios and developments. Its success will lie in its ability to establish correct measures in due time and place rather than a predetermined sequence of events or a mere detailed record of events. Control of shipping activities requires updated coordination and control for hemispheric security to be preserved not only in the event of international conventional armed conflict but also in view of the new threats; and this brings up not a few jurisdictional issues.

An additional problem in this respect is the difficulty, not yet overcome, in typifying or criminalizing facts or behavior at national and international levels. A shift from national defense to the internal security sphere may bring about institutional jurisdiction conflicts within countries, which should necessarily be dealt with through harmonious work between the different national agencies. At the international level particularly, controlled activities may give rise to jurisdiction conflicts between states. Such conflicts should be specifically addressed so that they may not hinder the development of tasks in support of common security.

These brief remarks highlight the need to work on a joint basis, including all tasks and activities pertaining to the various departments and each individual state, with a view to generating such agreements as may help overcome the above-stated
obstacles. Achieving a really efficient control system involves facing a number of challenges. In the first place, it is necessary that all actors in the maritime activity endorse the proposed rules; this requires a real-time information exchange to reduce any interference caused by the control mechanism.

Within each country’s individual system, a further challenge lies in achieving full integration of different agencies into an in-depth defensive order that ensures representation of the common space and information superiority. To this end, it will be necessary to establish a coordination-and-control system that enables real-time interaction between the parties.

Similarly, as new instruments are created in other spheres in connection with the issue, it is essential to develop a survey and coordination method that helps eliminate or reduce any inconsistencies or overlaps arising from their application. And since in other spheres there are other international instruments, as I said, we need to have coordination so that we can reduce incompatibilities or overlaps.

It is also important to have a permanent updating of international law. In this respect, we should highlight the importance of a review, within the legal framework of the International Maritime Organization, of the International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Security of Navigation. This is particularly significant in view of the need to counter new threats.

On the other hand, while it is clear that the navies in the region have established a tradition of cooperation and understanding leading to an adequate interoperability level, we should not forget that the system itself will not be stronger than its weakest link. Therefore, it is essential to enhance and homogenize coordination-and-control standards, since they will contribute to real-time decision making as concrete threats materialize.

These increasingly sensitive and complex threats have been discussed during the latest Inter-American Naval Conference in terms of their twofold implication—internal security and national defense, with rapid development once they have emerged and their impact on citizens’ everyday lives. In this respect the UNITAS and recent PANAMAX exercises have highlighted the cohesion achieved between our navies, but they have also reinforced the importance of adequate control of shipping and the great need to continue making progress toward consolidation of that control at the hemispheric level.

Within the globalization process that involves all nations, naval control of shipping will become an ever more vital instrument for the security of peoples, leaving no room for distinctions in terms of peripheral or marginal countries. The coordinator of the South Atlantic Maritime Area is committed to the task of introducing the new naval control of shipping concepts as a substantial aspect of institutional policies, respecting the legal rules enforced in each member country within the area. The COAMAS system contributes to stronger regional strategies intended for the security of international shipping and can be presented, if properly updated, as a proposal for a hemispheric network that would be useful to the continental community. As we said before, this highlights the importance of maximizing the participation of all countries in identifying problems and looking for suitable solutions, the need to explore and find coincidences or common ground that may open paths toward a safer world, and the value of relying on a pluralistic multidisciplinary approach that enables coordinated action by all participants. Thank you very much.
Admiral Roberto Carvalho:

Thank you very much, Admiral Godoy. Now I’d like to call Admiral Ilyas, Malaysia Navy, who will address the thought behind MALSINDO Southeast Asia.

Admiral Datuk Ilyas, Malaysia:

Admiral Moderator, I think we call him; distinguished guests, and friends. The content of my presentation this afternoon is as follows.

CONTENTS

❖ Setting the Scene
❖ Robberies 2001 Until August 2005
❖ Area of Concentration
❖ Modus Operandi
❖ Challenges
❖ What We Are Doing
❖ Formation of MMEA
❖ What Should Other Stakeholders Do
❖ Concluding Remarks

Setting the scene—The Malacca Strait is a golden heritage for the littoral states of Malaysia and Indonesia, with much of the Singapore Strait joining it at the southern end.

The maritime security challenges in the Strait of Malacca are very complex and cover a wide spectrum of issues, from minor theft incidents in harbors, armed robberies at sea, environmental pollution, and substantial illegal immigration, up to potential maritime disasters due to terrorist acts.

The many stakeholders, which encompass the littoral states, international communities, NGOs, and even robbers and pirates, have differing degrees of interest over the area. States face different levels of risk in terms of how threats impact their national interests. A substantial portion of the international community relies on the Straits of Malacca for its economic well-being. To put this in perspective, about 30 percent of world trade and 80 percent of Japan’s oil pass through the Strait of Malacca. About two hundred ships per day, or roughly sixty thousand ships per year, sail through the nine hundred kilometers of the Malacca Strait. By using the strait, supertankers transporting crude oil from the Middle East to the Far East can
save up to 1,600 kilometers, equivalent to three days’ sailing time. The different states will assess risk in different orders, in terms of how they will impact on the national interests.

Let’s now look at the sea robbery incidents, their trend, concentration areas, and *modus operandi*.

I believe if you were to examine sea robbery incidents close up, you would see that it is essential for us to categorize the incidents into petty theft; actual boardings, in which the sea robbers actually boarded the ship; and attempted boardings, in which the sea robbers unsuccessfully tried to board the ship.

The statistics for the year 2004 show that out of thirty-five incidents, nearly half—that is, seventeen incidents—involved petty theft. There were only seven actual boardings and eleven attempted boardings. However, the statistics for this year until August 2005 show only four petty thefts, five actual boardings, and eleven attempted boardings. This statistic indicates that sea robbers in the Malacca Strait are more inclined to petty theft. However, the numbers on attempted boardings do not reflect the actual intention of the robbers; it may have been another petty theft.

Sea robbery attacks do not occur throughout the Malacca Strait, but there are some areas of concentration where these activities normally occur.

From an analysis of the reported incidents, two areas of the strait have been identified as prone to attack. The first area is the northern part of the strait; the statistics for 2004 have shown that twenty-five out of thirty-five occurrences of sea robbery took place in this area. Another area that is prone to attack is the southern part of the strait, comprising the area close to the approach of the Singapore Strait. This is because the depth of water there is shallow, which is considered hazardous...
### SEA ROBBERIES IN STRAITS OF MALACCA (Malaysian Side of the Straits)

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### SEA ROBBERIES IN STRAITS OF MALACCA (Malaysian Side of the Straits)

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<td>Actual Boarding</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Boarding</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
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<table>
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<th>Until June 2005</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Petty Theft</td>
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<td>Actual Boarding</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attempted Boarding</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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waters. Ships entering this area slow down, and this provides opportunities for sea robbers to attack.

Based on the situation in the Straits of Malacca and information collected from previous incidents, it is strongly predicted that sea robbers’ methods generally correspond to the areas in which they operate. Attacks on fishing boats normally occur along the maritime boundary between Malaysia and Indonesia. Sea robberies normally occur during the dark hours from midnight to early morning, taking full advantage of darkness and limited visibility, the less vigilant state of the crew, and the lack of night surveillance and enforcement by authorities. Lately, hijackings of tugs and barges and kidnappings of crew have continued to increase, especially in the northern part of the Strait of Malacca and off northern Sumatra in Indonesia.

Modern sea robbers or pirates differ from those of old. They don’t subscribe to the traditional weapon anymore. Today they use automatic rifles and modern communications equipment. Modern-day sea robbers are crude and ruthless compared to their forefathers. They are willing to take life if their demands are not met.

Let us now look at the challenges that we are facing when carrying out our responsibilities. Despite several incidents of sea robbery, the strait is generally safe for ships taking passage. The task of guarding the strait is the joint responsibility of maritime enforcement agencies of the littoral states. However, the maritime enforcement agencies are not free from various challenges in the attempt to perform their function and tasks. The weapons used by the sea robbers are not that sophisticated and could easily be handled by the authorities. What’s really important, and what we need to address now, is our capability and capacity for arriving at these trouble spots within the shortest time possible upon receiving distress calls. It would be impossible for
agencies to place patrol vessels along the long coastline. Having said that, here are some of the constraints and challenges faced by the agencies:

First, timely intelligence input—it is critical if we are to conduct successful countermeasures that deter and avoid any crime. Intelligence sharing does become an imperative not only among the various communities but also among government agencies, in particular when dealing with sea robbery. If prevention is possible, real-time incident reports are absolutely a necessity to get the agencies to the scene at the quickest possible time. Late reports would complicate the investigation and rescue effort.

The Royal Malaysian Navy has mounted various patrols and operations along the strait, targeting illegal fishing, sea robbery, search-and-rescue operations, oil spills, illegal immigration, etc. Safeguarding the security and safety of the strait is currently the Royal Malaysian Navy’s main peacetime operation.

Allow me to give you a snapshot of the Malaysian effort in ensuring the security of the Strait of Malacca. There are no less than three naval ships on patrol twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, in the area of interest. While many other Malaysian Navy vessels have also relocated their exercise areas to be in the same general area, Royal Malaysian Air Force aircraft conduct daily patrols of the whole strait as well as designated areas, while the Marine Police has taken steps to counter the threat by deploying big and small police vessels in the designated areas or at the choke points day and night. These vessels have been trailing and following many merchant ships without their knowledge, just to ensure such ships would not be
victims to the sea robbers. During the day, police air wing units operate rotary and also fixed-wing aircraft observing the movement of ships plying the strait.

At the bilateral level, the Royal Malaysian Navy also conducts similar patrol operations with the Indonesian Navy, and also with its Singapore counterpart. In fact, currently the Royal Malaysian Navy and our Indonesian counterpart have four patrols a year along the busy strait. Several annual naval exercises were conducted with our Singaporean counterpart, including search-and-rescue exercises (SAREX).

Fearing that the piracy problem in the waterways could turn into a more sinister terrorist attack, whereby the perpetrators would board and hijack a ship, leading to a devastating outcome, the three countries—namely, Malaysia, Singapore, and also Indonesia—launched the Trilateral Coordinated Border Patrol, codenamed MALSINDO (for Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia), on the 20th of July, 2004, in Batam, Indonesia. The coordinated patrol launched by the three countries was a good initiative amid rising sea robbery threats and the beginning of a new chapter in regional internaval relations. We formally extended an invitation to the Royal Thai Navy to participate in this initiative, too.

This Trilateral Coordinated Patrol was organized in a short time frame. It was the result of good bilateral relationships among the navies in particular and their respective governments in general. The three countries have had effective bilateral arrangements with regard to interoperability, so moving on from bilateral to trilateral was easily facilitated.

Within the context of the theme of this seminar—that is, building a common picture of maritime activity—MALSINDO is testimony to cooperation that can be done. It is an effort or building block using existing cooperation. This cooperation
shall be further expanded with the inclusion of another littoral state, namely Thailand, hopefully.

To further enhance the security and safety of the strait, in August 2005 the three countries, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, have agreed in principle to get “Eye in the Sky.” It was actually launched on the 13th of September of this year. Essentially, the concept will assemble the military assets, such as maritime patrol aircraft, to patrol along the strait and to supplement the coordinated patrols by surface assets. The concept will point out opportunities for other nations possibly to provide assistance in terms of specialized assets such as UAVs and MPAs. Currently, the three countries are concentrating on finalizing the operational procedures and legal issues and other matters related to the operation.

Apart from patrolling the Malacca Strait, the Malaysian government is also using technology to ensure the security and safety of the strait. In this respect, the Malaysian government has taken the initiative by investing millions of dollars to establish a Vessel Traffic Management System, or VTS for short, to monitor the traffic in the strait. The VTS was established with the intention of ensuring the safety and security of the seafarers and mariners transiting through the strait. The mandatory ship reporting system—SHIPREP, for short—to the VTS Center was enforced as early as the 1st of December 1998. The SHIPREP is part of a vessel-detecting system that was installed in the Malacca Strait by the Malaysian government.

The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency is a new agency scheduled to be operational by November or December of this year [2005]. For a start, the agency will initially confine its duties to fifty nautical miles off the coast. The agency is expected to function like any other coast guard organization and will take over the
enforcement of laws governing the sea, including those relating to terrorism, piracy, marine pollution, illegal immigrants, and search and rescue. As the agency becomes better equipped, it will take over full enforcement of the maritime laws of the country. The agency, which will be paramilitary, will have federal and district bases nationwide.

What should others do? Ship owners must ensure that the crew on board is also qualified and trained. Crew members must understand what to do in the event of robbery and incident. Shipping companies must ensure that ships are equipped with security measures to prevent sea robbers from coming on board. The IMB, for example, has recommended that ship owners install the Secure-Ship system. The Secure-Ship system is the most recent effective innovation in the fight against piracy and sea robbery. It is a nonlethal electrifying fence surrounding the whole ship.

As I mentioned earlier, ships entering the Straits of Malacca are required to report to the VTS Center. The VTS Center can then monitor and ensure that the seafarers’ and mariners’ passage through the strait is safe. The VTS is capable of detecting any irregularity and suspicious movement, and if it does, it will then contact the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Coalition Center to tell the Royal Malaysian Navy ship in the area to investigate.

On the other hand, ships are advised to maintain their own antipiracy watches and report all sea robbery attacks and suspicious movement of craft. The practice adopted at the moment is to report to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, Kuala Lumpur—only then the information flows through various agencies before it reaches the enforcement agency so it can react. Ships plying the strait are also advised to communicate constantly with the Malaysian maritime authority in the vicinity and to report any movement or suspicious contact immediately.

Timely intelligence information would definitely assist the littoral state to respond immediately to a threat. Perhaps interested countries or user states can contribute this intelligence information. The information will definitely help the littoral state to respond without delay to a threat in the strait. Intelligence sharing, I believe, will also contribute effectively towards dealing with asymmetrical threats and transnational criminal activities. This is even more so in having to deal with nonstate players.

The Malacca Strait continues to be an important waterway for connectivity between the east and west. It is indeed a Malaysian area of interest. Currently, despite several incidents of piracy and robbery, the strait is safe for the shipping communities, and it is our will and responsibility to keep it that way.

The capacity- and capability-building efforts by the littoral states will continue. Concurrently, creative efforts and new initiatives are being undertaken. The sustainable safety and security of the strait requires international cooperation, not only among the littoral states but also in maritime usage, without compromising national sovereignty. The latter is equally important and needs to take measures and play its role, ensuring the safety of the Strait of Malacca.

Gentlemen, this is what our efforts are in diagrammatic form. This is what our expected outcome will be: a sense of security in operating in the Strait of Malacca. And I thank you.
Admiral Carvalho:
Thank you, Admiral Ilyas. Our next speaker will be Admiral Sir Alan West, Royal Navy, who will address this Symposium on Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR.

Admiral Sir Alan West:
Admiral Mullen, Admiral Shuford, thank you very much for inviting me here today. Admirals, General, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I’ve got to start by saying how delighted I am to be here, both to attend this very important Symposium but also, I have to say, to see so many familiar faces whom I’ve met time and again for the last three years that I’ve been in this appointment.

It’s a wonderful thing, I have to say, to be one of the Chiefs of Navy; what a remarkable set of people you all are. I’ve made some extremely good friends and, goodness me, haven’t we had some marvelous fun as well. Sadly, I will be leaving my post next year. I’m handing over to Jonathan Band, whom I know a number of you know. I will miss these gatherings, and I’ll miss seeing you on a regular basis. But I’m sure I’ll bump into you. Just be warned, I’ll be footloose and fancy-free and traveling the world, so you might see me for a drink or something.

I’ve got to apologize also—and it’s a bad way to start—for the fact that I’m only staying for today. Sadly, I’ve got to be back in the United Kingdom tomorrow, so I’ll be shooting straight off, and I’m very sorry for that.

I’ve been asked, as you’ve heard, to talk a little bit about Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR. It’s a NATO operation that I know some of you here are very familiar with. But some of you have little knowledge of what ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR is about, so I’ll give a short summary about that before moving on to discussing how
successful we can view the operation itself, what we might learn for other maritime security operations elsewhere in the world, and what we might perhaps do to improve its effectiveness.

Before getting into the topic, I think it is worthwhile just reminding ourselves again of the scale of the challenge that collectively faces us in achieving a global, free, and secure maritime commons. It’s been touched on before during the discussion today, but I think it’s worth doing again.

Eighty percent of world trade is moved by sea. When you think of that—that’s all the trade in the world including the big Asian and Eurasian landmasses—it’s amazing that 80 percent moves by sea, including about two hundred and fifty million container movements each year, and most of those are moved with only a very cursory check of their contents, if at all. Just taking my country as an example, annually about five hundred and fifty million tons of freight come through our ports. We have twenty-five million international sea passenger journeys—that’s longish ones—and a further thirty million short sea passenger journeys. And that’s just one country. Imagine if you put that together with the rest of Europe and the rest of the world—then the scale of movements and the challenge are absolutely immense. To be effective in countering terrorists and other illegal activities—and so often today, terrorism, illegal immigration, drugs, and movement of weapons all seem tied together—it is absolutely essential that we have a very clear picture of who and what are moving where and when.

Now, much has been done, unilaterally or bilaterally, by nations to monitor choke points such as the Straits of Gibraltar, the Strait of Malacca we just heard about, or the Dover Straits—and taking the Dover Straits as an example, over seventy-two thousand ships a year of over two thousand tons go through there. And there are other national and regional initiatives. For example, the French invest in monitoring its coastal waters, coordination of reporting in the Baltic, and all of these things are helping. But I think we need to move them closer together. The case studies we’re looking at in this panel are all part of this process. But it’s clear we’re only scratching the surface in establishing a common picture of maritime activity, and I believe there is still a long way to go.

Now, ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR was established on the 26th of October, 2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America, and it is NATO’s only Article V operation. It was initially established as a surveillance and monitoring operation in response to the United States’ request for counterterrorism support in the eastern Mediterranean. Subsequently the operation has been expanded to embrace the whole Mediterranean, with the boarding of suspect vessels and the escort of high-value maritime shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar, although the latter operation is currently suspended.

Forces allocated to the operation were principally NATO’s standing naval forces, with maritime air support contributing to the creation of a recognized maritime picture. The current operation uses three to four dedicated patrol frigates, boosted by units from the standing naval forces, submarines when available, and up to forty maritime patrol aircraft sorties a month. From what was purely a surveillance and monitoring mission, the operation has grown to include more effective pooling of national intelligence feed, the establishment of a list of contacts of interest, and support from nearly all the nations that border the Mediterranean, as well
as some from farther afield. Russia and the Ukraine will send forces to participate before the end of this year, and most recently Algeria, Israel, and Morocco have all declared their willingness to participate.

The purpose of the operation is to deter and deny the use of the sea for overt terrorist activity. This includes the transport of personnel and material to conduct terrorism and the use of the sea as a source of funding for terrorist activity through such activities as drug running and human trafficking.

Now, how successful has it been? How many terrorists have been caught? Over sixty-eight thousand vessels have been hailed, which, at face value, is an impressive total, especially when you consider that there are over five thousand vessels over five hundred tons and two to three thousand under five hundred tons in the Mediterranean at any given moment. However, not so impressive is that only ninety-five boardings have been conducted and of these only ten revealed suspicious activity. None of these revealed a direct tie to terrorist activity.

Some would argue that Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR is an extremely effective operation that has successfully contained the threat of maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean and significantly contributed to NATO’s collective defense against terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But has it? It is extremely difficult to assess what has been the impact of the operation, since no data existed at all before this operation to tell us what was going on in the Mediterranean. And I suspect this is the same in all areas of the world.

What I don’t think is in doubt is that the operation must have had a considerable impact on the users of the waters of the Mediterranean. The presence of the operation is well known and understood. And it would seem self-evident that the presence of the units engaged in operations of deterring illegal transshipment of humans, particularly in the central Mediterranean, is having an impact. Information on the movement of weapons, explosives, and other terrorist-related material is extremely scarce. But anecdotal evidence and, I have to say, some subjective evidence does suggest a reduction. Also, we believe there is a change of patterns, to move through other areas, such as the Black Sea. So in this regard it is possible that terrorist organizations are being forced to change their methods, expose themselves in other ways, and maybe reduce their activity in the Mediterranean. [ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR] has enabled a much more detailed knowledge of ship operating patterns and ship ownership to be established. We are really getting a very good feel for who owns what ships and how they move between different owners, and that is extremely valuable, particularly for our intelligence experts.

The boardings conducted are, however, inevitably superficial in character, despite the enthusiasm and ingenuity of the boarding teams. After all, the boardings are conducted subject to the agreement of the master, as NATO has no powers to require a vessel to accept a boarding or to go to a particular port—although I have to say a noncompliant vessel is likely to receive a very warm reception at its next port of call. NATO is also only really tracking those vessels over three hundred tons, and there are many thousands of smaller vessels moving around the Mediterranean, many of which could be engaged in illegal activity. Clearly, any master will have no real difficulty in disguising these activities, particularly if they involve very small items.
The key to making operations such as ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR a success is to move it on beyond the exercise in building a recognized maritime picture to one that brings all the interested parties together, or at least gets them all talking to each other, and places great reliance on intelligence for the cuing of reactive forces. As with most international [counter]terrorist operations, this is not purely military. To be fully effective in building a common picture of maritime activity from which the correct reactive forces can be cued, [the operation] needs to encompass all the possible sources of information in an interagency approach, as we discussed so much earlier today. And I think this is along the lines of the models so well developed in Key West for countering drug operations, as well as the traditional military sources of information provided by ships and patrol aircraft, supported by electronic signals and human and imagery intelligence feeds. The operation needs to encompass more effectively national sources of information, from customs forces, law enforcement agencies, financial institutions—and my goodness me, that’s difficult, to get that information—other NGOs, and transportation authorities.

Much has been done to try to make ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR an intelligence-led operation. There has been a great deal of collaboration, resulting in a raft of bilateral and multilateral arrangements—and of course bilateral arrangements are always easier in the intelligence world, covering the exchange of information and intelligence. This has gone a long way to improving our knowledge of illicit activity, but there is much more to be done to enhance this further, to produce coordinated, timely information that can effectively support disruption and interdiction operations.

Barriers remain—particularly electronic connectivity between nations and agencies. It’s interesting. There is a lot of data there in terms of the wide picture. If we had the right connectivity, most nations could actually almost get the worldwide picture; how good it is would vary in certain areas, but we could almost achieve that today. But there are issues over the release of information, and I think these can be resolved with sufficient investment of effort, proper regard to national sensitivities, and sensible application of legal principles. You might think that’s impossible, knowing laws, but I’m sure it can be done.

To address some of these issues, the NATO Southern Command in Naples has established an organization known as the Joint Information Analysis Center, the JIAC. This is how it works: The JIAC uses national intelligence cells to protect the supplying nation’s sources in accordance with their national rules and acts as a center of fused information. Its establishment is meant to encourage the wider sharing of information and ensure that the JIAC output is passed in a timely manner to the nations or agencies most likely to be able to exploit it.

Let me use a recent example as evidence of what has been achieved so far and give you a feel for what could be achieved in the future. Could I have the next slide, please? Thank you.

I’ve taken out the countries involved because, again, there are sensitivities; all the time there are sensitivities. In this case, the vessel was identified by a national source as about to transfer illegal immigrants. A frigate intercepted and shadowed the vessel across the eastern Mediterranean and into the arms of waiting authorities. The vessel was subsequently sent back and detained by the country of departure.

The operation validated the JIAC concept and highlights the close cooperation required to achieve a clear, wide, shipping plot. The JIAC was able to receive
THE INTERAGENCY APPROACH-JIAC

KEY ISSUE = Protection of Intel Source – Bilateral Protocols
Traditional Military Sources

ELINT
NMICC-M
SIGINT
HUMINT
IMINT

Nontraditional/Interagency Sources

Customs
Law Enforcement
JIAC
Financial Institutions
NGOs
Transportation Authorities

Fused Intelligence Picture

Guidance to Operational Forces

3 252035Z
BOARDED BY COAST GUARD AND DIRECTED BACK TO COUNTRY OF DEPARTURE

4 251230Z
COASTGUARD SHADOWING CEASES AND RESUMES NORMAL TASKING

5 270310Z
NAVY CEASE SHADOWING

6 02 MAR 05
ARRESTED BY AUTHORITIES

250800Z
M/V Co:320/Sp:7k

242200Z
M/V Co:308/Sp:8k

241800Z
M/V Co:312/Sp:8k

241400Z
M/V Co:325

240500Z
M/V Co:353

240300Z
TRANSFER OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS OBSERVED BY OAE UNIT

24 FEB 05
VESSEL DEP. WITH APPROX. 200 ILLEGAL
Sensitive information from national sources, protect those sources, and disseminate the essential information to a naval allocated force to conduct interdiction operations. Maritime forces were vectored to the correct location, recorded the initial phase of this illegal operation, and were able to maintain continuous monitoring of the suspect vessel while remaining undetected. The nation concerned with the interception was able to benefit from the tactical-level intelligence provided by the NATO assets involved, and the transfer of illegal immigrants was prevented and at least some action taken to discourage future activity.

Now, this is just one example. But it does show the value to be gained from encouraging all nations involved in maritime security operations of the benefit of a fused maritime picture and the importance of enhancing the exchange of information at whatever level available.

As to the future, the introduction of the Automated Identification System, AIS, presents us with an opportunity. While not designed for this task, AIS will give us immediate information on contacts and help establish a wide-area picture without the need to hail the vessel. There are some commercial sensitivities here, understandably. But correctly used, AIS could significantly improve the surveillance effectiveness of operations such as ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR—so much so that the Southern Command has recently purchased AIS sets to fit on units engaged in the operation. Clearly, those not transmitting will need a closer look, but the proper use of AIS information, in addition to other sources, will allow the more effective use of scarce surveillance assets and better cuing of reactive forces. It is also information that is freely available, that is unclassified, and can therefore be readily exchanged between nations.

In summary, I’d like to highlight four points. Despite the lack of success in catching terrorists, Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, I believe, is a very worthwhile operation that is doing a great deal to build up a clear picture of maritime movement—and that is an important thing to do—and also to deter illicit activity in the Mediterranean, which, although it’s difficult to prove it because we never had data, I believe is happening. It’s also doing a great deal to boost NATO’s image and encourage NATO partners and Mediterranean dialogue nations to participate—in other words, a multinational hook helping this global thrust that we are talking about between maritime nations.

The mechanisms are now in place for ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR to function well as an intelligence-led operation, and we need to move it forward to incorporate intelligence from all nations participating as soon as possible. That takes effort from nations, and it is extremely difficult to do, but it’s important that we try and achieve it. It is imperative that nations are committed to sharing information—not just the military information, but from all sources and all agencies with an interest. That can be very difficult in financial areas, commercial areas, and areas like that.

I believe this is a first step in a move towards getting a sensible wide picture. We got sensible wide pictures in some other areas of the world, and I believe it is not beyond the wit of man—indeed, not that difficult—for us to join that all together. In terms of all our navies working together in the context that’s being discussed today, I believe this is a first step, moving this onwards—that we can actually achieve it without all of the legal difficulties one sees in some other areas; and therefore I think it’s important. I’ve spoken quite long enough. Thank you very much indeed.
Admiral Carvalho:

Thank you, Admiral West. Our last speaker at this panel will be Admiral Oudot de Dainville, French Navy.

Admiral Oudot de Dainville, France:

Admiral Mullen and Admiral Shuford, thank you very much for this bright Symposium.

Admiral, ladies and gentlemen, before reminding ourselves of the task of TF 150, we have to put it in the context of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, which started in November 2001. Here you can read extracts of the CENTCOM AND NAVCENT directives.

We can already see the ambiguity of this operation aiming at international terrorism. As a link, it is not always clear between terrorists and honorable acts at sea. Beyond this ambiguity, some basic rapport has been established. We can look at the following lessons, according to permanent participation and three-time command. Historically, some background analysis highlighted the main following requirements listed on this slide.

The key to successful maritime interdiction operations was good situational awareness. Thus, building and sharing a common picture was essential for success. At the same time, merging and sharing intelligence among all coalition nations was necessary. Therefore, the Coalition Intelligence Interagency Cell was created on the 1st of October, 2004, and TF 150 and 151 merged on the 1st of May, 2004.
TF150 Mission

- **OEF Intention**: In support of the global war on terror ... employ the Maritime Force to deter, disrupt, and destroy international terrorist organizations ... deny ITO use of the maritime environment, prevent terrorist acts at sea and ashore, prevent ITO acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, kill or capture ITO leaders.

- **COMUSNAVCENT Intention**: Maritime Security Operation set the conditions for security and economic stability. MSO are designed to protect critical energy infrastructure and complement counterterrorism and security efforts of regional nations. MSO deny terrorist use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or for illegal transport of personnel, weapons and illicit cargo.

Lessons Learned

- Build up and manage RMP
- Merge and share intelligence in coalition
- Create seamless theatre
- Enhance forces reactivity
- Create Theater Security Cooperation to involve littoral countries
- Harmonize national ROE

**BUT**:
- OEF Goals achievement?
- MOE (measures of effectiveness)?
TF 150 and 151 operated with the same missions. TF 151 was more oriented toward leadership interdiction operations. In this way, TF 151 was composed of assets from nations accepting stronger rules of engagement. At the same time, we felt the need to involve littoral countries in theater security. Thus, cooperation was formalized by the creation of Theater Security Cooperation.

Last but not least, based on background and analysis, we became aware of the need to try to harmonize national rules of engagement. Indeed, TF 150 is a perfect illustration of the major difficulty in operating in a coalition, because each ship has to deal with its own national rules of engagement.

Finally, I would like to focus on two major difficulties. The first is about achieving the goals specified by the ENDURING FREEDOM objectives. On one hand, some skeptics highlight the lack of arrests or finds, and they claim that the coalition has been unable to prevent al-Qa’eda and associated movements from settling in the Horn of Africa. But, on the other hand, we must point out that piracy in areas where TF 150 is most present has decreased and that maritime area is safer.

However, this increased security also has curtailed some ancestral trafficking by which many of the littoral population used to earn their living. This illustrates a second major difficulty, which is to data-mine a relevant measure of effectiveness to indicate if we are still on the right path.

But another approach to the problem consists of listing items of satisfaction and disappointment that emerged from the background analysis.

**Items of Satisfaction/Disappointment**

**Satisfaction:**
- General use of CENTRIXS on every ship
- Standardization of procedures, reporting signals and data bases
- Best knowledge of others CTF’s directives

**Disappointment:**
- Coop with CJTF HOA
- Lack of data on particular areas

We register some items of satisfaction in the unification of the theater. All the satisfaction points you can read here have really lightened TF 150’s workload and
provides a common picture and, more especially, the standardization of procedures and reporting signals. This last point was very difficult to achieve, as it was a non-NATO operation including some non-NATO nations.

Concerning disappointment, the first attempt at cooperation with CJTF HOA [Commander, Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa] proved disappointing. A year and a half ago we understood that CJTF HOA wanted to increase cooperation with maritime forces to a fair level and then intended to use CENTRIX [Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange system], not effective at the present time. It seemed that ground base activity had cast itself away from the multinational CTF 150. That is not a good way to perform effects-based operations. On the other hand, analysis of that, I guess, engaged them in the south of the Red Sea, the Bab el Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden and has allowed us to appreciate the main merchant traffic lanes, as well as traffic into their approaches.

The conclusion is that if the volume of data available begins to show merchant traffic patterns, it also reveals areas where little or no data exists. Furthermore, the results may be actionable, which, in particular, means accurate enough to be mined by legal advisors of the authorities at strategic or operational levels before actions. That’s why we must still improve our effectiveness.

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**Improve our Effectiveness**

- **Create a Coalition Interagencies Intelligence Cell (CIIC)**
- **Reinforce TSC by by involving more TF150**
- **Keep on technological effort process (AIS,...)**

_But strengthen legacy of our action as we are confronted by illicit cargoes and can’t operate easily in TTW._

As it has been said, coalition intelligence cells can be a real success, but if we want to maintain the hope of dismantling the transnational terrorist networks, we must work to create interagency cooperation. Theater security cooperation has really improved, but TF 150 could be more integrated in the coordination of bilateral cooperation to ensure coalition effectiveness.
As far as the technological effort is concerned, we must fund the U.S. Navy with preferred-to-land Automatic Information System (AIS) kits to equip all the coalition maritime patrol aircraft belonging to CTF 57. But most important is to strengthen the legality of our action as we are confronted by illicit cargoes and cannot operate easily in territorial waters.

In conclusion, we can be proud of the rationalization work already done that has successfully improved the initial organization of forces in theater to meet the current situation. But there are many points that still have to be addressed. We must work on legal questions to provide our units with a legal framework for action adequate to the mission and satisfactory to every organization in which they may operate. That means to finalize the project of modification on the Rome Convention dealing with suppression of unlawful acts [1988] without changing the principle of the Montego Bay Convention [1982], which is in respect of sea freedom.

If you want to work with littoral countries and their navies, we must define the difference in cooperation agreements or combined operation orders that clearly state each one’s role and responsibility, notably when in the vicinity of territorial waters. Quite frankly, the south of the Red Sea is a mess, with smuggling of all kinds, shortage of capacity, lack of national political will, and the problem of territorial waters.

Nations must remain free to decide whether they take part in this theater-specific security cooperation in order to draw the most benefit from bilateral relations already existing with nations that could be reluctant to take part in any theater security cooperation.
TF 150 is a live laboratory for maritime security. We face difficulties, so the way we find solutions is the way to go further with maritime security. This concludes my briefing.

Admiral Carvalho:

Thank you very much, Admiral Oudot de Dainville. Before opening the floor for comments, questions, and answers, I’d like to remind you of the following procedures. I will try to call on the audience members in the order I see their hands up. When I call on someone, he should stand up, use the microphone provided, and identify himself. After that, he should also state whether he’s asking a question or offering a comment and identify a panel member to whom his remarks are addressed. Audience members should limit their remarks to one minute to allow time for others. For the same reason, panelists should limit their answers to one minute. The floor is open. Please.

DISCUSSION

Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang, Denmark:

My name is Nils Wang, and I have been Admiral, Danish Fleet, since the 1st of August this year [2005]. I have a question for Admiral Ilyas, and my question is basically coming from a great seafaring nation, even though my country is a tiny one: a lot of goods are going through the Malacca Strait under the Danish flag, and I consider my country as a stakeholder, a distant stakeholder, for the Malacca issue that you talked about. How would it be perceived if, for example, my country offered a frigate for a periodic reinforcement of the patrol effort? Would that be perceived as regional interference or as a welcome reinforcement of the resources in the region?

Admiral Datuk Ilyas, Malaysia:

Thank you. I think if you were to come into the area to get a feel of the situation in the Malacca Strait, if you just come for a ship visit, it’s not a problem. But if you were to say that you want to do escort duties for your flag ships, then I think that would give you a lot of problems, because then, for all the other countries in the world, probably you would be providing escorts. But if you want to come and feel the situation for once in a while, you can come to our area—you are most welcome.

But I reckon there are other kinds of assistance that you can provide. For example, experience sharing—in terms of training, in terms of information. I know there are a lot of ships that are flagged in Denmark. For example, we do not need to board a ship if you can actually send information to us about what it concerns. This would be information that we would most welcome coming from the flag state. I think that’s my response to you at this time.

Admiral Carvalho:

Yes, please.

Vice Admiral R. Mudimu, South Africa:

My question is to Admiral West; it’s a simple question. The navies of the world for the seventeenth time have met here in Newport to appreciate the issues of naval
cooperation and the issues that we must deal with. Do you believe that this audience has the capacity to address issues of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism?

**Admiral Sir Alan West, United Kingdom:**

I love your definition of a simple question, if I may say so. I think that this audience, with all the Chiefs of Navy here, is able to actually, intellectually, think through issues such as maritime global cooperation and how that might impact on PSI [Proliferation Security Initiative], the whole area of movement of, not just weapons of mass destruction, but actually other aspects of proliferation as well. I believe intellectually we can meet and discuss that. To think we can solve that—it’s the sort of thing you think you’ve solved over whiskies in the middle of the night, and the next morning you find you actually haven’t. It’s a very long and difficult process. But I’m sure a meeting like this and discussions of the type that we’re having over these three days, primarily addressing other aspects of global issues, can stray into the area of PSI in terms of proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, and how we can work better to try and actually monitor and check that sort of flow.

And I go back to what I said in my presentation: The first step, I believe, that we have got to do is get a very clear picture of what actually is going on, on the oceans of the world. By the oceans of the world, I mean right into the littoral and coming out of harbors; if we all have a common understanding and a clear understanding of that, it means we can start addressing those problems much more easily. It seems to me that is something that we probably can get our nations to agree with and get our minds around and go a long way down that track.

So I would take this in simple bite-size steps. We’re always very pragmatic in the UK. We go for little simple bits at a time rather than the grand, grandiose sort of idea. And I think that is something we certainly can address and talk about. So I think it’s very useful, and we can address them, but I would be amazed if when I get back to the UK I find you’ve come up with the answer on that here over the next two days. I wait with interest. Thank you.

**Admiral Carvalho:**

Yes, please.

**Rear Admiral David Ledson, New Zealand:**

I have a question for Admiral Oudot de Dainville. Sir, what interests me is that so far today we’ve talked about frameworks to provide the right context that we need to do our work. We’ve talked about the fact that the U.S. will have 80 percent of their present fleet in twenty years’ time. But what we haven’t talked about is that ultimately it’s our sailors who are at sea doing the hard yards, and my feedback from our operations in OEFMIO [Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Maritime Intercept Operations] in the Gulf is that our sailors today demand that we give them missions of effectiveness so they can see that what they’re doing is worthwhile, and OEFMIO is going to be an eight- to ten-year, maybe fifteen-year investment in ships and people.

What importance do you attach to developing MOE [measures of effectiveness]? The Fifth Fleet, I think, has been trying for four or five years to develop MOE for OEFMIO and has failed to do it. How important do you think they are?
Admiral Oudot de Dainville, France:

I’m sure it’s possible to have concrete results. You have to work day after day to improve the capacity to be very efficient. I spoke about the Rome Convention and the work to find a legal framework since the year 2002, if I remember, and we are very close to finding an agreement to improve our effectiveness at sea, and I am sure we can find solutions for that and to give an answer to our politicians asking for measures of the effectiveness of what happens—the effectiveness of a TF 150—even if we have some discussion about the presence of al-Qa’eda in the Horn of Africa, but the struggle, the fight against piracy and the safety we provide to the merchant vessels in the area of interest of TF 150 is a good result. So we can give that, and we can be proud of that. I am very confident of the way we have to improve our effectiveness at sea.

Admiral Sir Alan West, United Kingdom:

Can I just say, if I may—I think that is a very valid question you have there. I touched on it with what was going on in the Med. I’m sure it can be done, but we are not able to do it. And that is actually extremely difficult, not just for our people, whom I think we can motivate—although it’s interesting: when the tsunami arrived they were delighted to be doing the tsunami [relief operations], because they could really see [the results of] what they were doing. But it’s also difficult actually in terms of resources from our nations. When you sit down with your other chiefs of staff, they want to know what they’re getting for the amount of money being expended, and at the moment we are not able to show it very clearly—I just don’t believe that it’s not achieving a great deal, and I don’t believe that there isn’t a lot out there that we can catch.

We’ve already said 80 percent of everything that moves around in the world goes by sea. Well, that must be true of terrorists’ kits as well. It must be. Therefore we’ve got to somehow get an intelligence base and ability to do intelligence-led operations to actually start delivering. The best news possible for all of us would be if we actually got a few ships where we actually cracked either some key players in al-Qa’eda or some movement of some nasty bits of material. And we’re not getting as much of that as we should. So I think your question is very valid, and we have absolutely got to do better in this.

Vice Admiral Jan-Willem Kelder, Netherlands:

I want to dwell on a bit of the question of my Danish colleague for Admiral Ilyas. We have understood that during the tsunami, when there were a lot of warships around in your country near Indonesia, piracy went down. It would be something if we as stakeholders—as the Netherlands is also a stakeholder in the Malacca Strait—offer a frigate sometime as a command center or information center to assist you; I think it would be something to think about, perhaps, in these three days. I’d rather perhaps talk to you afterwards, but I think it is something to think about—why not?

Admiral Datuk Ilyas, Malaysia:

There are two ways of handling this. We can talk about this privately, but in response to your first remark that during the tsunami the [number of incidents of] piracy or the sea robberies went down: Possibly the families of all these people were
affected by the tsunami; could be—well, I don’t have any statistics to back this one up, and neither can I support this, but suddenly we also saw the trend; it actually came down. With regard to your offer, currently, the three states—together with Thailand; hopefully they will come together with us—are also trying to put a lot of other initiatives all together. To say that, we are lacking facilities for the time being in terms of specialized equipment, but we are not lacking platforms.

I think the issue here is that, even if you were to line up ships along the Malacca Strait, there’s no guarantee that this would work. I keep on using the word “sea robberies,” because sea robberies, as I think we mentioned earlier it all happens in territorial waters. The Strait of Malacca is very narrow, and even if countries offered ships, I would say that you would not bring down the level of piracy or even robbery. What we need is really maybe like this idea of an Eye in the Sky. Even that—we are trying to refine this idea. The Eye in the Sky gives you the detection, but we have the other part of identification and how we intercept all these targets.

So the other idea is that in the Straits of Malacca, especially the area that I showed on the chart—it’s a very narrow strait—maybe the kind of ships that you would be sending would not be actually useful because they’re large in nature. You are looking at boats that these so-called robbers use that probably are doing a speed of forty-five knots. They are very high-speed boats. They are fast. They operate in shallow waters. So I think this idea is an issue that we should look at. Even ships of our navy, for example: Some of our ships are not suitable for this kind of job. That’s why we are forming the Coast Guard equivalent, where they would be operating smaller ships, faster ships.

And again, I will say that timely intelligence and information sharing probably is the way that we are looking at now. This is something the three countries are doing quite well currently. Thank you.

Admiral Michael Mullen, United States:

If I could just offer one comment on your presentation. You talked about the JIAC [Joint Interagency Coordination Group], and I’m intimately familiar with that. And what was very powerful about it, where we broke through on the JIAC, was in the intelligence fusion piece and the protection of sensitive information, which all countries are very interested in. We did that by establishing liaison officers in the cell to protect the intelligence, and they would peel off the sensitive source information, which is usually what is most sensitive, and yet be able to use the substance of the intelligence to fuse it.

When we accomplished this—and when I say “we,” it was really some of the young NATO intelligence officers that came up with this—there was a real breakthrough in being able to fuse intelligence, which up to that point we had really been frustrated with. So I offer that as a model of very practical success in a very difficult area for us, and there were many countries that were very comfortable with it once we implemented it.

Admiral Carvalho:

As we have no more questions, I think we can conclude this panel. I’d like to thank the panelists and also the audience for their attention.
“An Address”

Vice Admiral Terry Cross
Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford:

Good morning; good to see everybody back today. I have to say that my sense from talking to very many of you yesterday evening is that we had a great day yesterday and have traction on the objectives of this Symposium comprehensively. There’s an extraordinary degree of encouragement as a result of the conversations yesterday.

We wrapped it up last night with the alums and the current NCC students and their wives and the sponsors over at the O Club. I know that many of you were there. Those who weren’t, I’m sorry, because you missed an absolutely extraordinary evening. I’ve been in the Navy for many, many years, as we all have. And we go to receptions, cocktail parties, and things all the time. I have to tell you that I have never been to one that was as convivial and warm as the one last night. That was an extraordinary event, and for those of you who were there, I know you recognize that—certainly a wonderful way to cap off the first day.

It was something of a record—we had almost six hundred people over there in that Officers’ Club—and a terrific spread; it was a bad night in Newport to be a shrimp. And we’ll see everybody this evening at Rosecliff. And we did finish, in record time, the famous group photo; the rest of the day should be relatively easy.

As we begin this second full day of discussions, we begin it with the United States Coast Guard, and I’m honored today to introduce its Vice Commandant, Vice Admiral Terry Cross. Vice Admiral Cross graduated from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in nearby New London, Connecticut, in 1970. His staff assignments have included leadership positions in program management, budgeting, and acquisition. He has commanded the Eleventh Coast Guard District, the Seventeenth Coast Guard District, and the Coast Guard Air Station, San Francisco. As part of his assignment as Vice Commandant, he served as the Commander of the Pacific Area, where he established the first Coast Guard Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, participated in Iraqi Freedom and Liberty Shield, and set records for seizing illegal drugs. Admiral Cross has also served as the Assistant Commandant for Operations, where he was responsible for managing oversight of all Coast Guard operating programs, including maritime safety, law enforcement, intelligence, and national defense. Very importantly, he has played a seminal role in the Coast Guard’s Maritime Domain Awareness initiative. Ladies and gentlemen, Vice Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Terry Cross.
Vice Admiral Terry Cross:

Admiral Mullen, Coast Guard and Navy service chiefs, delegates, distinguished guests, good morning. Admiral Shuford, I want to thank you and your terrific Naval War College staff for being such terrific hosts. Nobody does it better. Admiral Mullen, I want to thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished group, and on behalf of Admiral Collins I want to thank you for what we believe is an unprecedented level of cooperation between our two services. We think that both the Coast Guard and the Navy are better off because of it, and, more importantly, we think the country has benefited from that cooperation. I think we were given an opportunity to cooperate even more closely earlier this week when President Bush signed the National Strategy for Maritime Security.

I also want to thank all of you from nations who offered support to us and our country, not just as a Coast Guard flag officer but as an American citizen. I need to tell you that it was deeply appreciated. And lastly, before I begin my prepared remarks, I want to offer my condolences to Admiral Castro Rosas in the Mexican delegation for the loss of some senior counternarcotics officials in a helicopter crash just yesterday.

The theme of this Symposium, A Global Network of Nations for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons, is appropriate and timely. This morning I’m going to focus most of my remarks on the importance of partnerships among the global community to achieve that goal.

I believe everyone here understands that the maritime community is integral to the global economy. Interestingly, some Americans often tend to forget that. Perhaps that’s because of our system of interstate highways and the availability of intercontinental transoceanic jet traffic. But those who did forget were all reminded of our ties to the sea about three weeks ago, when Hurricane Katrina severely damaged the port of New Orleans—as you’ve heard, one of our busiest and most important ports. Not only that, but it occurred at a very bad time of year for our economy, in that it’s harvest time in the Midwest and over half the grain that’s exported from the United States passes down the Mississippi and through the port of New Orleans.

We’ve just begun to assess the effects of this very powerful storm. The damage, in fact, goes beyond the terrible loss of human life and destruction of private property. The entire country has felt the economic effects of this storm, and that will continue for some time to come.

Concerns about the adverse economic impact of the storm, I believe, were reflected in our president’s priorities for the response. The first priority was to save lives. The second priority was to sustain life in the delivery of supplies—water and food—to those who had been rescued. But the third priority was to restore port and waterway infrastructure, to open the river to commerce. And I’ll talk a little more about that in a few minutes.

When most people think about the role of the United States Coast Guard, they probably think of a lifesaving service—especially so in light of the performance of the Coast Guard following an event such as Hurricane Katrina. I think there’s little question that our Coast Guard’s search-and-rescue capabilities are respected worldwide. Moreover, it’s not just around the world. It’s an image that most Americans have of
our Coast Guard. For a long time we advertised ourselves as America's lifesavers. It's an image that we cherish as an organization, but it's not a complete image.

The value of our Coast Guard extends well beyond saving lives and responding to disasters. Though we will always remain ready to do that important work, our missions range from polar icebreaking to the interdiction of illegal drugs and migrants; from aids to navigation to pollution response; and beyond.

More importantly in today's world, the United States Coast Guard is also the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security. Now, this term, “maritime homeland security,” is a relatively new one, but the mission is not. We've been doing it since 1790, when Alexander Hamilton first formed what he called a series of cutters to patrol the coast of the United States, to protect the fragile economic security of the Republic. Moreover, in World War II, interestingly, we had more Coast Guard individuals engaged in port security operations than we have in the entire Coast Guard today.

Since September 11, 2001, our nation, and most nations, have increased their focus on terrorist attacks. Terrorism, however, is only one of the many security threats that we confront. Illegal migration and drug smuggling, for example, compound the threat of terrorism, because they contribute to the illicit movement of people, money, and weapons across borders. Profits from these illicit activities are well documented as funding sources for international terrorism. These threats have been with us for many years, and they continue to grow in severity each year—and they will likely continue to grow in the future.

The environment remains a huge concern for us. The death and destruction caused by Katrina's winds and the flooding were only the beginning. The Coast Guard now, with other federal agency partners and state and local partners, is leading a cleanup in the port and surrounding waters of New Orleans, where there have been over a thousand oil spills reported; in total, the volume of those spills now rivals the amount of oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez.

Hence, one of my messages to you today is that the United States Coast Guard shares very similar missions with the sea services of other countries. In fact, the smaller your navy, the more likely it is that your mission set looks a great deal like ours. That provides an opportunity for us to collaborate, exchange best practices, and learn from each other.

As a maritime nation, the United States shares with most of the rest of the world a strong interest in the safety and security of maritime commerce. I think we've already heard this week that the United Nations estimates that upwards of 80 percent of all trade of all nations travels by sea. Of that, almost 75 percent passes through one of the five main maritime choke points: the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. A terrorist attack against just one of these vital sea lanes could severely disrupt global trade. A terrorist attack against just one of our major ports, as we have just seen, could disrupt our economy.

This was a subject of enormous concern at this Symposium two years ago. Both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations called for “a worldwide coalition of military and law enforcement organizations to keep our oceans free and safe.” They recognized that the oceans are so vast that no nation alone,
no matter what the size of its navy or coast guard, can guarantee security everywhere all the time.

It’s true for the United States and, I think, for virtually all the nations represented here that sustained domestic prosperity depends on global trade, which is predicted to double or triple in the next twenty years. Most of that trade will pass through our seaports, so all governments need to be attentive to finding ways to facilitate an increased flow of commerce. This necessarily means minimizing disruptions and delays caused by inspections and other security requirements in our seaports.

Conversely, ensuring maritime security suggests a real need to restrict activity in our ports. Governments clearly have an obligation to keep illegal migrants, drugs, weapons, other contraband, and potentially weapons of mass effect from passing through those same ports, and to ensure that arriving ships are free of terrorists. We are left with the challenge of enhancing maritime security while accommodating an increased flow of commerce. This is easy to say—improve maritime security while enhancing the flow of commerce—but it’s extraordinarily difficult to do.

This concept is a key part of our new National Strategy for Maritime Security, which I mentioned earlier that the president recently signed. The president recognized that while U.S. agencies have each carried out more effective layers of security, it’s time to take maritime security to the next level. The president directed the secretaries of the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security, of which the Coast Guard is a part, to lead the federal effort to develop a comprehensive national strategy for maritime security, to better integrate and synchronize the existing department-level strategies and ensure their effective and efficient implementation.

The strategy is guided by three overarching principles. The first is freedom of the sea. The second is the uninterrupted flow of commerce, and the third is good border management, which is facilitating the movement of legitimate people and cargo while screening out the dangerous. Operating within these principles helps to ensure smoother operation of the world’s economy. It requires full cooperation and collaboration with state and local agencies, the private sector, and, importantly, other nations. I can assure you that our Coast Guard will be moving at best speed to develop and implement this strategy.

Fortunately, many of the efforts we have already undertaken are supportive of this strategy. For example, our work to enhance port security while facilitating the flow of commerce was embedded in the Coast Guard’s Maritime Homeland Security Strategy, which was developed in the fall of 2002. Its goals were awareness, prevention, protection, response, and recovery. And those goals are certainly aligned with the new strategy.

Our Coast Guard has four qualities that I think will make us a key agency in terms of implementing this strategy. And this is consistent. I’ve had conversations with a number of you over the course of the last couple of days about what it took to develop a coast guard, and these qualities that I’m going to express right now, as I’ve told you, I think are the keys.

The first is to have the right authorities. The United States Coast Guard is unique in the United States government in that we are both a military service and a law enforcement agency. Several of you have asked how it was that the Coast Guard
was able to have assets on scene so quickly following Hurricane Katrina while other federal agencies were not necessarily immediately present. The answer is that we were operating as a law enforcement agency, not as a member of the armed forces. We’re not in the Department of Defense, and therefore we were not restricted by internal federal laws in terms of our response. So we were able to flow forces immediately. We’re different.

Second, we have a standing force of trained people, along with ships and aircraft, at a national command and control system. Third, we had a broad mission set that already included port security, and that means we already possessed many of the needed capabilities to do the job.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, we’re a small organization. In numbers, we’re about the size of the New York City Police Department. Hence, in order to do our job, we have to have partners. We have a long history of partnering with other federal agencies, state and local government, and other countries.

Our challenge has been, and will continue to be, to employ three basic elements of our organization to accomplish the goals of the strategy. Again, the goals of the strategy were awareness, prevention, protection, response, and recovery. While each one of these goals could be viewed as having both domestic and international elements, our view has been that the protection of port infrastructure, responses to attacks, and recovery operations like those taking place in New Orleans today are primarily domestic responsibilities. However, because of the immense economic importance of international trade, the global threat of terrorism, and the use of the world’s oceans as the primary means to move commerce, for us to accomplish the goals of awareness and prevention we must have international partners. Said another way, global problems require global solutions, and global solutions require global partnerships.

As Admiral Mullen indicated on the first day, no nation can do this alone. Our Coast Guard’s partnership activities take place through a variety of international protocols. These include large international organizations, like the International Maritime Organization; regional organizations like the North Pacific Heads of Coast Guards, who will meet next week in Kobe, Japan; the Asia-Pacific Maritime Safety Agencies [Forum]; and others. Importantly, we also have twenty-six bilateral agreements with individual countries.

Perhaps the value of these international partnerships can best be illustrated by our efforts to improve maritime domain awareness and establish an effective international security regime to improve the world’s ability to prevent terrorist attacks. A result of that effort was the International Ship and Port Facility Security, or ISPS, Code. This was a collaborative effort with one hundred forty-seven other countries at the International Maritime Organization to build a new and substantial security code that enhanced the security of vessels and port facilities around the world.

In addition to our efforts to shape international security regulations and standards, the Coast Guard also has an active program to improve international cooperation and to help other countries develop more effective maritime organizations. For example, we’ve developed what we call a Model Maritime Service Code. This code sets forth the legal authorities that we believe must be in place for a maritime service to be effective. We also have a Model Maritime Operations Guide, which addresses standard procedures for conducting maritime operations. These
are available to anyone for the asking. Additionally, through equipment transfers, training visits, combined exercises, bilateral agreements, mobile training teams, and opportunities to train at our service schools, we’ve worked to help other maritime organizations become more efficient and more effective.

The training we provide is not limited to security missions but includes all of our missions, including search and rescue, law enforcement, and pollution response. We enjoy helping others, but, to be honest, we also gain in return. We think our training and assistance help other nations become positive forces for peace and stability. They also provide us with more productive partners and help to build that linkage of trust between nations that allows you and us to become better partners. And finally, we use these opportunities to learn from others. We shamelessly steal good ideas wherever we can find them.

Our international engagement is perhaps most apparent in the Caribbean. For many years the Coast Guard has had liaison officers, defense attachés, and training teams that cooperate with nations in the Caribbean. Our role in counternarcotics and illegal migrant operations has proven very effective over the past decade. I think there are two reasons for that. First, cooperation with other nations, including many bilateral agreements, has proven critical to success. Second, as I’ve discussed with a few of you since this conference began, was the advent, improvement, and growth of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, which serves to optimize the capabilities of a broad range of U.S. federal agencies as well as collaboration with other countries.

JIATF South is an interesting hybrid organization, and maybe that’s why it’s been so successful. It’s a Department of Defense command, it works under the auspices of U.S. Southern Command, and it is headed by a Coast Guard admiral, Rear Admiral Jeffrey J. Hathaway. That level of cooperation has allowed us, the U.S. Coast Guard, to take credit for record cocaine seizures each of the last three years; just within this past week, we topped last year’s total, which was a record in and of itself, by 10 percent. Last year’s total was two hundred and seventy thousand pounds, and so far this year we’re at over three hundred thousand pounds—or one hundred fifty tons—of cocaine seized.

However, our international efforts are not limited to the Caribbean. We now have Coast Guard officers assigned literally all over the world, including locations as far away as Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Colombia, Ecuador, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Yemen, to name a few. In addition to training, technical assistance, and bilateral and multilateral agreements, we also deploy, and have deployed in the recent past, major Coast Guard cutters to the Baltic, the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, Africa, and elsewhere around the globe in response to combatant commanders’ requests for support.

Our training and technical assistance programs in the Caspian Sea region and the Gulf of Aden are of particular note. In the Caspian and Black seas we partnered with the State Department and the Defense Department to help Georgia organize and train a coast guard. We think that Georgia now represents a model of how to develop a new, effective coast guard. This was accomplished through the three-year development of a U.S. Coast Guard training team and the provision of small boats, cutters, and other equipment.
We've provided similar assistance to the Azerbaijan Maritime Brigade, and we have a full-time Coast Guard officer stationed in Baku serving as a maritime advisor to a number of countries in the region. In Yemen, our Coast Guard maritime advisor just completed a three-year assignment. In fact, I pinned a Legion of Merit on him on Monday for doing such a terrific job. During his tour he worked with the ambassador, the combatant commander staff, and other nations to provide Yemen the funds, skills, and equipment needed to organize a Yemen Coast Guard. The Yemen Coast Guard grew from a staff of four in 2002 to a current operational service of over twelve hundred people.

We have concrete examples of successful international operations, as well. If you think back, part of the reason that we wanted to help develop other coast guards and navies and improve competencies and capabilities is so we can work together to accomplish more missions that are important to each of us in other countries. Let me give you some examples.

The U.S. Coast Guard and the Russian Border Guard frequently coordinate search-and-rescue responses and share fisheries law enforcement responsibilities in the Bering Sea. In 2004, a longstanding bilateral agreement with Mexico facilitated the first exercise of an international response to an oil spill of international significance. This included cross-border responses of equipment by both nations. In bilateral agreements with the Caribbean and South American nations, these countries are full partners in counterdrug efforts, as I mentioned, that have dramatically increased cocaine seizures. Finally, international cooperation has improved the world’s ability to enforce the United Nations moratorium on high-seas drift-net fishing. A good example:

In 2003, a Canadian aircraft observed several high-seas drift-net vessels in the Northwest Pacific. Later, a U.S. Coast Guard cutter and a People’s Republic of China law enforcement vessel interdicted and seized five foreign-flagged vessels engaged in illegal high-seas drift-net fishing. Since this multilateral approach has proven effective in apprehending high-seas drift-net vessels over two thousand miles from Hawaii, and essentially in a location that’s just about equidistant from Adak, Alaska, and Midway Island, it serves as a relevant model, we think, for high seas management of a broad spectrum of maritime threats.

The success I just talked about was the direct result of the collaborative efforts of Canada, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, which joined forces to form the North Pacific Heads of Coast Guards. Together we have developed a voluntary guideline for cooperative operations, and we’ve developed a manual to facilitate information sharing and conduct combined operations. This forum, as I think I mentioned earlier, will meet in Japan next week to work toward implementing work that’s been going on since the last meeting through a number of workgroups, on a variety of topics ranging from stopping illegal migration and improving the sharing of information to maritime domain awareness among our countries.

To further support these efforts, Coast Guard Pacific Area just this past summer initiated a combined fleet exercise under the aegis of High-Seas Driftnet Management. This summer, the Coast Guard cutter Jarvis completed an eighty-day deployment to Japan and South Korea, sailing through the high-seas driftnet area. Jarvis conducted bilateral exercises with host nations Japan and South Korea, while
Canadian Coast Guard maritime patrol aircraft and two law enforcement vessels from the People’s Republic of China conducted combined detection and interdiction operations.

We also conduct ship deployments to support theater commanders in promoting their security missions. Just this past summer, the Coast Guard cutter Bear completed a three-month deployment to North and West Africa to support the European Command’s Theater Security Cooperation Strategy. Bear visited nine countries, and for many of them this was the first Coast Guard cutter visit ever.

To conclude, let me return for a moment to the recent fury of Hurricane Katrina, which is still very much in our minds—even as Hurricane Rita is bearing down on the Texas coast. The potential destructiveness of Katrina, as well as Rita, was predicted well in advance of the storm. We knew about when it was coming and about where it was going to come ashore.

We have had adequate warnings of another approaching storm, but it’s not a threat of nature. This one is man-made. And let me suggest that we’ve yet to feel the full strength of this gathering storm that threatens us. In fact, it’s already struck in many nations around the world. We don’t know where it will strike next, but we must continue to prepare, and we must remain vigilant and ready.

We also know that we cannot be ready unless we have developed and continuously nurture robust partnerships with each other. Failure in this effort is not an option, because we all know that the impact of successful attacks—in terms of both human life and our vital economic systems—will be severe. Admiral Mullen had it right on the first day of the Symposium when he said, “No nation can do it alone.”

**DISCUSSION**

Thank you for your attention, and I think we have some time for questions and answers, if there are any. I see no hands. I think I may be the—oops—I was going to contribute to a longer break, but—

**Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang, Denmark:**

I’ll try to be a little more polite than yesterday. Could you please elaborate a little bit on the balance between having free access to the sea and the high seas—the freedom of the high seas as one of the leading stars, at the same time as you want to inflict jurisdiction on the high seas? How do you actually cope with that?

**Vice Admiral Cross:**

Well, that is a hard question, isn’t it? As I mentioned, I think they are combined; I think our goals, especially of awareness and prevention, are linked. And the solution has to be an international solution. Our first effort was the ISPS [International Ship and Port Facility Security] Code. It’s not complete, and it’s not a full effort, but it allowed nations that have agreed to set a standard for security in ports around the world. So we can all feel a little bit better about the security of the ports—not only the ports, but the ships that visit those ports.

Secondly, for the ISPS Code, the requirements are similar both for ports and for ships. Maybe some detail would be useful here. It requires ports and ships to have a security plan. It requires those plans to be exercised. It requires that both ports and
ships have designated security officers, and it opens ports and ships to inspections by other countries. So I think that for a first step it allows us to feel a little more secure about ships coming from other ports, in that the ports are secure but also the ships are more secure.

Also, an important element of that first effort was the requirement for ships over three hundred gross tons to carry AIS [Automatic Identification Systems] transponders. So that will give us the ability to obtain automatically information from at least large ships approaching our shores.

We have a follow-on effort. We’re working very diligently in the IMO now to increase the range of that AIS capability—something we call long-range tracking. I think that the initial AIS effort was an important one; but in order to prepare or interdict a suspect ship far enough from our shores, I think we all should recognize that we need to have advance notice. We need to be able to track those ships. And that’s also useful in terms of sorting. At the end of the day, if the information we have—perhaps intelligence information on a ship—is limited, then we have a great deal of sorting to do in terms of the traffic that’s inbound to the country. Having this advance information will ease that sorting problem. It won’t solve the sorting problem unless you have specific ship identification, but it makes the problem easier.

And that’s where we are at this point, working just within the Coast Guard and generating ideas about where we may want to go in the future. I think we see the requirement for perhaps transponders on smaller vessels. The U.S.S. Cole was not damaged by a vessel greater than three hundred gross tons; it was a pretty small vessel. And we’ve seen similar attacks elsewhere in the world. So I think we’ve taken a first good step, but ultimately we need better information about maritime domain awareness: Who’s in our waters? What are they doing? Why are they there? Who’s on board? And what’s on board? I think we’re going to have to refine that over time, and the more complete our information, the fewer restrictions that we have to put on vessels coming and going to our ports.

A good person to talk to about that—and I talked to him this morning—may be the representative here who’s farthest along in implementing that kind of a solution, Admiral Ronnie Tay from Singapore. Singapore is one of the busiest ports in the world—a thousand ship movements a day—and they’re working toward developing port rules that will require virtually everything that moves in the port to have a transponder. Ultimately, we think that’s the solution.

And of course the other key to this—probably my answer is too long here, but I think it’s important—is the maritime domain awareness piece. We heard yesterday about a number of regional efforts to share information on maritime domain awareness. That’s terrific, but until we get all those efforts connected into a global system, we’re not going to be as efficient or as effective as we need to be. Yes, sir?

Brigadier General Saleh Mujally, Yemen:

I am the Vice Chairman of the Yemen Coast Guard. Thank you very much, Admiral Cross, and we would like also to thank the United States Coast Guard for all the help that you have provided to the Yemen Coast Guard.

There is a comment I’d like to make here. My friends here from Italy and from France said yesterday that there are complex problems in the Gulf of Aden south of the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. And that is true. Even more than that, we have all
kinds of problems: illegal immigrants and hashish highway, we call it, drugs and every-
thing, and all kinds of problems. From our viewpoint, really we have to build up ca-
cpacity and mutual and regional cooperation in that area.

Going back to what Admiral Mullen says, no nation can do it alone, and that’s true. Yemen has a lot of difficulties—economic difficulties, social difficulties, and so many things. We cannot do it alone. We need help from all the nations from the re-

ion. I think we’ve also got to have something that we have to come up with—the
ations around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea—to try to con-
trol all illegal actions in that area. We are calling from this Symposium for more
and more and more cooperation. Thank you very much.

Rear Admiral Can Erenoglu, Turkey:

I am Commandant of the Turkish Coast Guard. Admiral, thanks for your presenta-
tion. If I’m not mistaken, the U.S. Coast Guard’s priorities are readiness, people,
and stewardship—and to improve the Coast Guard’s performance, especially for
the saving of lives. You said one of the first priorities is to save lives. What kind of ca-
pabilities do you have to save lives, and what kind of technological improvements
are you planning for the U.S. Coast Guard? Thank you.

Vice Admiral Cross:

People, readiness, and stewardship are the direction of Admiral Collins, of his ad-
ministration. Those are his priorities. Our mission priorities have shifted a bit over
the course of the last few years, and we share two number one priorities. One is search
and rescue and saving of lives, and the second is maritime homeland security.

In terms of new technologies, we’re working very hard to upgrade our aging air-
craft and cutter fleets in a project called Deep Water—and if I had to identify just
one project in particular, that would be it. Of course, that’s a very encompassing
project. It’s a twenty-plus-year project designed to replace both our aircraft and
cutter fleets, and, most importantly, our command and control infrastructure
aboard our aircraft and our cutter fleets. And that’s probably doubly important
now, not just for search and rescue but for maritime homeland security.

We’re working very closely, for example, with the Navy to ensure that our equip-
ment is even better connected than it has been in the past in terms of our ability to
communicate, and also to make our equipment more interoperable. That’s why, as
we sat down to develop Deep Water requirements for our cutters and aircraft, we sat
down jointly with members of Admiral Mullen’s staff to develop those require-
ments. So if I had one thing to talk about, that would be it.

And just so you understand, I think occasionally people perceive us as having
relatively new equipment, but when I was the Coast Guard Commander in Alaska, I
had two Coast Guard cutters, each of which was over sixty years old. So we have
some pretty serious upgrading to do in terms of the age and capabilities of our
fleets, especially our cutter fleet.

Thank you very much. I think we can take a break now.
Panel Discussion Three
Required Maritime Security Capabilities

Moderated by Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany

Panel Members:
Admiral Rodolfo Codina Diaz, Chile
Vice Admiral Russell Shalders, Australia
Vice Admiral Jan Willem Kelder, The Netherlands

Associate Dean Vincent Mocini, Naval War College:

Moving from yesterday’s discussions of collaborative efforts and prepared by Admiral Cross’s excellent remarks this morning, we move on to a discussion of required capabilities, how to develop them and how to share them. We’re honored to have leading the panel this morning the Chief of Staff, German Navy, Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt.

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt:

Admiral Mullen; ladies and gentlemen. I think I missed yesterday’s panels, and everybody told me that I missed something very important, so I will try very much to catch up.

I want to start this panel discussion—and we all four welcome you to this presentation and discussion—with a quotation. It’s a quotation from an article in Navies and the New World Order, and it goes as follows: “As the Merchant of Venice remarked, ‘Thou knowest that all my fortunes are at sea.’ Shakespeare might not have been a maritime strategist, but the words he gave Shylock are as true now as they were then, perhaps more so given mankind’s growing reliance on the resources of the sea and the dependence of international trade on the capacity to move people and goods across its face.”

The aim of this panel is to identify the capabilities required by maritime forces to ensure a safe and secure maritime domain. In detail, we should focus on the navies’ capabilities to address common maritime security issues from material, equipment, organizational, personnel, policy, and training perspectives. Last but not least, the panel should identify opportunities on how maritime forces can contribute, either regionally or globally, to improve maritime security.

Before I give the word to the first speaker, allow me to present to you, very briefly, my initial thoughts on this subject. They’re based on the German Navy’s involvement in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and, thus, partly pick up on what was said yesterday afternoon by the French Chief of Naval Staff.

Since 9/11 the German Armed Forces, together with our partners, have contributed to the effort on the Global War on Terror. The German Navy’s main effort has been the support of maritime operations and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Additionally, we continuously supported NATO and provided units to the Article 5
Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE) in the Mediterranean. The conclusions we draw after four years of involvement is that current maritime operations are at all times limited by the maritime assets available on scene. Besides that, the international law of the high seas and the global nature of maritime trade have to be taken into consideration. They’re both niches that are being exploited by international terrorism and organized crime. A number of worldwide initiatives are in place which may have a positive influence on maritime security. However, their coordination needs to be improved to increase the benefit. The following main areas, I think, need improvement.

Close cooperation among governments, coast guards, port authorities, and the commercial sector is essential to increase maritime security. Navies can provide a substantial contribution to this cooperation, but they also need to gently remind the other agencies involved that their effort and cooperation are needed as well—and “gently remind” is perhaps different from nation to nation. Together with other agencies, we need to find ways to reduce illegal activities in the littoral waters, especially in the open waters. We experience difficulties due to insufficient law enforcement capacity and the lack of bilateral agreements between affected nations.

From my perspective, we need an efficient system to improve the conduct of surveillance and maritime interdiction operations in the littorals. A new generation of low-cost, long-endurance, but highly capable units for stabilization operations might prove a solution to meet today’s challenges.

Germany is designing a new frigate, and we are going for four new criteria as the main criteria for this design: two years of endurance far away from Germany; one hundred plus crew on a rotational basis; focus on joint operations with the Army; and network capabilities, not only with the military network but with the other agencies’ networks as well.

Lastly, maritime information sharing has to be improved. While technology can assist, the inability to exchange and disseminate the gathered information between organizations remains. We must identify pragmatic workable procedures for sharing. The common operational picture (COP)—I would rather like to call it the common interagency operational picture—remains essential to improving global maritime security at sea.

I understand that the panel members will limit their presentations to about fifteen to twenty minutes each. Then, we will then embark on a question-and-answer session for the entire block. During that session I ask you to identify the panel member to whom your remarks are addressed. Please limit your response or any remarks and comments to one minute and a half before I turn it over to the other panel members wishing to respond as well.

Thank you very much, and now I want to ask Admiral Rodolfo Codina Diaz, Commander in Chief of the Navy, Republic of Chile, to take the floor. His presentation topic is “EEZ, Environmental Protection, and Search-and-Rescue Challenges.” Admiral, the floor is yours.

Admiral Rodolfo Codina Diaz, Chile:

Good morning, distinguished admirals and delegates. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss this matter with you.
Not long ago, in October 2003, our organization was presented to this important forum, explaining the way in which we face issues regarding maritime safety and security within our country for the benefit of the security of international trade in the region. [See Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium: Report of the Proceedings (2003), Presentation of Admiral Vergara, pp. 69-74.] This was just several months before the entrance into force of the amendments to the SOLAS [Safety of Life at Sea] Convention and ISPS [International Ship and Port Facility Security] Code. Now, I will refer to the challenges that we meet as a maritime nation to provide safety and security to people, ships, and the environment within the Exclusive Economic Zone and beyond, pursuant to the international agreements signed by our country.

My presentation will cover the following topics. Interaction: As presented in October 2003, the Chilean Navy is the final expression of the [Chilean] State at sea. DIRECTEMAR [Dirección General del Territorio Marítimo y de Marina Mercante], as established by the Navigation Act, is the national maritime authority that relates to all maritime activities at the national and international level.

The organizational chart of the Chilean Navy shows the Naval Operations Command, the Directorate General of Personnel of the Navy, the Directorate General of Services, the Directorate General of Finance, and the Directorate General of the Maritime Territory, and four naval zones.

The naval power task and its respective mission areas have three strategic vectors that are in some way related to the control of the sea in order to minimize all possible threats. The first one is the defense vector, where operations are jointly carried out with the Chilean Armed Forces; it is used mainly to safeguard our sovereignty.
and territorial authority. The second is the international vector—areas in which operations are carried out in combination with other allied countries, usually under the guidance of the United Nations, and act in support of national foreign policy.

The third vector is the maritime one, in which cooperation with all other national institutions is developed—for example, with the police, national customs service, health service, livestock and culture service, ship owners, and port management, among others. This vector relates to safety of life at sea and the protection and development of the maritime interest; criminal acts and terrorists are included in this.

To fulfill the strategy in the maritime vector, the institution relies on the Directorate General of the Maritime Territory and the Merchant Marine [DIRECTEMAR], whose mission is to “watch over compliance with international standards and agreements presently in force in order to protect life at sea, the marine environment, and national resources and to control activities carried out within its jurisdiction, thus contributing to the maritime development of our nation.”

This is performed through the commandants of the naval zones, maritime port authorities, and captain of the port officers. For this purpose, an operational concept has been included to implement the strategies mentioned before. The following is the scope of action where the maritime authority tasks are centered:

- Maritime command and control
- Maritime safety
- Maritime police
- Safety of life at sea
- Preservation of the marine environment and pollution combat service
- Maritime public service
- Maritime representation
- Development of maritime interests.

To accomplish this mission on the scope of action before mentioned, we have defined this integration of a strategic perspective in a new concept known as surveillance, control, and awareness of the national maritime area of responsibility—maritime domain awareness (MDA). This strategic concept has been defined as the timely and effective awareness of all the activities coming within the maritime area of responsibility that may affect national security and the development of maritime interests, in order to alert, prevent, protect, and give prompt response to the demands of the national interests. This integrated concept is aimed at being the joining element for the scopes of action of the Maritime Authority, thus introducing a high-level systematic framework that permits the subordinate commands to understand and direct their task at the various levels and scenarios.

Referring to the concepts that I have just mentioned in the introduction, I will now describe our maritime search-and-rescue service.

Chile’s maritime area of national responsibility regarding search and rescue covers all waters in the national maritime jurisdiction and those of the Pacific Ocean between latitude 18°21’ South and the Antarctic territory to longitude 171° West. The National SAR Organization breaks the search-and-rescue area of responsibility into five Maritime Search-and-Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCCs). These
centers are fitted with state-of-the-art maritime communication systems and assets in order to coordinate and carry out search-and-rescue operations. The area of responsibility also includes the area from the Drake Passage to Antarctica, where weather conditions are generally threatening.

The mission of the Maritime SAR [Search-and-Rescue] Service is similar to those services originally carried out by other nations in accordance with the SOLAS Convention. The Chilean Navy is equipped with the most appropriate assets to accomplish the mission within the SAR area. In order to operate in coastal and inland waters, specially assigned fast-response assets are used to cover these areas. When higher displacement vessels are required to be used in the Exclusive Economic Zone or on the high seas, these are assigned by the Naval Operations Command. Therefore, the further we move from the coast, the greater the need for more powerful units that do not come under the maritime administration but are part of the Navy’s force structure.

The following case is an example that shows how we proceed when carrying out search-and-rescue operations. On 3 August [2005], a heavy storm struck the south area of the country, with northwest winds of more than eighty knots and waves of twelve meters high (forty-five feet). A Chilean flagged RO/RO vessel, Porvenir I, was seriously affected by the weather conditions and, after having her cargo shift on deck, listed to starboard at a forty-five-degree angle, which resulted in the flooding of the engine room and losing electrical power and propulsion.

Once the distress signal was transmitted, the Search-and-Rescue Service deployed naval maritime units in aid of the crew—fifteen people. The deployed units were three merchant ships, one high-seas fishing vessel, and two heavy helicopters of the Navy. The combined effort of this unit made it possible to rescue ten people before the ship ran aground. Unfortunately, the captain, the chief engineering officer, and the second mate lost their lives in this incident.

The Preservation of the Marine Environment and Pollution Combat Service analyzes environmental, scientific, and technical matters and implements environmental assessment management in Chilean waters. Its mission consists of protecting the quality of the marine environment, enforcing compliance of the national and international regulations at sea and in ports, bay regions, and lakes of the Republic to reduce the risk of pollution through the preservation, inspection, and control of physical and biological parameters of the sea, rivers, and lakes. Its activities are implemented in two complementary areas.

The first area is environmental preservation, the objective of which is to establish measures to provide accurate data for correct decision making by maritime authorities in events where damage may occur to the marine environment. This is carried out through environmental studies or analysis of the main pollutants and environmental parameters, and control and monitoring of the sources that have been allowed to discharge or dump.

The second activity consists of responding to incidents involving spills that are a potential risk to the marine environment. This is called pollution combat. These tasks are carried out through means used to maintain and reduce possible pollution caused by noxious substances, mainly hydrocarbons leaking from ships or barges and terminals.
One of the projects in progress consists of the construction of twenty-nine coastal boats for the local maritime authorities, replacing old types of boats. A new project under execution is the acquisition of four Defender-class response boats in order to increase the assets already available to carry out SAR and maritime security operations.

Another project in progress consists of incorporating two new units into the naval service, known as offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), in order to increase surveillance and control, maritime search and rescue, aquatic pollution control, and combat support, the maintenance of maritime security, and logistics support in isolated areas.

The vessel design, by the Fassmar Company, was chosen by the minister of defense among several other alternatives. Here we can see an image of the selected patrol boat.

It is planned that this unit will be constructed by the Chilean shipyard ASMAR and be operative in the years 2008 and 2009.

In respect of effective units, the acquisition of medium-size helicopters is being studied in order to comply with requirements for tasks related to safety or life at sea, control, maritime police, and interdiction operations.

Another project related to the subject of this presentation is a Sensor Integrated System (SIS), which contributes to the fulfillment of international agreements reached by Chile to protect life at sea, increasing the safety and security of navigation and the capabilities of the maritime traffic control system within the sovereignty of the main national ports and oceanic accesses. In this particular case,
the automatic identification system, Automated Identification System (AIS), is used together with the Sensor Integrated System (SIS), which is a simulation of the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS).

This technical solution, created for our national needs, consists of a Sensor Integrated System including navigation radar, surveillance cameras, meteorological sensors, and the already-mentioned AIS, and is capable of incorporating alarms and displays of information both on the screen of an operator and in the maritime graphic information systems GRAFIMAR and GRAFIPUERTO. Also included in the budget is [the cost to provide for] the input of information coming from the long-range identification and tracking system to the SIS project, which may be added to the SOLAS Convention as a complement to the AIS.

Remarks: The SAR Chile area of responsibility in the Pacific Ocean constitutes a permanent concern and challenge to the Navy. The Chilean Navy relies on planning, infrastructure, and operative units to respond timely and promptly in the event of a maritime SAR emergency or incident. In view of the above, we believe it is important to find opportunities that will allow us to exchange experience, procedures, and technology with allied navies in order to efficiently contribute to the safeguard of life at sea.

Well, that would be all. Thank you very much for your kind attention.
Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany:

Thank you very much, Admiral. I now ask Vice Admiral Russ Shalders, Royal Australian Navy, Chief of the Navy, to take the floor. His presentation topic is interoperability and information-sharing challenges. Admiral.

Vice Admiral Russell Shalders, Australia:

Fellow Chiefs of Navy and Coast Guard Commandants, fellow naval officers, delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it’s an honor for me to be part of this final panel. It’s a particular honor to be back at this wonderful institution, the War College, which I left in 1981 as a graduate of the Naval Staff College.

I think the outstanding contributions that have been made by the Naval War College over many years are probably best exemplified by the fact that thirty-six of my fellow CNOs represented at this Seminar are graduates of the Naval War College. That’s an amazing statistic, Admiral Shuford, and I think the War College is certainly doing its bit to generate the global network of nations. I think you and your staff deserve our highest accolades; thank you.

Maritime cooperation, of course, has many facets. Unlike armies and air forces, navies have a long tradition of operating together, operating with each other smoothly, and fitting comfortably and easily into a multinational command chain. Those who drive ships are comfortable with quickly forming themselves into a task group and getting on with the mission at hand. Sailors generally speak a common language, and we have an easy familiarity with one another which makes it easy for us to get on with the job; I think the other services probably envy that easy familiarity that we do have. Each navy has particular navies with whom they’re used to operating.

Since the end of the Cold War, and more particularly since 9/11, we have seen more nontraditional coalition task groups being formed. The focus has gradually shifted, and continues to shift, from big-ship, high-end, war-fighting type missions on the blue seas, to a much more diverse set of operating parameters in very different environments to those which we all grew up in. This shift of focus that I’m referring to was cogently articulated yesterday in Admiral Mullen’s opening remarks.

From our perspective in Australia, this new environment has resulted in new mission sets. It has been evident, for example, in our participation in the maritime interception forces in the northern Arabian Gulf, in the cooperation between the Australian and South African navies in the demanding Southern Ocean fisheries protection mission, and, most pointedly and most recently, in this year’s operations to assist those devastated by the Asian tsunami which caused so much destruction at the end of last year. I think the cooperation that was evident in those tsunami relief activities is a perfect example of how sea power can be used to foster security and help build lasting relationships.

This morning I want to use two recent coalition operations that were led by Australia, as well as some of the regional engagement activities undertaken by Australia, to highlight aspects of cooperation and interoperability. My case studies hopefully will highlight some lessons that we can all apply.

First, let me talk about the 1999 INTERFED operation, which took place in East Timor. INTERFED was a multinational force put together to conduct an operation that was sanctioned by the United Nations. INTERFED contained forces from
twenty-two different countries, reaching a peak of approximately eleven and a half thousand personnel, over half of which were Australian. INTERFED’s mandated tasks were to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support the United Nations in carrying out its tasks, and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.

One of the key features of this INTERFED operation, as with any coalition operation, was relationship-building. INTERFED’s strong emphasis on communication across the coalition created a positive environment that enhanced the relationships and understanding among all nationalities and organizations, both civil and military.

INTERFED has predominantly been seen as a land operation, but there was a significant maritime coalition involved in that activity. At its peak, the INTERFED naval component included over twenty warships and five thousand people—briefly outnumbering even the land forces that were engaged in that activity. As well as ensuring a secure environment for the insertion points, the naval component provided continuing protection, surveillance, and logistic sustainment for follow-on forces. More than 90 percent of the cargo that entered the theater moved by sea, while all personnel and equipment movement within the theater ultimately depended on either amphibious vessels or the ground and aviation fuel that was provided by naval tankers.

My second case study relates to the Solomon Islands, which is an archipelagic nation state situated in the southwest Pacific. In July 2003, the Australian government authorized Australia’s participation in what became known as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). RAMSI represented a new and unique model of regional support. In this case there was no involvement of the United Nations Security Council.

The Solomon Islands at that time was a failed state in the Pacific. The aim of the Australian government was to stop the continued decay of a neighboring nation without appearing neocolonialist. To achieve this aim, there were a series of preconditions which needed to be satisfied before the intervention force was approved. These preconditions included, firstly, a formal request for assistance from the government of the Solomon Islands. Another precondition was that the Solomon Islands government was required to pass an international assistance act by their parliament. It was essential, of course, that the operation was at the request of the sovereign Solomon Islands government and that the government was also able to pass appropriate legislation to sanction the mission and to protect the legal rights of those assisting forces.

The response required a multilateral agreement and a multinational contribution. In fact, there were eight nations that contributed to that force, five of whom provided military forces. It was important that the response was not seen to be driven by any one nation, but rather a multinational Pacific effort to help a neighbor in need.

The operation was very much interagency and whole-of-government. It included a full complement of diplomatic economic police and military assets deployed in a whole-of-government or interagency approach, in a very coordinated way. It was a team effort in every sense of the word.

All levels of civil order and administration in the Solomon Islands required assistance. The military mission was to create a secure environment in which all of those
other agencies could work. In particular, our mission was to allow the participating police force to restore law and order. The military was very much a supporting agency rather than a supported agency—somewhat of a role reversal from their normal mode of operating.

I raise those two case studies, or those two examples, because I think both of them demonstrate some valuable lessons to be applied to coalition building, which in turn will assist us with achieving interoperability across the global network. First, in the case of both of those operations, the selection of the coalition leader from the immediate region of the crisis is important. In both cases that I’ve spoken about, Australia was an appropriate choice, as we could provide an immediate response. A large proportion of the overall forces required a functioning headquarters capable of conducting the operational-level planning and providing coalition leadership. As the coalition leader in both of those cases, Australia had to bear the responsibility for coalition management, with other countries wanting to contribute but sometimes unwilling or unable to bear the full cost of such a contribution or to wait until reimbursement could be finalized through the United Nations. So the selection of a coalition leader from the immediate region, I think, is a valid lesson out of both of those case studies.

Second, at the strategic level, building a coalition is a whole-of-government activity. It cannot be led by any one agency and certainly should not be led by the military. In both cases that I’ve spoken about, many countries had already decided on the nature and extent of their contributions, but senior government and defense leaders helped to reassure those nations of the viability of the proposed force, and we assisted them in refining the operational inputs. So building the coalition is very much a whole-of-government activity.

The third lesson I’d like to draw out from these two case studies is that it was abundantly clear that coalition management is required at all levels of command. At the strategic level in both operations, the military leaders of the coalition nations rightly expected direct access to the chief of the defense force, and through the chief of the defense force to the commander on the ground. On the ground and at the operational and tactical levels, all contingent commanders were actively engaged and updated through regular briefings by the coalition commander. We found that robust and forthright communication is essential to effective coalition management.

Fourth, the value of common or similar doctrine across the coalition cannot be overstated. If we have common or similar doctrine, it permits preparation and training times to be reduced and very simple command and control arrangements to be put in place. Self-evident, but another important lesson to be learned here, is that the effective use of liaison officers is always critical to the success of any coalition operation, and it eases the difficulties which are often experienced in integrating units from different nations into one coalition force. The regular exchange of personnel pays significant dividends when it comes to the day of reckoning. Also self-evident, but very important, the interoperability of weapon systems and ammunition, the compatibility of communications equipment, and the perennial problems of access to information systems and classified material are all issues; but they’re not showstoppers. Those things will always be an issue, but they can be managed. Careful coordination can overcome what is sometimes seen as an insurmountable issue.
Not by way of a lesson but a short word on C4I before I move on. For most nations—in fact, almost all nations—the difficulty of keeping up with the Joneses is a perennial and expensive program. We all try hard to remain compatible with the U.S., but it is becoming increasingly complex. Communication, as I've said a couple of times already, is the key to a successful coalition, and we neglect this issue at our peril. The transfer to lower-level coalition operations is smoother if sufficient groundwork has been done in the years beforehand to establish trust and develop relationships between the nations involved. To demonstrate what I’m talking about here, let me briefly discuss two of Australia’s regional assistance activities.

The first and best example is the Five Power Defense Arrangement, or FPDA, which is an arrangement between Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia. The FPDA has been in place since 1971, when it was established to provide for the collective defense of Malaysia and Singapore from external attack. It is a vibrant and dynamic arrangement which works extremely well. Since 1971, the prospect or likelihood of invasion by a foreign power has of course receded, and the focus of FPDA has changed. The nations involved now focus on developing technical knowledge and expertise. We focus on bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, on improving information exchange between the member states, and on maintaining and developing interoperability.

Just over a year ago, the defense ministers of the FPDA nations met and decided that the remit of the security arrangements should be expanded beyond traditional military threats to include new global asymmetric threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Recent Five Power Defense Arrangement exercises have increasingly addressed these nonconventional threats, both at the operational planning level and at the tactical level. This is, of course, particularly relevant, noting the current maritime security threats which face nations in this area, and particularly in the Malacca Strait area. Just last week I was privileged to visit my fellow chiefs in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and I was gratified to see how far we’ve advanced in taking forward a common view in these types of operations.

The second example of networking navies in the common good that I would like to share with you is what we call the Pacific Patrol Boat Project. It impacts twelve countries in the southwest Pacific; they are small countries, but it is a very successful program. Following the declaration of the two-hundred-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) brought about by the 1982 UN Convention, and at the request of the Pacific island states, Australia and New Zealand sent defense representatives out into the southwest Pacific Region to assist the surveillance and monitoring requirements that would be needed if those nations were to enforce their EEZs. The expanded zone introduced regulatory surveillance and patrol requirements far beyond the capacity of those regional nations at that time. The governments of those nations expressed concerns about the need for suitable maritime patrols, and the Australian government responded by instituting a defense cooperation project which aimed to provide suitable patrol vessels and associated training and infrastructure to the nations in that region.

The project resulted in the construction and the ongoing refitting of twenty-two Pacific patrol boats, which have been delivered to twelve nations in the southwestern Pacific. In addition to providing those patrol boats, we conduct the training for the crews, giving them the schools to conduct surveillance operations with
minimum external input. In each of the Pacific island nations we maintain a maritime surveillance advisor and a technical support team.

I think without a doubt Australia’s continued support of the Pacific patrol boat program has contributed to closer relations with our neighboring countries. Selfishly, the introduction of those self-reliant patrol forces throughout the region has also eased the strain on our own maritime patrol force. Finally, as every naval officer knows well, every deployment that we undertake is an operational deployment, and in the case of my Navy almost every deployment has the primary aim of maintaining and enhancing regional engagement.

Australian major service combatants, amphibious and logistic units, submarines, patrol boats, and hydrographic vessels have kept up a series of rolling deployments in Asia and the South Pacific throughout my naval career. In addition to preserving an almost-continuous high-profile presence and providing a very real and practical demonstration of Australia’s interest in the region, this work is indicative of the wider dimensions of Australian security. As in all of your nations, our warships play a very major role in shaping our strategic environment. Through the development of the relationships and the trust built during those deployments, I think our interoperability is greatly improved—to the point that when it becomes necessary to build coalitions, we’re able to smoothly transition into an effective coalition.

Can I share with you a quote of one of my predecessors, the late Admiral Mark L. Hudson? At the Seventh International Seapower Symposium in 1983, Admiral Hudson summed up the point I’m trying to make very concisely when he wrote—and I quote—“The skills our sailors take with them are highly regarded. And the Navy has been able to provide a great deal of assistance throughout the region. This is a source of pride and fosters goodwill which could never be achieved through any amount of diplomacy or [dollars].” I submit to this audience that it is this relationship-building that is the keystone to achieving interoperability. Without this trust to build on, we would struggle to achieve our desire to fix when our collective capabilities are most needed.

Thank you again, Admiral Mullen, for the opportunity to present to this very distinguished audience. I hope the experiences of the Royal Australian Navy have been helpful in putting some of these issues into context, and I look forward to the discussions which will follow. Thank you.

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany:

Thank you very much, Admiral Shalders. I now ask Vice Admiral Jan-Willem Kelder, Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy, to take the floor. His presentation topic is global maritime security challenges.

Vice Admiral Jan-William Kelder:

Admiral Mullen, Admirals, Generals, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor, and a pleasure as well, to give this presentation as the brand-new Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy.

In May 2005 I was appointed as Admiral, Netherlands Fleet, and just two weeks ago I took over as Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy; and on that day I realized more than ever that it was a special occasion—of course for myself, but even more for the Netherlands Navy. That day marked the end of an era of
commanders in chief and the inauguration of operational commanders of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, directly under the Chief of Defense Staff, who is now called the Chief of the Armed Forces.

That day also meant the conclusion of the largest reforms ever in the Netherlands Armed Forces. It was not only a matter of defense cuts. The available means had to be retailed for future tasks at hand, as well. Reforms that were aimed at increasing the focus on land operations and on modular expeditionary forces also meant rethinking the complete organization, which, for example, meant the loss of a complete command level—the command level of the commanders in chief. While reshaping this organization, difficult choices had to be made, such as losing operational capabilities like maritime patrol aircraft and selling off modern frigates. But on the other hand, new capabilities meeting the new requirements are in the process of entering service or are being procured. Enough about the reorganization in my Navy.

I would like to take a look at the global maritime security challenges that we encounter these days. Therefore, the following subjects are going to be mentioned. After a short introduction, I will touch on maritime security, followed by international development. I will discuss the challenges and how we are going to counter them further. I will go into the role maritime forces can play, and when I conclude I will give the means the Netherlands Navy can bring to this equation.

After 1990, the emphasis of the Netherlands operation was on crisis response operations. The maritime interdiction operation in the Adriatic and the Arabian Gulf and, later during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, leadership interdiction operations are some of the examples the Netherlands Navy was or is involved in. Supporting land operations mainly meant amphibious operations as part of the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, or naval gunfire support. Some major international developments, however, changed—or it may be better to say are still changing—naval thinking, in the world and, of course, in the Netherlands as well.

Maritime security is approached from a broad view, and its definition has, as you’re all aware, several dimensions. First of all, there is the physical dimension. Today, as said before, 80 percent of world trade and 50 percent of the world’s daily oil consumption are transported over sea. Defense approach lines flow through most of the sea straits and other maritime focal points, where they are vulnerable to attacks. Due to the western logistic principle of “just in time,” disruption of sea lines will result in a logistic nightmare.

I will immediately tie this to the economic dimension of maritime security. The Netherlands as a trading nation, with Rotterdam as her main port, requires the free use of the seas all over the world. The security of offshore installations in our Exclusive Economic Zone in the North Sea is also part of the economic dimension. The use and exploitation of the sea and the seabed also requires awareness of the local leaders of the aforementioned dimension. Fishery protection and pollution control are more and more important tasks of the maritime force to ensure enduring maritime security. Global warming and the potential rise of the sea level might lead to major floods. The lowlands may require major investments in the not-too-distant future.

Maritime security, of course, also has a legal dimension. Hugo de Groot [Hugo Grotius] in the sixteenth century wrote the classic Mare Liberum claiming the free use of the sea, a claim which not only the Dutch East India Company
particularly shared. And, of course, I need make no further elaboration that there is a military dimension.

I will continue to touch on some major international developments that at least focus the minds of our sailors and, even more so, influence the way we are expected to do our business. The big question is, where is the next conflict going to occur?

The map shows us that the area of operations is more unpredictable than ever. It needs no further explanation than that the majority of sea straits and maritime focal points are located inside these belts of insecurity. An increased number of coastal states are either incapable of securing, or unwilling to secure, these important choke points. There is an interest in the illegal flow of commodities, whether it be drugs, weapons, or immigrants. Most of these activities provide considerable support to criminal and terrorist movements. These illegal activities happen worldwide—not only in the Horn of Africa or the Caribbean, but also in European waters.

Ladies and gentlemen, I already touched on the economic ramifications of this distribution of a sea alliance, but equally important is the safety of our military logistic lines. To be able to sustain out-of-area operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, the majority of supplies are transferred overseas. The proliferation of modern weapon systems, piracy, and modern terrorism can pose a significant threat to our military logistics as well. Due to Western military supremacy, potential opponents are, however, unlikely to pursue a conventional approach to oppose the West. Potential enemies will pose an asymmetric threat and search for our weaknesses.
This map is, of course, familiar to you; it shows the trade routes, choke points, and areas of piracy.

Although the increase in piracy incidents seems to have halted, the total amount of piracy acts is still high.

The amount of violence in these acts has increased, as well as the firepower being used. The use of heavy machine guns nearly ruined the day of a Dutch tug combination in the Malacca Strait. In the end, only harsh maneuvering by the tugboat kept the pirates away, and yet its bridge house was hit by seventy rounds of armor-piercing AK47.

Maritime terrorism needs no further explanation than the following image. The attacks on the U.S.S. Cole in the Gulf of Aden and on the oil transfer vessel Limburg in the Red Sea do still spring into our minds.

In addition to the classic naval task, these international developments pose new challenges to our navies. The free use of the sea and the littorals and the narrowing of the use of the sea by nonstate actors are areas that in my mind—and I learned over here I’m not the only one—needs more attention. I will touch on that in a minute.

As part of the reforms, my Navy initially chose to meet future challenges by the full integration of the Navy and the Marine Corps. The balanced flexibility of the Navy and Marine Corps team, as an enabler for maritime operations and support of land operations, will increase the capability for joint/combined expeditionary operations across the whole spectrum of the use of violence. International developments also show a growing need for militaries to assist civil authorities. In the process of nation-building, we more and more see that Navy personnel and
Marines are working in close cooperation with civilian authorities and organizations. At present, the Netherlands provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan are formed with approximately 60 percent Navy fleet personnel and 40 percent Navy Marines.
Of course, a sailor is not a marine, nor the other way around. This increased focus on supporting the land operation requires new skills and drills for the sailor as well. The relative security of a ship at sea is gone. Every individual Navy man or
woman can be deployed everywhere at any time, either at sea or on land, and, apart from extra training, this requires a change in attitude as well.

I will now look more closely at the elements of a balanced flexibility Navy–Marine Corps team. First of all, the amphibious liftships will form the backbone of the Netherlands fleet and will, together with the fully integrated Marines, form a capable means to support land operations of any kind. The introduction of cruise missiles, though not yet formally approved by Parliament, and precision-guided ammunition on board the new air defense and command frigates will further enhance the capability for power projection ashore.

Whole elements of the Netherlands Navy need to fit into the joint/combined expeditionary scenarios today and in the future. Close cooperation with our international partners is a must. The force needs to be sustainable in the [Area of Responsibility] (AOR) and protected.

The Netherlands Navy will bring modules into joint/combined operations, so interoperability is a requirement. We need to be able to communicate with each other. For that we have to take up the challenge to follow the technological developments in the area of C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers (C4), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)].

Military aid to civil authorities is no longer limited to coast guard duties and home waters. It is evolving more and more to out-of-area operations. Piracy, illegal trade, and drug trafficking are to be addressed worldwide by us all. And, finally, special requirements are to be met to make our personnel ready for the new task.

Just recently we launched a new slogan for the Netherlands Navy command.
To deliver security from the sea, naval units are to be able to initialize, support, and influence land operations—in other words, to conduct power projection ashore. They need to be expeditionary, a joint/combined enabler of land operations. The maritime units are to be able to conduct sea control operations to ensure security above, at, and under water. And to ensure a sustainable force, forming a sea base is an absolute requirement.

To be able to deliver security, the Navy needs assets that can deploy in a modular way across the whole spectrum of the use of fires. The first in are the submarines, to gather intelligence and conduct special forces operations when required. They provide building blocks in the common operational picture. Next are the units providing protection for the force that will form the sea base and the initial combat support and power projection. The hydrographical units and MCM [Mine Countermeasure] vessels will prepare the AOR even further before the ship-to-objective maneuver actually starts.

I will now come back to the area that, in my view, needs more attention. Security at sea is a prerequisite, as already mentioned, to secure our economic interest. Military aid to civil authorities is on the increase as well. Nations need to act on illegal trade, piracy, and maritime terrorism. Also, in the areas of security sector reform and demobilization and reintegration, the navies can play a significant role. Training missions—as for the Iraqi coastal defense forces, but also for the clearing for hydrographical operations in harbors like Monrovia, Liberia—are examples of this new task at hand. Operations like Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean demonstrate NATO’s resolve and presence in the defense against terrorism. It would even be possible to extend these kinds of operations to other
areas in the world—for example, in the Horn of Africa or in cooperation with Malaysiа and Indonesia in the Malacca Strait.

I conclude this presentation with a quick overview of how the Netherlands Navy will support the relationship of security at sea and from the sea. For security from the sea, securing the maritime AOR, supporting land operations, and achieving escalation dominance with submarines and frigates like De Zeven Provincien Class with TACTOM [tactical Tomahawk missiles] will extend the range of guided ammunition and TBMD [theater ballistic missile defense] for protection against ballistic missiles. [This will involve a wide range of considerations, including:] initial entry, support of land operations, and command and control and NH-90 helicopters, amphibious support ships and larger marine battalions, sea basing, joint logistic support ship, amphibious ship, joint command support and combat surface support, intelligence gathering, securing the sea base and special forces, securing entrance MTMVs [main tactical mission vehicles] and mobile hydrographic sets and units. For securing the sea, securing the economic interest and support of civil operations will be done by offshore patrol vessels—a three-thousand-ton-sized ship with an NH-90 helicopter, two fast super RHIBs [rigid-hull inflatable boats], and a basic crew of fifty. However, this project has yet to be approved by the Dutch Parliament. For securing the littorals, out of the area or home waters and harbors, MCM vessels and two new hydrographic vessels are used for multiple tasks.

Ladies and gentlemen, I’m going to finish. I’ve tried to present you some of the maritime global security challenges we are all facing these days. I showed you that the Netherlands Navy is rethinking its capabilities required for security from and at sea—a goal no nation can reach these days independently. I see maritime security as a multinational goal. We need to join forces even more than before to counter such threats as piracy, terrorism, and the drug trade, and show our resolve to defend ourselves against these threats. Moving out of our traditional operating areas and deploying into areas where piracy and drug trafficking occur should be high on the agendas of our navies. The keys to success in these areas are commitment and cooperation. Thank you very much.

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany:

Thank you very much. I think the three presenters presented a broad spectrum of topics, starting with the responsibility of a huge area which is very difficult to handle—and in this case, the question is not only quality, but quantity as well. And then we went on to the importance of relationship building and the visibility of maritime operations, and, of course—what I found very impressive—the lessons learned; I’m very thankful that you pointed that out so clearly, about the different levels. So lessons learned have to do with different levels of responsibility; I think that is something which might be discussed in a little more detail. And the last, what challenges are very important to cope with from a global perspective; perhaps we can talk about that as well, if the audience likes to do that—not only the congruence between the different players, but how to bring together the military capability with the legal aspect and with the preparation of other agencies to work together with the military. I think that is one of the key questions for achieving security.

And finally—maybe it’s not a question for most of you, but it’s a question for the German Navy: We are in the process of trying to improve our interoperability to
cope and to communicate with the Army and the Air Force, and there’s a tendency
to lose our capability to communicate in an appropriate way with the other navies.
This is something which is a real concern for me. Maybe you have the same con-
cern. But it’s only an introduction.

Now the floor is open. Please ask your questions and identify the admiral who
has to give you the answer, if he is able to do.

DISCUSSION

Commodore Steve Cleary, Royal Navy:

I represent the Second Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia. Thank you very much indeed for
the presentations from each of you moments ago—very, very interesting.

If I may hone in to Admiral Codina and your mention of SIS and the ability to in-
terdict shipping within your region. It falls in line almost with Admiral Cross this
morning, with his AIS, a similar system of interdicting and tracking these ships.

How fantastic that would be on a global basis, if we were networked into an auto-
matic system that provided us with the ability to track all of these vessels. How much
easier that could and should make our detection of people illegally transporting
people, weapons, or drugs via the sea. If we ever were in a position to make it illegal
to go to sea without a transponder attached to your vessel, you could almost detect
by exception; i.e., in this massive database of vessels that are out there in all of these
choke points, those that didn’t have a transponder showing would immediately
flash up as an alert vessel.

If I had a concern, it would be this: Is the SIS system that you are developing
compatible with the AIS system that the U.S. Coast Guard and various other coun-
tries around the world are using? Otherwise, we could get ourselves into an
incompatible, difficult situation. I hope that’s clear.

Admiral Rodolfo Codina Diaz, Chile:

I will answer in Spanish [simultaneous translation follows]. Thank you very much
for your question. The Chilean system is a system that we have developed inde-
pendently, and we developed it a long time ago. We have been updating it, and it’s
unfortunately not compatible with the U.S. system. Now, in our environment in the
southern hemisphere, in APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation], which is the
trade union for the southern Asia Pacific region, we offer this system in the STAR
[Secure Trade in the APEC Region] Conference. I took part in two STAR confer-
ences, one of them in Bangkok and one in Viña del Mar, Chile, and we made this
offer to APEC countries interested in this type of system. Our plan was to deliver it
in exchange for information from that system. We haven’t arranged anything yet,
but that is our intent, particularly in our closed-in area with our neighboring coun-
dries and both with the countries to the north—Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia—as
well as with New Zealand and Australia and the rest of the Pacific.

So that is our purpose. I hope I have answered your question. I know the system
very well because for three years I was the director of COSAR; COSAR is a part of
the Navy in Chile. Thank you very much.
Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany:
But, Admiral, if you allow, I would like to ask a second question, following up your answer. The AIS, from my understanding, is not a U.S. system. It’s, as I have learned it, following the International Maritime Organization decision, made by and based on the UN. So as far as I see it, the AIS is the international agreed system. Is this correct?

Several unidentified voices:
Correct; that is correct, sir.

Rear Admiral R. W. Higgs, South Africa:
A question to both Admiral Kelder and Admiral Shalders concerning the expeditionary concepts and the possible moving out of the traditional area of operations, moving into other possible African-type environments. Sirs, could both of you possibly comment on the potential integration of other nations’ forces—not traditional, not the NATO or people you’re used to working with, but other nations’ forces—into your expeditionary-type capabilities to conduct sustained operations, and how you see this being feasible and possible and potentially sustainable in the longer term.

Vice Admiral Russell Shalders, Australia:
Rusty, I’ll take a stab if I can, and I’ll tell a sea story to illustrate my point. It relates to your navy and mine. And it relates to the Southern Ocean fisheries protection activity, which, of course, is conducted in a very harsh environment.

Two years ago, a vessel was detected fishing in an Australian Exclusive Economic Zone in the deep south. The vessel evaded the civil patrol vessel which was attempting to board. The hot pursuit continued right across the southern oceans over a period, I think, of twenty-six days. The ability of the Australian and South African navies to eventually affect a boarding and arrest of that vessel after twenty-six days of hot pursuit is a great example, I think, of what I was trying to get across—this notion of relationship building. I think the Chief of the South African Navy would agree with me that at that time we didn’t have a good relationship, but being sailors as we are, we were able to manage to achieve what was a fairly complicated apprehension and subsequent arrest of the vessel.

In terms of generating an ability to do that more regularly in an expeditionary way—as you indicated, Rusty, I think the only way that we can have that ability is to work more frequently with one another and, as I indicated in my prepared remarks, have common doctrine procedures whenever that’s possible and generate this level of trust between ourselves. There’s no easy way around that other than working together and being ready to do it when we have to. I don’t have a silver-bullet answer to that. It’s not something that we need to—or can—effectively prepare for, because the situations are going to be very different.

But back to my sea story: navies that had not operated together regularly were required to get together and conduct a fairly complicated operation in a very hostile environment.
Vice Admiral Jan-Willem Kelder, The Netherlands:

I totally agree with my Australian colleague. It is a bit of a training issue. So, especially in the more violent settings, if you didn’t train before, it is difficult to work together. It takes us a lot of time in the UKNL Amphibious Force to get all the material and all the communications right, to get the entire spare parts right. So if you do a big operation you have to have training before; otherwise, you could end up in a logistic nightmare. On the other hand, I think especially in a lower-intensity conflict, we must operate together as much as possible and train together wherever possible. Thank you.

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany:

But the conclusion of your question and the answer is that we need a forum—not only a forum for discussion, but a forum which is able to come to decisions about who is providing these common doctrines and procedures. As NATO members, we always think that everybody is familiar with NATO procedures, and for good reasons—a lot of navies are. But on the other hand, there are a lot of navies who want to contribute, and there is no common procedure up to now, and there is no discussion about common doctrines. My question is, which international forum, which organization, is in charge or can be set in charge to take over this task, to develop procedures and doctrines? Who makes it possible for the navies who want or intend to do that?

Our experience from ENDURING FREEDOM is that, on the backbone of NATO procedures and doctrines, it takes us three hours to integrate a new ship’s crew into this coalition of the willing. But it’s a little bit different if a ship from another nation is coming: it’s achievable, but it takes a lot more effort. That’s very practical experience which we have gained now from year to year, and there’s a real need. So my question to the audience is, who is taking over this task, to develop some basic common procedures and doctrines?

Rear Admiral Can Erenoglu, Turkey:

Commandant of the Turkish Coast Guard. Thanks for your interesting presentations. My question is going to Admiral Kelder. What kind of land operations will be supported by the Navy, and what sort of capabilities to support land operations other than amphibious forces and other than the disaster relief operations, war, and conflicts? Thank you.

Vice Admiral Jan-Willem Kelder, The Netherlands:

I think you suggested already the most important ones. They could be of any kind, and as I said in my speech, we don’t know where the next conflict will be. The only thing is—perhaps Afghanistan is a bad example, but most of the countries are alongside the sea, and we see the problems: if you want to make a base somewhere inland, it takes a lot of time, a lot of men and material, and you need to protect that base. Why not do it from the sea? And that’s the suggestion I was making and that was made already by Admiral Mullen, I think, yesterday.
Admiral Alain Oudot de Dainville, France:
I have a very general question. We work to increase maritime security, but how we can we succeed in this while maintaining free use of the seas?

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany:
I think it’s a question that perhaps we as Panel 3 members can give back to Panel 1 or Panel 2, or to everybody. But I agree with you that this is one of the very crucial questions. Of course, during the last decade, during the last years, we have always talked about increasing security, and nobody is talking about the value of freedom of movement, of freedom of the sea; and of course there’s a conflict between both tendencies. I would like the admirals on the panel to try to give an answer from their perspective and their experience, even knowing that it’s not a very easy answer and, perhaps, not the last answer to this question. I think it is very important that we keep this tension between both goals in our mind. Please.

Admiral Rodolfo Codina Diaz, Chile:
[Simultaneous translation follows] Well, I think that there must be a balance between safety and security and freedom in the seas. We have been affected by terrorist acts such as September 11, 2001, in the United States, and if we have another attack on a vessel, which fortunately has not been the case, liberty must be restricted in order to preserve security. That is my reply. If we have a lack of security due to these attacks, liberty must be restricted. Thank you.

Vice Admiral Russell Shalders, Australia:
I wish I had the answer, Admiral, to the question—which is really the $64,000 question, isn’t it? It’s a very fine balancing act. I think Admiral Cross put it well this morning when he said that there is a balance required to meet the need for maritime security without being so restrictive as to restrict commerce in a way which damages the national interests of any of our nations. I think it’s a continual balancing act. I think the pendulum might swing one way and then another, but ultimately there is some sort of balance which will need to be maintained. I don’t have an answer to the question.

Vice Admiral Jan-Willem Kelder, The Netherlands:
I don’t have the answer, either. However, we see that in my country—and I’m sure in other countries—that on land personal freedom is getting a bit smaller than it was twenty years ago. In the Netherlands, now you need to have identification with you all the time. If you say identification all the time on land, why not at sea, as we discussed earlier? So we should kick those lawyers we all have in our countries together and get our act together and try to find something that we can all try to agree on for the high seas and in the straits. Thank you.

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany:
If I may? Of course, if we agree—and I think that’s a first very important step—if we agree that this is a problem that needs a solution from the legal point of view, then I think we are, from my point of view, on the right side for an appropriate answer. But there are a lot of activities going on in all of our countries and in different areas
with different activities, which, from my experience as an officer who has been edu-
cated and trained in the time of the Cold War, very close to the former enemy, I
now notice that we are accepting today regulations and restrictions which would
never have been accepted during the time of the Cold War. And that is something
which we have to think through.

Therefore, I think if we agree in the first place that this is a legal aspect and we
have to push our legal experts and our governments and our countries to deal with
that, then it’s a good starting point. But sometimes I have my doubts about all the
regulations and restrictions increasing security. There’s a tendency to do something
and then to think about the results, and I would prefer that we think about what
could be the outcome of regulations and restrictions in the first place, and then im-
plement them—not the other way around. And that is a concern which I have.

*Rear Admiral Sağdıç, Turkey:*

I would like to add that next month, in October, at the IMO level, as you may
know, the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation issue will be discussed. In the last several years it has
been discussed to upgrade the authority to control ships at sea, following the ISPS
[International Ship and Port Facility Security] Code implementation, which be-
came effective from the 1st of July 2004. Now it’s the next step, whether to choose
to increase the authority to control ships on the high seas, so that the flag nation’s
authority could be shared by others. And I hope in November at the IMO level, the
decision can go this way. Thank you.

*Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany:*

Thank you, Admiral. Okay, do we have more questions? No? Then I would like to
thank you for your questions and for your statements, and I think we will now all en-
joy lunch and then come together for the afternoon session. Thank you very much.
Delivering a Ready Navy
Admiral John B. Nathman, U.S. Navy
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command

[Admiral Nathman gave his address extemporaneously. While it was not recorded for transcription, he used the following slides during his address.]

U.S. Fleet Forces Mission / Vision

U.S. Fleet Forces Mission
Organize, man, train, and equip Navy forces and provide planning support to Combatant Commanders.
Deter, detect, and defend against homeland maritime threats.
Articulate Fleet warfighting and readiness capabilities to the Chief of Naval Operations.

U.S. Fleet Forces Vision
An effectively prepared total Navy force ready to win in combat
Authoritatively defined and consistently accepted Fleet readiness and warfighting capabilities
Transformational change achieved through CONOPS and doctrine development
Agile, powerful, and persistent Navy forces and Operational Planning for Combatant Commanders
**Command and Control**

- Secretary of Defense
- Joint Chiefs
- Chief of Naval Operations
- Northern Command
- Joint Forces Command
- Strategic Command
- Fleet Forces Command

**Chief of Naval Operations Relationship**

- Deliver ready Fleet forces
  - Operational model
  - Fleet Response Plan
  - Readiness domain

- Shape U.S. Navy
  - Future readiness and warfighting requirements
  - Concepts of operation
**Our Operational Model**

- Use maritime maneuver space to deter, prevent, influence, and reassure
- Connect U.S. Navy Numbered Fleet Commanders and regional partners through security cooperation
  - Combined Force Maritime Component Commanders
- Build maritime awareness through presence and coalition cooperation
- Distribute and network forces to meet regional maritime security
- Aggregate forces to meet emergent operational needs

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**Fleet Response Plan**

- Maintain ready, forward-deployed forces
- Institutionalize presence and surge forces
- Align Fleet Response Training Program to deliver the right mission-essential training
  - Effectively
  - Efficiently

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**Capitalize upon Inherent Capability and Flexibility**
**Navy Readiness Enterprise**

**U.S. Joint Forces Command Relationship**

- Provide ready Fleet forces in support of:
  - Allocation to regional Combatant CDRs
  - Joint warfighting capability development
    - Interoperability
    - Concept development & experimentation
**U.S. Northern Command Relationship**

- Provide ready Fleet forces in support of:
  - Maritime Homeland Defense
    - U.S. Coast Guard special partnership
  - Support to U.S. civil authorities
    - Task Force KATRINA
    - Task Force RITA ?!

**Cooperative Model**

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**Coast Guard–Navy Interdependence**

Coast Guard brings domestic maritime awareness, interagency reach, and law enforcement

Navy brings global maritime awareness, command and control, international reach, and firepower

Coast Guard–Navy Maritime Security Integration Group

- Who pays
- Who operates

Multisource intelligence generation

- Joint Harbor Operations Centers
- National Maritime Intelligence Center

Formalized command relationships

- Homeland Defense/Homeland Security force allocation

**Model for Maritime Security**

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Regional Maritime Security

- Security environment increasingly complex
- Mission set expanding
- Enhanced regional security depends upon effective national and international efforts
- U.S. Navy remains...
  - Deployed forward
  - Ready to support regional security

Complex Challenge

= U.S. Fleet Forces Operational Readiness, Effectiveness, Primacy
Seminar Working Group Reports

Moderated by Dr. Ken Watman

Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies
Naval War College

Associate Dean Vincent Mocini, Naval War College:

Good morning, everyone. Please take your seats. Welcome back for the third day of the Symposium. First of all, on behalf of Admiral Mullen, I’d like to congratulate Saudi Arabia today on their National Day and briefly note that during the period of travel for ISS the following National Days are observed. The Chiefs were probably away from their country, so we appreciate you missing your National Day. Again, congratulations to Mexico, Chile, Malta, and Yemen, who have observed their National Days during the period of this symposium. If I have omitted anyone, that is purely my fault, and I apologize, but I think I covered them all.

Now, without further ado, I would like to introduce Dr. Ken Watman, who is the Dean of our Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He will be our esteemed moderator for the debriefs of the seminar working groups. Dr. Watman.

Dr. Ken Watman:

How do you do, everyone? It’s a pleasure to be here. Let me speak very briefly about the time we have available to us—which is painfully short, I’m afraid. As I do the calculations, there is fifteen minutes allotted for each out brief of the seminars. If there are to be any questions asked and answered, therefore, I would like the speakers please to speak for no more than ten minutes, if at all possible. And upon being alerted here by Vince Mocini, I will wave a yellow card at you (a propos of football) when you have, let us say, two minutes left, and a red card when you have one minute left.

Let me introduce to you, please, our distinguished panel, and we’ll speak moving from my right to the end of the table. To my immediate right is Admiral Singh of India, who will be speaking for the Asia-Pacific Seminar. To the right of him is Admiral Erenoglu from Turkey, who will speak to you about the Eurasian Seminar. To his right is Admiral Mohsin from Pakistan, who will be speaking to you about the greater Middle East. And finally, to his right, is Admiral Biraghi from Italy, who will be speaking to you about the Mediterranean Seminar. Without further ado, please let me welcome Admiral Singh.
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION SEMINAR WORKING GROUP

Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh, India:

Actually, after the moderator said I have ten minutes I heaved a sigh of relief, because I spent this entire morning trying to compress my speech into three hundred seconds. I believe I have a little more time.

Generally, this audience is fully aware that half the world’s population lives in the Asia-Pacific area, the fastest-growing region economically. We have roughly five hundred and fifty million tons of oil flowing from the Gulf eastwards every year, and by 2020 or so this will increase roughly four times. You have about sixty thousand, sixty-two thousand, big ships passing through the area. In the immediate western neighborhood of this region, we have the original home of some of the very unpleasant people who come under the banner of the al-Qa’eda. We have piracy, which affects shipping in the Malacca Strait. A very informal record indicates that insurance companies can lose up to $62 billion a year if things go wrong. You’ve got gun-running. You’ve got maritime terrorism. A couple of years back the pirates boarded a ship in the Malacca Straits, and spent the next five or six hours trying to learn to how to conn the ship. And maybe it was a precursor to a seaborne version of 9/11.

The very high probability of oil pollution in this area can affect tourism, whether it’s in Patia or in Goa, marine life, ships. We have had the tsunami, which never took place in our part of the world earlier. It does take place in Japan, but not the Pacific region but the Bay of Bengal side; and we expect more earthquakes. There has been global warming—and in another few years, what levels may arise? And all this calls for us to look forward in the year 2015, 2020, and see a little bit of crystal-ball gazing.

The seminar thought that there were four or five security challenges for the area. One of them was already labored upon the other day: preserving the freedom of the seas. The others include facilitating and defending commerce; enabling the movement of desired goods and people across borders; protecting the right of nations while respecting the sovereignty issues—because a certain number of nations in this part of the world were colonies earlier and they are generally sensitive to any new proposals; and then you have the influence of archipelagic thinking. Look at Indonesia: seventeen thousand-odd islands—it calls for a different management system all together.

Okay, how do we start cooperating in this region? We did discuss it. Do we maybe need an umbrella organization? Do we need the International Maritime Organization on top? Will it make the other nations feel more comfortable? And how do we share information? That’s the highest priority on a large scale. We’re looking at forty, fifty nations with diverse cultures, diverse backgrounds, diverse economic systems, diverse navies and coast guards. And how do we get intelligence exchanged very quickly? We felt that if you try to ramrod this thing through people in a hurry, there will be a lot of opposition, so perhaps a field-by-field approach to do this would be in order and more acceptable.

Everybody is aware there are a large number of bilateral agreements between nations—bilateral, trilateral, etc. So we’re not going to reinvent the wheel. We’re not going to start at square one. We’re going to build on these. We need to develop a global plot of shipping. The Americans have the Amber System. We have a system.
The Japanese have Jasper. The Australians have another system. But what I discovered from the U.S. Coast Guard, and I know from my own Coast Guard, the Amber System, for example, gets only about twenty, twenty-five percent of the ships reporting, while it’s roughly the same picture for us and for the Japanese system of reporting. Along with this, we have the Automatic Identification System (AIS), which the Americans now want to upgrade to the Long-Range Identification System (LRIT), which will come up in the IMO next month.

There is a little conflict between the Amber and the LRIT systems. Amber is a voluntary reporting system and for search and rescue, and LRIT is a mandatory requirement meant for security and safety at sea. So how can these two systems get along? But we do need long-range identification. There are loopholes in these systems. The IMO guideline laid down that if a particular master of a ship feels that by transponding and giving a position he is becoming a target for a terrorist at sea, he can actually switch the system off. And sometimes these gadgets don’t really work. The other day we had a speaker mentioning that if you know where the good guys are, that is good enough; the other guys can be looked at suspiciously. Then maybe the good guys’ system perhaps is not working.

Do we look at standard operating procedures? What kind of reporting format? What kind of communication channels do we get at? What are the contact points between nations?

We continued to get on to some of the principles. As I said in the beginning, let’s start small. Let’s not aim for some big stuff that is not achievable. You’ll have a lot of opposition. We find that INTERPOL, air traffic coordination systems, customs—they already have a fantastic system. Air traffic control has a seamless system around the world, because human lives are at stake. Between the coast guards and constabulary, communication channels are very, very open. Can we look at these models and say, okay, can the navies of the world or the navies of the Asia-Pacific Region try and take one of these models and see whether we can pull something out of it?

We have a lot of bilateral agreements in the region. Perhaps we can build on those. We’ve got to make sure that legitimate cargoes only leave ports, and this would actually mean very strict implementation of the ISPS and the CSI. We’ve got to have the same standards worldwide for this: Leverage commercial stakeholders, all the shipping agencies, big shipping companies—if the wrong cargo goes out, business is going to lose billions of dollars, and I think they have a very big stake. We must encourage them to fall in line.

We continue with some of these principles. Sharing information directly between navies, and in some cases the odd coast guard, is the ideal option. Is it possible? NATO has it. Some other groups have it. Is it possible on a scale of the Asia-Pacific region? It should be, if we keep it simple. Experience shows that when there’s a big emergency like the tsunami, everybody agrees. When the tsunami was there, we had an informal team of, I think, sixteen nations, including the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard. We were cooperating very closely with the U.S. Navy. So it didn’t take more than a couple of hours to get our frequencies sorted out. But there are situations that we must prepare for, doing things without waiting to be shaken up at three in the morning and trying to work out things. Maybe the Internet—God bless Bill Gates—maybe that’s a good solution.
We come now to the Pacific region. There are constraints. You can’t say who is
good or who is bad. The good guys and bad guys are both transnational, and unfor-
tunately they look the same also. Sharing information with navies becomes difficult,
because the word “military intelligence” has different connotations in different
countries, different cultures, and different navies, and is handled differently. As I
mentioned earlier, sharing the same information between the constabulary forces
appears to be a lot easier. In some countries the military structure may inhibit
peacetime quick flow of information. Information exchange infrastructure between
navies is not yet institutionalized. I do not cover the whole spectrum. On one side,
you have a huge, big, very powerful navy, like the U.S. Navy; and on the other end
of the spectrum you have much smaller navies. To try and get all these people on
the same grid will require a little bit of planning. Again, there is the good old
Internet. Internet protocols and exchange might provide an initial solution.

Having covered maritime terrorism and looking at cargoes, what other reason-
able or global initiatives can be considered? I know when you do a military
appreciation you always say, what is the utmost I can do? So we in our seminar
group said, let’s see what else can we do. Well, environmental protection was right
on the top of the list. Pollution control requires a lot of training, equipment,
interoperability, and exercises. Pollution controls can be difficult to enforce, and
pollution can also have consequences that can be disastrous economically to quite a
few countries. It will at the same time give you a window of opportunity to look at
something else. You will board ships that are likely to contribute to pollution con-
tral regimes. When you do board those ships, there’s no harm taking a look at the
manifest and checking out a few other things. You might find the odd gentleman
who is up to no good doing something else.

In maritime assistance and disaster relief—as I mentioned right in the begin-
ing, there is an urgent need to develop standard operating procedures. They’ve
got to be simple. They’ve got to be workable, understandable. They’ll also help us
in improving the multinational disaster response. There are bilateral agreements
between some countries. It’s a good start.

The issue of the tsunami: Now, it can happen, and it did happen during the tsu-
nami, that in some places the complete communications actually broke down. And
if you’re waiting for the country to ask for help, he may not be in a position to ask
for help sometimes. So judgment dictates whether you send some help uninvited or
invited, depending on the scale of the disaster.

Future initiatives in regard to search and rescues in most of the regions in the
Asia-Pacific Region—barring perhaps Japan, India, and Korea—are the Navy’s sea
search and rescue missions. As I keep telling all the naval officers I meet, ninety
percent of search and rescue is never done by the navy or the coast guard. It is done
by the merchant ships that are directed to that place by the MRCCs (maritime res-
cue and coordination centers) through the international safety net, and by the
trawlers, the offshore support vessels. So for the system to be understood, the
MRCCs must be in place, and in places where there is no coast guard the local na-
vies must get their systems in line with the international standard.

We need to have common maritime laws and punishments across national bound-
aries, if possible. Some guy commits an armed robbery in one country, and he might
get executed by the firing squad. In another country, he might get thirty days in jail
or something. So you want deterrence to work—not nuclear deterrence, but this kind of deterrence. We need some kind of standardized punishment system.

We need to build links between individuals and between navies at various levels, right from the lieutenant and lieutenant commander level to the top. Some countries already have these links, and some could perhaps join. You take a look at a lieutenant or lieutenant commander today, and he comes to a particular staff or war college international course. Well, out of the odd hundred lieutenants, one guy might make it to CNO someday, and his counterpart might make it to CNO in his navy. And it becomes a lot easier talking to people when you know who they are, rather than talking to some nameless person across the border, wondering who he is and how he is going to react. So war colleges like this one and similar organizations elsewhere are important.

And we’ve got to treat all this—search and rescue, pollution control, and the like—I won’t call it a war game, but you would run it on a simulator somewhere, and you have got to do it periodically and see whether everybody can get their act together. There have been some discussions about whether one should have the top-down approach or the bottom-up approach. I would say you need both in parallel. You need to start from the lieutenants upward, and you need to start with the politicians downward, and you’ve got to do it in parallel so that we can get this act together in a couple of years.

We’ve got to plan for unforeseen contingencies. When the tsunami happened at 6:28 in the morning, I got to know about 7:15. We all thought it was a really big earthquake on mainland India; then we realized it was a tsunami, and we kept on saying, “Well, tsunamis don’t happen in our part of the world.” So we’ve got to prepare for some of these.

Before I wind up, since I seem to have a couple of minutes, I’ll just wind up with a joke. In 1986 I had come back from nuclear submarine training, and I was asked to brief my senior leadership, and I was told, “Look, you’ve got exactly five minutes”—something like this morning. And I said, “Look, you want me to talk about nuclear propulsion, radiation safety, and reactors, all in five minutes flat?” They said, “Don’t worry; there are just admirals on the other end. Some of them are not going to be listening to you in any case. And though they’re listening to you, their attention span is roughly five minutes.” Thank you.

**Dr. Watman:**

Admiral Singh did use all the time available to him. But if there is a question or a comment, I think we ought to be able to entertain that. Please come to the mike, if there is someone. All right, very good, then let’s move on, please, to a presentation from the Eurasian Seminar, provided to us by Admiral Erenoglu from Turkey.

**BLACK SEA AND CASPIAN SEA [EURASIA] REGION SEMINAR WORKING GROUP**

**Rear Admiral Can Erenoglu, Turkey:**

Good morning, Admiral Mullen and distinguished guests. First of all, I would like to thank Admiral Mullen and Admiral Shuford for your warm hospitality, on behalf of myself, my Navy, and the members of my panel. We call our region Black Sea and
Caspian Sea. Originally the name was Eurasia, but the members of our panel were Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.

During our seminar discussions we decided to make a definition of maritime security and maritime safety. We tried to make a definition for maritime security as “secure sea lines of communication and freedom of the high seas, in conjunction with the prevention of illegal or terrorist activities at sea, and political-military actions to support a nation’s control of the sea.” What do we mean, concerning the Caspian Sea disputes, by this term, “a nation’s control of the sea”? And for maritime safety there is a very short definition: to follow the rules of the International Maritime Organization.

During our panel discussion, we discussed the first question for around one hour and a half, but we did not discuss who was going to be the spokesman of our panel. Everybody was looking at me, and I understood what was going on.

The first question, as we know, is, “What are the current and potential maritime security challenges for the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea region?” Today, stability in the maritime domain exists in the Black Sea, but we cannot say the same thing for the Caspian Sea. All the deputy foreign ministers and undersecretaries of the littoral states of the Black Sea gathered and discussed, and finally, on the 31st of March of this year [2005], produced a paper of maritime risk assessment. It’s a great success among the littoral states of the Black Sea. According to this maritime risk assessment, there are no threats in the Black Sea, but there are some potential risks.

But we cannot say the same thing for the Caspian Sea. When we came to the maritime security challenges, we discussed them and reached a consensus, but we have not prioritized them.

What are the current/potential maritime security challenges for the Caspian and Black Sea Region?

- Political extremism/terrorism
  - Ecological terrorism
  - Economic terrorism
- Future/Potential risk for illegal trafficking
  - Drugs
  - Weapons
  - Human
  - Food products
- Maritime jurisdictional limitations
  - Boundaries/Territorial disputes
  - Exclusive economic zone enforcement
- Environmental pollution
- Natural and industrial disasters
- Safety-related accidents
- Vessel of interest (LNG/LPG) escort/protection

We cannot say the first one, political extremism and terrorism, ecological terrorism, and economic terrorism, is given the first priority.

The second is the future and potential risk for illegal trafficking. What kind of trafficking? Drugs, human, weapons, and food products. And maritime
jurisdictional limitations, especially for the Caspian Sea: The deputy ministers gathered many times in the Caspian Sea area, but they haven’t reached a consensus so far. Boundaries, territorial disputes, and exclusive economic zone enforcement issues are still on the agenda in this region.

Environmental pollution is a common problem for all of us all over the world, and for our regions it’s one of the maritime security challenges. Natural and industrial disasters: you know, our region is an earthquake area. One happened in Turkey in August 1999; the magnitude was around 7.2, and we lost lots of people. And this earthquake area also has had industrial disasters—we still remember this accident because many people are still suffering from it.

Safety-related accidents are a concern; by this we mean that ships trafficking cargo, supertankers trafficking through the Black Sea and through the Turkish Straits are increasing every day. We expect this traffic will decrease after the establishment of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and the Burgas-Alexandroupolis and Constanza-Ukraine pipelines. As an example, the number of ships that crossed the Turkish Straits in 2004 was around fifty-five thousand, averaging twenty-five supertankers in a day.

The second question was, in what ways might cooperation with the maritime forces of other regional nations contribute to solving these challenges? The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BlackSeaFor) was established in 2001. On the 2nd of April, 2001, an agreement was signed among the littoral states of the Black Sea by the politicians. The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group will be a very good example for the Caspian Sea, and the Caspian Sea organization can use this BlackSeaFor as a model. The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group is not a military force. When we look at the aims and the missions of this force, they are mainly humanitarian aid operations, search and rescue, mine countermeasures—during the First World War and then the Second World War, they laid lots of mines, and still there are a lot of mines at the bottom of the Black Sea—and environmental protection issues.

Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY was established for the littoral states of the Black Sea, but now only Turkey is conducting this exercise, in affiliation with Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR. We are doing the same job in the Black Sea, for the smooth flow of shipping and maintenance of safe navigational orders.

Outside the region, what kind of benefits can we have? As I mentioned a moment ago, the security of the Black Sea maritime domain should be based on the consensus of all littoral states. If a warship from any other country or alliance enters the Black Sea, it’s welcome—but if it conducts any exercises, it can cause some instabilities. It’s a very sensitive area. We know the reason of that area. And when we talk about regional maritime security information exchange, “information” and “exchange” will originate from outside the region, and it depends on the quality of the available intelligence. We are getting lots of intelligence, but when we look at the quality of the intelligence—it can be discussed.

There are bilateral intelligence protocols between the navies. They can be multilateral, but first of all political intention and political will are very important for this issue. There is no standard mechanism for the distribution of information. Command, control, communication, and language interoperability—this is one of the barriers, one of the troubles, for our region. And the entirety of information
for security threats at sea must be made available to all parties within nations and the region: the customs, coast guards, and navies.

Among the littoral states, the coast guards of the Black Sea, the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center (BOURGAS) was established, and it’s working very well. In the last eighteen months, this Coordination and Information Center has exchanged information over four hundred times, and this information is going to the alliance and to friendly and allied countries also. It’s not being kept among the Black Sea littoral countries.

As for bilateral and multinational agreements, there are currently twenty-six international agreements concerning the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea region, and we can conduct joint exercises. What kind of joint exercises have we done so far? Search-and-rescue exercises, environmental protection exercises—we can conduct this kind of peaceful exercises, and we have done it. One of the topics also can be the security of underwater pipelines.

Exchanges of personnel, especially for young officers, can be a goal.

Establishing reliable information exchange between different agencies within a country is another area. In our countries, all official organizations are acquiring some intelligence information but they don’t know who needs this information. They are keeping that information within their organization; they are not sharing it and maybe do not know who needs it, but this can also be organized in the countries and among the navies. And there are some other troubles, maritime law enforcement issues, and legal issues and legal ramifications that could lead to serious consequences.

That concludes my presentation, and if you have any questions, I will be glad to answer.

Dr. Watman:

Thank you very much, sir. Are there any questions, please? We have a little bit of leeway now. Very well, let me ask, please, the representative from the Middle Eastern seminar to speak. That is Admiral Mohsin.

**GREATER MIDDLE EAST REGION SEMINAR WORKING GROUP**

**Rear Admiral Bakhtir Mohsin, Pakistan:**

Thank you very much, sir, for giving me the opportunity to present my seminar’s discussion. First of all, I would like to thank Admiral Mullen for inviting us from Pakistan to the U.S., and, of course, Admiral Shuford for being such a good host for us.

I want to let you know that I have two allies in this room. Admiral Soto—we were together in ’79, forming the department head course. He’s Chief of the Colombian Navy now. And in 1997, I was in the Naval Command College (NCC) with Vice Admiral Tim Jørgensen from Denmark. He’s Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff. So I’m not worried.

We wanted to have a definition of our region that extends from Egypt in the West all the way to Pakistan in the East. Now, how do we come about this region? I think this is a good way of establishing where we are talking about. I’ll just go by the questions that have been asked, and we’ll quickly go through that.
The first question was, what are the top four military and security challenges for the region? We have five main areas: regional instability, economic issues, illegal maritime activities, environmental issues, and lack of sharing of information. If we can address these five issues, then we added subsets into them:

**What are the top four or five maritime security challenges for the region?**

- **Regional Instability**
  - Iraq
  - Regional political disputes
  - Presence of foreign forces
  - Maritime disputes

- **Economic Issues**
  - Security of SLOCs

- **Illegal Maritime Activities**
  - Illegal fishing
  - Smuggling—arms, drugs
  - Illegal immigrants
  - Understanding the common maritime picture
  - Terrorism
  - Port security

- **Environmental Issues**
  - Pollution/marine disasters

- **Lack of Sharing of Information**

In what ways can we cooperate? Again, what we found was that even in this highly networked world—we are networked on the Internet, we are networked by the media—we felt that if we don’t have information, we’ll have more difficulties. With such a big network of information, we should be on the same plane. So, if we can have better information sharing, information access, and increased regional security coordination, and cooperation in capacity building, we will probably be in a better and secure environment.

So we were surprised, when we looked at the region, to see that we are already cooperating in many areas. We are doing combined exercises, combined training, bilateral cooperation. The United Nations drug control program (UNODCP) is in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan. We are already doing these control programs. We are doing bilateral logistic support amongst navies. The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) is in place. Regarding bilateral treaties such as the ISPS, the International Ship and Port Security Code—we are implementing the code, so we are all working towards this maritime security. And, of course, the TF-150 is patrolling the North Arabian Sea with the regional navies. So we are already very well networked in this region.

You asked if they are adequate. No.

If not, would modified or new mechanisms help? Yes; we should have a regional center for combating illegal activities. That’s what we felt was missing in our area. So this is one thing we came up with that we need to establish, and how we’ll go about that we will look at next.
There are constraints, variations in political direction or interoperability, and lack of a regional forum that includes all nations—again, going back to the last question—different or conflicting economic ability. These are challenges and the constraints which we are having now.

How can the navies help? We can improve interoperability, which means common communications. In this area we have three or four languages, but even now technology is able to translate these and transmit in the same language, so I think the technology is there to help us out on this area.

Would collaboration with navies from outside the region be helpful? Yes. (We really have very short and smart answers to the questions!)

What form should it take? Capacity building of regional navies, coast guards, and maritime security agencies. I put in a word for maritime security agencies because I am from the General Maritime Security Agency, which is equal to the Coast Guard. In Pakistan, we have two agencies, the Coast Guard and the Maritime Security Agency, looking out for the region. Also, we need better sharing of information with the regional countries, and support for the regional center for combating illegal activities that we have said that we would like to establish.

What regional or global initiatives would you be willing to consider over the next year or two to increase naval cooperation in an effort to improve maritime security?

- Information sharing
- Tolerance for others
- Respect for others' perspectives
- Assistance—training, capacity building
- Workshops among institutes of defense learning
- Shared regional responsibilities to nations on a rotating basis
  - IOT achieve a recognized maritime security picture

I did this list—information sharing, tolerance for others, respect for others—by this small card, which we got from the Naval War College in ‘97. It said we should have friendship, knowledge, and cooperation, and value respect, tolerance, participation, integrity, and excellence. So I included tolerance and respect, because in this area if we can have tolerance for each other and respect for each other’s perspectives, I think we are there. And assistance, of course—if we find that somebody needs assistance, let’s go in and help them out. We can also have workshops on regional responsibilities in this area.

Given the current efforts, is it now time to go forward? Yes, it is time to go forward; but we should first have regional responsibility, as shared responsibility has been achieved. Only then should we take the next step. I think Admiral Mullen mentioned baby steps. That’s what we were thinking of. Maybe we should take the first step in regional cooperation.

And then how do we connect the regional initiatives? We found that the best way was under the UN, and the big document which you have in front of us is the UNCLOS-82. We were told that the United States is not a signatory to this document. We said it doesn’t matter, because the United States is all in there to help the
different regions and different countries. So even if you’re not a signatory, it doesn’t matter; you can help out.

This is the outcome of our seminar. Thank you very much, sir.

Dr. Watman:

Are there questions, please? Comments? Or questions that are not necessarily directly on the point of this presentation but were stimulated by the presentation? Very well. Let us turn, please, to Admiral Biraghi from Italy, to speak to us about the reflections of the Mediterranean Seminar.

MEDITERRANEAN REGION SEMINAR WORKING GROUP

Admiral Sergio Biraghi, Italy:

It’s not so easy, because we discussed very hard. But we have about the same solutions. We defined the same problems, and we tried to arrive at the same solutions as my friends, because the problems are quite the same everywhere. There are some differences, of course—differences that I think are very important to keep in mind, because if you want to cooperate—and we want to cooperate, of course—it’s very important to know each other and to know the differences between the different areas, the different traditions of countries, and so on, to arrive at better cooperation. So, many of my items are the same as in the previous report. But I ask you please pay attention to the differences, because the differences are the problems that we have to shoulder in the future to cooperate better all together.

The Mediterranean Sea, for example, is quite different; that is clear. After twenty-five centuries of history, more or less—a lot of fights, of exchanges, of navigation, areas of activity—there are a lot of different nations with different religions, with different cultures, and with different societies, and people with different economies. So there is a lot of difference. There are about twenty-five nations. Everyone has a different history; that is an important point to remember. And this is a close basin; it is very small—one percent of the total water of the world, and with limited access points. There are only three: Suez, Dardanelles-Bosporus, and Gibraltar. Shared waters; and there have been—and there are, sometimes, still—many conflicts in the area. Territorial issues, of course, are still in progress with this problem.

What are the top four or five maritime security challenges for the region?

- Maritime Counter Terrorism
  - Protection of SLOC
  - Sea robberies
  - Economic interests
- Crisis Management
  - Spectrum of significant consequences
  - Humanitarian relief
- Illicit Trafficking
  - Immigration
  - Weapons
  - Drugs
It was not so easy to arrive at a list of maritime security challenges; everyone has a long list of challenges to regional navies. But I think that maritime security is really the most important. Maritime counterterrorism, of course, the protection of SLOCs, sea robberies, economic interests. These, I think, are the first ones everywhere in the world.

Crisis management is important. There was in the past—not so far in the past, and I hope not, of course, but there may be something else arising in a future situation. So this is an issue of significant consequence.

There is humanitarian relief, of course, as well as human trafficking—a lot of immigration. We put immigration in the first line because illegal immigration at this moment is really dramatic in the Mediterranean Sea; it’s a really common problem.

I mentioned the protection of the sea environment before, of course. It’s a very small sea, with a lot of traffic, with many countries that live along the seaside. So the sea has a lot of problems with pollution, with fisheries—there is a fight between the different countries for fishing. We spoke before of the Black Sea problems of supertankers. A lot of supertankers do go through the whole Mediterranean area, and they are really important for Europe, because they are the main line for oil for all Europe. If we cut this line, it will be a dramatic problem for all Europe.

In what ways might cooperation with the maritime forces within the region contribute to solving these challenges?

- Develop Trust and Confidence Building
- Information/Intelligence
  - Display, process, communicate
- Command, Control, and Communication System
- Exchange Experience/Expertise
  - Best practices
- Resource Exchange
  - Ships, manpower, comms equipment
- Common Set of Standards
- Legal Support
- Gate Guard Procedures
  - Cooperation along the seams
- Collaboration
  - Combined training and exercises
  - Systems
  - Common procedures
- Databases

In what ways do we try to solve these problems? The first one is clear. For trust and confidence building, we must know better how to exchange information, to exchange experience—to exchange everything. The second one—the exchange of
information intelligence—is always important. It is necessary to know how to do something effective, of course, in this sector, in the exchange of information, to really start to do something to work together at sea. But to work together we also need to have a common control and communication system, compatible with the different navies; otherwise, it’s quite impossible to operate at the same time on the same problem for the same purpose. But we must arrive at such a system because of the great need for the exchange of experience and expertise, because the nations are not at the same level regarding their navies’ activity and experience at sea.

We also have to exchange resources and try—not to help but to facilitate—to reduce the time necessary to arrive at a certain level of capability at sea, with changeover for manpower, communication of equipment, etc., just to speed up the operations necessary to arrive at a certain level of interoperability at sea. We need, of course, a common set of standards; it’s a necessity, you know, at sea to speak with common standards.

Legal support is an issue, because the legal points of view in the different countries are different—not quite dramatically different, but the navies have different activities, different opportunities, different possibilities to work and to do something; and we have a lot of limitations from our countries, because there is different law, so it’s impossible to do the same activity in some sectors.

Gate Guard procedures—of course, cooperation along the seas at the three gates of the Mediterranean Sea is dramatically important to controlling the Mediterranean Sea. For collaboration among the regional navies, we need training exercises, the same systems, common procedures, and common databases. That is evident, of course.

What cooperative mechanisms are currently in place to overcome these challenges? We have Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR now in the area and VRMTC [Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center]. There is a lot of cooperation—political, and cooperation among the different navies. On the topic of cooperation, of course one is the activity that we do in Venice with the Regional Seapower Symposium. But there are a lot of multilateral initiatives—for example, the Five Plus Five initiative in the western part of the Mediterranean. There are the Adriatic-Ionian initiatives, but many other bilateral and trilateral exchanges of training or activity throughout the Mediterranean Sea.

There are also many initiatives in the political sector. The two that are reported are the most important—the Barcelona Process and Mediterranean Dialogue—but every day there is someone to speak about a necessity to do something for the Mediterranean area: There is a necessity to do something [collaborative] between Europe and North Africa. There are a lot of initiatives, but they are only starting; none are really operational yet.

What is the problem with the existing initiatives? Their limited membership: there are many, but none with all the nations represented as members. That is a problem, because the different initiatives can’t work together easily, due to different political starting points, varying political importance, difficult political sensitivities and sensibilities. So it’s very difficult to work together. And too many initiatives look the same.

One of the problems, as I mentioned before, is the Mediterranean’s diversity. There is really a lot of diversity in the Mediterranean area, for probably twenty
centuries of different histories. Also, in the political sector there is a lot of difference in political sensitivities. In domestic intelligence, it is very difficult to find two nations that have the same organization for controlling the sea: someone has a coast guard, someone is still deciding if it’s needed, and if it will be part of the Navy or will be part of the Ministry of the Interior—so there are a lot of differences, and they are not all defined yet. This is a very big problem, because it’s difficult to coordinate such different national organizations. And wherever we are in the Mediterranean area, there are really a lot of bureaucratic and administrative problems and dramatically important at a certain level.

What can we do? Surely, we can work together; certainly—that is clear. We try to do so; there are a lot of new exercises, new training at sea, new exchange of groups, of information, of training. We work together—but not all together, but in bilateral and trilateral coordination. This is not enough. It’s important to start with a simple problem and a simple project, because there are a lot of differences that must be worked out step by step. These steps are necessary building blocks; we shouldn’t try to have everything in one shot. We can work with different subregional blocks and then overlap. And it is necessary to be really very flexible: the situation changes every day, so the organization has to be flexible to solve the new problem that each day we have to discuss and try to solve.

We will need to find a common interest, of course, and to set milestones and goals; otherwise, we will have too many goals, and we will not be able to achieve them.

We need to seize the initiative in order to convince our leadership that what we are doing is important.

As I said before, cooperation with those outside the region is of benefit. That is clear, but in what form? The first step is always the formation of intelligence, just to know better between us. And then we need an internal communication information system, a common support system—something to exchange information and experience and exchange opportunities to work together, to have the system to work together, to meet at sea to do the first type of exercise, to make some initial approach to the problems at sea. We want to exchange experience and expertise, of course—exchanges of all sorts: ship, manpower, communication equipment, and the like, in a Mediterranean area. And we need a common set of standards: The problem of legal support, as someone said before—all the world needs a common legal line; gate guard procedures, confidence building.

So it’s now time to go for the global way. Yes, of course; that is clear. But by necessity we must approach this by regions first. As I said before, it’s very difficult to have a Mediterranean approach to problems, because there are a lot of differences. So we need to solve the problem of Mediterranean coordination and activity and support, and then we can expand to the other regions. But we cannot expect to solve the problem in a large exchange of information or exchange of experiences with other regions. No, we have to start within regional activities, but the first approach must of necessity be a regional one. It’s very important, of course, for global awareness for a major crisis to have a significantly improved maritime cooperation. That is clear. It’s not easy to do.

How do we connect the regional initiatives into a global effort? It is a crucial necessity. It is not easy. One of the first steps may be that the regional representatives of the different organizations—of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and Inter-American
Naval Cooperation and South American Maritime Conferences, for example—might meet systematically and try to develop a global approach, or try to define something that is in common for all the regions. They might start from what there is in common and solve this problem, and then enlarge the cooperation to the different necessities of the different capabilities of the different regions. It is important to start, to start to know, to start to exchange, and to start to cooperate step by step, pragmatically. Either we take such an approach to the problem or we cannot solve the problems—and we need to solve the problems. It’s a duty for the navies to try to solve or control the problems. So we need to work together to cooperate, to reduce the original problems and arrive at global control of the sea. We need many more meetings, many more exchanges of experience, and much more work for the future. Thanks.

**Dr. Watman:**

Are there any questions or comments? Very well, we are ahead of schedule, I’m pleased to say, and there is a half-hour break scheduled. We can take the full thirty minutes, I believe. It is now 9:35. I think we ought to reconvene at five minutes after ten, even though that’s a slightly odd time. But let’s go for that. Thank you very much.

**Dr. Watman:**

Ladies and gentlemen, we’ll begin in a moment. In fact, the moment has almost arrived. But let me alert you to the fact that two of our colleagues on the panel will be presenting in Spanish. They are Admiral Rosas, to my immediate right, and Admiral Soto, at the end of the table. Admiral, are we ready to begin? Very good. All right, we shall begin. As I say, presenting for the North America and Caribbean Basin Seminar, it is Admiral Rosas of the Mexican Navy.

**NORTH AMERICA/CARIBBEAN REGION SEMINAR WORKING GROUP**

**Admiral Alberto Castro Rosas, Mexico:**

[Simultaneous translation from Spanish] Admiral Mullen, Admiral Shuford, on behalf of the delegates of North America and Caribbean countries, we would like to thank you for your invitation and for the opportunity to share experiences and comments with most of the countries of the world. First, I would like to mention that the delegates who made up this region are rather numerous, and therefore it was difficult to reach an agreement on some issues. We ran out of time, actually, to cover all the questions.

The question was, what are the challenges faced in maritime security? After a lengthy discussion, we agreed that these are the four challenges faced by the region:

- Illegal drug trafficking
- Environmental abuse and pollution
- Illegal immigration
- Counterterrorism
I should mention that we had a long discussion to be able to agree upon these four challenges, because not only did we mention these four, but we added search and rescue, maritime security, fishing protection, natural disasters, and human trafficking. However, at the end of a lengthy discussion we believed that these are the four main challenges that we face in the region.

All of you know that illegal drug trafficking is relevant in the Caribbean, Central America, and the United States. Therefore, for the governments of these countries and the navies of the region, this is a challenge. It is very difficult to face this challenge, because each navy has a different level of resources. Organized crime is rather wealthy, and they have technical means that are far superior to what we have in the Navy. As Admiral Mullen said, we cannot work in isolation. We cannot face the challenge by ourselves, and, as we will see later on, cooperation is the main issue here.

Environmental abuse and pollution is a challenge faced by all the countries of the region; more and more resources are needed to face these issues, and what we see is that some species are disappearing from the face of the earth. I can say that in my country the coastal areas where turtles live have been destroyed, and the population of those areas uses and eats the turtle eggs, and this is decimating the turtle population. This happens with other species as well. And, of course, we have to think about the abuse of consumption in shrimp and other species.

Another problem faced by the countries of the region is illegal immigration. It is said that this century is the century of immigration, and this is something that is faced all over the world. However, for our continent and our region in particular, the South American, Central American, and Mexican immigration to the United States represents a large burden that has to be faced by the countries, the navies, and the armies.

Last, but not least important, is counterterrorism. We have not yet seen terrorist events in South and Central America. However, we can say that we are not immune to the possibility of a terrorist attack. Terrorism knows no frontiers, no borders; it is faceless, an unknown enemy. I heard once that somebody said that when the Spaniards came to my country, Mexico, the Aztecs that lived there at the time had no idea what a firearm was, had no idea what a horse was; I believe that today we are in a similar situation in the face of terrorism. We have no idea where it’s coming from or when the attack will happen, and the only way we have to solve this problem is to cooperate.

These are the four challenges that we have identified in our region. Some of them have already been mentioned in other seminars. Here the question is, how can we link cooperation with the maritime forces of other regional nations, and how can they contribute to solving these challenges?

In what ways might cooperation with the maritime forces of other regional nations contribute to solving these challenges?

- **Build Capacity (Regional)**
  - Improve Maritime Interdiction Capabilities
- **Outpace the Adversaries**
  - Deploy Advanced Communications and Network Technology
  - Establish Battlespace Awareness/Intelligence Fusion Capabilities
- **Continue Regional and Maritime Force to Maritime Force Exercises:**
  - Environmental Abuse/Pollution
  - Illegal Immigration (Economic Migration)
  - Counterterrorism
  - Illegal Drug Trafficking

Due to the disparity among the countries of our region, especially Canada and the United States vis-à-vis Mexico and the Central American countries, we believed that the most important thing is to improve the capacity of the region and, therefore, to improve maritime interdiction. We think that the drug traffickers, organized crime, have almost limitless resources, and our navies and our governments have limited resources. Therefore, there is a need to improve the maritime interdiction capabilities of our countries.

Another important thing is the need to improve communication and networked technologies so that we can establish a method of exchanging information that will be more agile and faster. The organized crime that deals in humans or drugs is in a large area on the Pacific coast. The vessels that transport drugs or human beings work almost five hundred miles from the coast, sometimes. They go to Clarión Island, the Galápagos, or other islands in the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, one of the needs we face is to know where they are on the battlefield, and if we want to achieve that, we need intelligence, information. Another way of cooperating would be to continue with the regional exercises that we implement with the navies, armed forces, and coast guards of the region.

When we identified common mechanisms to overcome these deficiencies, we found that the Joint Inter Agency Task Force (JIATF) that gathers a lot of officers from Latin America, and the Americas in general, is one of the successful examples that will allow us to overcome the deficiencies that we have mentioned before. In the Central American area, we have the Central American Armed Forces Conference (CFAC), where information and experience are exchanged, and we have been able to face some challenges through that. We also have some bilateral agreements in the area—agreements among different countries of the region. These agreements could be more [extended], if we want to face the challenges already mentioned.

What regional or global initiatives would we be willing to consider over the next two years, to increase naval cooperation in an effort to improve maritime security? In answer, our group identified the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). There are differences among the legal frameworks of our countries. However, there are legal restrictions, and within those frameworks is the one that will guide our future exercises.

Another initiative, of course, is support for military and civil training. Most of the countries of the area need assistance in boarding techniques, and in legal and national requirements, because some countries accept the boarding of vessels and some do not. We also need training for detection or identification of weapons of mass destruction—production, storage, and delivery components—and in detection and identification of other illicit cargo. Another initiative that we talked about was collaboration to obtain a surface operational picture and intelligence so that we will be able to identify the illicit traffic and develop other
mechanisms to exchange information. We could also talk about centers of excellence or lessons learned.

Given the current efforts regarding regional initiatives, is it now time to go forward in a global way? Yes, we found that JIATF South could be expanded—we could cover South America, and we could include within its coverage not only drugs but counterterrorism activities, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal immigration. This JIATF model could be applied and transferred to other countries and other regions so that we could overcome agency or jurisdiction barriers to achieve an effective coordination. We have to talk about domestic and international barriers, and I think that these organizations would be able to overcome those.

Regarding illegal immigration, we should try to find regional and global cooperation to be able to stem the flow of illegal immigrants that come into North America, especially from our countries.

Regarding drug trafficking, we believe that a global protocol should be established that would allow us to identify and track maritime transportation, and we should agree on an identification method. This tracking capability is not limited by technology but by legal and political issues.

I don’t have anything else to present to you, and if you have any questions, I will be more than glad to answer. Thank you.

Dr. Watman:

What can I do to induce you to ask the questions that I know must be occurring to you? Why don’t I take a moment and let you think about them a little bit. Does anyone dare to be great? Yes, sir.

Rear Admiral Martzoukos, Greece:

Thank you, first of all, for the presentation. I command the Naval Academy in Greece.

I would like to make a comment, not a question. Since you mentioned boarding and the unwillingness of some ships to accept it, the backbone of what we’re talking about these days here is the freedom of high seas commerce. I think that in any case we all should have in mind that, first of all, we all agree it is necessary to protect this commerce along the sea, but that, on the other hand, the measures we have to take should not delay this flow of commerce and also should by no means damage fair competition of the private sector at sea. This is a great dilemma, to compromise these two things. Thank you.

Admiral Rosas:

[Simultaneous translation from Spanish] Yes, I believe that the French admiral asked the $64,000 question: what to do with freedom of shipping and security at the same time. I would like to say that when we talk about boarding, at least in our region, we talk about boarding fishing ships and small vessels. We are not talking about cargo ships. In the United States, it is the Coast Guard, and I’m not very sure whether they always do it or they do boarding when the vessels come to port. However, in our region, we do not interfere in any way with the flow of merchandise and goods. I don’t know whether I am answering your question or your comment.
Dr. Watman:

Would anyone else like to make a comment about this comment, and would any of the other panel members like to jump in here? Very well. Thank you very much; I hope you’ve set a precedent. Let me turn to our next speaker. This is Admiral Feldt from the Navy of Germany, and he will be speaking to you about the deliberations of the Northern Europe Seminar.

NORTHERN EUROPE REGION SEMINAR WORKING GROUP

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, Germany:

Admiral Mullen, ladies and gentlemen, I have the honor to be the spokesman of the Northern Europe Seminar. And let me start with a thank you. We have been assisted and supported by Vice Admiral Delgado from Spain and Admiral Duarte from Portugal, and I will come back to this support a little bit later, but we have been guided through all the different topics by Professor Catherine Kelleher—very successfully, I hope.

What are the top four or five maritime security challenges for the region?

- Maritime environment is not visible enough and thus lacking public support
- Northern Europe is now a region of peace but affected by distant events
  - Uncertainty remains—Expect the unexpected
  - If a harbor is closed, it has a major impact on the country’s economy—politicians need to understand this
  - Proliferation of lethal maritime capabilities, i.e., technologies, cruise missiles, submarines, etc., to nations with weak governments
- Twofold problem: 1.) local/regional issues 2.) global issues
- Remaining regional issues include
  - Protection of oil production
  - Unsecured borders and illegal immigration
  - Terrorist threats to port security and interruption of trade
  - Cleanup of remaining nuclear waste
  - Emerging threats—human security/environmental/drug smuggling
  - Uncertain future of the Kaliningrad Oblast

You can see in the first slide [above] that we have the feeling in the northern region that the maritime environment is not visible enough and thus is lacking public support. This is something which we understand as an overarching concern, as an overarching challenge. If you ask what this has to do with maritime security, it’s not only about the fact that there is a connection between the lack of public support and the lack of funding. It’s not only so simple—but in the end, it is so simple.

We talked about the reasons, and one of the reasons is, of course, that northern Europe is a very stable region. The Northern Europe Region is one of the winners of the collapse of the Soviet Union fifteen years ago, and a lot of things have changed for the better in our region. That has had an influence on the mind-set of most of the people living in the area. So it’s very difficult for the
military—and for the navies especially—to make clear that uncertainty remains and that we must expect the unexpected, to ensure that we are able to create maritime awareness.

The proliferation issue is a real concern for our area, because nobody really can make an assessment about what happens to some kind of modern technology which is exported or imported into the region; advanced conventional ammunition is only one example.

Then we started to find out what other remaining regional issues there were; some of them were mentioned by the other seminars, but some are pretty new.

The protection of oil production is a real concern in the area, and that is something which is totally out of the assessment of the public. Unsecured borders and illegal immigration are an issue in the northern Europe area as well; this is an issue the European Union has tried to solve, but it is now up to us to ensure that the legislation is put into real-life practice.

The cleanup of remaining nuclear waste is a continuing task for the next ten to fifteen years. We are talking about the nuclear waste produced by the nuclear reactors of the submarines from the Russian fleet. This concentration of nuclear waste far up in the north has been a concern for most of us for years already.

And going back into the region, the uncertain future of the Kaliningrad Oblast is the only area which has an uncertain future, when you look into the Baltic. All the other countries are now members of NATO, the European Union, or both, and their sea areas. Nobody really knows what the future of this [Kaliningrad] area will be. It could be an area where tensions could arise without warning. So we have to keep an eye on that.

There’s something about the Baltic Sea. There’s an old tradition for some of the countries around the Baltic to see the Baltic Sea as a *Mare Clausum*. I do not accept that, by any means; it’s very important for us to make it clear that the Baltic, even as a very small sea, is still a part of the high seas. That is very important, and I think it is worth every effort to make sure that not only the Baltic nations are exercising and training in this area.

Next slide please. I would like to talk to the first two bullets here:

**In what ways might cooperation with the maritime forces of other regional nations contribute to solving these challenges?**

- Threat is global in nature but should be dealt with first on a regional level
- Cooperate with each other and further the Laws of the Sea
- ROE with national caveats is still an unresolved issue
- Develop better maritime awareness among countries
- Countries in the region which are not part of formal alliances should try to work together and cooperate with others in the region
- Seek a common understanding of the threat and common agreement on the approach for combating the threat

Even a threat that is global in nature should be dealt with first on a regional level. I found during the other presentations that we have already reached a consensus about that. In our discussion, which was very fruitful and cleared up our minds considerably, it was obvious that sometimes we have the same problems in
different regions. We have to keep in mind that sometimes in a distant region there is a different solution for the same problem; we should also keep in mind that this is not only a problem for the military, it’s a problem for everybody, and different cultures produce different solutions. Therefore, I think it is very important to keep in mind that the first step is, in all cases, a regional approach to the problem; after that, linkage to the neighboring region is perhaps very important. I have my doubts that centralized solutions are the appropriate approach in the very beginning.

The second thing I think is very important is cooperation with each other. I think that’s the consensus here. Everybody who is attending this International Seapower Symposium is prepared for cooperation. That is a common understanding, and I really think that’s a good outcome of this meeting. But to further the Law of the Sea is something which must be pushed perhaps by us, the chiefs of the Navy. It’s a task for the politicians, but I think we have to do that because there are gaps between the practice and the need of the practice. Some of the questions which we cannot answer up to now are based on the fact that the Law of the Sea is not able to answer all the threats and open issues and challenges which are still there.

What cooperative mechanisms are currently in place to help overcome these challenges?

- A comprehensive network of agreements within the region
  - NATO/EU/Partnership for Peace/Proliferation Security Initiative
- Dissemination of operational procedures such as manuals, “EXTAC 1000 series,” common operational picture has begun
- The region can act as an example for other regions of the world in terms of cooperation, agreements, and exercises

This slide [above] reflects our discussion on the network we have achieved in the Northern Europe Region. We found that a lot of this networking is not only the NATO-EU Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). There are many more, and they include the whole spectrum of political networking, cultural networking, and social networking. A lot of these networks were established during the time of the Cold War and were used in a different way. I think the region has been very lucky in using the same network under different developments. I think that was one of the big advantages we had in the region, and it was used by all countries in northern Europe.

The dissemination of operational procedures, such as manuals of the EXTAC 1000 series, Common Operational Picture, has begun. Yesterday I asked who is taking care of developing common procedures; I’m very thankful that I got the answer with the EXTAC 1000 series. It’s something that I have learned is a really big step ahead, and I think we have to thank the Naval War College for being the custodian in this issue. This is something which we can develop further on, and it’s something which can be used by all of us when we are prepared and forced to cooperate in practical terms. I think there’s a lot of room for progress and for developing this for the next step.
In the end, we found in our group that the region can act as an example for other regions of the world, in terms of cooperation, agreements, and exercises, and we are prepared to do that, on a bilateral basis and as a whole group as well.

Are they adequate? Yes, but . . .

- EU has not dealt with maritime issues—just starting to address them
- NATO is still trying to decide on the common standard for the participating countries
- Utilize AIS as a core maritime picture—standard throughout the world: has function to exchange information among naval ships (AIS is product of the IMO)
- Surveillance is aimed at the big ships but problem may be with small ships
- Complex problems very often require complex solutions
- Need to maintain core naval competencies (organize, C2, logistics, transport)—other missions are secondary

Are all the things we have achieved—the network, the mechanisms—are they adequate? The Middle East group said, “no, but”; we decided to say, “yes, but.” But it’s the same in the end. Sometimes we Europeans, especially from northern Europe, have the feeling that we are in the center of the world, and that is perhaps not the best way to look for solutions. Therefore, if you look from a geographical point of view at Europe, it is the appendix of the Asian continent. And it’s surrounded by water.

The first topic is not a concern, but a statement about the fact that in the development of the European defense and security policy the maritime dimension is only speeding up a little bit. From the very beginning everything was land-centric, and the whole thinking of the European defense and security issue was land-centric. I think that was a real weakness, and I’m very happy that the navies, including the northern European navies, are trying very hard to convince the decision makers in the EU that the success of any agreement can only be achieved when the maritime dimension and the air dimension are included as well.

One word on the AIS we talked about yesterday, as well. I think we can use it a little bit more intensively than it has been used up to now. It’s a global system, but with a very regional or local impact; and as far as I’ve heard, this system is open for further development without great additional effort. If there are requests for more details, I would be happy to answer them after my brief presentation.

Another topic which we discussed very seriously is the issue of what is the core naval competence? We all agreed that cooperation with the different coast guards is vital for both sides, but, on the other hand, there is perhaps the danger of mission creep for the Navy. We have to look at this very carefully. We have to be clear about our major mission and make clear that we can do a lot of other things, but they are secondary.

There are constraints, and I tried to explain some of them already. The notion in Europe that all security problems have been solved by the unification of Europe and what happened in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in the northern part of Europe is a real misperception. It has to do with what I mentioned as the overarching argument from the very beginning. And the problem of overlapping
organization competencies, which may lead to duplication of effort, also poses a potential for chaos—and that is, of course, not something we want to achieve. So a network is a good thing, but on the other hand we have to look very carefully at the fact that too many agencies are not the solution for complex systems.

We talked about standard operating procedures, and the Western Pacific Forum talked about them. I think there’s no need to explain it again. There is a need for these standard operating procedures. There’s a need for lessons learned from the Partnership for Peace. That was one of the big successes for NATO in the nineties, and I think with some modifications and as a stand-alone issue we can use it in other regions as an advice as well.

Our conclusion is the enrichment and codification of PfP-style initiatives, to develop the potential of AIS, to adopt a commitment to lowering the size of vessels that are linked through AIS over the next several years, and, of course, to further develop the International Law of the Sea. That’s a lot. And it’s up to us. I think we as chiefs of the Navy and representatives of our Navy can start some initiatives, talking to each other about that and talking to our political masters about that. I will close with a question for my friends from northern Europe: What about a Northern European Seapower Symposium? There are other regions, not only here in the United States and in Italy and the southern part of Europe, that have had a good experience with that, so my question to you is, what about a Northern European Seapower Symposium? Thank you very much.

**Dr. Watman:**

Would anyone care to address that question in the audience or entertain any other question, please? All right. I’ll wait a decent interval, just to let things ferment out there. Yes, sir.

[Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang], Denmark:

Admiral Feldt, we would very much like in Denmark to call for a conference for a Northern European Seapower Symposium. So we’ll do that soon so we will have direct action on your question here. So thank you very much.

**Dr. Watman:**

Is there anyone else? All right, with that we’ll turn to the speaker from the African Maritime Issues Seminar, and that is Admiral Mudimu from South Africa.

**SOUTH AFRICA/WEST AFRICA REGION SEMINAR WORKING GROUP**

**Vice Admiral R. Mudimu, South Africa:**

Allow me also to register our great appreciation to Admiral Shuford and Admiral Mullen for having allowed the nations of the world to gather in Newport to exchange views that are aimed at shaping the destiny of our countries and the destiny of humanity, in order for us to share the resources of the sea together so that each country is powerful and able to live in peace with one another.

Admirals, I think you’ll greatly appreciate the difficulty of the immense size of the African continent, and that I’ve been given a very daunting task indeed. Our
continent currently is divided into four regions: North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. Of course, for South Africa, the situation, in terms of our relations with the world of nations, will change. However, my responsibility is to speak on behalf of this continent that has still to define itself among the nations of the world. I’ve decided as an introduction to say that the first step has been made in the correct direction towards the definition of the African continent.

Introduction

The Represented African Chiefs of Navies and Coast Guards and countries having large inland water bodies; having gathered for the “Seapower for Africa” Symposium in Cape Town, South Africa, over the period 29 to 31 August 2005 and having been exposed to a range of topical continental maritime issues, and being mindful of the need to productively use scarce resources, have found that Africa’s interests are inextricably allied to effective use and control of our maritime zones and interests. Such interests are directly intertwined with our economic and social well-being; and that the underlying principle is the need for co-operation and coordination in pursuit of improving maritime awareness in our countries, and to foster closer maritime ties and relationships between our respective navies.

African Seapower Symposium 2005

From the 29th to the 31st of August [2005], a giant step was made in South Africa, where the countries of Africa came together to appreciate and discuss the issues of maritime concern in a very difficult political environment on our continent. I think you are aware that many of these countries have just recently emerged from conflict and are still involved in different conflicts. However, Admirals, I think a giant step has been made. We think with this initiative we will be able to find one another as a continent and begin to shape our participation and create a better understanding of the navies of the African countries.

The question was asked, what are the top four or five maritime security challenges for the region? I think to understand the African continent you must understand the framework that has a lack of infrastructure and that has poor economic development. The continent is afflicted with civil conflict and regional poverty, which are fundamental challenges that must be addressed in conjunction with maritime security concerns. If you don’t address these particular issues, you’ll not come near to appreciating what the maritime concerns are. We say that in addition to this fundamental issue are the issues of health; lack of transparency between the people in government that leads to feelings of mistrust and the causes of the security challenges. May it be on land, in the air, or on the sea, the situation is the same.

Also fundamental is a lack of resources that leads to challenges in dealing with even the establishment of security issues. There is a fundamental lack of understanding within the governments on what navies are supposed to do and are responsible for, and consequently these navies are underfunded. As a result, they don’t have even the resources to do any of the maritime functions that they are required to do. So when you want to talk about navies in Africa, you must also think in terms of massive investments that must be aimed at ensuring that there is a
capability and capacity to begin to patrol and understand the maritime zones of the African countries.

Therefore, we said, what are the top four issues in terms of this particular problem? We said the first problem is a lack of naval assets. The countries of the African continent don’t have ships at sea to do the jobs that they must do. As a result, these countries become vulnerable to exploitation of resources and are unable to protect themselves. They are vulnerable to illegal fishing, human trafficking, and so many other crimes that happen at sea. Criminal activities and issues of piracy equally affect us. I think the members might be aware of the hijacking and attempts that have taken place recently on the coast of Somalia. As we speak now, I think that people are still being held hostage by the pirates in this regard.

The heavy trafficking in humans, drugs, and weapons on the continent assists in ensuring that conflict perpetuates in the continent rather than being addressed. Illegal seaborne immigration is a problem. The navies of the continent and their coast guards also don’t have resources to address even the issue of pollution. The countries of the continent that do have the capacity or near-capacity to address it meaningfully—South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Senegal—are, at their regional levels, able to interconnect with other nations of the world. They are able to work with the French, with the British, the American navies, with the other connections.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are part of the problem, because we don’t have the resources. Having understood this issue, what we have done—to inform this gathering—is that, in Namibia, South Africa contributed two harbor patrol boats so that they are able to at least have a meaningful presence at sea. We did the same with Mozambique: we contributed two harbor patrol boats so that they are able to have some meaningful presence at sea.

In what ways might cooperation with the maritime forces of other regions or nations contribute to solving these challenges? We say, first and foremost, there is a requirement among African nations to operationalize the concept of collaborative multinational utilization and interoperability of naval assets in pursuit of common objectives at national, regional, and continental levels. This includes empowering elements of national navies to perform coast guard functions and strengthen the capacity of landlocked countries to execute waterborne operations, because they don’t have these facilities. Many of our countries rely on foreign countries to train their students. In this regard, Brazil is doing an excellent job. The States are doing an excellent job. The French and the Germans are doing excellently in order to empower the countries of Africa through this regional cooperation, so that we have people able to operate the assets at sea.

In what ways would cooperation with the maritime forces of other regional nations contribute to solving these challenges? The African nations must take responsibility on maritime issues. They must form maritime organizations where they don’t exist, and they must build on the experience of the standing maritime committee of the SADC [Southern African Development Committee]. In the southern region, we have an annual meeting of the chiefs of the navies of the region—that is, South Africa, Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Zambia—where we’re able to share experiences and agree on the issues that need to be confronted jointly. We have recently agreed at the [African] Seapower Symposium
that because South Africa is a force that has assets, even in the great lakes where
we are mandated with the issues of riverine operations, South Africa must have
the capacity to put ships on the lakes; but in terms of the contingents on board the
ships they must include anybody from any of the African regions. We can have di-
vers from Tanzania and divers from Cameroon on board the South African vessel,
because at least we have that capacity, to provide assets so that we are able to ad-
dress the security concerns in our areas of operation.

We say that we need to coordinate and exchange information. In the West of Af-
rica, I think in Ghana they speak very well about the progress they are making in
that area. Senegal is speaking very well of the cooperation in their area that enables
them to share and exchange information on areas of threat. But the costs of conflict
between one African country and another make even the exchange of information
very difficult, even cooperation very difficult, because given the nature of the Afri-
can continent itself, we heavily rely on land forces rather than the navy. That’s why
the navies become vulnerable, because our governments invest a lot on land forces,
and perhaps some on air forces.

We need to have a common standard while we operate within our area, and we
say, as I already indicated, that the Seapower Symposium will assist a great deal. If
we say to ourselves we must use the bottom-up approach, it makes life difficult for
small navies or those that have worked with our countries; but if you use the original
muscle, we’ll be able to give power even to the modern navies, because we’re speak-
ing from a continental position.

So we’re saying that in terms of consensus we need to use the two approaches, the
top approach and the bottom approach, but with a lot of emphasis, because our
presidents are able to gather under the African Union to debate the issues of the se-
curity concerns of the African continent. And of course you will know that we agree
that the number-one problem in Africa is human security; terrorism and other is-
sues also manifest themselves, in a number of guises. As a result, if the nations of the
world don’t assist the African countries, they will become vulnerable in the event
they navigate off the African coasts.

We need solutions that must come from the African countries. The chiefs of the
navies of Africa must be able to stand up and fight for their slice of the budgets that
are being debated in the individual countries, so that the navy can be recognized as
a naval force. We need to continue to enhance South American and African coopera-
tion to maintain essential sea lines of communication on both eastern and western
coasts. That is very important. We need to set contingency plans for military and
nonmilitary issues, with stress on optimization and interoperability.

And we need to implement regional training and cross-training programs. As I
said, South Africa is doing a great deal in assisting in this regard with training the
Ghanaians, the Gabonese, with most of the countries, using the meager resources
that the South African Navy has. And of course we have encouraged these countries
also to train South Africans in their own countries. In that regard, you will find that
in Kenya, we have South African divers who have been trained there, in the staff col-
lege in Ghana we have South Africans there, so surely there is a cross-culture in
terms of training that takes place on the continent—though at minimal levels. So
we need to increase the capacity of these countries to be able to do this.
African nations must take responsibility on maritime issues
Form regional maritime organizations built on the SMC concept to incorporate all of Africa’s regions.
Coordinate, exchange information, set SOPs, set and maintain a common standard while continuing with the African Seapower Symposia to identify problem areas and find solutions to address them.
Continue and enhance South American and African cooperation to maintain essential SLOCs on both eastern and western coasts.
Set contingency plans for military and nonmilitary issues
Stress optimization and interoperability
Implement regional training and cross-training program

What cooperation mechanisms are currently in place to help overcome these challenges? As I said, the great start that has been made, which is applauded by all the people of the continent, was the idea itself of Africa’s Seapower Symposium. Of course, I said to Admiral Mullen that we stole this concept from the International Seapower Symposium here. What a great lesson that we have learned, because it helps humanity to expand. I think this is a force multiplier towards building countries of our world where there is peace. So at least we have seen the benefits of attending this Symposium.

Then there is the Maritime Committee under SADC, based in the southern region. The Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Commission needs to be enhanced and to be strengthened, as does the southwest Indian Ocean maritime cooperation and other regions. You must understand that even to host the Seapower Symposium in Africa was not an easy deal at all. South Africa had to put a lot of resources into ensuring that there is attendance on these issues. So part of the problem in the continent is that, even if these regional arrangements are there, some of the countries don’t have the resources to attend, to ensure that there is continuation. So we still have a lot of work to do in our continent in this regard, and of course we will take it upon ourselves, as a continent, to fight these issues; and we’re able to do a lot.

Are these measures adequate? No, none of these measures are adequate for the region. Of course, we say they are not; we will find new mechanisms to help form a regional maritime organization in cooperating with all of Africa’s regions, from north, east, west, and south. We must be able to come together and ensure that this continues, and we need to ensure that these regional and continental organizations communicate and are able to share intelligence.

Some of the constraints on the funding are lack of infrastructure, lack of understanding by people in other government organizations, and lack of maritime focus, because our governments contribute a lot to land forces.

How can the navies help eliminate these constraints? By educating our civilians and our governments about the importance of sea power and helping them realize that Africa depends a lot on sea trade—and as that is the case, if sea lines of communication are not open, commerce will not take place, and we’ll all be frustrated.

Yes, we need collaboration and cooperation from navies outside the region. Yes, this is possible. We need training from outside countries. The U.S. Coast Guard is very important, but most of the African countries don’t understand what the Coast Guard of America can do in terms of training. So they need to communicate with
the Coast Guard of the United States to be able to learn what training takes place there. We need to communicate and exchange information, as we said, through personnel exchange programs. Hydrography is a very important element to the African continent, and South Africa is ready to play a leading role in ensuring that this issue is attended to. And we say thanks to the American Navy, because they were able to discuss Article 98 [of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court], which we discovered was an impediment somehow to ensuring that we continue to benefit from this excellent program at this institute here. So thanks for the issues that were addressed adequately; I think we’ll be able in future to continue utilizing these facilities. I thank you, and I’ll be ready to take questions.

Dr. Watman:

Admiral Mudimu said he is ready to take questions. Are there people out there who are ready to ask questions?

Admiral, perhaps there will be later questions. Thank you very much. Now we will hear from Admiral Soto, representing the Colombian Navy and speaking for the Latin American Panel.

SOUTH AMERICAN REGION SEMINAR WORKING GROUP

Admiral Mauricio Soto Gomez, Colombia:

[Simultaneous translation from Spanish] Thank you very much, Admiral Mullen, on behalf of all my colleagues from South America. We thank you for having invited us and for sponsoring this very important Seapower Symposium. We among the South American countries have identified many of the same challenges that have been identified by Admiral Castro [North America/Caribbean Region Working Group] and the delegate representing the African navies [Vice Admiral Mudimu].

Perhaps the most significant maritime security challenges that we have identified would be the following. First of all, illicit and criminal activities through narcoterrorism—Admiral Castro was referring to this as well. He was saying that perhaps 90 percent of illicit drug trafficking originates on the northern coast of South America and the Colombian Pacific coast, and also the Caribbean coast of Colombia. For many of you, specially our colleagues from Europe, the threat from drug trafficking generates about four hundred tons of cocaine per year, and combined interdiction efforts, as well as information exchange, might only result in one seizure of perhaps 30 percent of that amount. This means that this criminal activity is a huge threat to maritime security.

The case is similar for terrorism in the South American region. We have the Panama Canal, which is a focal point for this type of activity. Thanks to an initiative from the Chilean Navy a few years ago, we initiated an exercise aimed at protecting the Panama Canal. More and more navies of the American continent are participating in this very important exercise. We believe that for all our countries the Panama Canal represents a crucial point for maritime traffic and for maritime trade. Illegal migration, similarly to what happens in Africa, for some years has been a large problem for some areas within the South American region, particularly the northern Pacific side of it—Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.
Our concerns include illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal fishing, potential exploitation of seabed resources, mining, etc., and natural disasters as well. Our Pacific coastline is threatened by the potential for a tsunami, and for this we require a high degree of coordination among the Pacific basin countries and an early warning or alert system—and perhaps we also need to learn from the lessons taught by the Asian tsunami last year.

Port security is another issue. We need to protect our trade. More than 90 percent of world trade goes by sea, and this requires a high level of security at the ports. In the Western Hemisphere, perhaps piracy has decreased in the ports. We saw yesterday that in the Strait of Malacca there are perhaps thirty or forty cases of piracy per year. In our region it’s a much smaller number. This is a result of the strengthening of maritime police and coast guards. But we need to reach higher standards of security so we can be as efficient as possible in our trade, and this will be a great challenge. We need to make it so that security—or the lack thereof—is not an impediment or an obstacle to trade. These threats are related to the perception that each country has regarding the various levels of threats that it faces. Therefore, in response, we must have a capacity to counteract these threats and exercise as much control as necessary—and to do it in a sensitive way in a specific maritime area and in a way that actually respects the interests of various nations.

Our ideas for improving maritime cooperation between maritime forces include the idea that it’s very important to enhance and strengthen existing agreements, as well as conventions that have already been signed—such as SOLAS, the ISPSC, the Vienna Convention on Illicit Trade of 1988, and the most important one, the Law of the Sea, which is perhaps the greatest legal success of the nations, at the Jamaica convention of 1982. We have a large body of regulation already, but what we need to do is improve our actions so that those regulations can be translated into effective action by our countries. We need to truly enhance and activate all these agreements.

One very important element for improving cooperation is establishing, or considering establishing, an information-sharing network for maritime activities that would allow us to give a rapid and immediate response to attack the various types of challenges and threats that we face today. We would like to have a communications network that would allow us to exchange all types of information in real time. For certain maritime activities, we already have this. Some Caribbean countries, for example, and some South American countries have CNIES [Counter Narcotic Information Exchange System], which is an exchange of information with the U.S. Coast Guard through a computer network that provides a large amount of information in real time to counter the common threat of drug trafficking.

It is also important that we work together on common legislation for certain maritime issues and aspects. Why? What for some countries might be a minor misdemeanor would be a major crime in other countries, so when countries share maritime areas, what the criminals do is just shift that activity to areas where control is less strict.

We also believe that it is important to improve on agreements and communications at the bilateral and regional levels in order to ensure that in each region we can work for the benefit of that area and seek a solution to challenges that are regional in nature, as we have seen today. Many of these challenges are not so regional anymore. If you listen to presentations from Africa, North America,
Central America, you can see that we share the same challenges. Therefore, our response to those challenges, within a region as large as the Americas or Africa, and the solution to them should represent a common set of solutions.

What are the initiatives that we propose in order to improve cooperation among navies in the next few years? We believe that, as somebody was saying today, a good solution would be to use the Internet to exchange information in real time, naturally using an adequate level of security in accordance with the type of information being exchanged. But it would be a quick and inexpensive method, and today it is possible to provide it with security at a degree that would make it adequate even for certain confidential cases.

And we should go back to conducting war games. That’s a good practice, because it allows us to test out certain plans at a relatively low cost. War games also allow us to improve our level of coordination, especially at this time, when many of those challenges come from an asymmetrical type of warfare—which, as we have mentioned in this Symposium, is a situation in which it is very hard to find the enemy, although it might be very easy to kill him. This is just the opposite of conventional war, in which it is quite easy to find a huge naval force but very difficult to destroy it. And this is why we feel that war games should continue, and we should include in them new types of threats.

We are also in favor of promoting bilateral and multilateral agreements as a way to find solutions to many maritime problems. Of course, we hope that it would be within the framework of existing laws and agreements, and here we cite again the example of maritime control of the Southern Atlantic maritime area. This is a type of cooperation that has been in existence for approximately fifty years and has yielded excellent results in the control of an enormous maritime area shared by Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. That is an example that we hope would be emulated in other regions. The Navy of the Argentine Republic has offered its help, its cooperation, in illustrating and showing this model, to see whether it can be adopted in other countries.

And lastly, in the next few years, at a general level, we believe that we should have a global information exchange system—a global communication system for all activities of the navies, all the maritime activities. This will help reap great benefits for maritime security, as well as for humanitarian assistance in case of a disaster.

All of this will be possible only if we manage to receive the support and political will of our political leaders, so that we can pass maritime laws that would enable us to initiate these processes and authorize those who are working on this to work in a more coordinated, more joint fashion, always seeking to fulfill these common objectives.

Thank you again, Admiral Mullen, for the invitation, and thank you very much for listening to my presentation. That’s all.

Dr. Watman:

Well, here we are. Are there questions or comments with respect to the last speaker and his material, or are there more general questions or comments that we can entertain at this point? You all must have many questions and comments, but perhaps you’ll mention them at some other time. Admiral—this is to Admiral Shuford—it is now 1100; we are one minute away from the scheduled stopping point of this
seminar. Do you want me to do as we talked about before and summarize? Or would you like me to turn the mike over to you right now?

Rear Admiral Shuford:
I think it would be useful for you to make a summary, if you have that available now.

Dr. Watman:
I do. This is a summary of my impressions from having studied the presentations today. I received them a little while earlier and was able to study them and then to listen carefully to the remarks.

We are here, after all, to identify two things, it seems to me: one, a strategy by which greater maritime interaction, collaboration, and mutual support can be promoted—a strategy; and two, the issues where there seem to be a great likelihood of a way forward. Let me comment, then, on both of those, please.

I think that the panels, all taken together, were very instructive with respect to a strategy for going forward. There is a time-honored strategy in negotiation—in fact, it was precisely this strategy that enabled the European Union to be created, and many others—which is, when you have a very knotty and complex problem, identify the easier portions of that problem, the more self-contained portions, and negotiate those. The success at achieving collaboration and agreement in those areas builds up confidence and trust and enables you then to step forward into more knotty and difficult areas. What we've heard repeatedly today is the instruction, the admonition, to focus on the simple before the difficult, focus on a small number of things at one time, not try to build a global, all-encompassing way forward for the next fifty years. Focus on the things about which there is a relative consensus already and do it in the form of building blocks—freestanding building blocks, if you will—so that the accomplishment of one building block does not require, and is not diminished by the lack of, accomplishment in other building blocks.

If that's the strategy, then what are the issues that the speakers and the panels have instructed us to focus on? I believe they're very clear.

Each panel mentioned, at or near the top of its list, the importance of access to information and sharing of information. All mentioned, with some degree of surprise and pleasure, the degree to which that is going on today under the auspices of many different activities and programs; but it is, I think, the unanimous view of everyone who presented that we can profitably do much better in these areas. Some mentioned a common operating picture; some did not. But if you can think of that in the abstract, that is the ideal to be striven for.

Second was the importance of the ability to communicate with one another—which, of course, in its technical incarnation is interoperability of communications. But also it gets into the areas of cultural awareness and a variety of things that enable people to communicate better, not just the technical.

Third, there is, I think, complete consensus on an important set of legal issues. There is no state that reported out today, and no region, that does not regard drugs as dangerous to it, and therefore drug smuggling as dangerous to it. Everyone pointed out the pernicious impact of trafficking in human beings and smuggling of all kinds, contraband of all kinds, including weapons—especially weapons, perhaps; and piracy as well. When you think about it, folks, in a world in which there's
an awful lot to disagree about, to have consensus on these kinds of areas is a very important thing to realize and a very important step.

Also and finally, there was consensus, I would offer to you, in certain subject areas—not necessarily legal, but substantive areas; and these are as follows.

- The importance of being able to collaborate more effectively than we do, and more promptly than we do, in search and rescue; no one can object to that.
- Humanitarian assistance—no one can object to that.
- Protection of the environment.
- Traffic control and identification of some sort—there is disagreement about precisely what form that would take, but there’s unanimity, I believe, as to the need to do it more thoroughly, more accurately, in a more timely way, and extend the floor of traffic control and identification to increasingly smaller ships.

With that, I will call this part of the meeting to a conclusion and ask Admiral Shuford if he would come to the podium and give us his remarks.

**Professor Mocini:**

Thank you, Dr. Watman. I would like you to take your seats at this point, and I propose a round of applause for Dr. Watman and the eight panelists.
Closing Remarks

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford and
Admiral Michael G. Mullen

Professor Vincent Mocini, Naval War College:

To allow the President of the War College and the Chief of Naval Operations to have the final words, I will just very briefly and succinctly go over closing administrative notes [not reproduced here]. . . And finally, on a personal note, I’ve really enjoyed this Symposium, and I look forward to 2007 very much.

At this point, I would like to bring back to the podium Rear Admiral Shuford, the President of the War College. Thank you.

Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford:

Vince, thank you; and thank you for a superb job, not only of moderating, but of being a principal driver to pull some of this together. I applaud your efforts.

And as we’re ready to bid our farewells one to another, I simply want to say thank you to each of you. I’ll tell you, this old college has been so very honored to have on its decks and in its passageways folks of such magnificent quality as you here today. Admiral Mullen, I think, said it best last night when he said we have been electrified by your genius and your passion.

For me, I’m personally reminded, as I look at all the uniforms out there, how profoundly proud I am to be a part of this very special culture. When Admiral Mullen began to talk on the first day, that was something I think that was clearly underscored and that we’ve reflected upon over these last several days in Spruance Hall and in the seminar rooms. It’s a culture that is different from armies and air forces and land-based agencies.

I like the metaphor that we’ve used several times about the commons—how well it conveys this special culture that we have of men and women that go down to the sea in ships, every night, every day. Coast Guard, Navy, we go out into this commons, and it’s like men and women of a great city walking down, flowing, day and night into the plaza, the square, the commons. They go there to do business, to work with their friends, and to enjoy their freedoms.

Over these past three days we have seen many of our old friends and renewed those friendships. We’ve made many new friends—I certainly have, and I’m so appreciative of that. It’s my great hope that as we each return to our own nations, to our own homes, time does not erode the warmth of this experience, those bonds that we have formed here, and the consensus that to some significant degree has evolved during this week.

Thank you all again for coming, for sharing your time, your intellect, your genius, and your passion. This is my first International Seapower Symposium, but I, like many of you, have been to many symposia. I cannot imagine one that was as credible and made as much progress as I believe—and, in listening to many of you, as you believe—we have made here over these last few days.
Finally, a special particular thanks to Admiral John Morgan, Charlie Martoglio, Captain Lee Smith, and a list too long for me to enumerate right now of those folks who collaborated so brilliantly and effectively with my team here in Newport. We certainly worked well together. John, thank you for your leadership there. We couldn’t have pulled this off without all the work, all the substantive stuff behind the scenes; the credit there goes to Admiral Morgan and his staff. And then, lastly, Admiral Mullen—to you, sir, thank you for letting the Naval War College be a part of this vital work we are doing here. Over to you, sir.

Admiral Michael Mullen:

I recognize I’m beyond the five-minute attention span that Admiral Singh talked about earlier today. I will try to wrap it up very quickly.

First of all, I’d just like to say once again how grateful I am to my staff in Washington, led by John Morgan; to Jake and Kathy Shuford for being such gracious hosts; and for this venerable institution that we care about a lot. And when I say “we,” this isn’t just the United States Navy. If there is a message clear to me in all of this, it is the value of this institution, and that has been expressed by your participation and the participation of over seventy countries, just in these three days and throughout the years.

I have some thoughts. I’ll be very brief. I have two slides.

**Observations**

- Strengthening maritime capacity of individual nations generally supported
- Regional symposia well developed and moving ahead
  - Recognition of challenges
  - Building response capabilities
- Global view of maritime security emerging ... many believe important

**Primacy of sovereignty ... value of collaboration in areas of common interest**

These are some comments that I would make with respect to what has occurred here. I think we agree on the need to strengthen and build the capacity that we’ve been discussing these last three days. I am taken by how far along some of the
regional symposia are, and we should, I think, be mindful and careful about leveraging that for the future. I think that it ties into the recognition of challenges and the ability to build responsive capabilities, and that a global view of maritime security is emerging, mindful of a model such as the one shown on the right side of the slide, and that clearly we must deal with the primacy of each country’s sovereignty, as well as understand the value of collaboration.

Way Ahead

- Blue Water Navies export security cooperation to increase capacity of coalition partners—agree to include discussion of results at regional symposia
- Regional symposia invite observers from all other regions to symposia
  - Building trust and cross-regional relationships
  - Broadening lines of communication established at ISS 17
- Regional symposia include active discussion of collaboration between regions on symposium agendas
- US Navy agrees to foster emerging symposia when invited by regional nations

Goal is networked regions ...  
... US Navy willing to assist as invited ...  
... agree to discuss progress at ISS 18

Some thoughts about a possible way ahead—and this is more as a thought than it is clearly for direction: Those who have built capacity in the past ensure that we reach as far as we possibly can—or you reach as far as you possibly can—into the regional symposia, and that the regional symposia over the next year or two reach to other observers. I thought Dr. Watman summarized it well: the ability to build confidence, to build trust in taking small steps, and to start to work across regional or cross-regional relationships. There is an active observation and participation, if you will, across regional symposia to share ideas. And clearly I would be willing to foster the emerging symposia, but—I say that with all sincerity—only if invited. And I really mean that. If we are able to help in the United States Navy, I am anxious to do that.

And then we need to set up some kind of mechanism that supports what we do two years from now, and between now and then. We should not just be figuring out what happens just before the next Symposium, but we ought to try to think of the fact that this is an International Seapower Symposium, and how do we use that?

A couple of other thoughts: one, we all, as senior leaders of our navies and coast guards—and war colleges and naval academies, for that matter—are responsible
for many things, but most of all I think we’re responsible for leadership. And in that we know we lead the maritime forces of the world. I am fond of saying to those with whom I speak, my peers, the leaders within my organization, “It is our turn. There have been many who have gone before us. They have gone before us; it is now our turn to lead. Time is fleeting. There isn’t enough time. There isn’t enough time. There isn’t enough time.” So this sense of urgency that is there for me is incredibly high, and I think about that every day.

At this seminar there are those who are here for the first time. I am particularly appreciative of those from Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe. There are individuals who are here for the last time, and I know some of them personally. They are good friends. I won’t single them out. Clearly it’s not their nations that are here for the last time, but the individuals who participated, and in many cases so eloquently; I am eternally grateful both for your friendship and your participation. And then I would ask you to tell your friends who aren’t here of the value, that they might come the next time because of the value that you see.

I was struck today by Admiral Singh’s presentation and by our leaders from both India and Pakistan, who spoke of principles around which to build these very, very complex issues. Some of them were specifically on slides, but I was struck by the respect for each other, the tolerance for each other. It does take patience—patience inside a sense of urgency, in these fleeting times, because our time is so short and the task so immense. We’ve said time and time again: “Small steps—small steps.”

Remembering the celebration two nights ago for those who graduated in the past, and particularly our young people in the classes that are here now from so many countries, I would emphasize that to educate and train our young, to share this institution, as well as institutions around the world, and to exchange that education is as valuable and invaluable a principle, if you will, as we move ahead. And Admiral Mudimu, I would not be concerned one bit about stealing anybody’s good idea. In every symposium, everybody should be encouraged to do that.

We talked about the global commons, and we talked about a different view of international sea power. It is tied to our security, our political progress, our economic development. It is in great part tied to our collective future and, as I think you heard me say earlier, to our children and the betterment of their lives and their futures.

I like to think about this in terms of what we can do, not what we can’t do. We had some discussions about lawyers—always controversial. We have seen, in my time, that lawyers who are operationally up to speed understand our problems much better than those who are not, and we have seen them fight for us to see what they can do, not what they can’t do. I would offer that the same is true for politicians. And this gets back to leadership. It was in the presentations this morning: In the leadership positions that we’re in, it is our responsibility to take these issues to the politicians. Too many people make our lives hard. We should make their lives hard in that regard. If we don’t, they will never see those issues. That’s part of our responsibility. We will be rejected—I understand that—but we must go back, back to the principles and what we believe in, and I do believe that over time things will change. I’ll use the example of rules of engagement, which many years ago were incredibly challenging, varying country by country, from one alliance to another. I have seen them evolve over time in ways that I never thought were possible. So take it to our politicians. I think that’s part of our responsibility.
We also did not say much about this today, but I offer as an exceptionally good model the JIAT South model for the interagency piece, which we all struggle with; we’ve talked of that, but it’s been out and operating for many years, and it offers solutions to that very difficult problem. Again, places where we’ve succeeded in the past can tell us much about the future.

Then, a question to us: Must it always take a crisis in order for us to break down the barriers? And I would ask, aren’t we in a crisis? We should recognize that and use it to continue to break the barriers down.

I think my expectations for this Symposium have been more than met. All of us have expended great resources to attend this conference. My expectation when we do that is always that we’ll get something out of it, get a good return for the investment up front. Certainly, on the feedback I’ve gotten, and just in listening to the panels and the energy that was in the seminars yesterday afternoon, it is more than worth the investment. That kind of outcome is a great one. This has been a tremendous value to me, personally and professionally.

I’ve seen that the maturity levels of the discussion—to compare to two years ago, the understanding of the issues, the sense of urgency, the sophistication of the discussion—have moved up dramatically. And again, as I said to many of you individually, because you chose to come, because you chose to participate, because you chose to bring your spouses, it moved this level up dramatically, I believe. I would look to have that standard moved up yet again two years from now.

Clearly the face of international sea power is changing. Again, I am very grateful to see you renew friendships with old friends, make new friends that I know will last a long time, and I look forward to seeing you—not just two years from now, but, many of you, between now and then.

Both Deborah and I wish you and your families all the best. Have a safe trip, and, as we say here, fair winds and following seas. Thank you very much.
APPENDIX A

List of Delegates

United States
ADM Mike Mullen
RADM Jacob Shuford

Angola
ADM Feliciano Dos Santos
RADM Manuel Ferreira De Jesus

Argentina
ADM Jorge Godoy
VADM Ricardo Rodríguez
CAPT Andres Di Vicenzo

Australia
VADM Russell Shalders
CAPT David Letts

Azerbaijan
VADM Shahin A. Sultanov
LCDR Shafi Sultanov

Bahamas
CDR Albert C. Armbrister

Bangladesh
RADM Hasan Ali Khan
CDR Mohammad Abu Ashraf

Bolivia
ADM Jorge Botelho Monje
CAPT Carlos Valverde Maldonado

Brazil
ADM Roberto de Guimarães Carvalho
RADM Antonio Ruy de Almeida Silva

Bulgaria
RADM Minko S. Kavaldzhiev
MG Evgeni P. Manev
Cameroon
VADM Ngouah Ngally Guillaume

Canada
VADM M. Bruce MacLean
CAPT William A. Woodburn

Chile
ADM Rodolfo Codina Diaz
VADM Francisco Martínez Villarroel
CAPT Enrique Larrañaga

Colombia
ADM Mauricio Soto Gomez

Croatia
ADM Zdravko Kardum

Denmark
VADM Tim Sloth Jørgensen
RADM Nils Christian Wang

Dominican Republic
VADM César De Windt Ruiz
RADM Juan Victor Sosa Ruiz

Ecuador
RADM Héctor Holguín Darquea
CAPT Jorge Luis Gross Albornoz

Egypt
RADM Raouf Mahmoud Bassiouny
RADM Mohamed Saad Zaghloul Abdel Karim

El Salvador
CAPT José Daniel Castellanos Cabezas
CAPT Marco Antonio Palcios Luna

Estonia
CDR Ahti Piirimägi

Finland
VADM Hans Vilhelm Holmström
CAPT Kai Uolevi Varsio
France
ADM Alain Oudot de Dainville
RADM Michel de Fresse de Monval

Gabon
Commander Major Paul Bivigou-Nziengui

Georgia
MG David Gulua
CAPT Gocha Vetriakov
CDR Jimsher Rukhadze

Germany
VADM Lutz Feldt
CAPT Heinrich Lange

Ghana
COMO Geoffrey Mawuli Biekro
COMO Matthew Quashie

Greece
RADM Vasilios Martzoukos

Guatemala
CAPT Luis Alfredo Monteroso de la Mora
CAPT Carlos Rene Alvarado Fernandez

Guinea-Bissau
CAPT Americo Na Tchuto
LCDR Nanda M’Boto

Honduras
CAPT Jose Eduardo Espinal Paz
CDR Mauricio Javier Aleman Quiroz

India
VADM Arun Kumar Singh
VADM Jagjit Singh Bedi

Indonesia
RADM Lisman Sosialisman

Ireland
CDRE Frances Lynch
CDR Thomas Tuohy
Israel
RADM David ben Bashat
CAPT Azarel Ram

Italy
ADM Sergio Biraghi
RADM Rinaldo Cherubino Veri

Japan
VADM Tsutomu Tamura

Jordan
BG Dari Rajeb Nofal Alzaben

Korea
VADM Park In-Yong

Latvia
CDR Senior Grade Andrejs Zvaigzne

Lithuania
RDML Kestutis Macijauskas

Malaysia
Datuk Abu Talib bin Hj Harun
ADM Datuk Ilyas bin Hj Din

Malta
BG Carmel Vassallo

Mexico
VADM Alberto Castro Rosas
RADM Conrado Aparicio Blanco

Morocco
CAPT Lahcen Lyamlouli

Netherlands
VADM Jan Willem Kelder

New Zealand
RADM David Ian Ledson
COMO Patrick Joseph Williams

Nicaragua
CAPT Juan S. Estrada
COL Juan Alberto Molinares Hurtado
Norway
RADM Jan Eirik Finseth

Pakistan
RADM Bakhtirr Mohsin
BG Firzok Attaullah
COMO Agha Danish

Paraguay
RADM Caballero Della Loggia
CAPT German Gimenez Roman

Peru
ADM Jorge Ampuero Trabucco
RADM Carlos Tejada Mera

Philippines
RADM Jorge de Guzman Necesito

Poland
ADM Roman Krzyzelewski
RADM Zygmunt Kitowski

Portugal
ADM Francisco António Torres Vidal Abreu
VADM Antonio Carlos Rebelo Duarte

Qatar
BG Mohammad Nasser Mubarak Al Shogairi Al Mohanadi

Romania
RADM Gheorghe Marin
CAPT Cornell Mihai

Sao Tome Y Principe
LT COL Justimo do Ramos Lima

Saudi Arabia
RADM Dakheel Allah Al-Wagdani

Senegal
CAPT Ousmane Ibrahima Sall
LCDR Jean Jaques Lopez

Singapore
RADM Ronnie Tay
COL Sim Tiong Kian
South Africa
VADM R. Mudimu
RADM R. W. Higgs

Spain
ADM Fernando Armada Vadillo
VADM Juan Carlos Muñoz-Delgado Diaz del Rio

Sri Lanka
RADM Sarath Ratnakeerthi

Sweden
RADM Anders Grenstad

Thailand
RADM Paiboot Kaensarn

Turkey
RADM Can Erenoglu
RADM Kadir Sagdic

United Arab Emirates
BG Mohammed Mahmood Al Madani
COL Saleh Al Aidarous

United Kingdom
ADM Sir Alan West
COMO C. J. Gass

United States
RDML Michael A. Brown
AMB Carey Cavanaugh
COMO Steve Cleary
VADM Terry M. Cross
RDML Jan C. Gaudio
PROF Jim Giblin
RDML Cecil Haney
RDML Harry B. Harris
RADM John C. Harvey, Jr.
AMB Rose M. Likins
RADM Joseph Maguire
RDML Michael K. Mahon
RDML Charles W. Martoglio
RADM Robert T. Moeller
VADM John G. Morgan, Jr.
RADM Robert B. Murrett
ADM John B. Nathman
United States (continued)

RDM. Joseph Nimmich  
ADM. Gary Roughead  
RDM. James W. Stevenson, Jr.

Uruguay

RADM Carlos Rafael Magliocca Tholke  
CAPT Italo Miguel Sorrenti Scordamaya

Yemen

BG Saleh Ali Mujally
INTRODUCTION

The Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium (ISS), which took place from 20 to 22 September 2005, represented a major step forward in the long tradition of successful Newport dialogues among the leaders of the world’s navies. Seventy states were represented by 141 national maritime leaders; some seven countries for the first time, a record for an ISS. Moreover, the three full-panel sessions and the eight regional working groups demonstrated a remarkable convergence in their responses to the tasks the ISS host, Admiral Mullen, had set them at the outset of ISS:

1. To define the principal challenges to maritime security to their nations and to their regions
2. To identify the major new regional initiatives to meet these that they might take over the next five years
3. To describe the instruments and organizational frameworks they saw as most appropriate to implement these initiatives and to move to new levels of maritime security.

OVERARCHING THEMES

Throughout the ISS, there were two common threads: the urgent need to increase information and information sharing, and the equally urgent need to increase the level of maritime security cooperation within and across regions. Few of the ISS leaders stressed solutions that required radical new technologies or complex new designs or organizational frameworks. Rather, the focus was on progressive, systematic improvement and expansion of existing regional cooperation, to include:

- Broader scope and reach of regional organizations and symposia
- A wider range and deeper level of information sharing
- An increase in the number of channels for regular and crisis communication
- Expansion of regional agreements on operational practices (SOPs, ROEs, SAR, crisis organization, comprehensive data banks)
- A heightened pace and more functional scope of intra- and cross-regional exchanges for education and training, to include war gaming.
THE CHALLENGES FACED

Most marked in all the discussions was the degree of fundamental agreement on the principal maritime security challenges faced. The list itself and the rankings each region gave to challenges in their seminar out briefs are shown in the table below. These reflect the expansion of maritime concerns and responsibilities in the 15 years since the end of the Cold War. As always, even when not explicitly ranked, freedom of the seas remains the first priority for most maritime leaders; this includes the maintenance of SLOCs, economic enterprise zones, and the free transit of people and goods. The terrorist challenge, including the direct threat to port security, reflected the intensity of the reconsiderations since 9/11. But not too far behind in the ISS rankings are the challenges posed by the fused problems of “drugs and thugs,” and of ensuring environmental protection and the prevention of pollution. The impact of the Asia tsunami and of Hurricane Katrina also meant strong emphasis on

**Figure 1: ISS Ranking of Principal Maritime Security Challenges in Next 5 Years by Regions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>North America &amp; Caribbean</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Northwest Europe &amp; Caspian</th>
<th>Mediterranean</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Seas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs &amp; Thugs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Emigration Flows</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Crisis Response</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Support at Home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Instability/Weak Goverance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the challenges navies faced in mounting humanitarian/disaster aid and in the timely organization of crisis response.

The specific remedies ISS leaders suggested to meet these challenges included a mix of both organizational and functional improvements. Discussion returned at numerous points to improved information sharing between maritime forces and their increasingly important partners—from customs and immigration services as well as the Coast Guard establishment. This was of highest priority at the national as well as regional levels for most of the participants. Particular attention was to be given to overcoming gaps in regional “seams,” and to intraregional intelligence-sharing consistent with national sovereignty and legal domains. Potent regional solutions could also be found in step-by-step building-block initiatives for enhanced cooperation that could stand independently. A number also saw the need to extend global conventions under the aegis of the United Nations or to build on the cooperative experiences under the Proliferation Security Initiative of the last several years.

Three of the regional discussion groups also urged steps toward the progressive establishment of a global system to plot world shipping paths and patterns. Included would be the gradual expansion across regions and the extension to smaller and smaller ships of automatic identification systems (AIS). At its core, this involved a political, rather than a technological, challenge.

**APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORKS**

Strengthening existing cooperation arrangements—regional and even bilateral—was seen by almost all participants as the appropriate near-term strategy choice. No grand new design was needed; these frameworks, if improved, would be sufficient to ensure better information sharing, coordination of practices and protocols, educational/training exchanges, and even political crisis cooperation. Moreover, there should be no unnecessary linking of specific regional initiatives or efforts within each region. Adopting the self-sustaining building-block approach of the WPNS model would prevent failed or delayed initiatives from stalemating the entire effort. In many senses, there were political choices to be made, not technological or even operational problems to be resolved.

But the goal to be kept in mind was also that of a system of networked regions with an increasingly common understanding of maritime security and its requirements. Only then would the maximum level of information and communication be realized in the global maritime commons to confront the new and continuing challenges now faced.

**THE WAYS FORWARD**

Recommendations by individual leaders and the regional seminar out briefs included a rich menu of possible future actions to be taken by the CNO, with facilitating actions by the Naval War College. Among others were:

1. Emphasis on and practical incentives for deepening regional cooperative organizations and agreements, with an eventual global network of regions in mind
2. Support for and encouragement of bilateral and regional information-sharing through
a. American example and “demonstration effects”
b. Fostering of codes of “best practice”
c. Cataloging available technological options.
3. Presence as invited at regional symposia and regional cooperation/training events
4. Dissemination and education focused on “lessons learned” from maritime/humanitarian disaster response—e.g., organization of crisis response teams, preorganization of supplies, equipment, cooperative training, and agreements on emergency standard practices
5. Expansion of opportunities for intra- and cross-regional educational exchanges—including exchange of training materials such as EXTAC manuals
6. Discussions and gaming of range of options for maritime traffic tracking systems
7. Regional war-gaming of consequences/procedures for crisis response cooperation.