Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

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Summary

This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan’s government and economy and of its cooperation with U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.

Several issues are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan. These include Jordan’s continued involvement in attempting to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace and the stability of the Jordanian regime, particularly in light of ongoing conflicts in neighboring Syria and Iraq. U.S. officials may also consider potential threats to Jordan from the Islamic State organization (also known as ISIS or ISIL).

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. Jordan’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another.

The United States has provided Jordan with economic and military aid since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2015 amounted to approximately $15.83 billion. On February 3, 2015, the Obama Administration and the Jordanian government signed a nonbinding, three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU), in which the United States pledges to provide the kingdom with $1 billion annually in total U.S. foreign assistance, subject to the approval of Congress, from FY2015 through FY2017.

In order to bolster Jordan’s economy and military capability, the Administration and Congress have provided significant amounts of foreign assistance to the kingdom in recent months. P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, provides “not less than” $1.275 billion in bilateral economic and military aid for Jordan. The act also authorizes the use of Defense Department-wide funding (Operations & Maintenance) for Jordan to increase or sustain security along its borders. Section 9012 of the act further specifies that “up to $600 million from the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) may be used to provide assistance to Jordan to enhance security along its borders.”
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Overview

The United States and Jordan are close partners in countering extremism throughout the Middle East. The kingdom is contributing to Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Daesh) in Syria and Iraq by periodically conducting air strikes, allowing the use of its bases by foreign forces, and sharing intelligence with coalition partners.1 Jordan also is bearing the costs of instability in its neighborhood. The kingdom is hosting at least 630,000 Syrian refugees, which places considerable strain on public services in its northern provinces. Jordan’s internal security services are attempting to thwart terrorist infiltration from either returning foreign fighters or lone wolf Islamic State sympathizers. Although no major public attack has occurred in recent years, two U.S. contractors (along with three others) were killed in November 2015 by a Jordanian police captain at a training facility. The incident is still under investigation, though the Jordanian government claims that the officer was mentally disturbed and not a violent jihadist.2

In order to bolster Jordan’s economy and military capability, the Administration and Congress have provided significant amounts of foreign assistance to the kingdom in recent months. P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, provides “not less than” $1.275 billion in bilateral economic and military aid for Jordan. The act also authorizes the use of Defense Department-wide funding (Operations & Maintenance) for Jordan to increase or sustain security along its borders. Section 9012 of the act further specifies that “up to $600 million from the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) may be used to provide assistance to Jordan to enhance security along its borders.”

The Islamic State, Syria, and Jordan’s Security Concerns

Since U.S. and coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State began in August-September 2014, the Jordanian Air Force has conducted airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq. Its role increased significantly after the capture and execution of Jordanian pilot Lieutenant Moath al Kasasbeh by the Islamic State in Syria in early 2015. In the aftermath of Kasasbeh's immolation, King Abdullah II vowed to wage a “relentless” war against the Islamic State and “hit them in their own ground.” Jordan increased the operational tempo of its airstrikes. Although press reports suggest that Arab contributions to counter the Islamic State have been reduced due to conflicts elsewhere (such as in Yemen), the U.S. State Department has continued to emphasize the importance of Jordan’s role, noting that the kingdom is a “lead Arab partner in the C-ISIL [counter-Islamic State] coalition and an active participant in the air campaign.”3 When asked earlier this month if Arab partners are continuing to strike IS targets in Syria, Special Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL Brett McGurk responded by saying: “I think the Saudis—they have their capabilities, their bandwidth is pretty stretched with Yemen. So I can’t say when the last time they took a strike in Syria, but of all our partners, you have to look at how they’re contributing in different ways. And the Jordanians.... I think just took a number of airstrikes just last week.”4

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3 CRS correspondence with U.S. State Department, January 7, 2015.
4 Special Briefing, Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition To Counter ISIL, Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Washington, DC, January 5, 2016.
Jordan's Support for Syrian Rebels & Russian Intervention

According to one report, Jordan has provided a “staging ground for rebels and their foreign backers on Syria’s southern front.”5 One broad coalition of Syrian rebel groups, known as the “Southern Front,” reportedly has direct ties to the Jordan-based Military Operations Center (MOC), which, according to press reports, has coordinated some rebel operations in Syria and is staffed by foreign and Jordanian officials.6 The Southern Front has yet to seize key southern Syrian population centers such as Dera’a city (62 miles south of Damascus) and military installations such as Suwayda Air Base. One report indicates that in the fall of 2015, Jordanian officials “vetoed any future operations against Daraa [Dera’a]” due to the ineffectiveness of the Southern Front, which “burned through money and ammunition” and lost over 200 fighters in battles with Asad regime forces.7

After Russia began directly intervening in Syria’s civil war in the second half of 2015, King Abdullah II secured a commitment from Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russian air strikes would not target the Southern Front. However, in late December 2015, the Asad regime, backed by Russian air strikes, launched an offensive in Dera’a province in order to secure supply routes between Damascus and Dera’a city. According to one Southern Front commander, “The [Syrian] army is making progress with heavy Russian aerial bombing.... We have had over 40 raids in the last 24 hours alone.”8 Additional reports suggest that the Asad regime and Russia are trying to dislodge the Southern Front and other militant groups from Al Sheikh Maskin, which is a town 14.6 miles north of Dera’a City. If they succeed, it would “drive a wedge between areas of rebel control in the south.”9

U.S. Troops in Jordan

According to the President’s last War Powers Resolution Report to Congress,10 “at the request of the Government of Jordan, U.S. Armed Forces elements, including Patriot missile systems, artillery, fighter aircraft, and related support, command, control, and communications personnel and systems, are deployed to Jordan to support the security of Jordan and promote regional stability. The total number of U.S. forces in Jordan is approximately 2,000 U.S. military personnel. These forces will remain in Jordan, in full coordination with the Government of Jordan, until the security situation becomes such that they are no longer needed.”11 Although precise details of the U.S. military presence in Jordan may be classified, American soldiers support the deployment of a contingent of U.S. F-16s and operate a Patriot missile battery near Jordan’s northern border with Syria. With the presence of U.S. and foreign troops in Jordan, some policymakers may be concerned over the safety of U.S. personnel working/residing in the kingdom. In February 2015, the U.S. Embassy in Amman warned that “high-end malls” in Jordan’s capital could be attacked by unnamed militants, presumably tied or sympathetic to the Islamic State. The State Department lifted that advisory warning in April 2015.

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6 According to the Financial Times, this operation helps to “co-ordinate some operations and is manned by the US, European states and regional powers such as Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The MOC sends weapons and distributes monthly salaries—about $50 per fighter—to several Southern Front groups.” See, “A Fight for Credibility” Financial Times, June 24, 2015.
7 “Western Backers end Support for Syrian Rebels attempting to seize Daraa,” Middle East Eye, September 25, 2015.
9 “Russia opens new Front in war on Syrian Rebels,” The Times (UK), January 11, 2016.
10 Letter From The President— War Powers Resolution, December 11, 2015.
Jordan’s Role in International Efforts to end the Syria Conflict

Jordan is a member of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), a group of countries attempting to broker a negotiated settlement to the Syria conflict. Meeting in Vienna, Austria, in late October, ISSG members agreed that “Syria’s unity, independence, territorial integrity, and secular character are fundamental”; that “state institutions will remain intact” as part of any ISSG-supported settlement; and that “the rights of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religious denomination, must be protected.” The ISSG invited the United Nations to convene Syrian government and Syrian opposition representatives “for a political process leading to credible, inclusive, non-sectarian governance, followed by a new constitution,” and elections in which members of the Syrian diaspora will be eligible to participate. On December 18, the U.N. Security Council unanimously endorsed the ISSG Vienna statements and framework in Resolution 2254.

Jordan’s primary role in this process is to spearhead the ISSG’s mutually agreed vetting initiative, an attempt to determine which opposition groups should be labelled as “terrorists” and therefore be excluded from any role in a political transition. To date, the group is continuing to deliberate over which Syrian groups should be placed on a terrorism list, and the kingdom is in the difficult position of balancing competing international views regarding the classification of specific Syrian groups as “moderate” or “terrorist.” According to the U.S. State Department, “It's not as if Jordan hasn't done anything. It's not as if they've put no thought in this. They have. But we said at the outset that it's going to be an iterative process and it's going to require more discussions and, frankly, more debate, because not everybody still agrees on every group. That shouldn't come as a surprise to anybody. So their work continues. We're grateful to Jordan for the leadership and for making the effort.”

12 The ISSG includes representatives of the League of Arab States, China, Egypt, the European Union, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States.


The Islamic State Threat to Jordan

Jordan may be an attractive IS target: many Islamist extremists consider King Abdullah II an apostate ruler, and the kingdom has strong ties to the West and maintains relations with Israel under a 1994 peace treaty. The Islamic State’s predecessor (Al Qaeda in Iraq or AQI) repeatedly plotted against Jordan. On November 9, 2005, Iraq-based terrorists carried out suicide bombings at three Western-owned hotels in Amman, killing 58 people.

In recent years, there have been no mass-casualty IS-related attacks inside Jordan and, as previously mentioned, the killing of five people (including two American contractors) remains under investigation. After the attacks in Paris in November 2015, King Abdullah II remarked that “We are facing a Third World War against humanity and this is what brings us all together.”

The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan

The continued inflow of Syrian refugees is placing tremendous strains on the Jordanian government. The United Nations (U.N.) High Commissioner for Refugees in January 2016 estimated that there were 635,324 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, who have increased the country’s population by 10%. Jordanian border authorities at times have blocked some refugees from entering the kingdom and forcibly deported others due to security concerns and/or the strains the refugee population has placed on the country’s northern provinces (governorates of Ma’afraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha and Zarqa). Rents have nearly tripled in border towns, making housing unaffordable for many Jordanians. Jordan’s hospitals, schools, sanitation, and water systems are under similar strain. Some Jordanian observers are openly questioning the wisdom of continuing to accept Syrian refugees and warning that resource, budget, and demographic pressures may disrupt life in the kingdom for a decade or more. According to one Jordanian government estimate, the direct cost of the refugee crisis to the government from the beginning of the Syria conflict is expected to rise to $4.2 billion by 2016. The U.S. State Department estimates that, since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees began in FY2012, it has allocated more than $668 million in humanitarian assistance from global accounts to help Jordan cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.

Jordanian-Israeli Relations

The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. In 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty, and King Abdullah II has used his country’s semi-cordial official relationship with Israel

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16 “Jordan's King Abdullah: We are facing a Third World War,” Reuters, November 17, 2015.
17 Currently, about 16,000 Syrian refugees remain stranded on the Jordanian-Syrian border, as the Kingdom has denied them entry. Jordan claims that many of these refugees come from northern Syria, in areas formerly controlled by the Islamic State. The Jordanian government also continues to assert that the international community has fallen short in its pledges to assist the Kingdom with the crisis. See, “Syrian Refugees stranded as Jordan Blocks Entry,” Financial Times, January 18, 2016.
20 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when (continued...)
to improve Jordan’s standing with Western governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for external support and aid. Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major challenge for Jordan. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population; more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel.

Recent Tensions with Israel over Jerusalem Holy Sites

Although Jordanian officials and their Israeli counterparts maintain quiet but cordial relations, tensions over Jerusalem periodically strain diplomatic ties. In the fall of 2015, Arabs clashed with Israeli police in protest over perceived Jewish worship (see textbox) at the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif compound (Mount/Haram, which includes the Al Aqsa Mosque) in Jerusalem. Per long-standing agreement, the kingdom oversees the Muslim Waqf (endowment or trust) that administers the compound. During the episode, some Jordanian parliamentarians accused Israel of occupying the Mount/Haram in an attempt to “Judaize” the site. During an October 2015 visit to the region, Secretary of State John Kerry defused Israel-Jordan tensions to some extent by facilitating an agreement in principle between the two countries to use video cameras to monitor the Mount/Haram. The details of any joint video monitoring efforts remain unclear.

Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation

Despite disputes over Jerusalem, bilateral cooperation is ongoing in other areas, most notably on military and water issues. In the summer of 2015, multiple reports suggested that an unnamed Arab country participated in “Red Flag” training exercises alongside U.S. and Israeli pilots. One U.S. official suggested that Jordanian warplanes participated in these multinational drills and Jordanian jets even “refueled from an Israeli tanker over the Atlantic Ocean.”

On December 9, 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority signed a regional water agreement that could pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, a multi-billion dollar project to

(...continued)

the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).

21 For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.

22 Article 9, Clause 2 of the peace treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to serve as the “Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since 1924.

address declining water levels in the Dead Sea. Under this December 2013 agreement, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority agreed to a water swap. Half of the water pumped from the Red Sea is to be desalinated in a plant to be constructed in Aqaba, Jordan. Some of this water is to then be used in southern Jordan. The rest is to be sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel is to sell freshwater from the Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan and sell the Palestinian Authority discounted freshwater produced by existing Israeli desalination plants on the Mediterranean. The other half of the water pumped from the Red Sea (or possibly the leftover brine from desalination) is to be channeled to the Dead Sea.

In February 2015, Israel and Jordan signed an agreement establishing a joint agency to administer the construction of the Red-Dead Canal and an associated desalination plant. In late 2015, Jordan moved ahead by issuing a “prequalification tender” to private companies and consortiums interested in contracting for phase one of the project to build a water conveyance system (pipeline) from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea.

P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, specifies that $100 million in Economic Support Funds be set aside for water sector support for Jordan. This aid is intended to support the Red Sea-Dead Sea water project, pending completion of relevant studies and assessments.

**Country Background**

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. Jordan’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another.

Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilaterally annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank. The original “East Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population and generally tend to gravitate toward the private sector due to their general exclusion from certain public sector and military positions.\(^2\)\(^5\)

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\(^2\) Though there was very little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.

\(^5\) Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948) in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004, and it is unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.
The Hashemite Royal Family

Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age 53) has ruled the country since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein, after a 47-year reign. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special Operations Forces with the rank of Major General. The king’s son, Prince Hussein bin Abdullah (born in 1994), is the designated crown prince.26

The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet).27 On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are dissolved by royal decree. This seems to be done in order to bolster the king’s reform credentials and to distribute patronage among a wide range of elites. The king also appoints all judges and is commander of the armed forces.

Political System and Key Institutions

The Jordanian constitution (promulgated in 1952) empowers the king with broad executive powers. According to Article 35, “The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.” The constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for two years.28 The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that allows provisional legislation to be issued by the Cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved.29 The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article 195 of the

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26 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. The position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.

27 In March 2013, King Abdullah II consulted with members of the 17th parliament before choosing a prime minister. Although the King retains the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, he has pledged to reach a consensus with lawmakers before choosing a premier. The Muslim Brotherhood, which boycotted the election leading to the formation of the current parliament, seeks a parliamentary system of government in which the prime minister would be chosen by the largest bloc in parliament.

28 The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”

29 New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue temporary laws.
Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté) with criminal penalties of one to three years in prison.

Political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.

Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: Civil courts, special courts (some of which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security offenses.” Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements.
Political Opposition and the Fracturing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

In Jordan, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and widespread apathy over the prospects for meaningful democratic reform. Nonetheless, public opinion seems more concerned with the deteriorating security situation in neighboring Syria and Iraq than in supporting the domestic political opposition. Moreover, although the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is the strongest opposition group, it is divided between reformists and conservatives, and pro- and anti-monarchical factions. Youth protesters also have become active in opposition political circles, though these groups tend to be small and divided along secular-Islamist or even tribal lines.

In the spring of 2015, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood fractured, leading to disputes over its legal status. A month after a state security court sentenced the deputy head of the organization to 18 months in prison for criticizing the United Arab Emirates in a Facebook post, 31 another Brotherhood leader attempted to form a new organization that would be legally recognized by the state. In March 2015, Jordanian authorities licensed this new off-shoot of the Brotherhood, called the Muslim Brotherhood Association. Its parent organization, which is licensed as a charity and not an association, expelled the new group from its ranks, leaving Jordan with two competing Muslim Brotherhood political groups. According to one account, “The new, watered-down Brotherhood, licensed on March 4, is headed by former senator Abdul Majid Thneibat and comprised of liberal Brotherhood officials with ties to the government, providing Jordan what many officials have desired in private—a Brotherhood answerable to the regime that would not push for widespread reforms.” 32 The old and new Brotherhood organizations are now locked in legal disputes over ownership of assets. Some analysts are concerned that Brotherhood members who are legally excluded from politics could join more radical organizations that espouse violence. According to one U.S.-based analyst, “while Amman has tamed its local Brotherhood chapter, it may have complicated its fight against domestic Islamist militancy in the process.” 33

Figure 3. IRI Poll on Jordanian Public Opinion

Source: International Republican Institute, “IRI Poll: Jordanians Optimistic about Direction of the Country even as Concerns over Terrorism Emerge,” May 27, 2015.

31 “Brotherhood Figure jailed in Jordan for Insulting Ally,” New York Times, February 17, 2015.
The Economy

With few natural resources and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy which is heavily dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances, and the service sector. Among the long-standing problems Jordan faces are poverty (14.4%), corruption, slow economic growth, and high levels of unemployment (including female unemployment), nominally around 12.5% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range. Youth unemployment is nearly 33%. Corruption is pronounced in Jordan. Use of intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta” (connections), is widespread, and many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of social and economic mobility that corruption engenders. Each year, thousands of Jordanians go abroad in search of better jobs and opportunities. Like many poor countries, Jordan suffers from a “brain drain” of its most talented workers, and the government has struggled to develop incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled workers close to home. The government is by far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-thirds of all workers on the state’s payroll. According to a recent survey by Pew, 73% of Jordanians have a negative view of economic conditions in their country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Renewable and Nuclear Energy in Jordan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Due to the cost of importing oil and natural gas, the government has sought to diversify its energy portfolio by expanding the amount of power generated by renewable energy sources. According to USAID, in 2014, Jordan spent approximately 16% of GDP on oil imports, and losses by the National Electric Company accounted for nearly 5% of GDP. By 2020, Jordan hopes that 10% of all energy sources will come from solar or wind power. The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has lent $25 million in financing to help construct a solar power plant constructed by a subsidiary of U.S.-based SunEdison. Other international (IFC), European (EBRD, FMO, FinnFund), and Arab lenders (Bahrain) also are providing financing for solar and wind power projects in Jordan. In February 2015, the government issued its first renewable energy tender, awarding contracts to several international and Jordanian companies, including Qatar’s Nebras Power, Diamond Generating Europe (a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation), and Jordan’s Kawar Group. Jordan also signed an agreement with the Russian company Rosatom to build a 2,000 megawatt nuclear power plant in Jordan by 2022. Jordan hopes that nuclear energy will ultimately provide 40% of the country’s energy.</td>
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34 Jordan possesses substantial reserves of phosphates and potash. No significant oil and gas fields have been discovered. However, Jordan has one of world’s largest reserves of oil shale. Officials estimate that the country contains the world’s fourth-largest oil shale reserves.

35 It is estimated that up to 20% of GDP comes from remittances. Nearly 10% of Jordan’s population (600,000 est.) reside and work in Arab Gulf countries.

36 One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma attached to menial labor jobs. Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal traditions look down on certain types of employment such as construction. In fact, the government estimates that there are approximately 300,000 to 400,000 foreign laborers in Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks. According to the Jordanian Employment Ministry, Egyptians make up 68% of foreign workers in Jordan.

37 Jordan was ranked 55 out of 175 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index.

38 In 2006, the Jordanian parliament passed a law establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which has taken on several high level investigations in recent years, specifically looking into accusations of graft in a public housing project (Decent Home for Decent Living) and a water works project (Disi Water Conveyance).


41 USAID, Congressional Notification #74, Jordan, March 27, 2015.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jordan’s economy is slowly recovering from the downturn that spread across the region in 2011. In 2014, GDP grew 3.1%. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that GDP will grow 2.5% this year. However, according to the International Monetary Fund, Jordan needs a growth rate of 6% to absorb new entrants into its labor force.

Due to perennially subpar economic growth, high energy/food subsidies, and a bloated public sector workforce, Jordan usually runs annual budget deficits (total public debt is $32 billion), which it partially offsets by appealing to the international community for direct budget support. In order to keep Jordan fiscally stable, the International Monetary Fund agreed to a three-year, $2 billion loan in August 2012. As part of the IMF deal, Jordan is increasing consumer electricity prices. It already has increased taxes on mobile phones and contracts. Nevertheless, economists are closely following Jordan’s overall debt burden, which has somewhat improved in 2015, falling to 80% (net public debt) of GDP.

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan

The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2015 amounted to approximately $15.833 billion.

Three-Year MOU on U.S. Foreign Aid to Jordan

On February 3, 2015, the Obama Administration and the Jordanian government signed a nonbinding, three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU), in which the United States pledges to provide the kingdom with $1 billion annually in total U.S. foreign assistance, subject to the approval of Congress, from FY2015 through FY2017. The new MOU followed a previous five-year agreement in which the United States had pledged to provide a total of $660 million annually from FY2009 through FY2014. During those five years, Congress actually provided Jordan with $4.753 billion in total aid, or $1.453 billion ($290.6 million annually) above what was agreed to in the five-year MOU, including more than $1 billion in FY2014. According to the Department of State, “The United States recognizes Jordan’s increased immediate needs resulting from regional unrest, the efforts Jordan is undertaking at the forefront of the fight against ISIL and other extremist ideology and terrorism, the influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq, the disruption of foreign energy supplies, and other unprecedented strains.”

Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan, FY2012-FY2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>FY2014</th>
<th>FY2015 est.</th>
<th>FY2016 est.</th>
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<td>State Dept. - ESF</td>
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<td>615.0</td>
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<td><strong>1,116.13</strong></td>
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Source: U.S. State and Defense Departments

Economic Assistance

The United States provides economic aid to Jordan both as a cash transfer and for USAID programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt. Approximately 40% to 60% of Jordan’s ESF allotment may go toward the cash transfer. USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water preservation, and education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building programs for the parliament’s support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, some Jordanian political parties and members of parliament. In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources, as Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is currently subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.

Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)

In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a Threshold country in the lower middle-income bracket. On September 12, 2006, the MCC’s board of directors approved up to $25 million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. In September 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, $275.1 million compact with Jordan to increase the supply of water available to households and businesses in the cities of Amman and Zarqa. The compact also is intended to help improve the efficiency of water delivery, wastewater collection, and wastewater treatment. If estimates hold true, the clean drinking water generated as a result of the MCC compact may be enough to supply almost 1 million Jordanian citizens with freshwater.
Loan Guarantees

Since 2013, the Obama Administration has provided three loan guarantees to Jordan, totaling $3.75 billion. These include:

- In September 2013, the United States announced that it was providing its first-ever loan guarantee to the Kingdom of Jordan. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate up to $120 million in FY2013 ESF-OCO to support a $1.25 billion, 7-year sovereign loan guarantee for Jordan.

- In February 2014, during a visit to the United States by King Abdullah II, the Obama Administration announced that it would offer Jordan an additional five-year, $1 billion loan guarantee. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate $72 million out of the $340 million of FY2014 ESF-OCO for Jordan to support the subsidy costs for the second loan guarantee.

- In June 2015, the Administration provided its third loan guarantee to Jordan of $1.5 billion. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate $221 million in FY2015 ESF to support the subsidy costs of the third loan guarantee to Jordan.

Military Assistance

Foreign Military Financing

U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain conventional weapons systems. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Jordan enable its Air Force to maintain a modest fleet of F-16 fighters and purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan’s purchase of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in order to enhance Jordan’s border monitoring and counter-terror capability. In recent years, Jordan also has acquired Javelin missiles, Hellfire missiles, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and night-vision devices.

Excess Defense Articles

In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development. Since 2009, Jordan has received excess U.S. defense equipment valued at approximately $81.69 million. In the last five

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43 Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706 (j) of the same Act also appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan guarantees for Jordan in section 7034(r)(1) of P.L. 113-235 (Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015). P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, once again reauthorized loan guarantees to Jordan.


years, Jordan has received excess U.S. defense articles, including two C-130 aircraft, HAWK MEI-23E missiles, and cargo trucks.

**Defense Department Assistance**

As a result of the Syrian civil war and Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS, the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through Defense Department-managed accounts. Although Jordan still receives the bulk of U.S. military aid from the FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan’s border security. Currently, Congress has authorized Jordan to receive funding from three primary accounts: (1) Section 1206/10 U.S.C. 2282 Authority to Build Partner Capacity,\(^{48}\) (2) the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF),\(^{49}\) and (3) Department of Defense Operations & Maintenance Funds (O&M).\(^{50}\) Military aid provided by these accounts is generally coordinated through a joint Defense Department (DOD)-State Department (DOS) review and approved by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

**Jordan’s Request for More Munitions**

When King Abdullah II visited Washington in February 2015, his government requested urgent resupply of munitions. Since then, the U.S. executive branch (via the interagency process) has worked with Jordanian interlocutors to expedite arms deliveries to Jordan. The executive branch may provide congressional oversight committees with updates on U.S. efforts to provide immediate air sustainment to the Royal Jordanian Air Force and enhance border security for the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces. Reports indicate that items provided to the Air Force have included F-16 air strike munitions, guided bomb kits, pilot survival gear, and spare parts. Reports indicate that items requested by Jordan for border security include UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, Hellfire missiles, Kevlar vests, night-vision devices, and TOW anti-tank missiles.\(^{51}\)

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\(^{48}\) Section 1205 of P.L. 113-291, the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, permits the transfer of other appropriated funds (such as CTPF monies) to conduct programs under 10 U.S.C. 2282 authority.

\(^{49}\) Section 9012 of P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, specifies that “up to $600,000,000 of funds appropriated by this Act for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund may be used to provide assistance to the Government of Jordan to support the armed forces of Jordan and to enhance security along its borders.” Section 1226 of P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act FY2016, authorized FY2016 CTPF funds “pursuant to section 1534 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 (P.L. 113-291; 128 Stat. 3616).”

\(^{50}\) Section 1207 of P.L. 113-66, the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), originally authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide up to $150 million in “assistance on a reimbursement basis to the Government of Jordan for purposes of supporting and maintaining efforts of the armed forces of Jordan to increase security and sustain increased security along the border between Jordan and Syria.” The FY2015 Omnibus, P.L. 113-235, permits the Secretary of Defense to provide Jordan with Defense Department Operation and Maintenance (O&M) OCO funds to “reimburse the government of Jordan in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may determine to maintain the ability of the Jordanian armed forces to maintain security along the border between Jordan and Syria.” Section 1226 of P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act FY2016, authorized funds available for reimbursement of certain coalition nations for support provided to United States military operations pursuant to section 1233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008 (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat. 393). P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, specifies that funds from Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide “may be used to support the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon, in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may determine, to enhance the ability of the armed forces of Jordan to increase or sustain security along its borders and the ability of the armed forces of Lebanon to increase or sustain security along its borders, upon 15 days prior written notification to the congressional defense committees outlining the amounts intended to be provided and the nature of the expenses incurred.”

Exporting U.S.-made Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to Jordan

Jordan may be seeking to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for its operations in Iraq and Syria. In early February 2015, Representative Duncan Hunter wrote a letter to President Obama suggesting that the Administration permit the export of the Predator XP to Jordan. On March 9, 23 lawmakers reportedly wrote the President asking that the Jordanian Air Force be permitted to utilize U.S. Air Force-owned MQ-1 Predator UAV assets without transferring actual UAV ownership to Jordan. Representative Hunter reportedly wrote another letter to the President in May 2015 suggesting that the Chinese government was in talks with the Jordanian government over the possible acquisition of “weaponized unmanned systems.” In August 2015, some press accounts suggested that Israel may be providing Jordan with Israeli-built UAVs such as the Heron TP.

In December 2015, Representative Hunter published an article asserting that the State Department had denied Jordan’s request to import the MQ-9 Reaper, saying “Now the Chinese are arranging the sale of their drone, the Caihong 5, a Reaper equivalent that would otherwise fall under the same constraints imposed on U.S. drones. Reportedly, Israel is also providing two of its Heron drones.” The State Department has explained its actions by referring to U.S. adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime, noting, “We recognize that the United States cannot meet all of Jordan's requests as we will likely continue to receive requests for systems that involve technology release restrictions and/or are prohibitively expensive and could therefore distract from higher priority requests.” Reports also suggest that the Defense Department has delivered to Jordan four Air Tractor AT-802 aircraft to be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes. These planes were originally destined for Yemen (redirected 1206 funding), and their supply to Jordan was notified to Congress in the summer of 2015.

54 Available at https://admin.govexec.com/media/obamahunter514.pdf. Also, see “China May Be Selling Armed Drones to Jordan,” DefenseOne, May 15, 2015.
55 “Israel to supply Jordan with UAVs to combat the Islamic State,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 17, 2015.
57 See CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
In report language accompanying P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, conferees endorsed “expediting Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales cases and related licenses to partners in the coalition in the fight against ISIL and, not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, is directed to submit to the Committees on Appropriations a report on the feasibility and actions required to furnish armed and unarmed unmanned aerial systems and associated technologies to such partners. The report should include a summary of actions taken to approve such systems since the initiation of military operations against ISIL, and efforts to expedite the approval of such systems, consistent with United States law and policy.”
### Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis

($ in millions)

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Notes: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations, food aid between 1999-2006, or amounts for de-mining assistance and counter-terrorism assistance.


b. Released in late July 1993.


e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).

f. These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).

g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.

h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).

i. Total FY2007 supplemental aid to Jordan was $85.3 million. The above chart does not include $25 million in NADR funds.

j. The total $700 million FY2014 ESF appropriation to Jordan was split between enduring ($360 million) and OCO ($340 million) funds.

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