Report of the Proceedings

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6 Sweden RADM Jörgen Eriksson
7 South Africa VADM Johan F. Retief
8 Sri Lanka VADM Daya W. K. Sandagiri
9 Israel VADM Yedidia Ya’ari
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank &amp; Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>ADM Marcello de Donno</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>RADM John Kodzo Gbena</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>VADM Samuel Afolayan</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>ADM Miguel Vergara</td>
</tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>VADM Ronald S. Buck</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>ADM Carlos Giani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>ADM Ricardo Arbocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>RADM Victor Blidea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>MG P. O. Awitta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>ADM Roman Krzyżelewski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>RADM Hans V. Holmstrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>RADM Sultanov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>VADM Michel Hellemans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>BG Dari Rageb Nofal Alzaben</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>VADM Chris Ritchie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>BG Mubarak Ahmed S. A. Al-Mannai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>VADM Gigla Zurab Iremadze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>VADM Werapon Waranon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>ADM Shahid Karimullah</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>ADM Francisco Antonio Torres Vidal Abreu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>RADM Zdravko Kardum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>ADM Koichi Furusho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>RADM Victor Hugo Rosero Barba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>BRIG Rupert Montanaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>RADM Ronnie Tay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>VADM Ernesto De Leon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>VADM Lutz Feldt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>ADM Jung-Il Moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>VADM Ruurt A. A. Klaver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>RADM Emil Ivanov Lyutskanov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>BG Ruais Al Mujajwar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>VADM Euripides Antonio Uribe Peguero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>VADM Jorge Omar Godoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>RADM Jan Eirik Finseth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>RADM Kurt Birger Jensen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SIXTEENTH
INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

Report of the Proceedings
26–29 October 2003

Edited by

John B. Hattendorf
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History
Naval War College

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
2004
Editor’s Note

The editor has made every attempt to establish a clear and accurate record of the symposium proceedings, one that faithfully records the opinions and views of the participants. In establishing the printed text from speaking notes, transcripts, seminar notes, and tape recordings of speakers or of the official English-language simultaneous translators, the editor has silently corrected slips of grammar, spelling, and wording. He has inserted full names and ranks, when omitted by the speaker, and occasionally a word or phrase in square brackets to clarify the text.

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Newport
June 2004

J. B. H.
# Table of Contents

Plenary Sessions

## Chapter 1: Welcoming Remarks
Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route, U.S. Navy  
President, Naval War College .......................... 1

## Chapter 2: Keynote Address: Sea Power for Peace, Prosperity, and Security
Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations .......................... 5

## Chapter 3: Panel Discussion One: Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level
Moderator: Rear Admiral Richard B. Porterfield, United States .......................... 13

*Panel:*

- **Coordinating Rules of Engagement**  
  Vice Admiral Ruurt A. A. Klaver, Netherlands .......... 15

- **C⁴ Connectivity**  
  Vice Admiral Ernesto De Leon, Philippines .......... 17
 Major General Ahmad Yusef Al Mulla, Kuwait .......... 20

- **Force Protection**  
  Admiral Marcello de Donno, Italy .......................... 21

- **ISR Collaboration**  
  Rear Admiral Richard B. Porterfield, United States ...... 24

*Discussion*  ........................................... 29

## Chapter 4: Luncheon Address: Maritime Power for the Twenty-First Century
Admiral Thomas H. Collins  
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard .......................... 41

*Discussion* ........................................... 47

## Chapter 5: Panel Discussion Two: New Operational Challenges of Maritime Security
Moderator: Rear Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth, Norway .......................... 55
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Panel:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Maritime Interception</strong></th>
<th>Vice Admiral Ronald S. Buck, Canada</th>
<th>55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Antipiracy</strong></td>
<td>Rear Admiral Ronnie Tay, Singapore</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Port Security</strong></td>
<td>Vice Admiral Yedidia Ya’ari, Israel</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Controlling Contraband</strong></td>
<td>Admiral Miguel Vergara, Chile</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Assistance, Nation-Building, and Peacekeeping</strong></td>
<td>Rear Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth, Norway</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 6  **Panel Discussion Three: Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level**  
Moderator: Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Australia 85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Panel:</strong></th>
<th><strong>Enhanced Military Readiness</strong></th>
<th>Admiral Shahid Karimullah, Pakistan</th>
<th>85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Worldwide Maritime Intelligence</strong></td>
<td>Admiral Thomas H. Collins, United States</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Western Mediterranean</strong></td>
<td>Admiral Koichi Furusho, Japan</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td>Vice Admiral Johan F. Retief, South Africa</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Latin America</strong></td>
<td>Vice Admiral Jorge Omar Godoy, Argentina</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>North Atlantic</strong></td>
<td>Admiral Roman Krzyżewski, Poland</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Arabian Sea</strong></td>
<td>Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Australia</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Discussion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7  Luncheon Address: Maritime Power for the Twenty-First Century

The Honorable Gordon England
Secretary of the Navy, United States .........................................119

Discussion ..................................................................................126

Chapter 8  Seminar Working Group Reports

Moderator: Dr. Kenneth Watman
Chairman, War Gaming Department
Naval War College .................................................................129

Seminar One:
Rear Admiral Mujtaba, Bangladesh ........................................130

Seminar Two:
Rear Admiral El-Arbi, Tunisia.............................................131

Seminar Three:
Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada.........................................132

Seminar Four:
Rear Admiral McHaffie, New Zealand ...............................136

Seminar Five:
Vice Admiral Afolayan, Nigeria..........................................143

Discussion ..................................................................................145

Chapter 9  Closing Remarks

Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route.................................................149
Admiral Vern Clark ..................................................................149

Chapter 10  Seminar Working Groups

Introduction ..............................................................................155

Orders of Battle and Platform Capabilities ..............................156

Seminar One:
Freedom of Navigation .......................................................160

Seminar Two:
Piracy ..................................................................................162

Seminar Three:
Preventing Loss of Life at Sea .............................................167

Seminar Four:
Naval Support to Civil Authorities ....................................170
Seminar Five:
Antiterrorism/MIO; Suspected WMD at Sea ...............173

Seminar Six:
Antiterrorism/Force Protection ..............................178

Seminar Seven:
Illegal Fishing ......................................................181

Seminar Eight:
Humanitarian Assistance .........................................185

Chapter 11 List of Delegates ........................................189
List of Illustrations

Chapter 3  Panel Discussion One: Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level
Figure 1. Numerous C4I Challenges .......................................................21
Figure 2. Coalition Naval Order of Battle, 11 September 2001 ..........24
Figure 3. Coalition Naval Order of Battle, 16 February 2002 .........25
Figure 4. 2002 Coalition ISR Collaboration ........................................26
Figure 5. Today’s Coalition ISR Collaboration ...............................27
Figure 6. Future Coalition ISR Collaboration ..............................28
Figure 7. Nondisclosure Notice .......................................................38

Chapter 5  Panel Discussion Two: New Operational Challenges of Maritime Security
Figure 1. Recent Operations ...............................................................56
Figure 2. Theatre of Operations .........................................................57
Figure 3. Canadian Roles in Theatre ...............................................57
Figure 4. Elements of Interoperability .............................................58
Figure 5. C4I Issues ........................................................................59
Figure 6. COWAN & BFEM ...............................................................59
Figure 7. Differing Nations’ ROE ......................................................60
Figure 8. Challenges of Boardings .................................................61
Figure 9. Modern Boarding Operations—Keys to Success ..........62
Figure 10. Very Highly Trained Boarding Teams ..........................62
Figure 11. Seapower Functions (Chilean Defense Policy) ............72
Figure 12. The Three Vectors of Chilean Maritime Strategy .........73
Figure 13. Wars Are Fought in Countries That Can Least Afford Them .................................................................76
Figure 14. Civilian Fatalities Are Increasing .................................77
Figure 15. Number of Refugees and Displaced Persons Is Growing ......77

Chapter 6  Panel Discussion Three: Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level
Figure 1. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM .....................................87
Figure 2. Maritime Cooperation in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM ...95
Figure 3. Host Nation Support Experience ...................................106
Figure 4. Shipping in the Baltic .......................................................107
Figure 5. Language Skills Increase .................................................108

Chapter 8  Seminar Working Group Reports
Figure 1. Discussion Flow for ISS—Preventing Loss of Life at Sea ....134

Chapter 10  Seminar Working Groups
Figure 1. Scenario Map .................................................................155
Welcoming Remarks
Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College

Good morning, everyone! It is my pleasure to welcome you all to Newport and to the Naval War College and to this very important symposium. I enjoyed meeting many of you last night, and I look forward to the opportunity to spend a couple of moments with each of you as we spend the next two and a half days together. In our audience today are fifty-two chiefs of naval operations, plus eighteen representatives of CNOs who could not be here; four commandants of coast guards, plus five additional representatives; fifteen war college presidents, plus thirty-three additional representatives from those schools whose presidents could not attend—all together totaling one hundred forty-two senior delegates from the United States and seventy-two of our most trusted friends and allies. I am particularly pleased to note that twenty-four of today’s delegates are alumni of this college, having graduated from our Naval Command College or the Naval Staff College. In fact, two delegates are graduates of both colleges. To our former students, congratulations on your obvious success, and welcome back to Newport.

The officers assembled here today are the senior leaders of the greatest navies in the world. The cut and color of our uniforms may vary, as do the languages and the cultures of the participants. But we all have a common set of bonds that will always link us together. These include an understanding and respect for the sea that comes only to those mariners who have challenged the oceans throughout their careers, a commitment to service and sacrifice in support of our respective nations, and a desire to work collectively with our friends and allies in coalitions to solve common problems.

It is this desire to improve our nations’ security through cooperation and collaboration that lies at the heart of the International Seapower Symposium series. For over three decades, the leaders of the world’s seafaring nations have gathered on the shores of this historic Narragansett Bay to share ideas, strengthen alliances, and plan for the future. We can all certainly agree that the world has changed significantly since the first International Seapower Symposium thirty years ago. Tremendous political, social, and economic changes have occurred over the ensuing decades, including the fall of communism and the rise of terrorism. I would argue—and most of you in this audience would likely agree—that the net effect of these changes has been to increase the need for strong navies and coast guards.

The title of our symposium is “Seapower for Peace, Prosperity, and Security.” In the relatively short time that we have together, we will look at the many ways the navies around the world help ensure peace, promote prosperity, and provide maritime security shields for their citizens. The importance of increasing our national security posture has never been greater. The horrific events that took place
in the United States on 11 September 2001 served as the catalyst for many changes and have sharply increased our awareness and commitment to our number one national security objective.

This symposium is all about the sharing of old experiences and the consideration of new ideas. The Global War on Terrorism affects all of us, and I can think of no conference over the past three decades where we have come together more as equals. The experiences of large nations and small, of blue-water navies and navies and coast guards that operate in the littorals, and of economic powerhouses and emerging nations all are of value. I encourage open discussion and full participation by our delegates. All of us need to hear your individual voices. Our professional program will include prominent speakers, a trio of panel discussions, and, for the first time, a series of structured seminar working group sessions that will provide you the opportunity to test new ideas in a number of realistic scenarios. If your schedule allows, I encourage you to read the scenarios this evening so that we can get off to a faster start when we assemble in our seminar groups tomorrow. This indeed promises to be a most challenging and rewarding two days.

As we embark on this year’s symposium, it may be useful and instructive to briefly look back on previous meetings in order to broaden our context while reviewing issues that may still be worthy of reflection over the next two days. The last ISS meeting, in 1999, marked the thirtieth anniversary of these symposia, which began in November 1969 as one of several contributions to international naval cooperation initiated by Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy, during his career. Known within his own service as “Mr. International Navy,” his contributions included key roles in founding both international courses here at the Naval War College and the establishment of NATO’s standing Naval Force Atlantic.

The International Seapower Symposium was created as a forum where the leading professionals of the world’s navies could exchange views on common problems under the mantel of academic freedom rather than as official negotiations among governments. Since that beginning in 1969, these symposia have been organized around plenary sessions that present broad issues of general international interest and include both individual speakers from a variety of nations and panel discussions that build on obtaining different perspectives, much as we’re going to do today. These are complemented by seminar discussions for a detailed exchange of views among participants, interspersed with opportunities for private discussions between delegates and ample time for social events—for enjoying Newport and for building new friendships. Following each symposium, the Naval War College has edited and produced a volume that records the proceedings in plenary sessions and summarizes the ideas expressed in seminar discussions. We shall do so again after this event.

Over the years the achievements of these symposia have not been limited to or even entirely expressed in the printed record of academic discussions. In over thirty years devoted to building a global network among professional naval leaders, the main achievements in these symposia have been those created through the friendships made or revived between individuals, the quiet personal conversations in the corridors, and the general ideas exchanged and only later turned into concrete action in some other more specific context. We can, however, point to a number of specific achievements that are related to or derived from this series.
of symposia. These include the growth of regional meetings such as the Inter-American Naval Conference, the Western Pacific Naval Symposia, and the Black Sea–Mediterranean Regional Symposia. As yet another example of ways progress has been achieved here, the International Seapower Symposium XIII in 1995 played a key role in producing the first Multinational Maritime Operations Manual.

A review of the titles of past symposia gives some indication of the state of the world over the decades. In 1973, delegates considered nonmilitary uses of naval forces. In 1979, the focus was rather optimistically on the role of navies and a world of peace. In 1985, we looked at traditional versus nontraditional views on maritime security planning. And in 1995, Admiral Boorda led us in discussion of maritime coalitions under the title of “Partnership from the Sea.” Participation has grown steadily over the years, from seventy delegates representing forty-one nations in the early 1970s to nearly a hundred and fifty participants representing seventy-three nations at this year’s event.

The fact that we have a detailed record of the accomplishments of past ISS events is in large part due to the outstanding work of Dr. John Hattendorf. He is chairman of the College’s Maritime History Department and has served since 1984 as the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History. He earned his master’s degree in history from Brown University and his doctorate in war history from Oxford University in 1979. The National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England, awarded him its Caird Medal in 2000 for his contributions to the field of maritime history. John has attended twelve of the sixteen symposia, has edited four volumes of ISS proceedings, and will soon publish a history of the ISS series. Thanks, John, for your dedicated and continued support of these important events. Please stand up and let us recognize you.

Throughout its history, the ISS has been a gathering of intellectual equals. Former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson said it well in closing the 1999 symposium when he noted, “It does not really matter whether you come from a big navy or from a small navy or from an old navy or from a new navy. Here everybody’s voice counts. This is the enduring strength of this symposium.”

Let me conclude by saying we are glad you are here. The Naval War College is proud and privileged to play our role in support of ISS XVI.
Keynote Address:
Sea Power for Peace, Prosperity, and Security
Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations

Rear Admiral Route, United States:
It is now my pleasure to introduce our official host, Admiral Vern Clark. Admiral Clark was born in Sioux City, Iowa, and raised in our country’s Midwest. A graduate of Evangel College, he went on to spend more than half his naval career in command. Admiral Clark commanded a patrol gunboat when he was a lieutenant and has had command in every grade thereafter. In addition to commanding USS Spruance, the lead ship of the class, he also commanded Destroyer Squadrons Five and Seventeen, Cruiser Destroyer Group Three, the U.S. Second Fleet, and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Joint service has figured prominently in Admiral Clark’s career. In the decade of the 1990s, he spent seven years in joint assignments including service as the director of the Joint Staff’s Crisis Action Team during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, as well as Director of Operations, J-3 and Director of the Joint Staff. Admiral Clark became the twenty-seventh Chief of Naval Operations on July 21, 2000. In July 2002, he chartered a clear and direct course for the navy to sail into the twenty-first century with the publication of Sea Power 21. And, if you have not already heard, I am pleased to inform you that last week President George W. Bush nominated Admiral Clark for reappointment to the grade of Admiral and reappointment as the Chief of Naval Operations. As such, he is on track to becoming the longest-serving CNO in U.S. history, since the Senate is being asked to confirm his tour of duty until July 2006.

Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome our symposium host—and my boss—Admiral Vern Clark.

Admiral Clark:
Good morning. Ron, thank you for that gracious introduction. Thank you for what you and your staff have done to make this International Seapower Symposium possible. It takes a great deal of effort to bring a symposium like this together, and I am very grateful to you, Admiral Route, and to your Naval War College team for helping us make this event a reality.

I would interject here that it has been four years. Of course, the last time we had this scheduled was within days after September 11, 2001, so many of you were scheduled to attend that event and situations in the world caused us to cancel it. We are so glad that you are all back here this year. The Naval War College is an
institution where we in the United States Navy grow and develop our officers, but as Admiral Route said, this place, through the years, has not been just for officers in the United States, but in fact for officers from all over the world. This is the very best setting that we could think of to bring us all together to discuss important maritime issues, and this year to talk about the future of maritime cooperation in the context of the world that we know of today and the world that we live in today.

I understand there are a large number of graduates of the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College who are back here for this symposium. Our words to you are very, very simple: welcome back!

It is heartwarming for me as the Chief of the U.S. Navy to see so many nations represented here today. In our initial planning figure yesterday we thought the number was going to be about seventy-five. We have documented fifty-two chiefs, but I know that some of you that I met this morning arrived very late last night and that the number could grow to fifty-five—and, of course, as has been said, we have here nine leaders and representatives of coast guards from around the world. I am very thankful that we have with us Admiral Tom Collins, my partner down here on the first row, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. We welcome all of you, and this is significant, because having this many nations’ leadership together brings about real possibilities for us all. I am especially pleased that the coast guards of the world are joining us navy types for this symposium. It reinforces that interservice as well as international cooperation is required for a complete maritime security continuum.

I have great appreciation for my own coast guard. I say it is my own; I am wrapping my arms around it. On 9/11, in the aftermath of the strike on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, I have told people around our country that the second call that I made on that day was to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. We had just signed a new memorandum of agreement just days before that event. That agreement perpetuated an understanding that the coast guard would operate in support of the United States Navy in time of crisis. On 9/11, in that telephone call to the commandant, I offered to the commandant that the rules had changed and asked him what I needed to do in support of him and the mission that he had to protect our homeland. He took me up on that offer, I would tell you, and all he asked was for all of our coastal patrols, and I gave them to him. I believe that this is the model for the future—this kind of working together. And so to each of you, I extend my appreciation for taking time out of your busy schedules to attend this symposium.

I would like to add that to me this reaffirms several things about where we come from. First, it reaffirms to me our collective belief in the importance of getting together to discuss the challenges that we face in the world today; second, that we understand the importance of sea power for facing the challenges of tomorrow; third, that we understand that threats are evolving and will be difficult in our operating environment, where we live and work every day. Fourth, it reinforces to me our belief that the world’s oceans should be safe and free, and that our nations will in fact expect us—the leaders of navies and coast guards—to be able to deliver that freedom and that safety. And [it reinforces] that technology will offer us opportunities in the future that can transform the way we develop capabilities to face challenges that confront each of us in the future.
So, to a person, to each and every one of you, I want you to know that I am honored by your presence and grateful that you have chosen to be here for this symposium. Over the next two and a half days, you will have the opportunity to share ideas and build relationships that will allow our navies and coast guards to operate and, if necessary, to fight as one awesome force.

In our navy, I am fond of discussing the operating environment, our navy’s operating environment, in terms used by people who are part of the land warfare scheme. If we all wore the uniforms of army officers—and, by the way, last night I told my wife there would not all be admirals at this conference. There would be generals and colonels, and there would be every different kind of rank, because we all do it a little bit differently, but all of us are fundamentally officers from the maritime domain. But if we were army officers, the word “maneuver” would be a key part of our discussions. I am telling my navy that we need to understand this term; if we are to be truly joint, we must understand it. Then I like to say that we in the navy operate in the largest maneuver space on the planet, and that is the world’s oceans. They are the freeways of the world.

I believe that it is helpful for us to focus on a few facts: that 30 percent of the world’s economy depends on trade. Our numbers suggest that 99.7 percent of all intercontinental trade travels by sea, carried by over forty-six thousand vessels servicing nearly four thousand ports. Today, we are truly a global economy, and we become more so every day. It follows then that the global economy depends on the global security of the world’s oceans to make this global economy a reality.

As we live here in this period, beginning a new millennium, the peace and security of the free world are challenged. This is reinforced by a cursory review of the headlines around the world today. This morning’s papers—pick up any one—reinforce this claim. To defeat an enemy in the old Industrial Age required large standing armies, large standing navies, and a strong economy. The enemies of that era stood out in the open for all to see.

Today, in the Information Age, our enemies are more likely to be widely dispersed, well-funded terrorist or criminal organizations, operating fundamentally in the shadows. Not a single regime, not a single person, religion, or ideology—the enemy is using terror as his method: premeditated, politically motivated violence, oftentimes against innocent people. Terrorists are organized to use a nation’s greatest strengths—including its freedom and openness—as weaknesses.

Terrorism takes many forms, and it has no borders: recently in Bali, Kenya, Tanzania, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the United States, on the high seas, and I could name many more. We know that terrorists can and have used our maneuver space, the oceans, for terrorist activities. And just as the sea is being used to support the global economy, it is also being used to smuggle weapons, drugs, and people. It is being used to gain revenue from shipping to fund terrorist activities. It is being used to operate vessels as weapons or as launch platforms. It is being used to conduct direct attacks on ships to inflict casualties and to disrupt trade.

An attack on one of our maritime areas can certainly affect us all. I would like to offer one example. Just about a year ago now, the French super tanker Limberg was attacked as it entered a Yemeni oil terminal. Limberg was preparing to load crude prior to sailing to London. As it slowed to take on its pilot, a small boat carrying explosives rammed the ship, and the effects are now well documented—disastrous.
effects for that particular ship. One crew member was killed. Almost one hundred thousand barrels of oil were spilled into the Gulf of Aden, affecting local fishermen and polluting the coastline. Reports that we have viewed here suggest the following economic impact: that insurance premiums tripled for ships entering Yemeni ports. Some premiums rose to as high as $300,000 U.S., causing some shipping lines to bypass that port. Container throughput, according to the reports that I have seen, dropped by over 90 percent, and it is estimated that upwards of three thousand jobs in the local economy were affected, due to the strain caused by the environmental and economic impacts. And again, I am quoting a report that we have seen that suggests that the Yemeni government estimated that it lost 15 million U.S. dollars per month in income, accounting for nearly 1 percent of its gross domestic product. These are the effects from an attack on just one of the thousands of ships that sail every day from ports around the world.

In a much broader context, all over the world, our sea lines of communications are under attack. In the first half of this year alone, there were a record 234 reported attacks against seafarers. This was the worst six-month period since the International Maritime Bureau started compiling piracy statistics in 1991, and it was a full 34-percent increase over the same time period last year. Most recently, seven attacks occurred between the fourteenth and the twentieth of this month. There is a growing concern among experts that the number of politically motivated attacks against vessels is clearly on the rise. Pirates conducting premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocent seafarers—that is, using terror: that is terrorism.

These events and the events of the last few years have caused us all to reassess the changing world landscape and to look closely at how our navies and coast guards operate in support of our national defense. It is clear that we, as leaders of navies and coast guards of the world, have the shared responsibility to keep our oceans free from terror and to allow our nations to prosper. So the question remains, how do we do this effectively? How do we do this efficiently? Terrorists hide in our cities planning to strike at our weaknesses. The battlefield is no longer the size of a country or just the deep oceans of the world. Today’s battlefield is in fact in the littorals, the land-sea interface where over 70 percent of the earth’s populations reside, with waterways teaming with merchant ships. That is the battleground. To win on this twenty-first-century battlefield, we must be able to dominate the littorals, being—I like to say—being out and about in the battlespace, ready to strike on a moment’s notice, anywhere, anytime we are called.

Now this shift in paradigm has caused many of us, and I include myself when I say many of us, to rethink our capabilities and the employment of our resources. This is why I set my navy on the course of *Sea Power 21*. Now, rest assured, I do not intend to use this time to give you a *Sea Power 21* speech. But *Sea Power 21* does reflect our collective assessment in the United States of the kind of navy we will need to face the challenges that we expect to see in the twenty-first century. *Sea Power 21* is about projecting joint and combined, decisive—and I underline “decisive”—capabilities from the sea, operating in an information-rich environment. *Sea Power 21* will include more precision, to be sure, more combat reach—one day soon, guns that shoot one hundred miles with extraordinary precision; and *Sea Power 21* in our
future and the capabilities that we define and develop will include my favorite new word: *persistence*—persistent combat capability.

All this [is] designed to meet the clear objective of our future *Sea Power 21* force—and this is it: to maximize the joint and combined capability that we will bring to a potential battle, designed from the ground up to operate in partnership with our joint and combined partners. Designed because the war on terrorism is serious business, and because I am convinced that this challenge is immense and it can only be won, in my opinion, through partnership.

Our nations have made great strides in the global war through international partnership. It is remarkable to note that since coalition operations began in 2001, the number of maritime interventions in the Global War on Terrorism has increased sevenfold—seven times. That statistic is indicative of the superb seamanship and capability that every one of us, and the unique capabilities that complement one another that we bring to the fight. Without a doubt, success in the Global War on Terrorism takes international teamwork. This will be in my view a long campaign, and we have already seen many examples of how teamwork and cooperation will make a difference.

One powerful example is Operation SEA CUTLASS. *SEA CUTLASS* is a coalition operation around the Horn of Africa to stop terrorist activity. The coalition is made up of ships from five nations that represent the best capability available at the time. This is a key point: *the best capability available at the time.* No navy has the capability or the budget to address its military needs without limitation, but every navy can benefit from the synergy of combining force structure, technology, intelligence, and situational awareness that comes from operating together.

Each one of us faces the challenge of optimizing our navy, based on our national military strategy and fiscal constraints. Some countries maintain coast guards or have navies designed for special operations, riverine, or harbor defense. Some navies are designed to operate in the littorals to patrol their economic exclusion zone. And still other navies are designed for open ocean operations or power projection from great distances. Every navy is different, but each brings critical capabilities to the fight. By working together, our maritime partnerships have robust capability, and that is what it is all about: building a partnership with the capability to defeat terror, building a partnership whose capability is much greater than the sum of its parts.

For four months, Admiral Nielson from the German Navy commanded Operation *SEA CUTLASS*. His team performed superbly, showing the capability and the flexibility of maritime coalitions designed to meet the challenges of terrorism. I should note that Admiral Jacques Mezars from the French Navy relieved as coalition commander on September 29 and is doing an equally superb job.

Let us look at NATO. Operation *ACTIVE ENDEAVOR* is an example of long-time friends taking a stand against a new enemy: terrorism. Vice Admiral Di Monteforte from the Italian Navy commands this operation. A task force composed of ships from the NATO Standing Naval Forces, Mediterranean and Atlantic, are deployed in the Straits of Gibraltar and the eastern Mediterranean to maintain security and ensure the safe transit of allied shipping. Since the operation was started in October 2001, the force has monitored over thirty thousand ships and escorted over 340 of them through the Straits of Gibraltar.
A newfound partnership against terrorism occurred mid-year in 2002 when my nation relied upon the Indian Navy to escort ships through the Straits of Malacca. The *Sharda* and the *Sukanya* worked with my logistics commander in Singapore to escort military sealift ships through those straits. This vital contribution allowed our Pacific commander, Admiral Walter Dorn, to focus his attention on other areas. And I hear it from my commanders after they work with your navies and coast guards, and I have witnessed it myself. Our navies accomplish more as a team than we ever could individually.

These two examples, Operation SEA CUTLASS and ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, are only two of many regional coalition operations underway today to thwart the advances of terrorism. I believe that the next step is to join forces and form a worldwide coalition of military and law enforcement organizations to keep our oceans free and safe. This coalition would share information to track shipping around the world, to end the illegal exploitation of our sea lines of communication, and to stop terrorism at its roots. In this coalition, just as we see today, actionable intelligence will be just as important as, and in some cases, more important than, force structure. And I ask you to discuss this during the symposium and to continue open dialogue when you return home.

We have an opportunity of historic proportions to assemble a maritime partnership the likes of which has never been seen or exercised or utilized before: a force with unity of effort that can deter would-be aggressors in peacetime and overwhelm an enemy in war, a global force operating as one to defeat terrorism wherever it may fester, the greatest maritime force to ever set sail.

But our vision is certainly not without challenges. One might say that it is pretty idealistic. So challenges do exist. Each of us has our own challenges, some shared, some unique. One challenge that we all share, though, is interoperability. Interoperability is hard enough to achieve among the forces of one’s own country, and I am sure we all have humorous—and not so humorous—stories about working with our respective army or air force or Marine Corps partners. Those stories are out there. I have them, to be sure. The challenge is even more difficult across national boundaries. I believe that by working together we can solve the interoperability challenges, but I acknowledge that it will not be easy. It will take all of us to show some flexibility, but we can succeed. The speed of technology and technological development can accentuate this challenge, but I believe that we can use technology to our advantage and turn it into one of our asymmetric strengths. We should use technology on our terms, to combat terror and to defeat our enemies, or they will use it as their advantage.

Another challenge that we share is fiscal constraint. All of us and every chief in the room has this challenge, I know. All of us are accustomed to the challenge of balancing the readiness of the operating fleet with the investment in the future fleet. While every navy cannot afford every capability, we recognize that each contribution helps build a robust coalition. This brings me back to the theme of the symposium: maritime coalitions against terrorism. By working together, we will form the greatest coalition that has ever set sail.

I would like to end this by saying that we have been given the opportunity to lead our nations’ maritime forces at what I believe is a historic period in the world’s history. We are combating an enemy that is willing to risk everything to drive a stake
between the nations of the world, pitting one friend against another, dismantling partnerships that have stood the test of time. They know that international cooperation is a powerful weapon, but so do we. And we must stand together shoulder-to-shoulder to defend against this enemy.

This International Seapower Symposium is the way ahead to greater cooperation, and my hope is that you will take the time and this wonderful opportunity to build personal and professional bonds to form deeper trust and confidence in your fellow mariners, because we have an opportunity of historic proportions. And so the moment is upon us. I believe that we are living in a defining time in history, a defining moment for navies. And when I address my navy, I always discuss the importance of our service to our nation in such a critical time in history. As I look out at this audience and see so many leaders entrusted with leading thousands of sailors from around the world, I am struck by this very same thought: *What a true honor it is to serve at a moment like this.*

So, the task for this great group assembled is this. By rolling up our sleeves and working together, I believe that we can create partnerships that will help our nations realize their fullest potential in so many ways and make it possible for our children and our children’s children to live in a world that is safe and that is free of terror. I thank each of you for your commitment, your decision to come to this symposium. I thank each of you for your presence, and I stand before you ready to go to work to help forge a powerful maritime partnership.
Panel Discussion One:  
Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level

Moderated by Rear Admiral Richard B. Porterfield, U.S. Navy

Professor Lawrence Modisett, U.S. Naval War College, United States:

The goal of these panel discussions is to give you the opportunity to exchange knowledge and experience about coalition operations and interoperability and generally how our navies can work together dealing with common challenges. Obviously, the War against Terrorism is a major challenge that we face, but there are other tasks as well that we need to be able to do in common. That is what we are hoping to accomplish here. We are trying to do this in several formats. We have heard Admiral Clark’s keynote address. There will be a couple of other major addresses by Admiral Collins and Secretary of the Navy England, but we also have a series of panel presentations for you over the next day and a half, and in these panel presentations you will hear from over a dozen navies and coast guards addressing various issues at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

At the conclusion of each of these panels, there will be time for you to offer remarks from the floor, either questions about things the panelists have said or comments of your own. We will have personnel to assist you in getting to a microphone or getting the microphone to you and would ask that you use those in making your comments after the panels. Another request: when speaking from the floor, please bear in mind that it is a mark of great wisdom to take a great thought and express it in just a few words. And that way we can assure the maximum number of people the opportunity to speak.

We will be changing the format tomorrow afternoon, and you will be going to our war gaming center, McCarty Little Hall, across the street, where you will break up into seminar groups. You should each have received in your welcoming package the number of the seminar to which you are assigned and the room number for that as well. Each of the seminar groups will be dealing with a different scenario, an operational situation that we’ve asked you to consider. And you will be playing the role in the seminar of members of a multinational task force, so you will be asked to conduct your planning for the particular situation specified in that seminar and identify the issues that need to be addressed and resolved for effective multinational operations. You will be assisted in the seminars by two moderators from the Naval War College faculty, and you’ll also have in each seminar a legal expert who will be able to respond to questions on international law or rules of engagement. The moderators will also be asking that one of you in each seminar serve as a spokesman on the final day, when we will have our fourth panel, and at that panel, each of the eight seminar groups will have a spokesman who will have ten minutes to present the highlights of that group’s discussion.
There is a change in terms of the rules between here and McCarty Little Hall when we do the seminars. Everything that we say in this auditorium, in Spruance Auditorium, during the plenary sessions is considered to be on the record, and we will be publishing a report, as Admiral Route mentioned this morning. Professor Hattendorf will be preparing that, as he has done a number of times in the past. We will be publishing a report on the proceedings, so everything that is said here in the auditorium we consider on the record and for attribution. And we will try to identify speakers from the floor, as well, of course, as the speakers on the panel. In the seminar sessions tomorrow, the rules are a little bit different. We will have note takers to record the issues discussed, but everything you say in the seminars is off the record. It is not for attribution, and you will not be identified by name or country or in any other way in the report on the seminar portion of this symposium. And with that, I would like to turn things over to Rear Admiral Porterfield, the director of naval intelligence, who is the moderator for our first panel, “Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level.”

**Rear Admiral Porterfield, United States:**

CNO Clark, Admiral Route, Admiral Stufflebeem, distinguished delegates to the Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium, welcome to Panel One. This panel is entitled “Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level.” I hope that over the next two hours or so, we can engage in a productive discussion on the challenges facing our navies that are particular to operating in the maritime coalition environment. It is my pleasure to serve as the panel moderator and the timekeeper for this panel. I am particularly pleased to do this because I share a widely held belief that success in the Global War on Terrorism and in dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will require that we take deliberate and sustained steps at the leadership level to maximize the effectiveness of international coalitions. For our part, successful maritime coalitions will be a key component in winning the Global War on Terrorism.

Second, serving as moderator affords me the opportunity to express our sincere thanks for the support you and the navies you represent have provided to the United States during these challenging times since the attacks on September 11, 2001. As director of naval intelligence, I have had the privilege to visit with and host many of my counterparts as part of our collective efforts to operate successfully in a coalition environment. The support we have received from coalition partners has been immense, and in a great many situations this support has been decisive in achieving U.S. and coalition objectives. Each nation that has supported the United States brings unique strengths and expertise to bear on the challenges we face together.

Let me begin the substantive part of Panel One by introducing the other panel members and their topics. I would also like to review the agenda as shown here in the schedule for this session before turning the floor over to our first speaker. I am joined on the panel today by Vice Admiral Klaver of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Admiral de Donno of the Italian Navy, Vice Admiral De Leon of the Philippine Navy, and Major General Al Mulla of Kuwait. I want to thank each of you for joining me on the panel and for leading the discussions on your respective topics. As the panel guidelines dictate, each speaker will have ten minutes to introduce and frame
a topic. After all the speakers have concluded their introductions, I will open the floor for discussion, comment, and questions. As you will note in the schedule, we will take a lunch break at 11:30 and resume discussions for an additional thirty minutes beginning at 14:00. Vice Admiral Klaver, the floor is yours to address the first topic, coordinating rules of engagement.

**Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:**

Thank you, Admiral Porterfield. Admirals, generals, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to start with expressing my sincere gratitude to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, in the first place for the flawless organization of this prestigious event and, in the second place, for the opportunity to address the distinguished delegates to this symposium. The theme of my short presentation is the coordination of rules of engagement in a maritime coalition at the technical level.

Before coordinating rules of engagement, there must be a basic agreement of what rules of engagement are. The Royal Netherlands Navy experience, from both operational missions and exercises—and that includes UN, NATO, and ad hoc coalitions—is that there is, indeed, general agreement on what rules of engagement are. They are directions to operational commanders that delineate the parameters within which force may be used. They are not tasks. Tasks are derived from missions and concepts of operations. Rules of engagement can be issued as a prohibition, which means there are orders not to take specific actions. They can also be used as permissions, in which case they are the authority for commanders to take specific action, if necessary to achieve the aim of the mission. Rules of engagement have to take the law of armed conflict into account. And rules of engagement do not negate the right of self-defense. I think most, but perhaps not all of us, agree on these principles.

However, if there is general agreement on what rules of engagement are, it does not mean that there is general agreement on how they should be interpreted. There is also wide difference in interpretation of some key definitions used with rules, especially in multinational coalitions. For example, how far does self-defense go? What entails minimum force? When do we have a hostile intent? But anyway, rules of engagement have a direct influence on how we execute our mission, down to the smallest unit. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to coordinate rules down to the technical level.

Until some years ago, most relations were preplanned, and the participating partners were based on the region in which they would be most likely to operate. Coordination of rules of engagement could, at least to some degree, take place in advance, based on scenarios that were not fundamentally different. These coalitions trained together using these rules of engagement. When actual deployment of the force was imminent, only minor changes would have to be discussed amongst coalition members. Legal and political differences between the participating nations were known in advance and could be anticipated and smoothly accommodated. A NATO task force operating in the North Atlantic was a good example of such an operation. However, even then, most of the NATO commanders present here have probably experienced some surprise at the reactions of partners in war games and exercises. But in recent years, we have seen very different scenarios. Out-of-region operations are no exception, but they are the rule. Ad hoc
Coalitions were formed with many different nations from all over the world. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is a good example of such an operation. Obviously the coordination of rules is a lot more complicated in such a scenario. After discussing rules of coordination at the technical level, we have to take three levels into account. I call them state level, force and component commander level, and unit command and individual level. Let us first look at the state level. At the state level, coordination must take place between nations, and each leader can face two situations: There is already a common set of rules of engagement, or there is not a common set. When, of course, there is a common set, coordination will be based on the existing documents. I think the two most well-known are UN-led missions, where the document is the UN standing rules of peace-enforcing operations and where the main players are the director of peacekeeping operations and the two contributing nations. An example was the UNMEE [United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea]. In NATO, rules of engagement are laid down in Military Committee Document 362, and the main players are the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee. This document is frequently used as a baseline in non-NATO coalitions with NATO partners.

These two documents, by the way, are quite different. There are probably more, but these are the ones we actually work with.

When there is no initial common set of rules of engagement, the nations have to start from scratch. A coalition of the willing is formed when the lead nation will have to coordinate among the nations. Examples are ENDURING FREEDOM and security forces in Iraq. Quite often, plain text is a good compromise.

Let us now identify some of the problem areas when coordinating at the state level. The problem areas can be legal, political, or operational issues. On the legal side, some countries have to make national caveats based on their national law or even their constitution. So we have to know what their restrictions are, for example, when they draft a treaty. The antipersonnel mine prohibition in Ottawa is one of the examples. Or they are prohibited means—for instance, riot control agents. On the political side, we all know that each nation has a known agenda on each subject. This interest can lead to reluctance to endorse certain rules. A good example is boarding of merchant shipping, where, on the one hand, you have nations who are very keen to protect freedom of the sea to all ends, while on the other hand, nations use extended self-interest differences in a lot more ways. On the operational side there can be troubles as well. It is hard to agree with certain actions when your units do not possess certain weapons or sensors; for example, designation of targets with laser is quite open in discussion. However, it is important that the political leadership of a coalition agrees with rules of engagement and promulgates them to the force commander with the national caveats.

Let us now turn to coordination of rules at force and component level. At the component commander level, life seems simple again. The force command will coordinate. But as I said, is he aware of all national caveats, and has he disseminated this down the line? Is the force commander aware of all relevant political and operational issues at state level? And if so, do all component commanders have the same frame of reference for the generic terms and definitions in the set of rules of engagement? Each component commander will inform his subsequent commanders about his interpretation of hostile intent. Its interpretation will be based on the
environment and might well be different between the land component commander, the maritime component commander, and the air component commander.

My personal experience in NATO exercises as Deputy CINC, EASTLANT, is that there are still differences in interpretation among component commanders and about rules of engagement. This was confirmed by lessons learned from Strong Resource 2002. A maritime commander is more likely to remain flexible in delegating to or holding back from commanding officers. The land commander, who has to use specific guards that cannot easily be changed, has less flexibility. So is there a requirement for specific rules for the maritime, land, and air environments? The NATO system allows for this, and in my experience, this distinction can be useful. However, a lot of people disagree with me; so we perhaps might discuss that.

Let us now see the unit commander’s level. He will have to work with the rules of interpretation of his component commander and, again, must take national caveats into account. The example given: is one of his units allowed to board ships, or not? And again as mentioned, where one component commander has delegated all rules down to a unit, it might not be the same case in all environments. As I said, warning shots allowed can be delegated at sea normally to the commanding officer, while in the air, it is the pilot, while on land, it is the individual soldier. Very important at this level is the national interpretation of self-defense that must be understood. Some countries have more of those definitions than others, but the act of one will always influence the other units. Coordination in the form of understanding each other’s interpretation is, therefore, vital. Although normally defined in the rules and instructions, the same goes for hostile act and hostile intent.

To round off, without even pretending to have touched all the issues, it seems, therefore, fair to draw four conclusions. Coordination is always needed at each level and even when operating within the same set of rules of engagement. Rules of engagement touch on so many issues that coordination should start at the earliest opportunity and must be completed before deployment. Commanders at each level should get together to discuss and explain their understanding of rules of engagement, UN game play, or tabletop sessions. And finally, rules of engagement and national caveats should be promulgated to the chain of command in a coalition. I know we are not yet in the question time, but I just want to show you this picture of our newest ship in this navy, because that is what we are all there for: ships.

Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:

Admiral Clark, gentlemen; good morning. Terrorism poses two significant challenges for traditional maritime strategies. First, it defies our concept of sea control, since we are not confronted by an enemy with ships and controlled territory. Second, it is always on the offensive, without us knowing when and where it will attack next.

Thus, it is imperative that our efforts and strategies of confronting the threat of terrorism—maritime terrorism in particular—should be coordinated into one seamless activity across national and regional borders. The advances in technology offer a great deal of opportunity for the world’s navies to enhance command and control of operations against terrorist groups. However, in the case of the ASEAN region, there are evident significant challenges for the establishment of C4 connectivity, as I am about to discuss with you this afternoon.
Trends in Maritime Coalitions against Terrorism

Over the past century, we have seen a variety of maritime strategies at work. In regional crises, such as in the Adriatic, the Gulf War, Vietnam, and the Korean War, as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq, maritime strategy was largely unopposed. Maritime nations concentrated on using the sea for their own purposes in supporting and getting out their military actions. The new context for maritime strategy today involves adhering more closely to the ideas of collective security, as nations recognize that international cooperation may allow more to be done with less, as earlier stated by Admiral Clark. However, the new threats of maritime terrorism and transnational crimes require new approaches and methods that demand the use of advanced scientific information about the maritime and security environment. In an era when the size and range of problems may well surpass the ability of any one nation or of any one navy to deal adequately with these threats, multilateral naval cooperation becomes increasingly common. Thus, the key problem that navies face today is to develop the necessary common procedures in communication and operational doctrine that will allow them to work together more effectively on a regional basis.

ASEAN Response to Terrorism

In dealing with terrorism in and transnational crimes, the exchange of information between countries is critically important, because terrorist organizations like al-Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiyah operate and cooperate across the state borders. ASEAN cooperation has two aspects to it. One is political, and this is expressed through various ASEAN declarations on terrorism that stressed the need to strengthen cooperation at all levels—bilateral, regional, and international—to combat terrorism in a comprehensive manner. The second is enforcing the political will of member states in enforcing the declarations to keep up the fight against terrorism.

At least four factors characterize ASEAN’s regional security environment that affects a state’s capability to respond swiftly to acts of terrorism. These are (1) porous borders and generally weak CIQ controls; (2) long-standing economic and trade links between Southeast Asia and Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, many of which operate outside normal financial channels and are not readily monitored by governments; (3) widespread criminal activities, including drug trafficking in the region, which in turn can facilitate the movement of resources by terrorists; and (4) the availability of a large supply of indigenously produced and important weapons in Southeast Asia.

Such conditions will dilute the effectiveness of multilateral security cooperation against terror, so that regional security institutions suggest ASEAN would function only at a moderate level—that is, confidence building. To address effectively the threats facing the region, ASEAN needs to adopt a more proactive role in order to embark on new security cooperation strategies.
Maritime Coalition Concept: The ASEAN Maritime Coordination Center

In order to embark on new security cooperation strategies to deal with nontraditional threats to regional security, more mechanisms for a collaboration and coordination have to be established. Of great importance is the need for (1) the facilitation of more exchanges, such as person to person or agency to agency; (2) the establishment of common databases; and (3) the need to develop a multinational task force. This is where connectivity between command and control, communications, and computers plays an important part, as it will form the nucleus of the three requirements I just mentioned.

The integration of forces, doctrine, technology, and information and a command and control system allows a commander to gain situational awareness, reach decisions about courses of action, and implement those decisions by means of operational plans and orders. Thus, the multinational task force against terror that I propose for the ASEAN is one that will function, through a system where command and control, communications, and computers will interface, to coordinate all efforts related to anti- and counterterrorism efforts of the countries in the region. These activities should be coordinated under the auspices of an ASEAN Maritime Coordination or Coordinating Center that could serve as the nucleus for fostering closer regional cooperation in areas such as intelligence, extradition, and law enforcement.

Information that will be processed by the center shall come from different sources, but mainly with the contribution of naval intelligence agencies of ASEAN countries. The private shipping sector shall also be tapped in information gathering, through a system of reporting and communication of incidents at sea or any unusual event in any of the maritime trade routes in the region. This coordinated approach to intelligence and information gathering could provide for adequate and real-time information on maritime security that is needed for the timely employment of anti- or counterterrorist forces. The Maritime Coordinating Center could initially follow the concept of the Strategic Maritime Information System (or SMIS), developed by the Information Technology Division of the Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization. The system was a database of open-source maritime information covering Southeast Asian and Australian waters. This type of data is important for risk assessments and managing maritime security, but, unfortunately, work on the SMIS was suspended several years ago due to lack of sponsorship. However, this particular problem of sponsorship or leadership of the Asian Maritime Coordinating Center could be addressed by rotating the sponsorship among the ASEAN member countries. I believe that developed countries such as the United States, Japan, and China will be very keen in supporting such initiatives, as this will foster a greater security and stability in the region where the majority of the world’s maritime trade traffic occurs.

Challenges for C4 Connectivity

The development of common and interoperable command and control, communications, and computers or computer connectivity is a serious challenge for the
region. Interoperability of ASEAN navies’ C4 equipment is only on a limited scale and is normally achieved during small-scale activities or joint exercises.

On the other hand, whatever the arrangements for command and control, the problem of doctrine remains a very difficult one, even for fairly routine operations. Almost always, observers interpret doctrine as a political statement or as a hard-and-fast directive that must always be obeyed. However, I believe that naval doctrine for multinational naval operations must be viewed as providing a standard approach for many different navies to work together effectively. But inasmuch as there are challenges for the organization of a command and control system for regional anti- and counterterrorism efforts, these same challenges could present themselves as opportunities in the long run. More than the strengthening of the diplomatic relationships between and among ASEAN countries, it will set the tone for a broader alliance against terrorism for the whole of Asia. This could be done through a regional framework that calls for the establishment of interoperable systems of communications and information technology equipment, necessary to facilitate the efficient flow of information for effective command and control. The establishment of the Maritime Coordinating Center will set a definite standard for ASEAN navies to develop their capabilities for interoperable C4 equipment and operate in mutually supportive doctrines against terrorism.

In closing, I do hope to have shared with you some insights as to how C4 connectivity could be enhanced on the tactical level in the fight against terrorism and transnational crimes in the ASEAN regional context. Indeed, I am deeply privileged to be part of this multinational event that focuses on the global integration of naval power to address the threats confronting our communities. Thank you very much, and good morning.

Major General Al Mulla, Kuwait:

In the name of God, the most gracious and merciful. Admiral Clark, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to express my deep thanks for the invitation to the Seapower Symposium here in Newport, Rhode Island, which reminds me of my old days when I attended the Naval Staff College in 1984. It is an honor to be here again. I think everybody looks very serious; I would like to start with a joke. A kid asks his sister, “Why [have] Dad and Mom [been] in their room since five days?” Sister said, “I don’t know, but why are you laughing?” The kid said, “Dad asked me for Vaseline and I gave him Superglue.”

I would like to emphasize that this was the first time that GCC Maritime Forces participated in a joint combat effort. In this operation, the Kuwait Navy was in command. This effort was in close coordination with the U.S.-led Operation IRAQI FREEDOM coalition forces. Even though that was complex and difficult, we had the advantage of twenty-two years’ work experience with GCC countries. Furthermore, we had fifteen years of experience working with the U.S.-led coalition. This took us through the liberation of Kuwait, then engaged in deterrence by enforcement of UN Resolutions, and, finally, through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Kuwait was an equal partner in the planning process that took equal participation, which took it from the Free World [operations] all the way through to Kosovo. Common rules of engagement were one of the important results of the planning process. Prevention of Blue-to-Blue fires was achieved through detailed planning and execution.
The C\textsuperscript{4} was complex due to the number of nations participating in a confined littoral environment. Hundreds of ships and many more aircraft were operating in close proximity to each other. And we must not forget the political differences and restrictions of each nation in the coalition operation. Dedication and commitment of each nation within the coalition were a key factor in achieving unity of effort and command [Figure 1].

**Figure 1. Numerous C\textsuperscript{4} Challenges**

- **COMPLEXITY**
  - DIVERSITY OF NATIONS
  - LITTORAL ENVIRONMENT
  - OVER 100 NAVAL UNITS
  - POLITICAL RESTRICTION
- **UNITY OF EFFORT/UNITY OF COMMAND**
- **EQUIPMENT INEQUITY/INTEROPERABILITY**

From the experience of my navy’s past years, I have developed several lessons learned that I believe are applicable to other nations’ navies. A detailed C\textsuperscript{4} plan is critical to the successful operation, and I would like to emphasize that an efficient C\textsuperscript{4} plan needs time and effort from all participants. With all the high-tech equipment we had, the human element had to be exercised for the C\textsuperscript{4} to be successful. Exchange of liaison officers will help overcome deficiencies in equipment or oversights in planning. With respect to communication, the highest priority is the ability to talk securely by voice; and others follow in priority.

I quote from the *Multinational Maritime Operations* document: “Ideally, relationships for and during multinational maritime operations should be maintained after its conclusion. It facilitates future cooperation, staff talks, doctrine exchange, and new or revised standardization programs, exercises of opportunity for visits and personnel exchange for professional education: all contribute to preserving of and improving the capabilities for future interaction.”

Admiral de Donno, Italy:

Thank you very much. I wish also to thank Admiral Clark and the U.S. Navy for having put together this important gathering in a time when being side by side at sea has become probably the most important aspect of our fight, our war, against terrorists. I would just start by making two considerations regarding the importance of a coalition in general—the first, which includes the intrinsic advantages that are not achievable by one country alone, even by the most powerful, and the
second, which refers to the additional value that force packages operating under a multinational flag, such as the experience we had with UNMARFOR, can bring to coalition operations.

For the first point, three aspects must be underlined:

- Strong support from the international community as well as from the world’s public opinion, given that the force is more easily perceived as the willingness of a group of countries rather than as the manifestation of some conceived interest or intent pursued by a single nation
- Reduced costs to participants, since considerable force packages can be assembled without putting an excessive financial burden on individual countries
- Availability of a wider range of military and nonmilitary capabilities, whereby contributing nations can more effectively focus efforts in their respective areas of excellence and expertise.

For the second aspect, when added to the force packages, there is higher ability to integrate our other forces, as shown by the many multinational assets that effectively operated under COMEUROMARFOR inside Task Force 150, and stronger attraction exerted toward other countries—even an improved integration process and professional conduct of the operation. As a consequence, interoperability becomes the most critical driver to success at the tactical level, thereby requiring support by both hard and soft elements, such as compatible C4I systems, as we just heard, and common doctrines and procedures.

A key role in this last category of elements is played by force protection measures, which, being strongly integrated with survivability of our own forces, have a direct impact on national public opinion and on mission success. Force protection, as you all know, involves the protection of our own personnel and equipment in all locations and situations. In the new operating scenarios, our forces are even more exposed and vulnerable to a new type of threat. The force protection concept has seen its relevance grow to counter these new threats, characterized by an international connotation, geographical delocalization, ease of ability of high technology, and effective adoption of the surprise factor, without any limit to the fantasy or creativity of the adversary. The need for increased force protection is also deriving from the deeper involvement of maritime forces in the littoral environment.

All these call for an increase in safety awareness on behalf of our men and women, both on and off duty. In brief, force protection is everybody’s job. It requires awareness and understanding by all involved. Furthermore, applied to the context of today’s discussion, it is a theme event, which must be properly analyzed and developed by all the participants in a maritime coalition, and by which all should benefit from the efforts of those around them. To that end, force protection is an issue that tactical commanders need to address at all times and places, becoming increasingly difficult when operating far from the homeland, especially in the world’s hot spots. This difficulty is accentuated in the case of a coalition force, when tactical commanders need to have full awareness of the different force protection assets and procedures adopted by each country, in order to harmonize them and move the force’s overall defensive posture. Besides this, it must be considered that force protection is often connected to the adoption of measures implying the use of
force, in which case the relationship with the rules of engagement also needs to be taken into account. Indeed, in maritime operations, similarities between rules of engagement and force protection issues can be observed in terms of diversity of approach, need for harmonization, and capability of selective management.

As has happened in the past, the experience gained inside structured alliances, such as NATO, could help in this effort for standardization in doctrinal development. As a matter of fact, the tactical commanders must provide the depending forces with detailed directives. For instance, in the form of operational task force protection, they are to take into account the direction and guidance issued by superior commanders while at the same time avoiding conflicts with the national regulations of the contributing countries. Overall tactical directives must, therefore, be harmonized in a way that makes them compatible with the relevant dimensional views, possibly representing the common denominator to all forces operating under the same tactical commander. Moreover, adequate leeway should be left to individual unit commanders, since they hold the final responsibility for the safety of their forces, while at the same time aiding the most immediate perception of the situation in progress. There are several force protection focus areas that I deem of key interest and relevance for tactical maritime commanders, in particular:

- Risk reduction, achieved by increasing the mobility and unpredictability of movement of own forces, intelligence, and counterintelligence, whereby information must be managed to gain the best knowledge of potential opposing forces, while at the same time negating the details on the characteristics and movements of own forces. These not only involve doctrinal aspects, such as OPSEC and INFOSEC, but also crew’s behavior during liberty, both abroad and at home.
- Culture, not only training, in terms of internalization of the importance of force protection at all levels, from senior officers to the last sailor.
- Standardization and thorough execution of procedures, for maximization of all possible synergy by better utilizing global resources and legal frameworks. An example can be provided by two ships moored alongside, whereby a rotation program can be developed for the utilization of lifeboats for area patrol.
- Prevention of mutual interference—first of all, fratricide engagement.
- Respect of host nation regulations and culture, albeit accounting for the possible incapability of local governments to create a stable environment around our force.
- Coordination of forces operating under different commanders and in the vicinity of other units under control of the land component commander.

In conclusion, I wish to underline the critical importance of coalitions for the success of modern military operations and for the establishment and preservation of stability in the world. I also wish to highlight the crucial need for standardized procedures and doctrine in the specific field of force protection, which I believe to be one of the most sensitive areas, especially for its direct impact on the survivability of own forces and, therefore, on the effective development and success of the mission. We were trained to face at sea a well-known and visible enemy, relying mainly on the power of our weapons. Terrorism has changed the
perception of our safety, making the harbor—once a grand place of rest—a place of concern and, sometimes, of fear. Thank you.

**Rear Admiral Porterfield:**

Thank you very much, Admiral de Donno and fellow panelists. It is my privilege now to spend a few moments talking about ISR collaboration in a tactical coalition. I want to frame the discussion surrounding these two major areas. First is what we have all discussed this morning, the Global War on Terrorism that affects all of us, and, secondly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD], their delivery systems, and related materials. I believe that maritime coalitions will play a critical role in combating terrorism and the spread of WMD. To further focus your thoughts on our discussion, I would like to use the coalition postured in the Persian Gulf and northern Arabian Sea to examine ISR collaboration as it was two years ago, how it is improved and is operating today, and finally transition to a discussion on what it should look like in the future if we make the proper investments in technology and the requisite changes to policy training tactics and procedures.

This slide [Figure 2] shows how the United States and coalition members looked on September 11, 2001.

By mid-February of 2002, the maritime coalition in the Gulf region had certainly changed, as evidenced on the next slide [Figure 3], and had grown to over one hundred ships, seventy-five of which were from nations other than the United States.

The hundred and six ships assembled in the region in early 2002 represented a high-water mark of recent maritime coalition activity and a monumental challenge in terms of ISR collaboration [Figure 4]. The situation these ships found themselves
in during that period leads me to a set of issues to guide our discussions on maximizing the effectiveness of maritime coalition.

The usual representation of ISR collaboration in late 2001 and early last year in the Gulf region might look something like this.

**2002 Coalition ISR Collaboration Attributes**

- Multiple baselines based on choices made years ago
- Redundant hardware and software performing below capability
- No end-to-end connectivity
- Manual information fusion
- Numerous national information processing/reporting systems
- No real-time coalition collaboration.

The characteristics of this timeframe—and, in large part, today as well—were the use of multiple communications architectures and technology baselines, for the most part based on national or fleet choices made years ago—redundant hardware and software, afloat and shore, performing well below advertised capability, with virtually no end-to-end connectivity. Fusion of information was often accomplished manually, and a high degree of information processing was conducted by way of national analysis in the reporting system. The result was that little real-time ISR collaboration capability across the coalition was in place. Indications and warning information were disseminated almost exclusively on voice circuits. Platforms such as the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft passed contact information to other platforms by voice. Reports or queries of a less time-sensitive nature were passed via satellite communication systems to national intelligence or operation centers. These
national centers then turned around the reports to coalition partners by various means. Daily ops and intelligence summaries were passed by exchanges of floppy disks, moved by helicopter from unit to unit. In summary, although some work-arounds were devised and wide-area networks were used to a limited extent, meaningful rapid ISR collaboration was hindered by technical and procedural barriers that could not be overcome by all units already in place.

Today, the architecture for coalition intelligence and ISR collaboration is usually established to fit the specific theater operational environment, to assign mission communications ISR infrastructures that each national element brings forward, and by external factors such as national policy regarding intelligence sharing and reporting change [Figure 5]. Common to each coalition operation is the fact that we start with the lowest common denominator in connectivity, interoperability, and integration and then apply a wide range of measures to overcome the limitations. Coalition tactical elements report intelligence via a number of stovepipe communication paths and technologies, including voice recording networks, data links, and unclassified and classified broadcast and Internet protocol base networks; and increasingly via chat sessions and, in some sessions, Web sites and portals.

**Today’s Coalition ISR Collaboration Attributes**

- Network integration through guards, gateways, tunneling
- Increasingly common hardware and software
- Digital production standards emerging
- Policy limits access to some data sets
- Rudimentary ISR collaboration

![Figure 4. 2002 Coalition ISR Collaboration](image)
These reporting-in data exchange paths are further differentiated by classification level, releasability, and time latency from data persistence in many reporting formats. As a result, coalition ISR data and intelligence must be fused by time-consuming, manual means. This makes it near-impossible to build a common synchronized picture, and very difficult to conduct ISR collaboration in real time among dispersed coalition units. That said, we have evolved a number of methods and procedures over the past decade to overcome these limitations and to obtain a workable level of coalition-wide battle space awareness (Figure 6).

As depicted here, these methods and procedures range from highly structured turnaround of ISR data from national headquarters to gateways and providing access to remote servers, such as collaboration-at-sea replication servers, to the tried-and-true sneakernet. Today’s architecture and operating procedures have been refined through a remarkable level of task force cooperation and collaboration among intelligence professionals and war fighters.

**Future Coalition ISR Collaboration Attributes**

- Multilevel security network
- Unlimited bandwidth
- Optimized national niche expertise
- Shared data fusion and visualization tools
- Full ISR collaboration services
- Rehearsed combined tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Before closing, I would like to focus for a minute on a much more integrated and synchronized coalition architecture of the future that would enable us to exchange ISR and intelligence in real time, collaborate in real time in the conduct of ISR functions and activities, use multilevel security systems, assess ample bandwidth for communicating with all coalition members, and enable seamless plug-in of multinational force packages that bring unique ISR niche expertise and capabilities to the fight. Above all, this future ISR architecture must have the flexibility to provide ISR support for maritime coalitions formed on short notice to respond to a wide range of missions and tasks.

Let me conclude with this slide on maritime coalitions.

**Maritime Coalitions**

- Commitment to making maritime coalitions work
- Cooperation, collaboration, trust
- Unique capabilities and strengths
- Central role for maritime coalitions.

I would offer that most of what we have heard this morning and what has been said about the United States and partner navies at the tactical level is that, first, there is a tremendous commitment to making maritime coalitions work at the national, service, and tactical levels. Second, cooperation, collaboration, and trust are essential parts of all effective coalitions and are best achieved through practice, training, a common language, and a clear sense of purpose. Third, each partner of a coalition has a unique strength or capability to bring to its partners, and coalition
leaders must adopt strategies to maximize the contribution of each nation represented. And finally, I am convinced that maritime coalitions will play a central role in achieving a number of shared national objectives, most notably the successful prosecution of the War on Terrorism and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

With that, I look forward to hearing your views on maritime coalitions today and in the future, and what we can do to make those coalitions more effective. The floor is now open for discussion, comments, and questions. Thank you very much.

**Discussion**

*Rear Admiral Stufflebeem, United States:*

First of all, I would like to thank the general and the admirals for your thoughtful presentations—very forcefully put, in terms of interoperability, across all subjects. It has been my experience as a recent tactical commander that we all seem to appreciate the requirement for standards of interoperability, particularly in command and control. My experience has been that in the realm of ROE [rules of engagement] we have not necessarily gone down the same path of standardization. In fact, my experiences have been as to build placemats of our national ROE, so that we could deconflict, in some cases, what force we could project or, in other areas, substitute strengths of rules of engagement where others might not have the same standardization. So my question is, should we also not, as a maritime body, be demanding of our national leaders that we have a parallel effort of standardization and interoperability for rules of engagement in our coalitions?

All the panelists spoke to interoperability standards, and, of course, Admiral Klaver spoke specifically to ROE. But I think that with the experiences that you have had in your operations, as well as many of those in the audience, we can relate that we work very hard and want to know what are the requirements for command and control interoperability, but we have not yet necessarily laid down the said demands for how we achieve the same interoperability for ROE within a coalition.

*Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:*

If I might start off, there are two things which are quite different. One is the procedural one, which I think we can solve if we want to. The other one will always remain a political one, and I am afraid, at our level, we cannot solve that problem. I talked about national caveats. Basically, ideally, if you are a force commander, you should have no national caveats. You should have the same rules for everybody, and everybody understands exactly what you mean. In my opinion, and [from] what we have seen over the last ten, twelve years with all sorts of peacekeeping and peace enforcing—whatever you want to call it—this will never happen, because politicians will not agree, and they will certainly not agree beforehand on any operation. If you look at the present operation in Iraq, there are national caveats in force. If you look at the politics involved, you would understand why. So I think the political problem cannot be solved by us, and it will not be solved by politicians, in my honest opinion.
Admiral de Donno, Italy:

I agree. I think that the rules of engagement are a specific problem of a political decision, because from the behavior of a ship or a military unit in facing a certain type of situation, certainly, comes a certain type of a consequence in the international relationship of the country. So this is the reason why we have this problem—and we had during the same operation: ships working under different lists of rules of engagement. Some of them were common—the most general, if I can say, because there are some aspects that are good for everybody. But when you enter in certain specific evaluation, at that point the problem rises at the political level and reflects the intention—the perspective—that each country has toward this very sensitive situation.

So I think that what we can do is to ask our political leaders for direction to receive and to discuss, in the widest way possible, the particular rules of engagement which are necessary for each type of operation, and then to bring [into the discussion] our participation with all these aspects that [make], if I can say, another aspect of what the characteristics [of the ROE] will be. Some can add a certain type of operational requirement or operational capability, and with that type of operational capability is also the availability to do a certain type of operation or not. And this is something that we cannot avoid in any case, according to my personal idea and experience.

Commodore Arshad Hussain, Pakistan:

I am the commandant of the Pakistan Naval War College in Lahore. While my question is focused toward Vice Admiral De Leon of the Philippines, regarding the terrorist challenges, it also refers to the speech of Admiral Clark at the outset. And the question is that there was a time that there were different alliances, like the Warsaw Pact Alliance or the NATO alliance, but different perceptions trying to sort out the problems through negotiations, and eventually we see that we are in a world [in which] those problems are sorted out. Today, we sit together not only as a maritime audience, but also the land audience, when you talk about terrorism and the menace which it is creating. We all see this menace, which has got no territory, which has got no language, which has got just one motivation. After all, what is this enemy, that the entire world as one alliance is taking it on and taking it so seriously and trying to take it on when it has picked our towns? Why not harness the same efforts and see that the enemy that has got no territory, the enemy which has got no expensive designs, the enemy that has got no language, the enemy that has got no religion—how and why has it become so powerful that it has become a threat to the world? Why not harness our efforts to see why it has picked up arms? Why not see the root cause of an enemy, which is, as a matter of fact, not as great, not as strong as we think, that the entire efforts of the world may, in terms of land or maritime power, not be able to tackle it. So why not go into the root cause as to why this happened? Is it because of the difference being increased between the have-nots? Is it because the people are being deprived of privileges and rights? Is it because freedom movements are being misinterpreted as terrorist activities? What is the cause of it? Why not use and harness our efforts toward identifying the cause of this political menace and then attack it? Then, to let them pick up their
arms and do it—after all, when the terrorist does that, we all know that is so very well motivated.

**Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:**

Yes, thank you very much. If I understand your question right, you are talking of the whole spectrum of trying to analyze the development of such problems for just terrorism: the root causes. But I believe that you will have the opportunity to address that tomorrow in Syndicate Number Four, where naval support to civil authorities will be discussed.

Now, as far as trying to address the naval aspect of that particular situation, I believe that the establishment of a regional, coordinating center would partly solve the problem. But of course, each and every navy should be aware of, at least, the national development in its own country, and possibly even a regional development within porous border areas of concern. Each and every navy would know how to interact with one another in solving a particular problem. But we have to start somewhere, and we should know what our objectives are. We know, for a fact, the wide spectrum of a problem, including poverty or deprivation, but we would not be able to solve that as a whole. But we should start somewhere in terms of naval cooperation at the outset, and, thereafter, find out our own civil authority and use our own capabilities to support their effort—just like what happened between Malaysia and us [the Philippines] one year ago, when the Area Two commander of the Royal Malaysian Navy and myself as naval commander in Southern Mindanao had to cooperate directly to take care of Filipino refugees: All we did was call each other by mobile phone and we were able to make it. Thank you.

**Vice Admiral Feldt, Germany:**

I want to come back to the rules of engagement business with one question. I think the technical problem of connectivity is something we can solve in time, and I think it is very necessary to find an answer to the question: Do we need to extend our rules of engagement understanding? I agree with what you have said, Ruurt [Klaver] and Marcello [de Donno], as well. I think it is not achievable to get something which is a standard set of rules of engagement. What we have to achieve is to develop a common understanding—not only in the maritime family, but a common understanding on the political side as well, and this is something which we have to start. We have to ask our political masters to do that, and we have to continue to ask them. I think for the NATO side, the NATO Response Force will be a test for that. I think a lot of governments agree to this NATO Response Force, and I think maybe that they are aware of the fact that now they have to think about rules of engagement and how to engage this NATO Response Force in a quite different way than they have done all the years before. I think this is a good test bed for answering the question. And my question to you is, do you agree to that? And do you think that perhaps the NATO Response Force could be an example for other similar forces in other parts of the world as well? Thank you.

**Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:**

I must say I fully agree; I think the NATO Response Force—let’s say the political side of it—will actually cause a lot more action amongst our politicians. We see it in
the Netherlands; we see it develop in a discussion in parliament which didn’t happen, about three or four months ago, when we actually started discussing the NRF over there. They are now certainly very interested in what they are actually committed to, and that also means what are the rules of engagement in which the NRF have to operate. So I think that will certainly give some dynamics to the situation.

I would like to add one more thing to my last remark. When I said that politicians will always have their own caveats, I think it is very important to point out—and I tried to make the point when I made my presentation—that I still think that the politicians should actually decide on what the common rules of engagement are, including national caveats. And they should send those rules of engagement, in whatever form and for whatever coalition, to the force commander, and he will have to disseminate that down. What I think is actually wrong, and what sometimes happens, is if individual units get national rules of engagement that are not coordinated at the top level—and which should be coordinated at the top level, with the exceptions nations have to make, because otherwise the end will be total confusion.

Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:

I’d just like to make a comment on the ROE discussion, and actually I have a question for Admiral Porterfield. The ROE concept clearly is in the hands of our political masters. However, I do not think [that] should abrogate our responsibilities to advise our political masters on the implications of varied ROE on force commanders in the field. I would also—at a technical level, though—suggest that there is something that we can do, because it is still true in various coalition operations—because the point that Admiral Klaver made that often there are ROEs extant in various units that the force commander is not aware of, is still true in various coalition operations. There is absolute need to share at the force commander level all of the ROEs, so that the force commander can make the appropriate operational decisions he needs to make.

My question, however, for Admiral Porterfield, is [about] your vision of the future of technical interoperability, which by and large I absolutely agree with. However, I noticed you had one particular observation which implied the need for unlimited bandwidth. I believe fundamentally, not only does the United States Navy clearly have challenges as we move forward in technical interoperability, but all of your coalition partners, to a lesser or greater extent, have the same challenges. To assume that we can work on the basis that we will all require unlimited bandwidth in the future, I would suggest, certainly from most nations’ perspective—my own included—is not realistic. So, I also suggest that there is a need that we collectively take an approach to assess the true needs of bandwidth and to work from a premise that there will not be unlimited bandwidth, because it is just not there; because to a lesser or greater extent, we all will have to work within the resources available to us, and they will not—either fiscal or bandwidth—be unlimited. I think if we are working forward on the premise that we will all need unlimited bandwidth, we will not be able to get there. I would be interested to hear a response to that.
Rear Admiral Porterfield, United States:

Admiral, I could not agree more with you. My boss, Admiral Clark, stated it very clearly in his remarks about physical realities and fiscal discipline. One consideration, though, in that comment was whether you could use the Internet as part of your unlimited coalition architecture, with the proper commercially available front ends: the laptops, for instance, to use the Internet and public key encryptions. You could do a great service to come-as-you-are coalitions that may form.

I would tell you that I used to work in the Pacific command and was very actively involved in the operations and the planning for the operations in East Timor. This was certainly a coalition of nations that came together for a specific reason that we really had not planned for, and so we were looking for a way of establishing an architecture that would allow command and control and, to some degree, intelligence information to be shared among that coalition. That is principally what I was talking about, but you are absolutely right about the realities of our bandwidth constraints.

Brigadier General Daria Alzben, Jordan:

My question is to Admiral de Donno, please. You mentioned on force protection, the importance of respecting a host nation’s culture. If you could please elaborate on that a little bit more, if you may. Thank you.

Admiral de Donno, Italy:

As I said, the problem of force protection is a problem related to the need to assure the survivability of the assets and the personnel, whether they are ashore or in service aboard the ship. So, in the many aspects that must be taken into consideration by the tactical commander in providing direction and the application of a certain number of initiatives, certainly the geographical and social environment in which it is, at that point, must also be taken into consideration, because we will know that in different locations, there are different ways to consider a certain kind of behavior. So a certain type of behavior which in a part of the world means a certain thing, in another part of the world can be offensive and can be considered in a completely different way. Therefore, of the many aspects that a commanding officer at the tactical level has to take into consideration when he is providing all the directions to the forces on how to defend themselves or how to assure their survivability in a particular situation, one thing that cannot be left without consideration is the fact of the geographical and social environment in which the particular situation is taking place. This is what I was saying. The same behavior cannot always be standardized in every place in the world, because, as I said, some things in different places can produce different reactions. So it is very, very important, because also a favorable and good relationship with the social environment is something that can help very much in assuring force protection. This was what I meant.

Thank you very much, and welcome back, everybody; this is the concluding thirty minutes of our Panel One discussion on maritime coalitions. It is interesting that we
all probably hear things at a different level, depending on what your job or experience is. I clearly heard that people in my business need to get busy, because it seems that intelligence and information—especially the sharing of that information—will be critical to our future endeavors together, whether they be in coalitions or as a unilateral force, but much more effectively as coalition partners.

From an intelligence professional’s perspective, we often talk about ISR only in the sharing or the collection of that information, but I would like to suggest that it also means collaboration in the analysis of the information. There are many different organizations in your navies and in your nations that can certainly contribute analysis of data to make our overall force much more effective. So, that said, please recall that the rules are to use the microphone, state where you are from and to which panel member you have a question or comment, and please keep your questions brief. We will take the first question or comment.

Admiral Dorn, United States:

I am the Pacific Fleet Commander, and I have a question for Admiral De Leon. Admiral, you talked about the establishment of a regional maritime coordinating center. I would be interested in your thoughts as to what role the Western Pacific Naval Symposium may have in bringing that to fruition, and also if you think it might be time to, perhaps, take our CARAT [Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training] series of exercises in Southeast Asia and put a certain flavor in those exercises that supports the problem that we are talking about this morning.

Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:

Thank you very much, Admiral, for the very interesting question. Actually, we are, in the Philippines and, I would assume, even in that part of the world in ASEAN, seeing how active the Western Pacific Naval Symposium has become in various coordinated activities. To my mind, we would welcome the active participation of the WPNS, so that we can jump-start the development of this regional maritime coordinating center among our countries that are involved in that part of the world in counter- and antiterrorism. Trying to phase in that particular activity will be very, very interesting for the navies, because we are actually looking at, even in the international city limits with Malaysia, exchanging wardrooms with the Malaysian Navy. And a CARAT would be a very, very good vehicle to be able to undertake that—much more proactive. Thank you very much, sir.

Admiral Jonathan Band, United Kingdom:

I am UK Fleet Commander. On that issue of regional focus, it seems to me that if one takes as one’s starting point that these are intelligence-led operations—or that is the challenge—[and] therefore you must have regional engagement, there is quite a good little model already present actually, down in Key West, which the U.S., UK, Netherlands, French, and agencies use, not on the terrorist game, but on the drugs war. That seems to offer a model, which I have certainly had clearer exposure to in the last four or five years, which was really quite effective. Because it is regionally based, it does get the national, local buy-in; and over time, then the intelligence agencies concerned actually start to trust themselves (which is not the starting position of any intelligence agency, one has to be frankly fair about [that]).
I think that sort of model there, which happens to be drugs, is one that I certainly would promote in various regions of the world, because it seems to work. Of course, the setup in Key West, also in a way politically, has the attraction that it is led by the coast guard and not by the military, which may be attractive in parts of the world.

**Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:**

Basically that is the advantage of the WPNS; you will be able to access most of the experience that is already available within the United States Navy. If you remember Operation ENDURING FREEDOM–PHILIPPINES, the intelligence fusion that we tried to undertake with the United States armed forces has helped us a lot in neutralizing the local terrorist group that we have had in the Philippines.

**Admiral Fallon, United States:**

Fleet Forces Command in the Atlantic Fleet. If I could take us back to the issue of rules of engagement—Admiral Klaver, maybe you might have an opinion, but it seems to me that it is not the right thing to do, to push this off and say, well, it is a political issue, just the politicians can deal with this. I think the ROE issue is fundamental to undertaking any coalition operations, and so I think it is our responsibility as uniformed people to get to the politicians, to approach them and to get them engaged in this business. Admiral Klaver, any suggestions on how we might facilitate this? Are there things that we can do collectively that might expose our people, our political leadership, to these issues so that they would have a better understanding? Or do you see any other ways that we can engage collectively that might help this problem?

**Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:**

Well, first of all, I fully agree with you that it is an operational commander’s issue. And what I wanted to say when I said the politicians will always have the end responsibility [is that], I think that will not change, but we, as operational commanders or fleet commanders or whatever—we have to explain to them what it actually means. I think that it is a bit of a shame that there are no exercises anymore. We used to have the NATO Command Post exercise, where we actually drew governments in and had them discussing things like rules of engagement. I think, on average, if we could actually set up these sorts of exercises again, it will be very beneficial, because quite often—or at least in my experience—politicians just do not want to be bothered until it is actually happening, and then they do not have a clue how it is actually working. But how can you actually attract the politicians to do that? I think what has happened in Colorado Springs with the ministers of defense was a good start, where they were actually being forced, more or less, by the Secretary-General (I am talking NATO now, of course) to actually get engaged in these things. I hope that they have been woken up there a bit, because they do not realize the issue and all the implications. The only thing is, as I said, with commanders they have to talk; they have to talk to these rules of engagement. The only thing is trying to set up some form of synthetic exercise again—perhaps starting off with NATO again, because that is actually how we used to do it, so why not try it again? I think that would be very beneficial, but it is certainly something [on] which we, as operational commanders, have to educate the politicians; I fully agree with that.
Major Jones, Belize:

My question is for Admiral Klaver. During your presentation, sir, you had mentioned self-defense and the fact that it is an inherent right, both at the individual and at the state level. I think we all can agree that it is in fact an inherent right. Recently, we have seen the emergence of this concept of preemptive self-defense. I was wondering if you would be so kind as to share with us your views on that concept and how you see it influencing customary international law, future coalition operations, and, subsequently, rules of engagement?

Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:

I will try to take this question, I think. Self-defense, of course, is always the right of an individual, of nations, of ships, et cetera, and that is why I said it is not actually part of the rules of engagement. You always will retain the right of self-defense. What is very important in the coalition is that you know how somebody else in another nation, in another ship, in another unit will actually use the right of self-defense, and that is where you get into interpretation by different nations. I am not saying that we should all have exactly the same meaning of self-defense. That will not happen, I think. But we must be absolutely sure what the reactions of somebody else will be who is actually working with us. Whether preemptive self-defense is a right thing or a wrong thing, it is something nations have to decide for themselves. Whether it is legal? This is bringing me too far in the legal world, where I do not want to go actually. I would like to stress again that rules of engagement are not just a legal problem. It is an operational commander’s working tool, problem, or whatever you want to call it, so we do not leave that to the lawyers. But we have to leave something to the lawyers, and I step out of the question.

Vice Admiral Hellemans, Belgium:

I have a question for Admiral De Leon with regard to C4I and exchange of information. We have a lot of problems on exchange of information, because many different departments are dealing with that. I am speaking in particular of Justice and Foreign Affairs, in the ASEAN region. Do you have any particular arrangements between the different departments, or do you have any problems on the exchange of information?

Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:

In my local experience in the Philippines, what we have right now is what we term a Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, and it involves identified cabinet ministers having regular, coordinated meetings. In my experience, it happens once in two weeks. And as far as this Cabinet oversight committee and internal security are concerned, they are able to thresh out the questions and thresh out coordination so that respective operating agencies are able to exchange information very quickly. We still have yet to do that at the ASEAN level—and not necessarily even ASEAN, but maybe with contiguous countries like the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. We have a grouping of what we call BIMP (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines), where we try to develop common customs, immigration, and quarantine procedures that would make it much easier for us to coordinate the different agencies that are involved in CIQ, and this is done on a regular basis.
Colonel Joharie [from Brunei] would bear me out on this. Just last month there was the lower-level meeting of the BIMP Conference, and we are making way, as far as that particular coordination is concerned.

Admiral Vergara, Chile:

I am going to make my question in Spanish to Admiral Porterfield; please use your translator. This was, I think, a technological surprise, and I am going to talk about technology. [Translation.]

More than a question, but an observation: This morning we have spoken of the strategic importance of maritime cooperation of naval forces. There is a fundamental aspect in bringing about that cooperation that should result from our meeting here at Newport. In this sense, I am from a South American country, and I have the impression that the leadership of powerful and developed forces speaks as though there exists a unified block of interests. In the case of South America, we have much in common, but we also have a distinct reality. There is, for example, the interest of CONOSUL, an Atlantic reality, a Pacific reality, and a Caribbean reality. Firstly, to speak of a Latin American reality is not easy. In this sense, the more we understand that there are many realities, [the more we understand that the Latin American] maritime reality is divided into three.

Rear Admiral Porterfield, United States:

Admiral, we totally agree. And, in fact, that is one of the principles that we find so attractive about discussing coalitions, because there are many important contributions that smaller navies and coast guards can make to the greater whole, and this is precisely what we would like to see. It is incumbent upon a coalition to bring all members of the coalition into the information sharing. If it is, as I mentioned before, a coalition for a specific purpose that was quickly formed, perhaps you could use commercially available laptops and software that is resident on those laptops, through some kind of encryption device for security, and make it available to you by using such things as the Internet. There needs to be an outreach to the smaller coalition members that have important roles to play in surveillance. But again, I know that your country has some outstanding analysts, and we need to take advantage of them. I think it was mentioned earlier that the training and establishment of tactics, techniques, and procedures, which can be examined and rehearsed and perfected in exercises such as UNITAS, would go a long way in the South American region to make sure that if we had to call upon a coalition such as Admiral Band [of the United Kingdom] was talking about, we would have already worked through some of these things. But you make an excellent point.

I would like to share with the audience one of the problems that I face as a guy in charge of naval intelligence in the United States [Figure 7].

Despite the coalitions that we form, my analysts want to write at the highest level, which typically is not for release. And you find yourself in a constant battle with people to understand the nature of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and what they mean and therefore having to write their analysis and provide the information at the beginning to the coalition members. So this is an intelligence policy that I need to continue to work on, to make sure that we do not unnecessarily shortchange the coalition. I also show some other languages, because I suspect that
we all have this common issue, and we all have certain things that are held at the unilateral, national level. But for me, we have to ensure that we write for release. This is the policy that we talk about, so that we ensure that everybody has the common picture of the battlespace. This is so important, and it begins with training our analysts and the people that are involved in the entire ISR process.

Vice Admiral Roughead, United States:

A question for General Al Mulla. As coalitions come together—and we have seen it in various places around the world—in your opinion, what are the three most important areas to most rapidly address to bring the coalitions together most efficiently and most quickly, as you form your coalition for operation?

Major General Al Mullah, Kuwait:

Thank you very much for this question. I think I would like to answer you by expressing some of my experience during the last IF operation. A very important point to be really looked at is the connectivity of C4I to start with. It really begins with the initiative of commanders to build up trustworthy relations with their counterparts to start with. And this is really the [the fundamental basis for] all the problems that come along in later stages.

Let us talk about, first, the way we supported all the marines and army—transportation and support to bring them to the area of operation. Of course, we do not have the huge command and control facilities within Kuwait to be able to conduct such coordination between the forces that attended this operation. So what we did, we really emphasized so much the liaison of such exchange. And from the Kuwait Navy, I can tell you we had about sixty officers dispatched to several ships and units within...
Kuwait and within the NOAG (the Northern Operation Area), so they could really get this connectivity. Some of them were carrying our equipment with them, to make sure that they could really provide secure communication through such operations. At the end of the day, it was working out, and it was not only from Kuwait it could be seen, but from U.S., UAE, Bahrain. So we had different material and different people just being dispatched in various ships. We had to level it out in certain command levels, as we had to make sure that we did not get mixed up between the staff and direct command within the area of operation. This is a very important factor.

The other factor which is very important is the understanding of the culture that is there, so people would really have this trust between them, so they can really get them to exchange information, develop their thoughts—having as well, in some cases, the need to transfer boats and people at sea for more analysis and discussion, to get the right posture for everybody for what action is next to be taken. It all comes to personnel, teamwork, and then the task that you are trying to accomplish.

Admiral Dumontet, France:

My question is to Admiral Klaver, about the ROEs in a joint framework. Today it is very different to act at sea or ashore, or in air and space. How can we imagine having the same approach on this issue in a joint framework for the ROE in an action against terrorism, which is obviously a joint action?

Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:

Well, generally speaking, I think we should have the same rules of engagement. As I said in my presentation, there is a possibility for certain areas that you actually design the specific maritime rules of engagement—for instance, for boarding ships. That is a good example. What I found—and I am talking about my experience over the last three years in NATO—is that, if you have the same rules of engagement, you will find that the interpretation by the land component commander and the maritime component commander, and I think these are the two major distinctions, are often quite big. The problem arises once you start sending marines ashore, that you actually have to do this overlap type of thing. I found, surprisingly in NATO, that there are still different interpretations of these rules of engagement. I found that the only way to solve this rules of engagement problem is, beforehand—before you start an operation, before you start an exercise—to talk together with the commanders and actually play a few situations where you have to use these rules of engagement, so that you understand from each other how they would actually interpret it. But even then, I found—and I am not talking about exercise type of things—that we were having problems. I think it is more complicated; it is a bit of the way the mindset works. Dare I say this in the situation where we are all very joint, but we still find that it is not as smooth as it should go. It is certainly something we should work on, and it is recognized in NATO circles and it is being worked on, but it is still not solved. I hope I answered your question.

Rear Admiral Porterfield, United States:

Okay, gentlemen, it is time. I want to thank my fellow panelists for your excellent presentations and active participation in the dialogue, and I want to thank the audience also for making this a good opening panel for this Sixteenth ISS.
Luncheon Address:
Maritime Power for the Twenty-First Century

Admiral Thomas H. Collins
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

Rear Admiral Route, United States:

If this morning is any indication of what this conference is going to be like, we are in for a real treat. I was very happy with the panel discussion this morning and look forward to reconvening here this afternoon. Also, if the discussion at the table is any indication, you are in for a real treat here with Admiral Collins, as we kick off his speech after lunch. As you know, he is the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. He is a 1968 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, where he later served as a faculty member within the Humanities Department. His shipboard tours have included service aboard the cutter Vigilant and command of the cutter Cape Morgan. Ashore, he successfully completed leadership and command tours on the Atlantic Coast and in Hawaii. From 1998 to 2000, he served as Commander, Pacific Area in the Eleventh Coast Guard District, where he developed a successful coast guard response to increased illegal drug and migrant smuggling traffic on the Eastern Pacific. From 2000 to 2002 he served as the vice commandant, where he spearheaded service-wide process improvement initiatives and directed system enhancements as a coast guard acquisition executive. He became the twenty-second commandant in May 2002 and now heads the leading federal agency for maritime homeland security. Securing the nation’s maritime border is nothing new for the U.S. Coast Guard; they have been doing it since 1790. Admiral Collins has agreed to take questions after he concludes his remarks, and I ask you to please join me in welcoming Admiral Tom Collins.

Admiral Collins:

Thank you for that very, very kind welcome. Admiral Clark, fellow service chiefs, distinguished guests and supporters of the Naval War College and this great symposium, it is an incredible pleasure to be with you, to be able to address you at this great setting, great venue, a college that is so richly steeped in naval tradition and history and so highly regarded throughout the world for the significant contributions it makes to critical security thinking, strategic studies, and war gaming. It is really one of those jewels, I think, in the navy’s crown.

I must also add that it is an honor for the United States Coast Guard to be with you here at this symposium, and I thank Admiral Vern Clark for the opportunity to address such a premier forum. It is a wonderful opportunity for us to discuss the important issues concerning security and our collective security interests.
Earlier this morning, we heard from Admiral Clark. He began this event with his keynote address and his thoughts on implementing a vision that suggests a powerful, forward-looking, collaborative-thinking, twenty-first-century view of naval power. We are lucky in our nation to have Vern Clark continue on another couple of years at the helm, and from my perspective in the coast guard, we are very, very fortunate to have him as a partner, as I cannot think of a closer relationship between agencies in our government than the coast guard and the navy [have], and I thank Vern Clark a lot for that development. I would like to continue on Admiral Clark’s theme of sea power, with some additional comments and insights of my own, and I think they will dovetail very, very closely.

Environment and New Thinking

As many of you recall from your studies here, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s definition of sea power rested upon the means needed to defeat organized military threats—nation-state threats. From his seminal work, naval power was the key element in sea power. Since classical times, the establishment and maintenance of naval power have been the focus of most seagoing nations.

I propose today, in today’s security environment, that this classical view needs some reshaping and some variation. As stressed by Admiral Clark and others in Panel One today, the most dangerous threats of today, to all of our nations, are not entirely traditional, state issues with organized armies and organized navies. The threats that concern us most today are transnational issues—criminal organizations undermining the very fabric of our societies; resource thieves stealing from the greater good of all; environmental menaces, who would destroy the future of our children; pirates, who would in certain parts of our oceans bring legitimate commerce to a halt; human traffickers, who reflect the worst in mankind; and, the most dangerous of all, of course, as we have discussed: terrorists—religious extremist terrorists, state-sponsored terrorists, narco-terrorists—unfortunately, all technically advanced and well armed. Increasingly, as underscored by Admiral Clark, the seas are serving as the highways for this bewildering variety of transnational threats and challenges that honor no traditional frontier. Many of these threats are conveyed in ways that are not effectively countered by naval forces. They look [like] and mingle with legitimate commerce and recreational traffic. You cannot launch cruise missiles or conduct air strikes against them. You must engage them—up close and personal—to determine their intentions and sort the suspicious from the innocent: a much different ballgame.

Now accordingly, in today’s and tomorrow’s world, I would suggest true sea power must be a broader and more expansive concept than naval power alone. Sea power in the twenty-first century is the ability of a nation to use the seas safely, securely, fully, and wisely, to achieve national objectives. In this new security environment, we need new thinking, new partnerships, and a new construct to provide the sea power we all want, to ensure the safety and freedom of the seas for all and, clearly, the security of our respective nations. I suggest that today we need to think about a broad complement to twenty-first-century naval power and to think in the context of maritime power.
Twenty-first-century maritime power speaks to a nation’s needs beyond purely military capabilities needed for war fighting. You have to include it, but you have to think beyond it. It includes, for each of us, the use of the seas to preserve marine resources, to ensure the safe transit and passage of cargoes and people on its waters, to protect maritime borders from intrusion, to uphold its maritime sovereignty, to rescue the distressed who ply the ocean in ships, and to prevent misuse of the oceans. These are timeless national interests, which are more relevant than ever, that collectively can be described as a nation’s maritime security and safety interests.

In the United States, the tragic events of 9/11 have forced us to think anew about the approach to maritime power in the context of maritime security. Prior to 9/11, the United States was a fairly wide-open country. Our borders were relatively unencumbered. International commerce moved freely, and our nation relied on superb armed forces in the broad expanse of the oceans surrounding North America to maintain our national security—or the perception of national security. But terrorists, as mentioned by Admiral Clark so well this morning, were able to use this free flow of people, money, and products to strike at the very core of our nation, just as they have at other countries in this world. In this new security environment, effective integration of both civil law enforcement authorities, private sector maritime stakeholders’ knowledge and competencies, and military might have to be part of the security solution. Accordingly, the United States Coast Guard, in extremely close cooperation with the U.S. Navy, figures significantly in the maritime homeland security component of our overall homeland security strategy.

Today, the United States Coast Guard’s unique capabilities help enhance homeland security, protect critical infrastructures, safeguard our sovereignty, and defend American citizens. The “power” inherent in these coast guard capabilities is the key component of the nation’s overall maritime power. To maintain sea power, the United States must be aware of and control what takes place in its own sovereign waters and exercise influence in international waters of vital concern to the United States interests, oftentimes working in an environment that can only be characterized as commercial maritime, with no clear enemy.

As a military, multimission maritime service with civil law enforcement and regulatory authorities, the United States Coast Guard operates in concert with, and I think in great complement to, the United States Navy, other government agencies, the private sector, and the international community, in the risk mitigation business across the entire spectrum of homeland security.

What is going on here, I would suggest, is not revolutionary, but it is transformational. Yes, the terrorist threat is new and dangerous. But the powerful precursor asymmetric threats, such as drug and human traffickers and international criminal organizations, have been evolving for decades. Concurrently, a critical body of international law was put in place to deal with the broader issues of maritime security. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea created new maritime law and extended maritime jurisdiction that presented all nations with new challenges. To exercise these challenges, maritime strategic thinking is changing, with today’s coast guards emerging as important national institutions with a potential to make major contributions to regional order and security.
Our Approach to Maritime Homeland Security

Today, maritime security in the United States is a concerted effort that encompasses more than just protecting the nation’s national interest against hostile nations, clearly. It includes protection against terrorist attacks; protection of our sovereign natural resources, environment, and the like. To reduce these risks in this new security environment, it requires a special application, I think, of concerted, integrated maritime power at four major areas of emphasis: to (1) increase our awareness of all activities and events in the maritime environment; (2) very importantly, build and administer an effective maritime security regime both domestically and internationally; (3) increase military and civil operational presence—persistent presence—in our ports and coastal zones and beyond, for a layered security posture; and (4) improve our response posture in the event a security incident does occur. To be successful here—to reduce vulnerabilities and to mitigate risk—our navies and coast guards require the right mix of authorities, capabilities, capacities, and partnerships.

Applying this strategy of maritime power collaboratively, in an integrated way, to navies and coast guards and other maritime interests in the world is a powerful notion. We heard it expressed again and again this morning, and I think before the conference is over we will hear it many, many times more. We must leverage new technologies and must obtain capability that provides coordinated, systematic, fused intelligence that provides a detailed in-depth knowledge of the sea space. In-depth knowledge of the sea space: for us, the key concept is something we have labeled Maritime Domain Awareness [MDA].

From a risk-mitigation perspective, MDA is perhaps the highest return element of our application of maritime power. Simply put, MDA is processing comprehensive awareness of the vulnerabilities, threats, and all matters of interest on the water. It means having extensive knowledge of geography, weather, position of friendly vessels and potential threats, trends, key indicators, anomalies, intent, and the activities of all vessels in an area of concern, including the innocent.

Maritime power is all about awareness, leveraging and synthesizing large amounts of information and specific data from many disparate sources to gain knowledge of the entire maritime [spectrum]. If knowledge is power, and MDA provides us the requisite knowledge of the maritime, then MDA is the key to maritime power. MDA, and the knowledge it will bring, will allow maritime forces to respond with measured and appropriate force to meet any threat on, below, or above the sea and, taken to an ultimate state, will provide the necessary awareness to create “nonevents,” proactively preventing incidents, challenges, and devastation.

Partnerships

In Panel Three of this symposium, I will talk in greater detail and specificity about MDA and some of the “peace parts” that are included in this concept, but I think this is the highest payoff ingredient, and I would not be surprised if we see this dominate discussion in most of the panels. The second-highest payoff of our strategy is the development, maintenance, and enhancement of security
partnerships. Intergovernmental, public-private, regional, and international partnerships are absolutely essential if we are to enhance the security and safety of respective nations and the world. We are dealing with international global systems. They require an international approach—not only partnerships of nations, but partnerships of navies and partnerships of coast guards, and commercial shipping interests between and among all of us.

It is a much broader definition of coalition. It is a much broader definition of partnership, and it is all about gaining the right ingredients, the right information to be fully aware of the threats and vulnerabilities in our environment. What I am talking about here is a new, expanded concept of jointness to fit with the concept of maritime power, a new jointness model—jointness squared or cubed. I have been stressing, here today, that existing threats require the effective integration of military power and civil authority. To deal effectively with these threats, we must blend our respective national elements of maritime military power and maritime civil authority in a collaborative way nationally, between our navies and coast guards, between our maritime administrations, between our transport ministries and maritime private-sector elements.

We need robust interconnectivity amongst these (we heard the interconnectivity word a bunch of times this morning, and we will probably hear it some more in the other panels)—real-time, protected communication across all involved agencies, to enable us to share threat information and to coordinate both preventative and responsive measures; automated access to other agencies’ databases to allow for rapid cross-checking of people, cargo, and vessels in the maritime domain.

We need robust interoperability, including:

- Units that can function seamlessly together, whether they are military units or nonmilitary units in this action
- A common operation picture that all will hold, both civil and military
- And even coordinated acquisition processes, so that our hardware systems are compatible.

I would like to think that the United States Navy and the United States Coast Guard National Fleet Concept, which allows for joint interoperability, joint development and management of our fleets across homeland defense and homeland security continues as a possible model for the appropriate level of interoperability among agencies.

Overall, we need an effective interagency strategy between our civil maritime and naval authorities. In addition to traditional military responses, nations must be able to provide coordinated solutions using law enforcement authorities that often spread across several agencies in terms of our government and several departments.

At the international level, an integrated approach among all international maritime partners can improve dramatically the security and safety of all nations and protect their economies. Strong international regulations through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and steadfast compliance efforts by all classification societies will help harden individual ships from terrorist activity—programs like the Proliferation Security Initiative and related, long-range ship-tracking and
surveillance initiatives that are now underway in IMO. I will be in London in November turnover up the flames on this issue in a robust way. But these programs and surveillance initiatives will help reduce security risk in the risk-mitigation business. Sharing of security, safety, commercial, and law enforcement information can create this global Maritime Domain Awareness that allows nations to create layered, multiagency, integrated maritime security defenses to combat the threats of terrorists and transnational criminals.

Partnerships begin or are reinforced in gatherings like this; they continue through joint and combined training and education; through exercises, cooperation, [and] operations; and through the development of joint systems. They continue in other venues, such as the United Nations and, an organization in which we have put incredible energy over the years, the International Maritime Organization, where collaborative rule-making is significantly impacting the international maritime security regime. As we gather here, in all of your nations, some of your services, but more often other agencies of your government, are hard at work enforcing new standards that call for specific security plans for vessels, for ports, and for port facilities. These internationally agreed-to protocols will have significant and positive impact on each of your nations’ maritime security. The navies and coast guards of the world must be intimately linked to these “civil authority” regulatory security initiatives.

**Conclusion**

Let me close today by again stressing that we are engaged in an “all hands” evolution. Today’s nontraditional, transnational, and unpredictable range of threats that each of our countries faces demands teamwork, demands partnerships; and, as Admiral Clark said this morning, we are going to win this thing only through partnerships. An integrated approach among all international maritime partners can improve the safety and security of all our nations. Sharing of security, safety, commercial, and law enforcement information can truly create Maritime Domain Awareness that allows us to create that layered, multiagency, integrated approach. An integrated approach is not a threat to sovereignty but should be viewed as a positive force that will help promote harmony and stabilization that meet the needs of member navies and coast guard organizations.

Forums like this are an ideal way to begin and to further that partnership, and once again I thank Admiral Clark for hosting this collaborative forum. I look forward to the rest of the symposium and getting a chance to work with all of you not only here in Newport, but also after our meetings when we have gone back to our respective worlds of work. But when you do, think in the broadest terms about jointness; think about a new construct for jointness that merges civil authority and military authority in a powerful maritime coalition that was referred to this morning.

Thanks very much for your attention, and I will be glad to answer a question or two.
Admiral Band, United Kingdom:

Are you convinced that we have got the shipowners and the cargo-owners on side with this coalition of the willing? Because my experience is certainly, in a number of areas of the world where my ships operate, that they, I don’t think, are on the side. I think they drive past people they know are illegal; they do not report them, in a way which would be inconceivable ashore. It would be inconceivable in the air. How do we bring them on side?

Admiral Collins, United States:

Well, I think, again, [by] the international regulatory regime that is put in place. Did you hear the question? It is the question, what about the shipowners, shipping companies—can we rely on them to have a security culture, and a safety culture, and do the things that they need to do to ensure the right goods are flowing in the places they are supposed to. That is what the new regulatory regime—the international regime, it is called—addresses. The International Shipping Port Security Code [ISPS Code] that has been passed through IMO goes into effect 1 July.

In the United States, we have passed a domestic regime that is similar, because we could have had a heavy hand at the pen writing both. We have our own regulatory approach we have taken: trust but verify, to steal a phrase from the past. I think what you need to have is a strong combination of what is referred to as port-state control. Those port states, those states that are receiving foreign bottoms in their ports, need to be very aggressive in their ports and holding people accountable. We have been very successful in the safety and the environmental front. We initiated something called the black list—you are going to be measured by your performance. And we quarterly publish [the names of] classification societies, shipowners, operators, and all the major players that had safety and environmental discrepancies, and they were on the bad list. No one wanted to be on that list, by the way. And we also publish a white list. Those were above standards. So, it is holding accountability—a wonderful word: to try to hold people accountable.

You can do that also with port-state control boarding. When ships come in 1 July, they are going to have to adhere to the new security regime, promulgated through IMO. They are going to have a security certificate on board, issued by their flag state, that says “We comply with all international standards.” We are going to trust, but verify. We are going to board those vessels. We are going to meet with the security officers. We are going to ask them about their security plan: do you just have one on paper, or are you really practicing security on this ship? So, it is being out there in a very, very aggressive way. On our own ships, we are reviewing and approving all the vessel security plans in the United States and all the port plans. There are ten thousand vessel plans and five thousand facility plans that we will be reviewing.

The other thing is a strong auditing mechanism. That has happened in the aviation industry but has not happened in the maritime. That is the second thing that I am pushing at IMO next month: to incorporate a strong, mandatory audit mechanism on flag states, with sanctions. So a flag state has a responsibility of ensuring the
right security protocols, the right safety protocols, and the right standards in its shipping fleet. If it does not, it should be held accountable. We do not have a mandatory audit mechanism, and we should have. That is another way to have accountability in the system. So we have a number of accountabilities: at the flag-state level, [through] international organizations, and through port-state control. I think those are the three ways to ensure accountability.

We have, for example, in our domestic legislation the Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in 2002, which mandated that we conduct foreign port security assessment and that we go to other nations of the world, to their ports, with a security team and audit their security protocols within their ports. If they do not adhere to the international standards that everyone has agreed to, then we will put control mechanisms in place, including denying entry into our country of any ship that departs from that port that is not following the standard. So there is some huge leverage here on driving a security culture through this international system, and that is what we are all about: driving a security culture, security protocols, through the port infrastructure to the vessel infrastructure to enhance security—and, oh, by the way, [practice] MDA while you are doing this.

Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
How far do the new regulations talk about regulation on the high sea? Because compared to the aviation industry, the seas are practically unregulated.

Admiral Collins, United States:
Right, I could not agree with you more. The question is, how about on the high seas? What kind of accountability and regulatory scheme [is there] for ships on the high seas, in that sort of Wild West [situation] you were describing, with less control on the high sea?

Part of what we are able to get through the IMO is the short-range tracking requirement. Ships have to broadcast a VHF-FM automatic identification system as they are approaching the coast of any nation, and that is effective next July, working up through all ships to comply by next December. We have got, from a tracking and surveillance perspective, a short-range answer, but we do not have the long-range answer. Part of the control is having an MDA, a Maritime Domain Awareness, relative to ship and long-range tracking. That is step number one, and that is something that we are trying to drive through IMO next month, to be considered by their various committees that work through the next six months or so—to ensure long-range tracking, mandatory long-range tracking, so we will have position information and other information on all ships that are plying the ocean. That is a step forward.

The other thing is having transparency. Shipping is one of the oldest businesses in the world, and it is secretive. There are all kinds of crazy organizational networks, financial and otherwise, used by shipping companies. One of the things that was built into the new code was to build in greater transparency on ships. So, every ship, now effective in July, has to carry on the bridge what is called a synopsis record, which is a complete detailed history of owner, cargoes, where it has called, etcetera—the whole history of that vessel. There are a number of things like that, that build in greater visibility, greater transparency, and greater accountability. We are
trying to control the port regime, the arrival regime, where the coastal regime comes into it; and long-range tracking will fill in some of the void on the ocean voyage. There is more to be done, but again, I think strong flag-state accountability is one of the magic ingredients, and we are working hard on that.

**Commander Sidney Innis, Jamaica:**

Part of the problem with all these new regulations that are being enforced—and they are absolutely needed—is the fiscal burden they place on small countries, like most Caribbean countries, because you have to have controls in your country to enforce these laws, and I think many of us are at a loss. Where is this money going to come from? I think this is going to put a major gap in the architecture which is being developed. How do you, or anyone else here, see a way around this?

**Admiral Collins, United States:**

There is certainly a fiscal issue to this. Part of the regulation was identifying in the United States, for domestic legislation, the billions of dollars that the private sector would have to invest in the security apparatus. I think there are two important components of this. It is not like the aviation scheme, where the government has funded and underwritten a lot of the security mechanisms through the Transportation Security Administration and all the security regimes in airports—both bag checking, people checking, and the overall security profile on the airport. That has been up-front funded by the federal government. But if you have ever traveled through our airports these days, take a look at your ticket. Compare it to a ticket of about two and a half years ago. You will see immense charges in there, so the user of the system is paying for it and also paying for security. The regulation that we rolled out domestically that is consistent with the international regulation is having the private sector underwrite the security for their facility. It is like Gordon England—who is now Secretary of the Navy, and you will hear him tomorrow, but who was Deputy Secretary of the new Department of Homeland Security—when he went out to Los Angeles to talk about security in that metropolitan area. The question was, “Mr. Secretary, how are you going to protect Disneyland, and what kind of security are you going to provide for Disneyland?” He said, “I’m not going to provide any. That is the fiscal fiduciary responsibility of the company, to provide that.” So the thrust of our regulation is that the private sector has a responsibility to come to the table and to underwrite security as a good business practice. If it is a level playing field, the market should take that consideration; everyone is going to have to play in that game. So our reliance is on the private sector.

You can also “incentivize” good behavior, by the way, in terms of how you deal with cargoes, how you deal with containers, those that practice good security and those that do not, in terms of how you deal with them in system. Our approach to the maritime has been, in this present administration, that this is a private-sector underwrite for the security requirements in a port facility, for example, and the responsibility of the corporate entity that oversees that facility. We, in turn, at the federal level, will invest in security systems that will help augment in the crisis situation, i.e., greater presence in our ports, boats, ships, planes, people, inspectors, all of which fall into the United States Coast Guard’s bailiwick. Our budget has gone up in the last two years by 30 percent, and in people growth by 10 percent, to
address that need. So, that is the investment from the government side, and the private sector has to come forward to take care of their facilities, where they are making business; that is the approach.

Admiral Johnson, United States:

I think you hit on it; but I think you were talking about the partnership between military power and civil authority, but the most powerful tool that you have is the tool in the marketplace, the market incentives here to get the private sector, the shipping companies and what have you, in line. And so, to the extent that through the IMO you can get nations to come aboard with agreed-upon regulations, I think this is, with your white list and your black list, how you are going to be able to achieve this. I don’t know what your expectations are at the IMO, and how willing it is going to be and how much clout it has to go back to the nations?

Admiral Collins, United States:

I think we have got security squarely on the top agenda of IMO. I mean, just think: you can count how many international protocols we have, comprehensive protocols; there is not an exhaustive list. We have attained one of the most comprehensive protocols in a number of years, and we did it in less than a year. We got a hundred and eight nations to say: we sign up to this; we are going to enforce security in our ports and security in our ships. That is pretty amazing, and that is unprecedented, so that gives us a lot of cause for hope.

Have we solved everything? No. I think I mentioned the next thing to put on the agenda is long-range tracking, get it sooner rather than later; and quite frankly my expectation is that if we cannot get IMO to act fast enough on long-range tracking, we will act unilaterally. That is how strongly we feel as a nation: we will act unilaterally. If you want to do business in the United States, you will comply with long-range tracking—period. I think Congress wouldn’t take a lot of jawboning to act on that. So we are going to push a multilateral approach, but we are going to be prepared to go unilateral if we can’t get there.

The other strong thing is, again, flag-state accountability. There are two parts of this equation to enforce good security, safety, environmental standards, and ships. One is an accountable, proactive flag state that has a registry, such as number of ships, that ensures a ship cannot get into its registry unless it is a quality ship, from security, safety, and other perspectives. That is one approach: to have a mandatory auditing scheme that requires them to do their job.

The other is a port-state control in which the receiving nation is aggressive. If you go to Rotterdam, which I just visited, they are aggressive; they are into control. They are into MDA, and Rotterdam has MDA. We are going to learn Rotterdam; they have MDA. That is what it is all about: being at the strong, port-state control posture, where there is nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. We are going to include it, as I said, in our mechanisms. We are going to go overseas with audit. The United States is going to be auditing other nations so that they comply, so that there is accountability in the system.

Part of the whole philosophy for our homeland security is a preemptive strategy. It is very much the national security strategy: The best defense is a good offense. The Global War on Terrorism is all about carrying it to them. Now, I would submit
that homeland security is a very close parallel. You do not want to be thinking of your border in a linear way—in other words, they come to your border, you inspect them, and everything is hunky-dory. If that is the way you think, you have lost. You cannot possibly physically screen, winnow, and determine threat at your border. By that way, it is too late. I do not want to find a weapon of mass destruction in a tank ship in Port Elizabeth. That is not where I want to find it. You have got to be pre-emptive all the way up the supply chain with security measures. That is part of our philosophy—certainly the philosophy of the Department of Homeland Security. United States Customs, for example, is having container security teams all around the mega-ports of the world, prescreening cargo before it comes to the United States. That is a wide spectrum: push borders out, go up the supply chain, and understand the threat as early as you can. These are all accountability, protective measures.

Admiral Dorn, United States:

I am the Pacific Fleet Commander. Enforcement would appear to be key-critical to what you are talking about. I would just be interested in what effect enforcement of these new regulations has had on your resources and on your manning of the U.S. Coast Guard.

Admiral Collins, United States:

Great question! This sounds like a people-intensive endeavor, reviewing vessel security plans, doing inspections, control mechanisms, and so forth. We have 361 ports in the United States and ninety-five thousand miles of coastline, and the United States Coast Guard is the size of the New York City Police Department. We are about forty thousand uniformed and six thousand civilian personnel, and we have not yet been resources for the implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act or the ISPS Code. The check is in the mail, supposedly in the '05 budget. We have a bridging strategy that we are engaging in (like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, a little bit)—we are rearranging our base of resources. We are drawing upon our selected reserve, the talented group of folks we will call up in the reserve force, to help us. We will also use a blend of contractors as support for screening of some of the security plans, and we are going to use that to get through '04. Like I said, we have been fortunate; our budget has gone up 30 percent in two years. We have grown in head count by 10 percent. We have added additional ships, additional planes, and additional units. We have the things called Maritime Safety and Security Teams, which are hundred-person units around the country. So the light, I think, is at the end of the tunnel on it. Thanks for the question. Thank you.

Admiral Clark, United States:

Tom, thank you. Well, Admiral, we are very grateful for your coming and being part of this symposium this year. I would think that the takeaway might go something like this: When I listen to Tom Collins talk about all the things that are going on in his world, it is instructional to me, and if I try to get a lead angle on what I am going to have to be focusing on in the future, it is very important for me to know what he is thinking. In some of your navies, you are not just integrated; if you are
the navy chief, you are also the coast guard chief, and you own all of this responsibility. In other nations, the coast guard is first and foremost, and then, second, it is the navy, and you own these responsibilities. In other nations, you have, like we do, a navy and you have a coast guard. In times past, it might have been “never the twain shall meet” kind of discussions; those days are over. It is very clear to me that the future for me is about operating in support of him, as he does, sometimes, in support of me.

I think of it like this. In the last few years, I have realized how quickly you can wear out an airplane looking for things. Any of you had that problem? I have these wonderful airplanes called P3s. They want them for everything now; even the land forces now want them. In fact, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM they flew almost exclusively over land, for the first time in history. I am thinking about the tremendous demand on this resource stream of mine, called overwater surveillance capability. I think about the many times when I have been in an at-sea operation and here comes a contact. First of all, an airplane got the contact on it, and he reported who it was, and then we lost it in the system. Then we sent a ship off to go identify that contact: who was that? And we spend more resources going over and identifying this same platform that we found yesterday, and here they are again. And then a few hours later, the watch turns, and we’ve lost identification on this unit again. So we have a submarine over in that area, or somebody is there, and we go through this process [again]. Now I know this probably does not happen in any of your navies.

The reality is, we talk today about forty thousand units being underway on the world’s oceans. We talk about all these ports. We talk about the people. We talk about the importance of international commerce to our own nations and what this means to our own ability to sustain our economies and, thus, our own operations. What is going to be required of us? It strikes me that the message here is very clear. If you are a country—and your question, what does it mean for you in Jamaica and how are you going to deal with the resource implications? I am sitting here asking myself the same question: how am I going to deal with the resource implications that are here? It drives home this issue to me. We cannot do this without partnership. We cannot do this without partnership, and sometimes the partnerships we are talking about are internal to our own governments in ways that we never clearly understood before. And so I need to know what Tom Collins is thinking about. He needs to know what Vern’s resource dreams look like. And we need to figure out how we can put together systems that we can make work in an international domain for the scheme of things in the future that will work for him, and for me, and for you, and you, and you, and how we are going to do this. We talked about the Internet this morning and things that can possibly be done, what the message is. The challenge for the future is immense. You know we have an agreement here in North America with Canada (where is Ron Buck?), called NORAD [North American Air Defense] System. I absolutely believe that the future on the global scale is like a maritime NORAD; we cannot afford to be going and identifying a particular unknown contact seven, eight, or ten times—or even twice. We need to be able to conduct our operations in a smarter way than that. That sort of encapsulates Admiral Collins’s address here today at lunch—encapsulates and gives us a sense of what the future is about for us.
I want to close with this thought and then go back to the symposium and to the other building. You see, I am convinced that this is, as I said this morning, an incredible time in our history; I truly believe that. Let us just say that we are not even talking about military matters at all, but that we are talking about something that is vital to our nations: that is, the health of economies. Let us say that we stop right there, and we are not talking about anything other than the health of economies. I would like to suggest to a group like this that the importance of the institutions we lead is going to multiply in the days and months ahead. I believe that the focus on items maritime is going to grow immensely, given the circumstances that we find ourselves in in the world today—[given] the willingness to use the kind of tools that potential enemies have demonstrated that they are willing to use to attack economies and to gain advantage for the cause that they are supporting. [And I believe] that for each of us, that means there is going to be a focus on our activity and what we provide for our nations that is unlike anything we have seen in the time I have been serving, and that is since 1968. I won’t go back too far; I am not sure that there is value in that. What I am convinced of is that the future is about a world that has much more focus on the kinds of capabilities we will be able to bring to bear and that will focus on this key point first: How will it protect and sustain the economies of our nations? Then the second-order steps are how you deal with enemies, [with] those that are trying to impact the economies of our nations.

Well, we have much to do, and thank you for helping us set the stage for follow-on discussions here. And, of course, we look forward to your involvement in sessions again tomorrow. Ladies and gentlemen, it is time for us to move to the next venue.
Panel Discussion Two: 
New Operational Challenges of Maritime Security 

Moderated by Rear Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth, Norway

Professor Lawrence Modisett, U.S. Naval War College, United States:

We can continue with our program. I am chairman of the Warfare Analysis and Research Department at the Naval War College and the program coordinator for the symposium. We now move on to our second panel. The title of this panel is “New Operational Challenges of Maritime Security,” and our panel moderator is Rear Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth, who is chief of staff of the Royal Norwegian Navy.

Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:

Thank you, Admiral Clark, President of the Naval War College, dear colleagues, we on the panel are all honored and delighted to address a group of such distinguished officers as are gathered here today. Admiral Clark, I thank you for the invitation; thank you for creating this excellent opportunity for professional discussions, and, not least, I want to thank you for inviting us to beautiful Newport and allowing us to socialize in such a scenic and maritime place.

I know how difficult it may be at the end of the day, with jet lag and after a delicious meal, to follow lectures and listen to discussions; but you will be an active part of the debate, after approximately fifty minutes’ time from now, and may I also urge you all to actively challenge the panel with good comments and questions.

It is said that it is easier to control five hundred sailors than four officers. Coincidentally, the panel consists of four distinguished officers, whom I will try to guide through upcoming comments and questions from the audience and comments also within the panel itself. They are Vice Admiral Buck from Canada, Rear Admiral Tay from Singapore, Vice Admiral Ya’ari from Israel, Admiral Vergara from Chile, and myself. As an introduction to the debate, we will now each give a short, ten-minute lead-in—and may I underline that questions and comments from the floor will follow after all five speakers have finished. We now start with Vice Admiral Buck, who will talk about the maritime interception. Admiral, the floor is yours.

Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:

Thank you, Admiral. Admiral Clark, Admiral Route, colleagues, it is a great pleasure to address this Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium on the subject of emerging new operational challenges and, specifically, coalition maritime interception or interdiction operations. We all have been active participants in naval operations since the First Gulf War, but this has been especially true during both
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. I believe that each and every nation has learned very significant national lessons in this area, but we, as members in the coalition, as we have been discussing this morning, must heed these lessons collectively if we are able to deal with future threats, effectively building on the strengths of each of our navies and nations.

By way of background, this is but just an example, over the last few years, of a number of emerging coalitions of the like-minded in the Middle East area [Figure 1]. What is significant about this slide is that virtually every navy, in some form or another, in this room has been involved at some point in doing a series of different missions and different operations. Because maritime interdiction is often looked at as a specific, today-warfare area—which indeed it might be, but it very often is not alone in the activities that any coalition is performing at that time.

**Figure 1. Recent Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Units Deployed</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998–2001</td>
<td>5 FFH</td>
<td>OP AUGMENTATION</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>CVBG Integration—Arabian Gulf—Enforcement UNSCRs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2001</td>
<td>1 DDG/3 FFH/1 AOR</td>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>UNSCRs IRAQ MIO/LIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 CTG and Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Force Sector Cdr—GOO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2 DDG/8 FFH/2 AOR</td>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>15+ 8 nations</td>
<td>UNSCRs IRAQ MIO/LIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 CTG and Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1 DDG/5 FFH/1 AOR</td>
<td>OEF during OIF</td>
<td>11 7 nations</td>
<td>MIO/LIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 CTG Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CTF 151—GOO/SAG/CAG Cdr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you can see on this slide [Figure 2], this is but a snapshot in time that was taken up to the end of June of this year [2003], where, in fact, there was a specific coalition of forces, and in the various boxes, differing activities were occurring throughout.

Put in words, this is another way of [showing] examples of some of the roles that my navy—but not just my navy, each and every navy—was performing at the same time in the area [Figure 3]. You would often transition from one operation into another; and, particularly interesting at the time, transition from maritime interdiction to leadership interdiction was but one example.
**Figure 2. Theatre of Operations**

- Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
- Maritime Interdiction Operations Iraq
- OEF-MIO
- Searching for Terrorists
- OEF Afghanistan

**Figure 3. Canadian Roles in Theatre**

- Sea Denial until Nov 01
  - CVBG/ARG integration—Arabian Gulf—Enforcement UNSCRs
- Sea Control Post Nov 01
- Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)
  - Central Arabian Gulf (CAG)
  - Strait of Hormuz (SOH) Escort
- Carrier Escort
- Leadership Interdiction Operations (LIO)
  - Gulf of Oman (GOO) and SOH
- CTF 151
  - CAG/SOH/GOO
- Support Operations
  - RAS, SAR, NEO
Now, focusing more sharply on maritime interception operation, I believe we have spoken a lot this morning about the elements of interoperability. We tend, however, often to focus on the pure technical aspects. But there is much more, as this slide [Figure 4] goes to show.

One of the key points, I think, in addition to all of the other issues that come into play, whether it be complementary doctrine—and I do not just mean U.S. and NATO, et cetera—is the ability of our highly trained sailors. They can make virtually anything work, if we set them free to do so. Two other things are mutual experience and mutual understanding, which are often facilitated, as was mentioned this morning, by the presence of liaison officers. My navy has found it very effective throughout ENDURING FREEDOM to have liaison officers both in carrier battle groups and ashore in various headquarters, and I would commend that to us all.

There is, however, of course, the technical piece in C4I, which is a major piece [Figure 5]. We had some significant discussion about that this morning, but I would suggest it is not just an issue for the allies; it is also an issue for the United States Navy, whether it is the bandwidth issue that I raised earlier [or] whether it is a releasability issue. The fact of the matter is, for us collectively to work with the USN, there must be an effort on the USN’s part to make sure that we can actually have that access.

Battle force e-mail (BFEM) is in use and is quite effective today, but I would submit to each and every one of you that from a U.S. perspective, battle force e-mail is the lowest common denominator, and it is a system that the USN does not use for war fighting. It is an incremental system the USN has to populate to feed us. It is good, but it is not the full answer.

I would just note the last point on this slide about some navies—I use my own as an example, but it could be any other navy, actually—could, in fact, in some cases perform the role of a gateway into the United States Navy for some coalition partners, who might not have as great a spectrum of capability to do that.

**Figure 4. Elements of Interoperability**

- Complementary Doctrine (USN/NATO)
- Technical Ability to Exchange Information
  - SATCOM/Bandwidth/Networks
- Highly Trained Sailors
  - Can get anything to work
- Mutual Training Opportunities (JTFEXs)
  - Establishes common procedures
- Robust ROE
  - Defines the scope of employability
- Mutual Experiences/Relationships
  - Trust between Commanders at All Levels
Now, nations joining a coalition need, each and individually, to strive to have the ability to achieve tactical exchange of information, while ensuring that that information is as real-time as possible [Figure 6]. These are some of the tools that are

- **USN interoperability**
- **Coalition information management interoperability primarily conducted using Wide Area Networks (WANs)**
- **Battle force e-mail usage varies; however, requires Concept of Operations**
- **Canadian ships acted as gateway service between USN and coalition members outside of Coalition Wide Area Network (COWAN)**

**Figure 5. C4I Issues**

**Figure 6. COWAN & BFEM**
currently in use, and Admiral Porterfield touched on some of these this morning. A coalition-wide area network can be done using a commercial satellite, battle force e-mail, obviously, and on it goes, but all of these types of systems and data need to be available in our ships to get the picture and to do the job.

We have also talked a fair bit this morning on rules of engagement. Here is a particular snapshot [Figure 7] of some of the key challenges experienced in the area of rules of engagement through ENDURING FREEDOM. As can be seen from this slide, there is a tremendous variance in the rules of engagement that individuals bring to the table. As a minimum, they need to be clear to the operational commander, but we all take the point that, where possible, we must also try and influence our national leaders in each country to ensure that there is as much synergy, commonality, and complementariness as possible in this particular area, because it hugely complicates the operational- and tactical-level commanders’ jobs.

**Figure 7. Differing Nations’ ROE:**
*Within Coalition This Created Challenges for TFC/CTGs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROE</th>
<th>Permitted</th>
<th>Not Permitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIO</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIO</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPLIANT BOARDING</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONCOMPLIANT BOARDING</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPOSED</td>
<td>NSW only</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEARCH</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETENTION of POW</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*% = all coalition partners*

Now, in terms of boarding operations per se, we do not live in a benign world anymore, where, in fact, every vessel is going to willingly stop and be boarded [Figure 8]. There are the two extremes, where in fact it is a fully compliant boarding, of course, to where it is a fully opposed boarding; but there is, in the middle, this area of noncompliance, where vessels make it difficult to be boarded, by often passive means or, in fact, just noncooperation. Those are a challenge to us all and require very significant training, both at the boarding party level and, indeed, in the ship coordination level. It is a level far beyond that which we were doing previously, but it is not a level necessarily that is reserved to Special Operations.
Coming back to technical interoperability, real-time information on what is happening when you are attempting an interception and a boarding operation is essential, so that the information the tactical-level commander has makes sure that he is applying the right tools to do the job and is safely executing the operation [Figure 9].

Of course, that means, from a boarding-team perspective, they must be highly trained [Figure 10]. With all due respect to the Canadian Commissioner of the Coast Guard here [Commissioner John L. Adams], there is great debate in my country about who can do boardings, but the truth of the matter is, to do boardings efficiently and effectively requires significant, ongoing training. It is not something that can be learned quickly or then put aside for a while.

**Lessons Learned**

- Netcentric warfare concept
  - Not standardized across coalition spectrum
  - Establish baseline capability
- Make ROE as consistent or complementary as possible
- Provide as common as possible doctrine training and procedures
- Continue to develop common MIO–naval boarding doctrine and procedures.

Some of the lessons learned, I believe, are in the area that you see here on this slide, and I would suggest as we move to the future in our area of coalition and like-minded nations that these are four issues we need to seriously ponder and focus upon, because, in fact, if we are to succeed collectively it must be upon the basis of our mutual strengths.
**Figure 9. Modern Boarding Operations—Keys to Success**

**Figure 10. Very Highly Trained Boarding Teams**
Conclusion

What to Prepare For and Bring to a Coalition Task Force

- Mutual training opportunities (JTFEXs) [Joint Task Force Exercises]
- Mutual experiences/relationships
- Ability to exchange information
- Effective MIO capability
- As common as possible ROE.

In conclusion, then, what do we need to do to prepare for the future and to bring our strengths to the coalition task force table? We need to identify mutual training opportunities. We need mutual experiences and relationships. We must understand each other, trust each other—we touched on this continuously today—and we must have the ability to exchange information, and, of course, coming back to the issue of ROE, which we have heard a lot about, as common a set as possible. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence, and on that note, I will close and hope to take questions later. Thank you.

Rear Admiral Tay, Singapore:

Thank you. Admiral Vern Clark, distinguished delegates of the various navies and coast guards that are represented here, I would like to first express my appreciation to Admiral Clark and the U.S. Navy for your very warm hospitality in hosting this Sixteenth ISS and for this opportunity to make some remarks on the subject of antipiracy.

Maritime piracy is as old as maritime commerce. Across the world, a few hundred cases of piracy are reported each year. Exact statistics vary, but according to data from the International Maritime Bureau, there were 370 incidents reported last year, and about 230 cases have thus far been reported for the year 2003. Besides the cost to global maritime commerce due to losses of personal valuables and cargo, maritime piracy also poses a threat to the safety of navigation, the environment, and even to human life. This is particularly so in the narrower channels of the world, such as those found in Southeast Asia. In the Malacca and Singapore Straits, 650 ships pass through those waters daily, half of them being major ships: the LCCs, LNG, LPG, chemical tankers, or large container ships. There are also numerous passenger cruise liners and ferries that transit these waters. The danger of piracy attacks, resulting in the accidental grounding or collision of such ships, is clear, not to mention the consequent environmental damage and the threat to human life. This could come about when ships being attacked are left unattended for periods of time, because the crews are either being held down while the crime is taking place or bogged down trying to resist the pirate attacks.

Ironically, technological advances today result in smaller crews on very large merchant ships, making them more vulnerable to attacks, since the smaller crew may find it harder to keep a good lookout on its deck and maintain sustained vigilance or to fend off attackers. Also, in an effort to reduce the risk of pirate attacks, some ship captains may well be tempted to charge through pirate-infested areas, inevitably predisposing the ships to collisions or groundings, especially in waters where there are narrow stretches and dense shipping traffic.
What, perhaps, is of greater concern these days is the thin line that separates piracy from maritime terrorism. Analysts have postulated scenarios of a packed cruise ship being rammed by small craft laden with explosives, or LNG tankers being hijacked and crashed into densely populated ports. The methods used by pirates or terrorists are strikingly similar—using small boats to intercept significant vessels, or boarding merchant ships for the purpose of carrying out their criminal intent. But the impact of pirate or terrorist actions could be very different.

**Challenges**

- Large legitimate small-boat presence.
- Traffic density.
- Difficult to compile coherent radar picture.
- Pirates choose time, place, and target.
- Antipiracy measures are resource intensive.
- Pirates exploit resource constraints of policing agencies.

One of the challenges in tackling piracy is that numerous small boats legitimately operate in littoral waters, providing an ideal cover for pirate operations. Sometimes local folks even decide to help themselves to the opportunities to make a quick buck. Compiling a coherent sea-situation picture of these shipping straits and understanding small-craft movements and their operating patterns are, therefore, a resource-intensive affair, requiring much effort. Even if we can have a radar picture of the coastal waters, identifying the many small contacts from the mass of radar echoes, seeking out the potential pirate craft for closer monitoring, is a daunting task. The recent IMO efforts to get ships and small craft equipped with transponders so that they can be identified and checked would help to clarify the sea picture.

Another challenge in tackling the piracy problem is that the initiative is on the side of the perpetrators, who have the liberty to choose the time, place, and target for their attacks. Meeting this challenge requires significant maritime resources, such as surface ships, maritime air patrol assets, trained personnel, good intelligence, and so on. For many littoral countries, such resource demands can only be partially met, given the myriad of tasks which navies, security, and government agencies are charged with, such as safeguarding the extensive territorial waters, EEZ protection, as well as deployments to fulfill training requirements. The resulting prioritization of assets for deployment often means that piracy incidents merely move away from areas of intense policing to those where security is reduced. Ironically, the best place to tackle piracy is ashore, in terms of prevention through law enforcement action or in addressing social issues like poverty, to reduce the lure of piracy as a livelihood.

Countries recognize the piracy problem, and they have done much to try and tackle it, either working unilaterally or cooperatively with one another. Within many countries, intelligence-based sea cooperation has also been the approach taken, especially post 9/11, in the face of the increased maritime terrorist threat. Such international and interagency attention is crucial, given the transnational and similar nature of piracy and maritime terrorism.
For example, Singapore has taken a very proactive stance toward ensuring security in the Singapore Strait. Our maritime security agencies, namely the Maritime and Port Authority [MPA], Police Coast Guard [PCG], and the Republic of Singapore Navy [RSN], work closely in an integrated manner to maintain a tight surveillance of Singapore’s port waters and the Strait. The MPA’s Port Operations Control Center manages the Vessel Traffic Information System [VTIS], which covers the Singapore Straits. It regularly communicates with ships transmitting through Singapore’s VTIS sectors, checking on their onboard situation, providing them with updates of the piracy threat situation, as well as reminding them to keep piracy watches. In fact, even the small act of ships providing timely reports on acts of piracy against them at some point of the passage can help in reducing the occurrence of more incidents. The MPA can quickly send out a broadcast about threats to ships. The PCG and RSN conduct patrols in the Singapore Straits and maintain a strong and regular presence there.

There are also several bilateral efforts between the navies and police forces of countries in Southeast Asia to combat piracy in the Malacca Straits and in the South China Sea. For example, Indonesia and Singapore have a coordinated patrol arrangement called INDisIN Coordinated Patrols [ISCP] in the Singapore Straits, which was started in 1992. This has proven to be very effective, for the number of incidents of piracy in the ISCP area of operations has been reduced to zero since its inception. I am sure that there are many other similar examples of coordinated patrols in other parts of the world where there is an incidence of piracy.

There has also been a range of other multilateral efforts to combat piracy. Two years ago, Japan initiated the development of a framework for regional cooperation among the fifteen countries of South and East Asia, called the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti Piracy in Asia [ReCAAP]. This multilateral effort is aimed to forge cooperation in a few areas, such as the exchange of information relating to piracy and armed robbery against ships, research and best practices, and the strengthening of the capacity of national agencies to tackle piracy.

Other ReCAAP discussions are still ongoing. The potential benefits of such an initiative are clear, not only as it will improve the quality of information exchanged, but because it would involve the various enforcement agencies to also pave the way for the multiagency and multinational cooperation to deal with a problem that is transnational in nature.

Another set of efforts is that initiated by the International Maritime Organization [IMO]. Since 1998, IMO has organized a series of expert missions and seminars around the world to discuss the prevention and suppression of piracy and armed robbery in ships. In December 2002, the IMO also initiated the International Shipment Port Security Code [ISPS], which will come into force on the first of July next year. This calls for both port and ship security measures to be increased.

Lastly, to deal with the post-9/11 maritime security situation, some of the ISPS core requirements for ships include the appointment and training of ship security officers, and the development of ship security assessments and ship security plans, as well as the installation of ship security alert systems. These measures would enhance security levels on merchant ships, thereby contributing to the ability to guard against the piracy threat.
At sea, some of the measures that some in the Maritime Committee have already taken have proven to be effective in preventing piracies. These measures include antipiracy watches, lighting of the deck, or running fire hoses to deter boarding, as well as involving the use of technological devices, such as installing closed-circuit cameras or checking devices, on the ships themselves. There have been a number of cases where such self-protective measures have successfully thwarted piracy attempts. For example, on 18 August 2003, pirates in three boats attempted to board the container ship *Gisiang 2*, which was under way in the Malacca Strait. However, the ship’s antipiracy watch crew detected the attempt, activated the fire hoses, increased speed, and took evasive maneuvers, and shook off the pirates after a while. On 29 August, in the South China Sea, six armed pirates attempted to board the bulk carrier *Vitali* from the stern but were deterred after the antipiracy watch alerted the rest of the crew to muster astern.

Some authors have romanticized piracy in their writings. The reality is that there is nothing noble about this menace to the freedom and safety of navigation and maritime commerce. Piracy continues to thrive, partly because there are many operational and other challenges that make piracy difficult to tackle, let alone to totally eradicate. But act we must. Especially when a distinction between the pirate and the maritime terrorist is extremely fine on the ground, and because they both do not respect any functional or territorial boundaries, there is an even greater impetus for us to maintain our continuous vigilance and work together more effectively to deal with this scourge of the seas. Thank you.

**Vice Admiral Ya’ari, Israel:**

Good afternoon. Admiral Clark, co-officers, I was asked to speak about port security, and my first thought was, there goes yet another tautology, just as Admiral de Donno mentioned in his last remark. For us, port is security: port is home; port is shelter; port is rest. Well, apparently, not anymore.

Now, most of what I had to say was said much better by Admiral Tom Collins during the lunchtime, so I had to improvise and maneuver in order to not bore you to death. I will try to develop the argument that Tom was trying to make so eloquently, this time through the microvantage point, if you like. Think about the following scenario.

A container full of explosives with a GPS-controlled fuse and a false manifest—say, used machine spare parts—can be prepared in Somalia, shipped to Khartoum, then sent, say, to Singapore, change carrier to Rotterdam, and continue its journey until its final destination, either in Europe, in America, or the Middle East. As of now, at no point along this deadly odyssey does there exist any effective mechanism to alert us of the coming catastrophe. That is how bad it is.

Or another one: a ship carrying a toxic substance, or say a gas tanker, can be taken over by some crew—to make the case even more difficult—practically anywhere around the globe, be driven to a port of choice, and detonated there. How much of that can be prevented?

I would try to take this to threat motives, as a means for gauging port security exposure. It is just one vantage point, but it might be illuminating to look at it from the microlevel. Now, generally speaking, there is, of course, nothing new about threats to ports and harbor in wartime. The fortification of one’s harbors for
wartime is a centuries-old concept for navies throughout history. To this very day, actually, we invest heavily in it, from air defense and antiair down to missiles and frogmen, and with everything in between.

Yet the wartime harbor defense paradigm will not do. It consists of means deployed against enemy forces, assuming very few ambiguities: you know an enemy when you see one; it is, by and large, anybody who is not one of ours. In peacetime, a harbor defense system is designed essentially as a hibernating system, built to be awakened with full strength only during the short outbreaks of war. In short, what we have now is hardly what is needed to confront international terrorism, and this is definitely not the way to stop either that container or the ship.

So the challenge at hand is to devise an effective defense system for ports and harbors against [the] terror of mass destruction, and, indeed, it is a task of gigantic proportion, as was very clear from this afternoon’s address by the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. But we do have to start somewhere. So let me leave out the question of guarding the port perimeter on land as too trivial for this forum, and try to look at where the main exposure, the main and critical exposure, is.

A 9/11-style operation, an airborne one, definitely can be intercepted using our wartime systems. Generally speaking—and this again was something that was mentioned already—the numerous attacks on airways brought the flight security regime to a much higher level than we have at sea. So, basically, a no-fly zone for ports’ airspace, with varying degrees of active reaction, can be established. Response policy is indeed an issue here, but at least we do have a reliable answer here, whenever we wish to use it. In fact, these measures are already at work for some military ports and, in principal, can be extended for all ports with not too many difficulties. Our pushing of seaways practices in a similar direction is a little bit more difficult. Yet I would say that it is definitely doable. It will probably require us to establish gated sea areas in harbor entrances to help isolate potential penetration attempts. What is done, practically, now for customs purposes can be extended to cover security angles as well. For that, port authorities will have to be aware in advance of every detail concerning personnel and cargo, for each and every vessel, and provide for controlled crossing into the harbor. To be effective, however, this monitoring regime must span over the entire globe and include all segments of civilian shipping, commercial and pleasure. I regret to say that at the present state of affairs, even with full international cooperation and under the most optimistic assumptions, we cannot hope to do better than we currently do on drug smuggling or illegal immigration. Let us be frank about it: that is not good enough. And that is to put it as simply as possible.

The main area of exposure for port security is the fact that we know much too little about who enters our harbors and what they carry with them. Where should we begin? I think we can start by following these two key questions, having the standards already in place and flight security as our reference. First off, we should do much better in terms of monitoring who enters our harbors. For example, no airplane can take off and fly without asking the permission or drawing the attention of some air controller. Yet, for most seaports, small-boat trafficking within the harbor water is permitted and free for all. If you are serious about it, I see no choice but to adopt air traffic standards in this case as well. An option for a terror attack like the one against USS Cole, for example, would certainly be much less easy. Second, and
as mentioned already, we need to regard port entrances as fully fledged gates. We need to develop a system capable of performing effective security clearing of any vessel entering these gates. We do not do this today effectively enough.

Ship crew and passenger monitoring is another issue. This area is indeed a much bigger problem. Generally speaking, I think the closer we get to flight passenger screening standards, the better, but that is not good enough. It is monitoring the multinational crews of vessels around the globe which is the real problem and the really tough challenge, and this is also where the more serious vulnerability lies. We must develop a system that is redefined and come up with a completely new form for a ship ID. It has to include a full and comprehensive profile of the vessel, with all the required data about the crew, the company, the port entry history, et cetera. Again, Admiral Collins was much better in portraying what we need here, but let me tell you from my own experience that most of the past interceptions were based on indications that popped up from this type of information. Now, what is essential about the system is that it must be able to respond to the continuous, real-time inquiry and should be an ongoing, netcentric process that actually monitors and reports positions, crew members, cargo, et cetera, et cetera. The critical asset and the necessary condition for this is a true multinational and multidisciplinary intelligence effort to create the required, relevant database. Some of us are already jointly working to make it operationally available, but it requires all of us to join in if you want to be effective.

Now, the other question, as to what they are carrying, is probably more critical. Intercepting the container is much more difficult than stopping the ship. Here no such indications can help, for there are no indications to begin with. It is one of tens of millions that move around the globe every day. Basically, I think we have two options here.

The first one again, already mentioned, is international cooperation in and responsibility for container shipping. The IMO’s last decisions are certainly moving in the right direction, but it has still a long way to go, and, indeed, eventually states will have to be held responsible for the cargo they send and ship. It is a prerequisite for a new security regime at sea. However, I submit to you that, in order to make this happen, we must have technology that enables us essentially to see through any existing packaging.

Now, the current bottlenecks of huge screening machines through which hundreds of containers should pass every day will not do; it just will not work. What we need is a much lighter and simpler solution, something that can be carried on board and put on the piers and give us an instant picture of what is inside of the container, visual and chemical. Technology must enable us to have shipping companies and vessel skippers as a continuous part of the screening process. They have the container in their possession longer than anybody else, and if you want their cooperation, we should give them the means to clear it, because eventually they, too, will have to be held accountable for what they are carrying.

Regarding the question that was raised about resources, let me say that, in my opinion, states should collaborate in developing the technology. The private sectors will have to pay the rest, but if we give them the technology, that is one of the incentives that can bring us partners, who are now, as mentioned in the lunchtime address, still a little bit dubious as to their incentive.
Finally, let me say that in the current situation in port security, as in any other issue concerning what we do against international terrorism, it is very, very hard to differentiate between the military aspects and the civilian ones. We simply cannot leave it to coast guards and police. That is my echo to Tom Collins’s request. From our standpoint, we simply cannot leave it to them and stay afloat—and so here I am, a naval officer, talking about containers and commercial shipping, port clearance procedures, and so on and so forth. Believe me, before September 11, you would probably wonder what did I have to drink last night. But that is where we are critically exposed and unprepared. It is not a case of breaching the system; there is no system as yet. If you want this process to be systematic and professional, rather than a jerky, evolutionary process driven by traumas, we had better hurry. Thank you very much.

Admiral Vergara, Chile:

Admiral Vern Clark, ladies and gentlemen, I am honored to present to such a distinguished audience the new operational challenges of the maritime security, focusing on controlling contraband and within the framework of what we have called “The Three Vectors of Maritime Strategy of the Chilean Navy.”

My apologies to switch now into Spanish, but my English skills are not at the level of this esteemed audience. So, please, if you want, use your headphones. Thanks. [Translation.]

Globalization and economic interdependence have facilitated new threats to arise. States have been urged to accept the new scenario of globalization and its consequences, but at the same time, they have had to incorporate new mechanisms of protection to counter those threats, due to the permeability of frontiers. Within these threats, we will focus on contraband at sea.

Armed forces, with police forces and other governmental agencies, such as customs, have been obliged to create internal interoperability, mainly because the criminal and terrorist organizations have increased their offensive and lethal capabilities. This situation urges us to review our current governmental infrastructure and adapt doctrines and procedures in order to establish sound and effective grounds for internal cooperation and interoperability, as well as with other navies and international agencies.

Thus, at the end of this presentation, I will explain to you the Chilean case, and consequently the Three-Vector Maritime Strategy, designed as a means through which the Chilean Navy is planning to solve such a diversity of threats. Now I will refer to new threats and their neutralization.

It is a fact that new threats or new versions of old threats have emerged. These threats have affected all states, regardless of their defense potential. The new threats mentioned above are as follows:

- Terrorism
- Contraband, within which we must mention illegal traffic of drugs, conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal goods
- Traffic in any kind of persons, which includes worker-slaves, uncontrolled immigrations, and prostitution
- Piracy
Armed political action, with its version of rural guerrillas and urban terrorism
Finally, environmental destruction, with its respective pollution, and illegal or irresponsible exploitation of renewable and nonrenewable natural resources.

For countries highly dependent on maritime communications, such as Chile, this is a relevant problem. From a maritime point of view, the neutralization of these threats requires the coordinated participation of means provided by different forces and governmental agencies, such as:

- Naval assets
- Coast Guard assets
- Maritime authorities
- Port authorities
- Customs
- Police
- Counterdrug agencies and others.

We establish, particularly in the contraband case, a double interoperability: internal and international.

Now I will review some aspects related to internal interoperability, which is the capability to operate in a coordinated way among Chilean state agencies. What has been explained so far requires from the state a capability to neutralize the near threats in the national sphere and, thus, prevent effects on an international scale. In order to accomplish this responsibility, the states have armed forces and police forces trained to operate where their interests demand it. In the case of the Chilean Navy, the maritime authority has the faculty to enforce law within its jurisdiction, and its staff becomes law enforcement personnel.

This system, which promotes the strict control of the state in relation to the sphere of competence of each force, can fail when the criminal’s technical capabilities or weaponry overcome those of the police force or other governmental agencies. A way to settle this problem is to differentiate the forces, not by their organic dependence, but through the capabilities of the groups against whom they are fighting. To do this, it is proposed to apply the concept of “equivalent military capability,” which means that if a criminal threat has enough capability to challenge a police force and other governmental agencies and eventually defeat them, it becomes a military threat. On the contrary, when that threat can be controlled by the police systems or other agencies, it is treated just as a criminal threat.

Conveying this situation into the maritime sphere, the struggle against the new threats at sea—among these, contraband—is a problem of coordination and interaction between maritime authority and naval forces. Applying the concept mentioned above, the struggle will be under the control of one or other force, according to the threat intensity. In Chile this has been solved by our constitution and laws, where it is said that the maritime authority—which is responsive to a particular law—is inserted into the navy. This significantly facilitates the solution of the problem.

As I have already said, when the threat goes beyond the state’s frontiers, and if it is convenient, one can resort to the neutralization capabilities of other friendly
states. To do this, interoperability is required between the forces and the agencies involved, both national and international.

Now I will convey this general concept into the reality of the Chilean case. The state of Chile uses all its naval assets to accomplish its mission, within the maritime areas of responsibility. In order to operate in coastal and interior waters, the maritime authority uses helicopters, patrol boats, and small vessels. The assets which are employed in the exclusive economic zone and high seas are provided by the fleet. This mechanism of defense is particularly efficient in the control of contraband by sea.

In this frame, one of the first barriers that allows us to detect vessels which do not comply with the security provisions stipulated by international conventions is the inspection of vessels by the respective port state control, in addition to the timely and effective information delivered by port and channel pilots to the maritime authority. The slide shows some statistics to this respect.

**Port State Control: Actions Performed by the Port State Control during the Inspection of Vessels in 2002**

- 1,531 foreign vessels called at port
- 906 foreign vessels subject to inspection
- 750 foreign vessels inspected
- 366 vessels with deficiencies rectified
- 52 detained vessels.

The Code for Shipping and Port Facilities Protection will be enforced as from July 2004, which means the implementation of twelve stations with the automatic ship identification system installed in different ports of our country. This method will accelerate the reconnaissance of the ships according to their characteristics and activities.

The following list presents statistics related to vessel-port interface protection and the struggle against drug traffic.

**Control of Contraband at Sea (Drugs)**

- Actions performed during 2000
  - 6,750 man hours in 139 rummages
- Actions performed during 2001
  - 6,930 man hours in 145 rummages
- Actions performed during 2002
  - 6,376 man hours in 105 rummages
  - 8.9 tons of cocaine seized.

It is worth mentioning that since the year 2000 up to now, nearly 9 tons of cocaine in Chilean ports has been seized. These activities are usually performed in coordination with customs and police services.

From a strategic perspective to face global threats, the Chilean Navy has designed what we have called the Three-Vector Maritime Strategy [Figure 11].

Now I will briefly review its fundamentals. Sea power fulfills military, diplomatic, and socioeconomic functions:
Its military function comprises activities such as sea control, projection, and coastal defense. To carry these out, it acts in combination with the other services of the Chilean National Defense.

The diplomatic function of sea power is reflected by deterrence activities, naval presence, and crisis management, acting in a combined as well as a joint environment.

Finally, the socioeconomic function of sea power embraces activities of security, surveillance, control, and development, being executed in a cooperative environment.

Those three functions of sea power, acting in a combined, joint, and cooperative way, conform to what has been called the Three-Vector Maritime Strategy. As seen before, the three mission areas of our navy correspond to the three strategic vectors, all of which relate in a way to sea control, against all the threats, including contraband.

- First, the defense vector, which acts in conjunction with the other services of the Chilean armed forces and is employed to safeguard our sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- Secondly, the maritime vector, which operates with other national organizations, such as customs, police, and so forth. This vector accounts for protection and promotion of national maritime interests within, which includes the controlling of contraband.
And lastly, the international vector, which acts in conjunction with other friendly countries, generally under a United Nations authority, and operates in support of the state’s foreign policy.

The defense vector accounts for national security. It is deterrent and is based on joint action. It comprises specialized means, such as submarines, fast patrol boats, and coastal defense. Furthermore, it shares with other vectors the marine amphibious forces and the fleet.

The international vector has the mission of international security. It is based on combined action and acts by presence. It includes peace operations, international naval exercises, and humanitarian assistance operations. In an overlapping zone between both vectors, defense and international, the fleet and the marine and amphibious forces are included.

The maritime vector is based on the principle of human security: it is against pollution and defends maritime interests, acting through cooperative action and law enforcement. This vector plays the main role in the neutralization of contraband through coastal patrol vessels. Other means, such as off-shore patrol vessels (OPVs), whose normal use goes directly to safeguard maritime interests, include the control of contraband, which is out of the scope of coastal forces. They can also operate internationally, given their blue-ocean capability, with other friendly nations and, if needed, be incorporated into the fleet as escorts in the defense vector.

As you can see in this chart [Figure 12], the surface combat elements of the fleet are present in the three vectors of our maritime strategy, being the core of our

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**Figure 12. The Three Vectors of Chilean Maritime Strategy**

- Defense Vector
  - Submarines
  - Fast Patrol Boats
  - Coastal Defense

- International Vector
  - Peace Operations
  - International Exercises
  - Humanitarian Relief

- Human Security
  - Controlling Contraband

- Combined Action
  - Law Enforcement

- Marine and Amphibious Forces

- Coastal Patrol Vessels

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naval assets, and represent the last stand in the struggle against contraband. For this reason, and given the average old age of the current platforms, my main concern as commander in chief is to promote their urgent renewal.

Conclusions

1. We are facing new operational challenges to maritime security, in terms of new threats, among them controlling contraband. We face a difficult challenge in the neutralization of these new threats, within which we highlight the control of contraband, because the enemy has a large adaptation capacity, financial resources availability, and the flexibility that globalization gives.

2. Combating the new threats requires appropriate national management that will affect positively the international environment. To effectively neutralize these threats, we must have first a nationwide management capability, with the purpose to prevent their effects from expanding to the international level.

3. We have to be able to interoperate, not only with national but also with international naval forces, coast guards, police, and other civilian agencies. We have to be able to cooperate not only with other naval forces, but also with maritime security forces and civilian agencies of different types, either from their own country or other states, observing the interests and laws of each country, developing common doctrines and procedures that will allow an efficient internal and international interoperability.

The Chilean Navy’s Three-Vector Maritime Strategy is a tool that satisfies the national interests to deal with contraband and other new threats. We think that in the Chilean case we are providing, with our Three-Vector Maritime Strategy, elements to support, in an efficient and effective way, the control of these and other new threats that globalization imposes on us. All this is to contribute to safe shipping, clean waters, and capabilities against unlawful activities. All these must give a better level of global security for the development and welfare of peoples. Thank you.

Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:

Thank you. The moderator is breaking all rules and regulations here, so after I have given you a short, ten-minute lead-in about humanitarian assistance, nation-building, and peacekeeping, we will go directly to a thirty-minute break.

The World Order of Today

The Cold War provided a cover for much of the domestic unrest and hatred in the world. It held a kind of umbrella over domestic and intrastate conflict. You might say it was a period of high threat and high stability. The new world is, in many ways, more open and democratic, but its character has changed to low threat and high instability. Military force and statecraft have always been intertwined in foreign policy, but never have the principles for their choice been so much in debate as today.
As of September 2003, the number of so-called significant armed conflicts in the world was twenty-three.¹ While the number of low-intensity conflicts or domestic disturbance is far higher, some research establishments and NGOs [non-governmental organizations] report as many as three hundred ongoing conflicts.² Political leaders around the world are acknowledging that intervention into these conflicts is necessary, although the means of intervention remain debated from time to time. We have seen that the collective conscience of the international community has been awakened when people are suffering, as we did in the Balkan conflict. The sense of moral obligation to help is perhaps the noblest case for intervention policies. The realist school of international relations may suggest another rationale for intervention into conflicts. Here the mathematics is simple. People that are well fed, well educated, and live in stable states or democracies are less likely to become terrorists. On the contrary, positive development in one country or region will have positive extended effects on economical growth in other countries. Thus, there is a self-interest in intervention, including humanitarian assistance, nation-building, and peacekeeping.

The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically over the years. Some key statistics are:

Increasingly wars are fought in precisely those countries that can least afford them [Figure 13]. Of more than 150 major conflicts since the Second World War, 130 have been fought in the worlds of developing countries. Since the 1950s, more wars have started than have stopped. Some nations have experienced ongoing wars for more than thirty years.

Civilian fatalities [as a percentage of total fatalities] in wartime climbed from 5 percent at the turn of the century, to 15 percent during World War I, to 65 percent by the end of World War II, to more than 90 percent in the wars of the 1990s [Figure 14].

The global case load of refugees and displaced persons is growing at alarming speed [Figure 15]. The number of refugees from armed conflicts worldwide increased from 2.4 million in 1974 to more than 20 million today, including a growing number of internally displaced persons. Women and children make up an estimated 80 percent of displaced populations. Even humanitarian activities that were once safe from attack are now treated as legitimate military objectives. Relief convoys, health clinics, and feeding centers have all become targets.

The mobility of ethnic, cultural, and religious conflicts is a direct effect of ongoing globalization. So is an increasing interstate and interregional economical dependability. The only answer to this is a reinforced multinational cooperation. We need to work together to solve future crises, because the crises themselves see no borders. All in all, it seems more and more likely that our navies will be involved in intervention operations of all kinds, all over the world. It is likely that a growing part of this will be humanitarian assistance and peace support operations. For that reason, I believe the topic of this discussion to be highly relevant.

The utilization of naval forces in operations other than war is nothing new. UN-led peacekeeping operations number fifty-five since the establishment of the

¹. Center for Defense Information.
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [UNTSO] in the Middle East in 1948. We have seen navies involved in embargo operations like SHARP GUARD in the Adriatic. Fleet forces have been used to aid the distribution of food and relief supplies, like in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia in 1992. In 1998, the U.S. Navy was involved in a massive sealift operation to bring humanitarian relief to the victims of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. As we know, some 75 percent of the world’s population lives in the vicinity of the coastlines. Any large-scale movement of personnel, equipment, or goods in the world today must be transported on keel.

**The Strengths and Weaknesses of Sea Power**

Naval forces are, above all, recognized for readiness, flexibility, mobility, poise, and self-sustainment. These are ground characteristics for response to many types of situations. Navies are highly relevant political tools. Naval forces are trained in command, control, and coordination. This is a valuable competence in a variety of situations. Furthermore, we carry with us complication structures, intelligence, and large lift capabilities. We often have the strategic plans to mobilize necessary resources and the general ability to act in a crisis environment, or even in humanitarian disasters.

To be a bit more specific, allow me to point out some examples of the type of operations we are talking about:

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Figure 13. Wars Are Fought in Countries That Can Least Afford Them

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3. The UNTSO was established in 1948 to oversee the truce between Israel and neighboring states of Lebanon and Syria.
Figure 14. Civilian Fatalities Are Increasing

Figure 15. Number of Refugees and Displaced Persons Is Growing

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<td>1.061.199</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>69.206</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>20.556.781</td>
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Within humanitarian assistance, the characteristics of maritime forces can be utilized for crisis management, evacuation, and transport, et cetera.

For peacekeeping, navies can help normalize the situation in an area of unrest. A maritime contribution may be or can be transport to the area, logistic support, surveillance, and control of shipping.

In maritime diplomacy, our forces can, by their presence, signalize the will and ability in a number of dimensions. This includes exercises, demonstrations, port visits.

Some NGOs and aid organizations have raised important questions [about] the increase in military interventions in various crises. Deploying military forces to aid humanitarian victims or solve internal conflicts may raise important ethical and legal issues. There is, of course, a thin line—or should we say a gray zone—between politically motivated actions and humanitarian assistance. We have seen refugee camps turned into military targets because military forces ran them. The NGOs working closely with NATO in Serbia argued that their ability to work effectively was severely curtailed. These are important issues that have to be addressed before any deployment. We know the importance of a well-defined mission, with a clear objective and end state, when we involve our units. We owe our commanders and sailors clear and robust mandates. The ethical ambiguities of humanitarian interventions are more of a political question than a military one. However, if they are not properly resolved ahead of deployments, the consequences are ours to cope with.

The Road Ahead

One thing is certain: these kinds of operations are with us to stay. Isn’t it obvious, then, that the changes in use of naval power will have to affect the way we organize, equip, educate, and train our forces? Perhaps the inherent capabilities of our fleets are enough and will enable us to answer the future call for all kinds of conventional operations. In discussions at home and abroad, I have sensed a general skepticism toward allocation of training resources in this direction. Some may say that our always-limited resources should be utilized in training and exercising combat missions alone.

I think this in many ways is wrong. I am a firm believer in the principle “train as you fight; fight as you train.” Operations that include an interface between naval forces and civilian authorities, NGOs, aid workers, et cetera, create other challenges. Misled operations in a low-intensity conflict may escalate the situation. This needs to be trained at all levels.

Conclusion

My conclusion to this short introduction is that military operations other than war are likely to occupy naval forces also in the future. Committed as we are to transformation and operational effectiveness, we cannot ignore this development. Peace support, nation-building, and humanitarian assistance have a natural place in our education, training, and force generation programs.

Thank you.
We are very excited up here and waiting for a lot of comments and questions, so please go on.

Admiral Dorn, United States:

I am the Pacific Fleet Commander, and I would like to direct a comment or actually get some discussion from Admiral Buck, to go back and pursue some of your thoughts on interoperability. We have made a commitment to CENTREX, to COAN, and all of the deploying battle groups now go out not only COAN-equipped, CENTREX-equipped, but we also work them up during their JTFEX. We are making a large commitment right now, next month, with the JMSDF and the annual X exercise, to really help bring them along in the same interoperability area. I would like to go back and just kind of pursue your thoughts, sir, and see if you had any additional thoughts on interoperability that would be helpful or that we could discuss.

Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:

Thank you, Admiral Dorn; I do, actually. There is a number of areas, I think, where you need to focus. Not all nations, of course, can avail themselves of participating in the USJTFEX, but for those that can and have the opportunity to do that, we certainly find that is a very, very valuable training ground, both in terms of procedural and doctrinal issues ensuring commonality. The emphasis that a number of nations have made on COAN, now called CENTREX, is hugely effective and, I think, points the way where other partners actually could participate much more fully, in a technical connectivity perspective. And again, speaking from my own navy as an example, while we do use access to both NATO satellite systems, and to an extent USN satellite systems, by and large the bulk of our bandwidth, which is currently 128K, is actually using commercial satellite systems. We buy bandwidth. We do not do dialup; we buy pipes, and it works very effectively. So there are commercial capabilities out there that you can apply to military encryption capability that actually can help very significantly in the bandwidth issue, the transfer of information area.

One of the areas that we touched upon, of course, as well is access to information, and the right information at the right time. There are a number of issues in this area, and I think Admiral Porterfield started to touch on it this morning when he put a slide up on the screen, because the U.S. to a certain extent, from a national security perspective, approaches security somewhat, I think, differently than many of our other nations do. A blank sheet of paper, because it does not have REL-something on it, is in fact not releasable, whereas I think most of us work the other schema, where if it does not say it is not releasable, we will release it. And that is with full understanding that there is information that is unique to each nation. That may sound like a small thing, but in some mindsets, that is a huge thing in terms of getting the right information around.

The other area that I would also suggest is that we focused on the connectivity of a specific mission. I was talking about maritime interdiction, but each of us does have capabilities that we can bring. If I could just focus for a moment on the
excellent work being done by the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, in the context of operations in the Gulf–North Arabian Sea, in terms of assisting other nations, in terms of provision of fuel, and certain things like that. Those are very, very important to the coalition activity, and I think, as we look internal to ourselves, there are areas like that that we could collectively do much better at. I threw up a slide, when I was speaking, about the significant differences in the ROE, and we discussed this extensively, but if you look closely at where the major variances are, some of them, yes, are driven by political decision; some of them are driven by, in some cases, constitutional issues; but many of them are actually driven by training issues and procedural issues inside our navies. I think there are areas there where we could actually, ourselves, make it significantly better.

Finally, relating to the Middle East Theater of Operations, there is an effort by an NAVCENT to leave in place a coalition, coordination capability, on an ongoing basis, and similar discussions have actually been held in the Pacific. And that is very, very important, because if there is a framework that is there, you do not have to start from scratch every time. That, in many ways, is one of our problems. Every time we have come together, we have had to build it from the ground up. So establishing some skeletons, some framework, some architectures, I think, also has a significant role to play, because the good news is, we are getting better. We just need to keep improving and moving the yardsticks. Thank you.

Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:

When we look at the new operational challenges for maritime security and we talk about interception, policy, security, port security, contraband, whatever—when you talk to people in government, they seem to have taken on a notion that they are the only jobs that exist. And with the notion of technology, as it applies to navies, there seems to be a growing perception that the high-end, war-fighting capability is becoming less necessary, because these are the sorts of things that we do. I do not deny that all of those things are part of the broad spectrum, but does anybody on the panel have any experience with that sort of effect from those who hold the dollars in their hand? And what sort of arguments have you used to counter that sort of thing, if you have found it?

Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:

Not wishing to be the only speaker, but I do have a bit of experience with governments who tend to have that view: my own. The interesting thing, I believe, is, we in Canada will shortly go through a change of leader, and ultimately we will go into a defense review, but the telling thing is not what the politicians want, but it is what the public wants, what society wants. It is very clear in the Canadian context that Canadians now understand they need an armed force. They expect it to be used, and they understand that there is a cost to using it. They also understand that they need to put some money into it and, indeed, that they have to provide the upper-end capability in the context of ensuring that you do not put sailors, soldiers, and airmen at undue risk.

In our own case, I often articulate our needs to ensure that whatever capability we have relates to the direct threat to Canada, which is—all of you would understand—there is no direct military threat to Canada; but that being said, there are
some significant asymmetric threats. For example, theater missile defense: we need a capability to deal with that, not just in deployed theaters, but in theaters closer to home. So I believe you need to make articulations around some of those areas. Each nation is different, very clearly, but I have found that being able to key on what your public now perceives, in explaining to government why we need various things, is in fact a slightly easier sell. Thank you.

Admiral Vergara, Chile: [Speaking Spanish]

Admiral Finseth, Norway:

Hang on for a second. I think there’s something wrong here with the interpretation. Is that okay now? [No;] while we wait for things to be sorted out, [a comment] from the back, please?

Unidentified Speaker:

I think one of the key messages that we need to deliver is that you fight the war that there is, not the wars that are not out there, and right now this is the war that you have to fight. The investment that needs to be put into it is an investment, the way I look at it, that eventually will be useful for other purposes as well. Sensors, communications, intelligence systems are flexible assets, and the fact that we are now preparing and adapting to a certain threat, a new one, does not mean that this will prevent us later on to adapt back to war fighting, whatever it is going to be. This is an evolving process and a changing world, and it just might be that this is the type of war that we will have to fight in the next few decades. But I do not think this is the real issue; I think politicians do understand that the threats that we are facing now are not the less serious than the ones that are connected to war fighting of the old type. It is just the same war, but different in many, many ways, and I do not think this is the real problem here. The real problem is that we have not been focused enough in requirements, in the sense that we make logic to politicians and to budgetary czars—that is the problem, in my view.

Admiral Vergara, Chile:

I want to complement the response of Vice Admiral Ritchie from Australia. We have the same preoccupations in Chile. There are new threats that confound the roles. These have led to the maritime armed forces taking a police role and, from these, political developments in that these new threats may lead some to assume there is no longer a necessity for naval forces and that we should change to what is primarily a police force, but what rather would lead to a multifaceted force for the traditional role of protection of national sovereignty, projection, humanitarian assistance, and countering the new threats. I believe we have to develop, but not in roles—only in policing.

Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:

Thank you. May I also give a short comment? There is a shift in the way small navies, as it goes for my own navy, are run and structured, and that is politically decided, so that we see a big change, actually, in all ways we are going to handle future challenges. Weaponry, how we educate soldiers, how we educate sailors, and so forth: there is a change happening now, also for small navies.
Rear Admiral Tay, Singapore:

Maybe I should just add a couple of comments. I think after 9/11 many navies, including the Singapore Navy, had to deal with two [sets of issues]. One is the conventional war-fighting requirements and the other one being some security [postures] we are talking about today. I think the stress put on us is to be able to do not one or the other, but to do both. I think the resulting load is a lot on the people, and, of course, on the operating budget as well, to meet those requirements. I guess governments will also have to keep both in mind rather than just to cater to the more prevalent threat for the immediate future. In terms of technology, I think a lot of technologies can be used also for current security requirements, and I guess it is an adjustment of where the money needs to be put, because investments in the traditional war-fighting [means] in communications or weapons can have the applications in dealing with [this new] level type of threats.

Major General Awitta, Kenya:

The security issue is crucial in the whole of Africa; it is one that provides for challenges that I am sure this symposium is good to address. The first one is terrorism. The one I want maybe Rear Admiral Tay to address is the issue of piracy. In the state of Somalia, where there is no central government, this threat now exists and shifts, traversing the territorial water of Somalia, [which] gets pirated now and again. Now my question is, what are the legal implications for, first of all, providing security in a situation where the country concerned is a failed state? Is it the responsibility of the United Nations or the states that are within that region? In other words, can the states within that region provide for security or patrols within those waters to address the piracy issue?

Rear Admiral Tay, Singapore:

Sorry; if you could repeat the question again?

Major General Awitta, Kenya:

The question I was asking is the [treatment] of piracy in a situation like Somalia, which is a failed state and there is no government, but the nationals belong to various warlords’ pirate ships, once in a while. Whose responsibility is it to provide for security for ships traversing the waters of that state?

Rear Admiral Tay, Singapore:

I get the question, but I am not sure I have the answer to that! I guess when it comes to piracy, I guess the message is that different agencies, various government, or the owners of the ship have a part to play, as I have mentioned in my remarks. The littoral states, I think, will take action. In a case of failed states, I guess it is a little harder, but, nevertheless, for ships transiting through, [if] the ships themselves—the merchant ships—could take self-protective measures, that would help in terms of deterring, in terms of increasing the level of protection against pirates. I know in tomorrow’s seminar, there is a scenario that is set up that perhaps talks about the situation. I think you may also be alluding to an international force or something, so I guess in the [Seminar] Group Two, the one on piracy, there will be
the issue of international forces dealing with this, and I think that may be another
time to address this sort of rights and obligations issue.

Admiral Vergara, Chile: [Translation.]

I would clarify one fundamental aspect of the neutralization of the threats and that
is the issue of national sovereignty. It seems to me that the first steps to neutralize
the threats, whether drugs or terrorism, are that countries have effective control of
their own national territory, that the police function in such a way to avoid internal
problems, that problems do not develop from third countries, and that problems
affecting international communities would include the United Nations.

Admiral de Donno, Italy:

From what we have said today, it seems to me there are two sets of problems related
with the new situation around the world. One is terrorism and war against terror-
ism, wherever it is formed and wherever it can be a menace for everybody. It is
something that is felt in an equal way from all the countries around the world, and it
is something that requires, as we have said, a lot of initiatives at the civil organiza-
tion level—particularly what the Commandant of the [U.S.] Coast Guard said
today—and problems for the defense of each country, and that goes to the organi-
ization of the ports or the defense of the territory against the possibility of having
such a type of situations.

Another set of problems are those related with what we have talked [about] this
afternoon, like piracy or specific problems of international illegality, if I can say,
which are characteristics of different places around the world and different regions.
So my question is, while the problem of the fight against the terrorist is certainly
something which involves all the navies as a military force, because they must be
ready to counter the terrorism even on the high seas far from our coasts, the prob-
lem of those other aspects could most probably [be] better faced by regional
organizations, which are capable of cooperating among them and trying to find the
best solution—probably with the support of the international community, but
reaching the best possible cooperative effort in terms of military and police organi-
ization in that specific area. [For example in those areas where the] problem of piracy
is principally concentrated: in the Malaccan Straits or, as it was said by our col-
league from Kenya, on the coast of the Horn of Africa, or Somalia, or whatever. For
instance, illegal immigration is a problem now strongly present in the Mediterra-
nean, and perhaps is the same in the Caribbean. So, all these are aspects that I
think cannot be countered with an international solution all over the world, be-
cause the first need is just, regionally, to reach the best cooperation possible, in
order to organize the force available to counter this. So what I want to ask is this: Do
you see that, in effect, these two aspects of the problem that we have discussed today
have to be faced in different ways, or can we face, at a global international level, all
the aspects of the new threats which have been described today?

Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:

Thank you. Just giving a short comment myself, I think what you are saying now is
actually two things, which have probably the same solution, in a way. It depends
where it is, where it happens: if it is regional, it is local, or if it is global. In my part of
the world, if I may, we have managed to cope with problems like you are referring to, either by creating coalitions of the willing, by using the UN, [or] by using other institutions like NATO and the WEU, which has been reorganized, as you know. I do not think that there are any defined and clear answers to the question, but I may have other comments from the panel up here.

**Vice Admiral Ya’ari, Israel:**

The system of systems, in my view, should be focused on terrorism. There are sub-systems that can be linked into it, but the main focus should be on the more dangerous threat that will require more effort. The tool that eventually will be at our hand will enable solving some of the “secondary” ones, but if we optimize for the sub-systems, we will never come up with the systems that we need now for the real threat, and the real threat is terrorism of mass destruction, and that is more serious than anything else.

**Captain Lambert, United Kingdom:**

I have done a quick bit of research this afternoon from the Web into the IMO and note that the chief concerns of the IMO are safety and prevention of pollution. The Web site reports that, over the last twenty or thirty years, the IMO has been very successful improving safety of shipping at sea and preventing all pollution. None of the things that we have discussed during the course of the day appear in the Web site of the IMO at the moment—terrorism, piracy, et cetera, et cetera. We are all members of a global coalition, along the lines of the one that Admiral Clark and Admiral Collins referred to in their keynote speeches, and that is the UN. I wonder whether we ought to be reporting to our political masters that perhaps it is time to expand the mandate of the UN and, through it, the IMO. Would the panel [have a] view on that?

**Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:**

I think that is a very valid and good comment. We have a huge problem regarding the area you are mentioning now, and close to my own border, we have a really tough one to solve. Anyone have comments?

**Admiral Vergara, Chile:** [Translation.]

I would clarify one fundamental aspect of the neutralization of the threats, and that is the issue of national sovereignty. It seems to me that the first step to neutralize the threats (whatever, drugs, terrorism), that countries must have effective control of their own national territory, that the police function in such a way as to avoid internal problems, that problems do not develop from third countries, that the problems avoid affecting international communities and would include the United Nations.

**Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:**

Thank you. That was Panel Discussion 2. Thank you to the audience for good questions and comments, and to the panelists for excellent answers.
Panel Discussion Three: 
Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level

Moderated by Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Australia

Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:

Thank you. Admiral Clark, colleagues, could I start by echoing the sentiments of those who spoke yesterday and adding my thanks to Admiral Clark and to the Naval War College for the priceless opportunity to be at this particularly important symposium. I think that, overall, the theme is not only topical, but it is essential to the safety and the well-being of the countries that we have the privilege to represent. This morning is rather a long panel session; in fact, it takes us all the way through until lunchtime. There will be a break from 9:45 to 10:15, and then we finish at 11:30. I am asked to remind you that when we eventually get to the business of asking questions from the floor that you take the time to introduce yourself for the purposes of the record later on. The speakers today are Admiral Karimullah from Pakistan, Admiral Collins from the United States, Admiral Furusho from Japan, Admiral Johnson from the United States, Vice Admiral Retief from South Africa, Vice Admiral Godoy from Argentina, Admiral Krzyżewski from Poland, and, finally, myself. So there are eight speakers to get through before we get to questions. In Australia the government in addressing the War on Terror has adopted a slogan, and that slogan is: “Be alert, but not alarmed.” I would ask you this morning to be alert, but not alarmed, because we are going to reverse the procedure at the end of all this; we are going to ask you questions.

Could I ask Admiral Karimullah to lead off, please, by talking about enhanced military readiness?

Admiral Karimullah, Pakistan:

Thank you. BSIM-ALLAH AR RAHMAAN AR RAHIM. [In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful.] Admiral Clark, Chief of the U.S. Navy, colleague delegates, gentlemen, good morning. At the outset, let me thank the CNO, U.S. Navy, for arranging this symposium and inviting me, thus providing this excellent opportunity to associate and exchange talks and views with so many eminent civil and military authorities who have distinguished themselves in maritime and naval affairs. For me it is a singular honor to be back to my alma mater after a lapse of more than a decade. The theme of the Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium, “Sea Power for Peace, Prosperity, and Security,” is well suited to the present-day environment. In these uncertain times, it is indeed appropriate to focus on the positive and constructive elements of sea power, rather than its exploitative and coercive use. Yesterday, we all had the pleasure of listening to a very inspiring and thought-provoking keynote address by Admiral Clark. I must felicitate the CNO
for his candid and enlightening discourse. I must also thank the first two panels for the in-depth presentation on maritime coalitions at the tactical level and new operational challenges for maritime security. These presentations have set the stage for our panel to focus on the strategic value of maritime cooperation. My talk will primarily cover the enhanced military readiness that is so essential for effective maritime cooperation. So, when I shall be referring to the term maritime cooperation in my talk, it will primarily be in this context.

Gentlemen, the sea is the common heritage of mankind, a bond that has joined different civilizations since time immemorial. With time, the significance of the sea has only increased, not just as a means of transport and trade, but also as a link between humanity spread all across the globe. The strategic value of maritime cooperation is well described in the annals of history. It was maritime cooperation across the Atlantic that assured the success of allies in World War II. During the Cold War, it was maritime cooperation amongst NATO allies and Warsaw Pact countries to strengthen their respective alliances. After the end of the Cold War, maritime cooperation has allowed multinational coalitions to operate in the narrows of the Gulf and to wage successful peace enforcement and peacekeeping campaigns in the littorals. Even in the present-day scenario, campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of successful coalition operations made possible due to maritime cooperation of member nations.

The tragic events of September 11 have illustrated that the twenty-first century will be characterized by dangerous uncertainty and conflict. It is important to form long-term strategy relationships necessary to plan and execute operations to eradicate terrorism. Maritime forces, due to their inherent flexibility, reach, and sustainability, have a vital role to play in the ongoing war against terrorism.

Another important characteristic that makes maritime forces a preferable means of military cooperation is the ability to quickly blend with and support other maritime forces. This is because of the unique character of maritime forces, as they routinely operate beyond the bounds of territorial seas in close coordination with each other. No wonder that all major campaigns in the last decade have been characterized by the creation of coalitions comprising primarily multinational maritime elements. This is where the strategic value of maritime cooperation in the military context becomes more obvious. There are many strategic concerns that warrant global maritime cooperation. These have been discussed yesterday by Panel 2, but to refresh, I shall only mention them briefly: global terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, national disasters and accidents, peace and stability operations.

Gentlemen, to deal with increasingly violent international maritime offenses, it is necessary to step up broad-based, regional cooperative efforts. This will necessitate coordination among all institutions concerned, such as naval units, coastal patrols, law enforcement organizations, shipping companies, crew and port authorities, as well as maritime security agencies. However, in this regard, the major players would have to play a significant role by extending material support to smaller nations in the form of the necessary equipment and training.

The challenges faced by the world community can be met by combined efforts and enhanced military readiness of professional maritime forces around the world. We shall seek to improve the military readiness of these forces through various forms of peacetime engagements between the armed forces of various nations, and
seek to improve the capacity of appropriate global and regional security institutions to sponsor and coordinate multinational efforts, especially peacekeeping and other stability operations.

Peacetime multilateral exercises and common operating procedures can facilitate sure transition of various forces into a more responsive unified coalition. These are inexpensive and powerful ways to develop the capabilities to work effectively as coalitions in complex contingencies, as partners in countering terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy; in managing the consequences of weapons of mass destruction, national disasters, and accidents; in evacuating citizens caught in the path of violence and certain rescue of mariners and airmen in distress; and in providing humanitarian assistance.

A coalition develops a cadre of competent partners able to contribute when called upon. The ongoing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is a manifestation of the strategic advantages that may accrue from maritime cooperation [Figure 1]. The U.S.-led coalition operation against terrorists has been ably supported by regional countries and the navies, which has facilitated substantial enhancement in the operational capability of the coalition.

In our case, the Pakistan Navy facilitated the beach landing operation by U.S. marines on the Makran coast and provided logistic support and security cover, which was essentially needed to follow on operations in Afghanistan. Similarly, contributions by other coalition partners have been instrumental in the success of the operation thus far. Having seen the strategic value of maritime cooperation and the

![Figure 1. Operation Enduring Freedom](image)
Gentlemen, the end of the Cold War led to proliferation of interregional conflicts in many parts of the world that denied many nations the perceived dividend of peace that was to accrue due to the end of superpower rivalry. These interregional conflicts included many maritime disputes that even today stand in the path of global cooperation to deal with the menace of terrorism. Regional disputes can block the efforts of global maritime cooperation. The only effective solution to overcome this impediment is the resolution of regional disputes through the mechanism of the United Nations, with strong support from major maritime powers and the international community. In particular, the major players need to play a proactive role to resolve intraregional conflicts for the sake of international peace and cooperation.

South Asia has lately been the focus of world concern due to unresolved issues, causing sporadic tensions and fear of full-scale war. Last year the Arabian Sea witnessed a flurry of activity as naval forces were mobilized in anticipation of an impending conflict. Thus, for an enduring regional cooperation, organized international effort, where necessary backed by world power mediation, may be the only answer to offer a unified and cohesive response for maritime interests or threats. Pakistan, being a peace-loving, moderate, and progressive country, will fully support any maritime and naval cooperation initiative which is just and for the right purpose to maintain peace and stability in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf region.

During the ongoing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, we not only made a maximum contribution in global efforts against terrorism, but also assured utmost restraint under difficult circumstances to uphold regional stability. The United States Navy’s coalition maritime campaign plan provides a forum for maritime cooperation without prejudice to the interests of the regional participants. We are ready to extend further support to the coalition, as it has been formed for a just cause.

In the end, I urge all my colleagues present here today to employ sea power at their disposal for world peace, harmony, and greater prosperity of the nations. Consequently, we need to open a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risk to our security. We need to observe in good faith our obligations under international law, including the provisions and principles contained in the UN charter. Commanders of the world’s navies should take the lead in imposing peace on the oceans to blaze a trail for our counterparts on land, or in seamanship jargon, we say, make others to follow our wake.

The following are some of the important principles that, in my opinion, can make the sea more secure and safer:

- Major powers must play a due role to resolve regional disputes; a *sine qua non* for maritime cooperation.
- Joint exercises between coalition partners on a durable basis to facilitate ease of interoperability and provide swift response to maritime threats.
- Collective measures to beef up security at principal ports of embarkation and disembarkation must be ensured.
Study of emerging environment and sharing of information is the need of the hour.
Cooperation of private sectors is vital in addition to the collaboration between
governments of each related country.
Concerned countries must agree to launch unified policies [inaudible].

Lastly, once again I thank Admiral Clark for affording me the opportunity to be
present here and share some of my thoughts with you all. I would also like to thank
all the distinguished delegates for the participation in this symposium which has
made this event truly worthwhile. Thank you.

Admiral Collins, United States:

Thank you. Admiral Clark, delegates, it is a pleasure to be on this panel and be with
you this morning. The panel topic, “Strategic Value of Maritime Cooperation,” is
obviously very, very germane to this symposium, a concept that I strongly stressed
during my talk at lunch yesterday, and clearly the crosscutting theme to every
panel. If you recall in yesterday’s discussion, both Admiral Clark and I made the
case for a vision of a collaborative twenty-first-century sea power, a robust blending
of naval power and maritime power, geared to a new and very challenging security
environment—thus allowing us to reach our national and regional objectives and
then enabling, as the CNO put it, the robust development and sustainment of our
economies.

In pursuit of these objectives and to mitigate security risk, I spoke of the need for
a maritime security strategy that had four overarching precepts: (1) to enhance
awareness; (2) to create and oversee an effective maritime security regime; (3) to in-
crease military and civilian maritime law enforcement presence; and (4) to improve
response posture, in the case that incidents do occur.

I emphasized awareness as the critical foundation piece in building maritime do-
main awareness, which we call MDA. I stressed the need for an effective integration
of both civil law enforcement authorities, private maritime stakeholders, and mili-
tary might. I suggested that the classic notions of strategic partnerships must
change if we are to be successful collectively and individually. MDA, intelligence,
information-sharing is the glue here. I would like to spend a few minutes providing
you some food for thought on this issue. To gain a true and effective integrated ap-
proach to MDA is a difficult challenge.

As I discuss my own thoughts on this issue and how we have approached it in the
United States, let me ask you to be thinking about the same challenge in the context
of your own professional situation. For example, who do you share information
with today? With what organizations inside your country, outside your country: mil-
tary organizations, civilian law enforcement agencies, private-sector companies? If
you are a CNO in your country’s navy, do you have a personal relationship with the
head of your country’s lead law enforcement investigative agency? I think you
should, because in today’s security environment, those kinds of agencies and coast
guards and maritime administrations and port authorities and maritime industry
are very likely to hold some of the essential information you need to do your job for
your country.
I would like to outline some of the initiatives we have taken in the United States to enhance security awareness capabilities, in the hope it may be instructional to all of us as we collectively build worldwide MDA and its subset, maritime intelligence, in sort of a description of the MDA building blocks that we are trying to put in place. The core of any MDA program is accurate information, intelligence, and knowledge of vessels, cargo, crews, passengers, and extending this well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries. We are building our MDA program to specifically address the conflicting interests of security, on one hand, and the flow of commerce in our ports and waterways. The goal is to know the difference between friend and foe so that legitimate commerce can move through our coastal and port areas unimpeded while we interdict contraband cargo and illegal activities of all types.

Our approach is an interagency approach. It leverages information technology and multiple information sources, and it includes active involvement of the private sector. Our ability to achieve better MDA will, again, allow us to better focus our security efforts on those contacts and activities of real interest. Within the United States Coast Guard, we had actually started to work on this MDA concept in late 2000, in very strong partnership with Vern Clark’s United States Navy. Although the problems we were anticipating were less extreme at that point, the nature of the asymmetric threats was indicative of what we face today.

Since 9/11 we have had an increased sense of urgency about the steps to increase MDA. For example, within thirty days of those attacks we amended our regulations so that oceangoing vessels approaching the United States were required to provide ninety-six-hour advance notice of arrival at our ports, with additional information on last-port-of-call information of the ship, the manifest, and the crew. We also centralized reporting, from our individual forty-seven captains of the port to a single location, enabling better coordination analysis of information and more rapid dissemination to other agencies. Both military and civilian agencies were integrated early, very early, in our efforts. We created a National Vessel Movement Center to catalog and to assess ship movements. In addition, with the passage of enabling legislation from our Congress, we became full members of the national foreign intelligence community and have invested considerable resources in expanding our intel program and associated competencies.

My hat is off to Admiral Porterfield and the intel established in the navy for helping us along the way as we build out a more sophisticated intel program. With their help and their partnership, we have established a program called Coast Watch, a new process for analyzing risks associated with vessels entering our ports. We established a Joint National Maritime Intelligence Center with the Navy, which uses these advanced notice of arrival reports that I have mentioned and other available information to sort and classify vessels of interest, so we can board these vessels before they reach our ports, if deemed necessary. We have established additional maritime intel fusion centers on the East coast and on the West coast within the coast guard, for both military intelligence and law enforcement-sensitive information, and established subordinate Field Intel Support Teams [FISTs] in key ports. These teams are actively engaged in intel collection and first-order analysis, in coordination with federal, state, and local intel agencies. They are joint in the broadest sense of the word. This gives us top-down and bottom-up information in the intelligence continuum. We have leveraged government and industry port
safety committees to address security and info-sharing at a local level in a very collaborative way.

And, of course, effective 1 March, we moved, along with twenty-one other agencies, into the new Department of Homeland Security. This alone has huge implications for MDA and information-sharing, because it has already paid dividends in facilitating sharing, particularly electronic sharing of law enforcement–sensitive information between Coast Guard, Customs, and Immigration agencies. We have collectively partnered with many of your governments to establish a multilateral set of protocols in order to create an international security regime, which includes the ISPS Code and accelerating the introduction of AIS to increase awareness of approaching vessels. We are cataloging performance—security performance—of all vessels entering the United States and beyond. The companies that they sail for, the cargos that they take, the classification societies that are involved, and we will have performance metrics holding them accountable for the good security regime.

In partnership with the CNO, we are establishing interagency prototype Joint Harbor Operation Centers in coast guard and navy ports, improving both port security and force protection. If you ever visit San Diego, you should take a look at the issue in San Diego and the center there. It is truly joint, in every sense of the word: state, local, federal, civilian, military, and private, embedded in a joint center. We have upgraded our VTS to enhance security including AIS, and we have launched a major modernization program in the coast guard that is really MDA centric. We call it Deep Water Modernization Project, but it is a complete recapitalization of the coast guard’s major cutters and aircraft. It includes UAVs, sensors, C4ISR, furthering the national fleet concept we have partnered with the navy on, and a network-centric system that gives us much-enhanced MDA in the littorals and beyond.

So, as you see, in this not-all-inclusive list, we have taken some very aggressive steps, some positive steps, but much, much needs to be done. We plan to move very aggressively forward on our modernization program for a network-centric system of ships and planes. We are aggressively and fully implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the ISPS Code in our country. We are completing and working on a comprehensive port security assessment of fifty-five of the top military and economically significant ports in our country. We are developing an international audit team to audit security measures in foreign ports. We have aggressively engaged the international community at IMO, and will continue to do so on such issues as long-range tracking, enhanced flag-state responsibility, and transparency. We plan to work with your governments in global industry to assist the United States Customs, who has the lead in developing assets and that enables all of us together, internationally, to track cargo from origin to destination. We have gained enormously positive experience in a joint and interagency effort and in Joint Interagency Task Force South [JIATF South] that was mentioned yesterday, which could and should serve as a model for intel collaboration around the world. It is readily expandable to transnational issues that extend well beyond counterdrugs. Ultimately, what we need is what the CNO spoke about yesterday, a maritime NORAD. In the United States Coast Guard, our plans are to establish a robust MDA program office to help develop that architecture in partnership with the United States Navy and NORTHCOM.
So where does all this leave us? As we have all recognized through this symposium, there is much more for all of us to do. First of all, I would certainly be the first to admit that we do not have all the answers, but I offer that the steps we have taken are steps down the right path. Between all of us in this room, we hold the keys to building an effective integrated, collaborative, worldwide maritime intelligence network—as Admiral Clark put it, an opportunity of historic proportions, especially if we think in terms of maritime power in a broad and new definition of jointness. Some of us are big; some of us are small. We have a variety of different competencies, but we all have something to add to this fight.

I will close with one final thought. I would ask all of us to consider how your local information-sharing systems might fit into a regional construct, suggested by several panelists yesterday, by Vice Admiral De Leon and Rear Admiral Tay, for example, and how such regional systems will help build a worldwide maritime intel network. Thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to the rest of the panel.

Admiral Furusho, Japan:

First, Admiral Clark, thank you for giving me this precious opportunity to speak at this ISS. Admiral Route, congratulations on your excellent hosting of this, the world's largest naval symposium.

Fellow chiefs, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I am Admiral Koichi Furusho, Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force. Before I left Japan, I called the former CNO, who attended the last ISS in 1999, and asked how many in the audience listened to the speech in the auditorium. His answer was, “About one out of ten.” I will try to do my best to keep you awake, especially those who still have jet lag. Today I would like to talk about the “Strategic Value of Naval Cooperation in the Western Pacific.”

The events of September 11th drastically changed perceptions of national security throughout the globe, and it has affected the military policy of many countries. Japan is no exception.

In response to those attacks, the Japanese Diet enacted a new law to enable the Self Defense Forces to support the Global War on Terrorism. As a result, from November 2001 to today, twenty-five Japanese naval ships have been conducting replenishment at sea in support of coalition ships fighting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the northern Arabian Sea. We have provided roughly 320 thousand kiloliters, or 85 million gallons, of fuel to three hundred ships from ten coalition navies. This amount of fuel accounts for 30 percent of all the fuel consumed by coalition forces at sea.

This logistic support operation has been carried out very effectively. We have learned that the key enabler of successful operations is interoperability. At the Fifteenth ISS, Admiral Jay Johnson stated: “We expect coalitions to play an increasingly important role in international security.” Following this, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, or Japanese Navy, started to focus on interoperability in coalition operations. No one anticipated the terrorism that occurred on September 11th, nor could they have predicted the emergence of the largest coalition operation in history in response to those attacks. Therefore, we, Japan, did not fully understand what coalition operations were about.
However, at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, or the WPNS, we saw the beginnings of discussions on coalition operations in the form of maritime cooperation in military operations other than war [MOOTW].

**Western Pacific Naval Symposium**

- Based on the Western Pacific subcommittee of ISS
- Symposium and workshop
- 21 navies.

I would like to briefly touch upon the development of the WPNS. The WPNS was established in 1988, based on the Western Pacific subcommittee of the ISS, and the symposium has been held every other year. The number of participating navies has grown from 12 at the first symposium to 21 and now includes all the major regional navies. In its early stages, the WPNS was a place to exchange information for mutual understanding. As the time has passed, the discussions have developed, and in the late ’90s, the focus of discussions shifted to cooperation among the WPNS navies in MOOTW.

At the Eighth WPNS, which the Japanese Navy hosted last year, one of the agenda items was how to cooperate in MOOTW and how to ensure interoperability. We can say that the WPNS has become the framework for forging naval cooperation rather than the forum for maritime confidence building.

The WPNS has entered a new era where discussion has expanded beyond the immediate issues of the present and now also includes discussion of the direction for our navies in the next generation. This year, we began a new program as a result of the last symposium. This program provides an opportunity for junior officers of the WPNS navies to ride a Japanese Navy ship during the Overseas Training Cruise for a certain period. We expect these junior officers to take this opportunity to share their knowledge and enlighten each other. One of the participants noted: “Although I perfectly enjoyed the program, I have nothing to provide in turn. The only thing I give is friendship. This friendship will never end. Please remember my friendship.” I am very encouraged by this kind of response, and I am determined to continue this program. Many of my fellow CNOs in this auditorium may be retired by the next ISS, but I can assure you, at least to the CNOs from WPNS navies, that they will be able to retire from the navy at ease, knowing that the next generation is already cooperating with each other.

I would like to describe the strategic feature of the Western Pacific region, because it has worked as a driving force to promote naval cooperation. One of the remarkable characteristics of this region is the fact that the sea has historically played the role of catalyst for trade and communications. Having said that, the sea has had different influences depending upon the historical period. For example, the Sea of Japan, which is surrounded by Japan, Korea, China, and Russia, was formerly the front line for East-West confrontation during the Cold War. Now, however, it is the Sea of Japan that supports the flow of trade for the economic prosperity of Northeast Asia, as well as provides the opportunity for bilateral and multilateral exercises among the regional navies. In any case, given the fact that the sea has connected the regional countries at various points in history, the WPNS
could provide a multilateral naval framework even where no prior regional security initiative existed.

Naval cooperation will greatly contribute to regional security in the Western Pacific where the sea is the means of communication. The navies in the region need to cooperate more, to cope with unconventional threats and dangers, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the requirements for naval cooperation in the area of MOOTW increase, the probability of coalition operations will increase accordingly. Coalition operations among the WPNS navies will not be easy, taking into account the varied capabilities and size of 21 participating navies.

The WPNS has been, and will continue to be, a strong foundation to build and foster continued regional stability. Flexibility and mobility make the navies of today the enablers for successful coalition operations. The WPNS recognizes the important role for enhanced international naval cooperation in a dual-track process. One track is focused on the near-term objective to enhance interoperability between navies. The second track is focused on the long-range direction for WPNS in the next generation. The combination of improved cooperation in the present and an eye toward shaping the next generation of the navies clearly makes the WPNS of vital strategic value to the countries in the region.

This concludes my presentation. Thank you very much for your attention.

Admiral Johnson, United States:

Thank you. It is a bit daunting to be sitting here trying to talk about the Mediterranean when we have representatives from Portugal and Spain and France and Italy and Greece, Turkey, Malta, the Black Sea, the Magreb and Levant nations, but I will do my best, and I am sure, with all that expertise, if I make a mistake I will be corrected. I would like to say that the environment that we live in in the Mediterranean, I think certainly in the post–World War II era, has the longest tradition of maritime cooperation. It is a tradition, I think, that carries well beyond the immediate Mediterranean area. In fact, I show that picture up there. That is actually from Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR; there are five countries represented in that picture: United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Italy, and the United States.

Here is another one [Figure 2], a little bit earlier, actually during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and those ships—many of you will recognize them: Charles De Gaulle, the Invincible, Garibaldi, [The Netherlands HNLMS Van Amstel (F 831)], and a couple of U.S. carriers, the “JFK” [John F. Kennedy], and Theodore Roosevelt. This tradition of maritime cooperation is so rich and so strong in the Mediterranean, it carries over. I would submit, to all parts of the world, although we know in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and certainly in IRAQI FREEDOM, there were many other navies—certainly our Australian colleagues, Japanese colleagues, and the GCC states as well. The strategic focus, I think we can all agree, of NATO—and we cannot talk about the Mediterranean without doing it somewhat also in a NATO context; certainly each one of our nations, and I can speak for the United States as well in this part of the world—the strategic focus, the strategic threat and what have you, have moved south and east. During the Cold War, the Mediterranean, you could say, was sort of a flank theater, but now it is the center of our security interests, and there are many, many reasons for it.
When I talk about threat in my job, both as a national commander—U.S. Naval Forces, Europe—and as a NATO commander in the Southern Region, I talk about such things as terrorism, the obvious threat that we have been talking about much over the past few days. In fact, our particular region, the Mediterranean region, is an area of the world that is very much used as the logistics base for terrorists. They need passports. They need to do banking. They need to do all manner of things, and, in reality, they do it in all of our countries, the Mediterranean area being a prime area. Weapons of mass destruction are certainly another area that we are watching very closely, and the Mediterranean plays a big part in that, not only as a potential means for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also as providing a great opportunity to interdict this kind of activity.

Transnational criminal activity is another area that we have paid a great deal of attention to. There are estimates that fully 5 percent of the world’s GDP [gross domestic product] is tied up in the drug trade, and we are seeing greater and greater indications of the flow of drugs into this particular region. Heroin, opiate-based kinds of drugs coming from the East, and cocaine flows from the Western Hemisphere into Europe. This also is tied into the War on Terrorism, because I think that terrorism rides on the backs of this criminal activity and the criminal activity logistics lines, which are very well established and organized. Terrorism rides on the back of that.

I also talk about resources when I talk about the kinds of threats and challenges we are going to face in the Southern Region. Most people, of course, when you talk...
about resources, think of fossil fuel, and that is going to become increasingly im-
portant. The Southern and Mediterranean areas, for this, are the sources, and we
do not even know how rich those sources are yet. They come online from the Cauca-
sus, both through pipelines and through shipping from the Black Sea through the 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles, into the Mediterranean, across the Mediterranean 
from pipelines that terminate in the eastern Mediterranean area.

Another resource in our particular region that is going to be a source of potential 
strife in the coming years is potable water. My prediction is that that is going to 
probably be the most strategic resource facing us in the next fifty years, a gigantic 
challenge with estimates that, in the not too distant future—when I say not too dis-
tant, the next fifteen to twenty years—fully 40 percent of the world’s populations 
will not have access to potable water. The social disruption that that creates, in 
terms of disease, [will be significant].

The final area that I think has a gigantic impact on the security situation and will 
drive a lot of the cooperation that we are going to continue to enjoy, I think, in the 
Mediterranean area is the demographics in a large sense. The UN predicts that in 
the next fifty years, the world’s population will grow from where it is today, 6.3 bil-
lion people, to just under 9 billion: 2.5 to 2.6 billion more people! But most of that 
growth is in what I call “the near abroad,” if you talk about the Mediterranean and 
its larger context. In other words, Africa will gain about a billion people, and South 
Asia and Southwest Asia will gain the rest of that growth. We can only imagine and 
have to start thinking about how that growth is going to manifest itself over the next 
fifty years and what kind of security challenges this is going to present.

Well, the history of maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean in that kind of a 
threat context—or I call it more than threat, it is a challenge context—that we have 
facing us in the twenty-first century [is] a rich heritage of maritime cooperation that 
I think is going to continue to serve us well in the future and something that we can 
build on. Just the fact that NATO has been around for fifty-four years now, since 
1949, has been a source of cooperation that we have continued to build on over all 
of these years, is going to be very important for us. That picture that I show up 
there—I think almost anywhere that you go in the world, the STANAGs, the ATPs, 
the various OPTASKs that have been developed over the years, and NATO sort of 
just transposed themselves into other parts of the world. The Standing Naval 
Force, Atlantic [SNFL] was established in 1967. It has been going for thirty-six 
years. SNFM [Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean] came online in April of 1992, 
replacing what was called the Mediterranean On-Call Force that had been around 
for several years. We have the tradition that began with SHARP GUARD, which had 
both the NATO forces and the WEU forces working with our operations in the 
Strait of Taranto during the crisis in the Balkans. We have the MCMRONs that 
have again been developed both in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, a very pro-
found sense of cooperation that I think we can grow on.

Over the last two years, we have been involved in what is called Operation Ac-
tive Endeavor. The CNO, Admiral Clark, mentioned that yesterday in his 
comments. Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, the Commander, 
Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe, is in charge of that operation. We have had 
thirteen different nations who have sent forces to the Mediterranean. This has been 
going on—yesterday I believe it was, the 26th of October, was the two-year
anniversary—and it has been immensely successful. As I mentioned, thirteen nations have contributed forces to this effort. Next week, we hope to have a frigate from Bulgaria that will join us for a short period, our fourteenth nation that will be directly involved in this operation. You know the statistics on it. Over thirty-five thousand boardings and what have you, in addition to the impact that I think it has had on terrorism, and Admiral Porterfield can tell you how hard this is.

Much of the success, I think, is, you do not know what you do not know. I cannot tell you that we have actually found an al-Qa’ida terrorist, but I think we have deterred a lot of activity that could have ridden on the backs of this kind of commerce that goes on around us and much of what Admiral Collins was talking about—flags of convenience, ships that are not very carefully regulated, that have suspect commercial ties, ownership, and what have you. We think that we have deterred a considerable amount of activity that could have gone on onboard these ships.

We have also had some second- and third-order impacts that we did not fully anticipate but have been rather dramatic. In 2002, the level of illegal immigration was cut by nearly one-half in the Mediterranean area, and from our statistics, this appears to continue to be true in 2003. So I am absolutely convinced that this is an operation that has been immensely successful, and it will continue for as far as I can see into the future. We may have to modify it. In fact, we are in the process, right now at the Naples Headquarters, [of] doing what we call a periodic mission review that I have to get to SHAPE by the end of the week. We have been given some strategic guidance to actually expand this, or take it out of Article Five and put it into the ongoing NATO effort in the Global War against Terrorism.

We are working on that at this time, but when it is all said and done, our challenge is the same challenge that Admiral Collins talked about yesterday and talked about this morning, and that is actionable intelligence, fused intelligence. We have a lot of information. We do not have a tremendous amount of knowledge, and we have got to figure out how to do that. Admiral de Donno talked about it yesterday. His view is that we are going to have to take some kind of regional approach, and I would like to close by endorsing that concept.

MARCOMED is a conference that NAVSOUTH hosts every year in our region in May. Last year, it was hosted by our French colleagues in Toulon. It was a very good conference; we talked about much of this. We had a presentation, and this is instructive—the person who gave the presentation was a French gendarmerie colonel who has been assigned to JIATF South [Joint Interagency Task Force, U.S. Southern Command] for five years; he has been working in Key West for five years. I think that the model at JIATF South is something that might be instructive to us. We know that if we are going to be successful in developing information into knowledge, into actionable intelligence, it is going to take an incredible amount of trust and comfort-level working with each other. And so I am convinced that for Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR and for us to continue to progress in the Mediterranean, we need to develop that kind of a capability. We need to give some thought as to how we do it, under whose auspices it operates; but if we are going to continue to have some success, we’re going to have to do this better. I think of what I know around the world; the JIATF South is the best model, where you have multinational and you have both civil and military who have been working together for a considerable amount of time and they are comfortable with each other. They are in the kind of
awkward position where they have a pretty good fused intelligence picture, but they are resource poor. I think that we are in a position in ACTIVE ENDEAVOR where, thanks to the support of the various nations, we have a pretty good stable full of resources, but we do not have enough intelligence, and we have got to marry that together and do better.

Now, I am talking beyond my competence and out of my area, but I could envision where you would have something that builds on what is being done in Key West, ties into what Admiral Collins talks about with his FISTs and the various things that he is doing in the Western Hemisphere, and then you would have something, I would propose, based in the Mediterranean. It could be under NATO auspices, or something that is all-source. You would have another such center that deals with the Southwest Asia–Horn of Africa–East Coast of Africa area, and then possibly a fourth that deals with Southeast Asia. These four centers of excellence could fuse this information together. As I have told Admiral Sanfelice, we have this problem where we do not have good East-West flow. You should be talking to the JIATF East or South. You should be talking to CTF 150 and what they are doing, so we can be passing this information back and forth. For one reason, we think there is a gigantic tie between the cocaine trade and smuggling of small arms, light weapons, and what have you from our particular area and probably involved in some other things. So I would leave you with that thought. This is not novel; it is something that everybody else has touched upon—we are at that point where we have got to make some progress in this area or we cannot move forward with what we are doing right now. Thank you very much.

Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:

Thank you, Admiral. The final introductory piece before we break for thirty minutes will be a view from Africa from Admiral Retief from South Africa. Admiral.

Vice Admiral Retief, South Africa:

Thank you, Admiral Ritchie. Admiral Clark, delegates, good morning. On behalf of my navy, I wish to extend our sincere gratitude for your invitation to attend the International Seapower Symposium. It is indeed a privilege for us, and I wish to thank the presenters for the excellent and illuminating presentations.

Today, I will report to the strategic value of maritime cooperation with a focus on Africa, and the focus will be on sub-Saharan Africa, not on the Mediterranean region. As such, I wish to acknowledge the presence of my colleagues from sub-Saharan Africa. They are Rear Admiral John Gbena from Ghana, Vice Admiral [Samuel] Afolayan from Nigeria, and Major General [P. O.] Awitta from Kenya, taken from west to east.

In the African environment, there is a growing realization that the sea can be used to connect nations and the sea is also our most safe and most neutral route. These realizations are ever still in a very immature and fragile state. For us, the sea has always been there, and we never thought it would be vulnerable or challenged. If you look at a map of sub-Saharan and subequatorial Africa, you will see that most of the internal communications lines are east and west toward the coast.

To explain this situation, I wish to tell you that Africa has been in conflict and subject to violence throughout the twentieth century, mainly due to colonization,
wars of independence, civil wars, the democracies we have established in African style, frustrations in new democracies, lack of infrastructure, various geographic fault lines, food pressures, poverty, overpopulation, and disease. Really, it makes our lives very difficult to manage this organization.

What is important to realize is that the overriding issue in subequatorial Africa is about land and the redistribution thereof, and not yet about the sea. We are only coming to grips now with the importance of the sea and the fact that we have resources there we may have to defend in the future. In the African Union, which is in the second year of existence, we operate in regions. The main regions in the sub-Saharan area are COMESA [the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa] in the east, ECOWAS [the Economic Community of West African States] in the west, and SADC [the Southern African Development Community] in the southern region.

South Africa is a member of the Southern African Development Community. Within SADC, maritime cooperation is facilitated through the existence of a formal standing Maritime Committee, functioning under the auspices of the Interstate Defense and Security Committee. In South Africa also, we have a situation where 95 percent of our economy is based on foreign trade. As such, the country has somewhat of an island economy.

The strategy of the standing Maritime Committee in the region is to focus on the establishment of the following: a formal, regional maritime strategy—and we are working hard on that, but I must tell you that, internally, our democracies are too immature here to have national maritime strategies. So, that is the first aim. We are working on interoperability of our navies. We are looking at a regional center of excellence for naval training in the SADC region, and already up to about seventy-five sailors and officers from African navies are trained with the South African Navy. We are looking at the regional ship repair facility to provide ship repair in the region, a regional search and rescue and disaster management policy, a regional law enforcement at sea policy and agreement, a regional hydrographic agreement, preparation of our extended continental shelf claims, and the establishment of a culture of maintenance and upkeep of our naval assets.

Much has already been achieved through the offices of the Standing Maritime Committee, and this committee is currently chaired by my colleague from Tanzania. The most important issue for us at the moment is the confidence-building that is taking place and being achieved through actions like regional seminars regarding maritime issues, training opportunities offered by various participants, and various multinational exercises. In South Africa, we take part in Exercise ATLASUR with the South American navies from Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina every two years, an annual transoceanic naval ship control exercise, interoperating exercises, East and West, between member states of SADC, and, in fact, we invite members of African navies in our region to attend these exercises as observers if they cannot send assets to participate.

Also, under the recently concluded Mutual Defense Pact in Africa, we are defining our maritime contribution to the African Standby Force. This is being done at the regional basis and is under discussion at the moment. Maritime cooperation in the region is considered a success story, albeit a relatively small one. It is easy for states to engage one another through ship visits, multinational naval exercises, and participation in the future ASF—that is, the African Standby Force.
We have found out a long time ago, you are received with greater friendship when you come by sea than if you come over land with a squadron of tanks. The importance of this story is not yet fully appreciated by our own superiors, nor by the people of Africa; nor is it fully appreciated that events on land will in future be influenced by events originating from the sea. The establishment of the African Union has expanded RSA’s [the Republic of South Africa’s] maritime involvement with, specifically, countries like Ghana, Nigeria, and Gabon, and we wish to extend this even further.

To summarize, the strategic value of maritime cooperation is not yet of great significance in Africa, but the level of maritime cooperation between littoral states is growing and will realistically reach a stage where it can no longer be ignored in our region. This growth is ever currently bedeviled by a lack of resources and ships. In the region, our fleets are aging. It is only South Africa which has an acquisition program for new ships and submarines that is actually delivering in this year and the next two years. There is also a perceived unimportance of maritime affairs, and it is very difficult to focus our people’s minds on the importance of the maritime environment. The growing involvement in peace support operations in African conflicts, specifically under the flag of the African Union, is eating into our resources and is making our life slightly more difficult. As I speak to you today, I have a number of harbor patrol boats deployed in Lake Tanganyika in support of our forces in Burundi. Also an issue that is very important to us is the inequality of our participants in the various endeavors. We are trying to achieve parity and to avoid domination of the group by one or the other of the navies.

To conclude, in the African Union, we have realized that the solution to our conflict lies in our own hands. If we realize our maritime objectives, we will have the mechanisms in place to address the security issues around our ports, our ships, our cargoes, and our crews. This is, however, going to take time; but we have started, and for us, that is very important. We have a clear passage to navigate. I thank you for allowing me to address you, and I assure you that we support the outcome of this symposium. Thank you very much indeed, delegates.

**Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:**

Thank you. Could we now break and please be seated ready to resume at 10:15. Thank you.

**Break**

**Vice Admiral Ritchie:**

During the break, Vice Admiral Waranon from Thailand, who is a delegate here, tells me that he was a graduate of the Naval War College and that this particular auditorium is referred to by the students as “the blue bedroom.” So I would ask you all to stay awake for the next hour and fifteen minutes, if you can. The next speaker is Vice Admiral Godoy from Argentina. He is going to speak in Spanish, so I would ask you to put your ears [i.e., headphones] on. He is going to talk about the issue from a Latin American perspective.
Vice Admiral Godoy, Argentina:

Thank you. [Translation.] Good day and many thanks to Admiral Clark and Rear Admiral Ronald Route for the invitation to participate in this symposium on themes which are of great interest to Argentina. Thank you.

In recent years, the international security agenda has undergone significant changes. Threats to security no longer result exclusively from conflicts between states, but they also stem from intrastate conflicts and from the interrelationship between nonstate actors (such as individuals, nongovernmental organizations, communities, etc.) and their own states or other states.

Between 1992 and 1994, the Argentine Republic, my country, suffered two terrorist attacks: one against the embassy of Israel and the other against a benefit society of the Jewish community. Hundreds of innocent people were killed in the attacks. Less than a decade later, on September 11, 2001, the international community was shocked by the attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, which showed unprecedented criminality and violence.

The whole world was overwhelmed by a feeling of defenselessness, and we all became fully aware that vulnerabilities make no distinction between borders and actors. A lesson was learned: within this new security framework, events in the “periphery” are as important as those taking place in central countries and can often be the prelude to more serious problems.

These and other brutal acts were the triggering factors for a redefinition of security paradigms and for the search of new ways to achieve security. On the occasion of the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council states that

[It] notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly material, and in the regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub regional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen the response to this serious challenge and threat to international security.

The sea—a favorable ground for the development of new threats. The sea—an irreplaceable route for worldwide communication, shipping, and free navigation—is today a favorable environment for a wide range of illegal acts against people and goods. Therefore, it is important to become fully aware of the vulnerability of the maritime environment, a potential target for the action of criminal organizations. In this regard, measures adopted within the framework of the International Maritime Organization reflect the concern of the maritime community over issues such as maritime security and environmental protection, the fight against illegal acts, and, recently, the possibility that nonnaval ships [may] be engaged in terrorist attacks. In view of this situation, states are looking for the necessary mechanisms and consensus to give global responses to the new challenges faced by humanity. An example, among others, is the International Ships and Port Facility Security Code, which has been drafted within the framework of the IMO and will soon become effective. Yet the magnitude and dynamics of this new scourge and the size of
the scenario involved call for a continued, thorough effort in search of innovative measures to enhance international maritime security.

### Strategic Value of Maritime Cooperation

To counter these threats, it is necessary to take at least two essential actions: to exercise an increasingly more precise sea control, at all times and in all places, and to be able to protect every ship sailing along. It should be noted that, in our view, the concept of sea control is broader than that traditionally understood in tactical terms. In our proposal, this concept involves close maritime surveillance and permanent presence. Therefore, it becomes necessary to keep an updated record of all ship movements across the seas, which becomes a difficult task as ships frequently change owners, names, flags, and courses, and navigate freely on the high seas. It is even more difficult to control their crews, cargoes, and passengers, given the possibility that members of criminal organizations may infiltrate the regular crews of merchant ships. If we take into account the space occupied by the sea on the planet, we realize that these tasks are so significant that no state by itself can perform them as efficiently and as effectively as required.

It is precisely in these vast maritime spaces that navies should be able to interoperate, even far from their own territory, by projecting their forces and implementing the in-depth defense concept, in order to somehow prevent these new threats from affecting coastal areas and causing important damages.

To that end, a close cooperation should be achieved between all navies, with a view to establishing procedures to attain greater efficiency in terms of sea control, as defined before. These control measures, and protection measures if so required, could be initially implemented in each region, on a coordinated basis, taking into account the geographical features and special characteristics of the states involved.

Two examples will help me illustrate how this cooperation can be achieved: on the one hand, the agreement recently signed between the Chilean Navy and the Argentine Navy regarding the exchange of information for the monitoring of ships carrying dangerous goods in transit through our region; and on the other hand, the Combined Naval Antarctic Patrol effort conducted in the southernmost part of the American continent and Antarctica. Another example, at subregional level, in the southwestern Atlantic, is the organization known as Coordinator Atlantic Maritime Area, South [CAMAS], which operates on a permanent basis. The CAMAS is integrated by Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina and is designed to monitor and protect maritime shipping for the defense of its area of responsibility. It has a command and control system to provide an updated picture of shipping within its area of influence and, at the same time, to keep all members informed of any contingency. It is worth noting that this is not a closed system; on the contrary, it gets feedback from other countries as a result of bilateral agreements.

To counter the new threats effectively, it is undoubtedly necessary to develop a high degree of interaction at the political, operational, and technological levels. Leaving the political aspect aside, this model of response is based on the concepts of information superiority, shared awareness, adaptability, and speed of command. All these features require common command and control doctrine and procedures, as well as a common representation of the environment to help navies operate on a
coordinated basis. In addition to the above, much greater efficiency will be required to coordinate work and cooperation between the different national organizations and/or agencies. In this respect, the Argentine Navy fully interacts with the Prefectura Naval Argentina [Argentine Coast Guard], a force whose mission is to ensure security of navigation and enforce the law in waters within national jurisdiction.

Thoughts and Recommendations

As we have stated before, the threats to security that are faced by humanity today are multidimensional and involve all states. For this reason, we should think of countering them through a cooperative security system aimed at joining efforts and devising common strategies. In this sense, the efficient operation of such a system requires a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance system to provide an adequate and timely answer through a fluent exchange of information. This could be implemented by maritime patrols designed to detect illegal activities, in coordination with neighboring countries and with countries flying the same flag as the ships in transit. In extreme cases, we might think of conducting maritime escorting to protect merchant shipping in the more conflicting or vulnerable areas.

We must also consider the possibility of signing agreements to facilitate both escorting and maritime interdiction operations beyond the territorial sea, when appropriate, adjusting the legislation in force to this end. On account of the importance and complexity of these practices, it will be necessary to obtain the approval of the highest political authorities in the countries involved. In short, the strategic value of international maritime cooperation emerges from the crucial contribution this cooperation can make to international security.

Therefore, according to what I have just expressed and regardless of the way other international forums may tackle this problem, I propose:

At a Political Level:

1. To advise our governments on the need to devise tools and mechanisms for cooperation at national, subregional, regional, and international levels which will allow us to adjust responses to these new threats to international maritime protection and, if necessary, continue working on the development of new international legal regulations. In this respect, we propose to direct our efforts, for example, on the revision of the International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (known as the Rome Convention, 1988). Likewise, we intend to continue advancing in the measures adopted during the International Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Protection, held within the framework of the International Maritime Organization in December 2002.

2. To put forward, at the relevant political levels, the need to promote cooperation between states for a rapid implementation of measures contributing to effective compliance of current international rules with a view to enhancing the maritime security level.
At an Operational Level:

As of the implementation of the International Ships and Port Facility Security Code [ISPS Code], the system should be in a position to provide safe ports; thus, concern should merely focus on the transit of shipping. This poses the need of:

1. Developing an organizational, doctrinal, and procedural structure for sea control and shipping protection between the navies. This structure should initially contemplate the monitoring of movements and the exchange of information through a “network of networks” based on regional flexible and autonomous organizations. In support of this effort, we propose to continue advancing in the implementation of a long-range Automatic Identification System [AIS] within the framework of the SOLAS Convention. This system would enable control stations to automatically receive all information on shipping identification, position, course, and speed of vessels navigating in their area of responsibility, which could be supplemented with additional relevant data.

2. Considering, as a next step, the future implementation of effective control and protection measures by means of a combined naval power, since the above-mentioned efforts would not suffice to counter the potential threat to shipping in transit.

At a Technological Level:

The development of this system requires that navies and other governmental agencies:

1. Be in a position to share information in real time
2. Gain a common awareness of the scenario
3. Use a common technical and tactical language, previously agreed upon
4. Profit from an updated and compatible technology, to be transferred from the more advanced navies to the less advanced navies, thus reducing the existing technological gap.

Final Thoughts

The first requirement to achieve a suitable solution is the resolve of our governments to work with all countries on a coordinated basis. In this respect, the president of the Argentine Republic, Dr. Nestor Kirchner, has recently stated in the speech delivered on the occasion of the Fifty-Eighth United Nations Assembly that “the vulnerability of all countries in the International Community in the face of this scourge—international terrorism—can only diminish through an intelligent, concerted and multilateral action sustained over the time.”

These criminal acts against humanity have a perverse nature and jeopardize the peace, prosperity, and security of our peoples. For these reasons, our contribution in terms of naval power will consist in advising and cooperating with the political leadership, by trying to anticipate potential events and by getting ready to counter them effectively. We have sufficient evidence to think that such events might take
place unless the appropriate measures are taken. In this critical situation, mistakes can be forgiven, but lack of foresight is inadmissible.

Admiral Krzyżewski, Poland:

Admiral Clark, first of all, I would like to heartily thank you for your invitation and to congratulate you for your new appointment. In the next few minutes, I would like to present, admirals and gentlemen, the Polish point of view on North Atlantic maritime cooperation.

When, over 10 years ago, with much enthusiasm, we celebrated the end of the Cold War, for a very short period of time it seemed we were entering a new peaceful era with no wars and no tensions. Unfortunately, the changes brought about with Poland’s significant participation did not bring common peace—the world is undoubtedly more secure, but, unfortunately, less safe.

The Cold War was replaced by a growing number of local conflicts and terrorism. Today, when our country’s security is to rely on the North Atlantic alliance and the united Europe, supporting joined international efforts aimed at a safe Europe and world and protection of basic human values is the means for ensuring the country’s safety and development.

In the simple bipolar world of global competition between the East and the West, matters of security came down to maintaining a balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Today the situation is much more complex.

The change of international security conditions significantly influences also the view on matters of maritime policy and security. It generates new tasks for the navies of all the NATO countries. After years of preparations for a global clash and of quiet nuclear rivalry in the deeps, naval forces have slowly returned to their typical tasks in their territorial areas. The role of the Atlantic as the link of life between Europe and the United States is still vital. On the other hand, the scope of tasks is also extended to include crisis response and participation in active peace support operations.

Although there is no direct threat from our neighbors, as stated in the National Security Strategy signed by the president of Poland, we pay much attention to tasks conducted in the frame of the alliance collective defense. We also see the necessity of participation in operations aiming at prevention of ignition and spreading of local conflicts. The Polish Navy forces are, therefore, prepared to operate with the alliance stabilization and prevention forces.

An important field for changes in the Polish Navy is adaptation to so-called asymmetric warfare. We are aware that, as an active participant of peace operations, we are under a threat of attack by armed groups of radicals and fanatics. This is a new type of threat for us.

Our soon membership in the European Union forces us to tighten our national borders, and that means, also, the sea border. That type of activities is in the area of responsibility of other national services [Border Guard]. Nonetheless, the Polish Navy must be prepared to support them, especially in the face of the probability of increase of illegal immigration.

Being fully aware of the strategic value of maritime cooperation, which is a vital factor of stability and peace, Poland is an active participant in the NATO enlargement process. As a young member of the alliance and a country of still-developing
democracy, we are well aware of the problems that such transformations create. Our understanding of the matter helps us greatly in those efforts.

We estimate that, at present, there is no real, direct threat to security and peace in northern and central Europe. The stability is a result of the balance of powers. Two fundamental tasks arise from that:

- Preparation of the Polish Navy command structure and forces to participate in an allied joint operation
- The Polish Navy’s logistics readiness to conduct HNS [host nation support] tasks for allied forces operating near our coast.

The first test of our readiness to conduct HNS tasks was last year’s STRONG RESOLVE exercise [Figure 3]. The STRONG RESOLVE international exercise conducted last year gave us an opportunity to verify in practice our HNS procedures, according to the new NATO concept. During the exercise, 44 foreign vessels from 15 countries visited our ports and bases. The scope of the logistic activities may be described, for example, by the quantities of supplied fuel (over 5,100 tons), fresh water (550 tons), or received waste water (over 800 tons).

![Figure 3. Host Nation Support Experience](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPLY ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FUEL</td>
<td>5135 TON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRESH WATER</td>
<td>550 m³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEWAGE RECEPTION</td>
<td>650 m³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILGE WATER RECEPTION</td>
<td>172 m³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRASH RECEPTION</td>
<td>645 m³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORT’S PILOTS</td>
<td>24 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUGS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMS SERVICES, FOOD</td>
<td>for 28 vessels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the age of threats of terrorist attacks, smuggling of materials forbidden by international law, and illegal immigration by sea, a constant control of shipping in international waters and a capability of immediate reaction and terror-at-sea counteraction are a necessity [Figure 4]. Another possible threat to shipping may be
caused by mines secretly laid in the sea routes and in harbor basins. With simple and cheap means, not only a loss of sunk or damaged ships may be suffered, but an even greater shortfall may be caused by suspension of shipping, import difficulties, or increase of transport and insurance fees for the ship owners.

Nothing, though, may replace a quick detection of threat symptoms and a rapid, decisive counteraction. Hence the stress must be put on correct threat evaluation and on constant, effective, and secret monitoring of the situation at sea.

For that reason, close cooperation between all Baltic countries must be undertaken. A subject to which we pay the most attention today is the preparation of Polish Navy forces to participate in allied crisis-reaction operations (peacekeeping and peace enforcement). We fully support the initiative of creating the SON, a force continuously ready to initiate an allied crisis response operation.

The history of Polish ships’ participation in allied operations since the Second World War began in 1992, when two of our ships participated in the DESERT STORM operation. We also took part in ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Here I would like to direct my thanks to the commanders of German and Australian navies for the cordiality and help received by the crew of our ship, especially in the area of communication.

The IRAQI FREEDOM operation was also our first experience with so-called asymmetric warfare. The experience is especially valuable now, when we are improving our force protection procedures, which are so important in the age of unconventional threats. Our forces’ participation in multinational, allied operations and
training exercises is strictly bound to the matter of ongoing integration of the Polish Navy with NATO.

Training has for a few years included also the knowledge of the NATO command and communication procedures and lately the force protection matters, based on recent experiences of participation in allied operations. I would like to stress the good experience garnered from Partnership-for-Peace-like exercises like Baltic Operation COOPERATIVE JAGUAR and COOPERATIVE VENTURE.

The factor that allows for successful training and a possibility of cooperation at sea is the knowledge of English [Figure 5]. We can notice that we have bigger successes in language training with officers. Therefore, more effort is put today into the language training of petty officers and sailors.

**Figure 5. Language Skills Increase**

![Submarine squadron example graph](image)

Poland is and wants to be an active and reliable member of the North Atlantic alliance and the future structures of collective European security. We move from the role of a “receiver” of the international safety to the role of a “giver.” That results in set tasks for the Polish Navy:

- We prepare for crisis reaction within joint allied operations.
- We prepare for threats of asymmetric warfare.
- We create forces capable of immediate response to appearing threats to international safety.

Those are our most important tasks today.
Trying to foresee the future and especially future threats is very difficult. One thing is sure: in the period of time equal to half of a typical ship’s life, the tasks she would have been built for will be outdated.

- It is necessary, then, to build universal vessels which will be able to meet the challenges of tomorrow.
- Navy must be balanced; equilibrium between all of its components is necessary.

Thank you for your attention.

**Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:**

As the final introductory person of this panel discussion on the Strategic Value of Maritime Cooperation, I have been asked to focus on the Arabian Sea. As the last of eight panel speakers in this particular symposium, I sort of have a feeling that most of the thunder has already been stolen, but nevertheless, we will press on.

The three key strategic tasks of maritime forces, in any type of operation, might be summarized as follows:

- To ensure the safety of global seaborne communications (and that is largely what we have been talking about for a day and a bit)
- To enable the projection of power
- To actually project power from the sea

Maritime cooperation is vital to all of those three tasks, and its utility has been demonstrated throughout the twelve-year campaign to bring Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions. In the wider context of the War on Terrorism since September 2001, much of that work has taken place in the Arabian Sea and the Arabian Gulf. To us in the Royal Australian Navy, operations in the Arabian Gulf during **IRAQI FREEDOM** were, in many ways, the climax of those many years of commitment to coalition operations. Over that time, my navy gained expertise in conducting boarding operations and tactical command of the Maritime Interception Force. We also developed an in-depth understanding of the littoral environment. In any war in that region, the skills and environmental knowledge of the Maritime Interception Force had to be exploited to the greatest advantage, to exercise sea control out of the North Arabian Gulf and, in particular, the Khor abd Allah (KAA) approaches.

Within the Arabian Gulf, unremitting surveillance and patrol efforts by multinational forces enforcing UN sanctions and no-fly zones ensured that the Gulf was locked down in 2003. No enemy craft were able to pose a threat to the force, and no mines were laid. Compared with the difficulties of the mine threat imposed upon us in 1991, this was a major hidden victory to the coalition forces and the result of the arduous multinational effort over more than a decade. The success of the operations to counter the Iraqi mine threat lay in the fact that the force had maintained a sustained presence inside Iraqi territorial waters. This presence forced them to take elaborate and, ultimately, futile steps to disguise minelaying operations. Prior to the war, multinational staff were attuned to Iraqi traffic patterns and, therefore,
suspicious of any changes to them. The maintenance of the regular flow of shipping into the KAA also served to counter minelaying by denying any chance to mine the waterway before the conflict began.

Equally important was maintaining the integrity of the KAA once it was confirmed to be clear of mines. Riverine patrols were instituted and undertaken by the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as by international boat teams from eleven coalition ships. Many of those who led boat teams were placed in an Australian ship, the *Kanimbla* [L-51], or in the Polish Navy support ship *Czernicki* [Pennant No. 511]. Prior to that effort, doctrinal and procedural work had been undertaken to ensure that riverine operations were conducted safely and efficiently, and all of those achievements by naval forces had a significant strategic impact. The failure of any one of those missions could have significantly changed the course of events, underpinning all of those achievements with a strong and abiding ethos of maritime cooperation.

Maritime cooperation has many facets. Unlike armies and air forces, navies have a long tradition of operating with each other and smoothly feeding into a multinational command chain. Individual ships are comfortable with quickly forming into a task group and with getting on with the mission at hand.

Of course, for any navy and every navy, I suppose, there are particular other allies, other allied navies that that navy is used to operating with, and that allows the levels of interoperability to be significantly enhanced. But since the end of the Cold War, and more particularly since September 11th, we have seen the growth of non-traditional coalition task groups. The force in the northern Arabian Gulf was a good example of that. The U.S. Navy, the British Royal Navy, have, with others, been long-term participants with the Royal Australian Navy, alternating tactical command of that coalition task group in recent years. But the ease with which U.S. Coast Guard ships fitted in, the ease with which the Polish ship *Czernicki* fitted in and contributed so effectively, was indeed impressive.

The long-standing commitments to operations in the Gulf, particularly sanction enforcement, have achieved remarkable interoperability. To give one particular example from earlier this year, boarding parties from one navy, if required, operated from a ship of another navy, and in many cases using a boat from a third navy. The effect of that seamless interoperability was to provide a much more flexible course for the expanded capacity. Importantly, this very close level of interoperability included virtually all units being on a coalition-wide area network to allow chats via the command and control medium.

For the boat operations, the common secure communications network was achieved, and robust recognition signals and procedures were developed to prevent these boats from becoming victims of fratricide. From a logistic perspective, the force also charted new ground. Logistic support of U.S. Coast Guard ships was provided on an improvised basis by the Australian command ship *Kanimbla*, and that was quite successful. Equally important was the invaluable support that the Polish support ship *Czernicki* provided, bringing forward replacement boats and stores as required.

Those achievements were, in part, the result of very close cooperation between task units and task group command staff. Those staff were invariably multinational in composition, and they possessed good interstaff working relationships. As a
bonus, they possessed excellent corporate memory of that long-running operation, and that has overtones, I think, of the MDA that Admiral Collins talks about.

To go back to the three strategic tasks, what can we take from a multilateral cooperation in the Gulf? Firstly, to the task of ensuring the safety of global seaborne communication, it has been said many times in the last thirty-six hours here, but the War on Terror has thrown into focus the vulnerability of the worldwide network of shipping from terrorist action. Many multinational efforts, we have heard, are in trying to protect ports, checkpoints, and shipping lanes, and these are dependent upon a high and increasing degree of international cooperation. Much is nonmilitary, but a significant component requires naval support. Our mutual dependence on seaborne communications means that such efforts are likely to increase in the future.

On enabling the projection of power, both Iraq wars, in 1991 and 2003, were maritime-enabled conflicts. Truly multinational efforts, land forces were inserted, sustained, and supported from the sea. Maritime cooperation protected shipping and kept sea lanes clear for strategic lift, flowing and uninterrupted. The 2003 conflict operated under greater terrorist threat than that of 1991 and, hence, extensive multinational patrols in other parts of the world: in the Straits of Gibraltar, as we heard; in the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, and in the Malacca Straits.

On projecting power from the sea, both conflicts and Afghanistan have demonstrated the utility of the ability to project power from the sea, and sometimes in ways that have not always been predicted by strategic thinkers. Multinational forces projected air and land power from fixed-wing carriers and amphibious forces and, in the case of Afghanistan, against a wholly land-locked country. Other multinational forces closed off escape routes in South Asia, across the Arabian Sea. Surface ships provided essential fire support into southern Iraq.

What of the future? Continuing dependence of the global community on the maritime environment means that that environment will become a target of choice for those who wish to disrupt world order. In the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, the navies involved drew on their traditional strengths, the cooperation, flexibility, and the willingness of commanders to delegate to the appropriate commanding officers, irrespective of which navy they were in. It is clear to me that ships’ companies revel in the multinational environment and in sharing a mission focus. Given the scope, they can identify the measures required to refine their doctrine and their procedures to achieve the mission. Cooperative efforts exploit the capabilities of each nation involved. They allow navies to play to their strengths. The maritime environment is one particularly suitable to smaller nations to make meaningful contributions to collective efforts within limited resources. Cooperation also increases the likelihood that nothing will be missed. Different countries look at problems in different ways. Against the hidden and changing threat, such as terrorism, this diversity will become increasingly important in involving effective strategic responses and effective preventative measures.

In part because of our experiences in the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, we now understand that cooperative activities across the spectrum of conflict and the range of maritime operations have significant parts to play in achieving the secure environment that we all seek. Much of this activity is unglamorous, and much of it is unseen, but it is vital nonetheless. Maritime forces must be flexible, adaptable, and
versatile, and so must be the international cooperation in which they engage. We must expect—and, indeed, we must look for—new opportunities to utilize maritime power for collective strategic ends.

Thank you.

Discussion

Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:

Right, we have finally got to the bit you are all waiting for, which is where we ask you questions, and the first one we would like to ask you is—no, we won’t! Who has a question?

Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:

Perhaps not a question, an observation; I would like to build on the point that Admiral Collins has raised so well, both yesterday and today, with respect to a domain awareness—with, perhaps, a reflection, and that is simply that here we have been greatly focused on the need to share information between nations and build very effectively a picture which can work internationally. But I think, frankly, one of the greatest challenges for nations with extensive coastlines and maritime areas lies internally. Admiral Collins, both you and CNO yesterday talked about cooperation between USN and the Coast Guard. I think that there are frequently tendencies for navies to think that use of resources must necessarily claim ownership of those resources—lots of opportunity there for cooperation between government agencies. If I could simply close by observing that what we have done in Canada, over the last several years, is to put the navy as the focus and as, perhaps, the agency that is best placed to manage information. We have pulled in information from fisheries, from the other government departments; we fuse the picture together, and then we disseminate that, both internationally, with yourselves, of course, with the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy, and to the agencies at home. It is an important step. It is one that does not require a vast expenditure of resource, and it is one that I heartily encourage all the nations here to look at closely, as part of this overall picture.

Admiral Collins, United States:

I could not agree with you more. Again, it is leveraging all our respective competencies and resources, in terms of national and regional interest, and we do not particularly care who owns it. It is to put together a system that gives you good performance at the end of the day, and I think that has clearly been the approach between the coast guard and the navy in the United States. If you look at the various partnerships we have formed, whether it is a joint collaborative collocation of our intel establishment or leveraging our respective competencies, it is nonredundant but complementary competencies that you put together. One plus one equals four, frequently. The fact is that we are leveraging all our competencies for the counterdrug war. We have got a Department of Defense command in Key West; it has a coast guard flag officer; it has civil law enforcement agencies; it has liaisons from countries around the Caribbean and beyond; and you are leveraging all that capability. If you look at a force lay-down, for example, of the counterdrug [operations] today, you will see probably ten or eleven ships, about 40 percent of which are
gray hull, about 35 percent or 40 percent are coast guard. You will likely see a Dutch and a Belgian and a French and a British ship, a British oiler with fused information out of JIATF West, where you can put metal on target. So you have got effective, efficient intel; you have got a cooperative, using all the respective capabilities of our services together. In the case of the U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard, we have put coast guard boarding teams on navy ships in that particular mission, because—why? They are not duplicative, but they are complementary. They have the law enforcement capability you need to do the search and the arrest and the seizure and whatever. Together, they make a very powerful package. And that is just one example. There are numerous others where that type of maritime cooperation yields incredible performance; and, again, to cite that specific mission—counterdrugs—we have less resources today, in terms of ship days, MPA hours, and so forth, than we did pre-9/11. Yet, because of the effective partnerships and the leveraging of our respective competencies in fused intelligence, we are getting more output from the system. We were close to breaking a record last year with less resources, and the reasons were international partnerships, great use of technology, fused information, and leveraging everyone's competency. So, a long-winded answer, but I obviously could not agree more with your observation.

Admiral Johnson, United States:

Just to carry on with that theme, we are not maybe as well organized in the Mediterranean theater as the JIATF South example, but I would submit that certainly with the effort that we have made in force protection over the last two or three years with our allies—I am speaking now, nationally, of when we send a Sixth Fleet ship in: incredible cooperation with those host nations that allow us to do port visits. I am speaking, going from west to east, of Portugal, Spain, obviously France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey; our STROG [STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR] Operations that have begun last February, thanks again to the leadership of Spain. But that operation is not just the navies; it involves the Spanish radar system that is now an excellent system in the STROG, and several internal organizations within Spain. Greece and Turkey in Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR are working very closely with their coast guards, inside their territorial seas. That information is fed to Admiral Sanfelice’s staff to help us build a coherent, recognized maritime picture. So we are sort of in the nascent stages of working through this, but it is no longer a navy stovepipe; it is growing and gathering steam. And I think we are going to have a much more coherent picture, and we need to jump on this opportunity now, to build a JIATF South-like capability within our region.

Admiral Doran, United States:

My question is for Admiral Furusho. Admiral, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on that wonderful presentation, given in such excellent English. It was terrific; very nicely done. My question, sir, is, in the recent PACIFIC PROTECTOR exercise that was hosted by Australia, Japanese participation was solely by the Japanese Coast Guard. Do you foresee a time in the near future where the JMSDF would have a role to play in such an exercise or in such a real-world operation?
Admiral Furusho, Japan: [Translation.]  
Thank you for your praising us; I am going to answer in Japanese. To answer Admiral Doran’s question, while Japan’s Coast Guard [JCG] participated in the PSI [Proliferation Security Initiative] exercise, we, the JMSDF, also made our members join it as observers. On the subject to participate in the exercise by our ship and/or P-3C, of course we just are talking with our government with the aim of participation in it. Therefore, we are negotiating with our government that we can participate in the exercise next year with our ships and/or aircraft, instead of being mere observers, if possible.

Additionally, I mention about the problem being for some time. The coast guards of each nation had been invited to the symposium, and their top men have been participating. Vice Admiral Yokoyama, JCG, had intended to participate in this symposium equally, but I hear that he cannot participate due to his urgent business, unfortunately.

On the WPNS level, [as] I presented a little while ago, I wish to lead to the direction that each coast guard in the regional Asian area will participate in the WPNS together from now [on], as well as having some coast guards participate in this symposium.

Vice Admiral Feldt, Germany:  
The question to you, Admiral Collins, again: I think you described a very complex, centralized organization, and my question is, how can you ensure that, in this organization, there is a transformation from data to information to knowledge, and then bring this knowledge back to the decision makers? How can you ensure this? I think it is a real challenge, and if you can elaborate a little bit about that, that would be very fine.

I have a second question for the panel. We talked a lot about, and I think we confirmed a lot about, what we have to do and what our challenges and tasks will be. My question to the panel is, have you thought about a strategy to convince our society that what we are talking about here in this symposium is something which is their topic as well? So this awareness, which you are always asking for—I think we have to include our societies in developing this awareness as well, and I would be very much interested if some of the regions and areas have thought about a possible campaign in respect to this.

Admiral Collins, United States:  
Clearly, the challenge of Maritime Domain Awareness is to take information, fuse information, and make it relevant and actionable and meaningful so that you can take our respective scarce resources and put them on target to get the biggest return. That is clearly a quality approach, and I don’t think you put your eggs all in one basket; I think it is a multilateral type of approach. You try to have the best combination of structure, organization, policy, doctrine, technology, sensors, coordinated databases, that you can mine data and push-pull architecture from various databases across the government. We, also as I mentioned, are trying to consider it on the tactical level as well as the strategic level—but, on the tactical level, building field intelligence support teams, as I mentioned, like the one in Boston or New York. For example, you will see the national guard in there; you will see the police
department, the state police, the Customs, the Immigration, Coast Guard, and so forth. We are trying to fuse information in a tactical level and say, “Where do we put our boarding teams today? Where is the highest risk today in this port, in terms of allocating our resources?” That is actionable knowledge—if it is well informed. That is at the tactical level, and I think it is working and building quite well. At the strategic level, across the government, that is also another level at which to generate information and awareness for policy decision making, budget-priority decision making, and a host of other things. I think the creation of, in our case, the Department of Homeland Security is an integrating, structural organization move that will help us manage information and turn it into knowledge better. One of the major elements within the new department has a complicated title, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. It is an undersecretariat, direct-report to the department, incidentally led by a retired three-star marine, that is the collector and repository of information products from CIA, FBI, Defense, and others, fusing that information and turning that into knowledge for the president, the secretary, and others. They have to take action [on questions] like, “What is the security condition today that we are going to set, across the country or in a particular port?” And it has got to be based on the best information at the time. So we are trying to develop an interagency architecture, interagency system, that push-pulls information, and it is hard. It is hard work, because there are a lot of people with their fingers in the pie. We have created the Department of Homeland Security, but that is not all the security agencies in our government. So it is a challenge, but I think those are some of the key approaches.

_Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:_

Admiral, can I ask you if you have a public affairs strategy to explain what it is that you are doing of significant change?

_Admiral Collins, United States:_

Clearly, part of the information is disseminated to the private sector, for example, and so, through this, our new department is sort of a clearinghouse for information, which will be this new undersecretariat that I mentioned. In terms of distribution of information to the private sector, if we want facility X in port Y to have a good security protocol and to implement certain security provisions, it has to have awareness, too, and we have to distribute information. So, the security information that is distributed is through an evolving [organization]. We have only been a department since 1 March [2003], but involving architecture which distributes threat information through the country. In terms of just general awareness on homeland security issues and strategy—that type of thing—there is a form of public affairs dimension to Secretary Ridge’s department. They are very actively involved in communicating strategies, approaches, precautions, and the like.

_Admiral Johnson, United States:_

To your second question, Admiral Feldt, I think that part of the burden rests on our shoulders, and that each one of us, in our own way, has to get out on what we call “the rubber-chicken circuit.” You have got to get out there and talk to the people: every forum that you can find where you can bring the message. We have the saying
in the United States about all politics is local and all local politics has to do with jobs. As Admiral Clark and most of our speakers have alluded to, in globalization, most of the growth in our economies has to do with that part of it that has to do with exports and imports and the future well-being of all of our citizens. The extent that they have economic well-being is very much based on the fact that we have to have a stable, secure maritime environment. Somehow, we are having difficulty connecting the dots, and, more importantly, having difficulty having our respective societies connect the dots, on just how interrelated this is and that their well-being is inextricably linked to this. I do think that we can do better; we must do better. It is also part of educating our politicians so that they can carry this mantle for us. I do think it is a problem, though, in the world that we live in, i.e., in Europe. It is a particular challenge that we have got to all work on collectively.

Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:

Just on that second question, in Australia, the issue of explaining the PSI exercise in the Coral Sea [Proliferation Security Initiative]: A lot of effort was put into explaining to the public why that was happening, and then a lot of effort was put into covering it, from a press point of view. I think that it came out reasonably well. So you just have to keep working at it. But as I said earlier, I think much of the things that we are talking about are unseen, unsung. That is the business of navies: to make sure that the people who have the dollars understand what you are doing so that you get the resources.

Admiral Band, United Kingdom:

I think, if we are honest, we are not winning this battle at all. The force structure challenge to practically every navy I know is explaining why, after we have solved the ASW [antisubmarine warfare] problem, we need to keep escorts, MPAs, and everything. These are exactly the units that we need to engage the ocean element of this campaign we have been talking about, and I think that every navy here is under pressure in those areas. While we can be smarter in net-centric and intelligence-led operations, in the end looking after high seas is a heavy activity, I think for some time, and I think we have got a serious problem in practically every navy now, getting at that lower end of the force structure. You know, it is very easy to argue for an OPV; it is a lot less easy to argue for a multicapability escort which can do this but then also can do some serious force projection and power projection. So I think we have got a long way to go. I thought the comment by Admiral Retief about the land-centric view in Africa [can be extended]. But rest assured, I think the land-centric view is alive and well, all over the place.

Admiral Angel Tafalla Balduz, Spain:

It is not a question, it is something that I would like to share with you and get some reaction. In the second LIVEX exercise on antiproliferation on BSI, we established what we thought was a challenging scenario, and we struggled to have political consultation for the missions, and said we should have an exercise on rules of engagement, and how this would follow, and if this was too much for the nation. The nation had objections to the framework that we established. One could accommodate this, because we changed the framework. We redrew the active participation in
the exercise. So what we have learned is, that was an exercise with a selected group of nations that believe in antiproliferation; if we are going to do that for real, we need to establish a robust political consultation—without that, the mission will fail. It is not the problem for navies to cooperate together; this is a piece of cake. But, at least for the NATO environment, it is the consultation, the agreement on the mission, the intricacies, that need to be established. This is what we learn from these exercises, and we anticipate this problem could happen in real life, too.

Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:

I agree with you. I think that unless there is political agreement as to what we are setting out to achieve, then we are not going to achieve it; and I think that that issue, really, was brought up yesterday. I think that Vice Admiral Klaver was moving toward that explanation when he was talking about ROE. But would anybody else wish to comment?

Admiral Furusho, Japan:

In answer to the German admiral’s question, if there is any other topic for the symposium: We have kept very good cooperation with each nation’s navy. Actually, we have had good operations with ten nations’ navies in the Arabian Sea, successfully. However, we hardly had trained with the JCG domestically. Since three years ago, when the spy ship case occurred, the Japanese general public came to pay attention [to the fact] that JMSDF can scarcely operate with the JCG, though it has kept a good interoperability with USN. Accordingly, we regard the two matters as important. One is how we share information between JMSDF and JCG. The other is the training on how we do the initial cooperation. For the purpose of the two important matters, we have shown the Japanese people the participation of each of our ships and aircraft with each other’s during the fleet reviews that have been held splendidly every year. Additionally, we show the people our presence on how JMSDF and JCG deal with terrorism, drug peddling, and so on, by providing the media the training scene conducted on the regional level. I conclude that we have to begin them from familiar options so that we share limited budget and manpower.

Admiral Godoy, Argentina:

I am going to speak in Spanish. [Translation.] I will speak in Spanish. More than a question, I want to make a reflection. Here this morning we have talked about the strategic importance of maritime cooperation between our respective fleets of our forces. It appears to me that a fundamental aspect in order to implement that cooperation is that we understand each other a little more. This is the important part of this cordial gathering here in Newport.

In the sense of one from a South American country, I have the impression that at times the more developed powers see the regions [of Latin America] too compactly, as a single bloc with overly homogeneous interests. I want to implant [the idea] that in the particular case of South America we have much in common, but we also have different realities: There is a CONOSUR reality, there is an Atlantic reality, a Pacific reality, and a Caribbean reality. Therefore, to speak of a Latin American reality is not easy. In this sense, the more we understand these realities, the easier will be the cooperation and the buildup of forces that share interests.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:

I make no claim to being a superpower, so I will pass it over to Admiral Johnson to answer.

Admiral Johnson, United States:

Thank you very much, Admiral Ritchie; I very much appreciate that. Admiral, I share your sentiment, and there sometimes is a tendency to take a broad brush at things and not understand these different nuances of what goes on inside the larger region. I cannot speak so much to the Southern Hemisphere, although in my time in Atlantic Fleet I began to gain some appreciation for that, and I share your concern and your suggestions. I see it much more now in the context of, say, the Mediterranean, since I have lived there now for some three years and been operating there and spent most of my life operating with the Sixth Fleet. There is the NATO part of it; there is the Levant; there is the Magreb; there is the Black Sea. There is an incredible amount of texture, and we would do well to understand that and to be able to leverage it to a maximum benefit, rather than just speaking of the Mediterranean or just speaking of the Southern Hemisphere or just speaking of Southeast Asia. We do have to do a better job of that. I do agree with you that getting together like this is the most important thing that we can do, and I think that we need to continue it in this ISS context, which is the entire global perspective. But I think we would be well served if we continue to build on the wonderful regional sea power symposia—we call it the RSS—that is hosted by our Italian colleagues now, on the odd year. I think that there is something with the Asian navies as well, and I am not so sure of exactly what the comparable organization would be for Western Hemisphere or Latin American navies, but I think we need to do that. This could be the capstone, and then we [could] have a series in the off years, a series of regional sea power symposia to build a better understanding in this world.

Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:

I think it is time now to bring it to a close. Could I personally thank everybody for their contribution to the discussion this morning.
Luncheon Address:
Maritime Power for the Twenty-First Century

The Honorable Gordon England
U.S. Secretary of the Navy

Admiral Clark, United States:

For all of you who so enjoyed yesterday and the rainy day that we had, we decided we would try to change the venue here for us a little bit today. And I want to thank all the people here from the officers’ club and how they have helped us make these events the last two days work here. If you would just join me in a round of applause for the folks here.

It is my distinct privilege to introduce our luncheon speaker to you today. The year was 2001. We had an election late in the year 2000, and the new administration was pulling the executives together to lead this administration. I had been the CNO for about six months when President Bush was inaugurated, and, of course, he brought in Secretary Rumsfeld, and they decided to put together some unique skills to help us run the Department of Defense. Their approach for the service secretaries was, while these are positions that require confirmation, nomination first by the president to the Congress and then confirmation by the United States Senate, the real approach here was to bring individuals into Defense who had excelled on the business side of this industry. Those of us in uniform were watching this with great interest, as you can imagine, and over the course of time it became clear that the president intended to nominate Gordon England to be the secretary of the navy. I remember my first session with him in preparation, initial briefings, and meeting him and talking about what was going on in the navy and what our challenges were. What I wanted to share with you today was that I found our secretary to be a person of great character who knew the business end of this business, and he became the individual who created the senior leadership team in the Department of the navy, to lead a department that in our military is unique, because there are two services in our department, as opposed to the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force. From the very beginning, he put a focus on this thing called teamwork, with him as the leader, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the CNO. I have to tell you that I found his leadership to be not only refreshing, but personally of great value to me, because, you know, I am a destroyer man. I grew up on ships, and there was not much about my experience that taught me what was going to be required for me to lead from the military side of this thing, to lead my navy and to understand the financial implications of running an organization as big as this. Gordon England helped me come to appreciate the business end of running the navy in a way that has been of tremendous value to me personally.
He would pull me aside and say, “Now, Vern, let’s talk about our strategy for how we are going to go at this,” and gave me wonderful counsel on when it would be a good time to go after a particular issue and when it would be a good idea not to do that. I was tremendously impressed. I knew that he was a man who had done very well in the American business scene, and he was nearing the point in his life that it was time for him to retire. In fact, retirement was just on the horizon for him. And when asked by the president, he made the decision to delay all of that and to come serve the nation and our navy and the Marine Corps team as the secretary of the navy. And so it was a tremendous experience, which was shattered late last year when we learned that the president had asked him to go be the deputy at the newly established Department of Homeland Defense. In fact, I will tell you—and I have never spoken about this in the public way—but the Commandant of the Marine Corps and I went on a “recce-run” to talk to him about the foolishness of this idea. But because he is a person of service and he believes in service, and because the president asked him to do that, he made the decision to go serve in that capacity. Well, I can only tell you, to make a longer story short, that the department was overjoyed when, very recently now, they made the decision that he had done the hard work that they had needed him to do over at Homeland Security and it was time to let him come home and come back to our department and continue to lead in the Department of the navy. When we think about the things that we have been talking about yesterday and today, I want to assure you that we could have nobody come to speak to us who knows [more about] the issues that we are confronting in dealing with the Global War on Terrorism. We could not have anybody come and speak to us who knows more about the challenges of pulling together organizations to do the tasks that are in front of us, here in the United States of America, than Gordon England. So, ladies and gentlemen, it is my distinct honor to introduce to you my good friend and our secretary of the navy, the Honorable Gordon England.

**Honorable Gordon England, United States:**

Admiral Clark, thank you, and good afternoon. This is a profound gathering, I will tell you; this is very impressive, to be here, to have all this naval leadership from around the world in one place and interacting. I made the comment when I came in that I am a firm believer that you do not establish good relationships between countries, you establish good relationships between people. Relationships between countries are built a person at a time and between the leadership. So I think meetings like this are absolutely magnificent in terms of building these bonds of friendship around the world, and the CNO and I thank you, I congratulate you, and I thank everyone for being here. This is terrific, that you all came this long way. I understand there are seventy-five navies represented here. I know we are separated by many, many oceans, but it is good that we could come together. We call this the thinking capital of the United States Navy, right here. So you’re all here in our thinking capital. Also, we have some coast guard chiefs with us; I am happy to see the commandant here, Commandant Tom Collins. I understand he spoke to you also. It is wonderful to see our commandant here, because of the vital role that our coast guard plays in our national security, particularly after events of 9/11/01.

Also, I know that we have a number of Middle Eastern naval chiefs here with us today, and many of them are here for the first time. As many of you know, this past
Monday was the first day of the holy month of Ramadan. The guidance to Muslims during Ramadan is that they spend this time with family members. And they are here with us. So for this week, we are the family members, and I thank them for their great support and for allowing me to be part of your family this week. So, a very special welcome to all of our friends during this week of Ramadan.

As you can tell, Admiral Clark and I are very close, and I do want to say a very special thanks to [someone] who is a very special leader, a great friend, and someone who was just honored by the president of the United States. Many of you may know he was just recently asked and nominated by the president to extend his tour of duty for another two years. This is only the second time in our navy's history that this has happened. The other time was a famous admiral, Admiral Arleigh Burke, [whose tour of duty as CNO] also was extended two years, and I just want to say it is an honor for this navy, and it reflects great leadership. Admiral, it reflects your leadership, your experience, the great job you do with our navy, navies around the world, and I want to thank you for your service, your sacrifice, and your personal friendship. I will tell you the greatest thing about being secretary to the navy—you get to serve with our great CNO and also our great commandant. Our last commandant, you know, went on to be the Supreme Allied Commander, and we have supreme days, I know, in mind here for Admiral Clark.

First of all, it is a privilege to be here. It is an honor and a great privilege to be here to talk about a few issues today. It is excellent that you all come together and discuss the issues of the navies, but also the issues of the world.

The world has changed. The world did definitely change from the last time this symposium gathered, four years ago. We may be different nations, from different places in the world, but we now have a common mission, and that is this War on Terror. We are now all bound in a common war and a common objective, and it will take all of us together—working together and, frankly, fighting together—for us to prevail, to bring peace and harmony and stability back to the world.

I know all Americans, but I think most people in the world, will remember where they were on 9/11/01. It turns out the World Trade Center was indeed aptly named; it was a world trade center. When the attack on the World Trade Center happened, there were 219 people killed from thirty-five countries other than the United States of America. So it really was a world event, and it was not just America that was attacked; the world was attacked that day in New York. There are probably only a handful of memories that we have that other people can share with us that are that profound.

Now there is a great challenge before us, and in my judgment, terrorism—and terrorism in this modern form, and I will speak a little bit about how it got in this modern form—is one of the greatest threats we have ever had to civilized societies in this world. The causes are probably many and diverse for international terrorism, but I believe that international terrorism is enabled by a few characteristics that have happened in perhaps the last ten or twenty years. In my view, there are five fundamental characteristics that have brought about the situation we are in today. I would speak very briefly about those five.

First of all, there is globalization. Perhaps an overused term, but if you think about globalization, [it is the] ability to move people, goods, services, money, almost unimpeded—and to some extent with very little government involvement.
Goods, people, money, services can move around the world, and I mean literally around the world. And that is not about to change. I mean, periodically we have demonstrations at different places in the world, but the fact of the matter is, this [globalization] will accelerate, and you cannot turn the clock back. So globalization is the ability to move anything, money, goods, services, people, around the world. That is going to go unimpeded and, if anything, accelerate.

Couple that with the fact that technology is now much lower cost and much more readily available, and continues to become much more readily available. My background is in electronics, developing electronic systems for military airplanes. At one point in my career, in the 1980s, we were putting global positioning satellites in military airplanes. It was brand-new technology at the time. It cost us $200,000 an airplane to put a GPS system in a military airplane. About a month ago, I was at a sporting goods store in the northern Virginia and Washington, D.C., area. I went in to buy a GPS receiver, and the GPS receivers went anywhere from $79 to about $200 U.S. The person in the store wanted me to buy one for $149, and I decided, no, that’s too expensive. So I bought a $79 GPS system, a little digital display: drop the breadcrumbs, right? Three-satellite tracking, everything very, very precise, probably good within about ten feet of any place on the face of the earth; $79. You know, in the U.S. military, we talked about how we own the night, because of all the night-vision and all that, that we have in all of our militaries. But you can now buy night-vision in your automobiles. For a thousand dollars you can buy a very good night-vision system. So this technology is becoming very, very low cost, available around the world; and, again, with globalization, you can move it around the world.

This whole information age and all it portends: it is the ability to move information. Terrorism is not new; what is new is the ability to organize international terrorism. If we decided to form a club—as a matter of a fact, to some extent, we have, if you think about it: this group can communicate; we can communicate information. We can do it from wherever we reside around a room; we can do it instantaneously. By the way, our men and women at sea now not only communicate with their families, but we now have mothers and fathers on our ships, right on the high seas, who help their children with their homework assignments.

This is the ability to move information so you can organize. If we were to organize a chess club, if ten of us got together from different places in the world and decided we would organize an international chess club, we could do it this evening. And we could put the rules into place and how it operated, and we could control things in advance. So, we can do command and control instantaneously. You can do it anywhere in the world; it is easy to organize. So terrorism has a new dimension: easy to organize, with command and control anywhere in the world, and carry out a mission anywhere in the world. That is why terrorism is no longer local. That is why it is now international, and, by the way, in that same way information is disseminated. So I worry once in a while. People would ask me with my last job at Homeland Security, what worries you the most? And I would say, well, I worry about everything. But what worried me the most was specifically biological. And the reason I worried about biological is because of this rapid dissemination of information that used to take a long time. By the way, it’s interesting—look at a newspaper someday, about some interesting activity that is taking place in this whole area of genetics or biology. You read about some breakthrough, some genetic
breakthrough, some biological breakthrough. And a month later, someone some-
where else in the world is doing the same experiment; and a month later, someone
else is; and then they move beyond that. So there is very rapid dissemination of in-
formation; goods, services, the ability to organize, has forever changed the world.
The world will never be the same.

I have been through three “isms” in my lifetime. I am older than some here.
[During the] first “ism,” I was four years old, and that was the fight against fascism,
and that took a world war. Then, a few years later, the United States went into Ko-
rea with a lot of our friends and allies. We did not know it at the time—people
talked about the Korean War—but it turns out it really was not the Korean War. It
turns out it was a very, very bloody battle of a much larger war, and that war did not
end until the Wall came down in 1989; and that was the war against commu-
nism—the second “ism” of my lifetime. And now we are into the third “ism,” terror-
ism. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is not the war; it is more like Korea: it is part of this
much larger effort in this greater War on Terrorism. And I am afraid that, frankly,
like the other “ism,” communism, this one is going to last a long time, much longer
than any of our tenures in office. Because of the factors I mentioned, this is going to
be a long-term threat. And it is now not just countries, remember; this is now small
numbers of people without any affiliation with any government, or without any
country. So small numbers of people with access to technology, ability to organize,
communicate, have changed the whole world.

They will forever have changed the world. And it is not just the terror groups we
have today. Once in a while I think about countries who harbor terrorism, and I
think they are very shortsighted. They do not realize that everyone in the future can
be a target of international terrorist activities. I think our CNO was right on target
yesterday, [when he] commented that, of course, terrorism is a world prob-
lem—that naval powers must unite for one fight, and that Sea Power 21 can help
transform the way we fight as an international force. I would like to complement,
that is to add on to, the CNO’s comments yesterday and give you a little bit of my
view—a little broader, perhaps, strategic view.

In September of 2002, we put out a new National Security Strategy for the United
States, and that got a lot of attention. It had three key themes, and at the time it was
generally referred to as the Bush Doctrine—and, frankly, in the United States and
in many places of the world, it got some negative reaction. But let me tell you what
the three themes are for the Bush Doctrine. First is, we will take the fight to the en-
emy. We will take the fight to the enemy, preemptively if we have to. We will fight
this war with our world partners, but we will act alone if we must; we will use all
means, primarily diplomatic and economic, to fight terror, but we will use military
methods if that is the final option.

Now, there are three big “ifs.” The three big “ifs” are the part that generally gets
most of the attention—that is, [they are] generally highlighted by many of the
press and many of the analysts. But I would emphasis the three main themes them-
selves to you: We will take the fight to the enemy. We will fight this war with our
world partners. And we will use all means, primarily diplomatic and economic, to
fight terror.

But there is an “if.” If they [our world partners] cannot work that way, then we
will take what actions we obviously have to do. Some people have called this
doctrine “assertive unilateralism,” but I will tell you that none of us—none of us—can ever again stand by as danger gathers. We cannot do it. And, in fact, the best defense is, generally, a swift and devastating offense. When necessary, because of the size of this threat and the consequences of what can occur, you can no longer stand by and wait for an event. This is an emphasis on action. It is broad-based. It does include all means, military, economic, and diplomatic.

Now, my conclusion is that this strategy is right on target. You need to know: The United States of America, we do not fight for land, we do not fight for money, and we do not fight strictly to impose our will. We do, however, take up arms to secure our country and to defeat evil when it threatens our lives and our freedoms and liberties, and we do that for our friends and allies, and we do it with our friends and allies. That has been our tradition for 227 years: the fight to defend freedom and liberty around the world. That will continue to be our legacy, and we will continue to fight for freedom, and we will finish the job once we start. The president, in his Strategy, wrote, “History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger, but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path to action.”

This strategy emphasizes the first imperative of all of our governments collectively, and that is protecting our citizens. The objective of the strategy is to provide a stable environment for peoples and governments to flourish. For that to happen, we need to recognize that security and economic development are two sides of the same coin. Security is necessary for economic development, but in the long term, economic development is needed for security. But in all cases, security comes first, and that is the fundamental approach of the doctrine of the United States—that is, to provide a secure environment for economic development around the world. Peace and prosperity are not ordained; they are earned. So we need to build on our inherent strengths. Navies fight away games. It does not matter if it is ten miles or ten thousand miles offshore; we are the best, we are the first, defense, so that the last defense may not be needed. We bring our sovereignty with us; we are the only part of the larger forces able to act anywhere in the world, around the clock, to execute the commander’s intent. Basing from the sea, coupled with our long-reaching capabilities, enabled by technology, naval forces are very unique and very essential. We should redouble our efforts to harmonize all of our navies, our coast guards, and other systems needed for our collective defense. We need to build or strengthen our channels of communication. The rapid and accurate flow of information between us is the foundation of actionable intelligence.

We then need to link this technology, this intelligence, with the appropriate law enforcement, and with agencies around the world that can take action against terrorism. Preventing the use of the sea to transfer arms or to move weapons of mass destruction or components or ingredients of weapons of mass destruction or drugs is going to be an endless challenge. Just as we use the seas to defend our interests, our adversaries use the seas to attempt to advance theirs. Our world will always turn to all of us to keep the lines of communication and commerce open in its vital geographic straits. Imagine the impact on our world if the Straits of Hormuz, Gibraltar, Malacca were closed, for just a matter of a few days; it would have a catastrophic impact. The Suez and Panama canals are two of the greatest gifts from a prior age, and they allow free commerce around the world, begetting more
freedoms that orderly countries like ours all cherish. But with every gift comes a responsibility, and now it is our responsibility to keep the great ocean seas and straits flowing freely and safely.

As the CNO commented, prior to coming back to the navy I served as the deputy to Secretary Tom Ridge at the Department of Homeland Security. That was a fascinating experience, and it gave me some other insights in terms of this collective security and this war on terrorism. By background, at the urging of the president of the United States, the Congress in November of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security here in the United States. That was the largest reorganization of the government since the Department of Defense in 1947. The Department of Homeland Security is much smaller than the Department of Defense, but still very large; it is about a hundred and eighty thousand people. It has a budget of about $37, $38 billion—so still a very, very large department. There are six critical mission areas in the Department of Homeland Security, called out by the president of the United States. Here are the six areas that are the primary responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security:

- Intelligence and warning
- Domestic counterterrorism
- Border and transportation security
- Protection of critical infrastructure and assets
- Defense against catastrophic threats
- Emergency preparedness and response.

Now, in just about any complex endeavor—and that is certainly a complex endeavor, those six objectives—goals are easier to accomplish through partnership; and in this case, international partnerships are essential. You cannot have homeland security without international partnerships. So, at the Department of Homeland Security, we set up international objectives. We wanted to promote information and technical and education exchange with our friends and allies, the same as we do on the naval and DoD side. We want to share best practices and technologies, including research and development information on homeland security technologies. We want joint training of first responders and everyone involved in this whole arena, and we want exchange of expertise on terrorism prevention, response, and crisis management. So we made this an international effort. And in Homeland Security, just like in the United States Navy, we try to bring in nations throughout the world to work with us in this collective activity.

The Customs Service now has relationships with twenty countries in the world, probably all of them represented here. And that is with the ports, so we can work at the ports for container security initiatives. It turns out that 95 percent of all the cargo in the world travels on containers. It all goes, by the way, on all the ocean seas and straits that we all need to protect; it all travels on ships and in containers. So container security is particularly critical, and that is about 95 percent of all the trade.

We also worked with international civil aviation organizations, with the International Maritime Organization, particularly with all the coast guards and those of you here, to establish standards, processes, and systems that, between us, would
provide for this collective security. So, the approach is to align the Department of Defense with the Department of Homeland Security and then to establish international coalitions working with those two departments. Internationally, working with these two departments, was our approach that had mutual shared security, and that is the approach that we have now with the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security in the United States: international shared responsibility with these two primary departments in America.

President Bush is right. It will take all of us, the entire international community working together, to defeat terrorism. It will also take our international navies represented here today to make that possible. We are an essential part of this whole effort, between our countries. This War against Terrorism will be a thousand fights across the globe and across the years. This is not going to be a fight like the great victory by Nelson at Trafalgar: there is not going to be this one fight that changes the outcome of this war. Working together, our navies can be a vital element of this victory. Our goal should not be the avoidance of another 9/11 2001. Rather, our goal should be a freedom from fear of another 9/11, anywhere in the world. That should be our goal for our children and our grandchildren. They should never live in fear that there will be another 9/11 type of attack, anywhere in the world. So it is not to avoid; it is so they do not have to live in the fear of that. This is now our battle, and I believe together we will indeed be victorious.

In closing, Admiral Route, thank you. I think this is a magnificent symposium you have put together. I appreciate that the Naval War College has given me an opportunity to express a few views today. I particularly want to thank our great CNO, for one, bringing everyone together, but for the leadership he provides, not just in the Department of Defense in the United States, but literally around the world. God bless you for your great service, Admiral. I thank all of you, everyone here, for your great commitment, for your great service to your countries and to your navies, and I thank you for your commitment to freedom and liberty. I am proud to stand here with each of you today. Thank you for all you do. Thanks for the opportunity to be with you, and the very best for the rest of your symposium. God bless you all. Thank you very much.

Discussion

Rear Admiral Route, United States:

Mr. Secretary has agreed to take a question or two. If anyone has a question, please?

Lieutenant Colonel Dashti, Kuwait:

How do you—on the planning level, can you convince the Muslim world that the War against Terrorism is not against their religion, but is against a group? Thank you, sir.

Secretary England, United States:

It turns out [in] the Department of Homeland Security, our responsibility was also terrorism within the United States of America, so we have had terrorist attacks. Oklahoma City was a terrorist attack against America by an American, by the way. But this, I believe, is a long-term issue. This is not just Muslims; this is not al-Qa’ida.
I believe the genie is out of the bottle. This issue of terrorism is a new kind of warfare, and I think it is a new kind of warfare we all need to learn to live [with] and adjust to. It can affect any country, any religion, any nationality. The history of the world is, [shows that] there will be [such] groups in this world at different times, in different years and different environments, who can band together, [perhaps with] only a small number of people.

By the way, here is something to think about. I thought about plotting. I have ten people on the vertical axis. Start back when we were all cavemen; go back thousands and thousands of years. How many people could ten people damage, hurt, or kill? I expect for a long time it was pretty much a straight line. Ten people probably could damage or kill ten people. Then you got into the Civil War or about that era—cannons, more accurate guns—and it probably went up, but not [by] many people. We were still pretty much one on one, even at that time. Then, at World War I, it probably changed some more, with tanks, machine guns; and in World War II, it became world. But on the other hand, it took a lot of people. It took whole countries to develop, to generate the money, the resources, the technology, to build the weapons of war. I am not sure, in total, that it changed a whole lot. Now, for the first time, ten people, unaffiliated, getting their hands on a weapon of mass destruction, whether it be chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological—the curve probably starts to go exponential. So, it is different. And by the way, the ten people can be any ten people—they can be any race, any color, anywhere in the world. Ten people can organize internationally and, I think, in the future, do great harm to the world. So this is not about today, precisely; this is about a threat to the world that has changed. I would also contend that, if you take that exponential curve, if you take the policies to the left of that curve and you apply them to the right of that curve, the results could be deadly.

I believe firmly that the president of the United States has great clarity of vision of what this threat is, this greater threat of terrorism. He has great clarity of vision and great resolve that you need to act differently than we have in the past. And I have great confidence in the president, that we will end up with policies and approaches in the United States and in the world that help us deal with this much larger threat we now face. So I do not think it is a question so much of exactly today; it is a much larger issue of terrorism and how we deal with it on a global basis, recognizing that it now utilizes the same technologies available to us.

Admiral Band, United Kingdom:

Thank you very much for setting out and restating the president’s strategies, which I think are encouraging for all of us: talks about partnerships, allies, friends, cooperation. There is also, of course, the patience factor: “We retain the right to do it alone.” I think the thing we will all look for is this application of reasonable patience to get the international community to agree, because I think there has been some potential damage in the last years to some international communities. Some of them probably do need shaping up and shaking out, but I think my suggestion, certainly coming from Europe, is that respect for the right ones will be a very important part. Hence, using the IMO to sort out thought rather than going unilateral. Do you have any comments on that?
Secretary England, United States:

The only comment, particularly: I will put on my Homeland Security hat and say this can only be successful with international cooperation. I think the difference, in this particular case, is New York City, Washington, D.C.—our sailors were killed in the Pentagon. I mean, we were attacked in the United States of America. So we may feel a little differently than people who are not attacked, frankly. We feel this threat much more vividly. So while we will be patient, we may not have the same degree of patience, because we are sort of waiting [for] what happens next here. I believe the president feels that way. Yes, there is certainly a certain degree of patience, but I think you can understand if we do not have the same level of patience as everyone else. I think it is different when you have been attacked and when you are a target. I am not sure where that line is, in terms of patience, but certainly we all understand this is one world we all live in.

[inaudible question]

Secretary England, United States:

Okay, I will leave you [with] one thought, and I believe it is a very, very valuable thought. I think it has been ingrained in the Department of the Navy. We do not go about our business trying to find ways to cut costs. We do not go out to find money, and we do not just go out and cut costs. Our mantra, the way we operate, and what I would suggest to everyone, [is] that the way you operate is that you always look for ways to be more effective. How do you become better at everything you do? Invariably, as you make yourself better at everything you do, you will find that you are also doing it more efficiently. So the CNO and the commandant and Admiral Fallon, and all the other admirals here: every day you are looking to see how do you run the navy better? How do you make this a better navy? And as a consequence, we have found that not only can we run it better, but we save money. Then we take that money and we buy more airplanes, and we buy more ships, and then we become even more effective. What I would encourage you is not to try to find ways to save money—try to find ways to be more effective, and you will save money and it will pay back, because you can reinvest the money where you really need it. Simple, but it works. Thanks again.

Rear Admiral Route, United States:

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. We are indeed honored to have you join us at our symposium today. We are very honored because of your background and what you bring to this office and what you bring to the podium. It is unusual to have someone with the knowledge of the administration, with experience in DoD, experience in setting up a new Department of Homeland Security, and then to come back to the Department of Defense and to speak about these issues from that perspective.

What is incredibly amazing here is, we are hearing the same things resonate throughout this symposium. It does not matter whether it is from our civilian leadership, from our military leadership, or from the leadership of the other navies and coast guards who are here with us today. This is a very important alignment, as I see it, and we are really grateful that you were able to come and share this time with us. I also am going to adopt “The Thinking Capital of the Navy at Newport” here, and we hope that you will come back and join us again sometime soon. Thank you, sir.
Welcome back for the third and final day of our symposium. I want to start by thanking all of you for the excellent work done in the seminars yesterday. The moderators tell me that the discussion was quite lively and focused and that there was good representation from everyone in the seminars. So thank you very much for doing that; it really helps a great deal.

As you will recall, our plan for the symposium was that we would use the panels to present issues involving coalition operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, and then use the seminars to give you the opportunity to discuss real-world application of those issues in the operational scenarios that you were given to deal with. This morning our panel is going to consist of the briefings by the spokesmen for the various seminars, who will tell us the highlights of those discussions and what you came up with. There will be a brief opportunity for questions of clarification only, after each of the presentations, and then there will be time at the end of the panel, as we have been doing throughout, for more thoughtful comments and questions from the floor. Our moderator this morning is Professor Ken Watman; Ken is the chairman of the Naval War College’s War Gaming Department.

Dr. Kenneth Watman, United States:

Thank you very much, Lawrence. Let me talk just a few seconds about the administrative details of this panel, which, as Lawrence said, is designed to be the culmination of the broad and conceptual discussions that took place in the panels on the first two days, which then in the seminars were made more concrete and more practical, using a seminar war game as the mechanism for guiding the discussion and adding sharpness and specificity.

Now we will hear the briefs from those seminars. Each briefing needs to be no more than ten minutes long, if at all possible, and better if it is shorter. We have a limited amount of time, and I would ask each of the presenters to try and stay within those constraints. There will be time between presentations for a short question or two, particularly if that deals with a matter of clarification. Please save the more substantive, broader questions, or questions that might engage all of the panelists, until afterward, where we can get a sense of how much time we have to deal with them. Also, please let me amplify Lawrence’s requests that you use the microphones in the aisles. With that please, let me turn the floor over to Rear Admiral Mujtaba of Bangladesh.
Seminar One

Rear Admiral Mujtaba, Bangladesh:

Admiral Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy, and gentlemen. Good morning. At the beginning of today’s session, I would like to recap briefly the situation or the scenario of the case. As you know, Green and Orange have declared that they will take certain actions to protect the Orange and Green Strait’s environment from destruction involving these nations. They have also enforced a traffic charge for any vessel transiting through that strait. Due to the scenario and practicability for tariff collection campaigned by Green and Orange, vessels’ insurance rates have begun to increase and traffic to slow down through this strait. This also deeply affected the world economy, as a backlash. Accordingly, the United Nations formed a coalition and multinational task force [MNTF] to ensure the freedom of navigation [FON] to this strait.

Now, let us look into the details of the two-day game from the MNTF perspective. Some assumptions had to be made to make the scenario sufficiently specific for our discussion.

The Mission

Ensure freedom of navigation; specifically, increase the flow of commerce through the strait to the pretariff level.

Our Assumptions

- Diplomatic moves and economic pressure did not dissuade Orange or Green from their proposal to enforce this tariff.
- There was a United Nations Security Council Resolution mandating a Multinational Task Force (a “coalition of the willing”) to guarantee ships’ safety in transiting the strait.
- The UN mandate did not allow the MNTF to engage in preemptive military action.
- One nation would have the lead in command of the MNTF; this does not necessarily have to be the United States (despite historical precedent).

The concept of operations is as follows:

- The MNTF would use ISR (hopefully U.S.-supplied ISR, due to the greater capabilities) to reduce the threats from enemy weapons systems.
- The force was judged sufficient for a “show of force” to deter Orange and Green, but was considered to have too few MCM [mine countermeasure] ships, too few hulls for escort, and had a perhaps unneeded amphibious capability. The force was perhaps more appropriate for full-scale combat operations than for guaranteeing freedom of navigation.
- An Information Operations campaign would be waged, designed to show the world that the MNTF was a defensive force assisting world commerce and that Orange and Green were the nations violating international norms. Orange and Green would be informed of what actions were deemed completely unacceptable (“trip-wires”) and that the consequences would be severe.
The Orange-Green restriction on FON would be gradually eroded by the following method. First, a purely military convoy would transit the strait. Then a small number of heavily escorted merchantmen would transit the strait. Gradually, the flow of commerce would be increased until the Orange-Green tariff system was rendered noncredible.

On rules of engagement:

• Ideally (i.e., what the naval commanders would prefer), identifiable hostile acts by either Orange or Green would be met by a coherent campaign to destroy the military forces of that nation that are capable of threatening ships transiting the strait, either currently or in the future.

• More realistically, the UN would only authorize the MNTF to operate under a plan of “self-defense plus.”

Thank you.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

Thank you very much, Rear Admiral Mujtaba. Are there any short questions that anyone would like to ask? Please, on the left? No? All right, with that, let me turn the floor over to Rear Admiral El-Arbi from Tunisia.

Seminar Two

Rear Admiral El-Arbi, Tunisia:

Admiral Clark, admirals, gentlemen, good morning. I am the spokesman of Seminar Two. This group had to examine the piracy scenario. I intend to present the issues and challenges this group identified, and I will end with some recommended options.

According to the scenario, there has been an increasing amount of piracy in and around the Green-Orange Strait. Reportedly, neither the Green nor Orange governments are supporting pirates. A United Nations multinational task force has been formed, with a charter to deter and/or apprehend the perpetrators of these piracy acts. From the group discussions, two excursions arose: one with Orange-Green cooperation, and a more complex excursion without Orange’s cooperation.

Not surprisingly, the issues and challenges that we identified are those discussed during the plenary sessions:

• First, this is more than just a military issue. It encompasses legal, law enforcement, diplomatic, economic, and social aspects.

• Second, the level of littoral nations’ cooperation and/or support through the UN multilateral, multinational task force is a key point.

• Third, quality of available intelligence is also a key factor. Governmental and nongovernmental agencies should be involved, such as shipping companies, insurance companies, customs, local police, local coast guard, and so on. But
how do you fuse intelligence from such different government and nongovernmental sources?

• Fourth, discussions about rules of engagement found the group confronted with the same issues and challenges discussed here during the last two days.

• Fifth, one question we tried to answer was, what do you do with pirates you arrest? This would be a real issue in the case of the second excursion.

The group recommends the following options:

• First, take a holistic approach to the challenge and use all capabilities, diplomacy, information, military, and economic.

• Second, local support to pirates being identified as the center of gravity of “the enemy,” undermining it will contribute to eliminate safe havens to pirates.

• Third, involve littoral states in MNTF. This will be the role of diplomatic endeavor.

• Fourth, assemble forces using capability approaches or approach. This would prevent the use of aircraft carriers against rubber boats.

• Fifth, the concept of operations should include deterrence actions such as presence and port calls, [and] alert actions with the precondition of an intelligence surveillance and recognizance effort.

• Last, develop rules of engagement to match the threat. The ideas that emerged were to consider escalated ROEs and to consider the use of nonlethal means.

In conclusion, the second seminar, to make it brief, recommends, “Don’t use cannon to shoot a mosquito.” Thank you very much.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

Are there any questions for Rear Admiral El-Arbi? All right. We are doing very well with our time budget here; this is good, and that was an excellent presentation. Let me turn the microphone over, please, to Rear Admiral Davidson of Canada.

Seminar Three

Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:

Thank you very much. Admiral Clark, gentlemen, good morning. I will attempt not to break this excellent shorter-is-better trend and move quickly through this.

Syndicate Three was asked to look at the issue of humanitarian assistance issues involved with preventing loss of life at sea. In brief, the scenario we were asked to examine involved a multinational force which was operating in the straits, in a freedom of navigation mode, to ensure freedom of navigation.

The particular scenario was that one of the ships of the multinational task force had observed a vessel which was assessed to be unseaworthy and boarded that vessel. I should point out that this was not a declared emergency and the vessel was not in distress. But once they did board the vessel, they discovered that there was a large number of sick and infirm people on board. So the task for us, basically, was
relatively straightforward. What do you do in this circumstance? How do you do it? How do you balance the humanitarian operation with your primary mission? And there was a second part of this, which was, how do you deal with arisings—that is to say, if people on board are taken to be illegal migrants, for example. So that was the scenario that we faced.

I should say, right at the beginning, that our syndicate was very privileged to have participants who had very extensive personal experience in exactly this sort of humanitarian assistance operations that we examined. These ranged from experience in the Mediterranean, the Straits of Gibraltar, Adriatic, the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, China Sea, and the Pacific. So I think we were remarkably privileged. We had both coalition and national perspectives, and we had an extremely interesting and informative discussion, including some discussion on very specific cases, which illustrated, for example, some of the dirty tricks that can be uncovered when you are in the people-smuggling business or countering that. We also discussed the decisions states must take, and we discussed the consequences of inaction; more on that in a moment.

We spent quite a lot of time on the scenario implications, as they were presented [Figure 1]. We decided not to fight the scenario, in the best traditions of naval officers discussing things that they would prefer to do differently, and we decided not to fight the information gaps, but rather to concentrate on the fundamental issues rather than the tactical play. Having said this, in the circumstances—that is to say, in an operation which is focused on freedom of navigation and, more to the point, an operation which was not focused on embargo operations, where there is no MIO-LIO tasking—the whole question of boarding a vessel which is in transit, not in distress, not broken down, was questionable to us. And we felt that in the scenario as presented, the boarding was not justified. However, having then dutifully fought it just a little bit, the scenario was presented as a fact, and, therefore, we focused on the arisings and the consequences from such an action. We assumed further that the boarding was sanctioned by the commander of the multinational force.

Having boarded and determined that there is a problem, our issue really was, then, what chain of action, what chain of decisions, does this unleash?

The first thing that we concluded was that the overall mission continues, and, if there is a humanitarian operation in progress, it has to be supported. The overall mission itself carries on, and there is no interruption to that. Probably the main and most substantive detailed discussion was this issue of action and subsequent responsibility, and, having boarded, clearly we felt that we were bound to assist.

The options ranged from, in a fairly straightforward way, the provision of water and food, medical support, which would enable the vessel to continue on its way, consistent with the freedom of navigation tasking, to another range of options. If the vessel were judged not to be just unsafe or unseaworthy, which can sometimes be a fairly subjective assessment, but actually in danger of foundering, then there is a whole other issue, and that is the evacuation of personnel—the most suitable platform to disembark people, and the whole chain of diplomatic engagement which would be required to get people ashore to a port of refuge.

Our group discussed in some detail experience of various states in these sort of operations and brought up very clearly, and focused on, the caution and awareness intended on embarking personnel in ships of any nation, and, where possible, the
preference to enable ships to continue en route. However, there was also a very great awareness of the consequences of inaction, and we discussed cases in which ships or nations have not rendered appropriate humanitarian assistance and there has been needless loss of life. Clearly, the issue is balance and judgment on the scene and, at the end of the day, our obligation to assess other mariners in distress.
The sense as well from this—this is the final point I will make on the action and responsibility one, and it’s an important one—[was] that the multinational task force having authorized the boarding then, we felt, assumes some responsibility to cooperate with the ship which has done the boarding, and also to assist with the humanitarian operation. It was clear that this could go quickly and assume some predominance as a national issue, but the multinational force, having engaged on this, had a responsibility to help get it right. We felt that there would be, almost inevitably—for the nation whose ship was involved in the boarding and to embark the distressed mariners—national attention, which would accelerate as media exposure accrued to this.

The third point, and I have just introduced this, is that we felt that the scenario, which presented these personnel as—the distressed personnel on board—as illegal migrants, was really not central to the game play and that our assessment and conclusion were that these were really mariners in distress and that we will treat them as distressed mariners. And that focused how we dealt with this. There was a game play instruction regarding the potential for the outbreak of violence onboard the vessel. We did not really get to this at all; but clearly, in the circumstances as presented, a non-embargo operation where your rules of engagement would not normally extend to boarding and actions on board another nation’s ship—you would be obliged to rely on the international standing rules of engagement, which would cover these sort of circumstances. And intelligent reliance on the principles of preservation of life and minimum use of force would be your guiding doctrine.

The final two points I will cover very quickly. This very useful and very, very interesting discussion pointed out the need for very clear policy guidance regarding humanitarian assistance when you are in a coalition or multinational force which could involve this sort of operation—guidance, that is to say, on the action to be taken and the scope and range of action and the responses, thought out freely by the commander and understood by the participants well ahead of time. And lastly, we felt that there was an interesting opportunity, and perhaps even a requirement, that arose from this discussion, for the exercise of some contingency plans in humanitarian assistance as part of future coalition operations. Thank you.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Thank you very much, Admiral. Are there any questions, anyone? Please.

Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Australia:
Did you give any consideration to the question of whether or not a multinational force would actually work in this circumstance, given that whoever boarded the vessel probably is going to end up owning the people and you are going to have to take them somewhere?

Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
We had an interesting discussion on this, and, frankly, one of the points we raised late in the afternoon was that, in this scenario, it is a bit like an ambulance driver going down the street and stopping and looking at somebody and saying, “Well, you don’t look very good; you know, you’d better get in.” We decided not to go down that line.
Our discussions ranged from the possibility of an ad hoc boarding, an unauthorized boarding, in the absence of clear direction or passing from the coalition; but given the geographic scale of this, we felt that was not practical, and, therefore, it had to be a sanctioned operation, and we went on that basis. I think you are right, Admiral, that at the end of the day the national play on this would be significant, depending on the number of people, the size of the vessel, and everything else—and also, I think, probably the extremity of the circumstance, if there were ships and assets in the coalition that were better suited to take on or to disembark personnel. There would have to be some degree of cooperation in that, but ownership being nine-tenths of the law, I suspect that the diplomatic effort to help disengage from this would certainly largely center around the nation of the boarding ship—in this case, on the ship to which they are disembarked.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

Admiral, do you wish to pursue that? Is there anyone else who would like to ask a question at this point? All right. Please, the floor over to Rear Admiral McHaffie of New Zealand.

Seminar Four

Rear Admiral McHaffie, New Zealand:

I thank you very much. Admiral Clark, Admiral Route, fellow delegates, on behalf of Syndicate Four and those that have not yet had a chance to express personally their gratitude and thanks for the ISS, I wish to pass that on from that syndicate and also to thank the facilitators that we had in our discussion, Captain Critz, Professor Wawro, and Captain Hayes, who led us particularly well and steered us occasionally in directions when we got into considerable detail in some areas. The scope of my presentation is that I will just briefly outline the scenario, and then we will discuss two issues, plus what we believe are brief solutions to those two issues. Finally, I will discuss two areas that our syndicate considered worthy for further study.

Just very briefly, our syndicate’s aim was to discuss the naval support to civil authorities in the standoff that could occur in the straits that we were considering, and our mission primarily was established as freedom of navigation through the straits and ensuring and allowing, where possible, innocent passage as required.

In our deliberations we had some considerations before we discussed the events that actually occurred, as how we might deploy our forces, noting the large numbers of units we had available to us. In essence, we were going to deploy to the east, primarily to the entrance to the area, with our larger forces and use smaller forces through the choke point, and have one VLHA also close to the east, ready to react should a situation arise. We had to consider that side of the risk of dividing our forces and how that might be achieved, and also we had discussions on how we would affect the escort, should that be necessary.

You will know, those of you who have read all the scenarios, that at that stage when we were positioned and ready to go, seventy environmental warriors boarded—unannounced and unexpectedly—the tanker, at which stage we were then positioning units, and we had one unit very close by in order to render assistance to the master of the tanker that had called a Mayday. Unfortunately, during
that stage of the operation, the vessel went close to the tanker and damaged it, and, therefore, the tanker became somewhat disabled. At that particular stage, I was someone from the syndicate to explain to higher authority why it was one of my vessels had damaged the tanker. During my absence, the syndicate did some sterling work in sorting out some of the issues, and when I came back, the situation was pretty much resolved. So, a sigh of relief on my part, thank you very much to my fellow members of the syndicate, but, perhaps, now to the more serious issues of what we considered in plenary.

Without going into the nitty-gritty and the real issues of how we might have dealt with the environmental warriors, we found in our discussions that one of the issues that we faced was really understanding the rules of engagements; and the rules for use of force must be robust to ensure the premature use of excessive force—in other words, to make sure that it does not occur. So a great deal of our discussion was about [how] we did not want to lose much time in taking action to be effective against the environmental warriors, but we really did feel that we must have robust ROE established very early in the piece in order that we would not have to deliberate and actually [would] be able to take effective action early. Therefore, if we establish that clarification needs to be sought, then that must be done in a timely manner.

The other issue that faced us in discussing what sort of ROE we would use in this situation was the limits of proportionality and how much force we could use. The solution to this particular dilemma, which would have been common to all syndicates, is really the need for considerable planning and analysis of such situations, and particularly war gaming to exercise these ROE through the potential scenarios. We also feel that it actually needs to be war gaming and planning done not only within the military environment, but very much within the civilian environment—in other words, establishing contact with all authorities and making sure that we all know where we stand. And particularly, when we consider the amount of environmental issues that are now prevalent in the world as well, if we do not have contact with those individuals, then it is going to make life particularly difficult for us.

The second issue that we raised coming from our discussions was a policy issue and that military missions need to be better defined in terms of policy issues which surround them. Again, one thing that came through in our particular syndicate was the issue with regard to environmental matters and, particularly considering that we are in a multinational task force and between both Orange and Green, in dealing with what we considered to be an international organization that was trying to make a point. The solution to this issue is again very similar to the previous one. Engage early on the other instruments of national power by diplomatic, economic, and informational [means], to better bound the military contribution. This, again, would establish and ease the perceptions and confrontation. In other words, if we are in contact, it would lower the threshold that we should know the modus operandi of such organizations.

One of the discussions that we did have was, in fact, press coverage, and we were in some doubt as to how far the environmentalists were going to take this issue. They may well only wish to get on CNN, and once they are there, they would not wish to go any further. So we had to consider how long we would have to be concerned about how long they are on the vessel and the overall situation.
So, our seminar, our group, came up with two areas for further study, and those are, again, emphasizing the environmental concerns and potential solutions, particularly with regard to freedom of navigation issues and choke points. Other issues that we considered, very briefly, were such things as the depth and the environment and the impact of that particular area. One of the shortfalls that we identified was that we actually did not have any oceangoing tugs or anything that were available within the task group to actually take immediate effective action. Although we felt we could do that with the ships we had available, we would have been better served with the availability of tugs and such.

The final point for further study is, again, better integration of diplomatic tools and consideration of demarche—in other words, being able to make sure that we can demarche between both Orange and Green, to establish better positioning in regard to environmental issues, and, of course, to emphasize the need and requirement for provision of both treaties and agreements and regional groupings of personnel, both in the maritime multinational task force and also within interagency and intergovernmental levels. That concluded deliberations in Seminar 4. Thank you.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

Thank you, Admiral. We have heard from half of the speakers on this panel, and we are ahead of schedule, I am pleased to say, so it occurs to me that we might at this point deal with some broader questions—some more open-ended questions, perhaps—that people may have been holding back to the end. I think we can entertain some of those now, if there are any that anyone wants to engage in.

Admiral Johnson, United States:

One of the interesting issues in our group that came up, that I do not think is unique to the fact that some of us were in the European theater, was this issue of environmental warriors; maybe their name could have been Greenpeace, or some other such organization. When we deal with those, we have to keep in mind that these organizations are also well entrenched in the political process of many of the countries that we deal with over there, and so this puts a different complexion on it. In fact, they are part of various ruling coalitions and what have you, and there is a great deal of sympathy toward these groups. And so that adds a degree of complexity that not everybody from every part of the world may fully appreciate and understand. And so, as you deal through one of these, the public affairs aspect of it and the diplomatic aspects of it are probably as large, if not larger, than the pure military aspects, as an observation. I do not know if anybody else has any thoughts on that, or if you have the same problems in all parts of the world, but it is a very real consideration in the part of the world where we happen to live. Thank you.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

Anyone on the panel who would like to comment on that observation, or anyone in the audience who would like to?
Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
I would simply add that I have been at the receiving end of some visits from some of these folks, and, Admiral, I can only echo the observation. Very well thought out, very carefully planned, very effective disruption of activities; and you are right, they are masters of manipulation of public opinion and bringing visibility to issues they wish to document. So I could not agree more; it is a public relations issue as much as a security issue, very frequently.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Are there any other broader questions, not just addressing the issue of environmental warriors, but those that our other panelists had spoken to: freedom of navigation, piracy, and preventing loss at sea? Please.

Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:
I'd just like to pick up on the exchange between Admiral Ritchie and Admiral Davidson. Admiral Ritchie made the point that in this multinational scenario—and this was the distressed mariners scenario—that, likely, the nation that effected the support to the distressed mariners would end up inheriting them. I would be curious whether the panel had any discussion about that in terms of how, in practical terms, assistance could be provided but might not necessarily have required that the distressed mariners be embarked in the multinational ship (because I think you indicated that there had been a wide practical discussion of that). And, of course, from our own experience in the Arabian Gulf–Persian Gulf area, there are some practical examples of how you can avoid that. But I would be curious whether you actually had some discussion on how you could resolve the issue, without necessarily getting into some interesting immigration arguments.

Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
Yes, we certainly did, and some of the specific examples focused on experience in the Straits of Gibraltar and essentially in areas where there was tasking specifically to counter illegal migrants. This was not the scenario that we were dealing with—we were dealing with essentially an arising at sea and how you manage this. This, of course, also was in a narrow strait, ten miles wide, with bordering nations who were uncooperative. We did not go deeply into game play—into the issue of which ship you would embark them in, or if at all. It was a strong sense that, if at all possible, you avoid this and you facilitate the vessel on its transit as your primary goal, in this one. Had the play developed further so it was necessary to disembark, we would have gone further down that route and looked at platforms, capabilities, and so on. Really, the strong sense was: you do everything possible to allow them to continue on.

Admiral de Donno, Italy:
Talking about the issue of life-saving at sea, one interesting aspect that I think must be considered in the final day of discussion is how is one able, from a multinational military force at sea, to give humanitarian assistance to a boat of illegal immigrants. You know that there are international laws which establish specific behavior for this kind of a situation, but this is something that—particularly in the Mediterranean,
with the operations we are doing in support of ENDURING FREEDOM, with the multinational NATO forces working in the Eastern Mediterranean and around the Gibraltar Straits—it is possible for multinational forces to find boats with illegal immigrants crossing the Mediterranean. This is something that can happen. So an interesting thing is to see how the ships belonging to different countries, which have different approaches to this problem, behave in this situation, being part of a multinational force with the force commander and a chain of command which can be of other nations. I would like to know if they have taken in consideration this aspect, or if there are any remarks which can be made on this?

Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:

I think, Admiral, that was a central thought as we concluded our deliberations, how in an operation like this—whether it was the possibility of encountering vessels with personnel in distress, or for whatever reason—the coalition or the multinational task force absolutely had to have a clear understanding of the possible range of activities and a clear, well-thought-out-in-advance plan for dealing with those, precisely in order to reconcile where there were different national approaches and which would help you sort out, perhaps, which ships you would employ, the scope of activity that they would be able to engage, and so on and so forth. Coordination amongst the players: that is essential to our thoughts.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

The gentleman at the left has been waiting patiently.

Unidentified Speaker: [Translation.]

In Spanish, please. Not only in the case of humanitarian assistance, but in piracy and in all these cases, there is a strong aspect of public opinion. Only one of the four panelists has mentioned the importance of this aspect. Sadly, we are in a world where perception is worth more than reality, and images more than ideas. Whatever force and whatever role it has, there is an important communications component.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

Thank you very much. Who would like to respond?

Rear Admiral McHaffie, New Zealand:

That certainly took up some discussion in the syndicate over the environmental issue, and one of the first things that we talked about was making sure that we had adequate public relations coverage. We saw, with that issue, that we would need to have real good top cover, because the reality would be that we would have to make a judgment as to how serious the environmentalists were. And, therefore, we did not want to take preemptive action if they only had one aim. That was the whole point of our discussion, to try and get to a position where we know where those risk levels are and when we have reached decision points, because we could have gone in there immediately and taken action, whereas their aim may have been just a very simple one. It was complicated, however, by the damage to the vessel, and we had other
considerations associated with that. But yes, it was very much part of our discussion, and your point is particularly valid.

*Dr. Kenneth Watman:*

Is there anyone else on the panel who would like to respond to that?

*Admiral Tafalla Balduz, Spain:*

I worked with a humanitarian assistance group in Seminar Three, and also have experience with some cases. Every case is different, so there are no recipes for success; but our main philosophy, which I would like to share with you, is that we should avoid having full responsibility for a situation that is not caused by ourselves. We need to share the responsibility, especially with the littoral state. So, coming to humanitarian relief, other than when human life is at risk, [it is important to] talk with somebody directly with the shore authorities, to share the responsibility. We help them to take them on board only when the littoral states are able to accept them. So I think the key point of this situation, in my personal point of view, is not to have the full responsibility of the situation, but to share with somebody else: multinational commander, littoral states, or organization that you to report to. Other than that, you finish in a situation that the final responsibility is with the ship taking it, as in this particular case.

*Dr. Kenneth Watman:*

Would anyone in the audience or on the panel . . .

*Admiral de Donno, Italy:*

Yes, may I? Just another remark to what the admiral said, and always related to the situation of illegal immigration. That is something that, unfortunately, we are experiencing very widely in the Mediterranean. First of all, the difference between the situation of illegal immigration and the situation of life-saving at sea is really very thin, and most of the time those situations have the final goal to be an illegal immigration, but they are performed through life-saving situations, which changes the international law under which the situation must be checked. But according to what the admiral was saying, I think there is not only a problem of deciding, as a navy, what to do in certain kinds of situations. It is also a problem of how the nation’s entire system accepts this. I want to share with you a typical situation regarding these facts. Last year, in 2002, I had the same commanding officer of the same ship who was prosecuted by a judge for two different situations: the first time, because he had not given support to a boat in distress, and, in another situation, because he had facilitated illegal immigration. So, as you see, the same man with the same ship in two different situations, he behaved absolutely perfectly from a technical point of view—in fact, as his boss, I have nothing [critical] to say about his behavior—but he has been put under prosecution by a civilian judge for two different situations: once, because he was inattentive to the law to save people at sea, and another one, because he disobeyed the law to discourage illegal immigration. Just to give you real-world examples.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:

I have got to support what the admiral said, from my own personal experience in very similar circumstances, which led to Senate enquiries and all those sorts of things. But the difficulty that the man on the spot has in deciding between, perhaps, political direction and the very humanitarian sort of feelings that all mariners [have] for people in distress, because illegal immigrants often become people in distress—it is a very difficult position that we put commanders on the spot in, out there in action.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

Anyone else on the panel or in the audience, please?

Brigadier Montanaro, Malta:

Just a comment on an additional concern. I wonder whether the same panel also examined the situation where the individuals themselves on the boat do not want help, because this often occurs as well. You are in international waters. You have the situation that everybody has just mentioned, but because they want to go where they want to go, as opposed to where you want to take them because of the situation that you found them in, you are then faced with this situation. Questions: Are you entitled? Are you within the law? Do you have jurisdiction to say, “Okay, get on my ship; I am taking wherever”?

Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:

That was very central to our preliminary discussions, and the scenario was rather complicated by the geography in which we were operating, in that we would have been, at any time that this coalition was taking place, in the territorial seas of one state or the other: first point. Second, the nature of this operation was to facilitate the free passage of ships, and we examined the scenario-play very closely, and it was not a case of declared distress. It was a subjective assessment that this vessel looked unseaworthy, and, therefore, a decision had been made to intervene. A fundamental question—and our conclusion amongst the panel—was that, in such circumstances, if the vessel was not in evident distress, if it was not having navigation difficulties, you could query it to determine if everything was all right, perhaps, but by and large, this intervention, we felt, and the boarding were not warranted in the circumstances. However, this scenario was that this decision had been taken and that it did play out accordingly.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

Anyone else like to comment on that particular line or any other, before we move on? All right. With that, please let me turn the floor over to Vice Admiral Afolayan from Nigeria.
Vice Admiral Afolayan, Nigeria:

Admiral Clark, President of the Naval War College, senior colleagues, good morning. I am representing Seminar Five, and we had two scenarios, but the objective of the two scenarios is the same. The aim of the terrorists is to attack a multinational gathering, and the given mission statement is to deter the terrorists from attacking the gathering at the Olympic Games. The situation is such that one cannot contemplate not taking a position, because of the provisions of the present International Law. It was a hot argument between the participants, and we could not come to the conclusion that the commander of such a task force only would take a position that would be contrary to world opinion. This, to my mind, raises issues that these seminars have been discussing in the past two days. What do we do in this serious issue, where thousands of lives are put in danger? Do we follow the Law of the Sea? Do we follow the traditional Maritime Operations Law? Do we follow the law of the United Nations Security Council that are not very precise (and by their nature are meant to be so)? These are the questions that arose in our seminar.

The issues that are involved are of three basic elements: the legal aspect, the rules of engagement, and the mission statement. We found out that all these are ambiguous. In the first scenario, the ambiguity in the rules of engagement mission statement, which was to deter, is subject to different interpretations by the nationals of the multinational neighbor task force. The United Nations Security Council Resolution on self-defense cannot be said to cover any attempt to board a ship suspected to be carrying terrorists, without permission from the host country or any other higher authority. Hence, the commander of such a multinational task force cannot make a decisive decision or pass any definite orders to units under its command. In such a conflicted environment, what does he do?

The result of not taking any actions should the terrorists attack the participants of the Olympic Games would be too serious to contemplate, as thousands of lives will be subjected to serious danger. However, the decision to attack or board these affected vessels is beyond a military position; rather, it is a political act, which should be supported by the appropriate United Nations Resolution. The international communities should not allow events like this or that of a similar level. We are nationals of countries to which this can happen in any part of the world.

Participants of Seminar Five are of the opinion that serious thought be given to the amendment of rules of engagement to allow for clarity of mission and to give a definite guide to the commander that is in charge of multinational forces. We also think it is necessary that the rules of engagement should be such that the units under that command can understand. Thus, the consensus opinion of the participants of Seminar Five is as follows:

Scenario A

- Green maritime vessels may be loading terrorists in a Green port for transport abroad.
- MNTF sent to “deter” terrorist deployment.
- Terrorist ships may be rapidly lost on the high seas.
Key issues:
- Legality of stopping/boarding vessels in Green/Orange territorial waters in the absence of UNSCR
- Different national interpretations of right of self-defense
- Issues in overlapping territorial seas
- Meaning of “deter”; expectation of more definitive mission statement for MNTF.

That is a summary of our decision on scenario A, which is about the boarding of a vessel within our own territorial water, and we all know what the rules of engagement and the Law of the Sea Convention say on this issue. Can we legally, on suspicion, board a ship within our territorial waters? Seeing the danger that ship poses, do we dare tie our hands and allow the ship to get into the area where we cannot look at, detect, or arrest him, and to go and carry out the attack? These are issues that we feel are very strong issues that are beyond a military position; they should be handled at the strategic level. To my mind, the commander that is in charge of this task force, as we all agree in my syndicate, is helpless; and any position that he takes there, he may find that he may not be backed up by his government. Therefore, the United Nations, as a global body, should be tasked to look into all these rules, beyond consideration of the present situation in the world, where terrorists pose serious risks.

Scenario B
- Green cargo ships in international waters may be carrying WMD for terrorist operations abroad.
  - MNTF sent to deter terrorist deployment.

Key issues:
- Consensus on MNTF action.
- Must make clear link of WMD to terrorist activity.
- Nothing illegal about a sovereign ship carrying WMD.
- Need clarification of character of WMD.
- Legal basis is then self-defense or SUA Convention [for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation].
- Proportionality principle applies; thus, measures taken depend upon assets available.

The second scenario is a follow-up, but the issue involved this time around is that there is a loophole in rules that are existing and that can be used, and that is in the International Maritime Organization Convention, Article III, subsection B, which allows boarding of a suspected vessel carrying out unlawful activities. It is on that that—with the handicap we have on rules of engagement and other international rules, and considering the seriousness of the vessel carrying weapons of mass destruction—we feel that we can exploit this and board the ship. But the point came up, again, which we have been discussing in this seminar: The multinational forces may not all be capable of detecting weapons of mass destruction by any equipment they may be carrying on board. But among them there are maybe a
few that may have this capability, so the idea of shared information becomes very relevant. Hence, the weapons of mass destruction that have been carried can be analyzed, classified. Then it becomes very easy for the task force commander to take a position. But in absence of that, it may be very difficult. But in this particular scenario, as I said earlier, we use the International Maritime Organization law to board the ship, bearing in mind the consequences of leaving the ship to go and attack the people at the Olympics.

This is our solution to the second part, but I would want this body to look at the issues critically: that is, the present or the existing rules of engagement and the mission statement of this nature of exercise, that it would be decided if something concrete can be done concerning this issue and, therefore, the statement of the Secretary of the Navy in the lecture he gave yesterday would become fact. If these situations are not tackled by the world body, if you get to a state that an individual would take what is the only option left to him to prevent the threat of terrorists, that is a big question to the whole world. Do we allow an individual on his own interpretation to act unilaterally? Do we as a United Nations body look at issues at stake and amend the existing laws? These are things that I will leave to be answered by this august panel, to talk about and maybe make recommendations at the appropriate level to our political leadership. Thank you very much.

Dr. Kenneth Watman:

Thank you, Admiral, for a very interesting presentation. Here, within about five minutes of our designated break time, my inclination is to hold large questions for the admiral until we return, because I think this is obviously a very key subject, and I think there will be an interest in talking at some length about it.

Captain Romano, United States:

Thank you, Dr. Watman; I am going to hold the remainder of the administrative remarks until we come back. At this time we will take a break and reconvene at 10:15.

Vice Admiral Sandagiri, Sri Lanka:

First of all, let me thank Admiral Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, for giving me and my delegates this opportunity to participate in this symposium. In the time we have arrived here, assembled, and participated in discussions, we have [had] much discussion on ROE, the rules of engagement. I am not too sure this rule of engagement has been specified to meet the various differing situations under the scenarios that we have discussed yesterday. Certainly, each nation would have adopted certain instructions under ROE to tackle whatever situations that
would arise in the area that they are operating. I would like to get into the situation where the bottom line of ROE could be considered, in general, in facing any situations as maritime nations, because at times we find the ROE one that, when you add it up, may not be the best ROE. Even the UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] is very silent on this issue, as far as the ROE is concerned. So I would ask the panel whether we could have a set of ROE as a bottom line and to be suited to meet situations by each nation, in the betterment of coexistence of nations. Thank you.

**Dr. Kenneth Watman:**

Who would like to pick this up?

**Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:**

Perhaps I could just start by offering a thought or two and then invite the other panel members to kick off as well. I think the discussion that we had over the last day or two really reinforced exactly the point that you are raising, Admiral. We have some standing rules of engagement now, of course, which apply to segments of the international community, and the NATO ones, the ones that we work with the United Nations, and clearly there is a need to standardize the general concepts of these. I think the other point, though, that came out very vividly in the discussions that we have had on this is that, regardless of the degree of agreement and standardization for a particular operation, there will always be some national instructions and some national caveats on participation, and that will not change. The message, though—and I think perhaps the most important message of all—is the need for participating nations in such an operation to share those rules of engagement and ensure that there is common understanding of the critical elements of this when they engage in an operation. We have had lots of recent examples where that has been very difficult for commanders to obtain, and the limits on national participation have greatly affected the effectiveness of some elements of an operation.

**Dr. Kenneth Watman:**

Anyone else like to pick up this issue of ROE? All right; are there other questions or comments, please? Yes, sir?

**Vice Admiral Hull, United States:**

[I am the U.S. Coast Guard] Commander, Atlantic area. I, too, would like to thank Admiral Clark and the United States Navy for inviting the Coast Guard, and what we bring to the table and how we work together, to this conference. It has been very instructive for me, and all of us, to be able to be engaged in this. I would go back to the comment about how do you prepare or how do you operate in a world today that is a little different: security, economic prosperity; it is the sharing of information, the awareness going on [in] the MDA picture. And I would go to Admiral Johnson’s comment yesterday on a joint interagency type of organization that can fuse law enforcement and military data, then transmit orders or directions to ships at sea in the maritime environment, as a model we should look into. I think you can use some of the JIATF model in the Caribbean that takes into account international
sovereignty. It has multinational representation in the command center. It has rules of engagement involved but yet respects those rules of engagement of the host countries. I think there is a lot of experience over the last fourteen years; no way do we know the answers, but it is a model that I think can be looked at in instructive fashion, and I encourage you to do that.

**Dr. Kenneth Watman:**

Other comments or questions?

**Vice Admiral Roughead, United States:**

To follow up on Admiral Hull, we talked about the various regional models that can be used—and to try and fit a common model around the world, I think, is very challenging—but what our objectives might better be is to establish the regional organizations and strive to have the connectivity between those organizations be compatible. That way, each region can adapt to the scenarios it will face, the structures that may be in place; but the objectives should be how they connect, so that information and dialogue can pass through that [connection] and yet let each one take its own form, if you will. Thank you.

**Dr. Kenneth Watman:**

Other points? Other questions?

**Admiral Fallon, United States:**

In the business of humanitarian and NGO, I think this is an area that is going to be with us for quite a while, obviously with increasing levels of activity around the world. It seems that we might benefit from some kind of a structured approach to this, in the form of, maybe, a template that could be used by the military authorities and another one by the humanitarian organizations. They always have needs and requirements, and when we get into these operations, there is a long list of things that people want to have done that the military can facilitate and assist. And it seems that, typically, when we get into these operations, we are back at a very low level, doing the same things again and again. It seems that you may offer this up for discussion as you go back to your own nations and whatever regional forums that we get involved in, that we might consider this and see if we can come up with some common procedures that would make it easier, when we get into these operations, to get started rather than going back to the baseline and doing it all from scratch. Thank you.

**Dr. Kenneth Watman:**

Additional comments on this point? Are we cooked? Let me, for myself, express our great appreciation and our great respect for the energy and the wisdom and the professional expertise all of you committed to this session, the panelists, and to the meeting in general. A report will be issued and sent to you.
Closing Remarks

Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route and Admiral Vern Clark

Rear Admiral Route, United States:

Thanks, gentlemen. It has been a pleasure hosting you here these past few days. On behalf of my staff and some others who have helped us, it has been our pleasure to provide the venue and the support to enable you to conduct a successful conference. Many of you have been effusive in your praise and your thanks to me, and as much as I appreciate that, I would like to bring some of our folks down front here who have helped and put a significant amount of time into this. I will just mention a few names as they are walking down here. Senior Chief Tessier is our security coordinator. You have seen many of our folks in the camouflage uniforms around the spaces, but he is also coordinator with the region for their security as well as the Newport Police and the Rhode Island State Police. Captain Derek Offer coordinated the escort officers who had been assigned to each of you individually. Our escort officers are primarily our faculty members here and staff members at the War College, but we do have some from Navy Warfare Development Command who have helped. Chief Parker, who coordinated our transportation, drivers, and the buses; our medical folks, including HM2 Smith, who not only helped us in the medical world, but helped fix the bus the other day. Our command center personnel—you have met and seen many of these. The folks who have been standing around and helping you with the microphones for the last couple of days have been instructors from the Surface Warfare Officers School, just down the street here, and we appreciate their help. Donna Rubel, our protocol officer, and Debbie Maddix, the assistant for Commander Carol Elliot, who is our Special Events Coordinator. If you all will join me in thanking these folks, who are just the tip of the iceberg here in support that we have provided today. Thank you. Thank you all very much.

I would also like to thank the folks in the Pentagon, Admiral Boomer Stufflebeem and certainly Pete Romano and the folks in N52. Admiral Clark, it has been our pleasure to do this for you, sir, but we could not have done it without your support, and we certainly appreciate that. And with those final remarks, I turn the podium over to you, sir.

Admiral Clark, United States:

Thank you. In accordance with the rules, I will identify myself. I am Vern Clark from the United States. I just want to say a few things in closing. Actually, there are so many things that could be said. I am so taken by the appreciation that I personally feel to each of you for choosing to be part of this symposium. I am a great believer in the power of choice and how important it is; and to me, the fact that you would choose to be part of this symposium is, above everything else, more important than anything, and I thank you for that. One of you said on the first day that
getting together as a group is the most important thing of all, and I like that; I believe it says it absolutely perfectly. The group would not work if each of you had not chosen to be part of it, and I thank you for that.

Admiral Route, we are very grateful to this institution—the center of thinking, as I was reminded again this week—for the effort that it takes to put something like this on. Of course, you all recognize that it has been four years. How many of you were here four years ago? Just a couple. In four years you can forget how to put one of these on; the lessons learned slip away. Your folks did a tremendous job, and outside of the little thing with the bus problem—we will get a medal to the corpsman and the medic for his ability to apply medical procedures to the bus and get it going again.

I hope this was an enjoyable time as well for the spouses that were here. One of the things that came out of this, for me, is the importance of the regional structure that was set in place a few years ago. I was fortunate enough to be part of the Regional Sea Power Symposium that took place last year in Italy under Admiral de Donno’s leadership; it was a real privilege for me to be able to attend that. It strikes me that we have to think about the output of these kinds of sessions. More than anything else, I will take away perspectives and insights from you, the key leaders—the majority of the leaders that are responsible for leading navies. You have all given me something very, very important to think about. Years ago—when I was a lieutenant, actually—I worked for a very wise admiral, who said to me, “Vern, don’t ever forget that we are all functions of our perspective.” I have gained new perspective these last two days. It is important for me to understand where individual leaders are coming from. It is important for me to understand how you connect the dots in the circumstances that you face.

The scenarios gave us opportunities to think about real-world situations. Some of them had artificialities that you challenged, appropriately; but all of them were designed for us to share our perspectives. I guess it was the middle of the first day when I turned to Ron and said, “Ron, we have to get all of these presentations. We must make them all available to everybody here, because we are hearing some very thoughtful pieces, some very thoughtful positions.” And I have to go now and spend some time thinking about all of those and see how I am going to make them part of my total perspective. I think that is clearly one of the very important products of this symposium.

But there is more that needs to be done, it seems to me, and Admiral de Donno made this point earlier; Gary Roughead made it today: the ability to focus, using the regional symposium structure to help us deal with some things that we need to wrap our brain around. Let us just take the ROE example. There were questions—very, very good questions—raised about that [that] fundamentally meant this: “Well, why do you feel about ROE the way you do?” Individual discussions went on, and the individual discussions are a key part of what this symposium is about; but, potentially, we need to spend more time putting together a notional ROE for specific things that we are facing and have the hard and difficult discussion about why individuals feel the way they do about ROE.

I remember times where I was convinced I knew more about ROE than anybody, because not very many people spent a lot of time thinking about it. When I was a ship commanding officer and my boss asked me to give a presentation on ROE,
that fact caused me to think a lot about what I was going to say to the group. And I was never the same in the way I thought about ROE after that event, because I had to think my way through a scenario and really come to grips with why I believed what I did believe about ROE. It might be a good thing for us to do. I do not at all believe that we can come up with an international ROE that will solve every case. But I believe that as naval and coast guard leaders it could be worthwhile for us to consider—to tee up to—this subject, because, as it was stated several times, we keep coming back to it. So maybe this is something for us to think about in the future.

I will tell you what else I took away from this. The next one of these we have, two years from now—put it on your calendar now. We were late getting the invites out this year, and I apologize, but sometimes there are distractions. For us to do this, we have to get permission from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and sometimes that is easy, and sometimes it is more difficult; but put it on your calendar for two years from now. Two years from now, I want us to hear from the Regional Sea Power Symposia. The Chief of the JMSDF [Admiral Furusho]—we heard your comments about the symposium that was held in Japan last, and I believe that it would be very valuable for us to hear the actions that are occurring out of these events. When I was in Venice with you, [Admiral] Marcello [de Donno] you set up some task forces to do work [on] follow-on problems, and now I will tell you, Marcello, at the end of this—the symposium is over, and as we were going through it, I realized that I should have had part of the agenda, the discussion, that led to specific actions that you directed and that the delegates agreed to, so that we could have this collective growth that comes from the regional structure. Next time I intend to do that. To the maximum extent possible, we want to be parties to these kinds of things; when we are invited to the regional structures, we will be there. So, this has been very valuable to me.

It seems to me that the focus of our discussions has taken us to the point where I might just close with this thought. If I had my way, what I would do now is go to a large boardroom and get the chiefs together, and just sit down and talk about the challenges each one of us is facing. I would love to hear what is going on inside your heads. At lunches, at dinner, and at sidebar discussions, I have shared with a number of you, and I am taken at how similar our challenges are: people; money; which ship to design and buy, and how to convince the legislature that this is a good thing; and how to get posture for the challenges that we face. All of us are facing the same kind of things. I would love for us to have time to just sit down and talk. But that is not the way we laid out the symposium, and, everybody, your time schedules are just incredible.

One of the things that has been driven home to me is—as our nations make judgments about how they will invest the nation’s resources, and they are all doing that; around the world nations are making those judgments—how important it is for us as services to win in the marketplace. Now, that is an economic term that is not oftentimes used in war-fighting parlance, but I am convinced that all of those scenarios that were up on the screen represent the marketplace—the marketplace of challenges and problems that our nations are facing in the world.

I am a very joint guy, and I do not get up and ever speak negatively about the army or the air force or the Marine Corps or the coast guard. I do not do that because I have learned that none of us can do it by ourselves, and our country and we
must work together. But I will say this—that I am more convinced after three years and three months in this job, that if I can’t handle these kinds of challenges, my Congress, my leaders, will be looking to see if one of those other guys can handle it better.

This is why I said, on the first day of this symposium, that we face difficult and demanding challenges. Some of these scenarios do not have good answers to them—which is why they were up there, because they are difficult. It is why I believe, more than ever, that we must figure out how to partner together to maximize the outcomes that are available to us. That is my very, very self-centered view—all about my own personal needs and requirements—but it is about how I can make my navy more effective and I can have it win in the marketplace. I want each of you to know that, since I am going to be around for a couple of more years, I am looking forward to working with every one of you, figuring out how we, working together, can do that. I used examples on the first day, talking about points of cooperation that are already helping me.

The issue of technology and C4I and interoperability conductivity came up time and again. I am asked frequently, “You are going very, very fast; are you going to slow down?” I want to assure you that the answer is “No!” But I also want to say this to this collective body: these guys sitting on the front row down here—we all work together, and they work in different parts of the world. They have a task to be spending their resources to develop solutions to reach halfway toward everybody else, because we understand that is part of being a partner. I want you to know that the gates are wide open on how we can utilize the explosion in technology to help us be better connected. That is the direction that these guys have been given, and that is what we intend to do to be better partners. In order to make that a reality, I am just asking myself a question, and it might be a question that we ask ourselves collectively. Looking at those scenarios, and let us say they are two years from now, I ask myself, “How do I want to write the headline that is going to result from my navy’s being involved in that scenario?” Whatever it is that I need to make happen between now and two years from now to gain the ability to write that headline, I need to get working on.

So to each and every one of you, I look forward to the creation of these partnerships in better and more meaningful ways, so that we can write those headlines together in a way that makes sure that we are winning in the marketplace—so that when the scenario is complete, somebody does not say, “Wow, why did we commit the navy to that? Why is the navy having so much trouble dealing with that?” The difficult issues that we need to raise to the political leadership, that we need to raise inside our structure—I am most interested in the development of these views and ideas so that I can take them up in my government to force the issue in the international domain, so that we can deal with these kinds of challenges effectively in the future.

I wish you well as you head to your homes, and I thank each of you. I was thinking how different we all are in the different cultures that we come from. The secretary yesterday talked about all of you that are in the middle of Ramadan and how important it was that you became part of this. It emphasizes our differences, and I appreciate the step that you took to be part of us in the middle of this very special and important season to you. As we acknowledge our differences, I would
like to focus also on how much we have in common. One of the things that we have in common is, those ships cut through the same kind of ocean and that water all smells about the same. If you fall in it, it is always salty. On those seas, we get a chance to do things for our nations, working together; we can get a chance to do things for this whole world, and to face the challenges victoriously in the first part of the new millennium, in the twenty-first century. So, to each and every one of you, it has been a great honor to have you here. We regret the fact that it was four years between events, but we invite you to make reservations for two years from now, and we look to seeing all of you who are continuing to serve then—and if you are not, please make great representation to those who relieve you that this is a wonderful thing for them to do and that when they come year after next, they will be encouraged to get up and dance with the CNO. Take care.

Captain Romano, United States:

Thank you, Admiral Clark. This concludes the sixteenth biennial International Seapower Symposium. Please have a safe trip home, gentlemen.
Seminar Working Groups

During the first two days of the symposium, participants worked together in plenary sessions at which panels of speakers addressed issues of common concern. On the afternoon of Tuesday, 28 October 2003, participants divided into eight groups for seminar discussions. These discussions were intended to draw further insights from participants on issues addressed by the speakers during the plenary sessions.

Each seminar focused on one of eight scenarios provided by the Naval War College. Participants played the role of a multinational task force undertaking operational planning for the scenario described. Key objectives were to identify issues likely to arise, possible solutions, and areas requiring further study.

Each seminar group had two moderators from the Naval War College faculty, one with operational expertise and one with expertise on international political issues. In addition, the College’s International Law Department provided each seminar group with an expert on legal issues and rules of engagement.

A spokesman for each seminar group briefed highlights of its discussion in the final plenary session of the symposium on the morning of Wednesday, 29 October.

**Figure 1. Scenario Map**

![Scenario Map Diagram]

Legend:
- **ORANGE**
  - BALMORAL
  - ORANGE FFG (1)
  - ORANGE FF (1)
  - ORANGE PCM (2)
- **BILLEROY**
  - ORANGE FIGHTERS (8)
- **GUNBAR**
  - ORANGE FFG (2)
  - ORANGE FF (1)
  - ORANGE PCM (2)

- **GREEN**
  - PORT ALBERT
  - GREEN FFG (2)
  - GREEN FF (2)
  - GREEN PCM (3)
  - GREEN PC (4)
  - CDOM LAUNCH SITE
- **CENTERVILLE**
  - GREEN MPA (4)
  - GREEN FIGHTERS (26)
- **PORT NAPIER**
  - GREEN FFG (2)
  - GREEN FF (2)
  - GREEN PCM (3)
  - GREEN SS (1)
  - GREEN AOR (1)
  - CDOM LAUNCH SITE
Orders of Battle

Orange/Green Forces’ Order of Battle:

Orange

- (3) FFG
- (2) FF
- (4) PCM
- (8) Fighter Aircraft

Green

- (4) FFG
- (4) FF
- (6) PCM
- (4) PC
- (1) Diesel Submarine
- (1) AOR
- (20) Fighter Aircraft
- (4) Maritime Patrol Aircraft
- (2) CDCM Launch Sites

Green/Orange Platform Capabilities:

- **FFG**
  - Max Speed: 29 knots
  - Max Range: 4,500 nm (20 knots)
  - Surface-to-Air Missiles
    - Range: 5.5 nm/Speed: Mach 3
  - Surface-to-Surface Missiles
    - Range: 66 nm/Speed: 0.9 Mach
  - Guns: 100 mm
  - Antisubmarine Mortars
    - Range: 1,200 m
  - Radars: Air/Surface Search; Fire Control
  - Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search
  - ASW/OTH-T: (1) Multipurpose Helicopter

- **FF**
  - Max Speed: 28 knots
  - Max Range: 4,500 nm (12 knots)
  - Surface-to-Air Missiles
    - Range: 2.7 nm
  - Guns: 114 mm
  - Torpedoes
  - Antisubmarine Mortars
    - Range: 1,600 m
  - Radars: Air/Surface Search; Fire Control
  - Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search
  - ASW/OTH-T: (1) Multipurpose Helicopter
• **PCM**
  - Max Speed: 22 knots
  - Max Range: 1,140 nm (17 knots)
  - Guns: 40 mm (Aft); 20 mm (Forward); Machine Guns
  - Depth Charges
  - Radars: Surface Search
  - Sonars: Hull-mounted Active Attack

• **Green Diesel Submarine**
  - Max Speed: 10 knots (Surfaced)/17 knots (Dived)
  - Torpedoes
  - Mines: 24 In Lieu of Torpedoes
  - Radars: Surface Search
  - Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active/Passive Search and Attack

• **Green AOR**
  - Max Speed: 18 knots
  - Max Range: 18,000 nm (14 knots)
  - Cargo Capacity
    - 10,550 tons of Fuel
    - 200 tons of Feed Water
    - 200 tons of Drinking Water
  - (1) Medium Helicopter

• **Green MPA**
  - Speed: 350 knots (Max)/170 knots (Patrol)
  - Range: 4,900 mi
  - Max Endurance: 18 hr
  - Weapons
    - Air-to-Surface Missiles (31 nm)
    - Standard Bombs
    - Depth Charges
    - Torpedoes

• **Orange/Green Fighters**
  - Max Speed: 1.25 Mach
  - Max Altitude: 66,000 ft
  - Combat Radius: 432 nm
  - Weapons
    - Air-to-Air Missiles
    - Air-to-Surface Rockets
    - 750kg General-Purpose Bombs

• **Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles**
  - Speed: 0.9 Mach
  - Range: 50 nm
  - Guidance: Autopilot and Active Radar-Fire and Forget

**Multinational Forces’ Order of Battle:**

- (1) CV
- (2) DDG
- (1) FFG
• (4) Fast Attack PC
• (1) Diesel Submarine
• (1) Combat Support Ship
• (1) Amphibious Assault Ship

**Multinational Forces’ Platform Capabilities:**

- **CV**
  - Max Speed: 32 knots
  - Max Range: 7,500 nm (18 knots)
  - Surface-to-Air Missiles
    - Range: 7 nm/Speed: 2.4 Mach
  - Guns: 100 mm
  - Radars
    - Air Search (110 nm)
    - Air/Surface Search (140 nm)
    - Fire Control
  - Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search

- **CV Aircraft**
  - 25 Strike/Air Defense Fighters
    - Speed: Mach 1
    - Service Ceiling: 45,000 ft
  - Combat Radius: 300 nm
  - Weapons: Air-to-Surface Missiles (31 nm); Air-to-Air Missiles; Laser-guided Bombs
  - 7 Surface Search/ASW Aircraft
    - Sensors: Surveillance Radar; FLIR; Sonobuoys
    - Weapons: Torpedoes; Depth Bombs
  - 2 ASW Helicopters
    - Torpedoes; Depth Charges

- **FFG**
  - Max Speed: 29 knots
  - Max Range: 4,500 nm (20 knots)
  - Surface-to-Air Missiles
    - Range: 25 nm/Speed: Mach 2
  - Guns: 76 mm
  - Torpedoes
  - Radars
    - Air Search (250 nm)
    - Air/Surface Search (140 nm)
    - Fire Control
  - Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search
  - ASW/OTH-T: (2) Multipurpose Helicopters

- **Fast Attack PC**
  - Max Speed: 38 knots
  - Surface-to-Surface Missiles
    - 4 to 8 Missiles (depends on torpedo loadout)
    - Range: 70 nm/Speed: 0.9 Mach
• Guns: 76 mm
• Torpedoes
• Radars: Air/Surface Search; Fire Control

DDG
• Max Speed: 29 knots
• Max Range: 4,000 nm (18 knots)
• Surface-to-Air Missiles
  • Range: 21.5 nm/Speed: Mach 2
• Guns: 114 mm
• Torpedoes
• Radars
  • Air Search (145 nm)
  • Air/Surface Search (140 nm)
  • Fire Control
• Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search
• ASW/OTH-T: (2) Multipurpose Helicopters

• Submarine
• Max Speed: 12 knots (Surfaced)/20 knots (Dived)
• Surface-to-Surface Missiles
  • Range: 70 nm/Speed: 0.9 Mach
• Torpedoes
• Weapons Mix: Total of 20 SSM and Torpedoes
• Radars: Surface Search
• Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search/Passive Search and Attack

• Support Ship
• Max Speed: 26 knots
• Max Range: 6,000 nm (25 knots)
• Cargo Capacity
  • 177,000 Barrels of Fuel
  • 2,150 Tons of Ammunition
  • 500 Tons of Dry Stores
  • 250 Tons of Refrigerated Stores
• 2 Helicopters

• Amphibious Assault Ship
• 1,500 Troops Embarked
• 10 CH-53 Helicopters
• 2 LCPL

• Littoral Combat Ship
• Primary Missions
  • Mine Warfare
  • Small Boat Prosecution
  • Inherent Missions (SOF, NEO, MIO, Medical, etc.)
  • Littoral ASW
• Top Speed: 40–50 knots
• Weapons: 57 mm Gun; CIWS; Mission-Specific Module Packages, including UVs
• “Hybrid Lily Pad” for MH-60 R/S Helo and VTUAVs
Seminar Working Group One
Freedom of Navigation

Participants:

Moderators
Operational Perspective: CAPT Walter J. Richardson, USN
Policy Perspective: Prof Craig M. Koerner
Legal Perspective: LCDR Errol D. Henriques, USN

Country Delegate
Bangladesh RADM Shah Iqbal Mujtaba, Chief of Navy
Barbados LCDR Errington Shurland, Chief of Barbados Defense Force Coast Guard
Brunei COL Matussin Joharie Bin Haji, Commander, Royal Brunei Navy
Cameroon VADM Guillaume N’Gouah N’Gally, COS Cameroon Navy
China VADM Zhou Borong, Deputy Chief of Staff—Plans
Egypt RADM Mohamed Ibrahim Madyn
Finland CDR Tapio Maijala, Commander Kotka Coastal District
Guatemala CAPT Otto Guillermo Wantland Carcamo, Commander of Caribbean Command
India CG Deputy Inspector General A. Rajashekhar, Commander, Coast Guard District #1 Gujarat
Kuwait CG LT COL Abdallah A. Dashti, Commander, Squadron 74, Kuwait Naval Forces
Malta MAJ Martin Cauchi Inglott, Squadron Commander, Armed Forces of Malta, Maritime Squadron
Netherlands VADM Ruurt A. A. Klaver, Commander in Chief, Royal Netherlands Navy
South Africa VADM Johan F. Retief, Chief of South African Navy
United Kingdom ADM Jonathan Band, Royal Navy, Commander in Chief, Fleet
Venezuela

RADM Jaime Toro Calderon,
President, Venezuelan NWC

United States

ADM Thomas H. Collins, USCG,
Commandant of the Coast Guard

United States

RADM Ronald A. Route, USN,
President, Naval War College

United States

Mr. Gerard Yoest, Political Advisor to the
Commandant of the Coast Guard

**Freedom of Navigation Scenario and Questions Posed:**

Recently, the governments of Green and Orange have seen a golden opportunity to control their adjoining strait (the internationally recognized Orange-Green strait). Orange and Green declare that they will "take certain actions to protect the Orange-Green strait environment from destruction by the heavy merchant shipping traffic of the world’s wealthy nations." “We will crack down on substandard shipping and put in place regulatory measures that will see to a smooth flow of traffic while at the same time substantially reducing the probability of accidents involving hazardous cargoes.” Accordingly, Orange and Green join forces to charge a tariff to all vessels transiting this key international waterway. The tariff will be used “to defray the cost of the regulatory teams ensuring substandard shipping does not transit the strait and to pay for cleanup teams chartered with environmental protection in the strait.”

Last year, over half of the world’s merchant fleet capacity sailed through the Orange-Green strait. Although extremely limited alternate routes are available, closure of the strait would be extremely expensive for some states and disastrous for others. Having to divert merchant cargoes around Green (a large and extended archipelagic nation) would increase shipping rates, decrease annual available cargo capacity, and eventually affect consumer prices. Orange is a relatively small continental nation.

Shortly after Orange and Green begin their tariff collection campaign, vessel insurance rates begin to increase significantly, and the slowdown of traffic through this strait starts to have a critical detrimental effect on the globalized economy as the resources distribution cycle is hampered. Accordingly, the United Nations forms a coalition multinational task force (MNTF) of the willing to ensure freedom of navigation (FON) through the strait.

- How does the MNTF do mission analysis?
- What is the public affairs plan for the MNTF (press embedded or not)?
- How does the MNTF deal with the coastal defense cruise missile (CDCM) threat from Green?
- How does the MNTF deal with potential mine threats?
- What preemptive actions (if any) would be warranted? Strike CDCM and/or mine storage sites? What action (if any) is warranted if intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets detect mines on the pier next to Green or Orange vessels? What action (if any) is warranted if ISR assets reveal a CDCM site is manned and has a missile uploaded?
- What is the MNTF’s role with respect to Green and Orange naval vessels?
A MNTF vessel escorting an oil tanker through the strait is hit with a CDCM launched from Green. What actions are available to the MNTF?

Another MNTF vessel hits a mine in the strait and is dead in the water. Both Green and Orange deny it was one of their mines. Neither country will allow the stricken vessel to enter port for repairs. What recourses are available to the MNTF?

Was the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional resources (if any) would the MNTF need?

How does the MNTF gauge mission accomplishment?

Summary of the Discussion in Seminar One:

- **Mission**
  - Ensure FON (i.e., increase commerce flow)

- **Assumptions**
  - No success with economic/diplomatic [influence]; therefore, military actions appropriate
  - UNSCR to uphold right-of-passage
  - No preemptive mandate from UN
  - Lead-nation command structure

- **Campaign Concept of Ops**
  - Strong ISR to ID and “reduce” threats
  - Sufficient MNTF resources for show-of-force mission
  - IO campaign critical; must include deterrents (i.e., trip-wires, demarches)
  - Graduated transit sequence for risk mitigation

- **Recommended ROE**
  - Not preemptive, but close (i.e., robust definition of “hostile intent”)
  - Response proportional to current and future threat

- **Probable ROE**
  - May have to operate under “self-defense plus.”

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**Participants:**

**Moderators**

- Operational Perspective: CAPT Steven D. Kornatz, USN
- Policy Perspective: Prof Bradd Hayes
- Legal Perspective: CAPT Grimord

**Country Delegate**

- Albania: RADM Kudret Celaj, Commandant of Albanian Navy
- Brazil: RADM Marcus Vinicius, Director, Brazilian NWC
Piracy Scenario and Questions Posed:

Recently, there has been a rapidly increasing number of piracy incidents in and around the Green-Orange strait. While presenting a danger to the welfare of the ships’ crews involved and preventing the ships from plying their trade, the piracy attacks also present a hazard to navigation in these shallow and restricted waters. Reportedly, neither the Green nor Orange government is supporting the pirates.

A UN MNTF has been formed to combat the rising piracy. The MNTF’s charter is to deter and/or apprehend the perpetrators of these piracy acts. The Green-Orange
strait is, however, one of the world’s busiest, and there are many vessels of many
types plying these waters on a daily basis.

How does the MNTF do mission analysis?

Accordingly, how does the MNTF position its assets to deter the pirates?

What is the relationship between the MNTF commander and nongovernmental
organizations (International Piracy Center in Kuala Lumpur, shipping companies,
insurance companies, etc.)? What is the MNTF’s role in dealing with the pirates?

Will port calls help as a deterrent (presence obvious to pirates)?

What host-nation support would the MNTF seek from Orange and/or Green?
Logistic support; access to ports; airfields; supply, training, and rest facilities; terri-
torial waters; airspace; etc.?

What is the role of MNTF aircraft?

While on patrol, a MNTF ship races to a mayday, and suspected pirates appear
to be leaving the area of a piracy act with an Orange military vessel escort. What op-
tions are available to the MNTF ship?

What if the pirates and escort are in Orange territorial waters, 5 nm from Gun-
bar Port?

Was the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional
resources (if any) would the MNTF need?

How does the MNTF gauge mission accomplishment?

Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Two:

Seminar Two discussed the implications, challenges, and possible solutions
raised by a piracy scenario. The term piracy is really a misnomer for the scenario
presented. In order to help participants understand the legal issues, two definitions
of piracy were provided. The first is the legal definition:

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, com-
mited for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the juris-
diction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft.

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
sub-paragraph (a) or (b) Article 101 of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The two most important points about the legal definition are that acts of piracy
must be committed “on the high seas,” which has been interpreted to mean beyond
the 12-mile territorial limit and therefore “outside the jurisdiction of any State.”
Under the legal definition, very few acts of piracy actually occur. Almost all of the
statistics offered at the conference and in various news reports come from the Inter-
national Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center. Its definition of piracy is:
Piracy is an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other crime and with the capability to use force in the furtherance of the act.

Under this definition, acts of piracy can occur in territorial waters as well as in port. This raised the first issue in the minds of participants. Regardless of whether the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution authorizing a MNTF, most participants indicated their countries would not provide assets unless both Green and Orange agreed to the operation. When queried as to whether they would contribute forces if only one of the two countries agreed, they were not sure.

The legal advisor also provided a couple of other points he felt participants would find useful:

- Duty to cooperate in the suppression of piracy.
- Right of approach and visit.
  - To verify the nationality of the vessel.
  - If reasonable grounds, may investigate for piracy.
- Sovereign immune vessels.
  - Flag state has authority to take law enforcement action.
- The inherent right of self-defense.
  - All ships and aircraft are entitled to take necessary and proportionate measures in self-defense.

He also talked about the Right of Passage:

- Transit passage through straits overlapped by territorial seas:
  - All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage.
  - Continuous and expeditious transit.
  - Surface, air, submerged.
  - No threat or use of force against the coastal nations.
  - May not be suspended.

The legal advisor said of the Right of Hot Pursuit:

- When a pirate vessel is fleeing from international waters into territorial seas or archipelagic waters:
  - Every effort should be made to obtain consent of the coastal nation.
  - Entry without consent is a serious matter.
  - Entry may be undertaken if consent cannot be obtained, but must be broken off if the coastal nation so requests.
  - Jurisdiction devolves to the coastal nation.
- Pursuit may be undertaken through international straits.

Participants were asked to do some quick regressive planning, beginning with the desired end state. The scenario indicated that the UN resolution discussed deterring and/or apprehending those involved in piracy. The participants added that they wanted to secure safe transit passage for all ships in the Green/Orange Strait,
with the ultimate goal of making the strait pirate-free. To do this, they realized they
would have to eliminate all pirate safe havens ashore.

To help participants consider how they might obtain these goals, they were
asked to list the strengths and weaknesses of the pirates. Among the pirates’
strengths were anonymity, the fact that they had the initiative, their familiarity with
local geography, their local support (be it governmental or private), their low oper-
ating costs, and their inside intelligence. Among the weaknesses listed were
knowledge about MNTF operations, logistics (they were dependent on local re-
sources), their limited endurance, the fact that they were lightly armed with few
defenses, and their lack of legitimacy.

When asked what forces they would prefer to have for the MNTF, most partici-
pants agreed that a high (frigates and corvettes)/low (fast patrol boats and
helicopters) mix would be ideal. They said in planning the MNTF they would pre-
fer to look at what capabilities would be needed rather than what platforms.
Foremost among needed capabilities would be good intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. They pointed out that organically gathered intelligence would be
insufficient to meet the problem. They were interested in fusing a large amount
of intelligence provided by organic assets, national and international intelligence
agencies, shipping firms, brokerage firms, port authorities, law enforcement, etc.
This, they felt, would be the single most important challenge to accomplish if the
operation was to succeed.

In preparing a concept of operations for the MNTF, participants recommended
a three-tiered approach: deterrence actions, alerting actions, and response actions.
They believed that “just being there,” like a cop on the beat, would deter much of
the piracy. Alerting actions included good command and control of the MNTF, as
well as providing transiting ships with warnings when pirates were in the area. Be-
cause pirates are generally lightly armed, minimum resistance can normally
discourage them. When deterrence failed, the task force had to be prepared to re-
spend with boarding teams, fast patrol boats, armed helicopters, etc.

Participants took a broad, holistic view of the problem. They realized that no
task force would ultimately succeed if pirates could continue to muster local sup-
port. As a result, they wanted the international community to undermine local
support by demonstrating it was more profitable for them to cooperate with law
enforcement than to support the pirates. They were not sanguine that piracy could be
eliminated completely and, therefore, argued that the goal should be to turn en-
forcement of the strait over to local governments. To this end, they recommended
that Orange and Green forces be an integral part of the MNTF. Offering training
and assets would also be an incentive for local governments to come to grips with
the problem.

During a previous plenum discussion involving piracy, one delegate raised the
issue of piracy in the territorial waters of a “failed state.” Since it was raised earlier,
the issue was discussed in the seminar. The first issue raised was that no legal defini-
tion of a failed state currently exists. As a result, there can be no authoritative
responses as to what might be legal when no legitimate or functioning national gov-
ernment exists. The legal advisor believed that the international community would
be on solid ground if it responded to piracy even within territorial waters if the

Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
littoral state had no means to enforce the law on its own. Not everyone agreed that was a correct interpretation of the law.

Another topic broached during discussions was rules of engagement. Delegates felt that adopting a series of escalating ROE would ensure that the right rules were used in the right situation. They were very interested in making sure that only proportional force be used. Looking at the intimidating order of battle provided for the MNTF, one participant remarked, “You don’t want to use a cannon to shoot a mosquito.” Participants were very interested in pursuing nonlethal weapons that could be used to stop pirate vessels.

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**Seminar Working Group Three**

**Preventing Loss of Life at Sea**

**Participants:**

**Moderators**
- Operational Perspective: CDR Jeffrey Barker, USN
- Policy Perspective: Prof Peter Dombrowski
- Legal Perspective: Prof Dennis Mandsager

**Country**
- **Canada**
  - RADM Glenn V. Davidson, Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
- **Croatia**
  - RADM Zdravko Kardum, Commander in Chief, Croatian Navy
- **Ecuador**
  - LCDR Mac Abelardo Mera, Sub-Director of Naval Education and Training
- **Egypt**
  - RADM Mohammed Ali Mohamed Zaki
- **France**
  - VADM Alain Dumontet, Commander, Naval Action Force
- **Greece**
  - RADM Ioannis Goulousis, Deputy Chief of Hellenic Naval Staff
  - Commodore Christos Karadimss
- **Honduras**
  - COL Nelson Mejia Mejia, Commander of the Honduran Navy
- **Iceland**
  - MR Asgrimur L. Asgrimsson, Head of Survey Division, Icelandic Coast Guard
- **New Zealand**
  - Commodore Patrick Williams, Defense Attaché, Washington
- **Pakistan**
  - ADM Shahid Karimullah, Chief of Naval Staff
Philippines  Commodore Carlos Agustin,  
President of the Philippine National Defense College

Spain  ADM Angel Tafalla Balduz,  
Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Turkey  RADM Ilker Guven, Commander,  
Turkish Naval War College

Venezuela  RADM Leopoldo Aponte Gonzalez,  
Chief of Naval Education and Training

United States  RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.),  
Director, Center for Strategic Studies,  
CNA Corporation

Preventing Loss of Life at Sea Scenario and Questions Posed:

While the MNTF is conducting freedom of navigation operations in the Orange-Green strait, one of the task force vessels stops and boards a vessel that appears to be unseaworthy and dangerously overloaded. Once onboard, the boarding party finds that many of the personnel on this wayward vessel appear deathly ill from lack of water, food, and sanitary facilities. The vessel also lacks basic safety equipment and is being operated by inexperienced sailors. Green and Orange both say they have inadequate medical facilities to handle such a large number of sick personnel and refuse to allow the wayward vessel to dock in any of their ports.

What does the MNTF do? It appears that many of the ill will perish in the next few days if they don’t receive immediate medical care.

How do you balance the humanitarian exigency with your primary mission, freedom of navigation through the strait?

What would you do if you discovered this wayward vessel was in fact smuggling migrants when you boarded it?

What would your ROE be if the migrants onboard began to riot, set fires, or even attempt to create flooding or explosions to protest your presence onboard the smuggling vessel?

As the MNTF commander, you receive word that it may take weeks to finalize the disposition of the wayward vessel personnel as the international community negotiates direct repatriation or the assistance of a neutral government. What do you do?

Was the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional resources (if any) would the MNTF need?

Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Three:

Scenario: In the straits of two coastal countries vying for supremacy over the use of the straits, a MNTF boards an unseaworthy vessel that is overcrowded with sick and infirm passengers. Master does not ask for assistance but agrees to be boarded. Ship’s crew is inexperienced, and there is no safety equipment. Neither coastal state actor will agree to take the vessel into its port. MNTF Mission: Freedom of Navigation under UN Mandate.
Issues

- ROE.
- Peril at sea.
- Vessel appears to be unseaworthy and overloaded.
- Does MNTF have the authority to board?
- Under what authority?
- Do coastal states have a legal right to deny aid under Law of the Sea (right of safe harbor)?
- Vessel is a hazard to navigation.
- Boarding this vessel could be seen as an act outside the Freedom of Navigation mission.
- Op order for UN MNTF is very mission specific.
- Is the master to be held responsible to a court of law?
- Which country is the vessel flagged to, and where is the vessel bound for?
- Illegal migration; no apparent papers.
- Did the MNTF vessel that boarded the unseaworthy vessel have orders from the task force commander?

Comments from the Panel Members

- Once you board the vessel for any reason, the responsibility for the life of the people [becomes] the MNTF’s.
- The MNTF steps into the shoes of the flag state.
- Suggestion: We give them humanitarian help (water, food, and medical assistance), but we keep the captain and crew responsible unless the ship is sinking. Help, but do not interfere. Legally, the flagged country is responsible.
- Coastal states should take the ship, but [there is] no way of enforcing the law.
- Take the ship just outside the harbor, but render humanitarian assistance.
- Suggestion: Keep the people off your ship, and assess the situation and contact the United Nations.
- World opinion would dictate action on the part of the MNTF.
- Does the primary mission take precedence over the humanitarian aid requirement?
- Suggestion: Arrest the people responsible (master and crew) and take people to Medical on one of our ships.
- If we make one of the coastal countries take the people off the ship (safe harbor), this does not validate any excessive claim for control of the straits.
- The flag state of the ship should exercise police action.
- Moderator’s comment: What would your countries’ ships do if they were the ship that stopped and boarded the unseaworthy vessel? If you were part of a MNTF, would you consider yourself under international law or your country’s laws in governing the behavior of your vessel?
- Who takes the responsibility? National responsibility (the ship that does the boarding would follow its country’s policies on authority when in this situation).
Action by one member means the responsibility is assumed by the task force commander.

Does it matter who the task force commander’s country is [in determining] what the commander’s decision will be?

The nature of this problem is political, and it is to whom I report.

If the task force commander tells you to board, can the onsite commander refuse because it goes against the SOP of the onsite commander’s country?

When public affairs/opinion kicks in, it becomes the UN’s responsibility.

Concluding Discussions

1. Mission continues.
2. It is moral and legal to rescue the people, and it is legal to provide safe harbor; the delegates had differing views on safe harbor.
3. [There is a] need for a multinational CONOPS to cover this situation, [as there is] insufficient guidance at the multinational level. As soon as you take [the people] onboard your vessel, national rules come into effect.
4. [There is a] need for guidance for MNTF.
5. The action taken leads to responsibility.
6. As you form your MNTF, [it] needs to address these situations. (In writing.) Humanitarian aid assistance is a national responsibility. A statement regarding boarding policy [is needed].
7. Distressed mariners (not policing rep).
8. Not just your action but your reaction to the participants (captain and refugees).

Final Conclusions and Briefing Points

1. Mission continues.
2. Action taken leads to responsibility.
3. Distressed mariners.
5. Build exercises into program.

Seminar Working Group Four
Naval Support to Civil Authorities

Participants:

Moderators
Operational Perspective: CAPT Michael Critz, USN
Policy Perspective: Prof Geoffrey Wawro
Legal Perspective: CAPT Hayes
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<td>Argentina</td>
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Naval Support to Civil Authorities Scenario and Questions Posed:

Environmental Warriors, a world-renowned activist organization, has been prolific in its attempts to deter oil-laden vessels from transiting the narrow strait between Green and Orange. Environmental Warriors claims many unsafe vessels are plying these waters and that it is only a matter of time before one of these vessels collides in the strait or runs aground and causes an oil spill, with dire consequences to Green and Orange and the surrounding environment. Environmental Warriors wants all oil-laden vessels to take alternate routes, avoiding the strait. Economically, any diversions would be cost prohibitive. Both the Green and Orange governments appear to be giving tacit approval to the efforts of Environmental Warriors, as neither country has condemned the Warriors’ actions, nor have they used any military or law enforcement assets to curtail the Warriors’ campaign.

Today, a UN MNTF patrolling in the strait, chartered with stopping the Environmental Warriors’ efforts against FON, receives a mayday from an oil tanker entering the western approaches to the strait. The mayday reports that at the break of dawn, seventy members of Environmental Warriors used grappling hooks to sneak their way onboard the oil tanker and overwhelm the crew. In his last broadcast over channel 16, the ship’s master indicated that the activists were demanding that the ship turn around and avoid completing its transit through the strait. The master said there is insufficient space to turn the vessel around safely and to do so would risk a grounding or collision, with the attendant environmental circumstances.

One MNTF ship is close to the oil tanker’s position. What does the MNTF commander task the ship to do?

The oil tanker continues to turn dangerously in the strait approaches despite repeated warnings from the MNTF ship on scene. What action(s) are now authorized?

Without other recourse, the MNTF ship damages the screws on the oil tanker, leaving it dead in the water.

What is the MNTF ship authorized to do with the Environmental Warriors activists?

What if the activists use force to resist the MNTF ship’s boarding party?

Was the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional resources (if any) would the MNTF need?

Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Four:

- What are we thinking on the strategic level?
- This is a straits operation, plain and simple.
- We must assume that our governments have agreed to the mission; now let’s make some ROE.
- Our mission: secure freedom of navigation.
- FON doesn’t include military transit unless Green and Orange agree.
- We will use minimum levels of force.
- Shouldn’t UN go to Orange and Green and tell them that they have a responsibility to keep the strait open, and that we’ll assist?
- Our force is overkill—we may have to pick and choose.
• The carrier and sub will move out to the eastern entrance to provide ISR; we will detach standard protection for the carrier: DDG, AOE. That gives us two groups, an air-heavy group with support, and the PCs to patrol and escort in the strait.

• Logistics are a huge concern. How do we sustain the flights, particularly given that the carrier needs “sea room” to do flight ops—i.e., longer distances to and from the strait.

• Ship has been boarded; a Mayday has been received—what do we do? Move vessels and helicopters to the area. Lean on the governments that support Environmental Warriors. (One participant dissented: Organizations like Greenpeace have a very positive public image. We must be careful here.)

• We must not let the tanker turn around. Stop him, or repossess the ship.

• We must exhaust all diplomatic options to gain control of the ship before using force. One participant recommends calling the hijackers on their radio and asking if they need help, particularly after we shot their propellers.

• Who would be so stupid as to shoot the screws of a big ship in a narrow strait? We don’t have tugs to control the ship. Who gave that order? (Admiral, was it you? Ha, ha.)

• We must call the hijackers and ask if they need help. They probably feel trapped, helpless on the uncontrollable ship.

• The principle of ROE must be the appropriate level of force. We screwed up; we went beyond minimum ROE and shot their screws, thus making ourselves part of the problem.

• Do we talk or do we act? And how much leeway do we have, anyway, since the ship is now out of control. We now have to act.

• Areas for further study—address enviro concerns of Environmental Warriors, and also Orange and Green, who may not like all this risky transit. Maybe there should be a pipeline.

• We should work harder on regional cooperation, so that Orange and Green will solve such problems themselves.

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Seminar Working Group Five
Antiterrorism/MIO; Suspected WMD at Sea

Participants:

Moderators

Operational Perspective: CAPT William C. Reed, USN
Policy Perspective: Prof James Fitzsimonds
Legal Perspective: Prof Wolff von Heinegg

Country Delegate

Australia Commodore Russell R. Baker,
Director General, Navy Strategic Policy and Futures
Numerous acts of worldwide terrorism have been traced back to country Green. Green is apparently trying to export a new brand of extremism that has a nascent following in numerous countries. Agents of Green and their supporters have routinely used terrorist acts when their interests have been threatened. It is believed that Green maritime vessels are the primary means for inserting terrorist teams into target countries. The government of Green appears to have acquiesced to the operations of terrorist organizations from within its borders but has been
extremely careful in not providing active support to these groups in order to main-
tain its claims as a state that does not sponsor terrorism.

Sensitive intelligence has revealed that Green intends to make a significant
statement warning “the enemies of Green’s enlightening extremism” with warning
of a catastrophic terrorist attack at the upcoming Olympic Games.

A MNTF has been sent to the waters off Green to deter potential terrorist de-
ployments. Yesterday, commercial satellite imagery revealed a high level of activity
at a known terrorist camp in Green. Security has been increased around the camp’s
perimeter, and numerous trucks have arrived in the past few days. Intelligence ana-
lysts believe the trucks may be used to transport terrorist personnel to merchant
ships located in Green’s major port. Detecting the loading of terrorist personnel on
merchants pierside is highly improbable.

Given this, can MNTF ships legally stop Green merchant vessels as they leave
port in Green territorial waters? Terrorist vessels are continually given new ficti-
tious names, repainted or reregistered using invented corporate owners, all while
plying the high seas. Given this, if the terrorist-laden merchants reach interna-
tional waters, they will be impossible to track and cross-decking of terrorists with
other vessels cannot be discounted.

What is the MNTF’s role with respect to any Green actions to prevent the
MNTF’s antiterrorist ops?

**Suspected WMD at Sea Scenario and Questions Posed:**

Country Green is again up to its nefarious ways. Sensitive intelligence has revealed
that three Green cargo ships are at sea, holding in an area approximately 50 nm
northwest of Green. These vessels, which have been at sea for about one month, are
suspected of carrying Green weapons of mass destruction that may be used to sup-
port terrorist operations. The vessels have refused frequent requests to provide de-
tails of their cargo or destination and are maintaining radio silence.

The same MNTF sent to the waters off Green to deter potential terrorist deploy-
ments remains on patrol. Today, significantly increased communications have
been detected between the cargo ships and a Green military operations entity
known to have supported terrorist operations in the past. Intelligence analysts be-
lieve the cargo ships may be receiving their orders and could get underway at any
time.

Given the likely cargo of these vessels and their imminent departure, can MNTF
ships legally stop these Green vessels in international waters?

It is uncertain if the vessels are carrying chemical, biological, or nuclear weap-
ons. If the Green crews scuttle the vessels, this could potentially cause catastrophic
environmental damage. What courses of action might the MNTF take?

Now consider that the MNTF has advanced equipment to detect the presence of
contraband by visual, chemical, and radiological methods. Does this alter the
courses of action that the MNTF might take?

What is the MNTF’s role with respect to any Green actions to prevent the
MNTF’s antiterrorist ops?

**Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Five:**

Moderator comments or a general sense of discussion is in brackets.
The discussion opened with an invitation for questions:

- Is the area between Green and Orange considered international waters? [They are overlapping territorial seas.]
- Do the two nations have any type of agreement as to the waters? [None that is known.]  
- Are the potential terrorist cargo ships flying the flag of Green? [They have been in the past, but their current flag is not known.]
- Who is in charge of the MNTF? Is there a UNSCR for MNTF operations? [This is not stipulated in the scenario.]
- Are there open seas on either side of Green and Orange? [Yes.]

**General Discussion on Scenario A**

- The terrorist ships are clearly in internal waters.
  - Do we have the right to board and search them in territorial waters?  
  - Does this come under any right to preempt possible attack?
- We must assume that the MNTF is under UN authority and UN control; does such UN authority then allow for MNTF boarding of the ships?
- The first step should be to ask Green to intercede and stop/inspect the ships. Failing that, we should ask Green to allow the MNTF to board the ships.
- It must be assumed (given this scenario) that those measures were already attempted with no cooperation from Green.
- The mission to “deter” is ambiguous.
- Can the MNTF ever legally enter Green territorial waters?
  - The answer is no.
- Agreed, but can the MNTF board the ships in international waters?
  - [Some seemed to think yes, but further discussion led to a consensus that the answer is no here as well, without some legally recognized justification.]
- Then there is the issue of the international strait. What is the law here?
- What is required is a UNSCR that would make the interdiction of terrorists legal and authorized.
- The principal problem in this scenario is that the MNTF must act soon or risk losing the ships on the high seas.
  - [Some felt that it should not be difficult for the MNTF to track the ships on the high seas. Others felt that it would be quite difficult and that the scenario stipulated that there would be some actions by the ships to inhibit tracking. There was a general view that the ships would likely be lost if they were allowed to leave port.]
  - We may have only minutes to hours to act here. That creates a real sense of urgency to act within Green’s territorial waters.
- [Some felt that the scenario offered clear grounds for the MNTF to enter territorial waters and board the Green ships. Others felt very strongly that such grounds did not exist absent a clear UNSCR or authorization from Green, which were not provided in the scenario. The general sense of the opponents of action was that this is a very slippery slope and that justification to act against these ships in this scenario would amount to justification under almost any circumstances.]
• The MNTF needs a much more detailed mission statement. The word “deter” is far too ambiguous.
• But what about the right of self-defense? Doesn’t that come into play here?
  ° [Some felt that the right to self-defense justified action; others felt that it did not.]
• The UN could have authorized action through a UNSCR but evidently did not; thus, the circumstances have not met UN requirements for action.
• This is obviously a political decision, not a military decision. This should be made by senior political authorities and not the MNTF commander.
• True, but the MNTF commander is the one on the scene, and political decision makers have yet to act.
  ° True, but there would be a continuous stream of communications between the MNTF and national/UN authorities in such a situation, seeking direction.
• Can the ships be disabled in their port?
  ° Possibly, but this would again require a political decision.
• We need to gain time for a political decision to act.
  ° True, but the scenario provides no option for gaining time. The ships could depart port in the very near term and then be lost at sea.
• Why not just wait and seize them on the high seas?
  ° Small ships, big ocean.
  ° Does the law allow the stopping and boarding of ships on the high seas?
  ° [No, a lawfully flagged ship cannot be interfered with on the high seas without the permission of the flagging country.]
• [Several delegates were strongly in favor of boarding. At least one delegation came out strongly opposed to boarding.]
• What are the ROE here?
• The UN must be clearer than just “deter.”
• The MNTF commander needs to be, and will want to be, involved in the crafting of the mission statement, to ensure that it is something that is understood operationally all of the way down the chain. The MNTF commander must be able to explain the mission so that all of his subordinates fully understand it.
• What is needed is a “system” that will define the clear legal standing of the MNTF. This needs to work through the mass media to announce the intention of the MNTF. Such a system is not now in place.
• This is much larger than a military issue. The military must demand clarity from the civilian leadership. The military commander shouldn’t be making these types of decisions.
• We need more definitive UNSC guidance.
  ° [But UNSCRs are never definitive because they are the product of political compromise. This is what the military commander has to deal with.]
• The MNTF was dispatched based upon national intentions, and therefore this problem cannot be solved based on majority rule.
• This scenario presents a problem that is dealt with in real life daily. Some MNTF ships cannot do some things. However, they will act in a supporting role to provide defense, logistics, etc.
[This issue was not further developed, but there seemed to be some possible disagreement with the idea that a ship could remain part of a MNTF that was carrying out an act deemed unlawful by that ship’s leaders.]

- MIO operations already have clear ROE.
- This comes under the right of self-defense.
- At what point would the MNTF be allowed to take preemptive action?

**General Discussion on Scenario B**

- What is absolutely critical here is to make a direct link between the WMD on the ships and terrorism. There is nothing illegal about a sovereign ship having WMD on board. Intelligence is critical to making this terrorist connection.
- If the ships are in international waters flying a Green flag, then they can only be stopped by a Green ship, unless the terrorist link can be made. Then there is an obligation to stop and board.
- But this is urgent given the Olympics connection—tens of thousands could be at risk.
- [Most of the delegates voiced the opinion that the scenario provided sufficient grounds for boarding the ships on the high seas. None expressed opposition. Those most vocally in disagreement with action in Scenario A agreed with action in Scenario B. Some expressed the opinion that the urgency or consequences of the act did not alter the law. The boarding is either justified or not justified, regardless of the consequences. Others seemed to feel that the nature of WMD might justify more preemptive actions.]
- [The basis for action was in disagreement:
  - Some held it to be the UN Charter (right of self-defense).
  - One delegation held it to be the Rome Convention (Article 3.1.d).]
- What about new technical capabilities for interdicting a ship?
  - [The law of proportionality applies—the most efficient/effective means.]

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**Seminar Working Group Six**  
**Antiterrorism/Force Protection**

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**Participants:**

**Moderators**

- Operational Perspective: CAPT Mark Seaman, USN
- Policy Perspective: Prof Barney Rubel
- Legal Perspective: Maj Richard Jaques, USMC

**Country Delegate**

- Albania: CAPT Fravini, President, Albanian Naval War College
- Azerbaijan: CAPT First Rank Shahin Asraf Oglu Sultanov, Commander of Naval Forces
- Bulgaria: RADM Emil Ivanov Lyutskanov, Chief of the Bulgarian Navy
Canada  VADM Ronald S. Buck, Chief of Maritime Staff
El Salvador  CAPT Marco Palacios, Navy Chief, Salvadoran Navy
Honduras  CDR Juan Pablo Rodriguez Rodriguez, Honduran Navy Inspector General
Israel  VADM Yedidia Ya’ari, Commander in Chief
Kuwait  MG Ahmad Y. Al Mulla, Chief of Kuwait Naval Forces
Nicaragua  CAPT Juan Santiago Estrada Garcia, Chief of the Nicaraguan Naval Force
Peru  ADM Ricardo Arbocco, Peruvian Chief of Naval Operations
Poland  CAPT Andrzej Felski, Deputy Commandant Polish Naval Staff Officer
Portugal  ADM Francisco Antonio Torres Vidal Abreu, Chief of the Portuguese Navy
Romania  CAPT Vitalian Popescu, Chief N3
Spain  COL Manuel Quiroga Diaz, General Chief of Staff
Turkey  RADM Engen Heper, Commander, Turkish Coast Guard
United States  ADM William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
United States  RADM Albert M. Calland III, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command

**Antiterrorism/Force Protection Scenario and Questions Posed:**

A MNTF ship pulls into an Orange port for refueling and logistics while supporting sanctions enforcement operations against Green. Worldwide, there is significant opposition to the multinational operation against Green, and the possibility of an attack against the MNTF vessel cannot be excluded. In addition, several organizations and their subversives sympathetic to Green are known to operate in Orange. Accordingly, security for the MNTF vessel while pierside is an acute concern, and the ship has increased its security posture.

- What elements of security is the host nation responsible for?
- Are Orange security guards on the pier sufficient?
- What elements of security is the MNTF ship responsible for?
- Are visible, armed guards topside on the MNTF ship appropriate?
- What if the host nation does not view armed guards topside as a “friendly” measure? What are possible alternative measures?

How are sovereignty issues/security concerns between the host nation and the MNTF resolved? Is a better zone (restricted area) needed? How large should the zone be? Who should enforce it?
How do the host nation and MNTF ship collectively guard against swimmer and/or small-boat threats?

Some protection measures might have an impact on the normal functioning of a busy commercial port. How does this figure in defense considerations?

What ROE is appropriate for the MNTF ship against perceived threats while in port?

Should external assets (e.g., special operations forces, marine guards, coast guard security units, etc.) be brought in to ensure force protection while the MNTF ship is in port? What intelligence support would be needed?

How do the external assets coordinate with host-nation security assets?

There are likely to be varying degrees of vulnerability for MNTF ships during port periods. Larger vessels will have larger crews and can muster sufficient security forces for self-defense, whereas a small vessel can possibly be overwhelmed by a significant threat.

How do force protection and host-nation support expectations differ based on MNTF ship size?

What are the roles of threat level and threat assessment in determining antiterrorism/force protection practices?

How are differences resolved between the host nation and visiting forces?

What are the expectations of each under differing threat levels?

How can navies work together and across agencies to reach agreements on threat levels and appropriate responses?

**Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Six:**

1. Members all seemed in complete agreement on the responsibilities and authority delineations between the host country and the ship’s captain. This agreement extended to the policy level.

2. With respect to the role of the MNTF commander and his staff, the picture was a bit less clear. Whereas most members seemed to agree that there might be a role for the MNTF staff in coordinating force protection for port visits, this did not reach the point of command authority. Port visits are strictly the business of the two countries involved. As one member put it: if something happened to a ship from the MNTF in port, how could you establish culpability/responsibility if the MNTF had a force protection planning cell?

3. Buffer zones were brought up as a needed procedure, but their exact nature and who had what authority in them was a matter for the nations involved to decide. There was clear agreement that aboard the ship while in port, the ship’s nation retained authority, because the ship itself is sovereign territory. Ashore, the host nation has the authority.

4. The notion of self-defense authority was briefly discussed, but a detailed examination of it did not ensue. The group decided that they would simply examine the case of the visiting ship being tied up to a pier, or at least anchored within the harbor. The question of whether there were differences in territorial oceanic waters and inland waters was judged to be an unnecessary complication.

5. The delegates addressed the need for ROE but did not address preferences/pros and cons regarding coalition ROE applicable to all vice national ROE... and the assorted mechanisms for coming to agreement (or not) on them. They
generically indicated that the MNTF commander could establish baseline force protection requirements, and the ship’s commanding officer could increase these requirements, but they did not address a scenario in which the MNTF commander establishes baselines that exceed those authorized by the ship’s nation (for example, when the MNTF commander’s requirements allow use of deadly force to protect property but national ROE do not allow this).

6. The group raised the question of how to deal with problems associated with a third nation (for example elements of MNTF) providing some force protection measures for a ship of another nation in Orange. The example, I believe, was elements of one nation providing for boats in the water around the ship from another nation. The seminar did not explore this question.

7. A resolution of issues between the ship’s nation and the host country would be worked through the attachés, while many minor issues could be coordinated and worked out through a coordination center/liaisons.

Principles that Apply

Responsibility for ship’s safety rests with the CO. However, host nation exercises sovereignty within its territorial waters and is responsible for enforcement of its laws and its security. Host nation may or may not allow ship to exercise all the force protection measures it believes necessary. CO’s options are to accept the risks or leave port.

Issues

- How willing and/or capable is host nation for providing security? Two subcategories that apply if the ship pulls into port:
  - The host nation is willing and capable?
  - The host nation is willing and incapable? Unwilling and capable?

Planning Activities

- Information and capabilities sharing between Country Orange, the ship, the ship’s nation, and the MNTF commander can be facilitated by an advanced party or assessment teams.
- A coordination center or liaison between the ship and the host nation is key to resolving issues.
- One of the factors of force protection is physical space. Depending on the level of threat and FP capabilities, establishing buffer zones with access limitations is one method of mitigating risk.

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**Participants:**

**Moderators**

Operational Perspective: CAPT Chester Helms, USN
Policy Perspective: Dr. Andrew Winner
Legal Perspective: CDR Glenn Sulmasy, USCG

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<td>RADM Brian Donkin, Commandant South African Defence College</td>
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<td>CAPT Nick Lambert, Commander, UK Maritime Battle Staff</td>
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<td>VADM James D. Hull, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., Provost, Naval War College</td>
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**Illegal Fishing Scenario and Questions Posed:**

Orange has routinely voiced concerns over illegal fishing in its economic exclusion zone. Orange recently has stated that the dwindling fishing stocks are causing widespread famine among its people and are also having an increasingly disastrous effect on its economy. Orange, an impoverished nation with a vast coastline (approximately 1,000 nm), has only a small navy and coast guard and is able to patrol only small segments of its vast fishing grounds and only on an infrequent basis.
Accordingly, Orange has requested international assistance in enforcing its fishing boundaries. Would a multinational naval force be justified to police Orange’s waters against illegal fishing?

- How big would the policing force need to be?
- What authority would such a policing force have?
- What would the police force’s ROE be if illegal Green fishing craft, supported by Green military vessels, are detected in Orange’s EEZ?
- What host-nation support would be needed from Orange?
- What additional resources (if any) would the MNTF need?

**Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Seven:**

In answer to the first question posed in the scenario, “Where does legal authority start to call in a multinational force?” seminar members discussed whether a MNTF was the way to go first. Many noted that it was necessary to exhaust all diplomatic means of resolving the problem before resorting to a MNTF. Indeed, it was unclear from the scenario brief whether diplomatic means had been attempted and had failed, resulting in the establishment of a MNTF. Eventually, the group agreed to take that as a premise—that diplomacy had failed, or at least had failed so far—in order to move on and consider some of the other issues laid out in the scenario.

Participants discussed real-world examples of cooperation among navies and law enforcement officials to combat illegal fishing. In one example, cooperation between South Africa and Australia in a portion of the southern Indian Ocean helped to deter or drive off illegal fishing boats attempting to fish in areas where endangered species resided and where other states had legal rights. Another example cited was cooperation between the United States and Russia in the Bering Sea. While all agreed that there are real-world examples of both illegal fishing and of international cooperation to combat it, they also noted that the degree to which this is an issue requiring something on the order of a MNTF really depends on the economic impact on the country in question.

The discussion moved to how illegal fishing by Green could be best addressed by multinational assets. Most participants felt that the notional task force provided for by the scenario was overkill for this particular mission, and there was a concern that a large-scale, military-heavy task force would exacerbate rather than calm the situation. The group put forward several sets of suggestions on how to counter this possibility and to best attempt to resolve the problem generally.

First, it was suggested that any multinational force could begin by providing surveillance capabilities and merely providing information to both countries on potential violations before any enforcement actions were even considered. Second, it was suggested, with significant agreement, that at least at the outset of any mission, unit types that were less threatening, such as coast guard or other law enforcement vessels, be used vice navy vessels. Naval vessels would become necessary if Green utilized its navy to accompany fishing vessels from its country in violating Orange’s EEZ (one possibility envisioned in the scenario). All in all, there was strong support for at least initially limiting the MNTF’s role to one of surveillance, tracking, and reporting.
If the mission eventually went beyond this set of tasks, the question of rules of engagement would then arise. The discussion on ROE highlighted various real-world experiences, including the difficulty of disabling shots and how it is difficult to stop a ship without the authority to attempt such shots. One participant noted that the resistance of some lawbreakers in other real-world cases depended on the level of fines and whether a vessel seized would be forfeited. The ROE, it was agreed, depended largely on the political/legal mandate given to the MNTF. In fact, at least one participant noted that the ROE was relatively easy and had been worked out in multilateral instances numerous times, but that the primary issue was political agreement on the overall mission. Again, the discussion of ROE returned to the question of whether the MNTF would escalate the situation or help to resolve it. If the ROE were too robust, it risked making peaceful resolution more difficult. After some discussion, it was agreed that the scenario assumed that sanctions had failed and that the initial task of the MNTF was to deter illegal fishing. It was assumed that deterrence might have to escalate to compelling Green to cease fishing, but that a mission analysis would essentially determine relevant ROE. Finally, it was agreed that the key element was a robust command and control mechanism that would allow rapid consultations and decisions on individual situations.

A discussion also occurred on whether the best method of operation was to have Orange law enforcement officials on board to take custody of Green ships and fishermen or whether the MNTF ought to undertake this portion of the mission. The group debated the pros and cons of including such personnel on MNTF ships.

The discussion also ranged to questions about whether a MNTF of this sort would create a precedent for the future resolution of these types of issues. In discussing that issue, the talk turned to the level of mandate and participation that would be optimal. Many participants felt that a regional or even subregional political framework would be best, rather than escalating the issue all the way to the United Nations at the outset. A subregional mandate might make an exit easier and might be healthier for the region as a whole rather than bringing in outside forces. Another possibility noted was a UN mandate but with subregional state implementation.

It was noted that the issue might not, at times, be completely bilateral. It was also noted that a level of force or pressure somewhat less than military force—namely, economic pressure—might be applied in such a scenario. Others noted that if there were more than two parties involved, then applying an economic embargo against those benefiting from Green fishing might help to resolve the issue. If, however, Green was fishing to feed its people, then this would be an attenuating factor. Depending on the situation, participants also noted that it might be important not to be seen as taking Orange’s side only. The best outcome would be a MNTF and associated measures that forced both sides to the table to negotiate a solution in a serious manner. All agreed, however, that it was critical to understand each side’s motivations for its activities.

A participant asked whether UNCLOS had any meaning in this scenario, and why the issue got to this level if both parties are assumed to be members of the treaty. It was noted that all nations who are signatories to UNCLOS are bound by its provisions but that not all nations were currently participants. It was also noted that the treaty does not contain sanctions provisions for those who violate its clauses.
Member states can complain and take the issue to the United Nations or other organizations, who can then apply sanctions; but UNCLOS, it was concluded, was at best informative and not dispositive. It does not compel signatories to resolve their disputes, nor does it provide clear examples of how this is to be done. In a follow-up legal question, a participant asked if Green could be accused of illegal fishing if it was not an UNCLOS signatory. The answer was given that it was possible under customary international law.

All agreed that this issue, while not highly prevalent today, would likely become one in the future due to population growth and resource scarcity.

Seminar Working Group Eight  
Humanitarian Assistance

Participants:

Moderator

Operational Perspective: CAPT Fred Horne, USN
Policy Perspective: COL John Taska, USMC
Legal Perspective: COL John Phelps, USMC

Country  Delegate

Argentina  GEN Carlos Edgardo Fernandez, Coast Guard Commandant
Belize  MAJ Lloyd Jones, Commanding Officer  Belize Defence Force Maritime Wing
Canada  Commissioner John L. Adams, Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard
Croatia  CDR Predrag Stipanovic, Head of N-5 Plans and Policy
Denmark  RADM Kurt Birger Jensen, Admiral Danish Fleet
El Salvador  CDR Guillermo Jiminez Vasques, Deputy Fleet Commander
Finland  RADM Hans V. Holmstrom, Commander in Chief, Finnish Navy
Italy  ADM Marcello de Donno, Chief of Staff
Kenya  MG P. O. Awitta, Commander of the Kenya Navy
Netherlands  Commodore Jan G. van der Burg, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff for Plans and Policy
Norway  RADM Jan Eirik Finseth, Chief of Staff
Humanitarian Assistance Scenario and Questions Posed:

Orange has been ravaged by civil war between rival ethnic groups, which has divided the military establishment and led to a breakdown of authority. An agreement brokered by the UN has resulted in an uneasy ceasefire, but large concentrations of refugees from both ethnic groups are too intimidated to return to their homes, many of which have been destroyed. Banditry by renegade military units is exacerbating the problems of inadequate food and medical care. To establish an immediate presence in Orange to enforce the ceasefire, a MNTF has been formed as the maritime component of a UN peacekeeping force whose mission is to maintain the ceasefire and provide security. The MNTF is also chartered with establishing conditions for the introduction of follow-on peacekeeping forces and to render communications and logistics aid to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in relief operations. The leaderships of the two military groups are located in the capital city, Billeroy.

How should the MNTF ground forces be employed initially? Under what ROE will they operate? What if the initial entry is opposed?

What support (if any) should be requested from the rival military groups?

Can MNTF aircraft play a role in controlling the situation?

How does the MNTF coordinate with the NGOs?

Is the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional resources (if any) would the MNTF need?

Report of the Discussion in Seminar Eight:

Assumptions

- Multinational task force (MNTF) requires common understanding of standard operating procedures (SOP), doctrine, each other’s capabilities, and the limitations of each other’s rules of engagement (ROE).
- MNTF will be operating under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter in this specific case.
• Tenuous cease-fire exists. MNTF will enforce the cease-fire, separate the fighting factions, and establish the conditions under which the NGOs can perform their roles.
• Warring factions or some local element has requested multinational assistance to maintain the cease-fire. This local element can help determine where to establish aid distribution points, refugee centers, and the like.
• MNF commander has determined requirements for NGO support to include security.

United Nations
• UN Secretariat should act as an overseer of the overall relief organization.
• Although the UN resolution will provide a clear mandate, humanitarian assistance actions are very complex. This reality will require extensive communication between military and political leaders of the MNTF.
• MNTF commander will report through the military advisor to the Secretary-General of the UN. This is a difficult chain of command.
• There must be a recognized legitimacy of mission, internationally and locally. The UN resolution will provide international legitimacy. Local legitimacy will depend on the perceptions generated by MNF actions.

Rules of Engagement and Planning
• Determination of the ROE will occur after the precise mission is determined. This will require extensive negotiations.
• The objective to be met will require common MNTF procedures and doctrine and, most importantly, a common understanding of objective and the means by which this objective will be pursued.
• Identification of the end state is vital to determining the method and means the MNTF will use to perform its mission.
• Identification of whether the action is primarily a policing action or a military action is a vital early determination to make. Closely related to this question is whether the MNTF action is primarily a humanitarian assistance function or a peace enforcement action. If this is or becomes a policing problem, adequate MNF policing forces must be supplied.
• There must be clarity of mission.
• MNF commander must determine what branches, sequels, and contingencies should be planned for.

Nongovernmental Organizations
• A difficult challenge is how best to deal with NGOs. What types of communications will be required to work effectively with diverse organizations toward a common goal? What is the best connection for each NGO?

Local Factions
• MNF commander must consider how to engage with warring local factions.
• MNF should strive to remain impartial if not neutral. If MNF is perceived locally as being partial to one side, it may lose its legitimacy. If MNF is viewed as illegitimate by both sides, the warring sides may unite against the MNF.
• Must have local knowledge—intelligence of political and military situation.
## List of Delegates

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<tr>
<th>COUNTRY/DELEGATE</th>
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<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td>RADM Kudret Celaj</td>
<td>Commandant of Albanian Navy</td>
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<td>CAPT Fravini</td>
<td>President, Albanian Naval War College</td>
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<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td>GEN Carlos Edgardo Fernandez</td>
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<td>VADM Jorge Omar Godoy</td>
<td>Argentine Navy Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>CAPT Rafael Luis Sgueglia</td>
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<td>CDRE Russell R. Baker</td>
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<td><strong>Bangladesh</strong></td>
<td>RADM Shah Iqbal Mujtaba</td>
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<td>LCDR Errington Shurland</td>
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<td>VADM Michel Hellemans</td>
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<td>CDR Mitko Aleksandrov Petev</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Operations Branch</td>
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<td>RADM Glenn V. Davidson</td>
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<td>ADM Miguel Vergara</td>
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<td>VADM Zhou Borong</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff—Plans</td>
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<td>RADM Zdravko Kardum</td>
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<td>Admiral Danish Fleet, Danish Navy</td>
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<td>CAPT Lars Kragelund</td>
<td>Commander Naval Base Korsoer</td>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>VADM Euripides Antonio Uribe Peguero</td>
<td>Dominican Republic Navy, Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>RADM Rafael Lee Ballester</td>
<td>President of the Naval War College, Dominican Navy</td>
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<td>LCDR Mac Abelardo Mera</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>RADM Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed Madyn</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>CAPT Marco Palacios</td>
<td>Navy Chief, Salvadoran Navy</td>
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<td>CDR Guillermo Jiminez Vasquez</td>
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<td>RADM Hans V. Holmstrom</td>
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<td>CDR Tapio Maijala</td>
<td>Commander Kotka, Coastal District, Finnish Navy</td>
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<td>VADM Alain Dumontet</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Action Force, French Navy</td>
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<td>MR Asgrimur L. Asgrimsson</td>
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<td>CAPT Ilmars Lesinskis</td>
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<td>CAPT Kestutis Macijauskas</td>
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<td>BRIG Rupert Montanaro</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>ADM Ricardo Arbocco</td>
<td>Peruvian Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>RADM Luis Ramos Ormeno</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>VADM Ernesto De Leon</td>
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<td>COMO Carlos Agustin</td>
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<td>ADM Roman Krzyżewelski</td>
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<td>CAPT Andrzej Felski</td>
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<td>ADM Francisco Antonio Torres Vidal Abreu</td>
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<td>BG Mubarak Ahmed S. A. Al-Mannai</td>
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<td>RADM Victor Blidea</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Chief of Navy</td>
<td>RADM Ronnie Tay</td>
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<td>LTC Hwye Min Seow</td>
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<td>VADM Johan F. Retief</td>
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<td>ADM Angel Tafalla Balduz</td>
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<td>RADM Jesus Alvargonzalez</td>
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<td>COL Manuel Quiroga Diaz</td>
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<td>VADM Daya W. K. Sandagiri</td>
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<td>LT COL Tau 'Aika 'Uta 'atu</td>
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<td>RADM Engen Heper</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>ADM Jonathan Band</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Fleet</td>
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<td>ADM Walter F. Doran</td>
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<td>RADM Thomas H. Gilmour</td>
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<td>RADM Albert M. Calland III</td>
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<td>RADM Robert T. Moeller</td>
<td>Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group ONE</td>
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<td>DR William G. Perett</td>
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<td>MR Gerard Yoest</td>
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