This comprehensive book is in itself a model of civilian-military cooperation, bringing together a superb group of practitioners with a deep understanding of these two communities, and their success and failures in working together. This volume will make an invaluable contribution to the classroom, and should be required reading in all institutions that share conflict management and peace support responsibilities.

Pamela Aall
Provost
Academy for International Conflict Management and Peace building
U.S. Institute of Peace

"Unity of Mission" presents a candid review of past and present American Civil-Military deployments; it explores lessons learned (and unlearned) from these conflicts and suggests how to apply these lessons in future operations. While serving as acting President of the National Defense University, I was recently aware that our nation's Ambassadors and Generals, despite the best of intentions, too often talked past each other. "Unity of Mission" provides a much needed antidote to this lack of communication.

Ambassador Nancy McEldowney
Director
Foreign Service Institute

"Unity of Mission" is an excellent compendium of historical examples, scholarly thoughts and recommendations concerning the application of civilian and military capabilities to achieve national objectives. As a District Senior Advisor in Vietnam and Chair for Interagency Seminars focused on Crisis Response and Combating Terrorism, I am convinced of the need for better military-civilian cooperation. This book shows us how to do it right.

Michael E. Spigelmire, LTG(R)
Distinguished Senior Fellow, Joint Special Operations University

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Before, during, and after combat, civilian-military cooperation is vital for the civilian population to regain its footing in order to build a stable society. Jon Gundersen and Melanne Civic have collected a series of invaluable real-life experiences, so that we don’t have to repeat the painful lessons of the past. A must read for those leaders trying to sort out how the United States will continue its goals after the shooting stops!

—Ambassador Dell Dailey
Lieutenant General, US Army, retired
Former joint special operations commander and Department of State coordinator for counterterrorism

*****

There have been innumerable studies on civil-military cooperation—or lack thereof—in complex operations. The subject, however, has not been addressed in a single volume aimed at scholars and diplomats as well as warriors. Unity of Mission does just that. The book offers unique insights by soldiers, AID workers, nongovernmental organizations, and others with on the ground experience. The essays provide a rich, diverse, and candid commentary about what worked and what didn’t work. This book will be enormously useful for anyone assigned to a military command, an embassy, or any international mission.

—Hans Binnendijk
Senior fellow, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns’ Hopkins University
Former vice-president, National Defense University
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of military personnel. Major Popov was appointed to command B Squadron, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, an armored reconnaissance squadron equipped with the Coyote combat reconnaissance vehicle, in June 2008, and began training for deployment shortly thereafter. In fall 2009, the B Squadron combat team deployed to southern Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, as the eyes and ears of Canada’s Task Force 3-09 Battle Group. In April 2010, B Squadron handed its responsibilities over to the US Army’s 1st Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, before moving to another area of operations in Kandahar Province. Major Popov returned to Canada in May 2010 to become a student, completing the Joint Command and Staff Program at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. He graduated in June 2011, earning a master’s degree in defense studies that focused on Canadian Forces personnel retention in comparison with industry, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australian military forces. His thesis was nominated for the Brigadier-General George Bell Medal for Military Writing. He is currently the G3, or operations officer, of the Canadian Army’s 2nd Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Petawawa, Ontario.

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Acknowledgments

In 2010 and 2011, at the height of American engagement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) at the National Defense University (NDU) sponsored a series of workshops largely devoted to the role of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in these conflicts. In the course of the workshops, we found there was great interest in the larger issues of how, where, when—and whether—to deploy civilian-military personnel in future operations. We initially limited invitations to American personnel, but as the scope of the project expanded, we included the international community and nongovernmental organizations. Many participants advanced innovative proposals and sometimes conflicting approaches to civil-military cooperation. They eagerly shared ideas and proposals in the workshops. The editors of this volume actively recruited and cajoled them to put their thoughts on paper.

Hans Binnendijk, then director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, encouraged us to capture the results of the workshops and expand them into a book. Joshua Jones, a PhD candidate working at CCO, marshaled the resources needed to support the project. We were ably and unfailingly assisted in the project by heroes too often unsung: the unpaid research interns. They did the heavy lifting of cataloguing, communicating, and coordinating with the authors of the various chapters and proofreading and formatting the manuscript. Those interns were Andrew Shaver, Michael Press, Robert Rasmussen, Benjamin Lightle, Samuel Beirne, Trevor Mills, Elliot Cheresh, Shannon Corson, Jacob Oldenberg, and Jonathan Reich. NDU and CCO leadership actively supported the creation of the book. NDU Press, in particular Frank Hoffman and Dr. Jeff D. Smotherman, provided welcome guidance on the publishing process. Garry Warkentin, then-CCO staff assistant, was helpful in identifying potential publishers; and PRISM editor Michael Miklaucic offered insights. The project would not come to fruition without the active support of CCO directors Amb. John E. Herbst, retired, Dr. Joseph J. Collins. Finally, the publication and distribution of Unity of Mission was made possible by the unstinting support of the Air University Press—including the expert editing provided by Dr. Ernest Rockwell, project editor, and Sandi Davis, copy editor, and their team of dedicated copy editors and print specialists.
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The editors, of course, owe our greatest debt to the authors, who patiently responded to the editors throughout the process of creating this book. As you will note, the authors represent a diverse group from US military and civilian agencies, the private sector, and the international community. We wish to thank them all for their creativity and flexibility.

It is the intention of the editors and the authors of this volume that these lessons learned through civilian-military teams in conflicts—past and present—will be instructive to current and future operations. We hope that *Unity of Mission* will be of some use for future generations of civilian-military teams.
Introduction

Iraq and Afghanistan and Beyond

Jon Gundersen

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been an integral part of the American consciousness for most of the new millennium. Military successes—and failures—have dominated the headlines. Names such as Tora Bora, Abbottabad, Abu Ghraib, and Fallujah, unknown to the American public (and even regional specialists at the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom) a decade ago, have become catchphrases for a new generation of political and military analysts. Yet perhaps the most enduring legacy of US involvement in these wars has been the evolution of US military doctrine and the concomitant growth of the whole-of-government approach that puts stability operations and civil affairs on equal footing with combat operations.

The whole-of-government approach is defined as “one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives.” While these principles have exerted influence in national security strategies in the United States and among NATO other organizations since the mid-twentieth century, the concept was distilled early in the first decade of this century. It underlays work on stability operations, “complex operations,” peacebuilding, and counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine.

The COIN doctrine, an innovative set of principles not unlike those guiding the Vietnam-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, has become the military analyst’s coin of the realm. COIN doctrine puts a premium on protecting civilians over killing the enemy, using minimum force on the battlefield, emphasizing governance and development projects, and building local capacity and ownership. Said another way, winning local “hearts and minds” is the most basic and difficult element of any counterinsurgency operation.

Most recently, new terms have surfaced such as hybrid threats, wicked problems, and countless others. Policy makers look to theaters and threats beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. And the doctrinal pendu-
lum seems to swing back to more conventional solutions, particularly with budgetary restrictions. Nevertheless, failed and failing states will remain part of the global landscape. Insurgencies, hybrid threats, and wicked problems will continue, and, if history is any guide, Americans and others, military forces and civilian experts, will once again be deployed in harm’s way. Therefore, in planning for the future, it is incumbent on policy makers and practitioners alike to study the lessons of the past to inform the present and future operations and training preparedness systems.

If there is one overarching lesson learned from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is this: US political goals cannot be attained by military measures alone. While some have argued that COIN was just the flavor of the day, it became clear over the course of the conflicts that COIN was the key element of military planning and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While civilian agencies, understandably, were unaware or resisted linking nonkinetic military objectives such as good governance and long-term development to COIN doctrine, they too, at times, recognized the necessity of closer civilian-military cooperation (see, e.g., the DOS’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review). Moreover, both former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates repeatedly called for a more robust civilian component in the civilian-military equation through a whole-of-government approach.

The deployment of mixed civilian-military teams or PRTs to Iraq and Afghanistan represented, in many ways, the tip of the COIN—and the whole-of-government—spear. Numerous learned papers have been written on PRTs. To some degree, PRTs inspired a cottage industry for a generation of staff college and think tank analysts. This volume contains a number of chapter analyses on the PRT experience by practitioners, both military and civilian, with on-the-ground experience in these theaters of operations.

Successful stability and COIN operations require both commitment and perseverance—qualities often in short supply in political climates with budgetary stresses, in particular. This is reflected in official pronouncements and budgets, such as those which openly discuss geographical resets, lighter footprints, and “offshore balancing.” A counterterrorism approach, such as that emphasizing a reliance on drones and special operations forces arguably will be more in line with the political zeitgeist, at least in Washington, albeit with a new set of problems and consequences—often unintentional.
In any case, it is clear that the mood of the United States shifted dramatically more than a decade following the 9/11 attacks. The American people—and, thus, American politicians—grew weary and increasingly skeptical about foreign commitments. Events in Afghanistan, as well as across the Middle East, in the second decade of the twenty-first century led both friend and foe to question US policy and resolve. As US and allied forces prepared to leave Afghanistan, the American president did not declare victory or “mission accomplished.” The public seemed more exhausted than exultant. In other words, especially at a time of financial constraint, Washington and much of the world seemed to have neither the will nor the way to engage in prolonged overseas deployments.

Nevertheless, regardless of the stated desires of policy leaders eschewing peacebuilding and stability operations again of the same scope and scale following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, fragile, failed, and failing states remain part of the global geopolitical landscape and undermine national and regional security. Moreover, the toxic mix of radical terrorism with extremist elements of all sorts regularly confronts US policy makers with difficult choices. The “Arab Spring” uprising may have toppled aging autocracies, but it also provided fertile soil for sectarian struggles and al-Qaeda offshoots. As this introduction is being written, the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) presents a uniquely brutal challenge to international peace and security. Yet while a more hawkish tone has been introduced into the debate, few leaders are advocating the introduction of their own “boots on the ground.”

One may not know precisely where the next crisis will occur, but national security professionals can be assured that a wide range of complex national security threats will arise again and again—often requiring US leadership and comprehensive coordination with friends and allies. In other words, retreating to fortress America, while seductive to some, will not advance US national security interests.

While much has been written about civilian-military teams in Vietnam and, most recently, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the subject has not been addressed in a single, comprehensive publication containing historical context and reflecting a broad diversity of views. It is the intention of the coeditors of *Unity of Mission* to fill this gap. We have chosen the title *Unity of Mission* because we are convinced that without unity among military and civilian actors, long-term mission success is difficult at best. We believe the essays contained in this volume
attest to this assertion. We are also fully aware that civilian-military teams are not a silver bullet. They are, at best, a useful tool in a more comprehensive security framework. Nevertheless, in an age of budgetary constraints, the need to coordinate military and civilian resources—hard, kinetic, and soft power—is clear. It is the opinion of the coeditors that civilian-military teams are critical to achieving the goals of sustainable peace, stability, and security.

With this in mind, the authors review past American involvement where civilian-military units have played a role—from the Philippines to Vietnam—and analyze what worked, what did not work, and why. They proceed to discuss in considerable depth US, non-US, and mixed provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their analyses look beyond Iraq and Afghanistan to operations in other fragile states. In addition, they examine the challenges of respecting the “humanitarian space” and the roles of the United Nations and NGOs in host-nation capacity building in societies with entrenched corruption. Our authors offer practical advice on how to work collaboratively and in a coordinated manner across US government agencies, as well as with international partners, NGOs and, most importantly, with the host-nation local population.

In doing so, the authors draw on recent interviews and reports from operators in the field and policy makers in Washington, DC. Finally, they look to the future and address certain fundamental questions: whether, why, when, where, and how civilian-military teams might be deployed—and to what ends. In other words, they provide historical context, reflect upon the diverse views within the US government and beyond, and offer policy recommendations for the present and the future.

Lessons Learned and Unlearned

While these chapters contain important lessons learned, they also highlight the limitations of the Iraq and Afghanistan paradigms and other historic examples. PRTs were conceived and then deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in singular conditions probably not to be duplicated. Despite a patina of coalition contributions, the United States was the predominant and driving player in both operations. In Afghanistan, assisting local forces such as the Northern Alliance, the United States intervened unilaterally to oust the Taliban and destroy the al-Qaeda network. Washington did not seek allied military assistance (despite NATO, for the first time, invoking the Article V collective
defense clause). Similarly, the Iraq War, while ostensibly a “coalition of the willing,” was primarily an American operation and was so portrayed in much of the world—most notably in the Middle East. Additionally, the US military was the predominant actor in both conflicts. The Pentagon largely determined strategy and operations on the ground. In addition, prior to US intervention, there were no traditional American institutions of diplomacy and development in either Iraq or Afghanistan; there was neither an American embassy in the capitals nor USAID missions in the field. Moreover, the United Nations had a limited and circumscribed role. Furthermore, despite a heavy military presence in both countries, insurgent forces severely hampered incipient governance and development efforts. The increased violence on the ground initially prevented more traditional development agencies and NGOs from reaching local communities.

As a nation, we have a convenient yet human tendency to forget unpopular wars: Korea, Vietnam, and now, perhaps, Iraq and Afghanistan. Europe was similarly exhausted after World War I. Following that war to end all wars, Europe disarmed and America retreated to isolationism. However, a generation thereafter, European youth were once again dying in Flanders Fields. After Vietnam, politicians also called for America to come home. Defense, State, and USAID budgets were drastically reduced. And yet, a generation after the end of the Vietnam War, American soldiers were fighting two land wars on the Asian continent. The United States may or may not be engaged in land wars in Asia in the immediate future (both former Pres. Dwight Eisenhower and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned against such endeavors). However, if history is any guide, Americans, both military and civilian, will again, in some capacity, be deployed in harm’s way overseas.

Unfortunately, decision makers tend to resurrect lessons learned from previous wars only after committing to the next conflict. George Santayana, an otherwise obscure American intellectual, famously warned that “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” While history may not repeat itself, it has a “tendency to rhyme,” in Mark Twain’s pithy phrase. Thus, this volume posits that there are lessons to be learned from the past military operations and civilian deployments and that some form of civilian-military teams will and should be utilized in future complex operations.
Executive Summary

Jon Gundersen

Parts 1 and 2: Historical Context

From the Philippines to Vietnam

The United States has a long and mixed history of deploying civilian-military teams in harm’s way. Or, more precisely, it has often used teams with both military and civilian skill sets in conflict zones. The US military has owned and operated most of these teams, which, for example, were an integral part of the US occupations of the Philippines and Haiti in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Later, US civilian-military teams were intimately involved with nation-building efforts in Germany and Japan after World War II. Both nations rapidly rebuilt their economies and gradually became members in good standing in the community of nations. The presence of US forces and civilian advisors, often under military command, played an important part in restoring stability and sanity to these formerly totalitarian nations. Of course, numerous other factors contribute to the success or failure of US policy, but civilian-military teams have often played an integral part in US engagement in any given region. Dr. Scott Moore’s chapter provides a sweeping historical overview of US policy and practice.

Vietnam and Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

As Germany, Europe, and Japan stabilized, a small nation on the periphery of Asia entered the American lexicon: Vietnam. To most American policy makers from Kennedy to Nixon, Vietnam was seen as a continuation of the East-West struggle. Enemy forces (North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong) were seen as surrogates of the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, the battle against the new enemy was multifaceted; it had both military and political dimensions. US forces needed not only to defeat the enemy on the battlefield but also to win the “hearts and minds” of the people. In Vietnam this program was termed “pacification.” The ultimate goal was to build local capacity, “Vietnamization,” so that US forces could declare victory and withdraw.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

with honor. The primary vehicle in this effort was CORDS, the most massive and sustained civilian-military teaming effort in US history. Dr. Richard Stewart, Rufus Phillips, and Dr. Sandra Scham have all studied and written about the CORDS program. Rufus Philips, in fact, was one of the creators of the program. They offer their own perspectives in three chapters of this volume.

1980s and 1990s

In the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, the military relegated COIN to a secondary mission, at best. CORDS was summarily and quickly relegated to the dustbin of history. The military reverted to its comfort zone: building and maintaining a force to win a war against a conventional enemy. Meanwhile, the DOS and, especially, USAID budgets and personnel were severely reduced. The main missions of the DOD, DOS, and USAID returned to the East-West conflict. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Frances Fukayama famously prophesized the end of history. The great battle had been won; liberal, free market capitalism had triumphed. Despite DOD, DOS, and USAID budgets being slashed, especially resources devoted to nation-building, US military and civilian teams became increasingly involved in a number of conflicts on the periphery of the old Cold War lines. Dennis Barlow, a retired Army colonel, was a key participant in a number of these teams, and he describes his experiences in Panama, Bosnia, and elsewhere.

Part 3: Iraq and Afghanistan

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the longest sustained combat operations in American history to date. Yet their historical legacy may well be determined not by military campaigns but by the success or failure of US and allied efforts to build stable societies after the last foreign boot has left the ground. The jury, of course, is still out. Nevertheless, practical experiences in the field, especially with civilian and military programs such as PRTs, can contribute to what the United States does next in these and other troubled regions. With this in mind, we offer a wide range of chapter analyses from practitioners and scholars with Iraq and Afghanistan experience.

Joseph Collins, deputy assistant secretary at the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2002 to 2004, was present at the creation of PRTs. He offers a unique insight as to the original missions of these
teams and what those missions mean to future deployments. Bernard Carreau describes a wide-ranging lessons-learned project that included interviewing returning PRT personnel. Andrew Shaver’s chapter addresses a Pentagon effort to resuscitate local business in Iraq. Three practitioners who each served in-country—James Soriano (Iraq), Lt Col Eric Hommel (Afghanistan), and Andrew Shaver (Iraq)—offer their perspectives regarding what worked, what did not, and why.

Part 4: International Perspectives

The United States and the international community have been deeply involved in peace and stability operations for many years. The International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, for example, composed of some 49 nations from Albania to Mongolia to the United States and its allies, is the most obvious manifestation of this multinational engagement. The missions and contributions of various international players, however, reflect their own particular national culture, history, and worldview. This section contains different and sometimes differing perspectives on how other nations view the role of civilian-military teams, particularly in Afghanistan. Retired ambassador J. D. Bindenagel, Karsten Friis, and Maj Mark Popov discuss German, Norwegian, and Canadian perspectives respectively.

While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have dominated the Western debate, regional conflicts, some hot and some cold, in all corners of the world offer lessons. David Becker and Col Christopher Holshek, Americans with extensive experience working in the field with the United Nations and host-nation local organizations from Haiti to Liberia, offer their recommendations on how best to work in internationally mandated and supported missions.

Part 5: Nongovernmental and Other Perspectives

Addressing the United Nations Human Rights Commission in April 2004, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argued that the “international community cannot stand idle” in the face of genocide or widespread human rights violations. The UN enshrined this emerging norm as the “responsibility to protect” (e.g., the international community had the right and responsibility to protect populations if the sovereign state could not). Genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and, arguably, in Darfur in 2003–2004 prompted UN action. However, it was NGOs such as Amnesty International and Doctors without Borders that pressed for international action. Similarly, NGOs
share the space with official military and civilians in zones of conflict throughout the world today. They often have a different mission and perspective regarding these conflicts. This section explores the role of NGOs, including their relationships with each other and with government officials. It also provides guidelines for interagency coordination and economic development in complex operations environments.

Dr. Lisa Schirch, based on her experience with NGOs and government institutions in conflicts throughout the world, outlines the roles of NGOs and offers suggestions on how to overcome real civil society-military animosities. Dr. Andrea Strimling Yodsampa discusses the findings of her extensive research in interagency and international conflict management in Afghanistan. Joanna Buckley and Ryan Gawn, British experts in the field of private-sector development in complex political environments, offer suggestions regarding how to promote local markets in a COIN environment.

Part 6: Training, Resourcing, Roles, and Missions

During the past decade, Washington has struggled with how to resource and train personnel for the massive and ongoing US commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most would agree that stabilization programs, at least initially, were managed and funded on an ad hoc basis and that there was little coordination between and among agencies. As the wars progressed, interagency programs were developed; however, too often, roles and missions were unclear, both within and among US governmental agencies. While much has been written about roles and missions, there is no clear doctrine as to when, where, or how to deploy civilian-military teams or how to transition to local ownership. To use current parlance, Washington is good at “clearing and holding” but not so good at “building.” The chapters in this section address these sometimes contentious issues.

Maj Gen Omer Clifton Tooley, commanding general of the Camp Atterbury-Muscatatuck Training Center for Complex Operations, outlines lessons learned from training interagency teams for duty in Afghanistan. Drawing from his experience at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and based on hundreds of interviews, Col Mike McCoy offers recommendations as to when, where, and how civilian-military teams should be deployed in future complex operations. Dr. Marcia Byrom Hartwell of the US Institute of Peace, with field experience in numerous conflict zones, most recently as an embedded civilian advisor in Iraq, rethinks the US civilian-military relationship.
Part 7: Preparing for the Future

In a democratic society politicians necessarily live in a world of fiscal constraints and domestic political accountability. After more than a decade of US engagement in two controversial wars, the American public and politicians, understandably, are more interested in domestic rather than foreign nation-building. The editors and authors of this volume fully appreciate this reality. Nevertheless, just as historians offer honest assessments of past wars, policy makers have an obligation to offer rational recommendations for present and future conflicts. The authors in this volume do so. One may not always agree with every proposal. However, in this section, the authors offer innovative suggestions on how to organize for future complex operations.

Nathan White offers a proposal for intelligence and information architectures for future campaigns based on an extensive survey of civilian and military intelligence personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. Noting the numerous temporary and improvised offices in Iraq (“acronymic adhocracy”), Stuart Bowen, special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction (SIGIR), calls for the creation of a permanent US Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO). Dr. James Derleth, Jason Alexander, and Sloan Mann examine the history of civilian-military teams from Vietnam to Afghanistan and, based on these experiences, propose the adoption of an interagency district stability framework to address future challenges. James Kunder identifies the possible role of the DOS in civil–military cooperation in stability operations and conflict prevention.

Finally, Dr. Christopher Lamb and Dr. James Douglas Orton discuss common themes and prescriptions, systematically compare and contrast research findings from the diverse case studies, and fashion a conceptual framework to guide future research. The variables for team performance identified by Drs. Lamb and Orton are a good place to start planning for the next complex operation.

Notes

PART 1

History of Civilian-Military Teams
America’s Coming of Age
Chapter 1

Nontraditional Missions

Civil Tasks, Military Forces, and Complex Operations

R. Scott Moore

For much of the past century, the United States sought to restore order and build lasting stability in regions wracked by internal conflict, ethnic and nationalistic turmoil, and political and religious extremism. The record of American involvement in such complex operations is both extensive and instructive. If the United States sometimes failed, it also frequently succeeded. Whatever the outcomes, both soldier and civilian left a legacy of hard-learned experience, albeit one apparently now largely forgotten or, at best, selectively remembered. This chapter explores the experiences of the United States over the past century when it sent its forces and applied its treasure, as it did quite often, to end violence and build lasting stability in situations on the verge of or emerging from conflict, tracing the development of the roles and responsibilities of both civilian and soldier. In doing so, I seek to add historical perspective to the ongoing, and sometimes acrimonious, debate over civil and military roles in conflict zones and perhaps offer insights on how one might approach complex operations now and in the future.

Confronted with the need to defeat insurgents and terrorists while rebuilding shattered governments and economies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States, despite more than a decade of conflict, continues to struggle, both conceptually and practically, with the civilian-military imperatives of stabilization operations. With respect to stability operations, the American government remains disjointed, its departments and agencies lacking a common operational framework and seemingly unable to agree on organizational roles and missions. At the Pentagon, military planners and policy advisors grouse about combat forces having to perform civil tasks in the absence of a robust civilian capability, claiming that such tasks detract from the military’s traditional war-fighting missions. The Department of State (DOS), staunchly defending the secretary of state’s mandated respon-
sibility to lead and coordinate complex civilian-military operations, remains marginally capable of assuming that role.2 After several years of internal gesticulation, its anemic and largely symbolic Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction is largely absent from conflict zones. The US Agency for International Development (USAID)—beyond its impressive ability to provide contractors and host nations with millions of dollars—lacks the capacity, and more importantly, the cultural proclivity for wartime operations, as its ethos of independence is closely tied to foreign aid and development. Other government agencies, despite strong efforts to execute niche tasks, are hamstrung by modest means and can field only limited teams. Attempts to pull these disparate organizations together in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven to be, at best, inefficient stopgaps.

A decade of civilian-military stumbling has spawned a sometimes heated, too often pedantic, and largely ill-informed debate over the roles of civilian agencies and military forces in conflict zones. Today’s conventional wisdom places civil tasks within the realm of civilian agencies and organizations, while combat and security responsibilities fall to military forces, with the two tasks coordinated but separate. Military forces end violence, restore order, and maintain stability, while civilians work under the security umbrella to rebuild the essential political, economic, and social structures of a stable government. If, on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, military forces bear the brunt of both security and civil tasks, it is purely out of local necessity, a temporary anomaly to accepted doctrines. The military, cynically noting the relative absence of civilians, actively seeks to get them to the conflict, even offering funding to do so, so soldiers may focus on traditional missions. As if to reinforce this attitude, many in the civilian agencies, academia, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) accuse military forces of being ill suited for civil activities by virtue of their ethos and apparent narrowness, arrogantly accusing military personnel of an intellectual proclivity to do little more than destroy. They often blame their relative absence from stability operations on insufficient resources and encroaching militarism. Both soldier and civilian seem to agree on a common vision that divides the two, citing organizational theories and images of the past in which civil and military operations were distinct entities, perhaps conducted side-by-side but clearly separated between civilian and soldier. As this chapter will demonstrate, such postmodernist thinking ignores historical as well as contemporary reality.
The American Approach to Stability: Expansion and Intervention in the Early Twentieth Century

The statutory responsibility for conducting diplomacy, representing US interests in foreign states, and concluding treaties has, since the first presidential administration, rested squarely with the DOS. Even within the North American continent, state envoys negotiated with indigenous tribes and the British, French, Spanish, and Russian colonials and Mexicans along the expanding US borders. Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, diplomats represented the growing reach of the United States. Yet, the DOS’s responsibilities rarely included the actual conduct of activities or enforcement of policies. Instead, these largely fell to others. Army officers explored and policed the frontier and protected US borders, sometimes assuming martial authority and acting as military governors of newly acquired territories. The aftermath of the Mexican-American War in the late 1840s required commanders to carry out postconflict occupation and stabilization in the wake of the fighting. The authority of the state envoy assigned to Gen Winfield Scott’s headquarters during his march on Mexico City extended only to the signing of a treaty with Mexican ruler Santa Anna; Scott’s army policed Mexico from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. In the American South during and following the Civil War, the Army maintained civil order, governed towns and regions, provided humanitarian relief, established courts and served as judges, monitored elections, repaired infrastructure, and supported the Freedmen’s Bureau in its mission to integrate former slaves into society. In the West, policing in the face of Native American uprisings and widespread lawlessness often fell to the Army. Until 1884, Alaska came under the jurisdiction of first the Army and then the Navy. The annexations of Hawaii and Samoa in the late 1800s thrust Navy commanders into the roles of governors. By the end of the nineteenth century, the US military, as well as its political leaders, viewed such civil tasks as military missions. If the DOS maintained its responsibility for foreign policy oversight and guidance, it routinely relied on the American military for its execution.

America’s emergence as a global power created new problems of scope if not concept. The collapse of Spanish authority in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines as a result of the Spanish-American War in 1898 raised the specter of long-term US administration of
overseas territories. Because these former Spanish colonies did not emerge as functioning foreign states, they fell outside the accepted and statutory responsibilities of the DOS, which neither sought nor played a significant role in their postwar stabilization and reconstruction. To deal with these acquisitions, some in the McKinley administration advocated for establishing a colonial office, citing the need for a cadre of trained and ready experts. Indeed, the president initially considered creating such an office inside the DOS. The US public weighed in; spurred by such anti-imperialists as Mark Twain and William Jennings Bryan, it quickly rejected any system that smacked of overt colonialism. Congress agreed. Indeed, the declaration of war against Spain had included the Teller Amendment, prohibiting the president from annexing Cuba and, some thought by extension, any of the former Spanish territories. If forced to create and sustain governments from the rubble of former European colonies, America would not install another colonial administration as a replacement. The DOS, citing statutory limitations, did not view governing foreign lands among its responsibilities. Policy makers thus decided, with some precedent, that military occupation and governance offered a legitimate alternative, one that sent a clear message that the United States sought no colonies and only wished to ensure indigenous self-sufficiency before granting full sovereignty.

As a result, the United States deployed thousands of troops to the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Faced with three simultaneous occupations, Secretary of War Elihu Root formed the Office of Insular Affairs to develop policies and provide oversight of military governors. Faced with these duties, soldiers quickly learned to govern provinces, police against crime and banditry, supervise sanitation projects, build schools, and provide a host of social services hitherto unknown to the local populations, in addition to fighting insurrections and uprisings. Military commanders, if reflecting the racist attitudes of the day about the indigenous population’s inability for self-rule, nonetheless fully understood they eventually would transition from military rule to local governance. While US influence remained strong in many nations in which the United States had intervened, the transition from military occupation to local self-rule fundamentally differed from the European colonial model. Cuba achieved independence in 1902, subsequent US meddling notwithstanding. Philippine self-rule began just nine years after annexation, with full independence guaranteed. Unlike their European brethren, US soldiers ex-
pected no civil colonial administration to relieve them of their civil tasks. Even in the Philippines, where a presidentially appointed high commissioner (who, notably, reported to the secretary of war) and an entourage of civilian advisors arrived as the insurgency subsided, military officers continued to serve as provincial and local governors, especially in the violence-prone southern islands. Americans understood that the military would provide stability and governance until the indigenous population could rule itself.

For the next three decades, American military doctrine, eventually codified by the Marines in the 1930s, differentiated little between military and civil tasks, seeing both as integral to reestablishing stability. More to the point, it viewed the two as parts of one military mission. A pattern quickly emerged that saw American forces deployed to quell uprisings or unrest, then remaining to reestablish and often enforce political stability before handing the country back to local leaders, whom American policy makers had usually carefully chosen, and withdrawing. While policy guidance emanated from Washington or, in the case of the Latin American republics, US ambassadors or emissaries, military commanders operated largely without a US civilian presence. Beginning in 1906, troops deployed to Cuba several times in the ensuing years to restore order; each intervention included several months of military governance before transitioning power back to Cuban authorities. In 1912, the Marines forcibly ended civil war in Nicaragua, monitored an imposed ceasefire, supervised elections, and then returned the reins of power back to the Nicaraguans. Other than American consular officials already in Nicaragua, no civilians accompanied the Marines. Soldiers and marines landed in Vera Cruz, Mexico, in early 1914, remaining for nearly a year as occupying forces. In 1915, Pres. Woodrow Wilson ordered a brigade of marines to Haiti and, shortly thereafter, another to the Dominican Republic to stop widespread violence and political turmoil. They remained to build new political and economic structures for the next 19 years in Haiti and eight years in the Dominican Republic. When Germany capitulated in 1918, the American Expeditionary Force marched into the Rhineland, occupying a sector while politicians debated the terms of surrender at Versailles. The Marines again landed in Nicaragua in 1925, remaining until 1932 to fight an insurgency led by the charismatic Augustino Sandino, a recalcitrant former rebel commander who refused to comply with an American-brokered settlement.
In all these operations, military commanders and their troops performed the full range of tasks associated with ending violence and building states. They became policemen, mayors, judges, public works officers, social workers, tax collectors, and any number of other formal and informal officials associated with rebuilding fractured states. In doing so, civil and military duties became almost indistinguishable; both were seen as part of the professional skill sets required of soldiers, marines, and sailors. Combat and stabilization resided in a continuum of military operations. Gen John J. Pershing, as a junior officer, served in the Office of Insular Affairs and later as a military governor in the southern Philippines, before leading an expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa in 1916 and then commanding the American Expeditionary Force in France in World War I. The marines who landed at Santo Domingo in 1916 fought Germans in France in 1918 and then redeployed to Haiti in 1919 to quell increasing unrest. On the whole, the US military possessed an extraordinarily pragmatic appreciation of the realities of the operations in which it found itself and an equally notable ability to adapt to those realities. Commanders and their troops, as well as ambassadors and senior policy makers, viewed the wide-ranging civilian-military tasks carried out on the ground as an essential part of military capabilities. Operations orders, contemporary journal articles, memoirs, and subsequent doctrine reveal little angst over military forces performing civil duties or the relative absence of US civilians in the field.

Despite their adaptability, US military forces sometimes stumbled. Cultural arrogance and ignorance too often alienated the local populace. Military units in the Philippines resorted to torture to find insurgents, sometimes abused local populations, and, reflecting the era, took a decidedly patronizing stance with a population deemed backwards and incapable of self-rule without sharp tutelage. In the Dominican Republic, marines were accused of arbitrarily arresting and imprisoning locals suspected of crimes or being part of bandit groups. Provost marshals responsible for law enforcement—too often young officers with little experience—trampled on local laws or customs, thereby abusing their powers, at least in the eyes of the local populace. In Haiti, the Marines incurred local enmity by conscripting local labor to build roads. Frustrated by the local populace’s unwillingness to perform such work, which many Haitians deemed socially unacceptable, commanders forced them to do so at gunpoint, with predictable backlash. The First World War’s demand for seasoned veterans to
fight in France significantly lowered both the numbers and quality of troops available for other commitments. Newly trained recruits led by officers deemed unfit for combat duty led to poor discipline and local excesses. In Haiti, Charlemagne Perault, a local warlord claiming special powers against Marine bullets, rallied thousands in an armed rebellion after poorly trained marines abused their authority. The uprising was only put down in 1919, when the German armistice allowed for redeployment of many of the long-term professional officers and noncommissioned officers who had been deployed to France. One veteran who returned to Haiti severally criticized the poor standards of the marines he encountered, blaming the unrest on their undisciplined actions. Yet none of these transgressions negated the fact that, until the final withdrawal of the Marines from Haiti in 1934, military forces bore the brunt of stabilization and reconstruction operations around the globe.

Reliant on the military, and in the context of a public wary of overseas expansionism, US civilian agencies saw little need to develop capabilities for complex operations. Ambassadors and their staffs provided guidance and advice to US forces, and military commanders understood they operated in support of DOS policies. Nevertheless, civilians rarely worked alongside or replaced military units in the field. Those civilians who sought to build indigenous structures largely consisted of missionaries, private citizens, and businessmen with few common objectives and little inclination to coordinate with military forces. The relationship was more one of tolerance than cooperation. The Marine Corps's *Small Wars Manual*, written in the 1930s and based on lessons since the Philippine Insurrection, devoted barely seven pages of its more than 400 to cooperation with DOS civilians—beyond recognizing the ambassador's primacy—and made almost no mention of other US government departments or NGOs. Conversely, it contained entire chapters on military governance, disarmament, supervision of elections, building local security forces, and relationships between military forces and the indigenous population. If military commanders clearly understood the need for close coordination with in-country embassy officials, they fully expected to be left to carry out the range of tasks necessary to rebuild failed states. The scope of operations undoubtedly required the organizational capabilities of military forces, especially in those cases where security remained problematic. Only the military possessed the necessary equipment, manpower, organization, and logistics to
conduct extended operations. Moreover, the DOS did not view field operations as part of its traditional foreign policy or ambassadorial mandates, nor did it feel institutionally challenged by the military. The DOS was content to allow them to carry out civil tasks.

Yet operational scope and organizational capacity were neither the only nor even the most important reasons soldiers and marines routinely carried out civil tasks. The United States created its own unique model for rebuilding failed states, one that meshed with its cultural predilections and rejected those of imperial Europe. The European colonial approach, at least until World War II, envisioned a transition from military subjugation of populations to a large and all-encompassing colonial administration, to local self-rule under imperial tutelage, to, perhaps eventually, independence. In this model, a robust colonial office carried out civil tasks. Not surprisingly, given their history and self-image, Americans steadfastly shunned this approach. For them, civilian-military operations provided enablers for indigenous political and economic development; US troops offered respite from violence and provided the capabilities needed to build democratic states. Embodied in Wilsonian concepts of armed humanitarianism, the goals centered on putting unstable countries on their feet, not on establishing US rule. If, on the receiving end, the American approach may not have appeared as benevolent as perhaps intended, it nonetheless reflected a strongly held view that such interventions sought to end strife and build indigenous capacities for self-governance rather than add to a colonial empire. While some later historians and academics, and detractors at the time, labeled the American interventionism as imperialism, the fact remained that unlike the Europeans, the Americans eschewed establishing a colonial government and always sought to withdraw its forces once stability had been regained. Military occupation might be required to end violence and build new institutions, but government leaders and the public at the time viewed deploying a substantial US civilian capability to govern other lands, akin to a European colonial office, as not only unnecessary but also culturally and politically anathema.

**Postconflict Stabilization: World War II Occupations**

While the Great Depression and interwar isolationism largely ended American military interventions, the entry of the United States
into the Second World War resurrected the need to stabilize foreign regions. Within weeks of the Pearl Harbor attack, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, anticipating the liberation of areas conquered by Germany and Japan, turned to the DOS to meet the demands of postconflict reconstruction, largely ignoring the legacy of the past four decades. He directed Secretary of State Cordell Hull to create an office to plan and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. Hull, after months of grappling with building a radically new capability—one without precedent—declared his department unsuited to the task. Notably, he pointed out to the president the vast differences between diplomacy and administering foreign territories, bluntly stating they were mutually exclusive and largely in conflict with each other. Despite his objections, the president persisted in attempting to build a structure to assume responsibility for governance, relief efforts, and economic development in areas liberated by US forces. Unfortunately, the magnitude of the effort overwhelmed the civilian agencies tasked to carry out the missions. Tested in North Africa in 1942 and early 1943, the DOS, through its newly formed Office of Foreign Economic Coordination, proved unable to provide the resources, expertise, and organization necessary for stabilizing Morocco and Algeria. The many smaller delegations from the DOS, the Department of the Treasury, and the independent Board of Economic Warfare that arrived in theater created organizational chaos. In addition, while the separation between soldier and civilian seemed clear in Washington, in North Africa such divisions quickly lost meaning. Although no longer combat zones, both Morocco and Algeria provided vital bases, seaports, and communications demanding Army oversight. The growing number of civilians imposing their programs on the Army units and facilities frustrated Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, who complained of increasing, rather than decreasing responsibilities because of the civilian influx. By mid-1943, the experiment had largely failed. Reluctantly, but with Cordell Hull’s endorsement, President Roosevelt reassigned primary responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction to the Department of War.

The Army chose to build an organization specifically trained to conduct occupation duties: the Military Governance Corps. Establishing a center in Charlottesville, Virginia, the Army trained officers to plan and coordinate the occupation and governance of liberated territories and, when the time came, Germany and Japan. Starting in 1943 in Sicily, military governance detachments followed in the
wake of advancing combat forces and assumed responsibility for maintaining stability, rebuilding damaged or destroyed infrastructure, and supporting development of indigenous political, economic, and legal structures. They advised local commanders and, at corps and army levels, formed distinct staff sections. In many cases, military governance officers commanded task forces consisting of military police, medical and logistics units, and even combat units to stabilize liberated areas. As US forces moved up the Italian boot and then across Western Europe in 1944 and 1945, military governance teams followed in the wake of combat, providing humanitarian relief to civil populations, establishing local government, helping to rebuild shattered infrastructure, and slowly transitioning civil responsibilities to local and national leaders. Notably, plans for the invasion of Europe included detailed provisions for the systematic military occupation of liberated cities and provinces. Eisenhower would later state that the military governance teams proved essential to his ability not only to meet the humanitarian needs of the populace but also to ensure the security and efficacy of his armies in the field. In the Pacific, military governance teams moved with Gen Douglas MacArthur's forces into the Philippines and eventually Japan and Korea, while similarly trained Navy teams assumed responsibility for the islands of the Marshalls, Marianas, Carolines, Bonins, and Ryukus. Some have argued that only the mobilization of civilian experts who donned uniforms allowed for the creation of a unique organization such as the Military Governance Corps and that, therefore, the example is singular and not replicable. However, that explanation ignores the reality of the innovation. Indeed, the same can be said of the entire US military that fought a global war largely with inducted civilians. A professional cadre led the conscript Army. This cadre included Eisenhower and MacArthur, who knew and understood the civilian tasks necessary for reconstruction and directed the planning and executing of those tasks. Moreover, while military governance officers, many with prior civilian skills, certainly provided essential expertise at the operational and tactical levels, combat and support units whose primary mission and organization were not intended for such tasks executed many, if not all, of the actual operations. Stabilization and reconstruction became firm missions of the US military, missions it conducted for more than a decade.

American civilian agencies sent individuals to assist with planning and give advice on policies emanating from Washington, but they did
not deploy substantial numbers of personnel or provide adequate resources. Beyond political advisors assigned to senior headquarters, the military assumed virtually sole responsibility for liberated and occupied areas. Even with the end of fighting and restoration of order in Germany and Japan, military governance continued.

In Europe, with the surrender of Germany, Eisenhower became responsible for the occupation and civil administration of the American zone. By Allied consensus, Germany would be subject to military occupation, rather than civil governance. The Army, despite its demobilization, assumed responsibility for internal security, economic development, and political reconstruction, guided by the Allied Control Authority and directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a notable innovation, the Army in occupied Germany formed a specialized unit to maintain domestic security and, later, serve as border police. The US Constabulary Corps, originally formed from elements of demobilized armored divisions and equipped with wheeled armored vehicles, became an elite force only disbanded nearly a decade later, when it turned over security and law enforcement responsibilities to the German police and newly formed Bundeswehr.

In Japan, MacArthur chose to develop his own policies based on his self-perceived unique understanding of the Japanese and Far East cultures. He proved less accommodating to civilian advice. Substantial US military occupation forces remained in Japan for several years, performing the full range of civil tasks necessary to put Japan back on its feet. Despite differences in how civilian-military tasks were carried out between European and the Far East, post–World War II stabilization and reconstruction policies dictated that US military forces performed the bulk of the civil responsibilities, slowly handing political and economic control back to indigenous authorities.

Much has been made of the Marshall Plan, which is often cited today as a model of the extent of civilian participation in rebuilding postwar Europe. The Marshall Plan, however, played little role in the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan. The US never intended the Marshall Plan to fund reconstruction in Germany, Austria, Japan, or any of the other defeated Axis states. Indeed, the Marshall Plan did not comprise an element or a driver of postwar military occupation or governance; it focused solely on governments of states once occupied by the Nazis that were no longer under US or Allied military governance. It largely proceeded on a separate track, specifically designed as a self-help tool to assist European governments to rebuild their
shattered economies and, more important, create an integrated European financial structure. The staff administering the program, small and based largely in the United States, provided monetary aid to governments so they might execute previously agreed-upon plans submitted to the United States.\textsuperscript{14} While perhaps a superb model of a developmental program applied to states emerging from war—its impact on the political and security structures of Western Europe cannot be underestimated—the Marshall Plan did not plan or execute the many tasks associated with the occupation of Germany.

**Changing the Paradigm: The Cold War Years**

Despite nearly 50 years of almost continuous experience, the exigencies of the Cold War changed how policy makers viewed America’s role in complex operations. Developing states in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America, many just emerging from colonialism, became key political, and sometimes military, battlegrounds. New concepts of limited war, most famously proffered by Robert Osgood, advocated swift, decisive military victory.\textsuperscript{15} As a result, stabilization became synonymous with propping up governments able to maintain political control against internal uprisings, usually labeled, rightly or wrongly, as communist-inspired. The suppression of violence through the heavy application of force and buttressing of strong central governments became the primary objective. If previously military and civil tasks dovetailed in an attempt to rebuild fragile states, the links became more tenuous. Policy makers came to view military operations as rapid and decisive applications of force for the military’s own ends, rather than integrated civilian-military campaigns as in the past. What civil tasks followed focused on building strong local government capable of suppressing internal unrest and maintaining political order. The United States provided sufficient military and economic aid to keep the new regime in power. Thus, interventions in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Thailand propped up existing governments. Stabilization and reconstruction, when applied at all, became instrumental adjuncts to Cold War military and political expediency, and thus viewed, in a sense, as proxy wars in a larger global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The deployment of large numbers of combat units to Vietnam in the 1960s, however, raised the specter of extended civilian-military
operations again. Reared on Cold War doctrines, US commanders initially viewed the Vietnamese conflict as a conventional military problem, leaving the US embassy and civil agencies to build strong indigenous political structures able to support military operations. Nonetheless, military units in the field, faced with an insurgency as well as a conventional fight, could not avoid addressing the civil problems they confronted. The Marines in the north instituted the combined action platoon program, through which small teams posted to villages and hamlets provided security, trained self-defense forces, guarded crops, and generally became part of the daily lives of the local populace. In other areas, Army civil affairs detachments also attempted to address grassroots issues afflicting the population. In addition, combat units routinely supported local authorities, if largely as a way to isolate enemy forces. Beginning in 1968, for example, the Army deployed five-person mobile advisory teams to advise Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces, the poorer cousins of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Some 354 of these teams were deployed until 1972. The Military Assistance Command of Vietnam viewed these teams as key links to providing security to the countryside and to counteracting Viet Cong influence. Overall, however, civil programs were limited in scope and mostly intended to support combat operations. The American military commander in Vietnam, Gen William Westmoreland, viewed “pacification” as the purview of the host government and the embassy and thus a diversion of US troops from the main effort of battling enemy forces.

As the war progressed, policy makers could not deny the need for civilian-military operations as an essential element of the war’s strategy. As a result, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program emerged. CORDS began as a way to harness US civilian agencies’ efforts to provide civil and humanitarian support to the Vietnamese government, and, more to the point, to the local populations often neglected by their government. It became an integrated civilian-military program, blending the activities of the US civilian agencies and military units. Consisting of provincial and district-level teams of civilians from USAID, the US Information Agency, other government agencies, and military personnel all under a single head, CORDS advised and supported local Vietnamese authorities engaged in economic development, political reform, police and militia training, and a host of other activities associated with solving the many political, economic, and social problems confronting
the populace. Either a civilian or a military officer commanded a CORDS teams at provincial and district levels and tasked these teams to plan and conduct civil programs down to the hamlet level. In addition, in theory if not always in practice, US military units operating near CORDS teams or projects provided security and logistics support and coordinated combat and security operations to ensure synchronization. Although not always supported by General Westmoreland during his tenure as commander in Vietnam, CORDS became a key element of US strategy beginning in 1968, when the newly appointed US military commander in Vietnam, Gen Creighton Abrams, shifted his efforts to address underlying problems rather than hunt enemy forces. By 1970, CORDS had become a mainstay of American strategy to both transition operations onto the Vietnamese and attempt to address the underlying issues presumed to be driving the conflict.17

If CORDS offered an important attempt to mesh civilian and military activities, it also remained shrouded in mythology.18 Much rhetoric today extols the program as an example of the efficacy of a properly resourced civilian capacity, but the facts show this to be a somewhat exaggerated claim. Although a host of diverse civil and military efforts began under the supervision of the US embassy, the initial years were plagued by stovepiped agency funding, inadequate resourcing, and interagency bickering. The embassy proved incapable of effective coordination, especially since it possessed no real authority to direct other agency representatives whose reporting chain and funding stretched back to Washington. As a result, in mid-1967, the US military command in Vietnam established CORDS and placed all those assigned to pacification programs, military and civilian, under the leadership of Robert Komer, designated deputy to the commander for CORDS. Komer was a civilian and had the trust of President Johnson as well as the military and civilian leadership in Saigon. The decision to place both military and civilian pacification operations under military command stemmed from multiple needs for security to protect civilian activities and the substantial personnel, logistics and transportation, and funding, resources provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). Komer later wrote that only the military command could bring all the diverse elements together and direct military and civilians toward a common goal.19 While civilians and military personnel served together in Saigon at the provincial and district levels and on corps staffs, the balance heavily tilted to the military. In 1970, the authorized strength of CORDS called for more
than 6,000 military personnel and fewer than 1,000 civilians. In the field, only 96 civilians served in the 190 districts in Vietnam, the rest of CORDS being military. In addition, nearly 4,000 soldiers and marines directly carried out rural pacification programs independent of CORDS. Funding also reflected the heavy military presence in CORDS; during 1970, the DOD provided nearly 94 percent of the US contribution to the program, with USAID offering the bulk of the remainder.20 While CORDS undoubtedly demonstrated the effectiveness of civilian-military integration, later claims that it marked a fundamental shift in America’s historical reliance on military forces to address civilian-military issues in conflict zones greatly overstated the reality of the program and civilian-military operations as a whole in Vietnam.21

**An Emerging Dilemma: Post–Cold War Interventions**

For the American public in general, and the military in particular, Vietnam left a lasting and noxious aftertaste, one that largely caused military planners to reject any notions of military forces conducting operations other than those that were decisively combat. The doctrines of rapid military victory, forged during the Cold War, again moved to the forefront. In a widely read and quoted book written a decade after the war, US Army colonel Harry Summers assailed US policy makers for failing to adequately adhere to the classical principles of war and use force decisively.22 Indeed, in the rush to forget the experiences in Southeast Asia, by the early 1980s, civil-military concepts associated with armed conflict bifurcated. For the military, and most national security policy makers, battlefield victory became the primary purpose of military forces; political, economic, and social rebuilding fell to others, preferably not Americans, once the troops withdrew. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger codified this division of labor when he pronounced a set of rigid rules for the use of military force. In what became known as the Weinberger doctrine, he included in his list of essential factors for employing military force that force must be a last resort, its purpose must be to defend vital interests, and military victory must be the goal.23 His ideas appeared to be validated by the rapid victories achieved in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1990, and Kuwait in 1991.24 In each, overwhelming military victory against a weak enemy defined the outcome, requiring
little need for lengthy stability operations in the aftermath. If force set
the stage for follow-on political and economic rebuilding, those tasks
largely lay outside the purview of the military and could be dealt with
at leisure in a secure environment. Reconstruction and stabilization
became the responsibility of the international community, perhaps
coa lition forces, or increasingly the NGOs that came to inhabit con-
flict zones. Fresh from its military victories in Panama and Kuwait,
overwhelming and quick force remained the prevalent US approach
to creating stability. In a barely disguised throwback to the Wein-
berger doctrine of an earlier decade, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Gen Colin Powell, argued for overwhelming force to quickly
end conflicts, followed by the quick exit of US military forces, re-
placed either by civil agencies or international peacekeepers.25 His
words became a cornerstone of US stabilization strategy for the re-
mainder of the 1990s.

If the military rejected stabilization and reconstruction missions,
US civil agencies made little attempt to build the necessary organizational
capabilities to assume them. Instead, they increasingly looked
to the international community, coalition partners, and the United
Nations (UN), while denying that a Vietnam-like conflict would ever
again occur. If US forces might employ their superior firepower to
suppress or eliminate violence and warring factions in another na-
tion, regional or international coalitions would assume responsibility
for building stability and protecting international organizations ded-
cated to political and economic redevelopment. For the DOS and
USAID, US involvement in the civil aspects of stabilization and re-
construction depended largely on outsourcing to international orga-
nizations or contractors executed by local authorities, in the wake of
military operations or, preferably, without the need for US troops at
all. Increasingly, civilian agencies came to view military involvement
in civil reconstruction as a challenge both to their authorities and to
their self-image. Yet, despite their stance, neither the DOS nor USAID,
nor any of the other agencies, attempted to include such missions in
their core capabilities. No new offices or bureaus, let alone field capa-
bilities, were added, nor was any real attempt made to institutional-
ize. Indeed, the DOS largely took the approach it had applied since
the turn of the century, relying on ambassadors to coordinate civil
tasks without actually carrying them out. USAID, suffering through a
decade of personnel and funding cuts in the 1980s, assumed its long-
term developmental and democratization programs fit equally well
into conflict situations. Unfortunately, while the military focused on its combat duties, doctrinally and organizationally eschewing involvement in postconflict missions, the civilian agencies failed to institutionalize the largely abandoned civil tasks.

If force set the stage for follow-on political and economic rebuilding, those tasks now largely lay outside the purview of the military, delegated to other government agencies, perhaps to coalition forces, and to the plethora of NGOs that followed in the wake of violence, natural and manmade. US policy makers increasingly turned to the UN to provide follow-on civilian capabilities to rebuild shattered political and economic structures. The UN largely obliged, sending substantial numbers of civilian experts and coordinators to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Often protected by UN peacekeeping troops, which sometimes included US forces, UN authorities worked with NGOs and local leaders, provided humanitarian supplies, and established interim governance structures. When US agencies participated, as they often did, they did so through surrogates. Following a business model developed in the wake of Vietnam as a result of substantial personnel cuts and congressional restrictions, USAID relied on private contractors and direct funding to local authorities for its humanitarian and development programs. It saw no need to change to meet the demands of conflict zones. Other departments also relied heavily on contractors. Given the necessary funding, which Congress tended to provide during crises, it proved much easier and more efficient to hire others to carry out what were seen as relatively short-term tasks. With the military eschewing the role, the US government made little attempt to create a permanent capacity for conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations.

A pattern emerged by the late 1990s in which US forces and those of its most robust allies—usually NATO members—employed or threatened overwhelming combat power to subdue warring factions, after which UN or regional organizations assumed stewardship and protection over the many civil organizations who arrived to conduct reconstruction. Even where US and allied forces remained for extended periods, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, they did so to provide military deterrence and protection, rather than with the express purpose of carrying out civil tasks. The fact that they often found themselves carrying out these tasks seemed to be conveniently ignored by policy makers. While both soldiers and civilians understood that lasting stability required a sustained, coordinated civilian-military effort, they
saw the transition as one of stages and division of labor, starting with military operations and, once security had been restored, handing off the civilian activities. Military forces would continue to impose security and stability, after which civilian organizations and agencies would rebuild broken societies. To make it work, complex coordinating mechanisms would be formed to deal with interagency planning; mutual consensus between agencies and bureaucracies would determine how operations would be conducted. In that sense, civilian-military plans and operations might be considered integrated, but both civilians and military were thereby brought down to the lowest common denominator. In their doctrines and policies, military and civilian occupied parallel worlds, perhaps mutually supporting, but rarely touching. Both had forgotten the past; civil actions could not be, and never had been, separated from military operations.

**Coming Full Circle: Iraq and Afghanistan**

Unfortunately, the United States paid a heavy price in Iraq and Afghanistan for its amnesia. The dynamics of civilian-military integration in both conflicts are discussed in depth in other chapters of this book; however, a few general observations within the context of this essay are in order. Aside from the anomaly, both historical and cultural, of installing what turned out, at least for a year, to be a colonial-style government in Iraq, US policy makers should not have been surprised that the civilian departments and agencies proved incapable of any but a token response to the challenges of postconflict reconstruction and counterinsurgency. The creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State (S/CRS) in 2005 largely sought to provide the needed personnel and expertise to conduct civil activities in the wake of military forces through the nascent Active and Standby Response Corps. Plagued by bureaucratic opposition and marginalization within the DOS, initially not funded other than through a DOD transfer of money, unsure of its role, and lacking authority, S/CRS quickly became irrelevant. USAID, with a robust expert capacity for field deployment—albeit largely ensconced in contractors—remained aloof, seeking to separate itself from the escalating violence in theater. It also sought to remain “neutral” with respect to including military operations conducted by US and coalition forces. It relied mostly on
contractors and often NGOs, often creating an institutional tension that precluded close cooperation with military forces. Other US civilian agencies were unable to meet the demands of overseas operations without the institutional history, mandates, congressional authorizations, or funding that would have enabled them to do so. Military commanders, although frustrated with being saddled with “nontraditional” missions, turned inward, using their own funding and forces to fill in gaps. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, they found themselves carrying out the full range of military and civil tasks, much as they had in past conflicts, but seemed wedded, at least initially, to the idea that the past had never occurred. As these conflicts progressed, the commanders began to remember the past and reconsidered old models, including CORDS. Meanwhile, unable to field a robust capability and equally forgetful, their civilian counterparts groused about the militarization of civil tasks.

In the midst of this organizational chaos the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) emerged. An attempted grassroots-level response to the problem of interagency integration, the PRT meshed military and civilian into a single team whose functions centered on helping the local populace use US funding and assistance to rebuild. Begun as embedded adjuncts to brigade-size units in Iraq, the PRT evolved in Afghanistan into independent entities under the control of the US ambassador. Modeled on CORDS from the Vietnam War, the PRT embodied both the best and worst of its predecessor. While military personnel comprised the majority of PRT members, and the civilian positions proved difficult to fill with competent personnel, PRTs nonetheless offered a cohesive civilian-military construct. Working among the populace and coordinating with local military commanders, the teams provided a link between military operations and many civilian activities and a means for smaller unit commanders to access civil programs immediately. However, PRT and military commanders, often located in the same place, reported to different chains. The former eventually reported to the ambassador, and the latter answered to the senior military commander. Short-term, temporary civilian hires from outside the government served for periods of about a year, while military personnel filled many of the gaps agencies could not fill and usually commanded the teams. In the field, many civil programs did not emanate from the PRT, originating instead either in the embassy or, quite often, Washington, limiting the ability of the PRT to work effectively. USAID, in particular, chose in-
stead to centralize management of many of its programs independently of the PRT. In that sense, the PRT more resembled CORDS in its worst years before 1968, rather than its more successful later years when it was under a single chain of control. Friction sometimes arose between the PRT and US military commander in the province or district, the latter being held responsible for PRT safety and thus tending to restrict movement and operations that could not be safeguarded. The PRT concept, while sometimes a locally beneficial tactical innovation, failed to resolve the problem of competing civil and military roles. At best, it proved a stop-gap measure conducted with little institutional backing.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States, despite continuing assertions to the contrary by both civilians and soldiers, had come full circle. Despite the theories of the late 1990s, and a decade of refusal to reexamine them, both civilian and soldier found the realities on the ground to be more reminiscent of those in the Philippines in 1901, Haiti in 1919, or Vietnam in 1968 rather than Bosnia in 1995. Military forces, as they had for more than a century, conducted the full range of tasks—civil and military—necessary to rebuild war-torn societies. The civilian departments and agencies provided expertise and guidance but lacked a robust capability for wartime operations in the field. The transition from combat and security to resumption of political, economic, and social responsibility moved from US military forces to the indigenous population, without an interim period of neocolonial oversight. Attempts at the latter or a hybrid of both resulted in organizational confusion and too often operational ineffectiveness, if not incompetence. In effect, the two wars of the early twenty-first century largely validated the basic doctrine that has underwritten US involvement in stabilization operations for most of the country’s history, one that relies primarily on military forces to conduct the full range of military and civil tasks necessary to fight armed enemies, reestablish stability, and then rebuild the structures necessary for lasting peace.

Notes

2. Notably, this office would function for almost four decades, assuming responsibility for overseeing several military interventions in the 1920s and 1930s. Although a military institution, it may have been the closest approximation to a colonial office developed by the United States, albeit one that employed soldiers as its professional cadre. Earl S. Pomeroy, “The American Colonial Office,” *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 30, no. 4 (March 1944): 521–32.

3. A *New York Times* article in December 1900, citing the secretary of war’s annual report to Congress, listed military operations against insurgents, civil administration, customs enforcement, public works, education reform, relief operations, building roads, and preventive medicine as among the various duties being conducted by the Army in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines. “Secretary of War Submits his Report,” *New York Times*, 4 December 1900.

4. Doctrine used in the early twentieth-century US military sense connoted a commonly accepted set of precepts and lessons for conducting operations rather than formal written guidance. Lacking the highly structured doctrinal process of today, such concepts in the early 1900s were usually transmitted though the small officer and NCO corps though training, practice, and occasionally professional journals. Not until the 1930s did the Marine Corps produce its *Small Wars Manual* to codify nearly 40 years of practice.

5. Perault was finally killed during a raid on his camp, and, to prove his voodoo had failed him, the Marines publicly displayed his body, an action that did not irritate local sensitivities.


9. The Navy soon realized it also required a civilian-military capability, but one much smaller in scope, to assist island commanders in the Pacific. Thus, it established its own cadre of personnel, trained at Stanford University. During and after the war, naval officers governed many of the Pacific islands recaptured from the Japanese.


15. Additionally, some unit commanders resented civil affairs programs for siphoning off their best men and too often diverting their units to protecting populated areas rather than fighting main-force North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units, which they saw as their primary mission.

16. See the chapters in part 2 of this book.
17. See chapter 4 of this book, as the author, Rufus Phillips, provides a first-person account of the CORDS program.


20. In recent years, civilian agencies engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan reconstruction, most often USAID, have cited CORDS as being the prototype of civilian agency capabilities in conflict zones. The reality of CORDS tempers that claim.


23. See chapter 2 in this book.


25. See, for example, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-56), signed in 1997, and a follow-on handbook issued by the National Security Council later that year, *Complex Contingency Operations Handbook*. Both outline a system for civilian-military coordination while dividing specific tasks along agency and department lines. The latter specifically addresses planning for transition to “follow-on operations” by the UN.

26. For example, see chapter 7 of this book, written by Bernard Carreau.

27. Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY 2006 and FY 2007 authorized the DOD to provide up to 200 million dollars over two years in funds, services, and defense articles to the DOS for security, reconstruction, and stabilization.


An Examination of Postconflict Operations in Panama, Kuwait, and Haiti

Dennis Craig Barlow

The rubble that until weeks earlier was the Berlin Wall was still strewn on the ground when operations to topple the Manuel Noriega regime in Panama were under way. During the six years following the fall of the Iron Curtain, the United States would engage in a whirlwind of civilian–military missions unlike anything it had ever planned or conducted. Among these were taking down the oppressive Noriega government, driving Saddam Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait, providing life-sustaining services to Iraqi Kurds, trying to bring order among long-festering factions in the Balkans, divining the nature of warlords in Somalia, responding to genocide in sub-Saharan Africa, and seeking to restore basic human well-being in Haiti. All defied conventional approaches to national security challenges, and the United States responded with an evolving set of civilian and military packages to meet these new challenges.

US plans for operations in Panama, the first of these national security challenges, envisioned virtually no civilian–military coordination. The military responded to the call to take down the Noriega regime with a combat force that, while paying lip service to civilian–military auxiliary planning, conducted modified civilian–military operations only in the face of mission failure. Operation Desert Storm once again placed almost total emphasis on combat operations, but the fortuitous assignment of key personnel and the timely—and frequent—oversight of key policy makers assured that the Kuwaiti infrastructure and rule of law would be supported by key civilian–military actions. US government activities in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti not only were buttressed by civilian–military plans but also choreographed on a daily basis by a comprehensive and integrated interagency team that oversaw and reacted to events as they happened.

This chapter is based on the firsthand observations of one participant involved in developing the policy-operational continuum relating
to civilian-military actions in three post–Cold War operations: Panama (1989–90), Kuwait (1990–91), and Haiti (1994–95). Six key suggestions have been culled from these operations to help inform the planning and implementation of future civilian-military plans.

Panama 1989: Operation Blind Logic—An Unfortunate but Appropriate Name

Depending on one’s perspective, the Panama intervention was one of the most successful or unsuccessful US military operations in the second half of the twentieth century. The reason for the disparity is that war fighters who measure an operation by doctrinal application of combat capabilities, tactical coordination, precision targeting, logistical support, lack of friendly casualties, and swiftness of mission accomplishment can point to Operation Just Cause, also known as Operation Blue Spoon, the combat plan for Panama, as a model of such efficiencies. However, those who look to the accomplishment of political and economic goals and the integration of national assets to cooperate in achieving restoration and societal stabilization can point to Operation Promote Liberty, the restoration plan for postcombat Panama, as a primer of what not to do.

From the beginning, the two plans were entirely bifurcated, and there was virtually no interagency planning. As amazing as it may seem, a mission that included as one of its four goals the development of “a plan to assist any government that might replace the Noriega regime” did not involve the Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), or the Department of Justice (DOJ) in any element of planning. Further, when the operation transitioned to civilians, both the DOS and the DOJ were slow and reluctant to respond. They were not prepared or programmed for the kind of situation that Just Cause presented. To the very end of Operation Just Cause/Promote Liberty (January 1991), no interagency team was ever constituted.

The Army civil affairs (CA) staff officer who was charged with coordinating and reviewing the restoration plan was Lt Col Rex Burns. Although he held the highest security clearances, he was denied access to the combat portions of the Panama plan within the Pentagon. He also was directed specifically not to coordinate or even to make contact with civilian agencies—especially the DOS—regarding the
civil affairs plan. This was not isolated guidance; even senior officials, such as the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) commander, Gen Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., had been prohibited from coordinating the civilian-military plan with the DOS, ostensibly to maintain op-
erational secrecy.5

Lieutenant Colonel Burns coordinated planning for the stabiliza-
tion and restoration of basic services and normalcy in postconflict Panama, working with his counterpart on the USSOUTHCOM J-5 (Civil Military Sections) and five US Army Reserve CA units that were aligned to the Latin America region. Collectively those units possessed extensive linguistic, cultural, and professional knowledge of Panama. By traveling to each unit (they were all located in the southeast United States), Burns was able to meet with command rep-
resentatives of each unit and develop a scheme of postconflict assign-
ments designed to quell disturbances, prepare for a military police presence, restore rule of law, maintain public safety and health, and deploy advisors with civilian professional and social expertise who would consult with Panamanian officials. The plan, however, was based on the assumption that the national security authorities would implement the presidential authority to activate the selected US Army Reserve CA units.6 This never happened.

During the weeks preceding the military intervention, Burns and I, then on the Joint Staff, issued several papers recommending that the National Command Authority approve the activation of the Re-
serve units and recommended coordinating with the DOS with re-
gard to developing reconstruction guidelines and criteria for the transition from a military to civilian lead. We also requested that the Pentagon convene the interagency Joint Civil Affairs Committee (JCAC) mandated by an overarching Pentagon document, the Joint Services Capability Plan. However, no action was taken based on these staff recommendations.7 The two staff officers were told repeat-
edly that the combat phase was the most important; the restoration phase would just have to wait. We were also told that no one wanted to burden the president and other decision makers with distracting political decisions, for example, determining to exercise activation authority.8

When it became unclear if the Army Reserve CA units would be activated, the CA staff officers in the Pentagon recommended to Army staff brigadier general William W. Crouch that a volunteer civil affairs task force be mustered from the five units previously identified
for deployment. His concurrence began five hectic days in which the CA reserve volunteer task force, known as the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF), was selected and prepared for deployment. The delay proved extremely costly; the five days of resultant lawlessness and rioting caused over a billion dollars in damages to an already poor and suffering nation. To some Americans, the scenes of looting became the overriding image of the operations in Panama. None of the plans to implement public safety procedures were included in the final operational plan.

As a result of the chaos in the streets, Gen Maxwell R. Thurman directed Air Force brigadier general Bernard Gann to assume command of the derived CMOTF and, in conjunction with the chargé d'affaires at the US embassy, to “assist the newly inaugurated Panamanian government.”

Placing an Air Force general in the role of government liaison, giving a staff officer the role of commander, and placing an ad hoc USAR CA force under his control contravened both doctrine and common practice. The DOS in Panama, understaffed and ignorant of the planning and personnel involved, did not accept the mission. General Gann was forced to proceed on his own.

The CMOTF, as a composite unit, found itself without its own flag rank officer in command and without the normal logistical and administrative support of regular military units. It was difficult to achieve consistent support, gain recognition of legitimacy, or operate within clear lines of authority. Nevertheless, General Gann and his Army Reserve CMOTF commander, Col Bill Stone, directed the field grade officers who comprised the 25-man task force to establish themselves as advisors to the various government agencies in Panama. In a generally unheralded mission, these diplomat warriors brought clarity, competence, and calm to the newly organized government of Panamanian president Guillermo Endara in the early days of 1990.

A more immediate problem, both as a result of the rioting and the military destruction, was the restoration of lifesaving services and public safety. The 96th CA Battalion, an active duty unit deployed as part of Operation Just Cause, immediately went into action and provided billeting, food, and emergency medical services to the displaced persons of Panama City. Literally overnight, the battalion created a tent city at Balboa High School, built latrines and water points, and promulgated waste disposal and other sanitary procedures. This unit of fewer than 200 soldiers provided stability and calm in the otherwise frantic and dangerous combat zone in Panama City.
However, the greater challenges of disarming the dreaded Panamanian Defense Force, developing an ad hoc police force, and developing long-term civilian government plans fell to the main combat force of the operation, Joint Task Force Panama. The challenge of bringing all the postcombat missions under the cognizance of one organization was met by creating an omnibus unit called the Military Support Group (MSG). Handpicked active duty soldiers were selected based on education or prior experience in the region; the CMOTF consisting of civil affairs reservists was included as were the active duty CA and psychological operations units. The MSG and its component parts, although poorly coordinated internally, worked hard and long at creating nascent and effective relationships and governance solutions.13

A Lack of Civil-Military Cooperation in Panama

From the beginning, the combat phase took complete precedence over the “residual” postconflict phase.14 The DOD isolated itself from other agencies, as it allowed both inter-and intraservice considerations to drive the composition of forces and command and control relationships throughout the Panama postconflict operations of 1989–90.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the brilliant combat leader General Thurmond replaced the politically astute General Woerner. Thurmond later admitted that he did not even spend five minutes considering the reconstruction plan as he hastily prepared to conduct operations.15

It is easy to point fingers at the US military leaders in Panama in December of 1989. It must be remembered, however, that this was the first major military operation after the end of the Cold War, and in spite of incredible obstacles, the staff and operators crafted an ad hoc postconflict civilian-military system that sufficed. A greater inhibitor to implementing an effective postconflict mission might take cognizance of national political leaders who set initial goals for the mission but seemed to take no special efforts to shape or influence the ongoing operations. Richard Shultz, in his early and classic examination of restoration missions, In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause, concluded that “in the future, senior officials have to be more interested.”16 Unfortunately, several subsequent operations and policy decisions jump to mind to remind us that senior officials often seem detached
once operations are under way. The reasons for this phenomenon would make interesting research material but are beyond the scope of this work.

**Operation Desert Storm: Restoring Kuwait (1990–91)**

The lessons of Panama were not entirely lost on participants in the next military operation, the liberation of Kuwait. Many of the same officials in Washington, DC—military and civilian—occupied the same offices as they had during the Panama operations; however, most of them were oriented to the Middle East and were not directly impacted by the events in Latin America. Moreover, they had not necessarily gleaned any “take-aways” from the operations in Panama.

Many contend that the success of postconflict operations in Kuwait was due mostly to the fortuitous circumstance of the “deep pockets” of the Kuwaitis and that the financial and operational support of others—Saudis, Europeans, and Japanese—obviated any real need for a robust and complete civilian-military plan for transition and reconstruction. The facts suggest otherwise.

Monitoring events in the Middle East, CA staff officers in Washington, DC, were considering possible civilian-military responses prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Many of the action officers had been involved in developing plans for Operation Promote Liberty in Panama the year before and had seen those plans scuttled just prior to the execution of the mission. They were resolved not to let that happen again. A key civilian-military issue had been framed by Pres. George H. W. Bush when he identified one of the four “simple” goals driving US participation as “restoring Kuwait’s legitimate government in place of a puppet regime.” However, accomplishing that goal would be anything but simple. Some Kuwaiti officials had gone to ground, while others emigrated abroad to await the conclusion of the ground war. The puppet regime installed by Saddam Hussein would follow the Iraqi dictator’s every wish and could wreak havoc on the society and infrastructure of Kuwait. Trying to help the Kuwaitis restore the country and install a legitimate post-Saddam regime in Kuwait was a daunting task. While the mission seemed to point to the DOS, recent operations in Panama suggested that aid from the DOS would not be available until well after hostilities had ceased.
In spite of the imminence of action, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) had not developed a civilian-military plan (the required Annex G [Civil Affairs] to its operational plans) for Iraq. The Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) were given no assurances that any consideration would be given to post-combat missions. Therefore, there was reason to fear that civilian-military missions and forces would again be given short shrift in war planning consideration as was the case in Panama.

On 14 August 1990, less than a week after President Bush demanded the immediate and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Assistant Secretary of Defense Jim Locher, with the lessons of Panama in mind, developed a paper recommending that the OSD consider raising the issue of postconflict planning. It suggested that the DOD consider its role in the “restoration of Kuwait,” coordinate restoration plans with the DOS; and activate the JCAC, a board of senior advisors designed to provide advice to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on CA matters. Locher believed that the president’s statements provided clear guidance to begin civil-military planning at once. He and Assistant Secretary of Defense Henry Rowan sent a joint memo to the director of the Joint Staff (DJS) on 22 August, requesting comments and approval to develop an approach to crafting a postconflict strategy. Within a week, Locher received a handwritten note from the DJS that rejected the idea from Locher and Rowan, noting that activation of the JCAC would be inappropriate. While no explanation accompanied this response, there were verbal discussions within the Joint Staff that characterized the activation of the JCAC as relatively unimportant compared to the urgent mission of preparing combat operations plans.

During the next six weeks, neither the USCENTCOM nor its Army component took any significant action to develop civil-military or postconflict plans in conjunction with rapidly developing war plans. Nor, for that matter, were there plans to request presidential authority to call up CA reservists and units. Concurrently, message traffic was quite explicit in concluding that “USCENTCOM was ill-prepared to conduct CA operations.” Discussion among rank and file action officers in the Pentagon focused on emphasizing combat missions and said that other considerations—specifically postconflict or restoration operations—must be attended to after the war fighting was over. Despite requests from the Joint Staff and the OSD, responses from the staffs of USCENTCOM, the Department of the Army, and
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) did not promise any postconflict planning related to Operation Desert Shield. A common response to these requests was that no one wanted to tell a regional commander—and especially not a strong-willed leader like Gen Norman Schwarzkopf—how to do his job.

Locher, nevertheless, decided that it was time for the OSD to construct a policy directive on civilian-military goals that would benefit “the field.” He believed it would be the kind of guidance General Schwarzkopf would find helpful. To ensure the fullest participation in the process, the ASD–SO/LIC invited representatives from the Army, USSOCOM, and the Joint Staff to develop the directive. Accordingly, a draft version was completed around 25 August. Over the next several weeks, however, the process slowed significantly as the Army staff raised concerns and continually offered alternatives. The process dragged on into early October when the project, which had slowed to a near stop, was ended. General Schwarzkopf, who had become aware of the effort within the Pentagon, declared that no policy guidance should be provided because he required none.

On 20 September 1990, an event occurred that broke the stalemate. The Kuwaiti government-in-exile dispatched 20 specialists to Washington to establish a reconstruction planning structure under the authority of Amb. Saud Nasir al-Sabah.

Col Randall Elliott, a member of the 351st Civil Affairs Brigade, was a senior officer assigned to the DOS and knew ambassador-designate to Kuwait Edward “Skip” Gnehm. Gnehm informed Elliott of the newly arrived Kuwaiti team of specialists. Elliott told Gnehm that his Army Reserve CA unit possessed the kind of planning, cultural, and functional expertise that the Kuwaitis might find useful. Gnehm wasted no time in taking the information to the Kuwaitis, who wanted to hear more. The Kuwaiti government-in-exile sent a request to the director of the Joint Staff, Lt Gen Michael P. C. Carns, for a DOD department briefing, and the request was quickly approved.

On 4 October 1990, the Joint Staff civil affairs staff officer briefed the Kuwaiti contingent, now known as the Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program (KERP) in the Pentagon. Also present at the briefing were Ambassador Gnehm; the J-3 of the Joint Staff, Lt Gen Tom Kelly; Headquarters, Department of the Army and USCENTCOM representatives; and OSD officials. At the conclusion of the presentation, the Kuwaitis showed considerable interest in obtaining US Army CA support to help restore their country; a request was duly delivered to
the president on 9 October 1990. A scant 10 days later, ASD–SO/LIC Locher attended a deputies committee meeting in which the topic of support to KERP was on the agenda. The committee agreed to provide restoration and planning advice and assistance to the government of Kuwait.

The deputies committee met on 15 October and approved CA support to the Kuwaitis. A mid-level Pentagon civilian-military team was tasked to develop guidelines for CA support to the Kuwaitis, while senior leaders were acting on decisions made at the 19 October deputies committee meeting. National Security Council (NSC) member Robert Gates recommended that the DOS, OSD, and Joint Staff establish a steering group to develop a postconflict plan in conjunction with the Kuwaitis.

The steering group produced the terms of reference that specified that the DOS and the DOD share responsibilities for developing a civil-restoration program, assisted by other departments and agencies when appropriate. The steering group committee, chaired by the DOS, was to oversee the planning effort along with members from the OSD and the Joint Staff. The government of Kuwait was expected to execute applicable contracts for services and equipment with US civilian firms, and the US government was to be allowed to request reimbursement for the cost of services rendered. Semimonthly reports were to be distributed to the DOS, OSD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSC, and USCENTCOM.

On 22 October, a DOS official attending an interagency meeting hosted by Assistant Secretary Locher volunteered to draft a memorandum of understanding between the United States and the government of Kuwait. At the same time, the Joint Staff would distribute a message from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Colin Powell, asking the Department of the Army to create a task force to assist in planning with the Kuwaiti officials.

On 1 November, the KERP received an update briefing. The same day, the deputies committee confirmed the members of the steering group committee. The steering group authorized the establishment of a United States–Kuwait Civil Affairs Group, specifically to oversee civil-military planning efforts, and endorsed working groups for each of the CA functional areas.

In spite of the fact that high-ranking policy officials in Washington had authorized this plan, it nevertheless became stuck in the Pentagon. With reservations about the capabilities of its reserve CA units
and concerns that it had been forced into an unfamiliar role, the Army staff and USSOCOM offered numerous objections to the formation and employment of the Kuwait Task Force (KTF). The Army staff felt that the DOS and other civilian agencies should have assumed the role that the CA reserve soldiers were to shoulder. After all, the restoration of government dealt with traditional civilian, not military, matters. While the concept of interagency play finally had been articulated, the Army CA role was encountering opposition from within the Army itself. Doctrine entirely supported the concept of operations, and a vast amount of resources had been directed to the training, equipping, and employment of the CA force to conduct this kind of mission. However, there were those in the Army who felt uncomfortable with such a mission or who were afraid that the civil affairs forces would not measure up. The issue of Army prerogatives in conflict with interagency actions poses a perennial issue in Washington: the primacy of policy guidance over organizational prerogatives. The question revolved around determining how firm and how binding was the guidance of interagency representatives (National Security Council, the deputies committee, the DOS, and DOD officials) that called for the formation of a CA task force, over the Army, the USSOCOM, and the commander of USCENTCOM.

The draft Joint Staff message authorizing activation of the KTF required concurrence from the Army, and the decision became contentious. The arguments of the Army and elements within the Joint Staff and a silent USSOCOM had given General Carns, the director of the Joint Staff, pause. He delayed the activation order for the selected reserve members of the 352nd CA Command as he considered other alternatives, including declaring the mission a DOS responsibility.

On the evening of 21 November, after an exasperating and frustrating week, Assistant Secretaries of Defense Locher and Rowan requested a meeting with General Carns, and together they argued that giving the mission to the reserve CA unit was doctrinally correct and the smart way to go. Carns agreed and gave a “thumbs up” to the deployment order that tasked the chief of staff of the Army and the commander of the USSOCOM to activate a CA task force to support the government of Kuwait in developing restoration plans in Washington, DC.

The Army—as it had done in Panama—inexplicably and at the last moment precluded the unit commander from deploying with his unit; so command of the KTF fell to Colonel Elliott. His team consisted of reserve soldiers who had previous experience in Panama the
year before and highly qualified members of the unit whose professional skills matched perceived requirements in Kuwait. His designated deputy was Maj Andrew Natsios (in civilian life, the director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance [OFDA] in USAID). The team assessed hot-button issues such as due process of law regarding suspected Iraqi sympathizers, possible sabotage, reconstruction of electrical grids, possible oil fires, and provision of needed food and medicine.

The unit worked every day—including Christmas—between its activation and its eventual deployment date of 26 January 1991. Elliott put into place an ambitious phased plan that culminated in the creation of the preliminary Annex G, Civilian Action Plan, designed to become part of the USCENTCOM’s operational plan. The KTF developed these plans in coordination with 27 US government agencies—a happy circumstance owing to operating in the nation’s capital. Elliott introduced the Kuwaitis to Army engineering personnel who were later to deliver critical support to Kuwait in the spring and summer of 1991. The KERP group also received briefings from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and OFDA. Colonel Elliott made the most of his task force’s location in downtown Washington, DC.

The creation of bonds of trust between KTF members and their Kuwaiti counterparts on the KERP made the KTF’s crucial work possible. While much of the planning support took the form of KTF members acting as “honest brokers” to identify reliable contractors and develop workable procedures, a great deal of effort was focused on the sequencing of postconflict actions and identifying agencies (both US and Kuwaiti) that would support a comprehensive plan of action. Of particular import to the US was ensuring the rights and safety of Palestinian and other third-party nationals after the liberation of Kuwait, since the region was rife with rumors of these groups committing atrocities against Kuwaitis.

In January 1991, the emir of Kuwait, apprised of the progress of the KTF, requested that it deploy to the area of operations. USCENTCOM concurred with this request. The steering group committee and the undersecretary of state for political affairs coordinated the effort with the Pentagon, and on 31 January, the KTF deployed to Saudi Arabia.

The KTF acted quickly, continuing to coordinate with the Kuwaiti ministerial representatives. However, a problem remained. Colonel Elliott assumed that his long-term planning with Kuwaiti government officials would continue after his deployment. Nevertheless, when in theater, the KTF was, as is usual, placed under the control of
the commander of USCENTCOM. There was an expectation that the KTF would “fall in” under the normal chain of command. This was a crucial moment. US policy makers had created the KTF to develop long-term and high-policy issues relating to the restoration of the society of Kuwait. USCENTCOM, however, focused on the immediate CA missions of managing displaced civilians and assuring that life-preserving goods and services were delivered.

Ambassador Gnehm and General Schwarzkopf hammered out a solution via a meeting in which they decided that the KTF would continue its higher-level coordination while providing liaison duties for US Army Central Command (ARCENT) and USCENTCOM. The focus of KTF work, however, shifted from long-term to short-term (emergency) restoration projects.

The creation of a Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) allowed synchronization of all civilian-military actions. In turn, the CCATF became part of Task Force Freedom, a composite service-support unit commanded by the deputy commanding general of ARCENT, Brig Gen Robert Frix, who provided the KTF a “home” within the USCENTCOM structure in which it could conduct its civilian-military activities.

The US-led coalition ground war began on 24 February 1991. The CCATF moved into Kuwait City on 1 March. The KTF accomplished its work within the context of Task Force Freedom’s missions and continued to do so until 15 April, when it handed the job over to Maj Gen Patrick Kelly, the head of the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office, an agency of the US Army Corps of Engineers. Although the government of Kuwait requested that the KTF remain until December 1991, KDF redeployed with its parent unit, the 352nd, on 10 May.

In spite of the fact that the invading Iraqis and subsequent plundering and vandalism caused much infrastructural damage, within one month after the end of the fighting, 50 percent of the telecommunications and transportation systems in Kuwait were restored, and 30 percent of the devastated electrical grid was repaired. More importantly, not one Kuwaiti died from thirst, starvation, or lack of medical attention after the liberation. Civil rights were immediately restored and, astonishingly, there were virtually no acts of retribution or vigilantism directed against suspected collaborators.

Due to the scores of contracts facilitated by the KTF and coordination among military units, 2.8 million liters of diesel fuel, 1,250 tons of medicine, 12.9 million liters of water, 12,500 metric tons of food, 250 electric generators, and 750 vehicles were delivered to the devastated
country. By the time the KTF departed, the Kuwaiti medical system was operating at 98 percent of its prewar capacity, the international airport was reopened, and the police force was fully operational. All major roads were opened—as was one port—while two others were being swept of mines.

The postconflict planning and execution of the KTF has drawn high praise. From the New York Times to officials of the DOS and DOD, there is unstinting praise for both the levels of expertise and the passion and dedication KTF members brought to this task.

The members of the KTF must have been pleased when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said to them, “Your role in the US government assistance to the Government of Kuwait in the reconstruction of that country was exceptional, both for its swiftness and the depth of expertise which you provided. The extraordinary skills resident only in the Reserve Component were absolutely essential to these successes.”

Desert Storm: Civilian-Military Cooperation Improves: Lucky or Smart?

While the civilian-military plan for Kuwait faced many of the same challenges as the operation in Panama, those who executed the plan were able to overcome those obstacles because senior US government leaders took an energetic interest in it; many of the US officials involved had been cross-trained among various government agencies; many of the planners were to become implementers, thus insuring continuity; and interagency communications and coordination efforts were timely and efficient. Unfortunately, each of these situations was to some degree serendipitous and unlikely to be replicated.

On the negative side, Army intraservice issues again hurt unit composition, planning, deployment, and effectiveness. Additionally, the issue of Washington officials walking a fine line between giving guidance and respecting the commander’s (or chief of mission’s) authority proved delicate indeed.

Operation Uphold Democracy: Haiti (1994–95)

After the success of CA actions in Kuwait and Northern Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort), CA enjoyed a time of relative high-level cognizance during which decision makers and senior officials in various agency positions were aware of and valued the capabilities that
CA afforded. CA planners were included in the process, as options were considered for dealing with the junta installed in Haiti by Gen Raoul Cédras.

Fortunately for the United States, there was strong international support, including a clear and strong stance from the United Nations (UN), to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency of Haiti and to oust the usurper, Cédras. Unfortunately, the United States had no clear idea of what to do after Aristide was reinstalled.50

For months in early 1994, the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) had been planning two possible scenarios for entering Haiti: permissible and forceful. While developing the alternate plans, the 10th Infantry Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps generally kept to themselves and were not accessible to other US government agencies.51

Nevertheless, in April Secretary of Defense William Perry insisted that his department begin a strong interagency planning effort.52 This process evolved throughout the summer and culminated in a Washington-wide team of very high-level officials, the executive committee (EXCOM), which met frequently and garnered a quick reputation for its direct and no-nonsense approach to crafting an interagency process to accomplish policy goals in Haiti.

The aggressive and energetic Richard Clark of the NSC chaired EXCOM. Clark kept the meetings short, employing a brisk and direct style that held each member—senior or not—strictly accountable. Principals who attended these meetings included US Marine Corps general John J. Sheehan (commander of USACOM), Adm William A. Owens (vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, Amb. James Dobbins of the DOS, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch, and directors of various agencies, principally the USAID.

The EXCOM often held meetings on Saturday mornings, precluding interference from day-to-day business, frequently at Jefferson Square, in the Pentagon, or even in the Situation Room of the White House. Clark encouraged members to bring action officers with them to provide in-depth background but ultimately held each principal responsible for his agency’s actions.

Daily teleconferences supplemented the EXCOM meetings, attempting to drive policy guidelines down the chain while receiving feedback and recommendations back up the operational-to-policy apparatus. It was not unusual to have nine military headquarters and US government agencies participate in the morning teleconferences.
It was also not unusual to have agency members of the highest rank participating on a regular basis.

Meetings and teleconferences of the EXCOM not only fostered a coordinated planning and phasing system but also, perhaps more importantly, became the accepted fora to explore potential problems and suggest possible solutions. Additionally, it became easier for mid-level agency counterparts to coordinate with each other and to know more fully the context in which they were working.53

On 16 September, when a mission to Haiti led by former president Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Colin Powell had successfully negotiated the resignation and departure of the Haitian military junta, the game changed entirely for the US military, which had been primarily concerned with the now moot combat phase. Fortunately, the postconflict plans formulated by the USACOM under the guidance of the EXCOM were executed nimbly and effectively.

There were problems. The rules of engagement were vague and resulted in several deadly and high-profile breakdowns of law and order.54 The despised Force Armée d’Haïti (Fad’H), which had gone to ground, was capable of emerging stronger than ever. Most towns were without decent water, electricity, and medical care of any kind. The populace was hungry, scared, ill, suspicious, unemployed, and prone to mob violence.

Gen David Meade, commander of the 10th Mountain Division, took a minimalist view of the security he was to maintain and basically kept his troops in garrison. This resulted in criticism from those who thought the US military force was showing a lack of fortitude or commitment.55 Eventually a multinational police force provided security in the larger cities, while special forces teams provided security for scores of towns in the hinterland.56

However, the basic questions of the US troops on the ground were, “How much do we do?” and “What are we not to do?” There existed an international legal requirement to establish a safe and healthy environment. In Haiti those conditions were difficult to achieve in the best of times. Nevertheless, there was also the clearly stated policy not to engage in mission creep or to conduct nation-building activities.57 To a special forces sergeant, to a USAID coordinator, to a civil affairs ministerial advisor, when was one restoring life-sustaining services and when was one engaged in nation-building? It is interesting to note that 18 years after Operation Uphold Democracy, critics of the
mission remain divided between those who would have done more and those who would have done less.

At the highest levels, the interagency machinery had worked. The USAID Office of Disaster Assistance was first on the ground, brokering needs and assistance. Office of Transitional Initiatives contractors carried out that work. The former commissioner of the New York City Police, Ray Kelly, worked with the International Police Monitors to create an effective police force, designed to prepare the way for a new force to be created under the auspices of the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Program. Special forces teams fanned out through the countryside to provide both immediate security and life-saving services to those in the rural areas. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had created a high-ranking CA team that redesigned the penal system. General Sheehan had been convinced that he needed to establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) in Port au Prince to coordinate the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) with military operations. This effort to engage local NGOs and get them back on their feet was Admiral Owens’s particular emphasis. CA officers coordinated with the head of each ministry to get them back on track. Other Army CA teams tackled the problem of providing clean water, electricity, and medicine to suffering communities. These teams applied the civic action model of helping the Haitians plan the engineering improvements but having the inhabitants conduct the work and receive credit for doing so. Nevertheless, it was difficult not to do more or conversely not to create high expectations among the citizenry as to what they could expect from the Americans.

Back in Washington, the EXCOM had established the interagency mid-level Haiti Working Group to prioritize and coordinate aid provided by US agencies and NGOs. A five-phase program, based on CA functional areas, was being implemented to insure a proper handoff to the UN on the last day of March 1995. Washington officials made periodic trips to Haiti to gauge the effectiveness and progress of the US team effort. One such effort was a tactical tour by Undersecretary of Defense Walt Slocombe and the head of the strategic plans and policy directorate of the Joint Staff, Lt Gen Wesley Clark. Both men were advocates of a clear exit strategy for Haiti, as they accompanied Maj Gen David Meade throughout the country to gain a better understanding of the nature and effectiveness of the operation.
When the time came to hand off to the UN, it went easily. USACOM had developed a “UN Staff Training Program” to prepare UN personnel for their mission. Maj Gen Joseph Kinser assumed the dual role of US and UN commander. Even the special forces elements developed ad hoc procedures with their new UN counterparts.62

**Operation Uphold Democracy:**

**The Policy Operational Gap**

While the core mission in Haiti had a clear goal—the restoration of the legally elected president—its objectives relating to providing security, life-sustaining services, stability, and a healthy environment for the Haitians were nebulous.

Perhaps never before had so many senior interagency players come together to plan, implement, coordinate, and conduct transition activities on behalf of a limited national security operation. The result was clarity among virtually all of the US government agencies as to roles and schedules. The credit for this has to go to a dynamic band of high-ranking leaders, including William Perry, Richard Clark, James Dobbins, Strobe Talbot, Walt Slocombe, Wesley Clark, and John J. Sheehan.

However, the consensus was that while senior leaders knew the intent and intended flow of the mission, policy makers failed to impart this vision completely to the units and organizations on the ground. Army units were continually wondering about rules of engagement, the level of expected or tolerated nation-building activities, and what to do when confronted with the threat of violence. Some unit commanders erred on the side of doing nothing; others stepped up and became virtual provincial governors.

Routinely, deployed US military units did not know how, where, or if USAID was doing its job. DOS officials on the ground were either absent or invisible to their military counterparts. This situation was even more baffling since policy makers had brought so many mid-level staffers and officials into the coordinated planning process in Washington. Perhaps they were too busy to push such mundane matters as liaison and coordination down the chain. Perhaps they were concerned with crossing over into another agency’s bailiwick, or perhaps—as is most likely—they left it to the soldiers and officials on the ground to settle on ways of working together. Whatever the reasons, it seems clear that while individual operators, units, and agencies were doing heroic
and energetic work, they were mostly operating in an uncoordinated fashion, even though their bosses thought their mission was clear.

Lessons from Civilian-Military Operations of the 1990s

1. Policy makers must set and reiterate clear goals and objectives. Exit strategies may change, but their modifications must be clear and pervasive. Washington leadership and intent must be identifiable and unmistakable.

National security policy goals do not have to be “wordy,” but they must be clear and attainable. Policy makers must understand that the words they choose will be interpreted by civilians and military alike as they are massaged and developed into mission statements, warning orders, terms of reference, rules of engagement, phases, transition points, and desired end states. Sounding good or “humanitarian” at a press conference or in *The Washington Post* should not be the goal. One must select a goal that truly captures the commander’s intent and is clear to all involved. Moreover, if policy makers modify that goal, then they must alert the entire policy-operational continuum.

In Panama, the regime change of Noriega was basically all that was desired. Yet without the ability to assure safety in the streets and basic life-sustaining needs, a regime change was superfluous. Civilian-military planning to assess and plan for the exigencies of regime change was sacrificed on the altar of swift and decisive combat operations. After the administration deduced the initial enormity of the operation, policy makers needed to redefine the mission. It is difficult to imagine why no one higher than planners in the DOD could understand the need to articulate and assure the restoration of law and order in Panama in 1989.

In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, policy makers once again oversimplified the mission and allowed the combat portion of the plan to assume almost total focus. Fortunately, mid- and senior-level officials in the DOS and the DOD requested guidance or rather persevered until their requests for further guidance and direction were granted. The result was that an energized deputies committee provided strong and timely oversight to an interagency team that developed a civilian-military restoration plan that was very successful and widely heralded.
Policy makers planned Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti from the beginning as an operation that would require strong and comprehensive interagency action to assure success. Not content to let one mission statement drive its actions, daily meetings of the principals were held, phased schedules were monitored, and situation reports gauged progress and requirements on a frequent basis. The decision of a key national security advisor to personally and energetically lead this effort left no one in the dark as to the overarching goals and policies of the administration.

However, policy makers did not articulate fully the nature of the restoration mission, and this had a profound effect on ground operations. Both USAID and military personnel were perplexed as to what constituted forbidden nation-building activities, yet international law and human decency required them to rectify serious problems. Special forces teams took the initiative and conducted well drilling, sanitation, medical, and electrical projects in rural areas, while many other units hunkered down for the duration. Soldiers and USAID personnel were confused as to what they were to do and how they were to cooperate to do it. Organizations on the ground were frequently unaware of each other or of overlapping responsibilities. Even the rules of engagement were unclear, resulting in several touchy incidents.

2. Plans must be coordinated, or at least considered, with all involved or interested agencies, including UN agencies and NGOs.

It is now understood in Washington, DC, that a successful civilian-military operation may require more than a “whole of government” approach to accomplish its mission best. UN field agencies, “for-profit” corporations, and NGOs can all bring value to a comprehensive stabilization or reconstruction plan carried out by the US government, as can the right players from the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Transportation, and so forth. That, however, is easier said than done. Organizational prerogatives, not to mention budget constraints, political behaviors, and institutional divides, will not be going away anytime soon. The wise leader of such a mission will find ways to reward and cite those who do participate. No one wants to be left out. Those who are ignored will not be happy, and almost every plan gains from review. However, it is important to note that inclusivity requires good management.
Operation Just Cause occurred at a time when US policy makers had not flexed military muscle for some time. The Army, especially, felt the need to demonstrate its ability to deliver swift lethal force in a controlled and decisive way. Not only was there no recent precedent for interagency action, but also the stated need for regime change caused few in the Pentagon to lose focus on what promised to be a “good show.” The fact that policy makers allowed no interagency coordination plans to proceed out of the Pentagon should have surprised no one in 1989, but one has to wonder why the leadership in the administration, with a greater national perspective, did not require it.

Interagency actions taken with regard to the creation of the KTF were both timely and crisp. Deputies committee requirements were met within hours. DOS and DOD operatives acted in a seamless fashion, and Washington agencies offered up supporting services in a breathtaking fashion. However, one must remember that the DOS was fortunate enough to have a key official in one of the CA units and that all preparatory actions were accomplished in Washington, DC. Still the myopia of the Army staff (with its lack of confidence in Reserve CA personnel) and the pushback from the theater commander, who resented receiving further policy guidance, almost stymied the operation. If it had not been for the Kuwaiti government-in-exile pleading for the activation of a civilian-military planning organization, it is very likely that none would have been created or deployed.

Policy makers developed and coordinated Haiti policy in 1994–95 in textbook fashion. The NSC chaired frequent and detailed meetings of the EXCOM and expected participating agencies to follow up. Actors synchronized plans, roles were articulated, and virtually every organization participated in face-to-face or teleconference venues. When direct questions were met with embarrassing periods of silence or puzzled faces, the resultant demand for better responses insured that such noncompliance would not be tolerated. Policy makers discussed and agreed upon tasks and phases. Subordinate groups handled issues in the same manner. Members of major agencies took trips to Haiti to oversee activities of their own agencies and to “see the battlefield.” Once on the ground, agency representatives soon realized that they also needed to bring others into the planning and implementation circle: allied forces, UN field agencies, and international and local NGOs.
3. If decision makers do not develop coordination mechanisms at the strategic or operational level, deployed soldiers or officials will develop those mechanisms tactically on an ad hoc basis.

We are fortunate that Americans are good at improvising, but it should not be up to an Army sergeant or USAID disaster assistance response team worker to develop foreign policy on the fly. While bureaucrats may try to develop policies that are flexible (sometimes intentionally vague), the result is usually bad. It would be much better if policy makers and their lawyers would take the time to develop policies with sharp and clear distinctions, rather than taking the easy way out and hoping that the operators will find a way to muddle through.

The fact that the original civilian-military operation in Panama—Promote Liberty—was scuttled at the eleventh hour left a gaping hole in the policy fabric. No one was engaged with the Panamanian ministries, there was no police control or training program, sanitation was at a standstill, and areas affected by combat operations were in chaos. While the CMOTF took matters into its own hand and engaged with the ministries of President Endara, so did other members of USSOUTHCOM. With the duplication of effort came internal friction and lack of efficient coordination. Eventually police training and basic human services were restored, but only after billions of dollars of destruction occurred, organizational friction arose, and makeshift organizations were developed. It is difficult today to comprehend an effort to revitalize the society and economy of Panama without the leadership, support, and engagement of the Departments of State, Commerce, Education, and Agriculture and the USAID.

While the policy guidance and interagency support rendered to the KTF were effective in Washington, DC, these attributes might easily have evaporated in the field. Upon deployment to Kuwait, the USCENTCOM commander quite properly wanted the KTF assigned as part of his forces. However, the high-level nature of its work argued that the task force should continue to provide support directly to the Kuwaiti government. Fortunately, Ambassador Gnehm met with General Schwarzkopf and developed a compromise in which the task force continued to work with the Kuwaitis while being assigned to the Army component in theater and given additional CA missions. Since both NGOs and other US agencies were not resident in Kuwait in any numbers, the need for complex interagency coordination was unnecessary, thus simplifying this mission.
In 1994 the Haitian population was in desperate shape. Great numbers of people went hungry routinely, sanitary conditions were universally appalling, and local NGOs tried heroically to feed 6,000,000 people daily. With the demise of the dreaded police force and development of a sudden medical and food vacuum, the situation was critical. Fortunately, the effective planning of the EXCOM set things in motion quickly. USAID personnel were on the ground rapidly, NGOs were bringing needed and validated goods into the country, CA officers (legal experts) were reengineering the penal system, and international police experts were reinventing the police.

USACOM and the Joint Staff agreed early that NGOs and UN field agencies needed to be brought into coordination mechanisms. General Sheehan approved the creation of a CA civil-military coordination center that acted as an information and planning hub where NGOs and other military planners could coordinate activities. These actions obviated many friction points and pinpointed areas of need and concern. Without the coordination center, the full weight of feeding and providing medical services for the entire nation could have fallen on the US forces on the ground.

4. Plans must address the accessibility of all required personnel, whether civilian or military. When accessed, these organizations must not lose their identities.

Fortunately, the United States has a plethora of capabilities it can array against challenging civilian-military missions. Unfortunately, accessing those capabilities can present a host of quandaries, including facing a nebulous authority to legally deploy civilian personnel, dealing with departments that claim to have insufficient budgets and personnel, determining relationships of disparate participating agencies, arranging and prioritizing logistical support activities, and caring for a very diverse group in international and likely very austere conditions. Therefore, it is one thing to count and measure assets and capabilities; it is quite another to assume availability in the event.

Plans can appear complete with the addition of reserve forces, civilian surge organizations, and various US departments and agencies. However, the real accessibility and other challenges associated with each of these categories make it mandatory to specify how each piece will be accessed in order to be activated and deployed.
Plans utilizing military reserve units or personnel must require their availability; therefore, a trigger mechanism for their activation must be part of the plan. The same goes for other US agencies. Planners must also understand the legalities and politics of accessing civilians. Recent events have shown that those who are very interested in supporting a contingency notionally often react differently when actually directed to deploy. Buy-in must occur early in the process. Time spent in getting agency agreement and senior approval of these aspects of plans will be time and effort well spent.

Once organizations are integrated into the plan, let them do what they do best. Often military or civilian bosses will try to make the attached unit or organization look like them. Military leaders especially like to deal with familiar and doctrinal organizations. Leaders must resist this impulse. Reserve units and civilian agency officials in the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury know their jobs and can be trusted to act according to their own levels of professionalism. Smart leaders will find the appropriate time and place to employ these assets and then plug them in and let them play. Modifying and cobbling together “new” units from existing units without significant time to rehearse or to be part of an organizational family is likely to be dysfunctional in the extreme and is almost certain to result in very low morale in the modified organization. It is very unlikely that an organization thus employed will succeed.

The fact that the ad hoc CA plan for Panama depended on US Army Reserve units led by attached active duty Army and Air Force leaders who did not understand or trust the CA capability virtually doomed it. Since reserve CA assets eventually carried out the program successfully in spite of substantial logistical and personnel hurdles, all signs indicate that the original plan would have succeeded. By all indications, senior leaders did not ever consider the deployment of assets other than active component military personnel, even though Operation Promote Liberty was a plan to restore government functions.

The KTF made maximum use of its time in Washington, DC, to visit and receive important guidance from other government agencies. Although the restoration plan for Kuwait did not request activation of civilian officials, it made maximum use of key personnel while in the critical predeployment preparation phase. Since the main job of the KTF was to prepare future contracts that would kick in after the liberation of Kuwait, getting advice from the government agencies
led to the development of a comprehensive and effective package of postconflict deliverables.

However, other military leaders in Operation Desert Storm did not understand the capability of the KTF’s civil affairs forces. In Saudi Arabia there were instances of CA units being given the job of putting up tents, while commanders were struggling with the dilemma of how to deal with dislocated civilians—the doctrinal purview of those same CA soldiers!

The plan for Haiti did not call for the activation of civilian organizations that did not have deployment experience, but it maximized the use of organizations designed to deploy. USAID organizations were among the very first to hit the ground and initiated many actions which civil affairs, special forces, allies, and the DOS were able to take over. As USAID teams developed the framework for subsequent relief work, the military fell in behind and solidified the process.

Policy makers identified early a senior CA team that was deployed to Haiti with its own commanding general and the specific charge to revamp the penal system of the entire country. This was the first time in a generation that a reserve CA element was deployed as planned.

5. Someone needs to be in charge—overall and by phases of the operation. If some personnel who develop the policy can be part of the mission throughout, they can facilitate and improve this process.

No one disputes that in an operation there must be an overall authority. However, in a complex civilian-military operation, the shifting nature of the mission, as well as the diverse nature and sheer numbers of players, makes this a difficult challenge.

Initially, there is the Washington level of play. If decision makers develop plans according to the guidelines above, the appropriate agencies and departments will have participated and planners will have designated an administration official and designated a lead agency. However, the nature of the mission may presage a shift from an emphasis on military capabilities to political or diplomatic or vice versa. When such transitions occur, authorities need to recognize the fact and design a mechanism to transfer authority and responsibility. Also, after planning has been accomplished and the mission is deployed, US authorities in the host country must be prepared to exercise support and authority as the mission unfolds in that country. Too
often in the past the mission does not change hands simply because it is felt that continuity would be disrupted or that the current lead would feel disenfranchised. Egos often get in the way. This too may result in the embassy team feeling bypassed and unable to use its substantial power to influence events. A successful civilian-military plan must tackle the sensitive issues of “who’s in charge,” based on planned phases, deployment schedule, end state conditions, and in-country authorities. One way to assure that continuity prevails even though the nature and authority of the mission transforms is to assign policy advisors to take part in the mission until it is concluded.

Policy makers developed Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty without the knowledge or participation of the DOS in Washington or in Panama City. The result was that the DOS was silent when called upon to support it. In the short term, the US military was forced to accomplish all diplomatic and government missions with a makeshift CA task force composed of conventional Army officers and Army Reserve volunteers. Unfortunately, no one involved in the Panama operation was outside the military chain of command.

The KTF enjoyed the happy circumstance of having one highly qualified diplomatic Army officer designated as the task force commander to plan the Kuwaiti restoration. He did so by coordinating with all interested organizations and conducting a transparent operation. When he deployed to Kuwait, the situation changed. Ordinarily Colonel Elliot would have lost his authority upon deployment, but because the theater commander, Kuwaiti officials, and the ambassador crafted a line of authority for the KTF, it continued to exist and flourish.

It should also be noted that CA needs arose that were not foreseen in Washington, DC, and the authorities on the ground (notably Generals Schwarzkopf, Frix, and Howard Mooney) were able to tackle such issues as displaced civilian camps and emergency food distribution by relying on the expertise of the units and proven doctrine.

Policy makers based the Haiti restoration plan on a six-phase operation that identified key players, expected time lines, major culminating activities, and areas of responsibility. Handoffs were handled efficiently and monitored daily in Washington and throughout all involved organizations via daily teleconferences. While the director of the NSC and the EXCOM controlled the policy reins in Washington, the theater commander exercised clear operational control in Haiti and coordinated activities with numerous civilian agencies.
There was a problem with control in Haiti. Tactical elements on the ground did not know who else was working beside them. Part of this was because the rules of engagement in Haiti did not encourage an “out-and-about” attitude. Nevertheless, the agencies and military organizations on the ground tended to run stovepiped operations, not coordinating efforts with each other. In spite of clear guidance from the top, there existed an operational gap among tactical players, suggesting that policy makers need to pay more attention to coalescing varied organizations that are involved in the mission.

6. Face-to-face and real-time meetings help enormously.

In an age when distance learning and virtual reality are hot topics, one must not forget that human interaction remains the key ingredient in developing successful activities in any culture.

The two operations (combat and restoration) in Panama began as separate and severable issues. The fact that the planners worked in the same office did not assure that they actually shared ideas or concerns. They did not. Even though interagency experts were available, they were not consulted. In addition, even when on the ground and involved in delivering civilian-military services, the various military task forces seldom met.

While the bifurcation of plans at the beginning of the planning cycle for Desert Shield mirrored that of Operation Just Cause, things quickly changed. The genesis of the KTF was a briefing to the Kuwaiti government-in-exile in the Pentagon. Kuwaiti officials met and developed a bond with their CA counterparts. That bond continued after the preparation phase of the operation and through the unit’s deployment. It was a special request from the Kuwaiti government that helped convince General Schwarzkopf to maintain the relationship between the KTF and its Kuwaiti counterparts. The results of the partnership—accomplished in a very short time span—have been saluted universally.

The creation of the CCATF under the rubric of Task Force Freedom gave CA units access to force commanders and vice versa. The open style of General Frix allowed CA units that had previously been misapplied to attend to the demanding requirements relating to the proper disposition and care of civilians in the area of Desert Storm operations.

A succession of physical and teleconference meetings among both high- and mid-level officials hallmarked the Haiti mission in 1994–95. Not only were ideas and concepts immediately on the table, but also
lower ranking officers could discern clearly the intent of superiors. In this environment, direct authorization to communicate across staff and unit lines was encouraged strongly; action officers met other action officers, just as decision makers talked to other decision makers. The concept permeated the entire policy and planning process as interagency working groups toiling under the authority of the EXCOM developed a like methodology. As simple as it sounds, the meetings provided much needed contact points and answered the often uncomfortable questions, such as “Who does what in what order?” and “Who’s in charge for each phase of the operation?”.

The face-to-face nature of the operation continued on the ground as the theater CA force opened and operated the CMOC. It encouraged NGOs, the military, and other organizations to come and coordinate planned activities. Many have credited the CMOC with providing a nonthreatening umbrella under which each participant felt welcome and comfortable.

Final Thoughts

It will come as no shock to any who have participated in interagency missions that communication is the key to success. What is surprising is the continuing lack of communications and coordination mechanisms that continue to hallmark US efforts in civilian-military ventures. If policy makers articulate—and continually monitor—a clear set of objectives, including measures of success and mission conclusion, staffers and operators alike are likely to operate in a clearer and more confident manner. Further, if plans, phases, and transitions are coordinated among all involved—perhaps even all interested—agencies, the chances of success become even greater.

Policy makers cannot adopt a “fire and forget” attitude toward whole-of-government operations. Complex civilian-military challenges require more frequent and crisp emphasis from the top than do pure combat operations. This does not equate to micromanaging—quite the contrary. If decision makers are clear about the intent, subordinates and operators will develop sound and effective tactical means of achieving goals and will feel more comfortable in coordinating with other agencies and organizations.
Notes

4. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, 64.
7. Several inquiries were subsequently made (one by the Army Times) as to why these recommendations were not acted upon. No explanation was forthcoming.
8. Many considered the decision to activate reserves a very strong indication of political will at the time. Reserve call-up authority had not been granted during the entire conflict in Vietnam, or subsequently.
10. Policy and doctrine for civil-military operations and applications had been promulgated within the Joint Staff, Army staff, and US Special Operations Command. Decision makers ignored all such policy and doctrine.
12. The Army and USSOCOM had refused to activate any reserve CA officers as part of its volunteer force.
16. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War, 69.
19. Patrick W. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force: A Unique Solution to Kuwait’s Reconstruction Problems” (Box 1, Carlton Papers), 5. Although the JCAC has never officially convened, it has been part of DOD policy for over 50 years.
21. Ibid., 212.
23. Ibid., 8.

retary of Defense Richard Cheney, this report confirms that early CA planning for Operation Desert Shield was insufficient.

25. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and Civil Affairs Association, “Read Ahead for the Civil Affairs Symposium,” 212.
26. Ibid.
27. The fact that Skip Gnehm was a former deputy assistant secretary of defense was no doubt of great value in his ability to work the processes within the Pentagon.
30. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and Civil Affairs Association, “Read Ahead for the Civil Affairs Symposium,” 214.
31. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 51.
35. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and Civil Affairs Association, “Read Ahead for the Civil Affairs Symposium,” 214. USSOCOM generally remained silent as this issue developed. Several times when it had the opportunity to state a position, it took no stance or interposed no objection to actions being contemplated by the Joint Staff and OSD.
42. Ibid., 25.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 26.
45. Ibid., 28.
53. A continual problem in Washington, DC, is the need for action-level officers to know precisely what their bosses and other agency heads have agreed upon. Principals often meet one-on-one, arriving at decisions that lack specificity and clarity when passed down to subordinates. When their staffs can communicate informally across staff lines, they are much more likely to arrive at a clear and shared understanding.

55. Ibid., 58.
56. Ibid., 70.
57. Ibid., 64.
59. Local NGOs provide food to approximately 6,000,000 Haitians. Had such a burden fallen upon the US military occupying force, it would have been burdensome in the extreme.

60. Once again, it was difficult for US officers to determine what conditions were life threatening and what constituted nation-building. Haiti, the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere, is continually lacking sufficient services.

62. Ibid., 82.
PART 2

The Vietnam War (1954–1975)
Chapter 3

Measuring Success


Richard W. Stewart

One of the critical attributes of any counterinsurgency (COIN) or nation-building campaign organization is that it must have a way to measure success, or at least progress, in attaining its long-term goals. Military officers, civilian managers, and policy makers must constantly ask themselves a number of questions. What does success look like, how will we know if we are doing the right things, and how will we know what additional resources or management focuses are needed unless there is a way to measure success? Is a program doing well, or is a course correction needed? What measurements do we need, and how do we take them? Even after we collect data points, what does the data really mean? And, how long does it take to know whether or not we have attained success even if we do manage to measure it carefully?

All of these issues have been raised before, at no time with more interest than during the long pacification struggle in Vietnam. And the solution at the time lay, according to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his “whiz kids,” in the amassing of larger and larger quantities of data through which they could measure progress. McNamara, whose management style and belief structure derived from the systems analysis world of business and project management, was convinced that only through statistical collection and data analysis could one measure progress and plan for future success.1

Such a strong belief in the power of numbers can easily delude one into thinking that numbers are accurate reflections of truth and can lead to a misplaced confidence that war can be treated in a scientific, stimulus-response manner. Certainly any number of engineering problems or even operations research studies benefited from the rigorous collection of statistics, facts, and percentages to calculate costs, acceptable tolerances, and projected benefits. But, measuring loyalty
to a government? Measuring “hearts and minds”? Calculating “trust,” security, or progress? Can these measures be captured in numbers?

Statistical analysis may work well for designing and building aircraft or ships, but how would this technique of statistical analysis help in COIN, pacification, or stability operations? How do you measure those intangible things like security, rural development, or good governance? By whose standards and with what internal milestones of success can one measure these? To assess trends and developments, US pacification managers in Vietnam certainly tried hard to measure all of these things using a variety of sophisticated techniques and automated programs. The results and accuracy of the measures, however, were decidedly mixed.

Robert Komer and later William Colby, as deputy commanders of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) for the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)—the interagency headquarters tasked with managing US support to Vietnamese pacification efforts—were only partly in the McNamara camp of believers in statistical compilation as measurements of success. Each was, in his own way, deeply committed to the success of the US effort in Vietnam and eager to find ways to calculate such intangibles as “trust of the government,” “sense of security,” and “degree of economic improvement.” However, both were suspicious of the degree to which numbers reflected reality. Yet they saw that it was necessary to measure things in order to manage programs. Komer and Colby always grappled with ideas about how to put numbers to concepts like security or trust in government and track progress over time as an aid to managing the always-limited COIN assets. Then they would look for other avenues to double-check those numbers using a variety of tools. Their efforts over time built up a system with at least some degree of success at measuring progress.

One of the principal measures of success used by CORDS, and one that quickly gained currency from headquarters from MACV up to the White House, was the still controversial Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). This system was developed by the Central Intelligence Agency, introduced incrementally during 1966, and fully instituted country-wide in January 1967 but continually revised and modified over time in attempts to refine its accuracy.

HES was devised initially as a management tool to help district and province advisors determine, over time, how successful their efforts, and especially those of their South Vietnamese counterparts,
were in achieving progress in their regions. Part of the HES monthly survey included raw data collection on the number of enemy incidents or attacks in the previous month, garnering a sense of the degree of corruption of local officials, numbers of refugees, condition of the roads, and so forth. This useful compilation of basic statistics could, eventually, give a sense of what was happening in the provinces if not define what those data meant.

The most controversial part of the HES was the hamlet rating portion of the form. Each month, a US district advisor was supposed to individually evaluate every hamlet in the country—over 14,000 separate communities—and rate those communities in six major areas: Vietcong (VC) military activity, VC subversion and political activities, capabilities of friendly forces, actions of the local Vietnamese government, and economic development. For each of the major areas, the advisor filled out three questions and assigned one of six ratings from “A,” the strongest rating, indicating complete government control; down through “B,” “C,” “D,” “E,” to “V,” or complete VC control. It was a somewhat subjective rating by the district advisors that indicated what they felt was the security posture of the hamlets in their areas of responsibility. Each advisor could define for himself the differences and weights in words like “frequently,” “systematic,” “satisfied,” “being met,” and other explanatory words. With advisors receiving only a few hours of training in-country on how to fill out the form, consistency of meaning was a constant problem.

There were other problems with the HES right from its inception. Although its district and provincial advisors viewed it as an internal management tool, HES rapidly became the “report card” of choice that CORDS used to evaluate programs and the capabilities and effectiveness of the district and province advisors and their counterparts. Yet the advisors were the ones responsible for collecting and analyzing the data. The HES rating was thus often the result of highly subjective judgments by some of the people whose job performance was being graded by how they reported the data they collected. This left the system wide open to potential abuse, although it was at least an attempt to be more systematic and useful than statistics of irrigation ditches dug or schoolhouses built. It was a good measurement tool for specific accomplishments or events, but was not necessarily good for more intangible statistics such as true political progress.

Despite the regular attempts by CORDS leaders to explain that HES was just one data point in the larger picture of pacification activities, the
press often viewed HES results with great suspicion as being overly optimistic and self-serving. Ambassador Colby continually tried to point out that the HES was only an “aggregate guide” to security to assist in management. In his memoirs he commented on the HES: “No one pretended that these categories were accurate in themselves.” He wrote, “They could be influenced by the advisors not getting to the hamlet that month, by his district chief pushing him to give [him] a better grade, or by his own inexperience early in his one-year term.”4 However flawed, Colby and others still considered that even this rudimentary attempt to quantify progress was better than most other measures adopted by US forces in Vietnam in terms of amount of money spent, number of troops trained and to what standard, or the infamous “body count” measure of progress in the field. Those quick and very dirty measures of “success” were deeply flawed and ripe for abuse. In fact, they were at best misleading and at worst directly counterproductive.

The problems inherent in HES caused the entire program to be one of the centerpieces in a congressional investigation of pacification by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1968. A member of the committee, Cong. John V. Tunney (D-CA), traveled to Vietnam in May 1968, and in his report, he blasted the HES as inaccurate and unreliable. In his introduction he stated, “I found it difficult to believe that such a precise evaluation of the political sympathies of rural people could be made; yet this information was being used at the highest levels of the US Government as a guide to operational planning and as a means of informing the American people on the progress in the war.”5 In his report, Congressman Tunney discussed the methodology of HES and criticized its tendency to “average” A-, B-, and C-graded hamlets together as all being “secure.” He further objected to the subjective nature of the judgments made by American advisors on their short tour in their post, the lack of detailed training on the HES either during the superficial training of advisors in the United States or after arriving in Vietnam, the random nature of data collection in the field, the subjective and unreliable information collected, and its overall unreliability as a measure of political success or grading the loyalty of the people for their government. In short, the congressman focused clearly on the most critical flaw of the HES: garbage in; garbage out.6

Colby and his staff were not unaware of the problem and even suspected that the way data was collected often led to inflated results. In January 1969, partially in reaction to Tunney’s report and partially due to the suspiciously high rating of 76 percent of the country being
“secure” less than a year after the Tet offensive, Colby requested that MACV establish a regular inspection team to conduct sample inspection visits in various districts and review with each advisor how he filled out his forms. This activity would seek to double-check some of the assumptions and subjective judgments made by each district senior advisor and validate, or refute, those assumptions. For several weeks in February, teams of evaluators, both American and Vietnamese, collected data from 159 hamlets, looking for the “potential for error at any stage in the evaluation system” and for “personal perception and subjective analysis of the DSA [District Senior Advisor].”

The results of this internal investigation were mixed. The team reported to Colby in April that the HES was “quite unreliable” for the determination of “a specific piece of information about a specific hamlet” and that advisors tended to err “significantly” on the side of optimism. They acknowledged that the short tours of district advisors (on average only six months in duration) compounded the problem since most advisors found it hard to visit all of their hamlets (with over 14,000 hamlets and villages in the country this was always a challenge) during their tour and accepted many Vietnamese reports and data at face value, “filling in” information gaps with assumptions and second-hand data. The HES rater was “ultimately required to make extensive subjective determinations without clear guidance,” which made specific facts for particular hamlets suspect. In fact, the team reported, “It is not unusual for an advisor to simply decide what overall rating he feels a hamlet deserves, and then to check the appropriate boxes necessary to give a hamlet that rating.” However, when the data was compared with other, independently gathered material from MACV J-3 or the Pacification Studies Group, the team reported that nationally many of the subjectivities evened out. They further reported that overall, despite its flaws, the HES was “reasonably accurate” when viewed on a national basis over time. However, it was still very weak on defining what really constituted “relative security” in a hamlet and weaker still on really measuring political loyalty or support for the government. This was a critical flaw that was never fixed.

Other methods were used to verify the degree of security attained in the countryside and thus measure the degree of success of various pacification initiatives. One interesting measurement tool was the Public Attitude Analysis System (PAAS) developed in October 1969 in conjunction with the Vietnamese government. The PAAS was basically a
long running, systematized, public opinion poll program that would send teams of samplers out to the countryside with the mission of determining “trends in rural Vietnamese attitudes towards pacification and development.” Random hamlets and villages would be selected in each Corps’s area and combined teams of US and Vietnamese questioners would have villagers fill out forms (or provide answers in interviews for the illiterate) with 60 questions. Somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 villagers were polled each month.

Like the HES, each PAAS public opinion poll, taken monthly, was by itself of little value, but it provided important information over time as indicators and trends of support or regression. As CORDS stated in its forwarding letter to the commander in chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and other higher agencies, the PAAS results on security perception, political attitudes, and the economic situation of the Vietnamese “are to be taken as indicators, not a statement of fact.” The February 1970 report, for example, was compared with the October 1969 report to show an overall increase in perceptions of security but a decrease in belief that the economic situation was improving, with increased prices the biggest single problem. The survey also showed an interest of more villagers in participating in local government, reflecting an increase in their trust in the ability of the government to affect their daily lives and some measure of confidence that the government was legitimate. Eventually, such public opinion polls could provide valuable information on attitudes, trends, and issues that might not otherwise surface.

Another valuable use of the PAAS teams revolved around a test of validity for the HES. Since the HES was not meant to be viewed as a stand-alone report (though it often was), it was valuable to test the data, occasionally using other means to see if the posited security level of a province was accurate. In January 1970, for example, the HES stated, as part of its questionnaire, that 114 randomly chosen hamlets reported that a government hamlet chief stayed overnight in the hamlet regularly. However, the PAAS, when queried about the results of its interviews in those same hamlets, confirmed only 80 of the hamlets had their officials staying in the hamlet overnight regularly. Assuming the PAAS was more accurate, such a relatively low HES reliability rate of 70 percent threw doubt on one critical indicator of hamlet security. How could a province advisor declare a hamlet secure if the hamlet chief was afraid to spend the night? It is probable that such statistics, a direct result of continually collecting data to test
other data, were a factor in changing the HES and also qualifying the conclusions drawn from that system. There are times that any collection instrument, no matter how sophisticated, simply cannot assess future possibilities. As with other pacification initiatives, no developmental program or increase in local security forces, or even belief in the eventual survival of a government, could withstand massive conventional invasion forces.

Like the HES, the PAAS program was turned over to the South Vietnamese government in January 1973 when United States forces departed. The Vietnamese continued the sampling program with some help from the United States right up until April 1975. It is indicative of some of the limitations of the PAAS that the last published PAAS report in March 1975, a mere month before the North’s legions crushing defeat of South Vietnam, showed that the South Vietnamese people were confident (66 percent of rural and 79 percent of urban respondents) that a year from that time the government of South Vietnam would still be in control of the country. Public opinion polls may reflect attitudes but cannot predict future reality on the ground.

In short, the United States developed a number of means to measure success over the course of the Vietnam War, but no one means could be trusted to stand alone as a completely accurate measurement of progress. The HES probably came closest, although that system was not without its share of flaws. And even after it had been used aggressively throughout the country for six years under direct US control (January 1967 to January 1973), it was still only useful as a general indicator of progress. It could not be a true measurement of success since it could never truly tap into the degree of commitment and loyalty that a South Vietnamese citizen had for his or her government. And that, in the end, was what the Vietnam War was all about.

**Considerations for Contemporary Operations**

The COIN challenges in Vietnam (sophisticated political infrastructure, extensive conventional force in place, and massive aid from the communist world) and the resources available to fight that insurgency (some 800,000 South Vietnamese and 8,000 US personnel and vast interagency resources deployed at each level of governance throughout the country) were different than contemporary situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there is much the United States still can learn
about attempts to measure progress in Vietnam. In particular, I think we can learn from the various methods employed, however flawed, to focus on the details of the pacification struggle down at the hamlet and village levels. This sophisticated attempt to gather large amounts of data, especially using the much maligned but useful HES, was a comprehensive effort to collect key data elements, over time, on a truly vast array of programs and initiatives. By conducting such an effort using generally consistent data points, with incremental improvements to the instrument, to measure a “basket” of facts, managers of the pacification struggle were able to get a general sensing of progress or regression on all aspects of hamlet, village, and provincial life. Furthermore, it was in the hamlets and villages that the struggle for victory took place. By gathering data on all aspects of enemy activity, friendly forces, aid projects, construction activities, governance programs, health, education, welfare, and even economic activity, the United States and the host-nation government took a regular series of snapshots over time, with quite remarkable granularity, of what was happening throughout the country.

While the various methods used to measure progress in South Vietnam were not all that its critics hoped it would be, they were, however flawed and inconsistent, at least detailed and determined attempts to measure what was happening in key areas and to collect data along a continuum toward specific and approved goals. That was an invaluable guide to leaders who needed to justify and manage programs and determine if their results were consistent with overall plans. Are systems and procedures in place to collect detailed accurate data and analyze for lessons? Is information collected and analyzed for the effectiveness of militia training, conflict prevention, and stabilization programs and initiatives? As Yogi Berra was reputed to have said, “You’ve got to be very careful if you don’t know where you are going or you might not get there.”17 As an adaptation of this adage, if you do not make some kind of effort to keep track of the turnings in the road and the key landmarks along the way to “there,” you will not even know if you are going in the right direction. This was as true in Afghanistan as it was in Vietnam.

Finally, even if a systematic attempt to collect such data in every instance were put in place, any contemporary military, civilian, or mixed civilian-military team attempting to assess the success or failure of US or host-nation efforts in a region needs to remember a few critical things. First, even if it looks as though “hard data” is collected, any
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analyst should immediately ask who collected the data, how subjective the data might be, and what agenda the collector or collectors might have. Will overly optimistic data prove their own success? I have heard of at least one incident in Afghanistan when a province was given a “green” overall rating in order to “give confidence” to the provincial governor rather than being based on any actual fact. Conversely, will overly pessimistic data garner more resources for a team, effort, or province? Will initially pessimistic data followed by dramatic-looking progress over a short period of time be seen as an attempt to make a team or their boss look good? If any initial battlefield report should not be taken at face value, as most experienced combat commanders know, then why should one uncritically believe any data with the potential for subjectivity? In short, any provincial reconstruction team (PRT) or regional PRT supervisor needs to consider how subjective any collected data might be. Always be suspicious of data (as Ambassador Colby was in Vietnam in the case of the HES) and devise other, parallel means to test the data to see if it holds water. It pays to consider how the data could be wrong since often a great deal rests on the result.

Notes

2. “Hamlet Evaluation System,” CORDS files, file cabinet 77, folder 16, US Army Center of Military History (CMH), Fort McNair, DC.
6. Ibid., 8.
7. Colby to MACJO1R, HES Analysis, 18 January 1969, Records Group (RG) 472, Box 12, 1601-10A, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Pacification Studies Group, to CINCPAC, JCS, etc., report, Public Attitude Analysis System (PAAS), April 1970, RG 472, CORDS Historical Working Group, Box 23, NARA.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Pacification Studies Group, to Ambassador Colby, Hamlet Officials at Night, memo, 10 February 1970, RG 472, CORDS Historical Working Group, Box 23, NARA.
15. CORDS Files in CMH, File Cabinet 71, Drawer 2, PAAS, March 1975.
16. Ibid.
Chapter 4

An Eyewitness Account of Counterinsurgency and Civilian-Military Teams in Vietnam

Rufus Phillips

After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in April 1954, the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel. I arrived in Saigon as a young Army officer on 8 August 1954, three days before the Geneva Accords took effect. While the communist Vietminh consolidated their power over the North, French forces evacuated to the South. At the same time, the South struggled to survive in the face of resettling a million refugees fleeing the North, contending with rival religious and gangster sect forces vying for power and attempting to assert control over large swaths of southern territory that had been under Vietminh rule for over nine years. These territories, along with active combat against sect forces in Saigon and the Mekong Delta, posed a significant counterinsurgency (COIN) or pacification challenge as the South emerged as an independent republic by the end of 1955. The US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), previously limited to advising the French, now began giving direct assistance and advice to the Vietnamese army.

I was assigned to work directly for the legendary Col Edward G. Lansdale. He had been the principal US advisor during the successful campaign against the communist Huks in the Philippines. Under Lansdale’s guidance, I began taking Vietnamese officers to the Philippines to show them how the Philippine army, with its “people first” approach, had defeated the Huks. Building on the Philippine experience, I was soon involved in revamping the Vietnamese army’s efforts to extend security and governance into those former Vietminh territories. In February 1955, I became the first US military advisor to accompany Vietnamese army troops in the field on that mission. My mission continued until late 1955, when I was assigned as an advisor to the Vietnamese government’s civic action program, which sent civilian teams into the villages.

Subsequently, in 1962 during the Kennedy administration, I returned to Vietnam serving as assistant director for rural affairs in charge of COIN in the US Economic Aid Mission. This office decentralized US
aid to the provinces and created the first US civilian-military advisory teams at the provincial level. These teams supported Vietnamese COIN operations based on the strategic hamlet program, a village-level self-defense, self-government, self-development effort to secure the rural population and win its support. I became directly involved again from 1965 to 1968, returning periodically to Vietnam as a consultant to the US Department of State (DOS) to assist in COIN and political advisory efforts.

This chapter reflects my firsthand experience in the creation and deployment of American civilian-military advisory teams within the framework of US pacification/COIN doctrine and practice in Vietnam and offers recommendations for future COIN and stability operations.

Understanding Civilian-Military Teams within the Context of Counterinsurgency: It’s Them, Not Us

To understand the use of civilian-military teams in Vietnam within the context of overall COIN doctrine and practice, it should be stressed that the role of these early teams was primarily advisory. They were not direct actors as civilian-military teams have come to be in the Afghanistan provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), for example. The principal focus was supporting Vietnamese COIN efforts, not US forces conducting COIN. The distinction is important—the US policy position that ultimately prevailed was that the South Vietnamese themselves would have to win the insurgency struggle.

Pacification as both a strategy and a tactic suffered from several interrelated and overlapping problems. First, the Americans and Vietnamese failed to understand that the conflict was, at its core, a political war for the support of the insurgent base—the rural population. Second, Americans, for too long, did not fully understand that only the South Vietnamese themselves could defeat the insurgency, albeit with US help—not the other way around. Third, there was an absence of a coherent, workable, and widely accepted COIN doctrine. Fourth, US agencies, civilian and military, did not coordinate or unify in purpose. Instead, they followed separate agendas. Considerable time and effort were required to overcome inertia and strenuous bureaucratic objections in order to execute an interagency melding of joint command with truly combined civilian-military advisory teams in the field of operations—a necessity for success. It also took
time to arrive at a commonly accepted, population-centric COIN approach. Most important were properly organized and determined political and military efforts by the Vietnamese government to carry out effective COIN. Finally, the Vietnamese alone would have to sustain the effort once security and stability had been established—the issue of sustainability. Ultimately, sustainability became an insurmountable challenge.

Figure 4.1. Editor Jon Gundersen, as a young military advisory team member in Vietnam. Photo courtesy of the editor.

The On-Again, Off-Again Approach to Counterinsurgency and Civilian-Military Teams

Five distinct periods define the often tortured development of pacification and the use of civilian-military advisory teams in Vietnam. The first extended from 1954 to 1961 and involved an initial understanding of the importance of bringing popularly responsive government to the rural areas. These areas had been under direct communist
(Vietminh) rule or under its indirect influence. Other areas were under the influence of religious sects not friendly to any centralized government. However, after initial success in 1955–56, the situation on the ground began to deteriorate. When the weaknesses of the Vietnamese government were combined with US neglect of the rural areas in its military and economic aid programs, a security and political vacuum developed that the Vietcong (VC) eagerly began filling.¹

The second period, from 1961 to 1963, began with the decision by the newly inaugurated Kennedy administration to help the South Vietnamese defeat the rise of the VC through an increased economic and military aid program and advisory effort. By mid-1963, this program began to see some success but ultimately self-destructed with the overthrow and murder of Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and the assassination of US president John F. Kennedy in November 1963.

Vietnamese political turmoil, poor American leadership and advice, increased VC activity, and the introduction of North Vietnamese units into the South marked the third period, from the beginning of 1964 to mid-1965. This turmoil met with an ineffective response by the Vietnamese army.

The fourth period, from 1965 to 1968, saw the direct introduction of US troops into the war with the initial objective of preventing a South Vietnamese collapse, quickly evolving into a US war of attrition against the North Vietnamese units in the South, with the objective of killing enough enemy forces to win. The United States ignored the Vietnamese army and paid only lip service to pacification. The US position was to win the war itself and then give the country back to the Vietnamese. The mind-set was akin to that of World War II and the Korean War, not true pacification or COIN.

The fifth and final period began with the change of military command from Gen William Westmoreland to Gen Creighton Abrams in mid-1968, which accompanied a shift in military strategy and tactics from conventional big-unit warfare to protecting the civilian population. Originally created in 1967, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), with its use of civilian-military advisory teams, became an effective US mechanism for supporting Vietnamese COIN.² Even more important was the establishment of a constitutionally based and relatively stable government in Vietnam that refocused on COIN.

Subsequently, having lost the insurgency battle in most of South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese turned to conventional war by direct
invasion across the 17th parallel and from its Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries. In 1972, the South Vietnamese army with the backing of still existing US advisory, air, and logistical support defeated this first incursion, the Easter offensive. However, in 1975, when the entire North Vietnamese army invaded and after the withdrawal of all direct US support, South Vietnam collapsed.

One may draw lessons relevant to Afghanistan and future conflicts from the CORDS experience in Vietnam. These lessons include the following. First, the United States must be aware of the importance of the critical psychological and political aspects of the struggle. Second, policy makers must integrate US advisory efforts with those of the host government in a joint approach as much as possible. Third, high-quality American civil and military leadership must cooperate in a team approach based on a realistic understanding of the host country’s political vulnerabilities and underlying security and governance problems. Fourth, the US and host government must jointly share a coherent and coordinated COIN doctrine, combined with effective civilian-military advisory operations in the field. Fifth, US troops need to consider transition to host-country control from the very beginning. Sixth, estimates of progress in stability operations should rely more on intangible indicators rather than statistical measurements.

Early Support for Winning the Rural Population Turns into Neglect of the Gap between the Central Government and Rural Communist Strongholds

In late 1954, Colonel Lansdale was given a broad mandate as chief of the National Security Division of the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM), a joint US-French military advisory mission that had just formed. This broad US mandate was in the shadow of a disorganized Vietnamese army with low morale and a habit of either ignoring or actively alienating the civilian population. I was tasked to develop a special training program to change troop attitudes. Then I was assigned as the first US military advisor to accompany the troops into the field on two Vietnamese army occupations of former Vietminh-controlled areas. The operation in central Vietnam was particularly memorable because it occurred without a single adverse incident between a soldier and a civilian despite vicious communist propaganda that the South Vietnamese troops would steal
and rape. I saw villagers voluntarily bring water out of their homes for the soldiers to drink. This positive spirit carried over into Vietnamese army operations that overcame sectarian rebellions in Saigon and in the Mekong Delta. American civilian agencies, whose attention was elsewhere, were only marginally involved.

After 1955, with a constitutional Vietnamese government established, the United States began treating South Vietnam as a normal, well-established country, ignoring the gap that existed between the newly formed central government and the rural areas, where the communists had been strong. US agencies each pursued separate conventional objectives. The Diem government requested US support for civic action teams to work in the villages. I was there helping the Vietnamese present their request when the director of the United States Operations Mission (USOM), Leland Barrows, refused to provide advisors or any significant financial support. He thought the focus should be on industrial development in the cities where there was a labor surplus. Largely ignored by the United States was an effective civilian follow-up to the Vietnamese army pacification operations and Vietnamese civilian efforts to establish effective governance in the countryside to bolster fragile security.

Moreover, the Pentagon insisted on changing the Vietnamese army’s basic mission from internal security to that of a regular army to block an overt North Vietnamese attack across the 17th parallel. To take the army’s place, a Civil Guard was created to provide rural security; however, USOM outsourced the new entity’s training and support to a Michigan State University team staffed by US municipal police retirees. At the same time, the Diem government took a more authoritarian turn and failed to rally widespread political support, while instead undertaking suppressive programs against former Vietminh and religious sect supporters, not all of whom were communists. This alienated much of the rural population, particularly in the Mekong Delta. While the VC insurgency incubated between 1957 and 1960, there was little effective response by the Vietnamese government and no effective coordination between the US military and civilian agencies to address this nascent problem. Much of that time was consumed by open conflict between the MAAG and USOM over who should train and advise the Civil Guard.
Counterinsurgency Becomes the Byword; Civilian-Military Advisory Teams Are Born

In 1961, facing a rapidly growing VC insurgency against the South Vietnamese government, the newly inaugurated Kennedy administration decided to support South Vietnam in defeating the insurgency. It pursued this policy by beefing up military support and assigning military advisors to the Vietnamese armed forces at all levels, including the provinces (called military sectors). A new entity, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was established over the existing MAAG. US Army Special Forces—the advisory effort’s only unconventional component—were assigned initially under CIA direction to help create irregular counterguerrilla forces, mainly among the mountain people called Montagnards.

While the entire US support effort was labeled COIN, there was a gap in understanding regarding what it meant to be successful. To Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff pacification meant primarily conventional military operations to kill VC, not a population-centric approach. In 1962, McNamara was preparing his own chart of indicators about whether the United States was winning or losing. McNamara asked my old boss, Lansdale, then a general on McNamara’s staff in the Pentagon, for his views. Lansdale looked at the chart, which consisted of numerical factors such as enemies killed and weapons captured, and said, “Something’s missing. . . . You might call it the X factor.” “What’s that?” McNamara asked? “The feelings of the Vietnamese people,” Lansdale replied. McNamara initially jotted down an X but then erased it and asked sarcastically how anyone could get an accurate reading on people’s feelings. Lansdale, who understood the war’s unconventional nature and what made the Vietnamese tick, begged him not to so codify the war. Lansdale had lost the secretary’s attention.4

Sadly, McNamara’s thinking, that men plus money and materiel equaled victory, permeated down to the leadership of MACV in shaping the advice given to regular Vietnamese army units. They were urged to conduct battalion-sized and larger sweep operations (later called “search and destroy” by American forces) with excessive use of poorly controlled artillery and air attacks against VC guerrilla forces when they could be found and engaged. These tactics were based on experiences from World War II and Korea, given that most
of the US senior officers had served in those wars. The real COIN battle was being fought in the provinces for the protection and support of the population. There the MAAG sector advisors concentrated on helping that fight and quickly acquired a different view of the war working with the Vietnamese provincial chiefs.

The new Kennedy administration gradually changed its approach. In 1962, I was suddenly asked to leave my private-sector job and return to Saigon on a temporary basis to prepare a report on how best to involve the civilian aid program in COIN. Like many of my generation, I was infused with the Kennedy ethos of “ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.” My report would result in the White House asking me to immediately take charge of the program I had recommended.

My report advocated the reorganization of USOM/Saigon to create a special Office of Rural Affairs that would assign representatives to each of 44 provinces to work directly with the provincial chiefs and their staffs in coordination with the US military-sector advisor. We would accept only volunteers.

A special fund was established to support COIN, and Washington authorized US ambassador Frederick Nolting to purchase $10 million in local currency (approximately 700 million piasters) from the Vietnamese government’s central bank. These funds were held in a special counterpart account managed jointly by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) mission and the Vietnamese ministry of finance and disbursed through Vietnamese channels to support specific COIN activities in the provinces.5

To administer expenditures from the special fund, a tripartite committee was created with Diem government agreement in each province, consisting of the Vietnamese provincial chief, the USOM provincial representative, and the MAAG sector advisor. These three made funding decisions largely by consensus but with the provincial chief having veto authority. This was the first truly joint US civilian-military advisory team effort in Vietnam, and its creation was undoubtedly facilitated by the existence of the US special fund for COIN support.

The committee mechanism was well received, as it enhanced the provincial chiefs’ capabilities, while shielding them from Saigon’s second-guessing. Funds supported hamlet construction, development, and security, including the training of hamlet militias. A surrender program (Chieu Hoi) was added with rural affairs advice and assistance. A miscellaneous fund proved indispensable for activities
ranging from compensation to the families of hamlet militiamen killed in action to transporting self-help building materials from provincial capitals down to the hamlets.

Cooperation was so close at the provincial level that when USOM rural affairs was gearing up, MAAG sector advisors were designated as USOM provincial representatives until civilians could be assigned. Turnover was the main hindrance to sustained cooperation at the provincial level. All military advisors were assigned for only one year, which could not be extended even if the advisor requested, while USOM provincial representatives were assigned for a minimum of two years, with many volunteering to extend.

In Saigon, a US Provincial Rehabilitation Committee was created to coordinate COIN support. The embassy’s deputy chief of mission headed the committee, which was composed of working-level representatives from each US agency, including MAAG. This worked well to coordinate support for COIN at the provincial level but lacked the ability to coordinate or influence Vietnamese regular army combat operations and US air support. The top levels of MACV guided these latter operations. In other words, tactical combat decisions made at higher levels at MACV too often undermined the priority of population security. Vietnamese army operations that indiscriminately killed civilians outraged John Paul Vann, then a US Army advisor in the Mekong Delta. He was heard to proclaim rhetorically that if he had “his druthers,” he would equip Vietnamese soldiers with only long knives, so they could see who they were killing. Nevertheless, the strategic hamlet program was making progress until the Buddhist crisis began to undermine it, paralyzing the South Vietnamese government in the late summer of 1963.

**Effective Vietnamese Government Dissolves: Civilian-Military Teams Abandoned**

After the military coup and the assassination of President Diem on 1 November 1963, the new military junta opposed, in principle, practically everything the Diem government had done. While they did not formally cancel the hamlet program, they left many hamlets undefended. By June 1964, the new Vietnamese government of Gen Nguyen Khanh renamed the strategic hamlets New Life Hamlets, thus backing the same basic concept but with less than effective support.
On the US side, another step backward occurred in the fall of 1964 when the new USOM mission director, James Killen, abandoned the civilian-military team approach, saying that the tripartite provincial committees were “an affront to Vietnamese sovereignty and against standard AID procedures.” Harkening back to the philosophy of 1956–1962, USOM technical assistance focused again on working with the Vietnamese ministries in Saigon. This coincided with enormous political turmoil and personnel changes on the Vietnamese side. At the same time, the new US ambassador, Gen Maxwell Taylor, created a higher-level mission council, composed of the chiefs of the various US missions—USOM, US Information Service, MACV, and CIA—to coordinate US activities. Despite Taylor’s reputation, based largely on his World War II experience and his close connection to the Kennedys, he was politically inept at interacting with the Vietnamese. The working-level provincial rehabilitation committee was ignored. As a result, firsthand views of the Americans in the field—filtered as they were up through several levels of command—received inadequate attention by the mission council.

**Conventional Combat by US Forces Supersedes Pacification**

Beginning in the middle of 1965, US troops were introduced into Vietnam in a direct combat role under General Westmoreland as head of MACV. At around the same time, Henry Cabot Lodge returned to Saigon as the US ambassador. He wanted to give renewed attention to pacification, bringing with him my former boss, retired Maj Gen Edward Lansdale, and a small team to coordinate and direct the pacification effort out of the embassy. Although back in the private sector, I came out temporarily as a consultant to lend a start-up helping hand. It soon became apparent, however, that the main focus in Washington and by Westmoreland was on winning the war quickly, waging a conventional war of attrition against the VC, and infiltrating North Vietnamese forces. Body counts became the way success was measured. Politically, the fact that the United States had taken over the war only bolstered VC propaganda that the South Vietnamese leaders were puppets, undermining their legitimacy as independent nationalists in the eyes of the population. General Westmoreland gave only lip service to pacification. The Vietnamese army and the
various local security forces responsible for pacification received little attention. According to Westmoreland's J-2, Brig Gen Phillip Davidson, “Westmoreland's interest always lay in the big-unit war. Pacification bored him.”

While US military advisors continued their efforts in the regions, provinces, and districts, they operated in a MACV backwater environment. Under the new USOM director, Charles Mann, the provincial tripartite committee structure continued to languish. USOM's provincial representatives had no access to funds to support pacification directly or jointly with the Vietnamese provincial chiefs. In response to the need, MACV had begun providing limited defense funds directly to its sector advisors, but the old committee structure that fostered civilian-military teamwork was gone.

Although Lansdale initially had a broad charter in August 1965, Lodge gave him very weak support. Lansdale's approach involved a blend of high-level political advice and direct contacts with Americans and Vietnamese in the field. This cut across traditional US agency lines of authority. As the various US agencies continued their own separate pacification support operations, Lansdale found it practically impossible to coordinate these efforts. Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky needed useful advice on how best to organize and carry out pacification. Lansdale undertook this task with some success but soon ran afoul of Lodge's objections that only he and the head of the embassy political section should be dealing with Ky since he was prime minister. In contrast, when Ellsworth Bunker later became US ambassador, he actively encouraged the head of CORDS, William Colby, to deal directly with Pres. Nguyen Van Thieu on political as well as technical matters related to pacification. Lansdale also proposed a set of pacification guidelines for all agencies to follow, but this raised bureaucratic objections from each agency, including MACV.

A COIN conference was held in January 1966 at Airlie House, near Warrenton, Virginia, drawing representatives from all agencies in Saigon and Washington. Opening the conference, the DOS's Vietnam coordinator, Amb. Leonard Unger, focused on the need for US coordination and rationalization of all US programs and activities, citing “conflicts over resources and manpower” and “no clear priorities.” USAID, the DOS, the United States Information Agency, and the CIA argued for their own independence. The civilian agencies led by the DOS objected to Department of Defense (DOD) being put in overall
control of pacification, while the DOD refused to put any of its military advisor operations under civilian control.  

After Airlie House, the Johnson administration decided to place the deputy ambassador in Saigon, William Porter, in charge of the civilian side of pacification. Lansdale was pushed aside. While Pres. Lyndon Johnson believed Porter should command, Ambassador Lodge and Porter himself saw his role as one of coordination. Lodge continued expecting Porter to carry out his regular duties as deputy ambassador. It was typical Washington thinking that appointing a high-level diplomat would not only ensure his authority over all US civilian operations but would also enhance US influence over the Vietnamese. This was not the case. Porter lacked practical COIN experience. At the same time, Porter’s rank afforded little influence over the Vietnamese who were looking for practical advice and accepted it mainly based on personal trust and confidence. The US civilian agencies continued to answer directly to their Washington headquarters, while MACV largely ignored and even undermined pacification in pursuit of its strategies of attrition and using maximum force against the VC—strategies that caused widespread damage to the civilian population. At the same time, there was no coordinated US political approach at the top to unify the Vietnamese government and its military leaders in support of pacification.

In March 1966, President Johnson appointed Robert Komer as his special assistant for supervising pacification support out of the White House. Komer had a broad mandate to direct, coordinate, and supervise in Washington all US nonmilitary support for pacification in Vietnam—the “other war” as it was called. He also had direct access to the president and direct communications with Porter in Saigon. While Komer was able to improve coordination at the Washington level, Ambassador Lodge again gave lip service to supporting Porter’s efforts in Saigon, while bending to individual agency views. This left Porter with the title of coordinator but in command of nothing. President Johnson’s frustration mounted, but he never confronted Lodge directly on the issue. Finally, in December 1966, President Johnson authorized a new Office of Civilian Operations (OCO) to coordinate all US civilian agency support for pacification, with Porter as its head. OCO was given a period of four months to become effective.

As OCO was launched, a separate combined civilian-military single manager approach was developed as an experiment for one province, Long An, just southwest of Saigon. Previous attempts beginning
in 1964 to focus pacification efforts in the province had not been successful. In November 1966, Ambassador Lodge assigned the mission council coordinator, US Army colonel Sam Wilson, as the leader of the entire US advisory effort in Long An. Wilson had considerable guerilla and counterguerrilla experience, having previously served in Merrill’s Marauders during World War II and as my replacement heading up USOM rural affairs (renamed provincial operations) from 1964 to 1965. A US brigade operating in coordination with Wilson but not under his command, along with a Vietnamese army unit, were initially assigned to Long An for clearing operations. However, the US unit was soon withdrawn, followed shortly by the Vietnamese army unit. Coordinated Vietnamese government follow up with adequate local security forces was lacking. While some progress was made, no other potential leader with Wilson’s military and civilian capabilities were available to replace him; thus, the project died. Komer, however, would use the concept of a single manager in later promoting the idea of CORDS.13

OCO was organized with its own separate central staff in Saigon. Senior civilian directors were to be appointed in each of the four corps areas to coordinate with the senior MACV Corps advisors and to supervise all civil operations in each province, where OCO-appointed senior provincial representatives would direct all civilian operations. Only one appointment was made at corps level from within existing ranks. By late February 1967, the last of four regional directors had been hired, but only approximately two-thirds of 175 important new positions had been filled.

Even as OCO was being formed, interagency disputes at the mission council level in Saigon reached such an intensity that the participants seemed to concentrate more on fighting each other than on supporting the war effort.14 At one point, Richard Holbrooke, then a young foreign service officer assigned to Komer’s White House office, asked me to contact Lansdale to try to give Porter some support, since Porter was under strong criticism from Washington circles.15 As the short trial period for OCO ended, failure was clear.16 Even if policymakers had given OCO more time to organize, without any influence over MACV’s military advisory effort, or an effective advisory connection with key leaders of the Vietnamese government, it was doomed to fail.

The National Security Council, Komer, and the DOD finally prevailed on President Johnson to put pacification squarely under MACV, regardless of objections from the DOS and USAID, but with
a civilian director. By May 1967, the president authorized the transfer of OCO to the new pacification command called CORDS. Komer was soon sent out as a deputy to the US military commander, General Westmoreland, to take charge of CORDS.

With the formation of CORDS, two chains of command existed within MACV, each with a deputy to the MACV commanding general. One chain ran directly to all US military units in the country. The other commanded all US military advisors at all levels down from corps (region) to provinces and districts and all civilian agencies working at these same levels. Within CORDS, at the corps level either a senior military officer was in charge with a civilian advisor or vice versa, while the regional USOM missions came under their command. At the provincial level, a senior advisor was put in charge (most often military with a civilian deputy but sometimes the opposite) with a combined interagency team of personnel working for him. While CIA personnel were housed separately and had separate offices, they participated in team meetings. Many provincial teams had over 20 members from MACV and the various civilian agencies. At the district level the teams were smaller, usually 4–5 members with a senior district advisor in charge, either military or civilian.

Funds to support pacification, beyond Vietnamese government–supported personnel and operational costs for revolutionary development cadre teams and local and regional defense forces, as well as the provincial government staff, came through US channels. Called “assistance-in kind,” US advisors dispersed these funds with liberal spending limits. This funding was an important ingredient for success, and the degree to which the Vietnamese were involved in funding decisions was up to US initiative. Provincial pacification plans were prepared on an annual basis. At best these plans were developed primarily by the Vietnamese provincial staff with US assistance, thus helping prepare provincial governments eventually to function without US advice.

CORDS was not particularly effective during its first year. It took some time to staff up and to iron out the wrinkles, but its main weakness was cooperation with the Vietnamese, which was not Komer’s forte. It also continued to suffer from General Westmoreland’s disconnect with the Vietnamese security forces and ignorance of on-the-ground realities. As an example, in August 1966, I wrote a firsthand report for Lansdale that he gave directly to Westmoreland. The report indicated that a significant area just outside the Saigon city limits was under VC
control despite MACV maps showing the area as being secure. Even though Westmoreland’s own staff verified my report, nothing happened to correct this situation. The VC used this same area to assemble sizeable forces for their January 1968 Tet assault on Saigon.17

Changes in Vietnamese Governance and US Command
Revived Pacification

When General Abrams took over MACV in June 1968, after the Tet and mini-Tet offensives, the operational emphasis shifted to the security of the civilian population as a priority for all forces. While the Thieu government suffered from corruption and insufficient popular enthusiasm, it nevertheless had a more stable, constitutional, elected status and enhanced legitimacy. This improved status helped mobilize an effective pacification effort. A senior Vietnamese official involved called it “the best organized and conceived [pacification] operation we have had in Vietnam since . . . the Strategic Hamlets Program.”18

By 1971 almost all of South Vietnam’s countryside had been pacified—a feat that many had previously thought to be impossible. While the CORDS advisory and support effort and its civilian-military teams played key roles, it was mainly a Vietnamese achievement. The defeat of the VC in a series of attacks that began with Tet in January 1968 assisted the pacification effort as well. Progress came too late, however, to sustain US public support. Tet was widely interpreted in the United States as an American defeat, coming as it did on the heels of General Westmoreland’s claims beforehand of victory being just around the corner.

The success of CORDS owed much to William Colby’s leadership and the support he received from Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams. While Komer’s highly forceful approach (he was known as “the blow torch” in US circles) was effective in getting CORDS started, it alienated the Vietnamese.19 The entire effort picked up steam when Colby, who knew how to work with the Vietnamese, replaced Komer. The main weakness of CORDS became the sheer number of advisors, who tended to take up too much Vietnamese government time and attention.20
Applicable Lessons

An important lesson from the Vietnam experience is that the political and psychological aspects of an insurgent war are likely to be determinative in the long run. The sustained defeat of insurgents will rely ultimately on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government the United States is trying to help. An important component of that legitimacy is the need for the host country’s leadership to be perceived as independent and responsible in the eyes of its own people. This creates a dilemma for US intervention, obliging us to wield influence and provide advice as unobtrusively as possible while at the same time inducing host-government reform and responsiveness to its citizens. Time, persistence, and persuasiveness are needed as well as understanding that the United States cannot substitute its efforts for those of the host government. At the same time, wise US support can be critical to making local efforts successful. Vietnam is replete with good and bad examples of how and how not to do this.

To be most effective, US civilian-military teams supporting another country’s stability need to assume an advisory role and should be integrated with the host government as much as possible. Initially, in 1962, Washington adopted this approach. However, that was abandoned, until actively resumed after 1968 with CORDS. In Afghanistan, the United States primarily used PRTs, combining military and civilian elements, in direct support of International Security Assistance Force operations. The Afghanistan PRTs were not adequately integrated with the Afghan government. When combined with a late-blooming Afghan effort to stand up local government, the transition to ultimate Afghan stability was difficult and time consuming. Where rural-based insurgency is incipient or already active, early recognition of the problem by the host government is critical to efforts to fill the security and political vacuum with something positive and lasting.

The use of civilian-military advisory teams, as useful as they are in addressing the necessary coordination of US assistance and advice, should be fitted into an advisory role to the host government as jointly as possible. Ideally, there should be early local leadership buy-in to a joint US-host government advisory approach that minimizes any appearance of violating national sovereignty. The tripartite committees at the provincial level in Vietnam always operated on the basis that decisions had to be consensus-based and the provincial chief had the right of veto. Moreover, the best US advisors were careful to
take a back seat in public. Creating a special US assistance fund to support host-government COIN efforts could advance and strengthen such a joint approach.

In short, CORDS, with the advantage of a single combined US chain of command, albeit with a smaller footprint, is a useful model for future civilian-military teams. Obviously, circumstances vary from country to country. However, there is no reason why, with effort, civilian-military teams cannot work effectively with host governments if all elements are dedicated to working harmoniously with each other.

Assuming former Secretary of Defense Gates was right when he suggested that the United States may be seeing the last of direct major US military interventions in troubled countries, policy makers need to consider a smaller and less intrusive civilian-military advisory team approach. For example, based somewhat on the earlier 1962 Vietnam model, this might consist of three advisors operating at the provincial level: one from the DOS focused on governance, one from USAID focused on development, and one military advisor focused on population security with a small special-forces or similar type military team in support for training and group security. Under an agreement with the host government, stability assistance funds would be decentralized through host-government channels down to the provincial level, where there would be a joint sign off on expenditures by the provincial governor. One member, based on the nature of the stability challenge, would be designated to head the US team. Only personnel with prior on-the-ground experience with stability operations would be considered for assignment.

It is also clear from the Vietnam pacification experience that the quality of US leadership and its understanding of the political nature of the war and of Vietnamese perceptions and practice mattered a great deal. The same principles would apply to US engagement in other countries. One can speculate how things might have gone better had General Abrams been appointed as head of MAVC in 1964 instead of Westmoreland and had the appointment of an ambassador of Bunker’s quality been made then instead of replacing Lodge with General Taylor and then bringing Lodge back again in 1965 or had the South Vietnamese government established political stability sooner. The bottom line is that leadership makes an enormous difference on both sides. Therefore, the United States should be very careful about who it puts in charge of both the military and civilian sides...
of US assistance and the way in which it contributes to stability and effectiveness in the host government. Realistically, in most troubled regions, host-government leadership often is less than optimal. Nevertheless, as the CORDS experience indicates, significant success can be achieved by working within a less than perfect host-country environment.

Additionally, combined civilian-military advisory efforts need to function not just at lower operational levels from the districts and provinces up to higher levels but also at the very top. As occurred in Vietnam between General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker, a contemporary example of leadership making a significant difference in outcome is the collaboration between Amb. Ryan Crocker and Gen David Petraeus in Iraq. If the top rung is working well together, this filters down to the working levels. At the same time, a special effort is needed to keep the United States and the host government on the same page with a strong buy-in to stability operations up and down the line. In the author’s opinion, this will invariably be needed no matter where US civilian-military teams may operate. While local initiative in rural areas is extremely important, the host government as well as the US or international advisors must develop significant support from the top down for stability operations to succeed in the long run.

Furthermore, there is a tendency to overrely on numerical metrics to determine whether stability operations are succeeding. The hamlet evaluation system used by CORDS was certainly an improvement over previous, cruder statistical measurements. However, assigning a numerical grading to hamlets presumed to be secure left the system open to exaggeration. The tendency was to overreport good news, because these reports were tied to performance evaluation of the preparer for promotion. Intangible factors such as evidence of being able to move around freely at night as well as during the day needs to be given greater weight. Since COIN success is so dependent on the perceptions and attitudes of the civilian population, intangibles that cannot be statistically measured are often the most meaningful measures of progress.

A Final Word

CORDS unified the US pacification effort from top to bottom. The civilian-military advisory teams CORDS created were essential to the success, albeit temporary, of pacification in Vietnam. So too were two
other factors: 1) getting COIN doctrine right and having it guide all significant military and civil operations, and 2) having the Vietnamese organized and fully committed to implementing that doctrine on the ground. If there was a fault, it was not giving more time and attention to preparing the South Vietnamese to take over. That, of course, required a longer period than US domestic politics allowed. The really hard work for stability building in Afghanistan, as it will be elsewhere, is the transition to full host-government responsibility. This requires us to keep in mind Col T. E. Lawrence's guidance that it is “better [your allies] do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”22 Or as General Abrams put it in 1970, “Sooner or later the Vietnamese themselves have got to settle this thing. We can only help and we can only help so much.”23

Notes

1. “Vietminh,” or the Vietnamese Independence League, began as a front group organized by Ho Chi Minh in 1941. It evolved during the French Indochina War into a completely communist-dominated and -controlled organization. “Vietcong,” which literally means Vietnamese communist, was a term the South Vietnamese government applied to the insurgents, including the National Liberation Front, in 1960, replacing the term Vietminh.

2. Revolutionary development was a translation of the term used at the time by the Vietnamese to describe their own COIN/pacification effort.


4. Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters, xiii and 1n. Lansdale went on to write a memo for McNamara explaining the “x” factor in more detail and suggesting questions that could be asked by a small team in the field to help garner “a sharper picture of how we're doing in Vietnam.” McNamara appeared to have had some second thoughts and asked Lansdale to talk to Gen Joseph Carroll, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, about his memorandum, but then nothing came of it. See US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 2, Vietnam 1962 (Washington, DC: DOS, 1961–1963), 506–10.

5. The special COIN fund was a set-aside within the overall US FY 1962 budget for economic and military assistance to the Vietnamese government.


8. Ibid., 116–21.

9. An exception was the US Marine Corps’s combined action platoon program in the villages. Begun in 1965 by Marine platoons jointly with Vietnamese local security forces, it was kept at a small scale due to General Westmoreland’s focus on regular big-unit warfare.
16. Ibid., 83–85.
17. Ibid., 270–71. The report, entitled “Peace and Prosperity Village, Gia Dinh Province,” related a visit by the author to a village area just four km south of Saigon that had been overrun by a sizeable VC force. Relief had come not from Saigon itself but from Long An City, some 20 km away across the rice paddies and had taken eight hours to get there. However, this area was noted as secure on MACV maps. Not believing the report, Westmoreland sent a brigadier general on his staff to visit the same village. He completely verified the report’s findings, but nothing was done to address this enormous security gap until after it was fully exploited by the VC during Tet 1968 as an assembly area to attack Saigon itself.
21. Ibid., see pages 312–13 for further elaboration on this theme.
Chapter 5

The Present Past of Vietnam

Implications of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support for Today’s “Other Wars”

Sandra A. Scham

Bob, I’m going to put you in charge of the other war.

—Pres. Lyndon Baines Johnson

In his characteristic casual manner, as he greeted guests at a party, Pres. Lyndon Johnson introduced Robert Komer to the task that became the most prominent undertaking of his career. This presidential pronouncement took Komer completely by surprise and, at the time, must have seemed more of a threat than a promise. Nevertheless, the man who soon thereafter earned the nickname of “the Blowtorch” began to move at full speed toward winning the trust and cooperation of the Vietnamese people as part of the ongoing pacification effort. Despite an uncertain beginning, Komer’s Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was a unique effort to pursue stabilization and development goals within the framework of an ongoing conflict and managed to achieve a modicum of success within the context of what is now largely acknowledged as a major setback for US interests in the region and overall US foreign policy. While “hearts and minds” became a derisive slogan for the futility of the entire Vietnamese effort, CORDS team members were quietly proving that this fight actually could be won—at least on a small scale.

The realization in recent years that CORDS was an effective program has not come easily. This may be due to the fact that the military outcome of the war has overshadowed almost all analyses of the US presence in Vietnam. Gen David Petraeus’s prescient statement—“the legacy of Vietnam is unlikely to soon recede”—in his 1987 doctoral dissertation on the subject has been demonstrated time and again by the many articles and analyses on current conflicts that reference the earlier war, usually to strike a warning note. In the same work, Petraeus further stated that “historical analogies are particularly
compelling during crises, when the tendency to supplement incomplete information with past experiences is especially marked.⁵ Although he was speaking of the insight to be gained from a deeply disheartening military experience, this observation could just as easily apply to our first national encounter of such magnitude with a planned counterinsurgency (COIN).⁶

Some military strategists and scholars have summoned the ghost of CORDS in assessing the US engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁷ The appropriate “lessons learned” niche for the CORDS experience still has not been found. The most apparent problem with the literature on the relevance of CORDS to today’s “other wars” is that it has been examined as a blueprint for specific operations and usually found wanting. Different time, different place, different tactics are cited as reasons why CORDS could not work in Iraq or Afghanistan.⁸

Taking a different approach, this paper discusses the potential applicability of CORDS—particularly in the context of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT)—through an analysis of three separate streams of evidence. The first stream is the recent literature on CORDS and PRTs. The second stream is a group of 208 recorded interviews with CORDS civilian-military participants. The third stream is a group of 460 transcribed interviews with PRT civilian-military personnel. Focusing primarily on understanding of mission and unity of effort, these sources are used to address four specific research questions with respect to CORDS and PRTs. First, how well did team members understand their mission? Second, was there a common understanding between civilians and military members on objectives? Third, how did civilian-military participants overcome their differences in order to work together? And fourth, what were the major strengths and weaknesses of each approach?

Here, we attempt to go beyond the recognition that other wars require “other” strategies—which, it goes without saying, are not those of conventional conflicts. This study is based on the premise that the basic COIN practices that have evolved greatly over the past few decades have still left a gap in regard to how to apply the lessons and experience of the past to similar conflicts in the present. Certainly, like unhappy families in Leo Tolstoy’s famous quotation, every war is difficult “in its own way.”⁹ This does not mean, however, that the lessons learned from other conflicts are irrelevant to our current strategy. In fact, our increasingly better educated civilian-military leaders are using their knowledge of previous wars, in some cases without
even consciously acknowledging it. What this study offers is a more quantitative and evidence-based window on the recent history of US COIN experiences.

**Background: Survey of the Literature**

The Malayan emergency (1948–1960) was not a conflict that involved the United States, but it nevertheless has had a substantial impact on US policies. As a result of that experience, Robert Thompson authored an influential work on the subject of COIN, pointing to important lessons that he later put into practice as the head of the British advisory mission to South Vietnam and advisor to the US Vietnam mission. According to Thompson's doctrine, victory over guerrilla groups requires more than just numerical military superiority. The most crucial part of his outline of five “basic principles of counterinsurgency” focuses on the necessities of the government having a clear political aim, the ability to function in accordance with accepted law, possessing an overall plan, giving priority to defeating political subversion, and securing its base areas first. Thompson's extensive experience, albeit in countering a particular type of rural Maoist guerrilla group, led him to acclaim these principles as the cornerstone of any successful COIN conflict.

CORDS was the first US military experiment to apply Thompson's COIN principles, as it provided economic and agricultural development support, educational assistance and training, health care, refugee relief, and assistance with the Chieu Hoi (open arms) program, which welcomed and reintegrated former insurgents and opponents back to the South Vietnamese fold. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) contributed advisors to the police and to local officials. USAID also ran traditional development programs that complemented CORDS in fields such as education, health, and nutrition. CORDS coordinated the service delivery for these programs.

Authors who have written about CORDS, with a few notable exceptions, have generally assessed the program as effective. Few of these studies, however, are evidence-based, and most have relied primarily on secondary sources. Among the historical conclusions that have been drawn about the impact of CORDS, four are of particular note for purposes of this analysis. First, while the overall CORDS effort subdued and virtually eliminated enemy influence among the
people through 1972, the program was not sustainable. It was resource intensive and ultimately dependent on US support that was badly cut in 1973 and beyond. Second, the 1967–70 “new model” pacification program, with all of its flaws and weaknesses, contributed materially to at least short-run improvement in the Vietnamese government’s ability to cope with rural insurgency. Third, programs such as CORDS cannot ultimately succeed if the indigenous government is corrupt and lacks political will. Finally, institution building is time consuming and can exhaust the patience of the US public.

Recent studies of the Vietnam pacification program in general and the CORDS program in particular have inspired a number of researchers to reevaluate CORDS. According to traditional COIN theory, such programs, by their very nature, require in-country government partners. Yet some students of CORDS history have suggested that its major flaw was the necessity to partner with the corrupt South Vietnamese government. The management tools of US support for pacification were effective, while the entrenched corruption of the South Vietnamese government undermined comprehensive success. According to other commentators, CORDS achieved an unprecedented level of integration of US and South Vietnamese efforts toward the pacification of the countryside, largely nullifying the effectiveness of the communist insurgency in the overall conflict. Still others point to particular strategies that worked, including placing the focus on improving the quality of life for the local population in order to win their loyalty and on giving communities access to opportunities that the enemy could not or would not provide. Researchers who have taken the time to assess the hamlet evaluation system (HES), used to measure CORDS progress, have been generally impressed, although they note that, while it allowed CORDS to monitor its effectiveness, data collection on the scale required by the HES during wartime requires high levels of commitment and the resources of a powerful government to execute.

Many consider the greatest successes of CORDS to be its advances in interagency coordination through development experts convincing military planners and decision makers to incorporate development projects into their overall security strategy and coordinated intelligence gathering that helped root out enemy cadre hidden in plain sight.

Proceeding from historical hindsight to contemporary political and military analysis, the wealth of literature on PRTs suggests that, in contrast to CORDS’s organization and planning, today’s joint efforts
have not introduced any element of certainty as to the proper concept, role, and objectives of civilian-military teams. Originally designed to deal with leaders and parties in Afghanistan who believed that negotiations threatened their power, worldview, and interests, the introduction of other objectives in both Iraq and Afghanistan transformed PRTs. Therefore, a basic understanding of what a PRT should be trying to achieve and what it realistically can achieve has been in flux from the beginning.

Some analysts suggest that PRTs should stay away completely from governance concerns and conduct only limited reconstruction, focusing on security-sector reform, intelligence, and force protection. According to these authors, in areas where a lack of security makes development difficult but not impossible, PRTs can make a valuable contribution. There is no consensus, however, among other analysts as to how PRTs should conduct operations or what should be their objectives. Many of these analysts also cite the lack of a clearly defined end state for PRT operations that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for team members on the ground to balance rapid results appropriately with sustainable development and capacity building. Also, these authors note that, without a plan articulating specific aims, measuring progress becomes a haphazard endeavor. Sometimes the literature provides suggestions for redressing these weaknesses, including using the CORDS HES as a model.

Unclear PRT objectives translate into unclear strategies, and almost all analyses of PRTs cite the pressing need for an overarching strategy. Some of these analyses have proposed a number of strategic fixes, including civilianizing the PRTs across the board, limiting their role to buy time for military efforts and proper development, and setting up interagency coordinating bodies to fit PRT efforts into broader US foreign policy objectives. Throughout the literature, a lack of engagement with the host nation (HN) is cited as an impediment to PRT efforts, while paradoxically, the confusing nature of the PRT structure is seen as an impediment to engagement by HN members.

Most PRT literature suggests that there were no clear lines of authority to ensure that civilian-military PRT efforts were effectively coordinated. Starting at the policy level and persisting down through the tactical level is a consistent fragmentation that is ameliorated only by special circumstances, personalities, and goodwill. Within individual PRTs, the clash of institutional cultures is frequently noted, and civilian PRT members complain about being treated as outsiders by their
military counterparts. Insufficient preparation for these cooperative efforts and for predeployment socialization exacerbates the problem and undermines full team integration. Added to this is the frequently mentioned problem of “stovepiping,” whereby the various elements of PRTs failed to communicate and share information internally. Many researchers have made the case for improved procedures to ensure continuity between PRT efforts from one rotation to the next. Recognizing that there is a steep learning curve for the newly deployed, other authors cite training as a major concern. Training is frequently the subject of lengthy discussions where analysts offer detailed suggestions on the specific content of various training programs. There is general consensus that joint civilian-military training is essential to enable familiarization with different approaches and operating procedures and that there is a pressing need to increase expert input into the design and execution of PRT training.

**Ethnography of Civilian-Military Communication**

For the purposes of deriving lessons learned on the COIN and development front, the availability of interviews and data on the operation of CORDS and PRTs presents a unique opportunity to evaluate and compare the achievements and challenges of these programs. This is done through the use of content analysis, a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts.

Keywords are usually calculated by carrying out a statistical test that compares the word frequencies in a text against their expected frequencies derived from other similar texts (in this case, interviews). Given that all conversations and comments analyzed here focused on the same subjects, it was not strictly necessary to select a large number of comparison documents to determine that such words as “counterinsurgency” and “pacification” are not in general language use. For the keyword analysis used here, it is important to note that words were counted if they are in any form of the keyword. Positive, negative, and neutral contexts, however, were counted as separate occurrences.

The selection of the contexts was not as straightforward as the above explanation might suggest. Ultimately this was also a fairly subjective categorization, but in consideration of the goals of COIN programming, guidelines allow for the sorting according to positive,
negative, and neutral context. The latter, of course, offers the greatest challenge. While many analysts agree with media scholar John Fiske that “our words are never neutral,” there are some instances of specific words that cannot accurately be characterized as either positive or negative—hence the necessary, though deficient, “neutral” category.35

Critical discourse analysis does not provide a tangible answer to problems based on scientific research, but it enables access to the assumptions that define organizational cultures and roles and can reveal the hidden motivations behind a written or spoken text. Neither qualitative nor quantitative, discourse analysis constitutes a deconstructive reading and interpretation. The essential purpose of discourse analysis is not to provide definite answers but to isolate unacknowledged agendas and motivations.36

Framing the Discourse: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Interviews

The Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, which is available online from the Library of Congress, contains some 150 interviews with foreign service officers from both the Department of State (DOS) and USAID who reference the CORDS program.37 In addition, 36 interviews with military CORDS participants were available from a recent study conducted by George Washington University and the Vietnam History Archive.38

Counterinsurgency was not a term in frequent use during the CORDS period, but pacification, which was often brought up in the interviews, has similar implications. This term was used very frequently by civilian and military participants alike—usually in a neutral or positive context. Most CORDS participants made positive or neutral statements about their mission and the training they received. The statements relating to interagency coordination, however, were overwhelmingly positive. There were no categories in which negative contexts outnumbered positive, leading to the conclusion that CORDS participants were generally satisfied or, at least, not dissatisfied with most aspects of their deployment.

CORDS policy statements, mostly from the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) handbook, and statements made separately by civilian-military participants reinforced some of the aforementioned conclusions but also brought out other more nuanced readings of the
CORDS experience. Interestingly, a number of themes followed through from policy statements to civilian-military interviews. The advisory, assistance, and support goals of the CORDS program as outlined in the directives were also emphasized by participants who agreed with the idea that, in the words of one interviewee, they had “spent most of the time advising and training the Vietnamese.”

Most participants spoke of clearly defined roles and said that they were appropriately “inculcated as to what their job was,” as described by one interviewee. Civilian government CORDS participants differed somewhat from the military in characterizing their activities. Statements such as “we were intermediaries between the city and those in the US military who had resources” typify the general tenor of civilian remarks, while “it was essentially a matter of developing unified command and then the right kind of approach and then applying it” was more representative of military statements.

In terms of unity of effort, policies and interviews were even more consistent—in some cases reflecting a mutual understanding between civilian-military participants of each other’s roles. It was not uncommon to find civilians speaking of patrols, reports, and commands in a way that indicated intimate knowledge of military activities and military interviewees speaking of funding, cooperation, and progress as one might expect civilian foreign service professionals to communicate. Again, the policy statements do not necessarily reflect this understanding, which would be unlikely in any event, but consistent references to integration and unification in interviews clearly indicate a high level of support on all sides for efforts to achieve a “remarkable degree of harmony,” as one interviewee said. Another offered further explanation of this support: “The theory was that our advisory effort should speak with one voice,” he said. “In any case, at the provincial level, it was not easy to separate military from civilian aspects of the war; it didn’t make sense to have all agencies acting independently.”

With a unified pacification effort under a single manager, placed inside the military structure, interviewees found that such singular access to human, financial, and organizational resources was much more effective. Also, many noted that the single-manager concept eased the need to resolve institutional cultural disputes, leaving them free to engage in joint planning.

Interviewees frequently referenced the CORDS training program, and of those who did, the majority thought that its mix of language, cultural, and military training was an appropriate one.
Civilian-military interviewees, for the most part, indicated that they believed that they had done some good in the country and that the experience was a positive one. It was “so much more challenging than working in an embassy,” as one foreign service officer put it.45 “Americans in their own way had done a pretty good job,” said another.46 Nevertheless, the end state of the program, not surprisingly, was the cause for most negative assessments. As one military participant stated, “[We] would have loved it had [we] been able to have some serious impact.”47 Other interviewees would agree that, while pacification worked for a time, the eventual troop withdrawal and the growing perception that the United States lost the war made them think of their work as almost irrelevant. Ultimately, despite the clearly positive discourse, civilian-military interviewees frequently concluded their statements with their greatest disappointment—the slowly dawning recognition that the South Vietnamese government would never be able to create government structures capable of winning popular support.

Framing the Discourse: Provincial Reconstruction Team Interviews

Between 2005 and 2011, the US Institute of Peace (USIP) conducted a series of interviews with civilian-military PRT members who had served in Iraq and Afghanistan.48 National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations (CCO) began collaborating with USIP in 2009. In all, some 129 interviews were conducted with Iraq PRT members, and some 103 interviews were conducted with Afghanistan PRT members. In addition, the USIP-CCO PRT evaluation project has provided a number of interviews, mostly from DOS participants, plus some from USAID and US Department of Agriculture personnel. These interviews can be used to compare and investigate what progress has been made in alleviating earlier articulated concerns. All of the PRT interviews were scanned for keyword instances. The most negative references were concerned with training and secondarily about security. Security, however, was the only category in which negative comments outnumbered neutral ones. Development and mission also were mentioned in a significant number of negative contexts usually in a way that indicated that neither was being accomplished. The content of these comments was most likely to refer to the
short-term unsustainable nature of certain development activities and the fact there was little clarity of mission on the PRTs. Military respondents were more likely to use the term “mission” than civilians and less likely to characterize the security situation as negative.

Discourse analysis of PRT interviews together with the policy documents revealed almost no areas of accord. One of the few consistencies, however, is the infrequency with which the term “interagency” is mentioned. Although the PRTs squarely were an interagency effort, policy documents seem consistently focused on reinforcing its decentralized nature, perhaps reflecting that team members could work out the details of coordination. This may have been viewed in Washington as the best way to achieve effective collaboration, but interviewees were more apt to characterize it as disorganized. One PRT member explained that “there was a lot of confusion between what responsibilities the military had versus the State Department.” Another interviewee lamented that “I feel like I’ve been set up for failure.” “Haphazard,” “ad hoc, hit or miss,” and “it was invented on the fly” typify the comments from many PRT members who found the interagency process difficult to understand. “We need to take a much more systematic approach to front end training, in service training, setting up systems, improving standard operating procedures and all that kind of thing,” one team leader advised.49 Many interviewees noted that confusion and uncertainty resulted in some friction.

The policy documents contain almost no clear references to the mission of PRTs and no real indication of the expected end state for the PRT effort other than that “the end state of a PRT occurs when the host nation’s provisions for security and public safety are sufficient to support traditional means of development, and political stability is sustainable after the withdrawal of international forces.”50 This suggests that the only expected result of PRT deployment is to make the region safe enough to deploy more traditional US government interventions, rather than stable enough for host country nationals to conduct their own affairs.51 Characteristically, PRT policy language is task oriented rather than goal focused, providing a great deal of detail about activities and almost nothing about their purpose. This is reflected in the interviews that refer to lack of focus. “Like an elephant being described by blind men,” said one interviewee at a loss for words on how to describe his PRT.52

In many respects, interviewees appear to openly disagree with civilian-military policy documents in tone and almost as often in content.
Where the policies use terms relating to progress, accomplishments, contributions, and performance, interviewees speak about bureaucracies, conflicts, differences, and loose organization. Military policies and interviews both reference coordination, cooperation, integration, and consolidation, but these are notably lacking in civilian policies and interviews. As for longer-term development, many interviewees noted that these efforts were largely uncoordinated and that they expected a kind of operation. References in the policy statements to reconstruction, security, support, and stability suggest a more defined role for PRTs than those they eventually performed. Members of Afghanistan PRTs, in particular, expressed concern about the nature of their mission, and most were unclear about it beyond a general statement that their objective was to strengthen the central government and “bring it out to the provinces.”

Policy documents effectively lack any references to training or joint operations, although it can be argued that policy does not normally address these details. Interviewees were very vocal about training, however. Representative of most comments is “the training I received was in Washington, like everybody going to Iraq, which was a little bit cultural. I had an Iraqi lesson for twenty minutes. I had some training in medical emergencies . . . I had some cultural awareness training, about how the country developed, the value structure, the tribes and so on. But that is about all.” Among the more negative comments regarding training was that there was “zero, we had none,” in the words of one interviewee. Another, more diplomatic, interviewee stated that “I would say the training I received was not adequate.” None of the interviewees indicated that they thought the training was good or excellent. These views are characterized by remarks such as “there was no such thing as PRT training. The PRT office, and I use that term loosely, at the time I was there consisted of one FSO (foreign service officer), whom I had known previously. He was assigned as the PRT coordinator. That was it.” On the positive side, many of these interviewees noted that the training situation was quite different for them than for current PRT members. The Foreign Service Institute has substantially increased PRT training requirements of late, but considering the pending drawdown, these improvements will probably have little overall effect. In any event, the budget necessary to do effective training is unlikely to be allocated to this enterprise in the future. Interviewees indicate that the facts on the ground are quite different from the PRT as envisioned by policy makers. This strongly
suggests that the vision may not have been a realistic one to begin with. Civilian-military policy documents on PRTs, in general, describe PRT operations as empowering, implementing, building, and directing activities and declare that PRT members will constitute acknowledged experts bringing needed skills to the regions. A statement in the PRT handbook gives the impression of a league of trained specialists through which the vast resources and sectoral expertise of the US government will be brought to bear upon the problems of the people of Iraq and Afghanistan: “The focus of these combined civilian-military efforts is to diminish the means and motivations for conflict, while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance (provide basic services, foster economic development, and enforce the rule of law). . . . It combines the diplomatic, military, and developmental components of the various agencies involved in the stabilization and reconstruction effort.”57 In contrast, the sectoral expertise constituted, as one PRT member put it, “a mixed bag.”58 Former PRT members frequently stated that while some “experts” were able to function in country, a number of them were ill-prepared for the environment in which they found themselves: “The [agricultural] advisors here, we’re all very, very specialized. There’s damned few of them here that know anything about farming wheat and maximizing wheat yields and irrigation.”59

Host-Country Relationships: The Key to Success

CORDS civilian-military members indicated that they supported the policy of working closely with HN organizations and, more significantly, with the Vietnamese people, and that such close and sustained contact enabled them to assess more accurately the needs of the communities. This arrangement created a certain bond between CORDS participants and the Vietnamese, as evidenced in a number of interviews. HN interactions were described in such terms as “we had really gotten into the country.”60 In describing the level of commitment of a colleague, one participant noted that he had “just put his whole life into the Vietnamese. The whole village liked him and worked with him.”61 Another typical remark stated that “folks assigned to the advisory teams were there to work with Vietnamese counterparts and we did.”62
Interviews with CORDS participants, who recount in detail their direct experiences with villagers and village officials, suggest very frequent contact with locals. Further, virtually all of the interviewees use language that accords either coequal or superior status to their Vietnamese counterparts, such as, “their war,” “knew the situation on the ground better than we did,” “we were outsiders,” and “they’re running it.” While it is true that unity of effort and reinforcement of common understanding between civilian-military actors were successful elements of the CORDS program, many interviewees suggested that the strength of the CORDS program in country was its emphasis on working collaboratively with the Vietnamese and advising rather than directing. As Komer was later to characterize the program, “CORDS success . . . was achieved via programs that have been primarily Vietnamese staffed and run from the outset.”

In contrast, the PRT handbook appears to discourage a strong relationship between PRT members and HN citizens, with policy statements such as “the existence of the PRTs is predicated to a large extent on the premise that local government lacks capacity at the institutional and individual level. For this reason, it is not likely that the host government representative would have the capacity to do more than assist the PRT in better understanding the environment.” Those who conceptualized the COIN operations in Iraq or Afghanistan might disagree, but judging only by the policy and interview statements, it seems that neither the responsibilities nor the capabilities of the HNs are considered to be vital to the success of PRTs. Many PRT interviewees, in fact, expressed serious doubts about how they were supposed to relate to local communities and to what end.

“If you don’t take any credit whatsoever, you undercut your own effectiveness.” This statement, made by one frustrated PRT member who had attempted to achieve a more symmetrical relationship with his HN, exemplifies the double-edged sword that characterizes US aid to Iraq and Afghanistan. Almost all PRT interviewees noted the difficulty of getting their Iraqi and Afghani “hosts” to take responsibility, even while interviewees made statements indicating a high level of exasperation with the project such as “how can you have Rule of Law if people can’t read the laws? If they don’t understand what is going on around them?” Interestingly, military PRT members were more likely than civilians to acknowledge the necessity of understanding culture. “It is essential that the PRT understands the Afghan culture,” as one Navy lieutenant flatly stated. Some individual PRT
members took the initiative to obtain this knowledge and, obviously, felt some sense of achievement in doing so. “Go to a group of farmers,” said one agriculture advisor, “and say ‘Look, I’m here to learn from you. You all have been farming 5,000 years and you understand the concept of farming better than I do. How do you do it?’”

The language of PRT members about their indigenous counterparts stands in contrast to that of CORDS participants. It suggests far less frequent contact and accord; in many cases, a less than equal status to Iraqi and Afghani counterparts’ education, talent, and ability; and an attitude that only the United States could execute programs and that local officials were so limited in capacity that “they can’t expect windfalls, they need to plan rationally.” Such statements posit a traditional teacher-student or benefactor-client relationship. Despite what is noted by many as the lack of clear guidance and training on HN relationships, PRT members would clearly like to understand and work more closely with the people of Iraq and Afghanistan. “An American answer for an Iraqi problem is not an answer” is a succinct summation of the frustrations.

Conclusions and Recommendations: Unconventional Methods for Unconventional Conflicts

I had, in my own mind, thought of the PRTs as the logical next generation from the CORDS program in Vietnam. And that is how it had been described to me. That is how I envisioned it. I knew how important a role they had played in Vietnam and, actually, how successful they had been. Afghanistan, of course, is quite different from Vietnam.

Charles Handy and Roger Harrison have distinguished four types of organizational cultures. First, power cultures concentrate power among a few, and control radiates from the center like a web—power cultures have few rules and little bureaucracy, and swift decisions can ensue. Second, role cultures are those in which people have clearly delegated authorities within a highly defined structure and form hierarchical bureaucracies. Third, person cultures exist where all individuals believe themselves superior to the organization. Fourth, task cultures are those in which teams are formed to solve particular problems and power derives from expertise as long as a team requires expertise.

In effectively seeking to combine representatives of the first three organizational cultures under the rubric of the fourth—the task culture,
COIN civilian-military teams must depend upon training and constant reinforcement of common goals and objectives. PRT team members, in contrast to CORDS interviewees, frequently cite the inadequacy of preparation for their tasks and the absence of a commonly understood mission, indicating that the necessary tools for forging an effective team have been lacking. Ubiquitous comments about personalities and cultural differences in PRT discourse also reflect this fragmentation.

The United States has responded in recent years with a more scattershot approach through the PRTs than that taken in CORDS. Today’s COIN efforts might benefit from a transformation of the operational worldview from an “experts and skills” to an “advice and support” model. The infamous stovepiping of PRTs could thus be avoided and a more holistic effort mounted.

Today’s civilian-military teams involve actors from sources that would not have been tapped for talent in the days of the Vietnam War. This is often cited as a strength of these operations but, in fact, may be a detriment to establishing commonality among team members. Department of Agriculture extension service employees and Department of Justice attorneys are unaccustomed to having contact with each other, let alone collaborating. In addition, they will not necessarily be acknowledged for their skills in the tribal areas of Afghanistan or the deserts of Iraq no matter how well qualified they are considered to be at home. It is more likely that HNs will want to deal with those who can speak about their problems in terms they will understand rather than with outsiders who have little or no knowledge of their country but immediately attempt to assume the authority of an expert. From the discourse of PRT representatives it can be inferred that dividing this substantial pie into small slices to be digested by a multitude of agencies producing “representatives” with little or no country knowledge is not the best approach.

This comparison of CORDS and PRTs further indicates that emphasizing relationships with HNs, during training efforts and during deployment, is highly instrumental in enabling a positive impact for any program. In general, the attitude portrayed by CORDS discourse implies a certain level of deference toward the HN that appears to be mostly lacking in PRT discourse. This is summed up in the words of one CORDS interviewee: “They [the Vietnamese] thought they were smarter than we were and they were probably right. They certainly knew the situation on the ground better than we ever did. We never
seemed to learn and the Vietnamese knew that.”77 Judging from studies of adult learning, which is essentially what COIN operations are attempting to achieve, the most important single factor for empowering students is establishing collaboration.78 That a primary factor in persuading people to join or identify with insurgencies is, according to many studies, anxiety about a lack of control over one’s life should suggest that a more collaborative rather than controlling approach could achieve better results.79

Many critics of the CORDS analogy for PRTs emphasize that the cultures of Iraq and Afghanistan bear little resemblance to that of Vietnam. Most CORDS participants would affirm, however, that the real subjects of CORDS culture change objectives were, more accurately, the US government’s military and foreign service communities. The recognition that these operations require major adjustments in attitudes, extensive training on how to deal with the HN, clear guidance on objectives, and a common understanding of mission were the major assets of the CORDS program.

Despite the great differences in the amount of time and human capital the government was willing to invest in the CORDS effort in comparison to the much smaller amount of resources and attention devoted to PRTs, there are strengths that can be replicated from the Vietnam experience. For one thing, CORDS participants were well trained in the art of achieving Vietnamese buy-in and engagement in the effort. There was also a great deal of care taken in the preparation of CORDS participants for assessing and addressing local needs. Ultimately, however, CORDS would have achieved very little, regardless of how much money was spent on the program, without its emphasis on converting disparate elements into a functioning whole. The mirror image of this on the ground was the overarching goal of the program—to organize conflicting cultures into a stable government. That this is also the overarching goal of today’s other wars suggests that the most significant lesson that can be drawn from the CORDS experience is that it may be best for PRTs to first consider leading by example.

Notes


5. Ibid., i.

6. The resources—material and human, civilian and military—available to Vietnam pacification have been unmatched in US history, with the military draft and civilian policy that every unmarried foreign service officer in the fledgling US Agency for International Development (USAID) serve in Vietnam.


41. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mdfip:1:./temp/~ammem_cPus:.

42. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mdfip:1:./temp/~ammem_4eNs:.

43. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mdfip:1:./temp/~ammem_iRtN:.

44. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mdfip:1:./temp/~ammem_xN1t:.

45. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mdfip:1:./temp/~ammem_UxhA:.

46. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mdfip:2:./temp/~ammem_1OU2:.

47. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mdfip:1:./temp/~ammem_k37e:.


49. The author recorded these unpublished online survey statements on 11 July 2011.

50. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), US Army Combined Arms Center, CALL Handbook 07-34: *Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Playbook,*


52. The author recorded this unpublished online survey statement on 10 July 2011.

53. The author recorded this unpublished online survey statement on 10 July 2011.

54. The author recorded this unpublished online survey statement on 11 July 2011.


57. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, 32.

58. The author recorded this unpublished online survey statement on 10 July 2011.

59. The author recorded this unpublished online survey statement on 10 July 2011.


61. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:1:./temp/~ammem_k37e::.


63. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:1:./temp/~ammem_4eNs::.

64. Ibid, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:2:./temp/~ammem_1OU2::.

65. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:1:./temp/~ammem_IRtN::.

66. Ibid., http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:1:./temp/~ammem_k37e::.


68. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook, 26.


73. Ibid.

74. Unpublished interview statement, recorded by the author.


PART 3
The Post–9/11 Wars
Iraq and Afghanistan
Chapter 6

The Origins of the Provincial Reconstruction Team

Almost Present at the Creation

Joseph J. Collins

In the summer of 2002, as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations, I made a staff visit to Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180), our war-fighting command in Afghanistan, then led by Lt Gen Dan K. McNeill, US Army. There I learned that the command was struggling with a problem. As the Afghan interim transitional government was trying to get to its feet, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had already proved itself an effective peacekeeping force around Kabul and its environs. The reinforced brigade actually policed nearly 250 square miles. The rest of the country was inadequately policed and often economically devastated from more than two decades of continuous warfare. There were virtually no Afghan security forces and fewer than 10,000 US forces in the fight—a very small figure for a country the size of Texas. Warlords and their militias often filled the security gap. Sometimes this was a fortunate happenstance, other times not so much so. By the summer, however, the European urge to deploy outside Kabul had faded, and the US desire to keep ISAF small and separate from the low-level war in the countryside remained a constant. CJTF-180 faced a quandary: how could it expand the ISAF effect, without actually expanding ISAF? The answer was simple: put small civilian-military teams in the countryside to advance security and reconstruction. The underlying inspiration for this might have been initiatives in the Malaya campaign or the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program in Vietnam, but the stimulus for the invention of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) was necessity.

The basic idea came from the team under Col (now Maj Gen) Nick Carter, UK army, who was the task force (TF) CJ5. The proposal, when I saw it, was just a few PowerPoint slides. Initially designated as joint regional teams, the teams would absorb and enlarge the small Civil Affairs–Department of State (DOS) coalition, humanitarian liaison
cells that were in many areas, often working closely with nearby US special operations forces. I took the TF concept for the PRTs back to the Pentagon. The Office of the Secretary of Defense policy team briefed it to the interagency deputies committee, who heartily approved the concept but was initially unable to provide additional resources for it. The deputies closely monitored the fielding of the PRTs for over a year. The concept was also briefed to Afghani president Hamid Karzai, then the interim leader of Afghanistan. He opined that “joint” did not mean anything in local languages and that “regional” had nothing to do with how Afghanistan was to be governed. As one non-eyewitness related, President Karzai said that warlords had regions but Afghanistan had provinces. He also said that the emphasis of such teams should not be security but reconstruction and that they should work closely with district and provincial governors. Thus, the term provincial reconstruction team came into being.

The generic purposes of the PRTs were to further security, promote reconstruction, facilitate cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations in the area, and help the local authorities in governance and other issues. PRTs were also excellent representational and reporting agencies. Some of them, such as the British PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif, under Col Dickie Davies, were also instrumental in dampening factional fighting. The original interagency overseers of the PRT concept were not eager to pin down the PRT mission set, but later groups of senior personnel were inclined to create more standard templates for PRT activities.

The original plan was for four PRTs, with the first being at Gardez. It went into limited operation in December 2002 and full operation by April 2003. The PRTs and associated elements were originally commanded by the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force but later in 2004 were integrated into the five regional commands, with one officer commanding coalition forces and associated PRTs, unifying the military and the stability operations aspects of counterinsurgency.

While the PRTs were widely supported, like all new organizations, they had their growing pains. Posting DOS, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and US Department of Agriculture (USDA) personnel to field organizations commanded by military personnel was problematical. The NGOs and IOs were unaccustomed to having military units in the “humanitarian space.” Many also objected to combining military and humanitarian activities in such a
manner as to make them political acts. Many NGOs also wanted to maintain personal safety and “neutrality” but were hard pressed to explain how one remained neutral between a legally constituted government and outlaw insurgents. The rollout of the PRT concept complicated this, as briefers told NGOs that the PRTs intended to coordinate humanitarian and reconstruction activities, not realizing how sensitive NGOs were about their independence and perceived neutrality. The PRTs also were associated with other IO/NGO-related issues. Doing stabilization and reconstruction work in the same area as intelligence and military activities will always be problematical.

In the summer of 2003, on a subsequent visit, I visited the Gardez PRT. It included a 52-personnel PRT (including four units of five-person civil affairs teams that were often deployed far from Gardez), and a 77-soldier defense force. Inside the PRT, there was also space for “visiting” US or Afghan National Army units. The PRT had USAID and DOS representatives and expected any day the arrival of their first USDA representative. The PRT covered five eastern provinces: Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni, and parts of Logar Province, an area the size of South Carolina. The people there were eastern Pashhtuns. Polls and reports showed them to be 40 percent progovernment, 50 percent neutral or pragmatic, and 10 percent antigovernment or pro-Taliban. The provinces not only had an active Taliban presence but also unruly tribes, warlords, and smugglers. The PRT had $1.24 million worth of projects that included 39 schools, 17 wells, and eight medical clinics. Over time, PRTs were able to use USAID and Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funds directly to supplement humanitarian funds from the Pentagon.

In all, I was able to visit five of the early PRTs including those in Bamiyan, run by New Zealanders; Parwan, run by South Koreans; and Mazar-e-Sharif, then run by the United Kingdom. This has been a successful initiative and is worthy of being kept in our policy tool chest after our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have become a distant memory.

Notes

1. One of the best, early analyses of the PRT phenomenon is by my colleague, Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters 35 (Winter 2005): 32–46. A comprehensive effort at evaluating the concept can be found in Robert M. Perito, “The U.S. Experience

2. There are now more than two dozen PRTs; half are run by coalition-partner militaries and half are operated by the United States. In most cases, military forces lead, but in some coalition PRTs, diplomats are co-leads. In Iraq, the US Department of State took the lead in running both regional and embedded PRTs.

3. The data in this paragraph are from my notes and the briefing slides used by the PRT commander, Lt Col Anthony Hunter, US Army. Subsequent US PRT commanders often came from the US Navy or Air Force.

4. At least five PRTs cover this area today.
Chapter 7

Civilian Agencies in a War Zone

Afghanistan and Iraq

Bernard Carreau

The greatest impediment to unity of mission among civilian-military teams in a war zone is the difficulty of shaping traditional core capabilities to operational requirements in theater so as to meet mission goals rather than agency goals. This is an enormous challenge for civilian agencies, whose leadership and staff—including permanent, temporary, and contractor personnel—generally have no military training and little to no background in security issues. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the military had to refocus its attention from major combat operations to counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization, rebalance its lethal and nonlethal activities, and reconsider the second- and third-order effects of its kinetic operations—albeit with only mixed success. Similarly, civilian agencies had to reexamine their traditional missions and develop new capabilities in order to meet the stabilization requirements of Afghanistan and Iraq—again with only mixed success.

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) collected, analyzed, and disseminated lessons and best practices from civilian-military personnel assigned to provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) and other civilian-military teams in Afghanistan and Iraq at the regional and district levels. In this chapter, I highlight the main conclusions regarding the effectiveness of these teams and offer recommendations for improving civilian-military teaming in future operations, particularly those involving nonpermissive environments.

A certain degree of ad hoc innovation is inherent and, in fact, necessary in any COIN or stabilization operation to deal with and manage the changing environment on the ground. However, when an operation is overwhelmingly reliant on ad hoc mechanisms to coordinate resources of agencies constructed to work independently, on-the-fly arrangements can make challenges like command and control and unity of effort difficult—if not impossible. In the early days of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, there was no mechanism for unifying diverse efforts, and later, even those that were eventually established
lacked the strength to overcome systemic institutional cultures and ways of doing business. To be fair, as the operations matured, the ad hoc mechanisms did improve coordination and guidance. Nevertheless, as one observer has pointed out, “these hard-won alliances, driven as they were by white-hot circumstances, have yet to yield the kind of systemic institutional reform within the US government that would forestall future agency ‘stovepiping’ during stabilization and reconstruction operations.”

**Understanding the Operational Environment**

At the height of the Afghanistan and Iraq surges, the US government deployed over 1,000 civilian employees (a mixture of permanent staff and temporary government hires) to each country. Yet the number of personnel deployed does not tell the whole story. In fact, it is a relatively minor part of the qualified success of the civilian surge over the last decade. The real challenge faced by the civilian workforce was not the ability to deploy in numbers sufficient to meet operational requirements. Actually, at times an overly acute focus on numbers of personnel deployed distracted the leadership from the far more significant issues of understanding the operational environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, defining mission requirements, and then adapting traditional agency capabilities to meet those operational requirements.

In the early days of the surges in Afghanistan and Iraq, civilian and military PRT members alike referred to the lack of guidance from Washington as detrimental to team unity. Some cited the failure of the Department of State (DOS) to articulate comprehensive guidance, direction, and evaluation criteria for the program. While the military has typically looked to the DOS to take the lead in civilian affairs, several interviewees pointed out that the DOS and the Department of Defense (DOD) never agreed on a standard doctrine for their joint efforts embodied in the PRTs. Many team members also believed that embassy oversight offices—the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) in Baghdad and the Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) Office in Kabul—were too far removed from ground realities in the field to be of much use, and teams complained of a lack of guidance and planning from these offices. However, from the oversight offices’ perspectives, both OPA and IPA had their own issues with which to
deal. Both offices did not fit into a traditional embassy structure, and personnel often struggled to justify their mission in the embassy hierarchy. Over time these oversight offices did produce guidance, but office leadership had no way of enforcing uniformity. Instead the offices acted largely in an administrative capacity, managing such issues as personnel, resources, and travel.

Neither the DOS nor any other civilian agency produces doctrine. However, the DOS did work with the military to produce the *Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* in 2009 and then updated it in 2011.4 In addition, the DOS spearheaded an interagency effort to produce the *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* in 2009.5

Many PRT leaders found the operational guidance they received ambiguous and in some instances contradictory. In the absence of clear direction regarding which documents PRT members should use, members reported using a variety of written sources. These included various combinations of doctrine, agency-specific documents, and country-specific plans. Some of these documents were produced two years into the surge. These were not synchronized or integrated with each other. Moreover, there was no entity capable of enforcing uniformity. Hence the tendency was for most members to default to the core missions of their home agencies. Other PRT team members stated that they ignored guiding documents altogether and instead developed their own plans from scratch once they arrived in theater. In other cases, returnees lamented that incoming PRT personnel completely disregarded the plans of previous PRT members.

As a further complication, the PRT was not the battlespace owner in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Regardless of whether or not the PRT leader could get all PRT members to agree on the mission, there were other entities outside the PRT with their own concept of mission. The commander of the maneuver unit in charge of the PRT’s area of operations sometimes had different priorities than the PRT leader, and the maneuver units normally commanded more resources in terms of manpower, influence, area access, and program money than the PRT leader did. In Afghanistan, some areas also hosted Army National Guard agribusiness development teams (ADT), some with support from US Department of Agriculture (USDA) advisors, which were outside the chain of command of the PRT.
Developing a Common Team Identity

There was a lack of a common team identity among members of civilian-military teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Members either did not feel they were part of the same team, or more likely, home agency prerogatives and missions prevented them from being part of the team. This does not mean that there was no sense of camaraderie. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of interviewees reported a sense of kinship with fellow team members, and intrateam friction and interpersonal conflicts were the exception, not the rule. Yet there are institutional and structural factors, including separate agency core missions, cultures, authorities, funding streams, and reporting and evaluation requirements, that prevented members from being a true team working toward the same mission goals. Barriers to team identity arose not only between civilians and the military, but also among civilian agencies, such as between the DOS and USAID, between USAID and USDA, and even among different groups within individual agencies—especially between career and temporary employees.

Lacking a common team identity, individuals retreated to the institutional cultures, perceived core missions, and traditional responsibilities of their home agencies and services. For example, some DOS foreign service officers viewed cable writing, a traditional DOS mission, as the main function of PRTs. Several PRT commanders in Afghanistan (many of whom hailed from the Navy and Air Force) observed that the PRT mission was unlike any assignment they had ever had in their careers; yet they noted that most of their predeployment training was combat-related—the Army's traditional core mission. While recognizing the importance of combat training, they felt unprepared for the main mission of the PRT, which was to promote stability and governance. A common complaint from USAID representatives on PRTs, and from other agency representatives working with their USAID counterparts on the local teams, was that local USAID representatives did not have any influence over the agency’s national programs. As with traditional worldwide development missions, most USAID programming takes place in capitals—in this case, Kabul and Baghdad—in conjunction with Washington headquarters. This sometimes impeded the ability to target programs to local stabilization and governance requirements. Some USAID representatives on PRTs observed that they had more influence over military spending than over USAID program funding.
To be sure, there were many individuals on the teams who appreciated the distinctions between the traditional missions of their agency (and what their experience and training had prepared them for) and the requirements in the field. There were permanent and temporary personnel from the DOS and other agencies who volunteered for multiple tours, learned local languages, studied tribal relations, familiarized themselves with local disputes over such issues as land and water rights, and actively participated in promoting local governance in a manner that matched local circumstances and promoted overall mission goals. There were USDA advisors who were willing to join special operations forces in village stability operations in Afghanistan. Some USAID personnel attempted to get headquarters to issue task orders to suit local stability requirements.

Yet despite the many tactical successes that took place in the field with certain agency personnel bucking traditional agency roles and missions, on balance, home agency prerogatives and traditions won out. In Afghanistan, the DOS’s focus remained Kabul-centric and concentrated on ministry-to-ministry relations, in accordance with its normal mission, instead of promoting local governance structures more in line with Afghanistan’s history and culture and with the stabilization goals of the operation. Likewise, the DOS’s focus in Iraq remained Baghdad-centric. USAID programming was dictated largely from the capitals and remained generally inflexible to rapidly changing local operational requirements. USDA headquarters as well as Embassy Kabul forbade agriculture advisors from joining special operations forces in village stability operations for fear of security threats to its personnel and due to a perceived lack of congruence with the mission of the special operations forces.

Establishing Command and Control

In addition to the fragmented concept of mission and limited operational guidance, the structure of the PRT did not facilitate the fostering of internal loyalties. Although the agencies worked side by side, they did not report to one another, and the PRT leader had little or no input into the performance evaluations for those outside his or her agency or service. Most respondents endorsed the separate chains of command within the PRT because they wanted to be evaluated by
their own agencies or service. In some instances, agency guidelines required evaluations to be controlled by the home agency or service. These separate chains of command created challenges for team cohesion and unity of effort. For example, in both Iraq and Afghanistan there were multiple actors working on agriculture issues. In addition to USDA, there were USAID civil affairs personnel attached to the PRTs, maneuver units with their own agriculture programs, and the Army Corps of Engineers. In Afghanistan, there are US Army National Guard’s ADTs, and in both countries, there were “Borlaug teams” working on agriculture issues funded by and reporting to yet another separate office. Sometimes different agencies funded the same projects. In the worst cases, different agencies’ programs worked at cross-purposes. For example, USDA often encouraged agricultural production for domestic markets, whereas USAID generally promoted agricultural production for export markets. While not necessarily mutually exclusive, the different orientation sometimes led to disagreements over which crops to encourage and what production methods and quality control standards to support in the local context.

In another case, a maneuver unit provided money to the local branch of the Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock for government-supported veterinarians who provided low-cost services or services free of charge. While well-intentioned, the program effectively derailed a USAID initiative to support local private veterinarians as profit-oriented enterprises. Embassy Kabul attempted to address the lack of cohesion and coordination among the multiple actors working on agriculture issues by appointing an “agriculture czar” in 2011. This czar was a senior official from USDA who oversaw an internal agriculture working group made up of all the major players with an agriculture portfolio. However, most respondents reported that they saw little difference in the field as far as coordination and direction for agriculture programs were concerned. Ultimately, the czar had no effective control over the personnel and resources of the various players in the field. In fact, USDA is a relatively minor player in terms of personnel and resources it controls directly as compared with those controlled by the military, DOD civilians, and USAID.

Some civilian-military teams in Afghanistan used a “board of directors” model to coordinate interagency activities. The composition of the board varied among teams but generally consisted of the PRT leader, the civil affairs officer, and representatives from the DOS, USAID, and
USDA. In many instances, the model proved effective, but the arrangements were ad hoc and could change from one rotation to the next.

In Afghanistan, the embassy and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command worked out the command and control arrangement depicted below in figure 7.1 to accommodate the huge influx of civilian advisors between 2010 and 2011. The intention was to match each echelon of military command with a corresponding civilian leader of comparable rank/seniority. All military units were under the direct chain of command of the commander ISAF (COMISAF), and all civilian advisors were under chief of mission authority—reporting to the ambassador. Leadership also introduced other efforts, such as colocation of military and civilian personnel on the same teams, in an effort to encourage coordination and camaraderie. These efforts achieved mixed success, but ultimately the parallel chains of command had no mechanism to force coordination and integration.

![Figure 7.1. Civilian-military team command structure in Afghanistan.](Based on Embassy of the United States of America–Kabul and International Security Assistance Force, *Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* [Kabul: DOS and DOD, 2009].)
Operationalizing “Defense, Diplomacy, and Development”

The “3 Ds” (defense, diplomacy, and development) mantra adopted by much of official Washington in recent years belies one of the central lessons from the last decade of war. It implies that merely mobilizing and deploying sufficient numbers of personnel from the defense, diplomatic, and development communities will satisfy the requirements for complex operations like Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not the case. Elements of traditional defense (combat operations), traditional diplomacy (state-to-state relations), and traditional development (long-term institution building) were imperative to meet the requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, one of the major lessons from the last 10 years is the need to develop and sustain nontraditional elements of the defense, diplomatic, and development communities, as well as nontraditional elements of other agencies representing the entire civilian workforce of the US government.

A common misperception among DOD officials and the military, and in fact in much of official Washington, is that the civilian workforce has empirical knowledge of most of the nonsecurity-related requirements for overseas contingency operations—notably stabilization, local governance, rule of law, and economic rehabilitation. In reality, this vastly overstates civilian agency capabilities. The DOS’s diplomats receive virtually no training in these areas and, with a very few notable exceptions, have never had to execute any of these missions in their diplomatic careers. Rather they engage in state-to-state diplomacy, analysis of local events, and reporting on those events to Washington. These are certainly worthy endeavors but a far cry from expertise on tribal relations in Iraq, local governance structures in Afghanistan, and settling disputes among warring factions over land and water rights. The USAID has great expertise in disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and long-term development programming, but this is distinct from the ability to restore essential services, establish local security, and create local jobs in order to stabilize conflict-ridden states. The DOS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) provide police training and judicial system capacity building as part of their core missions. However, funding and monitoring police training programs from Washington, or even in a host-nation police academy, has nothing to do with regulating traffic, arresting and detaining
criminals, and generally establishing public order in the crime-ridden streets of an anarchic post-regime-change state.

Yet agencies made great strides in adapting their traditional missions to operational requirements. Condoleezza Rice, then secretary of state, drew a distinction between traditional diplomacy and “transformational” diplomacy. The DOS created an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which later transformed into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, with a new mission of “expeditionary” diplomacy designed to promote stabilization and prevent conflict.7 The USDA's Foreign Agriculture Service's mission is to promote the sale of US agriculture products abroad. Likewise, the mission of the Department of Commerce's (DOC) Foreign Commercial Service is to promote the sale of US industrial products abroad. Such endeavors would produce little stabilizing effect in a war-torn state, so both the USDA and the DOC recognized early on that they needed to expand their roles to improving local agriculture production techniques and promoting local private-sector development, respectively. Other agencies made similar adjustments. Whereas the Federal Aviation Administration acts as a regulatory agency in the United States, its role in Iraq and Afghanistan was to do capacity building and advise the host nation how to create a system for regulating aviation that makes sense in the local context.

Perhaps no agency did as much soul searching over reconciling its traditional mission with operational requirements as the USAID. Early on in both Iraq and Afghanistan, many observers began to question the effectiveness of traditional long-term development programming in a conflict zone. Some of this was generated internally, but most of the pressure to reconceptualize the development mission was generated by external sources, notably the military, some members of Congress, and especially government watchdog agencies, government research institutions, and independent think tanks. The agency responded in spades. Rajiv Shah, the USAID administrator, issued a directive exhorting his staff to distinguish between development and stabilization. The agency opened a new Office of Military Affairs (later renamed the Office of Civil-Military Cooperation), staffed with a mix of permanent agency staff, military liaisons, and recently retired military officers. It issued new guidelines on programming for COIN, economic development in postconflict zones, and countering violent extremism. In Afghanistan, the agency created a new Stabilization Unit, moved contracting officer technical-
representatives out to the regional platforms to monitor the effects of its national programs in the local context, and instituted several innovative monitoring and evaluation techniques in order to measure progress in stabilization, such as the district stability framework and a new tool called Measuring the Impact of Stabilization Initiatives.

Understanding Stabilization and Counterinsurgency

Civilian agency personnel fared less well in their appreciation of the security-related elements of the mission, the interrelationship between kinetic and nonkinetic aspects of the mission, and the interplay among their own initiatives and counterterrorism and COIN requirements. This is understandable given that most civilian agency personnel had little to no background in security issues and no military training. With a few exceptions, most civilian agency personnel did not even have the opportunity to train with their military counterparts before deployment.

The requirements for stabilization in an unstable security environment can be quite different from those in which the normal development and capacity-building initiatives of civilian agencies engage. As an illustration, new joint doctrine establishes a framework for understanding COIN built around three interdependent root causes: opportunity, motive, and means. In this account, grievances alone are not enough to cause insurgency but instead are a necessary but insufficient component of “motive” (fig. 7.2). Savvy insurgent leaders weave grievances, social identities, and ideologies into a compelling narrative that convinces portions of the population that violent rebellion is just, necessary to protect their interests, and likely to succeed.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been widely criticized for applying Western assumptions about the structure and role of government without taking local realities into account. Reconstruction efforts have also come under fire for often having dubious rationale and questionable impact. Grievances matter but not in the way that US efforts have typically assumed. As shown in figure 7.2, grievances are part of an intricate web of factors that fuel an insurgency. Many civilian agency programs in Iraq and Afghanistan were designed to address the grievances per se without an appreciation of the larger context of how grievances fit into the insurgency narrative. The new joint doctrine emphasizes that efforts to improve governance and
deliver services must be carefully tailored to the local context and narrowly focused on meeting the expectations of the population rather than Western preconceptions. Counterinsurgents should keep in mind that it will typically be impossible to fully address grievances in the middle of active conflict. However, the credibility of commitments to resolve grievances over time will be judged largely on how counterinsurgents behave in the near term. Counterinsurgency efforts should focus on providing predictable and tolerable conditions for the population, leaving long-term development until there is sufficient security. However, civilian personnel did not get this type of training.

Figure 7.2. Root causes of insurgency. (Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 November 2013.)

Another critical consideration in a large-footprint operation is the often uneasy relationship between the host-nation government and foreign security forces, whether or not those forces are part of a formal occupation under the laws of armed conflict. Many civilian agency programs are designed to promote host-nation ownership and legitimacy, but a large US footprint can create perverse incentives and distort the relationship between the host-nation government and its people—undermining the very sovereignty and legitimacy the United States is trying to support. Contrary to a traditional donor-recipient
relationship, in a large-footprint operation there is not necessarily a *sovereign check* on civilian agency programs designed in foreign capitals. That is, there is no truly sovereign host-nation government to parse through and reject certain elements of programs designed in Western capitals. This can lead to programs and initiatives that may be more suitable in a Western context than in the local context.

**Building Better Civilian-Military Teams**

The ad hoc systems established to integrate civilian and military teams in Iraq and Afghanistan were largely incapable of overcoming bureaucratic inequities and were not able to meet operational requirements. Despite the many innovations introduced and the progress made on the military and civilian sides, integrated teams in the field never fully overcame this fundamental flaw. The following proposals, intended especially but not exclusively for large-footprint operations, would address this and other deficiencies discussed in this chapter.

**Overall Mission Clarification**

As the planning begins for each new operation, the White House should issue a presidential directive, parts of which may need to be classified, to clarify the mission of all civilian-military teams, the mission of each of the military and civilian actors on the teams, as well as the command/coordination relationships among them.

A recurring theme in interviews with civilian-military team members is that personnel from different institutions often have very different visions of the overall goals of the mission. The well-intentioned refrain calling for defense, diplomacy, and development has had the unintended effect of drawing sharp distinctions among agencies over who is responsible for what and who is in charge of what. DOS personnel should be as concerned with security and stabilization as they are with diplomacy and governance because these would all be included as part of the mission. Military personnel should be as concerned with governance and rule of law as they are with security for the same reason.
Agency-Specific Mission Clarification

The presidential directive would instruct all relevant agencies to develop agency-specific guidelines for implementing the directive. The guidelines could be similar to a white paper issued by USAID administrator Rajiv Shah in January 2011 regarding differences between stabilization activities and traditional development but would need to be more detailed with respect to operational and programming activities. One of the main purposes of the agency guidelines would be to describe differences between the agency’s traditional core mission and the operational mission at hand. One of CCO’s principal findings from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is that, in the absence of a genuine team concept and common understanding of mission, agencies revert to their traditional core missions. The presidential directive would make clear that mission goals will always take precedence over agencies’ core mission goals.

Integrated Chain of Command for Civilian-Military Teams

The presidential directive would call for a single chain of command for all civilian-military teams in theater. Although many civilians cringe at the concept of unity of command, the DOS would still retain chief of mission authority, and the military would retain command of all military forces. However, where designated teams are established at the regional and district levels, a single leader would be established, and all personnel on the team—whether military or civilian and whether from one civilian agency or another—would report to that leader. The commanding general and the ambassador could negotiate whether a military or civilian lead should be established for specific teams, perhaps based on the level of security in a given region or district.

Reporting and Evaluating through Team Leader

The team leader would be responsible for evaluating all personnel on the team. If the team leader were military, this would mean that civilians on the team would report to and be evaluated by a military commander. If the team leader were civilian, military personnel on the team would report to and be evaluated by the civilian leader. This is the only way to guarantee coordination and team cohesion. Civilian
and military personnel attached to civilian-military teams must be bona fide team members—not liaisons to the team representing their own individual agencies or institutions. Team leaders would get input from home agencies or institutions, especially in technical areas where the team leader has little background. However, team leaders must evaluate members based on progress made toward operational mission goals, not home agency or service goals.

**Team Leader Sign-Off on Funding Decisions**

The civilian or military team leader of all civilian-military teams should have dual or co-sign-off authority over all spending decisions that affect that leader’s area of responsibility, regardless of the source of the funding. Civilians have voiced many concerns about their lack of influence over the way the military uses Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Individual commanders have instituted a board of directors approach to funding decisions, with input from interagency partners, that has proven to be effective. There has been less military or interagency input permitted on USAID and other civilian agency funding decisions, but a similar board of directors mechanism could be institutionalized to help shape civilian agency programs to regional and local needs.

**Mission-Specific Rather than Agency-Specific Training**

Predeployment training for civilian and military personnel serving on civilian-military teams needs to be refocused toward mission goals rather than agency- or institution-specific goals. There are many complicated issues associated with military and civilian predeployment training—not the least of which is synching training cycles and enabling civilian-military members who will deploy to the same team to train together. Regardless of whether some of these issues can be resolved, there are several elements of current training programs that could be changed to improve civilian-military relations in the field. Civilian-military team members train separately for the most part, and their current curricula tend to focus on agency core mission skills and capabilities over mission-specific, team-building skills and capabilities. This is true of both military and civilian training programs.

A distinct feature of the Vietnam-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was that participants
trained for much longer periods prior to deployment, usually from four to six months. The training included instruction in the language and local history of the region to which the team was being deployed. The training also included interagency components so that team members developed a common sense of identity and understood their common objectives. In some cases, agencies provided their personnel with even more in-depth training. USDA, for example, sent their employees to the Philippines for up to three months to study rice cultivation in a tropical environment.

Conclusions

Much of the recent literature on developing civilian capacity for contingency operations assumes there is sufficient expertise at the civilian agencies and that the main impediments to mobilizing the civilian workforce relate to inadequate budgets, authorities, and available personnel. Although budgets, authorities, and personnel are important factors, by far the main consideration is the ability of the civilian workforce to understand the operational environment and develop appropriate capabilities to match operational requirements. Developing the civilian workforce for overseas contingency operations is not primarily a capacity issue; it is primarily a capabilities issue. As a rule, commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as chiefs of mission, would have been better off with fewer civilians if those deployed civilians had a better understanding of the operational environment and the operational requirements, as opposed to larger numbers of deployed civilians who were simply trying to implement their home agencies’ traditional missions without regard to operational requirements.

The capabilities required to meet the operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan relate to stabilization, not traditional defense, diplomacy, or development. At least until relatively recently, no agency considered stabilization to be part of its core mission. That the secretary of defense had to issue a directive (3000.05) instructing all DOD components to put stability operations on par with major combat operations, that the DOS had to create a new bureau dedicated to stabilization and that the USAID took so many extraordinary steps to draw a distinction between traditional development and stabilization serve as indications of the extent to which stabilization
as a core mission was not part of the culture and mind-set of any of the three agencies, to say nothing of other “domestic” agencies like the DOJ, USDA, DOC, Department of Transportation, and Department of the Treasury.

If select capabilities acquired by the civilian workforce over the last 10 years can be retained into the future, if new stabilization capabilities can be developed, and if stronger civilian-military teams are developed in accordance with the recommendations in this chapter, the DOD will have a robust and reliable partner in the civilian workforce as it strives to complete the missions identified by the president and the secretary of defense in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance:

- Counterterrorism and irregular warfare
- Deter and defeat aggression
- Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges
- Counter weapons of mass destruction
- Operate effectively in cyberspace and space
- Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
- Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities
- Provide a stabilizing presence
- Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
- Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations

At least half of these missions—counterterrorism and irregular warfare, deterrence, stabilizing presence, stability and counterinsurgency operations, and disaster relief—will require stabilization capabilities in the civilian workforce. These mission sets were reinforced in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. It is in the national interest that agencies retain select capabilities and institutional knowledge in order to respond to future threats, even if the US response does not take the form of a large-footprint operation as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The issue is not whether the United States is likely to engage in another large-footprint operation like Iraq or Afghanistan in the near future. It is how might agencies retain and employ the knowledge and capabilities acquired over the last 10 years and develop new capabilities in order to respond more effectively in future overseas contingency
operations—whatever form the US response may take and engage more effectively with allies and partners so as to deter future conflict.

Notes

1. Starting in 2009, CCO conducted hundreds of interviews of personnel from multiple US government agencies including the Department of State (DOS), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of the Treasury. In collaboration with the military services, CCO developed similar questions for military personnel working on civilian-military teams in Afghanistan and Iraq and sent several collection and analysis teams to the field to interview civilian, military, special operations, and intelligence personnel.


3. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Handbook 11-16, Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Team* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL, February 2011, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-16/11-16.pdf. Although there was no formal DOD-DOS doctrine for PRTs, this publication, more commonly referred to as the PRT Handbook, was drafted with the assistance of multiple US government agencies, including DOS and USAID, and served in lieu of such doctrine.


6. Borlaug teams were part of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations–Iraq, sponsored by the DOD Business Transformation Agency through a partnership with the USDA.

7. S/CRS and the new CSO Bureau were designed to be permanent structures aimed at dealing with contingency operations other than Iraq and Afghanistan. Both offices had no involvement in Iraq and only limited involvement in Afghanistan.


Chapter 8

Civilian-Military Capacity-Building Teams

The View from Anbar Province (2006–2009)

James Soriano

During the war in Iraq, as one wag said, Anbar Province comprised one-third of the country’s land mass and one-half of its problems. The place was synonymous with the lawlessness and chaos that had seemingly engulfed Iraq. In 2006 military operations in Anbar were stalemated. However, even when those dark days looked darkest, early signs of the war tipping in our favor began to appear. Anbar was the home of the Awakening movement, the coalition of Sunni tribes that, after a long period of hesitation, threw their lot in with the United States, declared war on al-Qaeda, and called the enemy the enemy. Pulling the tribes off the fence and onto our side was a great achievement by the US commanders and service members who fought there. Similar moves were later reproduced with great effect elsewhere in Iraq. Anbar, like other provinces, was also the site for the experimental use of civilian-led reconstruction teams in a war zone. I was the leader of one such team.

These pages contain some personal reflections and comments on that experience, composed with an eye to being of value to future practitioners. First, practitioners would profit greatly by defining and redefining the general context in which the capacity-building teams will operate before their deployment. Second, they should phrase and continually rephrase the teams’ purpose and goals so that all stakeholders develop a common picture of the facts on the ground. Third, if the teams are deployed with US military forces, it is better to assign them to specific geographic areas rather than to “embed” them with maneuver units, as was the case in Iraq. Fourth, teams should set up their own internal procedures for vetting projects and development initiatives. Fifth, larger teams should have their own long-term planning and operations capacity, rather than relying on higher echelons for those functions. Sixth, metrics must be developed. Seventh, practitioners should be alert as to when those measures point to a kind of stasis in the environment, where greater team inputs do not translate
into measurable results. Eighth, practitioners should understand that in complex operations interagency frictions will be inevitable but manageable. The team design phase would be the place to start, especially on defining the lines of control and authority between military and civilian agencies. Practitioners would do well to avoid informal, “handshake” agreements between agencies that will invariably be-devil operations in the field. Perhaps the most important tool in managing interagency frictions is to ensure that the right people—in both military and civilian organizations—are put in the right jobs.

**Defining the General Situation**

Most observers of the war in Iraq are generally familiar with the role played by the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). Broadly speaking their goals supported counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and laid the foundation for future economic development initiatives. Government and private-sector analysts alike have documented the lessons learned.

Certainly the teams had an experimental, ad hoc quality, which should not be surprising since they were stood up in the midst of a military campaign. Those who served on PRTs learned by doing; they wrote the manual as they went along.

PRT activities were decentralized and varied from province to province. In one instance, the focus might have been on stabilization and supporting COIN operations. In another, the team might have moved on to capacity building. In many cases, it was not uncommon to find a significant degree of uncertainty about lines of authority. “We never knew exactly who had authority over us. Seemed to keep changing,” one PRT respondent told congressional investigators in 2008.

I was a PRT practitioner in Anbar Province, and if asked to identify a key lesson learned, it would be this: decision makers should take the time to define the problem before jumping in to solve it. Einstein is variously quoted as saying that if he had one hour to save the world he would spend the first 55 minutes defining the problem. Planners intuitively know this. They know that the quality of their solutions depends on the clarity of the ideas that go into them. The US experience in Iraq would be a good example of that.

It took the United States several years to come up with an adequate definition of the situation in Iraq, but eventually we learned that the
conflict was as much about restoring order and protecting civilians as it was about engaging the enemy. The US military eventually understood this. It implemented new tactics and techniques. It perfected terrorist network analyses. It worked with Iraqi security forces to roll up insurgent leaders and their cells. It engaged local power brokers to coax them off the fence and onto our side. Moreover, it learned the value of civil affairs and staying power. In other words, the counterinsurgent must stick with the local population through thick and thin.

While the United States conducted a COIN campaign, it also launched an ambitious PRT initiative to bring civilian expertise into the fight. Many new PRTs were stood up in 2006–07, as joint civilian-military field teams.

The situation at that time may be described as follows. Compare for a moment a COIN operation to a conventional war in which two armies face each other along a broad front. In a conventional battle, the commander of one army tries to punch a hole in the defenses of the opposing force. If he is successful, he exploits the advantage. He pours reinforcements into the gap. The troops fan out behind enemy lines, seeking to impose a decisive defeat.

Obviously, fighting an insurgency does not play out in the same kind of spatial dimension as a conventional war, but the counterinsurgent can create a kind of opening, more temporal in nature than spatial, that can be exploited. He can establish a sufficient basis of stability and security in certain areas that prepares the way for reconstruction and capacity-building activities. This is where civilian expertise comes into play. In Iraq the PRTs too exploited the advantage, armed not with weapons but with the tools of soft power. They deployed in the gaps created by coalition military forces. They fanned out to consolidate gains, denied the enemy advantages with the local populace, and helped set conditions for the longer-term, postconflict period. Broadly speaking, that was the general concept behind the PRTs.

While the PRT concept was innovative, it soon became apparent that some of the organizational and managerial problems encountered by the PRTs should have been addressed during their predeployment phase.

The Situation in Anbar

Anbar Province is Iraq’s large western expanse of desert and irrigated farms, comprising nearly one-third of the country’s landmass
In 2006 it was in an al-Qaeda death grip. Insurgents roamed Ramadi, the provincial capital, at will. They kidnapped and murdered prominent citizens. The mosques were under the control of radicals.

Figure 8.1. Anbar Province, Iraq

During my first office call on Anbar's governor in September 2006, a gun battle raged outside Ramadi's government center. The governor was the only civil servant who kept office hours in those days, protected by a platoon of US marines who had turned the center into a walled fortress. The insurgents outside would have killed the governor as quickly as they would have killed any of the young marines who guarded him.

The marines had been sent to tame the place in 2004. They were the “strongest tribe,” and along with US soldiers, sailors, and airmen,
were locked in grim urban fighting in cities like Ramadi and Fallujah. The toll was high: 30 percent of US war fatalities were sustained in Anbar Province.

In 2006 the war was not going well in Iraq or at home. US public opinion stood divided as to whether the United States should keep troops in Iraq or bring them home. This was the time of the Iraq Study Group, the 10-person bipartisan panel appointed by Congress that was charged with assessing the situation in Iraq and making policy recommendations for the US war effort. The study group found that “the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.” On military strategy, it recommended that the United States shift its focus from combat to training Iraqi soldiers and police. Accordingly, US combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be withdrawn by early 2008. President Bush ultimately ignored that advice. Instead, he doubled down and surged.

Nevertheless, by the time the Iraq Study Group submitted its report in December 2006, signs had already appeared indicating that the tide of battle had begun to turn in our favor. The process started in Ramadi where a group of local tribal sheikhs decided to come off the fence and to align with coalition forces in a joint effort against al-Qaeda. Their motive had more to do with their revulsion at al-Qaeda’s murder campaign and the fear of a radical Islamic challenge to their own social positions than with any affinity for the coalition. Nonetheless, change had taken place, and US military commanders on the scene exploited it. Their patient, day-to-day engagement with local leaders shored up a promising initiative and gave it the momentum needed for success. This became known as the “Anbar Awakening,” or more broadly the “Sunni Awakening.” It was basically a local, self-defense effort, and was later reproduced in other parts of Iraq.

The Act of “Embedding”

By the spring of 2007, an exploitable opportunity for civilian stabilization efforts presented itself. Schools reopened, police were on the streets again, and economic life picked up. At that time, the United States stood up three new PRTs in Anbar as part of the civilian surge. These organizations were “embedded” with Army brigades and Marine regiments, hence their designation as “ePRTs.” Team members lived with their military counterparts on forward operating bases.
They worked closely with them in repairing schools and roads, getting basic services up and running, and otherwise helping Anbar’s mayors and town councils get back on their feet after the long period of al-Qaeda murder and intimidation.

The ePRT mission was exactly the sort of foreign intervention needed at the time. Anbar was stabilizing; it was in a transition from the clear and hold phases of a COIN operation to the build phase, where the expertise of civilian subject-matter experts (SME) came into play. However, the mode of organization—embedding a civilian-military capacity-building team with a maneuver unit—presented enterprise management and command-and-control issues that became evident with the passage of time.

*Embedding* was an unorthodox term that meant different things to different people. To some practitioners, it meant that the ePRT would deploy where its associated military unit deployed and would depart the area when the unit departed. That did not happen. As the campaign progressed, leaders instructed Anbar’s ePRTs to remain in place and to stay in business after their military units had departed the province. This caused further problems. For example, base closures caused one team to relocate twice in a year in search of a new home, disrupting its effectiveness.

Embedding resulted in confused civilian lines of authority. In Anbar, the three ePRTs joined a preexisting organization, PRT Anbar, which had been set up two years earlier. The latter team was responsible for engagement at the provincial, or gubernatorial, level of government, as compared to the municipal or district work of the ePRTs. The ePRTs each had a separate line of communication to the embassy for resources and personnel. The result was that four coequal civilian-military teams were active in the same province. Whereas the US military deployed in hierarchical organizations with clear lines of control, the civilian reconstruction teams were decentralized with uncertain control authorities. This organizational structure was far from optimal. Finally, embedding civilian aid workers in military units contributes to the undesirable perception that US development activities are in support of military operations.

The principal lesson learned would be to avoid embedding as an organizational structure. Assigning capacity-building teams to a specific geographic area, say to a strategically important city or town, would be a preferable approach, especially for long-duration missions. That may not always be possible, but it would avoid the ambiguity of
whether the team is assigned to a maneuver unit or is more or less geographically fixed.

Of course, the four Anbar reconstruction teams cooperated among themselves for the sake of the mission. They found themselves in a situation that might be summed up in the words of the 9/11 Commission report, although the latter was written in a different context. “Good people can overcome bad structures,” the report said, but “they shouldn’t have to.” Getting the structure right is the job of the planners in the predeployment phase.

**The Idea of Transition**

Planning for change, as the saying goes, is a constant. PRT Anbar was constantly planning for the transition from one stage of the campaign to another. We dealt with this by standing up a cell for plans, operations, and assessments, a needed capacity that was not an organic part of the team’s original design. During the civilian surge, the Department of State put the emphasis on recruitment, getting civilian SMEs into the field as quickly as possible. Little consideration was given to staffing up a team’s administration and planning capacities—a need that became apparent as the PRT staff grew larger. However, during the campaign, the US Marines command in Anbar seconded several marines to the PRT to fill this need. The team leadership relied heavily on this cell for any number of tasks, including drawing up plans for the future consolidation of the ePRTs, adjusting to the redeployment of US military forces and base closures, and right-sizing the team as it moved forward.

Another way of looking at the idea of transition was the “hand off” of capacity-building responsibilities from US military forces to US civilian experts and ultimately to local organizations. In this respect, Anbar was typical of the situation found in other Iraqi provinces, in which, generally speaking, there was a threefold process.

In the early stages of the campaign, US military civil affairs teams had the lead. They shored up local government, engaged local officials and power brokers, and let contracts on a wide variety of construction and other projects selected by military commanders to produce quick results on creating jobs, underwriting stability, and winning the confidence of local inhabitants.
As security in a certain area gradually improved, civilian-military capacity-building teams were brought into play. In the early part of their life cycle, these teams basically had near-term COIN functions, but gradually they shifted focus to longer-term capacity-building initiatives. They did this by bringing to the fight needed civilian subject matter experts and budgetary resources geared specifically for economic development and capacity building.

Finally, in the latter stages of the campaign, generally coinciding with the redeployment of US military forces, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), led and staffed by Iraqis, assumed the lead in capacity-building activities. These NGOs implemented programs designed and developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). A USAID professional was assigned to the PRT Anbar staff to help administer these programs as they were rolled out locally.

The shifting of gears from the US military to US civilians and finally to local NGOs needs to be planned for and managed. In Anbar there was some gear grinding between phases two and three. This was evident when USAID rolled out a well-received program for local governance, which included workshops and training for members of Anbar’s provincial council and other officials. Not surprisingly, local government officials responded well to an initiative proposed and explained to them by other Iraqis. The “homemade” quality of training resonated with them better than engaging US civilians who lived on a fortified military base and traveled to local government offices in armed convoys.

However, almost overnight the USAID governance program, led by an Iraqi NGO, rendered redundant several PRT staff members who had been hired months earlier to work on the same issues. The PRT Anbar staff had developed its own training plan for local governance. The Iraqi NGO had similar plans, and, more importantly, it had a contractual obligation to USAID to achieve certain goals and objectives.

PRT Anbar found itself handing off governance activities to a local Iraqi organization. That was a desirable goal. Putting Iraqis in the lead had a compelling logic. It was a sign of progress. However, the hand-off came about suddenly and created a redundancy problem for several PRT Anbar staff members, whose work plans were radically curtailed or rendered unnecessary. Compounding this problem was the slow-moving procedure at the US embassy in Baghdad for reassigning redundant PRT staff members from one PRT to another. By contrast,
obviously, the US military was not so encumbered. It could deploy its personnel into and from a particular theater with dispatch. That was less true or not true at all for many of the PRTs’ civilian experts.

Several lessons could be learned from this discussion about transitions. Future civilian-military teams should be fitted out with their own internal future plans capacity before deployment, especially for large teams expecting to go on long-duration missions. Any hand-off of reconstruction or capacity-building responsibilities from the US military to US civilians to local NGOs should be planned for and gamed out in advance of deployment. Teams set up on short notice and under ad hoc circumstances should keep in mind that their long-term objective is to work themselves out of a job. They should plan for handing off their activities to local NGOs as soon as possible. Since USAID will likely be engaged with those NGOs, USAID should be intimately involved in the early design stage of setting up a civilian-military capacity-building team.

### Choosing the Right Project

All PRTs in Iraq were engaged in projects. These typically took the form of small-scale grants or micropurchases, designed and implemented by team members themselves and intended to make modest improvements in local government or to meet a local need. In fact one recruitment attraction for PRT members was the prospect that they could design their own projects and thus “make a difference” in the war effort. This kind of emotional satisfaction attracted many talented civilians to step forward for service in the field.

Which projects to choose, where to spend limited resources, and how to make a meaningful and worthwhile intervention were questions that needed answers before a team leader gave approval to a project. On PRT Anbar, we addressed these issues by setting up a “concept review board” to vet projects proposed by team members. We saw a need for greater conceptual rigor in the design stage of a proposed project.

The procedure allowed us to head off a situation in which the “project champion” would spend considerable effort in designing an initiative of limited utility. Instead, that person arranged to meet with the review board in a relatively formal setting just to talk about the concept. Design plans, local government buy-in, and pro forma budgets
were not necessary. The emphasis was on talking and exchanging ideas so that the team leadership could help shape a project in its infancy. The presence of a USAID professional on the review board was critical. Overall, the process helped orient new team members who came to the field with great enthusiasm but less experience in development assistance. It was also helpful in “desnagging” proposed initiatives originating from within a civilian chain and those being considered in military channels. The objective was to launch good ideas, trim wasted effort, and nip bad concepts.

The health of a capacity-building team’s project portfolio depends not only on finding and promoting good ideas but also on weeding out bad ones before they get too far. Many Iraq PRT veterans would have little difficulty recalling a dubious project that staggered on for too long. It was common, for example, for a PRT to divest a bad project only after its team champion had rotated out of the theater.

On PRT Anbar our program manager was the concept review board chairman. That person arranged the agenda for the weekly meetings, identified appropriate funding mechanisms, and kept a log of the board’s recommendations and follow-up actions. On several occasions, the team leader used this forum to appoint “exit champions”—team members who were specifically given responsibility to close out underperforming projects. Like the project champions, the exit champions made periodic reports to the board.

By and large, the PRTs in Iraq had a useful set of metrics to gauge progress in the field. The embassy’s Office of Provincial Affairs designed the maturity model, a quarterly assessment that measured a province’s performance in five areas: rule of law, governance, reconciliation, political development, and economics. Each variable was broken down into several subvariables, comprising some two dozen measurements in all.

In Anbar, we used a modified Delphi technique to complete the maturity model assessment. Each quarter we brought together a panel of 8–10 PRT and US military SMEs to discuss the various maturity model metrics. After each round of discussion, the facilitator called for a secret ballot in which the SMEs gave each variable a score of one to five. The process took approximately four hours. In some Delphi techniques, the SMEs showed their votes to the other panel members. Then another round of discussion follows, aimed at narrowing differences and producing consensus. We conducted only one round of discussion of each variable and calculated the arithmetic
mean from the secret ballots. Since the mean tends to cancel extreme scores, the process reduced subjective bias. We used the mean as a proxy for the team’s consensus on Anbar’s quarterly progress.

**Transition and Metrics**

Figure 8.2. The author with Anbar Governor Ma’amoun Sami Rasheed and Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, head of the Anbar Awakening, October 2007.

Over time, the scores showed that key measurements were gradually improving, a finding generally supported by individual perceptions of progress in Anbar. However, it was not uncommon for the panel to give a lower score on a certain variable from one quarter to the next, as more information became available and the team’s knowledge of the environment improved. In other cases, some variables appeared stuck in a narrow range over several quarters, suggesting a kind of steady-state condition.
The Idea of Stasis

As originally designed, the maturity model was intended to provide decision makers with information about where progress was being made, where reconstruction resources could be shifted within the theater, and whether the overall PRT mission was being accomplished. In the embassy and among PRT practitioners, “How much is enough?” was a question frequently asked about the PRT effort. The maturity model would thus give decision makers the empirical basis for a “conditions-based” drawdown of the PRT program; the more progress that a province made on key indicators, the less justification there would be for PRT support. That was the original intent.

However, during our quarterly assessments, the panel of SMEs discovered that many variables exhibited a short period of improvement followed by a steady condition in which there was little or no change. In some cases a variable’s recent performance would continue more or less unchanged into the near future. If change occurred, it was at its own rhythm without noticeably responding to inputs from coalition forces or the government of Iraq. The local population’s access to potable water or hours of electricity would be examples of this, as would be the extent of untilled farm land and certain other variables.

We observed that for any given input, there was typically an associated output. However, after a certain point, we also observed that increasing or decreasing the inputs would result in essentially the same outcomes. When such a condition is reached, it might be said that the civilian-military team has accomplished some of its objectives or even its mission as a whole. Its inputs are no longer having a measurable effect on the environment. A kind of stasis has been reached.

In Iraq, however, the decision was made to keep many PRTs up and running during the subsequent redeployment of military forces from the theater. This was done as a sign of US reassurance to the Iraqi people and government. Thus, the lesson learned is that even after a capacity-building team begins to observe steady-state outcomes and behaviors in the environment, its job may still not be done. There will be occasions when the team’s eventual drawdown will change from achieving certain conditions-based results to a time-based decision, geared to larger US diplomatic and strategic interests.
Conclusions

The battle for Anbar Province turned around in 2006–07. By the time I left in 2009, the markets were busy, local elections had been held, and Ramadi’s government center, earlier the site of fierce urban fighting, was a busy office complex.

Today the province, like the rest of Iraq, is not out of the woods. Terrorists still strike with lethal effect. However, their day has passed. Anbaris would not countenance jihadists strutting down Ramadi streets as they had during the height of the battle. In Iraq, the United States learned a great deal about COIN and the options for capacity-building. It experimented with embedding PRTs with military units and found that it created managerial issues that could have been avoided in the predeployment phase. It found that PRTs spent much time adjusting internally to the redeployment of US military forces. The need for fitting out civilian-military teams with their own internal planning capacity became apparent. And many practitioners found that capacity-building efforts eventually reached a kind of stasis condition, where additional inputs did not result in measurably improved outcomes in the target environment.

This chapter started with the observation that planners should take the time to define the situation before jumping in to solve the problem. That was not possible in Iraq, where the situation required standing up capacity-building teams fast. However, planners in future contingencies should allocate adequate time and attention in the teams’ concept and design phase. Decision makers must come up with a definition of the situation, which would include such elements as developing a common picture of the facts on the ground, a shared understanding of the roles played by each of the parties and agencies, and their expectations of how each would react to developments seen and unforeseen.

During this period, planners should phrase and rephrase the problem, ask the right questions about the team’s mission and its organization, challenge assumptions, look at the situation from different perspectives, revise, rewrite, and reframe the problem again. There should be a consensus on the team’s goals and on desired end states. Informal agreements, handshakes, and unorthodox approaches should be avoided. They lead to unnecessary problems down the road. Ideally, institutional expectations should be codified into formal agreements and understandings or even into doctrine. Larger
teams should have their own organic planning capacity to take into the field.

A complementary note would be to get the right people into the right jobs. In complex operations, many interagency frictions are not necessarily institutional in nature but are driven by personalities. This can be seen in the often exaggerated insistence upon the differences between US military and civilian cultures. Of course such differences exist. They are prominent, institutional, and based on personal outlook. However, dwelling on them tends to obscure one of the most prominent lessons learned coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan, which is the Department of Defense’s spirit of inclusiveness and its expectation that other federal agencies play a role in a complex, problem-solving matrix.

To paraphrase a top general, “Today when I look around and do not see the other agencies, I get nervous.” The “3D” framework—the interface of diplomacy, defense, and development—is the manifestation of the importance of such collaboration. Interagency frictions are inevitable, but they can be managed at the outset by recruiting those who are suited to working in collaborative situations and across agency boundaries.

The lessons learned outlined in this chapter are largely based on my formative PRT experience in Iraq, a dangerous place where circumstance required that practitioners write the rules as they went along. The PRTs were tested over a period of years, in different parts of Iraq, in different security and operating environments, and through several team-leadership changes. Practitioners came away with their own lists of what works and what does not work. Because of this experience, it would be fair to say that civilian-military capacity-building teams have secured a place in the policy maker’s tool kit. The question today is not so much whether such teams should exist but rather how and to what purpose they should be used.

Notes

1. House, Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2008, 73.

This chapter is not an academic analysis. The content is based purely on my personal experiences and observations—one United States Air Force (USAF) officer’s perspective. I believe it demonstrates “the truth of experience.” I have conducted reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and continue to be engaged in stability operations consulting and training. In the capacity of a military legislative liaison, I have also escorted numerous congressional delegations to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly meetings and fact-finding missions in past and current war zones.

I completed the first draft of this chapter shortly after my return from commanding the Panjshir Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)—a tour that I would characterize as successful and personally satisfying. It was spring of 2010. Every member of my team had returned home safely, and I was confident that the wheels set in motion by this PRT were destined to be the benchmark in civilian-military stability operations. At Panjshir, we increased the number of competent and outgoing interagency civilians embedded within the PRT. Civilian and military personnel possessed the leeway to work directly with their Afghan counterparts and the ability to initiate a scalable transition strategy to a larger civilian force and a smaller military force. As a counterinsurgency (COIN) unit, we empowered an Afghan provincial government for the very first time by beginning to transition the governance responsibilities to the rightful owners. We also left a civilian-centric team in place to conduct stability operations and continue the governance empowerment process while paving the way for the military to first transition to civilian interagency control and soon thereafter to Afghan control. The idea of the military furling and casing the Panjshir PRT guidon as a symbol of military success as we marched out of this remote mountainous province was exhilarating. What has happened since our departure, however, has
left me frustrated and wondering if the international community can truly achieve stability through intervention in Afghanistan and in future complex environments. I seek to explain why the prospect of such success is questionable and offer suggestions about how the US government should approach future stability operations, based on lessons born from the truth of experience.

The Civilian “Uplift” Ended

Within a year after our PRT’s departure, reports from the field indicated that decision makers had completely reversed our internal transition from a military-dominated PRT to a civilian-dominated provincial development support team (PDST). The construct had regressed back to a military-dominated presence with what appeared to be a singular focus on transition of security responsibility to the Afghans as a precursor to a US withdrawal. Developing and empowering provincial, district, and local government to sustain the institutions that we helped to develop became an afterthought.

Building a Civilian-Military Relationship

I met the incoming civilian PRT director, Jim DeHart, on a humid overcast day at Arlington National Cemetery in May of 2009. Jim, a career foreign service officer, and I were attending the funeral of the Panjshir PRT commander, my predecessor, who, along with three members of his team, had been killed in a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack while transiting through Kapisa Province. I had met the Panjshir PRT commander only two months earlier, during my predeployment site survey. He and I developed a personal relationship that lasted through my team’s predeployment training; I admired his connection and devotion to the people of Panjshir and his unwavering conviction of mission success. His funeral was an intensely sobering event that marked the beginning of my professional relationship with Jim DeHart, who I would meet again in July of 2009 when I assumed military command in Afghanistan. I held the honor of commanding the Panjshir PRT from July 2009 to March 2010.

DeHart, the PRT civilian director, is a highly effective diplomat who went on to serve as the director of the Office for Afghanistan at the Department of State (DOS). But back in 2009 Jim and I were
stuck together as the respective civilian and military leads, sharing the same office and hooch—basically connected at all times. Having worked reconstruction in Iraq under DOS leadership, I observed the clash in corporate culture between the DOS and the Department of Defense (DOD). Realizing this, the civilian director and I were determined to work through these differences to find common purpose and define common goals.

Defining the Mission

In 2004 the first PRT arrived in Panjshir. Since Panjshir was “secure” by Afghan standards, the PRT skipped the “clear and hold” phases of operations and went straight to “build.” Typically, military assets are fully engaged during the clear phase of an operation and methodically diminish in size and prominence during the hold and build phases once security has been established. Ideally, the presence of military forces is inversely proportional to civilian presence, particularly as operations move toward the final phase of military operations, “transfer” of authority back to the legitimate government. With Panjshir Province firmly situated in the build phase of military operations, we positioned the civilian-military PRT to capitalize on increased government competency and capacity.

The overarching mission of all PRTs is encapsulated in three directives: enhance security, strengthen the reach of the Afghan government (for example, governance), and facilitate reconstruction. Although we understood the overarching mission of the PRT, policy makers never formally defined the specific mission of the Panjshir PRT. I strongly believed we needed more concrete objectives, and so Jim and I worked on mission statements and shared objectives.

Shortly after our task force (brigade-level) changed command in early autumn of 2009, I submitted a memorandum to my new commander stating that the mission of this PRT was to deliver transition of lead security responsibility (TLSR) to the Afghan provincial government and we were going to accomplish TLSR by March 2010. My task force commander told me to “slow down” and wait for NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) to define “transition.” After eight years of prosecuting this war and witnessing the realities of warfare, I believed the United States no longer had time to waste, so we pressed forward by focusing our energies on building the institutional capacity of the
Afghan government to support a TLSR. Suddenly, relationships with and empowerment of all provincial line ministry directors and district leaders were valued over the number of buildings constructed.

TLSR later developed into transition of lead responsibility (TLR) with a broader focus on transitioning responsibilities to the Afghan provincial government as the individual sectors of government developed. Additionally, PRT Panjshir never received a definition of “transition” as defined by NATO’s NAC. As a former military legislative liaison, I had the luxury of sitting in various NATO Parliamentary Assembly meetings prior to assuming command in Afghanistan. Armed with the firsthand knowledge of how methodical NATO parliamentarians worked, I believed the NAC would be slow to produce a tangible plan for those of us on the implementation/tactical level to follow, so we had to press forward.

**Location, Location, Location**

As the newest of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, Panjshir holds a distinctive place in modern Afghan history as a province that successfully expelled the Soviets and then resisted the Taliban. It is located in the northeast (Hindu Kush) section of Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah Massoud, the “Lion of Panjshir,” was the most notable military commander from this region. Massoud played a leading role in driving the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan in 1989, and Afghans revered him as a national hero. With the rise of the Taliban in 1996, Massoud returned from Kabul to the mountainous Panjshir region to fight against the fanaticism of the Taliban and served as the military commander of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, popularly known as the “Northern Alliance.” Al-Qaeda agents assassinated Massoud on 9 September 2001, two days before the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States.

Panjshir’s military history and anti-Taliban mujahedeen mind-set permeates this province of approximately 300,000 people. This anti-Taliban mind-set has led to what is effectively an informal “neighborhood watch” program. More than 30 years of fighting have created an exhausted population now primarily focused on developing its next generation through education and career opportunities, while never losing focus on its underlying need for security.
Integrating Military and Civilian Assets

Civilian-military expertise coupled with the resources that the military brought to an expeditionary environment was and continues to be vital to success in this type of population-centric COIN effort. There was never a question of which resource was best. The two components were just different from and complementary to the other.

To effectively function “outside the wire,” we focused on being able to first function as a team “inside the wire.” The personnel structure of the Panjshir PRT combined individuals from the USAF, US Army, US Navy, DOS, US Agency for International Development (USAID), US Department of Agriculture (USDA), US Department of Justice (DOJ), and US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Based on experience, something as simple as civilian and military counterparts sharing an office enables a dialogue that is vital to establishing and reaching collective goals. Therefore, to overcome corporate cultural distinctions, civilian and military personnel worked side by side; shared the same office space; and met with Afghan military, civilian officials, and civil society. The only visible distinction was that the military personnel wore uniforms. Together, we integrated into a single unified effort aimed at developing governance, economics, rule of law and justice, and social, educational, and physical infrastructure provincewide.

The Corporate Challenge

Yet, with a military primarily trained to execute war, the challenge in any stabilization, development, and COIN environment is identifying the military member who can make the transition from warrior to diplomat when needed. For some troops, this transition is a major paradigm shift not easily grasped. In a civilian-military environment, troops must understand and accept this multidimensional role. The reality is basic: many junior troops do not have the life experience or specific nonkinetic training to accept or change over into a civilian-military stability operations environment.

Through three months of military predeployment training and nine months of real-world application, I assessed the teams’ individual “talents” in an effort to determine if, among the troops, their relationship-building skills were equal to their ability to engage the enemy.
This method cost the team a small level of attrition, since I was compelled to remove anyone from the team who put the methodology of the mission at risk. By the time we were done, there was no misunderstanding the fundamental methodology of mission: it is all about relationships, both with the Afghans and our interagency partners.

For PRT Panjshir, the continuity established by the civilian personnel (the DOS, USAID, USDA, USACE, and DOJ) enabled the system to work, but the military presence and the cooperation of the local Afghan government authorities and citizens in providing the relatively stable security environment enabled development and governance to occur. As security remained relatively stable in Panjshir, we envisioned and worked toward a time when the military and civilian personnel resources would become scalable.

**Unified Decision Making**

After completing the change of command with the outgoing PRT that served the region from October 2008 to June 2009, Jim and I directed a strategic pause in current operations in order to establish a baseline for future operations. We decided that to figure out where we needed to go, we must have a complete understanding of where we had been. We did not want to commit the fatal flaw of many stability operation newcomers: going full speed out of the gate in an effort to accomplish great things and possibly making things worse in the process. Because of this direction and subsequent discussion, we established a single, integrated decision-making process, with equal participation by military and civilian personnel. Establishing baselines within each sector of government led to shared input, discussion, evaluation, and mission directives.

The baseline establishment process also led to a secondary unexpected effect. Jim and I were able to assess the further competency of the team based on its understanding of its assigned governmental sectors. As a result, we shifted responsibilities as necessary and adjusted the unified decision-making process based on the depth of understanding and competency of the sectors within the civilian-military team. With the team’s responsibilities firmly established, the decision-making process developed into group meetings where well-defined Afghan-partnered plans were encouraged and ultimately put into action,
while never losing sight of our overarching strategic objective of TLR to the rightful Afghan owners.

“The First Provincial Reconstruction Team to Make Us Work . . . and That’s Good”

In February 2010, eight months into my tenure as commander of PRT Panjshir, Hajji Bahlol, the governor of Panjshir, asked me a question: “What makes you qualified to be a PRT commander . . . what are your qualifications?” Up to this point, I considered my personal relationship with this man to be completely honest and transparent. We talked about our families and military experiences, spoke frankly of politics and religion, hiked together, shared meals and drank tea together, and collaborated in practices to best govern this region. I wondered to myself why this former mujahedeen commander was asking such a pointed question about my abilities as a PRT commander, especially this far into our relationship. I answered honestly, albeit with a tinge of embarrassment. I told Governor Bahlol of my education and experience in development and city and regional planning, with additional experience working as a civilian in city government and as a military legislative liaison to Congress; I also told him of my time in Iraq working reconstruction as the interim chief of staff for the Iraq Project and Contracting Office. Governor Bahlol said, “The reason I asked about your qualifications is because you are the first PRT to actually make us work . . . and that’s good.”

Let me clarify. This civilian-military PRT was the sixth PRT to operate in Panjshir. I believe that Governor Bahlol was not saying that the previous PRTs had failed at their jobs but that we were taking a different approach and one that he found more effective for this particular province. The first five PRTs followed their directives and gave their best to program the construction of paved roads, functioning health clinics, and formal schools. As mentioned earlier, my predecessor dedicated and sacrificed his life to build functioning institutions for this province. They built where there was nothing and laid the foundation for this civilian-military PRT to come in and focus on “governance” and the culture of transition and tangible change.
Panjshir Is Different . . . So Was Our Provincial Reconstruction Team

“But you were in Panjshir. Panjshir is different than the rest of Afghanistan; no one is shooting at you.” This is the phrase I usually hear when I brief on my experience as the commander of the PRT. As an example, in September 2010, after a weeklong Afghan transition workshop at NATO Joint Forces Command in Brunssum (The Netherlands), it became painfully evident that the lessons learned “on the ground” with civilian-military transition and the Afghan empowerment in Panjshir would not be applied to the other 33 Afghan provinces. Instead, people who had never stepped foot in Afghanistan, or, if they had, likely never left the confines of the embassy compound in Kabul, had to develop transition measures of effectiveness from scratch in a Dutch conference room.

As It Turns Out, We Were Shot At

Five days after taking command, my team experienced our first command-wired improvised explosive device (IED) along a portion of the Panjshir main valley road. We were fortunate. The detonation was mistimed and the blast sent shrapnel in between the spacing of two of our soft-sided Land Cruisers. Sporadic small arms fire ensued from the triggermen as civilian and military members of the team donned their body armor and secured the area. Military members and Afghan National Police (ANP) tried in vain to pursue the triggermen; with that effort exhausted, the team recovered multiple pieces of evidence.

This was the first combat test of the combined civilian-military team. We had every right to become a garrisoned force in order to preserve life and limb, especially the noncombatant civilians. The deaths of the previous team members were fresh in everyone’s mind; now, we had been specifically targeted and had been very lucky that no one had been injured. My junior engineer officer even approached me the day after the event and told me that her parents wanted to know “why aren’t we driving around in our up-armored Humvees and wearing our body armor?”

The PRT had an agreement with the local Afghan authorities guaranteeing our security. The PRT director and I both understood the
need to trust our Afghan counterparts. In fact, we viewed this event as an opportunity. Taking a leap of faith, albeit in a display of honest anger and frustration, Jim DeHart and I made it clear to provincial leadership that the vaunted Panjshir security failed us but that we would continue to honor our security agreement.

It was time to take a calculated risk in relation to the reward of creating trust between allies. Jim and I agreed that we needed to continue the mission to make it clear that we would not succumb to those threatening our collective efforts. I held a commander’s call with the civilian-military team, explaining our way ahead and placing myself in the lead vehicle for the next mission outside the wire. This event solidified our resolve to conduct business as usual with added force protection measures and a renewed shared sense of purpose.

Eventually, an additional opportunity arose from this incident, when the ANP captured four suspects. We were then faced with the choice to prosecute these alleged triggermen through the ISAF justice system or push the Afghan courts to do their job. Understanding the shortcomings of the nascent Afghan judicial system, I still elected to push the suspects through the Afghan system knowing the suspects may reach a point during prosecution where they would be released from prison. In order to build institutional capacity, the institution must be challenged, learn from failure, and be held accountable.

**Something Funny Happened on the Way to the Forum . . . Our Money Disappeared**

In the stability operations/COIN world, money is viewed as a weapon system. In fact, the Army handbook *Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS)* states, “Coalition money is defeating COIN targets without creating collateral damage, by motivating antigovernment forces to cease lethal and non-lethal operations, by creating and providing jobs along with other forms of financial assistance to the indigenous population, and by restoring and creating vital infrastructure.”

With MAAWS as our guide and Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) money as our weapon of choice and the primary means of funding projects, we were poised to do “battle.” Then something funny happened. In mid-summer 2009, then chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense,
Congressman Jack Murtha sent a letter to Robert Gates, secretary of defense, stating congressionally approved CERP funds were not being used in a manner true to the intent of emergency reconstruction. Chairman Murtha directed the DOD to review how CERP funds were being used in situations where development agencies, namely USAID, should be designing and funding the projects. As a result, command structure made it clear that any initiative that I could not define as an “emergency” would not be funded with CERP dollars.

Up to this point, the five former PRTs were able to address the vast majority of “urgent humanitarian need” infrastructure projects that also included business development grants and a cash-for-work program. Our baseline assessments indicated that we needed to go beyond infrastructure development and shift focus to institutional capacity-building projects designed to make government systems function, become sustainable, and further develop on their own. Maintenance and growth of business development grants and cash-for-work programs were also determined to be essential to capacity building. It was time to “teach a man to fish,” but with our CERP dollars restricted, I could not even buy bait.

Promoting Self-Reliance: Seize the Opportunities and Empower the Rightful Owner

Money seems to have a paradoxical effect: the more you infuse it into the government, the more government becomes dependent on you, and you assist in breeding an environment easily seeded with corruption. “Assistance” in the form of money has a tendency to breed bad behavior.

With the vast sums of money removed from the Panjshir equation, honest and transparent discussion with provincial, district, local, and religious leadership eventually spirited our governance efforts, but initial reaction was that good Panjshiri behavior led to the removal of reconstruction funds. On several occasions, various Afghans asked us, “What if we caused trouble, would we get more money then?” Sadly, the answer was probably “yes.”

With the majority of urgent humanitarian need projects addressed, our civilian-military team pursued opportunities to empower sectors of the provincial government without the use of emergency funds. In essence, we were forced into de-emphasizing CERP projects, and in
the process, another opportunity developed. It became evident that we could work toward a transition into a larger internal PDST with an interagency provincial affairs team—the DOS and USAID—in full operational control that would allow for a reduction in the US military presence. It was time to strengthen the reach and capacity of the Afghan government and the abilities of our civilian-military team.

**Partnership**

DOD Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, cites stability operations as “a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” The instruction directs the military to “support stability operations activities led by other US government departments or agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations . . . [and/or] lead stability operations activities . . . [until] it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other US government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations.” (emphasis added by author) Yes, our intent was to work ourselves out of a job. This is not a glib statement. Jim and I made it clear to our respective civilian and military commands and to Pres. Barack Obama’s national security advisor that our intent was to furl and case PRT Panjshir’s guidon following transition of lead responsibility, first to a civilian-centric PDST and then to the Afghan provincial government.

One of our most significant partnerships outside of the interagency PRT was with the United Nations Assistance Mission–Afghanistan (UNAMA). Together we pooled governance resources and mentored and conducted a five-year provincial development plan (PDP) workshop. The four-day workshop provided an environment where local provincial officials identified needs and project/program solutions. Superb attendance by line ministry directors and district governors demonstrated serious commitment, and the detailed and analytic quality of discussions and planning pleased UNAMA. Unfortunately, some line ministers persisted in believing that the PDP was primarily designed to please the PRT through a “wish list” of potential projects—a remnant of a reconstruction-centric PRT. Overall, this event represented a strong showing by the provincial government to accept
more authority, with the understanding that the PDP is a governance tool needing a single, coordinated planning and development process. The development of these planning skills became transferrable to other aspects of the provincial and district government, with some line ministries expanding their planning skills to write and submit grant requests on their own volition.

**Building Government Capacity—Eminent Domain**

During the course of reconstruction, a 130 km main valley asphalt road was determined to be the most effective means of delivering government services to the population. In addition, the newly widened and paved road would allow access to markets, health care, and educational opportunities never experienced in the history of the Panjshir Valley. While most villagers would agree that the road brought unimagined development and progress, many would agree that the road has also brought unimagined destruction. During the course of paving the existing 130 km long by 3 m wide dirt “jeep” trail to become a new 10 m wide asphalt road, the Afghan government exercised eminent domain authority without a formal process, seizing private property for the public good. As financer of the road construction projects and rule of law advisor, the US government was also culpable in this process and in violation of the Afghan constitution.

Unfortunately, over the course of several years, decision makers failed to compensate villagers for their losses. In turn, they were understandably upset with and questioned government authority. With mentorship and encouragement from our civilian-military team, the provincial government accepted its responsibility, conducted an exhaustive damage assessment survey, and documented the extent of damage and the personal information of those claiming damage. Working with road contractors (six Afghan companies), within the parameters of the road contracts, the provincial government secured and distributed compensation for 541 affected families.7 This undertaking was extraordinarily difficult and served as tangible proof of provincial and district government officials working for the people and understanding their roles as public officials. Citizens, who once believed that their provincial and district government previously had ignored its responsibilities, came to view their local government as legitimate and responsive.
An ancillary effect of government surveys came in the form of property documentation. Afghan record keeping has been typically poor, a common result of prolonged civil unrest and unrecorded outcomes from informal justice mechanisms. The eminent domain process allowed the provincial government to revisit and revise property titles.

On a side note, as soon as the provincial Afghan government began engaging with the public while conducting damage assessment surveys, no longer did the PRT experience any IEDs along the main valley road. I do not have empirical evidence that government concern for “taken” property ended our IED problem, but it appears there may have been some correlation.

Securing Their Own

From an Afghan perspective, security in Panjshir was very good. However, make no mistake, this was still Afghanistan. Panjshir, while secure, also endured corruption, criminal activity, and political biases, resulting in criminal and even terrorist events occurring on rare occasions. The PRT and coalition forces were welcome in the valley, and residents were in support of security to continue with development and governance efforts. Separately, there remained complexities involved in prosecuting suspects engaged in illegal activity, as there may be second- and third-order effects within the current Afghan legal system. Simply stated, the current Afghan legal system was the most difficult sector of government to wrap our arms around. Cronyism and reliance on the existing tribal justice system will continue to require trained civilian legal experts to foster an overarching acceptance of Afghan constitutional law.

More than 600 ANPs protect Panjshir’s six districts and one municipality. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has a minor presence in the province, with a recruiting station and joint manning of the operation control center–provincial (OCC-P). The ANP is a young force eager to develop. With a US Army police mentoring team and two civilian law enforcement professionals as part of the PRT, the ANP received much-needed training. Unfortunately, we were training a largely illiterate police force. As a result, many of the officers charged to enforce the law were unable to understand the very law they were charged to enforce. Eventual partnership with the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM-A), Panjshir line Ministry of
Education, Panjshir chief of ANP, and civilian-military PRT led to the implementation of a literacy education program specifically designed for the ANP.

An overall success since its August 2009 opening, the OCC-P is a professional security command-and-control center led by honest and effective combined ANA and ANP leadership. In January 2010, the PRT designed and implemented a major emergency response exercise to validate mission readiness levels of the OCC-P, Anaba District ANP, and government sectors to respond to humanitarian crises. In addition to meeting training tasks as specified in each phase for the exercise, all organizations met or exceeded expectations of coordinating through the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) partners.

Clearly, Afghan self-reliance is built on a foundation of security; but now, with the current decline of civilian resources, the formal development of the justice sector through rule-of-law training and broader ANP literary education will only suffer. Afghan security force literacy education must remain a top priority during the security transition process; otherwise, we are simply training the Afghans to employ tactics and procedures without the understanding of when and how to employ them. The worst-case scenario is that we are just training some Afghans to be better thugs. This regressive transition to a security-centric mission in a province like Panjshir only serves to belittle the progress achieved throughout the other sectors of government.

**Public Health**

With maximum capacity reached within Panjshir, no longer did the Panjshir PRT need to build health clinics. Since all Panjshiris had physical access to health clinics within a reasonable distance, it was time to shift focus to the services provided within the walls of the clinics.

The paramount concern of any mother is the health and survivability of her children. Although Panjshir is a fertile valley, certain vital nutrients are lacking in most Panjshiri diets, with infants and toddlers most notably affected by malnutrition. Without proper nutrition at this formative juncture in physical and mental development, malnourished children typically grow up to experience worsening health and lower educational development.
The civilian-military team in a Shutol District clinic under the direction of the Panjshir line minister of public health initiated a very low-cost CERP initiative called the Strong Foods Program (SFP). The program provides mothers with a high-calorie, vitamin-fortified, almond-based paste developed to help their children to the normal state of health.

The key element to a successful SFP boils down to basic administration and distribution of the product coupled with individual patient assessment and continued patient documentation designed to monitor patient development. Following the successful test of the Shutol health clinic’s administration of the SFP, multiple programs were subsequently initiated throughout Panjshir. The provincial public health office solely administered these follow-on SFPs; the civilian-military PRT completely stepped out of the process.

**Education**

Failed states prone to insurgencies and humanitarian crises commonly lack a legitimate government or basic services and employ strong-armed tactics to cause fear and exert control of a largely ignorant and defenseless population. Ignorance results from a lack of information and education. It was largely ignorance that allowed the Taliban to establish a foothold in Afghanistan under the guise of establishing “law and order,” and once that human cancer was allowed to enter the country, support to terrorist organizations was allowed to metastasize.

During my tenure, the civilian-military team tried in vain to secure USAID and/or CERP funds to build a dormitory and a library/laboratory to address the profound need for continuing education programs at the existing teachers training college. Since institutional capacity-building initiatives were not considered an urgent humanitarian need, this request was systematically denied under CERP guidelines.

Consider the basic need for properly educated teachers. On the surface, the majority of Panjshiri children, both male and female, separately attend some sort of school. If we determined the effectiveness of a program promoting education solely by counting the number of students attending school, Panjshir would be a success. Yet the PRT would conduct informal random quizzes of the school-aged population (with pens and pencils given as rewards for correct answers). Our sampling revealed that many full-time fifth- and sixth-grade students could not accomplish a simple addition problem or
identify a single country bordering Afghanistan. The teachers who taught were uneducated themselves and ill equipped to teach students.

We cannot continue to judge the success of the Afghan education system (and reconstruction efforts) by the number of schools built. It is ludicrous to believe that a physical structure has the power to teach children, yet the number of schools built is one of our primary metrics used to determine the success of the educational system.

Those engaged in reconstruction efforts fostered a culture of repeating ignorance, failing to build human capacity to sustain the institutions such efforts support—as with teachers and schools. If combating ignorance is viewed as a priority, facilitating continuing education for teachers should be as important as the often-heard mantra of Afghan girls attending school.

**Afghan Budget**

Money is leverage. When I returned from Afghanistan in 2010, I met with professional staffers from the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, where officials asked me, “What can we [the United States] do to make Afghanistan work?” My response was simple: “Stop appropriating money for the reconstruction of Afghanistan until the Afghan government can produce a transparent budgeting process.”

Several months earlier, back in Afghanistan, my civilian counterpart, Jim DeHart, and I were faced with a military command structure directing us to work with our Afghan counterparts on what they believed to be a formalized Afghan budgeting process. Working with our Afghan counterparts was no problem since Jim and I already had all members of the civilian-military team working within the many sectors of provincial government. The hard part was the reality of a formal Afghan budget process. It did not exist. The US Department of Treasury documented and acknowledged this fact. After several unsuccessful attempts to explain to my military command structure the makeshift process in which monies were requested from the provincial line ministries up through their respective central ministries largely through personal relationships and with “wish lists,” it became clear that we had to go in a different direction. Jim and I could attempt to “bottom-up” this process, but if the central government did not have a budgeting process, then our efforts would all be for naught.
With my military channels unwilling to accept the shortcomings of the Afghan budget system, Jim had been quick to draft an official DOS cable outlining the realities of an Afghan budget process that did not exist and how it needed to be structured in order to exist. What resulted from this document was a classic example of circular reporting where the cable was accepted as fact and then distributed through military channels, eventually making its way back down to our interagency PRT as the guide for provincial budgeting direction. Because of our collective civilian-military efforts, the Afghan budget system was clearly defined, and we were able to lay the foundation of a budgeting process with our provincial government counterparts.

**Sweat Equity**

With restrictions on CERP dollars and USAID unable to tailor local development projects, the civilian-military team had to get creative. Through a series of lively local *shuras* (consultative councils), PRT engineers (both military and civilian) created a “sweat equity” school building program designed to empower rural villages to assist in the building of their community schools. This initiative saved over $300,000, gave the villagers a sense of project ownership and community pride, and enabled the schools to be built in record time.

Community buy-in was pivotal in ensuring success of the sweat equity program. When a society becomes conditioned to the donor-recipient mind set, it has a tendency to expect additional and continual support. We found that locals usually met the sweat equity concept with a typical response. They would state that the PRT should build a school for their village because the PRT built a school for an adjacent village. By employing job training (carpentry, masonry, and electrical) into the sweat equity program, the civilian-military PRT was able to dislodge the cycle of dependency in some specific cases, but dependency will remain an unintended consequence of continued assistance.

Interagency civilian-military teams sweating together also achieve value. Incorporating civilian team members in military training and operations builds the credibility of the civilians among the troops and builds the confidence of most civilians working in a combat environment. From a team-building perspective, it just makes sense to incorporate
civilian team members with the military in all aspects of predeployment and continuing training.

So What?

_The greatest threat to our national security will not come from emerging ambitious states but from nations unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people._

—Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations

As Army Field Manual 3-07 says, “During the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have fought only 11 wars considered conventional. From the American Revolution through Operation Iraqi Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests, where the political risk to the nation was always gravest. These were the wars for which the military traditionally prepared; these were the wars that endangered America’s very way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most are now considered stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat.”

To believe that the United States will not continue to engage in stability operations is to ignore historical trends. To continue to plan, program, budget, and equip the DOD at current “conventional warfare” rates without acknowledging stability operations realities could lead our nation closer to financial ruin. To be proactive, leaders must position the military to adapt to a greater unconventional role with a primary goal of precluding crisis from becoming conflict. In other words, the United States needs to spend moderately on “an ounce of prevention”—conflict prevention and stability operations—to avoid breaking the bank on “a pound of cure”—maintaining and employing a massive standing force.

Although the civilian-military interagency model in Panjshir appeared to work in this one specific context, at this specific time in history, it still begs a question. Is it time to integrate fully the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the US government, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, multinational partners, and private-sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal of greater international stability? If the United States acknowledges the need to combat and prevent instability leading to violent extremism,
a new unified expeditionary construct must be developed and maintained. This unified organization must take a comprehensive approach to foster the development of capabilities to shape the operational environment in a way that precludes the requirement for full-scale military intervention.

With the creation of the Civilian Response Corps and the intended establishment of a reserve component for that new entity, the DOS has taken steps to build an expeditionary civilian interagency mechanism interfacing with the military to bring stability to conflict and postconflict countries and regions. While moving in the right direction, the military must also continue to move in coordinated sequence, in line with the DOD Directive 3000.05, *Stability Operations*.

With the DOD developing compatible capabilities to a wide range of other government development agencies in order to “establish civil security and civil control; restore or provide essential services; repair critical infrastructure; and provide humanitarian assistance,” it appears the military is as deeply engaged as are the DOS and USAID. Some may even argue that the DOD is so deeply engaged in humanitarian assistance that the military has usurped a vast amount of the DOS’s and USAID’s authority.

As a next step in the evolution of such expeditionary forces, the US government should design a professional and standing stability operations force—a hybrid of both military and civilian capabilities, a formalized PRT structure, with the focus on serving as a force multiplier for both international development community objectives and military operations. A professional standing force trained and equipped for stability operations work would free up the military to concentrate on their traditional roles, without shouldering the burden of developing ad hoc “armed humanitarians” when the need arises. Furthermore, a professional standing stability operations force could engage local partners to genuinely and comprehensively in the stability process.

Instead of a continual pickup game, it is time to formalize the process by engaging a “whole of government” approach and structure a professional civilian-military hybrid force free from existing agency or department paradigms. It is time to acknowledge that warfare and international assistance are politically interconnected, requiring the exponential power of shared resources and skill sets similar to what the United States employed in Panjshir. It is time to formalize a unity of effort process with a focus on common goals. We set a “unity of
effort” table in Panjshir, but it appears most international organizations, NGOs, and US government agencies still want to eat at their own place.

A senior Army officer, who had several meetings with Hajji Bahlol, governor of Panjshir, in a PRT oversight role prior to my tenure, asked me about the governor during a Capitol Hill reception following my tour and return to the States. When I responded that he had stated to me that we were the first PRT to make his government work, the senior Army officer responded by saying “everyone likes to think that they did better than the command before them.” I understand this concept. All commanders have found themselves taking care of the leftovers from those we succeed (as I am certain my successor had to do), and it usually adds up to some level of frustration. However, I firmly believe that our case was different because our parameters changed so completely that we had to be different. Without reconstruction money, we embraced our differences, and I am unabashedly stating that we made the Afghans work! Here is the motivational part: the majority of our Afghan partners embraced their responsibility, and with this transformation we began to see how we could truly reach a level of tangible success in Afghanistan.

Hope Doesn’t Live Here Anymore

To paraphrase Governor Bahlol, what this one civilian-military Panjshir PRT left behind was an Afghan government that worked for the first time and a civilian-centric PDST positioned to take the reins from the military and guide the rest of the transition mission. It was March 2010, and what has transpired since has dashed the hope that this one province could serve as the model for lessons and best practices for the remaining 33 Afghan provinces.

The hope, coupled with a tangible plan, was to continue to enhance the civilian-military mix in order to achieve transition authority to Afghan provincial control. The long-term vision is to support an effective civilian-military mix in stability operation environments in order to preclude crisis from becoming conflict and eventually formalize a process integral to a whole-of-government approach.

The civilian-military Panjshir PRT set the conditions for Panjshir to be the model civilian-military interagency team. This plan died with the actions to move PRT Panjshir interagency personnel from
the province back to Bagram Air Base, while leaving a small cadre of military in Panjshir. With a focus on security transition, and knowing the reality of how scant are the logistical resources, I see no way a diplomat could return to Panjshir on a regular basis to maintain effective working relationships with their Afghan counterparts, although a plan was put in place for continued civilian engagement. The civilian experts, who needed to continue to mentor the Panjshir provincial government, were sequestered behind the walls of Bagram Air Base, essentially an American/coalition island in the middle of Afghanistan.

The inroads created by the establishment of a civilian-centric team should have allowed coalition forces to focus on the final stage of military operations in Panjshir with, first, a transition of responsibilities to a more civilian-centric PDST, followed by transition of responsibility to the legitimate provincial government—“transition” being the decisive operation demonstrating progress toward a secure and independent Afghanistan. A transitioned functioning government would have only enhanced the security construct.

Instead, with only a military contingent left in place, for the first time the forward operating base (FOB) came under a coordinated Taliban attack in October 2011, wounding a number of Afghan security guards and leaving five Taliban attackers dead. This was the first full-scale attack on the Panjshir FOB, and it came only after the civilian-military presence regressed into a military-only presence.

The civilian “uplift” in Afghanistan ended, and the United States has regressed largely to a military-centric structure with what appears to be a singular focus to transition security responsibility to the Afghans (perhaps in an effort to get the US military out of Afghanistan as soon as possible). Developing and empowering provincial, district, and local government to sustain the institutions that the United States helped to develop has become an afterthought.

**Final Thoughts**

*The military is a very powerful hammer, but not every problem is a nail.*

—Gen Hugh Shelton, US Army

It is time to stock our “toolbox” with something more than just a hammer. To execute war successfully, in Afghanistan and in future
conflicts, the United States’ resources must be fully engaged in the struggle. Much to the dismay of our military-industrial complex, military hardware can, at best, only help us through the clear and hold phases of military operations. Only competent and dedicated people from a wide array of specialties willing to go into harm’s way can accomplish the remaining two phases of build and transfer. What inhibits our grasp of victory in Afghanistan is not our inability to engage and defeat the enemy; we are expert warriors. What truly inhibits victory is our inability to fully leverage the potential of the United States’ interagency partners with military might in a stability operations construct.

My 25 years of experience in this military business has taught me some things. When I first enlisted in the Navy and volunteered for service in the submarine force during the Cold War, life was well defined. We knew who our enemy was, and we knew our enemy’s intent. They were the Evil Empire, godless and ruthless. We knew our mission on fast-attack submarines was to hunt down bloodthirsty communists and kill them before they could unleash their murderous fury against our great nation. It was simple—kill the bad guys and break their things. The enemy wore a uniform; the enemy was a nation mobilized against our way of life.

Afghanistan is different. The Taliban has little for us to break, and the vast majority of Afghans are good people just trying to make their way through life. The common Afghan has been victimized; in fact, Afghans have a history of victimization. A brief study of the region reveals that average Afghans have had little to no say over their government or occupiers. In fact, your average Afghan has focused purely on survival and the survival of the family for the past 30 years.

I have tremendous respect for Afghans; they are an amazing group of people who rely on their wits and “street smarts” to outgame the government du jour and the international community. This is the game that the average Afghan is forced to play. So many times, ruling entities have failed or taken advantage of the average Afghan. In other words, Afghans are conditioned to get as much as they can now, before outsiders declare Afghanistan unimportant, disassemble our civilian-military operations, shift focus, and dash the Afghans’ hopes—yet again.

I wish, at times, I was writing fiction; however, this is real life in the context of twenty-first-century warfare, where good people continue to suffer. Therefore, if the United States, as a nation, chooses to deploy
dedicated military and civilian personnel to areas of conflict in a humanitarian context, we ought to formalize this force and arm them with clear directives. History has shown that we cannot win a lasting peace just by killing the bad guys.

Notes

1. In a nine-month deployment, PRT Panjshir conducted 1,020 mounted, 26 dismounted, and 6 cavalry patrols, logging over 56,000 km of convoys in the process and resulting in the completion of more than 4,300 unique mission objectives throughout the 3,610 sq km area of responsibility.

2. Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS), Center for Army Lessons Learned (Handbook), No. 09-27, April 2009, I.


5. Ibid.

6. Gen James Jones visited PRT Panjshir in February 2010. Jim DeHart and I presented General Jones with a “Transition to Afghan Control” co-brief. ISAF communication back to the PRT indicated that General Jones “left Panjshir a changed man.”

7. Key to note: I met with initial and continued resistance to any type of eminent domain compensation program from my task force and specifically from the Army Corps of Engineers (AED) due to the fact that this type of activity “would set a precedent” that held the potential to affect the AED road building program throughout Afghanistan. I argued that payment for “taken” property should set a precedent—“a good precedent.”

8. USAID programs coming to Panjshir were driven by but not designed by USAID field officers. Without a funding mechanism for field-designed, province specific programs, the USAID field officer operates with a handicap. A USAID field officer is simply not empowered to deliver in the way a typical military PRT can. This process must develop in order to fulfill the requirements of a PDST.


Chapter 10

How Department of Defense Spending Was Used to Resuscitate Local Business

A Select History of Civilian-Military Engagement in Iraq

Andrew Shaver

Introduction

Early 2006 was an especially challenging period for the United States as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) entered its third year. The numbers of attacks on coalition forces and Iraqi casualties reached record levels. The bombing by militants of the al-Askari Mosque, one of Shi’a Islam’s most revered shrines, triggered a spate of retaliatory killings between the country’s Sunni and Shiite Muslim communities that analysts feared had ushered in an era of Iraqi civil war. Additionally, a major study commissioned by the US Congress found that, despite tens of billions of dollars spent by the US government on reconstruction projects, results were anything but indicative of success. Pentagon leadership actively sought new means of stabilizing the country.

In June of that year, Gordon England, deputy secretary of defense, ordered the creation of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations to facilitate Iraq’s economic revitalization. To encourage new thinking on the application of economics-based programs as a means of stabilizing the country, he sought to incorporate a private-sector perspective largely absent from other US reconstruction and development initiatives. He selected as task force director a former JDS Uniphase Corporation chief information officer, who, in turn, appointed former private-sector executives from corporations including Nortel Networks and IBM to other senior organizational positions.

The task force initially focused on restarting select state-owned enterprises that had been shuttered following the US invasion but quickly expanded its activities. Rather than undertaking large-scale reconstruction projects or limiting focus to particular Iraqi provinces,
as was typical of US reconstruction efforts at that point, task force leadership sought to create conditions that would cultivate private-sector activity in the hope that commercial enterprise would eventually minimize the need for governmental efforts to stabilize and develop the country’s economy.4

In its role as a business development agent, the task force undertook a variety of measures, which included building the capacity of Iraq’s National Investment Commission, brokering the country’s first private investments in Iraq’s state-owned enterprises, and providing support and materials that aided the emergence of hundreds of agricultural enterprises within the country. A subset of these business development initiatives included directing US military spending on goods and services toward Iraqi firms, helping to establish a modern banking system within the country, and facilitating foreign direct investments by major multinational corporations within targeted sectors of the country’s economy.

Programs within this more limited set were unique in that they leveraged in different ways billions of dollars’ worth of existing military procurement spending that was necessary to sustain military operations. Such programs evolved through significant cooperation among officials from the task force and defense agencies responsible for contracting and business-systems development, US military contracting officers, and various civilian partners, including officials from the US Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Iraqi Ministry of Finance, and Iraqi National Investment Commission, Iraqi bank executives, and corporate executives of major multinational corporations.

These programs and the specific forms of civilian-military collaboration that underpinned them are described in the following sections. The conditions under which these initiatives emerged were much the result of unique cooperative arrangements between defense agencies that may be unlikely to rematerialize naturally during possible future conflicts given bureaucratic reorganizations that have since taken place. Therefore, if the Department of Defense (DOD) is to apply initiatives in future operations similar to those described in this chapter, plans should be developed that would allow for the rapid establishment of intradepartmental and interagency collaboration necessary to facilitate the appropriate public-private partnerships. Because the task force initiatives described were made possible by, and indeed were a reaction to, the large spending levels inherent to operations within a theater of significant troop deployment, this piece serves
specifically to inform future stabilization operations in which the United States has deployed substantial numbers of troops, civilians, or contractors.

**Iraqi First**

For years following the initiation of OIF, the US military relied largely upon complex supply lines originating out of the United States and countries neighboring Iraq to sustain the war effort. Yearly spending on goods and services required to maintain operations in theater amounted to billions of dollars. Following the end of major hostilities, US Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) primary contracting entity, Joint Contracting Command–Iraq (JCC–I, later Joint Theater Support Contracting Command [JTSCC]), entered each year into contractual commitments worth billions of dollars with US and other non-Iraqi firms.5

As the insurgency in Iraq developed, DOD officials increasingly recognized the untapped potential that existed to stimulate host-nation business by contracting directly for goods and services offered by Iraqi firms. In 2006, George Casey, former Army chief of staff and then commanding general for Iraq, requested that the director of JCC–I establish a local contracting program.

For contracting officials of JCC–I, the case for local procurement, while distinct, was great. The practice of purchasing locally offered savings to contracting officials, for whom cost considerations were second only to ensuring the timely provision of goods and services to the troops whom they were entrusted to serve. Prices for goods that were produced locally or imported from neighboring countries did not reflect the cost of transportation as did goods originating from the United States. Significantly, not all savings were strictly monetary. Materials shipped into and within Iraq by US military forces required protection against attack, subjecting US service personnel to the dangers associated with travel within the country.

JCC–I, however, lacked the capabilities necessary to establish the local procurement program requested. The command lacked sufficient Iraqi business relationships to undertake local procurement on a meaningful scale. Moreover, during the initial years of the conflict, US military contracting officials had relied on a vendor database that included virtually no Iraqi firms. Iraqi vendors were generally unaware
of specific business opportunities with the US military, and those Iraqi executives who attempted to engage in business with the US military encountered difficulties associated with fulfilling vendor registration requirements developed for the US business community that often proved insurmountable.

Because of these difficulties, the JCC–I director solicited the assistance of the task force. In his role as the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) codirector, the task force director instructed members of that agency to design the necessary business systems to support a local procurement strategy. Simultaneously, the task force augmented its efforts to develop a local purchasing program by deploying 14 host-nation business advisors to regional contracting commands throughout Iraq who were charged with developing relations with Iraqi vendors on behalf of the US military. Utilizing contact details obtained from Iraqi chambers of commerce and business centers, these advisors engaged in a major telephone and e-mail campaign to apprise Iraqi business owners of commercial opportunities with the military. They also played an important cultural role during this period of outreach, in part by seeking to dissuade their audiences from adhering to edicts issued by radical Islamic clerics that banned engagement with members of the coalition.

These initiatives laid the groundwork for the large-scale initiation of local purchasing. As regional contracting commands forged relations with members of local business communities, web-based BTA systems were introduced to Iraqi vendors, permitting them to view and respond to US military solicitations. Meanwhile, the advisors held seminars throughout Iraq at which they trained on the process and procedures of contracting with the US military. The business systems gathered basic Iraqi vendor information and the cost, schedule, and performance of vendor activities, creating a database that US contracting officials throughout the country could consult for a variety of goods and services.

In the years that followed, procurements from local businesses increased considerably, and decision makers introduced a similar program relying upon the same business systems in Afghanistan. By the end of 2011, the JTSCC had made approximately $10 billion in contractual obligations for various commodities, construction projects, and services from more than 6,000 private Iraqi and Afghan businesses. This figure represents more than just the dollar value the DOD has contributed to spurring host-nation business activity
within both countries. The local firms successfully executed the vast majority of the contracts they were awarded.7

Following completion of his assignment as director of JCC–I, Maj Gen Darryl Scott was appointed deputy director of the task force and, later, of the BTA. This assignment served to promote continued cooperation among the task force, BTA, and JCC–I on the Iraqi and Afghan First programs. It also aided in subsequent efforts to improve Iraq’s banking sector and to create conditions conducive to international investment in Iraq. The former JCC–I director applied his expertise of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations to assist the task force and BTA to continue to leverage departmental spending on the war effort to encourage Iraqi private-sector development.

**Banking**

An underdeveloped Iraqi banking sector presented a specific challenge to task force officials who sought to generate business in the country. Iraq’s government had nationalized the banking system in 1964, and the government did not license private banks to operate until the early 1990s.8 Even then, however, strict deposit reporting requirements remained in effect, and private banks were not allowed to open correspondent accounts until much later. According to the task force, a “lack of activity in the banking sector of the last 50 years . . . [and frequent government raids] for any accumulated hard currency bank notes” contributed to “low loan to deposit ratios” in Iraqi banks.9 From the organization’s perspective, this was problematic on two levels. First, limited borrowing opportunities stifled domestic private-sector reconstruction activities. Second, despite these restrictions, it was important for Iraqi firms to deposit their proceeds with Iraqi banks in order to make use of electronic funds transfer (EFT) capabilities, which the task force and US Treasury leadership saw as critical to attracting investments by major multinational corporations and creating a climate wherein small and medium enterprises could effectively meet the needs of Iraq’s government.10

The US Treasury had deployed a team of specialists to Iraq to assist local bank officials in promoting such capability. These officials worked with members of the Central Bank of Iraq to implement a Real Time Gross Settlement System and Automated Clearing House for Iraqi banks. Yet once these systems were in place, Iraq’s bank and
business executives were loath to adopt EFT practices. While the Central Bank assessed no fee for domestic interbank transfers, Iraqi bank and business executives had few incentives to adopt the new technology. These individuals were accustomed to conducting their business affairs in cash, and the immediate benefits of adopting EFT practices were unclear. Further complicating matters, bank officials were often reluctant to cooperate with one another, citing privacy issues and risk of customer flight.11

Task force officials recognized, however, that the US military was well positioned to alter the incentive structure facing many Iraqi firms. By the time task force officials turned their attention to Iraq’s banking sector, business between the US military and Iraqi firms had grown considerably. Thousands of Iraqi firms held contracts with the military, but nearly all payments on such contracts were made in cash.12 The military, task force leadership reasoned, could condition future business with Iraqi firms on their adoption of payment by EFT.13

From the military’s perspective, Iraqi firms’ limited use of banking services was problematic. Iraqi vendors without accounts could be paid only in cash for goods and services provided. Payment in cash was logistically burdensome for both US military contracting authorities and the Iraqi vendors with whom they did business. Cash payment reduced the efficiency with which contracts could be processed. And, for members of the military’s intelligence apparatus, payment in cash obscured efforts to track the flow of finances within the country.

Yet despite the shared recognition by civilian-military officials of the benefits of banking services, technical barriers existed to prevent the implementation of a program by which the US military could pay Iraqi firms through EFT. While task force banking specialists were qualified to provide Iraqi banks with the technical guidance necessary to establish EFT capability throughout the country and contracting authorities could introduce EFT payment conditions into future contracts, incorporating EFT payment to Iraqi vendors into DOD business systems required structural modifications. The task force director made use of his position with the BTA to remedy this matter by directing that agency to assume responsibility for necessary accounts payable restructuring, an initiative that also attracted the support of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Department of the Army’s Finance Command.

Once the necessary systems and procedures were in place, instructions were issued to contracting officials mandating that payment to
any firm for contracts valued at more than $50,000 be paid through EFT; six months later, the contract value threshold for required EFT payment was further reduced to $25,000.¹⁴ Within a period of less than four months of establishing EFT capabilities for 10 banks in Iraq, the US military successfully transitioned from paying approximately 90 percent of its contracts in cash and the remaining 10 percent through EFT to paying 10 percent in cash and the remaining 90 percent through EFT.¹⁵ Task force personnel eventually helped 11 Iraqi banks establish EFT capabilities within a total of 256 branches throughout Iraq. As a point of illustration, in calendar year 2007, more than $420 million in US military contracts in Iraq were paid in cash.¹⁶ By the end of the following year, that number had decreased to less than $100 million, while the US military made nearly a half billion dollars in EFT payments to Iraqi firms.¹⁷ And the benefit to the banking system was ultimately quite positive, particularly in the encouragement of financial intermediation.

Corporate Development

While the task force undertook efforts to funnel business to Iraqi firms and develop the country’s banking infrastructure, a separate group of task force employees sought to broker investments by major multinational corporations in Iraq. Such investments, it was hoped, would create employment opportunities for Iraqis and establish a critical supply of goods and services to the postwar Iraqi government and private sector. Executives of various corporations indicated that their respective firms were likely to establish operations in Iraq once exposure to political and security risk was deemed sufficiently minimal.¹⁸ Yet many executives judged risk estimates too great to warrant market entry over immediate time horizons. The task force thus sought to change conditions for the firms in a manner that would expedite their (re)entry into Iraq.

From a development perspective, task force personnel recognized that modifications to the Iraqi First program could be made whereby planned spending on various goods and services in support of military operations could be leveraged to encourage development of critical sectors of the Iraqi economy and further stimulate local economic activity. Specifically, contracts could be extended to multinational firms willing to partner with host-nation businesses to produce a
good or service locally for US forces that would otherwise be imported. In this way, spending on procurements could be directed to promote the targeted development of economic sectors deemed critical to US economic stabilization and development objectives for Iraq while ensuring that coalition requirements in theater remained satisfied. For certain corporate executives, the contractual guarantees were sufficient incentive to move their firms forward with establishing Iraq-based operations. And for military contracting officials, such investments were advantageous for the cost reductions they offered, as described previously with respect to the Iraqi First initiative. Moreover, such initiative promised to satisfy a primary goal of the Iraqi First mandate: development of “vocational, trade skills, and business management training to the vendors . . . [in order to] build valuable skills in the Iraqi workforce that are critical for long-term economic growth.”19 To ensure the greatest benefit to the host-nation labor force, military contracts issued to foreign corporations that would partner with host-nation businesses could be written to include features designed to promote human-capital development.20

Enterprising contracting officers successfully applied this concept of utilizing contractual guarantees to encourage the formation of joint ventures in Iraq, although on a somewhat limited and ad hoc basis. Under the advice of task force personnel, US military contracting officials leveraged appropriated funds in the form of sole-source contracts to facilitate foreign direct investments by Fortune 500 firms within industrial sectors of the domestic economy. Through such efforts, major industrial corporations developed operations in Iraq in partnership with Iraqi firms. For example, Cummins, Inc. and Ira-trac, Caterpillar’s sole authorized dealer for Iraq, established generator repair services for tens of thousands of worn US and Iraqi-held diesel generators.21

Task force members also recognized that the Iraqi First program could be expanded through appropriate contractual modification so as to facilitate, where appropriate, the transfer of critical, modern infrastructure established in support of US military operations in theater to the Iraqi public/private sector. Such a concept was successfully applied in the area of water purification and bottling.

For years following the coalition’s invasion of Iraq, incidents of cholera and typhoid afflicted Iraqi communities, where dilapidated water and sewage treatment plants had grown dysfunctional or were damaged by attack.22 Yet potable bottled water produced by modern
purification and bottling facilities constructed in country and operated by a US firm under contract with the DOD was widely available to military personnel throughout the country. Problematically, military contracting regulations prohibited the US firm from selling excess product to the Iraqi government or private sector.

Under the advice of task force officials, military contracting authorities amended the terms of the firm’s contract to permit product sales to Iraqi consumers, laying the groundwork for commercial operations and transfer of the firm’s treatment and bottling plants and other infrastructure constructed on US military installations to the Iraqi private sector and government.23

Conclusion

The efforts of the DOD during OIF included the unique application of military spending to advance business revitalization efforts as part of a broader initiative to combat insurgency through a campaign of reconstruction and stabilization.24 The link between economic activity and strength of insurgency in Iraq remains a point of contention and matter of continued academic inquiry.25 Nevertheless, these initiatives had a direct and significant effect on Iraq’s business environment. For this reason, defense leaders may wish to reemploy some variety of these capabilities in future operations either because future studies demonstrate their effectiveness against insurgency or because US officials seek to generate local business activity for other purposes (as in, for instance, a post–disaster relief-setting in which large numbers of US military units have been deployed to assist).

To ensure that defense officials can employ the type of business development initiatives described in this piece in future operations, such programs should be established through proper planning as an enduring feature of emerging US stability operations. Unless these programs are supported by the DOD’s extensive human and financial resources and business systems and are capable of being deployed worldwide, future operations in which such capabilities could be of benefit are likely to suffer the same limitations of ad hoc engagement and delayed development time that plagued US efforts in Iraq.

The task force director’s concurrent role as codirector of the BTA allowed for the development of critical business systems capabilities that made various business revitalization initiatives possible. And the
task force’s unique relationship with JCC–I, US CENTCOM’s primary in-theater contracting entity, created conditions under which contracting officials governed by strict US contracting regulations could effectively drive business revitalization initiatives. Yet such unique circumstances are unlikely to exist during possible reconstruction and stabilization efforts in which the DOD may someday be engaged.

The BTA no longer exists as an agency. As part of an initiative to reduce DOD costs, Robert Gates, the former secretary of defense, announced in August 2010 the planned closure of the agency. While certain BTA functions, including support for the war fighter, endured, they were transferred to other departmental entities, including the Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer and the Department of the Army. Moreover, unlike the first JCC-I director who assumed positions with the task force and BTA upon completion of his assignment with the command, his successors did not establish such relations with either entity. Meanwhile, the task force also experienced organizational shuffle. While overseen throughout OIF by the deputy secretary and, later, the secretary, the organization was repositioned under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy following the task force director’s resignation from office. More importantly, it is uncertain that the task force will continue to operate beyond the planned cessation of major military operations in Afghanistan.

While some of the programs developed to revitalize business in Iraq were incorporated into ongoing reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, as US forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan in accordance with the administration’s plans to end combat operations in the country, these remaining business-development programs will likely be terminated. Unfortunately, no plan currently exists by which such business-revitalization initiatives could be applied to future operations. Even if the capabilities that existed within the task force, BTA, and JTSCC were to remain resident within the department, those familiar with federal bureaucracies can appreciate the difficulties that would effectively obstruct reemploying such during future operations without formal guidance and procedures in place for doing so.

If the United States is to apply public-private partnerships of this sort effectively in future operations, it must establish them through proper planning as an enduring structural feature of emerging US stability operations. And unless the DOD’s extensive human and financial resources and business systems support such programs and
those programs are capable of being deployed worldwide, future operations in which such capabilities could be of benefit are likely to suffer the same limitations of ad hoc engagement and delayed development time that plagued US efforts in Iraq.

Notes


4. The task force was not the only US government entity to engage in efforts to promote private-sector development within Iraq. The Department of Commerce’s Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force and Overseas Private Investment Corporation, for instance, were actively engaged in this regard. This piece, however, deals specifically with a particular set of business revitalization efforts led by the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations.


6. Ibid., 5.

7. Ibid.


12. Ibid.

13. The number of Iraqi firms with which the US military was then doing business was growing rapidly. In 2007, for instance, the US military contracted with roughly 5,000 Iraqi firms through the Iraqi First initiative.

16. Ibid., 5.
17. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
24. Comparable versions of certain such programs were later also implemented in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
26. Interview with high-ranking DOD official, Princeton, NJ, 9 November 2011 (unattributed interview).
PART 4

International Perspectives
Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq
Chapter 11

From Afghanistan to Africa
Civilian-Military Teaming in a Whole New World

Christopher Holshek

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have practically monopolized US foreign policy and national security attention since 9/11. These conflicts provided US military and civilian analysts a virtual cottage industry in operational and tactical lessons in response to “asymmetric” threats. However, the Iraq and Afghanistan models for civilian-military teaming and counterinsurgency (COIN) have limited application elsewhere. By contrast, Africa—home to the majority of the world’s security and development challenges—provides a wealth of postconflict and conflict prevention situations representative of the paradigm toward which American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan moved. A premier example is the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a nearly decade-long multinational peace-operations engagement that featured an adept combination of bilateral and multilateral approaches. It is debateable how well US policy makers and practitioners alike have understood this learning dynamic, as the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan wound down and as “comprehensive engagement” in Africa becomes the centerpiece of US security involvements abroad. Drawing upon my experiences in US and UN stability and peace operations from the Balkans, Iraq, and Liberia, I examine and compare the US-dominated interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan with security challenges in African countries such as Liberia and then draw implications for US civilian-military teaming under emerging circumstances.

Two strategic imperatives have primarily driven the need to better synchronize civilian-military power and influence: the constraints of a transforming security environment and the restraints of diminishing resources in the face of higher costs, risks, and demand for intervention. With respect to constraints, security threats, challenges, and opportunities increasingly come from the seams between states rather than from states themselves. Conflicts also tend to be intra-state and capitalize on social instability and more local or “human” security issues. The adjustment process to this security paradigm of the twenty-first century has been slow and not always smooth. As far
back as the 1990s, military interventions were bedeviled by the nettlesome problem of finding balance in the working relationship between military and civilian actors and the “hard” (or coercive) and “soft” (or persuasive) forms of power they respectively represent. Beyond challenges inherent to COIN and the now-familiar difficulties in the relationship between civilian-military actors in the field, “winning hearts and minds” and providing humanitarian assistance and development aid to address threats have been less than fully effective and, at times, even counterproductive. A fundamental problem with applied COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, is the tendency to view protection of the civilian population as a means to an end (defeating insurgents)—in other words, a tactic versus a strategy, which risks calling into question the legitimacy of the whole operation.

Then there are restraints of rapidly diminishing fiscal and other resources to support enduring large-scale military interventions as we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan. These responses to 9/11 alone have cost trillions of dollars, leading to huge cuts to the defense budget and resulting in some experts identifying the national debt as the greatest long-term threat to national security. At a time of resource restraints and donor fatigue, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify foreign and military aid not seen in direct or “traditional” US interests; this will worsen over time.

While some lessons may be transferrable, Iraq or Afghanistan cannot be a “petri dish” for dealing with fragile and failing states elsewhere in the world because the learning process there was the result of moving away from an outdated understanding of security per se. Despite prolific lessons, “it is very difficult, half way through an incomplete war, to shift direction if for the previous several years you have been shooting at people you are now offering to protect. It lacks credibility.” The non-Iraq/Afghanistan security environment calls for more conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and comprehensive, whole-of-society approaches—well beyond “whole-of-government” and involving civilian-military teaming in more collaborative and multinational settings. Africa presents a profusion of such examples with greater currency, among them UNMIL.
From a “National Security” to a “Human Security” World

At a time of increasing constraints and restraints to US foreign intervention as described above, the threats-based, enormously expensive, US-centric national security approach continues to dominate and shape American foreign intervention, especially since 9/11. Even the hand over of administrations did not effectively change this: “Obama has persistently argued that addressing the poverty and misery of people in remote places is a U.S. national interest. But the case he has made is, like Bush’s, limited to the threat of terrorism and does not have much to say about, for example, the threat that collapsing states pose to more stable neighbors.”3 For many in Thomas P. M. Barnett’s “gap” area covering the underdeveloped world, “the threat of terrorism is a low priority relative to their other security concerns.”4

The exceptions, of course, are in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and a handful of other places where extremist Islamic terrorists may be found; but then again, they are more a concern to the United States than just about anyone else. (Even next door to Afghanistan, a major source of US-Pakistani tension is divergent interests in deploying Pakistani military forces to combat terrorism—something Pakistanis are less enthusiastic about than Americans.) A running joke in Africa is that if you want the United States to get involved and spend money in your country, just say that al-Qaeda is there—much as many African strongmen would draw the United States in with the specter of Soviet or Chinese involvement during the Cold War. “Bad-guy baiting” is also the way to obtain congressional appropriation of security assistance or foreign aid funding—a main driver, no doubt, of the “militarization” of foreign policy and “securitization” of aid. Unless, however, there is a new awareness of what “security” in the twenty-first century is, budget-conscious Washington may well double down on the counterproductive foreign interventions of the previous decade.

National security writ large had not only become more globalized by 9/11; it had also become more humanized. In Africa, home to the bulk of security, development, and civilian-military engagements for decades, “human security” and civil society challenges such as poverty and food security, rule-of-law and justice, governance, economic development and job creation, and public health have long defined the security problem, calling for approaches going well beyond
whole-of-government. Comprehensive and collaborative approaches to conflict prevention and postconflict operations in multilateral, human security situations are every day for “civil society organizations” working there and elsewhere. They stress the long-term legitimacy and relationship-building characteristics of development. In this more predominant paradigm, development, appropriately done, is therefore not a component of security; it is security—and then some.

The people-powered intrastate movements in North Africa, the Arab world, and many other places offer bottom-up-generated, “soft-power,” civil society instances of change with clear implications for the role that outside powers like the United States may or may not be able to play. As we have seen, freedom is better promoted through SharePoint than at gunpoint, and the relationships between peoples are more important than those between governments. Bush may have broken the eggs in the Middle East, but Obama has the opportunity to help make the omelet.

Thus, US-centric whole-of-government formulations such as “3D” (defense, diplomacy, and development) do not constitute the model for which most of the international donor community for security, humanitarian, or development assesses and implements its programs and projects. “Peacebuilding,” a word still seeking a consensus definition at the Department of State, is the policy pertaining to “comprehensive” and “collaborative” approaches. Meanwhile, across the river at the Pentagon, “stability operations,” or “complex operations”—terms very much posited on a national-security model of security—have supplanted “peacekeeping” and other “peace support operations,” terms not very widely used by the US military at any rate. The world outside Washington speaks a rather different language.

This is the distinction between US and other approaches to security. Unilateral regime takedown and wholesale COIN or counter-terrorism operations are not the security norm outside the Iraq-Afghanistan models. The United States and other international actors are learning that peacebuilding is most effective and less costly when done as conflict prevention as opposed to “postconflict reconstruction.” In collaborative, human security environments, influence is more important than power, engagement more than response, and sustainability more than power projection.

While bad-guy-centric approaches may not be entirely inappropriate to tackling the threat of terrorism in places like the Trans-Sahel, taking on al-Shabaab in Somalia, or chasing down the Lord’s Resistance Army
in Uganda, this is now the rare exception and not the rule. More than in Iraq or Afghanistan, security engagements in places like Africa call for a much more limited military role within more comprehensive, collaborative, civilian-military, and multilateral approaches—and with military hard power clearly subordinate to civilian soft power, for example national security as ancillary to human security, not vice versa as has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. The geopolitical and cultural complexities of the vast African continent and growing US resource restraints simply prohibit the kind of heavy-handed, high-intensity US military interventions seen in Iraq and Afghanistan—drones or no drones. US involvement in Africa is and must be more and more low-profile, featuring a small military footprint of special operations, civil affairs, foreign area officers, and enablers such as engineers and the National Guard in support of what former secretary of state Hillary Clinton calls “civilian power”—comprised of development aid workers and their civil society organization partners and overseen by diplomats within country team and regional settings.

Even with a more teamed-based, whole-of-government effort, which is no doubt a progression, the context for international security in especially Africa is more multinational and regional. In Africa, countries look to the UN first for security assistance, as that organization maintains the largest eight (and perhaps a ninth in Libya) of its 15 peacekeeping missions there. Secondly, African countries look to regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for security assistance as well. These are seen as the mediating or arbitrating entities with respect to conflict resolution and conflict prevention, with an array of bilateral and nonstate actors also shaping the outcome—the United States being one among many. In this more complex multilateral, regional, and bilateral assortment, corresponding policy rule-sets and operational models bearing little resemblance to those in Iraq and Afghanistan guide security engagements. In Africa, we are already seeing the shape of things to come—a whole new world in which the United States no longer dominates but still plays a leadership role.

**The World Is No Longer America’s Playground**

Fortunately, the way Washington is looking at the world and its place in it, at least from a policy standpoint, appears to be adapting.
Driven increasingly by the constraints of a transformed international security environment and burgeoning resource restraints, policy makers are learning what many practitioners have already learned and know: it is no longer business as usual, for example, in the often overlooked role of (strategic) communications:

If the Obama administration continues to embrace its role as a global convenor, it should be careful not to repeat the past mistake of appearing to put the United States at the center of every global challenge, focusing too much on “us” and not enough on “them.” . . . The goal is not simply to be liked. It is to be more influential and therefore more effective at lower cost. In a world where foreign public opinion has ever greater impact on the success or failure of vital American national interests, it should be weighed in making policy decisions and should shape how the United States pursues its policies and how US leaders talk about American policies. Listening, understanding and engaging makes for better policy, helps to avoid unnecessary conflicts, and should ideally allow policymakers to foresee and pre-empt objections to policies that sound worse in the field than they do in Washington.7 (emphasis in original)

Perhaps Americans will learn better in Africa what they had difficulty learning in Iraq and Afghanistan. In places like Africa, “listening is a guiding principle. It’s a principle that’s been lost in the constant chatter of the Western world, where no one seems to have the time or even the desire to listen to anyone else. . . . That’s not the case in Africa. Here, instead of linear narrative, there is unrestrained and exuberant storytelling that skips back and forth in time and blends together past and present.”8

In a world which is no longer America’s playground, Americans are learning more about collaboration and complexity, especially at the international level. Specifically with respect to the United Nations (UN), the 2010 National Security Strategy, under the rubric of “Pursuing Comprehensive Engagement,” notes: “In recent years America’s frustration with international institutions has led us at times to engage the United Nations system on an ad hoc basis. But in a world of transnational challenges, the United States will need to invest in strengthening the international system, working from inside international institutions and frameworks to face their imperfections head on and to mobilize transnational cooperation.”9

The National Security Strategy additionally affirms former secretary of defense Robert Gates’s earlier anticipation of the need for greater military collaborative engagement capabilities, recognizing the growing mission to “build partnership capacities” as a strategic
economy-of-force measure. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Gates pointed out in numerous places that

America’s interests are inextricably linked to the integrity and resilience of the international system. . . . America’s power and influence are enhanced by sustaining a vibrant network of defense alliances and new partnerships, building cooperative approaches with key states, and maintaining interactions with important international institutions such as the United Nations. . . . Moreover, military forces must be capable of working effectively with a range of civilian and international partners. . . . Strong regional allies and partners are fundamental to meeting 21st century challenges successfully. Helping to build their capacity can help prevent conflict from beginning or escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployments of U.S. or allied forces would be required.10

No paradigm shift occurs, however, and no lessons are therefore learned unless they have been institutionalized, not in policy or doctrine, but where it really counts: in programs and budgets and what people actually do or have to work with on the ground. In those measures, there is plenty of evidence that there is still a long way to go, even though Americans may have come a long way.

The Softer Side of Security: Doing More with Less

As a result of national security, political, bureaucratic, and budget cycle pressures, US government and military officials are often attempting shorter-term, quick-impact development. The challenge, however, for policy makers and practitioners is “to design short-term programming that contributes toward long-term goals and to design long-term programming that supports short-term objectives.”11 In other words, their difficulty lies in thinking globally while acting locally or thinking strategically while acting tactically.

The US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) was created with the intention of a more deliberate, rather than ad hoc, civilian-military and interagency teaming approach, structured from the top down, and with a much heavier civilian content and lead—thus, with more soft than hard power at play than in other combatant commands. Accordingly, one way USAFRICOM can do this is to heed the advice of civilian partners:

Military planners can avoid negative outcomes by relying on the humanitarian “do no harm” principle. In the context of the CJTF-HOA, and other similar missions, the do no harm principle suggests the following four guidelines.
First, military projects should complement the work of civilian organizations, rather than duplicating or ignoring it. Second, focusing on the long-term sustainability of projects will ensure that any goodwill generated does not quickly evaporate. Third, military forces should also target their efforts to areas in which they hold a comparative advantage, such as disaster relief, logistics, and operating in insecure environments. Fourth and finally, hearts and minds operations should attempt to project an appearance of relative neutrality and humanitarian services separate from overt COIN activity. While one cannot expect a military operation to adhere to the [nongovernmental organizations’] NGOs’ values of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, the “do no harm” philosophy provide a helpful metric for evaluating outcomes from both a humanitarian and political standpoint.12

The real problem, however, at USAFRICOM is that, despite its large civilian component, it still largely serves military missions (in particular, counterterrorism) rather than vice versa—at least on the ground. This conflicts with USAFRICOM’s central message. By and large, the military staff defines security requirements. This is one of the reasons why USAFRICOM has had such great difficulty in gaining credibility and acceptance in Africa. The greatest evidence for this is that it is still headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. This is a strategic and not an operational issue.

This has played out particularly in security assistance and “building partnership capacity” activities. The poor civilian-military performance of forces such as the Mali Defense and Security Forces moving back into northern Mali suggests they and other African militaries have been trained for much of the wrong thing. US involvement in Mali and much of Africa, for instance, has zeroed in on terrorism, which most locals do not perceive as their existential challenge. US security assistance is often resourced overwhelmingly to “train and equip” for war fighting rather than institution building and military civics. “The US was too narrowly focused on counterterrorism capabilities and missed the bigger picture,” said former Department of State (DOS) official Todd Moss, while former USAFRICOM commander Gen Carter Ham recognized failure to pass on “values, ethics and military ethos.”13

Moreover, US civilian-military operations training has been correspondingly modeled on US doctrine and practice, which stress defeating threats more than helping to build governance and civil authority. A carryover from Iraq and Afghanistan, it has been slanted toward winning hearts and minds in order to find bad guys and kill them. The focus on the tactical rather than the strategic prompted
one Department of Defense (DOD) Trans-Sahel program manager to report two years before the coup in Mali that it risked exacerbating “unhealthy civil-military balances.”

Things are changing, albeit slowly. In *Joint Force Quarterly*, USAFRICOM director of strategy, plans, and programs Maj Gen Robert Hooper said the “underlying premise of our institutional capacity-building efforts is that military forces must be subordinate to civil authority and accepted as legitimate members of a civil society based on the rule of law.” The Mali Watch Group, cosponsored by the Alliance for Peacebuilding and The Bridges Institute, agrees but also sees this has not yet trickled down to the troops. Its point paper contends that “U.S. executive and operational security-sector guidance in Africa must emphasis [sic], at all levels of person-to-person interaction, demonstration of the primacy of civil authority as the paramount principle in security advisory and assistance at regional, national, and community levels.”

The paper further stresses that “establishing a strong, sustainable civilian-military relationship that institutionalizes the primacy of civil authority and takes a more strategic, peacebuilding approach to security-sector development will be the key component of national reconciliation and addressing the main drivers of conflict.” Key ways to establish popular confidence in the military are in-depth training on military subordination to civilian rule, including civilian-military specialists, and for military leaders to support civil dialogue and reconciliation at community levels.

As mentioned, it is not just because the playing field has changed. The United States is entering a new era of relative strategic scarcity, where more traditional resources to shape and influence events are less at its disposal. Beyond reducing America’s militarily influence, this decline in relative financial and commercial power is also translating into an end of unilateral freedom of action. Asymmetric threats have already mitigated much of the longstanding US advantage in hard power, while peer and near-peer competitors can better bankroll their own agendas. Perhaps most importantly, information and social networking technologies and low-tech, low-cost, sociocultural and information enterprises, such as those that brought on the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, present inexpensive equalizers to traditional and more costly industrial-era forms of power.

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, the customary US bias toward hard power in general, albeit expedient and more
manageable and measurable, has also generated counterproductive costs and risks, often known as “unintended consequences.” Hard power is more resource-intensive, zero-sum, reactive, and short-term (e.g., tactical). Soft power, more appropriate to collaborative, human security settings and largely resident in civil society, is more adaptable, economical, renewable, engaging, synergistic, and long-term (e.g., strategic). It ultimately generates more peaceful, stable, and profitable outcomes, has further-reaching effects, is less costly and risk-laden, and introduces more feasible, acceptable, and sustainable strategic options—as long as they are approached strategically.

Still, the question is not whether to employ hard or soft power, but what balance and combination ought to be used. Utilized together appropriately, they are comultipliers, which may be the greatest argument as to why the military may still play a role, albeit limited and subordinate, in humanitarian assistance and development—as long, however, as it does not attempt to cloak its engagements as “humanitarian,” when it is clear this is not the ultimate objective.

Indeed, the more collaborative, comprehensive, and softer approaches in human security environments, borne out in part due to forced frugality and replete in Africa and places other than Iraq or Afghanistan, may eventually come more naturally to US policy makers and practitioners as they look to transfer their experiences from the Middle East and Central Asia. In this regard, there should be much to learn from those who have already worked far longer under these settings, especially those who have been part of an effective country team (or the UN) conducting enduring engagements in fragile states and integrating the full range of instruments of power and influence, which may in fact serve as a model at the national strategic level.18

Soft power gets more play in places like Africa not just because it is more appropriate but also because it is more necessary. International resources for creating sustainable peace have been more limited outside Iraq and Afghanistan, which have received more money in security assistance and development aid from the United States and other donor nations than the rest of the world together. In 2010 the US provided $1.7 billion and $3.3 billion in foreign aid to the Near East and South and Central Asia, respectively; it provided $648 million to Africa, $448 million to the Western Hemisphere, $631 million to Europe and Eurasia, and $158 million to East Asia and the Pacific.19 This does not even include the more than $1 trillion in military-related costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, as the United
States has poured money into Iraq and Afghanistan, China has seized opportunities to gain greater influence in Africa and Latin America. Chinese foreign assistance and economic projects in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia grew from less than $1 billion in 2002 to $27.5 billion in 2006 and $25 billion in 2007, with the largest increase in Africa.20 In the meantime, direct US [military or police] involvement in UN field missions has dwindled while involvement of other “twenty-first century centers of influence,” among them China, has grown.

Organizations and entities working in Africa have never had the luxury of the scale and array of financial resources seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the US fiscal crisis grows, the more creative and collaborative ways born out of such restraints, such as microfinancing and community-based, are already more commonplace there than the American reflex to “throw money at the problem.”

Research suggests that the failure to win Afghan hearts and minds is not because too little money has been spent. In fact, money has been part of the problem. Spending too much money with too little oversight in insecure environments is a recipe for fueling corruption, delegitimating the Afghan government, and undermining the credibility of international actors. Moreover, policy makers also ignore the most obvious, effective, and quickest way to reduce corruption: reduce funding, especially in the most insecure areas, to levels more in line with what Afghanistan can absorb.21

USAFRICOM is by no means the first combatant command to comprehend and implement more collaborative approaches that invoke greater soft power, emphasize civilian efforts as leading, and exercise what the military calls “economy of force.” US involvement, for example, in low-level COIN operations in the Philippines, has long taken the approach of following the local lead in civil action programs. “Filipino doctors, dentists and veterinarians come in to provide free care. Of utmost importance . . . is putting a Filipino face on all these operations.”22 Perhaps more illustrative of the shifting paradigm is the latest US response to Haiti, where the military clearly played a supporting role and the US government sought to work within multilateral frameworks rather than expend the resources to create a parallel management structure, for example doing more with less:

Early on, the United States decided not to create a combined Joint task force. With the UN already on the ground, a robust multinational force was in place. In addition, [United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti] MINUSTAH countries contributing additional resources and personnel already had links
to their local UN representatives. Creating a combined Joint task force would have conflicted with those efforts. . . . The purpose of JTF-Haiti was to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to the Government of Haiti, the UN, and USAID. The military possesses significant capabilities that are useful in emergencies, but long-term plans for relief and reconstruction are best left to non-military government agencies.\textsuperscript{23} (emphasis in original)

\textbf{Multilateral Civilian-Military Coordination:}  
\textit{The Liberian Way}

US policy makers and practitioners can learn to engage most effectively in truly multinational settings where a different security paradigm is already the norm. As the United States transitioned from a “military mission to a civilian-led effort” (as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee termed it) in Iraq and a similar conversion in Afghanistan, it would have been instructive to examine a similar case study in transition from military-intensive, postconflict peacekeeping to civilian-led peacebuilding with the aim of preventing a return to conflict in a major multinational intervention in Africa led by UNMIL, regarded as among the most integrative of UN field missions.

In 2003, following 14 years of one of the most vicious civil wars in modern African history, the international community embarked on an effort under UN Security Council Resolution 1506 to bring sustainable peace to Liberia and prevent the return of conflict to the country and the region at large. In January 2008 UNMIL commenced its drawdown of forces phased parallel to Liberia’s implementation of its own poverty reduction strategy, all with the help of the UN development assistance framework and other collaborative tools such as joint (multiagency and UN-Liberia) working groups and the joint county offices. All of these were designed to help build the capacity of the Liberian government, particularly at the county level, to deliver essential public services, among them security, rule of law and justice, governance, and economic and social development. The intent was to reach these conditions through a series of benchmarks by the time of the next general election in October–November 2011, thus, marking the end of drawdown and beginning the final UNMIL phase of withdrawal. This would be characterized by local, civilian-directed peacebuilding focused on self-sustainable development to supplant security-intensive, military-based peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{24}
UN Mission in Liberia Civil-Military Coordination

In recognition of its role in underwriting much of this transition process, the UNMIL peacekeeping force’s approach to civil-military coordination (CIMIC) began to transform substantially, based on the constant concern regarding “the increasing dependence of the Government of Liberia (GOL) on the assets of the Force.” The greatest risk for security and stability in Liberia during drawdown was that the dependency on the international presence in general and the UN military in particular would persist as force capability diminished, bringing on potentially destabilizing effects that would risk the investment and sacrifices of many to bring lasting peace. This essential transition management challenge in Liberia was not unlike the situations seen somewhat later in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CIMIC in Liberia recognized that “cooperation and coordination between the military and humanitarian components are critical in multidimensional peacekeeping operations.” The interface between security and development was consistent with the complex and interconnected operations environment and the UN “integrated mission” (e.g., civilian-military and multiagency) concept. Moreover, the role of the military was as an enabler to the peace process, duplicating the civilian-military relationship in democratic societies and marking an unambiguous path to the end state of any peace operation—self-sustained peace and civil society. Consistent with this attitude was UNMIL CIMIC’s catchphrase to promote its transitional thrust: “their game plan is our game plan.” CIMIC activities in Liberia thus fell within the same structure as and were directly traceable to the poverty reduction strategy, adopting civilian rather than military benchmarks for success.

UNMIL CIMIC was firmly nested in the UN integrated mission concept and “motivated by the need to maximize coordination and coherence between the military and civilian components of the same integrated mission, between the military component of a U.N. peacekeeping operation and the rest of the U.N. system, and between the military component of the mission and other external and internal civilian actors in the same mission area.” Furthermore, UNMIL CIMIC anticipated the core functions of civil-military coordination writ large in the “UN-CIMIC” policy for all UN peacekeeping forces: first, to support management of the “interaction between civilian and military actors,” and second, to support “creating and enabling
environment for the implementation of the mission mandate by maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area. Accordingly, the UNMIL force has been pressed to engage in CIMIC in order to work itself out of its job—although it has taken some time for these contingents, each with their own (not necessarily democratic) civilian-military cultures, to understand and embrace this operating framework.

UNMIL CIMIC incorporated the same understanding of transition as later defined by the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, namely that transition management involves both a process and a goal and is therefore inherently collaborative and complex:

Transition is the multi-faceted application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources (means) over time in a sovereign territory to influence institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals and legitimate statehood (ends), guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently complex, and may include multiple, smaller-scale transitions that occur simultaneously or sequentially. These small-scale activities focus on building specific institutional capacities and creating intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term goals.

Further, understanding that peace support operations in a human security context involve an environment that is largely psychological rather than “kinetic,” UNMIL CIMIC emphasized building both capacity and confidence in numerous ways simply beyond public relations. Fully cognizant of the supporting rather than supported relationship with civilian interlocutors, the CIMIC intent in Liberia was to use the capabilities of the force to “enable and multiply civilian initiatives, and conducted in coordination with the UNMIL civil component (jointly) and UN agencies as well as NGOs and the GOL (collaboratively).” This entailed a transition from a more direct to a more indirect use of military assets with respect to stabilizing the civil population—more clearly in support of civilian agencies and leading less from the front and more from behind the UNMIL civil component, UN agencies, and the GOL. The author, as chief CIMIC officer, called this “civilianizing” the stabilization effort.

CIMIC efforts were also aligned with those of local partners and their frameworks and benchmarks, in order to promote transition to local ownership of civil administration and essential public services responsibilities and to help build civil authority and public confidence. Its project management instruction thus directed that Liberians would
be visibly in the lead of capacity-building efforts or events such as medical outreaches, even if most of the effort was resourced by the UN military. The author called this simultaneous effort “localizing.”

The emphasis of transitional CIMIC, as such, was more on capacity development and an enabling process, rather than on “winning hearts and minds. However, confidence was at least as important as capacity, if not more so. This is because the linkage between security and development is mostly perceptual. Regardless of measurable development progress, if the common perception remained that the country’s future is in doubt and that the departure of UNMIL would precipitate renewed mass violence—the underlying security concern in Liberia—Liberia may indeed destabilize following drawdown and withdrawal. In clear support of governance and security-sector reform (SSR), when feasible, UNMIL CIMIC sought to involve local police and the military in CIMIC projects in order to build their capacity and, more importantly, promote public confidence in the government by transferring the psychological capital of public trust in UNMIL to maintain security to the local security sector. In other words, it was up to the Liberians to win hearts and minds. To socialize and institutionalize both “civilianizing” and “localizing,” the moniker for UNMIL CIMIC thus became: “it’s not about us; it’s about them.”

The key illustration in the UNMIL CIMIC Directive, a unique playbook written, fielded, and validated by the author that has been sourced at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and shared with other field missions, is provided as fig. 11.1. The idea was to bring the force from the front to the rear of assistance efforts through a deliberate process of transition management. First, the military shifted the use of its assets away from direct assistance to the population and more to enabling efforts led by the UN agencies, themselves working in tandem with NGOs, while gradually integrating CIMIC efforts with those led by these agencies (“civilianizing”). Simultaneously, it looked to improve partner efforts to build the capacity of GOL entities to perform civil administration functions (“localizing”).

In this double transition, the aim was to create the proper alignment of assistance efforts in order to facilitate the conditions desired by all three stakeholder groups, as depicted in the graphic. The assumption of a more indirect and supporting role made it easier for the force to diminish its presence and operations while mitigating or reducing potential destabilizing drawdown-related gaps and risks associated with overdependency. The author was able to use this simple
illustration of what really is the essence of civilian-military operations to communicate the role of UNMIL CIMIC to the officers he was training and the civilian partners to whom he was selling the concept.

Figure 11.1. UNMIL CIMIC civilian-military transition management process

This simple illustration helped meet a major challenge in communicating to diverse audiences a civilian-military approach that goes beyond the widely held and amateurish belief that CIMIC is some kind of military public relations activity. As with most African peace support operations, a critical vulnerability was the relatively low understanding of this more appropriate and collaborative idea of CIMIC among both military and civilian players, along with a shortage of trained military CIMIC officers, even though civilian-military operations are at the core of peace and stability operations.

In addition to the visualization technique, the author used numerous catchphrases to form the rule-set for UNMIL CIMIC in the “CIMIC 101” presentation of the homegrown UNMIL CIMIC course, including:

- It’s not about us; it’s about them;
- If you don’t understand the culture, you don’t understand the problem;
- Your customer’s success is your success;
- Focus on unity of purpose (common end state) and shared risks;
- Knowledge is your economy; information is your currency of exchange;
- Ask not where they want to go today—ask where they want to be tomorrow; and
- As always, manage expectations—yours and theirs.
These aphorisms are reminiscent of approaches used by development professionals. Not only because of the nexus between security and development and the recognition that, in human security environments like Liberia, development is security, it is also because the most important aspect of CIMIC, besides simply managing the civil-military relationship, is transition management. And, to facilitate that you have to adopt the rule sets, ways, measures, and means of those to whom you are transitioning both capacity and confidence. Their game plan must, therefore, be your game plan.

**Learning from Liberia: Greater Emphasis on Military to Civilian Transition**

As mentioned, a critical vulnerability for the drawdown phase has been the relatively low understanding of CIMIC at UNMIL and the shortage of trained military CIMIC officers. This is a common short-fall among most UN and especially African field missions and peacekeeping forces, even though civilian-military teaming is a core competency of peace and stability operations. To mitigate this, UNMIL instituted multisourced education and training to grow overall understanding of CIMIC, build CIMIC capability, and enhance mission coordination. Besides CIMIC officers, its CIMIC course included UN, GOL, and NGO civilians, UN Police personnel, and members of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and Liberian National Police.

This not only promoted collaborative civilian-military dialogue but also indirectly contributed to SSR. In fact, UNMIL CIMIC also significantly contributed to the demobilization and reintegration part of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) through vocational training activities provided by qualified uniformed personnel in such areas as agriculture, construction and engineering, and office skills to a substantial number of former combatants, in tandem with civilian-funded programs.

Measuring effectiveness in UNMIL CIMIC was simple. It was not about humanitarian or development outputs as much as it was who was doing them and how effectively: the growth and transition of capacity and confidence. The more indirect role the military had in these efforts, the “greener” things were; the more things became “civilianized” and “localized,” the closer to the end state.
The major weakness of CIMIC as introduced in Liberia, and in the UN generally, is that it has not been well understood in time. Gradually embraced throughout transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it was learned on the go. Although it had an implemented and validated CIMIC directive, in-country CIMIC training, and continuous chief CIMIC officer engagement and “sales work,” the results, while remarkable, were limited. This diverted a great deal of energy into activities based on improving understanding of CIMIC that could have been obviated in advance and thus used to further the transition process. Although the concept of CIMIC validated at UNMIL provided the bulk of a new UN-CIMIC policy, providing a civilian-military operational framework for UN peacekeeping forces worldwide, it remains to be socialized among troop contributing countries and the major UN agencies. While the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, for example, acknowledges the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and advocates greater coordination in the process, it hardly recognizes the military’s role in enhancing this transition—e.g., in being its multiplier.32 CIMIC as such needs to be better understood by both military and civilian players—prior to operations. The author is currently helping to address this shortfall by assisting organizations such as the Peace Operations Training Institute and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations develop online and exportable predeployment training packages in UN-CIMIC for UN peacekeeping troop contributing countries.33

This critical dearth in understanding points to another major weakness: the failure to grasp the comprehensiveness and importance of the general transition process itself. As the general election and the beginning of the UNMIL withdrawal neared, key transition tasks, particularly in the security sector, were only not yet identified and agreed upon but also not yet put into place in any serious, concerted way. Security-sector reform in Liberia was still being “coordinated.” This is very late in the game, reflecting a still relatively widespread failure to fully appreciate the importance of building confidence and not just capacity in transition management—the psychological aspect of which is the most critical and yet requires greater patience and risk management.

Nevertheless, a major lesson for the United States is that its own efforts to build civilian-military capacity in Africa should use more universal civilian-military models that emphasize peacebuilding as much as security, such as the UN-CIMIC framework coming into use
by UN, African Union, and other forces. This means that US civil affairs and civilian-military security assistance education and training programs like the DOS-funded Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) must learn these new frameworks, if they are to teach them to their clients.

Another insight the author has gained through his multiple experiences centers upon what one does in the “steady state,” comprising the strategic and operational capital to draw upon during crisis response or in the field in general, with corresponding levels of success or failure. This is a common, yet still underappreciated, lesson for both those who have been to Iraq and Afghanistan, worked in Africa, or responded, for example, to the crisis in Haiti. It is mainly because, in the twenty-first century security and development engagement environment, relationships, and influence matter more than power. This critical strategic and operational capital is, at best, difficult to obtain once the operation begins.

Another outstanding feature of the Liberian example is the role of bilateral players in a multilateral setting, especially the US country team, which has often worked collaboratively with the GOL and UNMIL to pursue common goals, especially in security-sector reform, but also with international partners to include China in fostering civil society and economic development.

As elsewhere, SSR and DDR are keys to the transitional aspect of the peacebuilding process in Liberia, mainly in human security but also in a nascent Liberian national security context. Given growing trafficking in illicit items in the region, including a significant migration of drug trade and related activities from Latin America to West Africa, Liberia’s ability to provide a coordinated, integrated whole-of-government response to maintain security within and at its borders is an essential US geostrategic interest in this fragile and volatile region. With regard to SSR, UN Security Council Resolution 1506 recognizes the US defense-sector reform role, and the country team there has heeded former Secretary Gates’s admonition that, beyond the traditional national security tendency to focus almost exclusively on operational development of the armed forces, “there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term.”34
In Liberia, the Office of Security Cooperation is synchronizing, albeit ad hoc, USAFRICOM’s Operation Onward Liberty program, designed to enhance AFL operational capacity, and the DOD’s Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI, similar to the Ministry of Defense Advisory program in Afghanistan) to build institutional capacity among the defense ministry staff providing civilian oversight. Perhaps most importantly, carefully synching these two programs comultiplies and exemplifies the democratic civilian-military relationship often missing in fragile civil societies. If better understood and appreciated, multinational civilian-military teaming efforts could also be beneficial in technical mentoring and advising Liberian government staff, capitalizing on UNMIL’s long-term presence and best practices in order to strengthen defense ministry civilian staff and leveraging at least the 28 percent the US funds, as with every UN field mission, in UNMIL operating costs.

It is important to note, however, that local understanding of both problems and opportunities and the initiative of those on the ground largely drives the level of collaboration the civilian–military teams in Liberia have exercised. “Stovepiped” or segmented and nonintegrated US policies and program and budget authorities and regulations—and congressional oversight as such—still present more of an obstacle to this kind of adaptable, economy-of-effort enterprise management approach than they do an enhancement.

In the human security environments of places like Liberia, perhaps the most important lesson being learned—having profound implications to everything including programming and budgeting to deployment and stationing policies—is that the work in such settings is fundamentally centered around building relationships on a human and not just institutional level, evoking sustainability more than stamina. Again, the steady state insight comes into play:

Fundamentally, in peace or war we need to trust one another. We learn to trust each other through building a strong relationship, personal and professional. That is the key to building an effective team that works toward a common purpose. In Haiti, this proved to be the case within our own military and with our interagency partners, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign partners. When tough issues were encountered, their strong relationships broke down the barriers.

Relationship-building, however, is a marathon and not a sprint.
Civilian-Military Teaming Is Strategic

The civilian-military context has changed. The constraints of a transformed international security environment and the restraints of growing strategic scarcity and capital shortages for the United States and the wider donor community have correspondingly transformed the operative paradigm for security engagements across the full range from conflict prevent to postconflict operations. This includes associated changes in the way we approach civilian-military teaming as a whole. Even today, US civilian-military operations doctrine is threats-based and command and control oriented. They are largely operational and tactical in their focus. It is not only that such legacy approaches to security and civil-military teaming are increasingly less effective. We can no longer afford them. More appropriate civilian-military teaming approaches, such as applied in Liberia, are comprehensive as well as collaborative, clearly place the military in a supporting and not supported role, employ an enabling process of building capacity as well as confidence, and give greater currency to relationships, networking, and sustainability. In short, civilian-military teaming in the twenty-first century must be more applied strategy than mere operations or tactics—thinking globally while acting locally, or thinking strategically while acting tactically.

When looking from the more global, human security vantage point outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, the relationship-building aspect of comprehensive, civilian-military engagement and teaming takes on a new level of meaning and application. As such, context takes greater precedence over content, partnership more than predominance, strategy more than operations and tactics, and human more than organizational enterprises. The civilian-military challenges and opportunities seen in places like Liberia may help us begin to gain greater understanding of how to think globally and act locally in the more multilateral, collaborative, and comprehensive settings the United States is already finding itself in and will no doubt see more of as it goes deeper into the century. Contingent to this more global and interconnected context is the all-important replication of the civil-military relationship in democratic societies in operational approaches in both postconflict transition management, as being faced in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in conflict prevention. In human security settings, this takes on an unprecedented moral imperative. Linking strategy and tactics, security with development, and hard
and soft power demands more art than science. Again, this is because civilian-military teaming is more a strategic obligation than an operational requirement—and the truth is, it always has been.

Beyond the usual discussion of policy and doctrine, the implications for US civilian-military teaming under this new paradigm are profound and far-reaching. Moreover, unless reflected in the steady state of programs, budgets, authorities, and oversight mechanisms and in the mindsets and skill sets of both policy makers and practitioners, no paradigm shift really occurs and no lessons are learned. This runs not just from Washington to the field, but from the field to Washington:

We have always been able to win ugly by throwing money at a problem, but that is no longer the case,” he said. “We have lost our margin for error and we are headed for a decade of austerity, when even great programs are being killed. The times call for a national security system that is effective, efficient, participatory and agile. Unfortunately, we don’t have it—we have the opposite of that, a system that is archaic, designed sixty-three years ago, that still clings to Cold War concepts. At [Project on National Security Reform] PNSR we have a saying, ‘How can we secure our children’s future with our grandparents’ government?’ We are not going to win the future with that government.”

Thus, how Americans understand the transformed context for peace and security interventions in the larger, more collaborative, and more complex world beyond Iraq and Afghanistan should not only have profound and far-reaching implications for US interaction around the world. It could also help reshape the US approach to national security writ large back at home—not just because the larger world is forcing us to but also because we can no longer afford to do it any other way.

Despite its overwhelming national security, hard-power psychology, encountering a strategic ecosystem more aptly described in human security terms, the United States still has a great deal to bring to bear, beyond its still considerable soft power and influence. More concretely, for example, it possesses a unique comparative advantage, as it is demonstrating in Liberia and other lesser-known places, in assisting foreign governments and militaries in improving civilian-military linkages and mechanisms at all levels, due to its program depth in areas like civil affairs. One important exercise in implementing such a paradigm shift would be to see how to enable a more strategically-driven combination of programs such as the DOD’s DIRI program, as well as GPOI and ACOTA, in order to build partnership civilian-military capacity and confidence in the civilian-military relationship in democratic societies.

Indeed, focusing more on military civics in general and the civilian-military relationship in particular as operational instruments, not only
in terms of security and defense-sector reform and partnership capacity development but also in an overall teaming approach under the rubric of the country team, can only improve the strategic effectiveness of US “comprehensive engagement.” It would lend greatly to the cache of legitimacy of US interventions, even more important in human security environments that concentrate on the problems and promises of civil society, where Napoleon’s famous dictum that “[in war] the moral is to the physical as three is to one” takes on a whole new meaning. This is because by “leading through civilian power,” as former Secretary of State Clinton has termed it, the United States would then be doing abroad what it is doing at home, clearly connecting strategy with operations and the whole-of-society with the whole-of-government. It is also because Americans working abroad can draw upon the strengths of their own dynamic, multicultural civil society, whose foundation has been always moral and whose national ethos of \textit{e pluribus unum}, is most ideally suited. When Americans demonstrate their time-honored civil-military relationship in the field in view of adversaries and partners alike, they make this transforming principle difficult to defeat and easy to emulate. Furthermore, when they reach out to collaborate with others, they bring the whole world with them, changing themselves with it.

![Figure 11.2. The Armed Force of Liberia’s first Bailey bridge launch in December 2008. The author is at center-left, with AFL engineers and officers to his rear and left. Contract mentors, international developers, and Ministry of Public Works men and women stand in the foreground with female AFL members. Photo courtesy of the author.](image-url)
Figure 11.3. The Liberian project manager of a youth agricultural training farm explains the pilot project to the author and staff officers of the resident Bangladesh peacekeeping battalion. Photo courtesy of the author.

Figure 11.4. What’s wrong with this picture? In a photo featured in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, a US soldier hands a humanitarian daily ration (directly) to a Haitian girl.
Figure 11.5. What’s right with this picture? Liberian Ministry of Public Works and local personnel receive on-the-job training in culvert restoration from Bangladeshi engineers. Photo courtesy of the author.

Notes

1. The term “petri dish” was used by Anne-Marie Slaughter, former director of policy planning at the Department of State, when talking about the Obama administration’s strategy on weak and failing states. See James Traub, “In the Beginning, There Was Somalia,” Foreign Policy 180 (July–August 2010): 80–84, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/in_the_beginning_there_was_somalia.


3. Traub, “In the Beginning, There Was Somalia.”


17. Ibid., 3.

18. For an excellent discussion of the coordinating power of the US country team as a national security civilian–military and interagency teaming model, see Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks, *Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration*, Strategic Perspectives 2 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, December 2010).


28. United Nations, Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC), Ref. 2010.2 (New York: Department of Field Support, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, October 2010), 5.


Chapter 12

A Whole Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts, or If It Were Only Army Stuff, It Would Be Easy

Mark N. Popov

Canadian soldiers have deployed to a wide range of operations and have served with distinction in Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, East Timor, the Golan Heights, and Ethiopia/Eritrea and on a host of smaller missions. Prior to Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), most of its missions were peacekeeping, observation, or stability missions, staffed almost completely by military personnel and with almost no significant civilian component and no nonmilitary role. Canadian soldiers performed patrolling, security, stabilization, or constabulary duties and had little measurable interaction with other Canadian governmental agencies or host-nation organizations (other than police), belligerent factions, or nongovernmental organizations. Canada’s whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan was a relatively new development not seen in previous theatres. Down as far as the tactical subunit level, this approach sees Canadian soldiers working in mixed teams in the field alongside their civilian counterparts from other government departments. Canada’s official Afghan policy, linked to the 2006 Afghan Compact, was to use a whole-of-government approach and operate along the compact’s three pillars—security, governance, and development. B Squadron, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, a company-sized armored reconnaissance squadron, was tasked to secure the population of Kandahar Province’s Dand District from September 2009 to May 2010. It was augmented by attachments and enablers from across Canada’s Task Force Kandahar, including partners from Canadian civilian
police departments and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

**Background**

Insurgencies are political power struggles in which armed militants seek to overthrow an existing government. In this type of struggle, the population’s attitudes, perceptions, and support are often the center of gravity for both insurgents and government forces. While killing is sometimes necessary, recent history has continued to prove that in a counterinsurgency (COIN), one “cannot kill or capture [one’s] way to victory.” Government forces, locked in “a competition with the insurgent” for influence, must convince the population to deny insurgents the succor and support, both tacit and overt, that they need to live, operate, hide, maneuver, and attack. This task is far more difficult than it appears. When planning operations, physical areas on the ground no longer solely define key terrain and vital ground. Rather, one must take into account attitudes and actions taken by residents of an area to render the insurgent ineffective. One must take a page from the insurgents’ playbook and influence the population by acting on multiple concurrent axes, coordinating both military and civilian actions.

**Kandahar Situation, Fall 2009**

While the need to influence the Afghan population was clear, the means to accomplish this task were more difficult to discern. Furthermore, the spectrum of battlespace effects in Afghanistan could have often been fragmented, creating tactical-level friction as different elements with different mandates, capabilities, and commanders operated in the same piece of terrain and sought to influence the same population. Much as fire and maneuver had to be closely synchronized to achieve a concentration of force, maximize economy of effort, husband scarce combat power, and prevent fratricide, nonkinetic effects also had to be synchronized similarly. Civilian elements that were not under the direct command of military battlespace owners were often focused concurrently on larger-picture national strategic objectives beyond the purview of military commanders and smaller scale initiatives that took place at the tactical or grassroots
level. The majority of Kandaharis cared far less about command structures and the division of responsibilities among different units than they did about effects. To them, ISAF soldiers, no matter the unit or nationality, were a homogenous group of foreigners. The concept that within ISAF there were different groups responsible for different things and effects seemed inconceivable. In order to best focus on Kandahar’s population and encourage the people to reject the insurgency, it was essential to synchronize reconstruction, development, governance, security operations, raids, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), development, and stability.

Enabling Synchronization

In order to better synchronize the disparate and dispersed elements of its deployed units, Canada’s Task Force Kandahar began implementing the battlespace commander (BSC) concept in southern Kandahar Province late in 2009, first in Panjwayi District, followed by Dand District. The concept of one commander responsible for tactical effects in a single area of operations was part and parcel of kinetic operations and a given in military culture. The BSC concept extended this unity of command more broadly and sought, at the tactical level, to better synchronize the capabilities inherent in both civilian and military elements. It saw one commander appointed as a district’s BSC, responsible for synchronizing and guiding all battlespace effects and activities in a specific district, including nonmilitary stabilization, governance, reconstruction, and development efforts.

This approach was not without its frictions, particularly because it was, when implemented, outside both the military and civilian comfort zones and something that had never been tried before at the tactical level. Given the tenuous security situation and significant kinetic threats in Kandahar in 2009–10, security concerns were primary considerations but by no means the only ones. While the military BSC appeared to be in charge of traditionally civilian activities, the approach was more nuanced; large-picture, long-term goals remained the purview of the civilian experts in the provincial reconstruction team (PRT), particularly in the realms of reconstruction, development, and governance. The BSC had the final say guiding when and where events occurred on the ground, while the goals, means, and participants were determined, in Dand District, cooperatively between
the BSC and his or her civilian partners. For example, while the BSC was responsible for ensuring that measures were taken to improve his or her district’s economic viability, his or her civilian stabilization officer planned how this was to be accomplished. The same BSC was also responsible for all interactions between ISAF elements, Afghan government officials, and ANSF in his or her district.

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<td>• National Directorate of Security</td>
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ANSF-led operational coordination centers, at the district and provincial levels, mandated by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) Order 3501, coordinated security, governance, reconstruction, and development efforts and acted as a central information source. They frequently partnered with ISAF elements, worked at the district and provincial levels, and linked civilian and military, GIRoA, and ISAF elements together in a common setting. Establishing Kandahar Province’s OCC was predicated on the security situation, ANSF capacity, and local Afghan government officials’ political will. Before 2009 the conditions for establishment of district-level operational coordination centers (OCC-D) were not right. Once conditions evolved sufficiently, the BSCs in Panjwayi and Dand established OCC-Ds and partnered Afghan-Canadian synchronization and information nodes that supported each BSC, their partnered
ANSF elements, and each appointed district leader (DL). Civilian representatives used the OCC-D structure to keep stakeholders informed of civilian-led stability, governance, reconstruction, and development activities. The OCC-DS brought disparate battlespace players together in a cooperative forum where the emphasis was on information sharing and coordination of effort and not top-down, military-led directives and direction.

**Evolution and Organization**

B Squadron’s configuration as the Dand District Combat Team (DDCT) is depicted in figure 12.2. This configuration represented an evolution that brought it an approximate threefold increase in personnel and a great deal more responsibility to its existing structure.

![Diagram of Dand District Combat Team](chart.png)

**Figure 12.2. The DDCT, December 2009.** While the DL, CIDA stabilization officer (CIDA Stab O), and Afghan National Police (ANP) were not subordinate to the BSC, they are included with dotted lines reflecting their partnered status.
The DDCT’s attachments and enablers coupled with the OCC-D’s ability to interact and coordinate with civilian partners, local government officials, and ANSF offered significant capability. The team’s CIDA Stab O and the OCC-D worked closely with the DL and his staff, linking military and civilian aspects of operations. They also worked together to professionalize legitimate local government officials to contribute to ongoing stability, governance, reconstruction, and development efforts, synchronizing them with both ANP and ISAF security activities. The construction management organization (CMO) team focused on larger-scale village-level or multiple-village projects such as building irrigation canals. It had excellent contacts with local labor organizers and the ability to monitor local attitudes and impressions during its interactions with local work teams. The civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) team was the combat team’s overt, public, and friendly face, manning a reception center oriented to mitigate dissatisfaction over maneuver damage, land claims, and other issues. It also had the ability to assess village needs and then initiate precisely targeted, quick, low-level projects to resolve minor grievances and provide limited employment. The police operational mentor liaison team (P-OMLT) focused on training, mentoring, and developing the individual and collective skills of the district’s ANP detachment. It specialized in weapons, scene management, and first-aid training; search techniques; basic investigations; and public interaction as the professional face and primary constabulary apparatus of the Afghan government. The P-OMLT, including a very experienced Canadian civilian police officer, also acted as the BSC’s primary link and liaison with the ANP command structure. P-OMLT facilitated partnered planning and operations and ensured a consistent approach and style of interaction between the ANP and the combat team. This organization ensured that every facet of COIN efforts in the district, from kinetic operations to construction projects and from village meetings to ANSF activities, was synchronized. Every combat team element knew what every other element was doing, which enabled the BSC to set priorities, resolve conflicting demands quickly, maintain flexibility, and keep pressure on the insurgents through a full spectrum of synchronized military and civilian-led effects.
Lessons Captured and Applied

Throughout its tenure, the combat team captured lessons through after-action reviews, conducted by Canadian military and civilian personnel, often in partnership with ANSF leaders. While some of these lessons appeared to be geared only toward military leaders, all these lessons were captured in a combined civilian-military team context. For the military reader, some would be familiar, while others would appear to run against the grain of the typical military, mission-focused, quick-action mind-set. For the civilian reader, they would provide an illuminative view to the military mind-set, demonstrating some of the flexibility in thinking that military leaders are capable of and hopefully disproving some of the stereotypes that both military and civilian experts have held about each other. The lessons that follow apply specifically to creating effective civilian-military teams and are all critical. The most important, which span both the military and civilian aspects of any mission, is articulated first, while those later lessons have more applicability for the military leader and less so for the civilian partner in any combined civilian-military team.

The Military Force Remains the Fundamental Building Block

The military brings a depth and breadth of skills, command and control elements, and the ability to provide security and mobility. In some instances, the only way to demonstrate resolve and capability, protect the population, and maintain force protection is to kill or capture insurgents. Military combat teams maintain the core skill of defeating enemies. Combat team headquarters are well-established, highly trained, and practiced in communicating, synchronizing, and tracking friendly, enemy, and other elements in complex battlespaces. The COIN combat team must have additional skills and enablers over and above those found in the traditional combat team in order to best achieve a mix of effects. Normally this mix includes “battle winners” and “war winners.”

Battle winners are the traditional combat team grouping of armor, infantry, engineers, artillery, and, in the DDCT’s case, armored reconnaissance forces. The battle winners are capable of destroying the enemy. The battle-winning side of the combat team is essential to providing the necessary security, conducting kinetic operations such as clearing villages, seizing key terrain, or destroying insurgent elements, and supporting
nonkinetic operations such as village surveys or humanitarian aid distribution. The battle winners make the team a hard target; they are resistant to enemy action and are capable of rapidly applying force, up to and including lethal force, anywhere in the battlespace.

War winners provide softer effects in the battlespace and are focused on achieving longer-term changes by connecting with and influencing the population—actions that will not win single battles but are necessary in COIN to winning the war. In the Afghan context, war winners were the enablers, both military and civilian, that developed ANSF capabilities, built stability and governance, and supported reconstruction and development that further separated insurgents from the people through actions and positive effects that the insurgents could not bring. The DDCT’s war winners included its CIDA Stab O, CMO team, CIMIC elements, P-OMLT team with attached civilian police mentor, and the OCC-D.

Battle winners are necessary but are not sufficient for securing long-term COIN victory. Yet the war winners would be unable to act without the security, deterrent effect, and capability that the battle winners provide them. Thus, the two are mutually supportive and provide complementary assets.

Both Military Personnel and Civilians Must Work to Understand Each Other and Appreciate Their Distinct, yet Complementary Roles in Modern Conflict

There is often a divide in understanding, background, context, and perception between military and civilian leaders even during deployed operations. From the military perspective, the stereotypical battlespace civilian is overly idealistic, unaware of the realities and brutalities of war, and a burden that drains combat power. From this perspective, civilians cannot and do not wish to fight; instead, they must be protected and are tactically unaware, often seeking to think, discuss, confer, and reach consensus rather than act. From the civilian perspective, stereotypical military personnel are one dimensional, poorly educated, and nominally illiterate, focused only on achieving short-term results. From this perspective, military team members lack true depth and comprehension of the complexities of modern life and seek to resolve every problem by using weapons and inflicting maximum damage in everything they do. Neither stereotype is true. In Afghanistan both military and civilian personnel shared risk,
threat, triumph, and failure. While time was the commodity in shortest supply during operations, each element needed the patience to listen to its counterpart, ask questions, and truly comprehend the other. Only by investing time and understanding were they able to disprove stereotypes and work effectively together.

In order to integrate civilians into their teams, military leaders must lead by example and establish an atmosphere of understanding, awareness, and tolerance in word, deed, and action. The DDCT included its civilian personnel as full, integral members of the team. The CIDA Stab O sat directly next to the combat team commander during every orders group and daily coordination session. All understood and emphasized that from an organizational perspective, the CIDA Stab O was their combat team commander’s equal and advisor, not a subordinate, and treated her as such. Military commanders must ensure that, in the eyes of their subordinates, what they say and what they do, with regard to their civilian partners, are in concurrence. Including their civilian members in planning sessions, keeping them apprised of ongoing and planned operations, and seeking to use the multiple talents inherent in both battle winners and war winners tangibly demonstrate this integrated approach.

Civilian members of a military-led team must accept, respect, and work within the hierarchical nature of a military force. They also must focus on working as a member of the team, sharing the team’s experiences, and working in concurrence with accepted norms, customs, and traditions. Simple actions such as being punctual, following force protection policies, obeying light and noise discipline in forward locations, and working to understand the military rank and position structure will go a long way toward ensuring they are accepted as full members across the team.

Personal interaction, more so than digital communication, is absolutely essential in mixed civilian-military teams; sharing the same home country and speaking the same language do not guarantee effective communication. The civilian-military divide in background, experience, and context offers a potential for misunderstanding over and above that inherent in communications between military forces. During the implementation of the BSC concept in Dand district, the provincial stabilization officer, a civilian from the Kandahar PRT, spent several days in Dand district with the DDCT commander and his key staff. The information, knowledge, and understanding that he shared were absolutely critical to the team’s success. No amount of
briefing notes, directives, or e-mail could have substituted for this personal interaction.

**Command Climate: Always Know, Understand, and Use the Full Team**

Success in COIN depends on flexibility and initiative at the lowest possible tactical level. It is particularly vital that leaders not only understand COIN but also are able to properly educate their subordinates and inculcate its principles throughout the organization. Soldiers typically will default to what they know and how they are trained, which is, primarily, to fight and win in a worst-case-scenario, high-intensity close combat. Commanders must ensure that every member of the team, both military and civilian, is aware of how his or her particular skills, attributes, and abilities—working in conjunction with other elements of the team—contribute to success. COIN requires synchronization of kinetic efforts plus development, influence, security, and confidence-building activities. Every plan must include synchronized battle- and war-winner actions and effects prior to, during, and following every operation.

For example, in preparation for a partnered ANP/ISAF cordon and search operation, the P-OMLT conducted a 10-day training program to bolster ANP capacity and prepare patrolmen to conduct building searches. Had this training not been synchronized with the operation, ANP patrolmen would not have been properly prepared to conduct their mission. The training was a success, and the ANP successfully executed thorough, professional, and effective searches throughout the initial operation and successive iterations in different villages. During the cordon and search, CIMIC operators followed immediately behind the partnered lead search teams to complete village surveys, gather critical local information from the population, carry out information operations messaging, locate key leaders to set the conditions for future meetings known as “key leader engagements,” and identify potential quick impact projects to further influence and support the population.

After deliberate operations, follow-up ANP/ISAF partnered patrols comprised of both battle and war winners maintained presence in and attention towards villages to gauge changing attitudes, targeted nonkinetic effects, and positively influenced the population. This technique was used successfully in several cordon and search
operations. Over the course of several months, it paid dividends in every instance. Relations between ISAF/ANSF patrols improved, and several villages that had previously been overtly hostile took a neutral stance, opening the door for future influence. Without the potential for kinetic operations and the overt physical security provided by the battle winners, the war winners would have been unable to act, giving insurgents a free hand to intimidate the population and win undecided residents to their cause. However, the long-term tangible benefits that the war winners provided made the insurgency unattractive and countered insurgent claims that the government cannot care for its population.

In order to maintain operational security, local officials were not apprised of deliberate security operations in advance. However, immediately after each operation commenced, the CIDA Stab O and OCC-D met with the DL and local officials to keep them apprised of progress, demonstrating trust and transparency. In every instance, the DL appreciated being included and supported ongoing security operations. After some operations, when local leaders approached the DL to criticize operations, he supported both the local police and military forces and emphasized the need for searches to ensure security. Due to her close relationship with government officials, the CIDA Stab O was able to assess what local village leaders were telling their district-level leadership and gauge grassroots attitudes to ongoing operations. This assessment, particularly in the aftermath of deliberate operations, provided the combat team commander a more balanced view and insights into the complexities of local politics that military forces alone would not have been able to provide. While the battle winners often led in deliberate security operations, kinetic operations were very much a whole-team, full spectrum event that relied on every element of the team, military and civilian, to succeed. Military commanders must know and understand how all attachments and enablers operate and what they can achieve, ensuring their employment in every operation.

Unity of Command Is Essential

Prior to the initiation of the BSC concept, there were, in some areas, multiple subunits operating in the same villages and interacting with the same villagers but pursuing different mandates. Information gathering was fragmented, as different elements reported information
through separate reporting chains, limiting lateral commander awareness. Patrols were unable to address effectively queries from locals about needs or grievances addressed in project proposals by other Task Force Kandahar units, drawing capability and credibility into question in the eyes of local leaders. This gap in understanding created difficulties, often confusing and infuriating village leaders when they attempted to ask questions or make complaints. Once the BSC concept was implemented, kinetic operations, patrolling, projects, messaging, meetings, and ANSF interactions were all tightly synchronized and more effectively targeted. Soldiers and civilians on patrols, attending meetings and interacting with the population, gathered information that the combat team headquarters analyzed and acted upon quickly, using the full spectrum of battle- and war-winning efforts. One commander remained responsible and accountable for effects on the population across the spectrum from kinetic events to efforts that influence the support of the population.

The Whole-of-Government Approach: A Whole Is Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts

Whole-of-government partners, such as civilian police officers and the CIDA Stab O, offered capabilities that counterbalanced and complemented those inherent in the military force. In the Dand District, the CIDA Stab O ensured that the combat team was apprised of ongoing civilian-led efforts in the district, ensuring that military patrols and efforts were able to gather information and atmospherics and thereby coordinate efforts. One such example is that of a tactical-level, civilian-led initiative to establish poultry farming in the Dand District. Rather than providing chickens, the program selected families for training in egg production, marketing, poultry supply chain management, and chicken husbandry to establish viable grassroots poultry farming in the district. CIDA funded this particular program, but locally contracted Afghan civilians oversaw it. The CIDA Stab O ensured that the BSC was aware of the program and therefore able to support it by gathering information on its progress and impact on the population. While the chicken program was not a civilian-military effort, the CIDA Stab O brought awareness and a link between civilian programs and military personnel that a purely military team would lack, and this link advanced overall civilian-military teaming goals.
Without bringing military and civilian efforts together under one commander, the chicken project would have been isolated, not synchronized with any other initiatives, and likely able to achieve only marginal effect. From the civilian aspect, the DFAIT representatives sponsoring it would have only reports from locally hired agents of unknown reliability to assess the project’s success or failure. In southern Kandahar’s fragile security situation, DFAIT would never have been able to reliably move, see, or assess the project for themselves. The military force, fully cognizant of the project’s scope and nuances, reliably reported on it, offered suggestions to modify it, and tracked it for the civilian components of the team. From the military side, knowing about ongoing projects like the chicken project gave leaders an informational advantage and point of leverage that could be used in negotiations, shown as an example of tangible development, or simply offered to deserving families to sway further the population’s support towards the government and away from the insurgency.

The civilian members of a mixed civilian-military team offered other multiple benefits to efforts in the Dand District. First, nonmilitary thinking and problem resolution styles helped the BSC resolve challenges in dealing with Afghan government officials. Second, specific expertise required for reconstruction and development was more readily available among civilian members of the team. Third, coordinating civilians and military personnel resulted in greater information sharing and ultimately better decision making. Fourth, civilians may have been better able to mentor, shape, teach, and develop the capacity of the ANSF and government bodies, build systems of governance and accountability, plan civil infrastructure development, foster economic development, and manage civil administrations—all techniques that were not the forte of most military personnel. Civilian-military teams could also offer a civilian face of leadership to represent the BSC at governance and development-oriented fora such as district development assemblies and administrative and education shuras and in mentoring sessions with district and other Afghan officials. Fifth, civilian personnel provided a less intimidating option than uniformed personnel in conducting meetings and liaising and interacting with locals, which left the BSC room to broaden the approach to resolve challenges by introducing uniformed personnel into a situation when required. In Dand, the CIDA Stab O worked very closely with district government staff to improve governance and accountability. Last, as a result of a longer rotation cycle,
civilian personnel represented longer-term commitment and organizational stability to locals and district staff. They often offered the BSC a vault of institutional memory that could be called upon to outline the history of current relationships and ongoing programs that a new BSC may have been unaware of when assuming responsibility for an area.

**Listen, Do Not Tell**

When interacting with Afghans, particularly when attempting to institute change, listening often paid better dividends than talking. When conducting an influence operation to set the conditions to recruit more police and establish new police stations in the district, the BSC met with a series of village leaders, elders, and tribal leaders. During each interaction, listening to what they had to say, asking their opinion of security activities, and soliciting their opinions on police checkpoints and patrols paid dividends. COIN experts say that “re-empowering the village councils of elders and restoring their community leadership is the only way” to counter religious leaders and others who have been “radicalized by the Taliban.” The local leaders were, in every instance, flattered to be asked for their advice instead of being “told by foreigners what was going to happen.” Listening instead of telling made measurable gains in building trust and cooperation between local leaders and ISAF/ANSF elements and further served to support and legitimize traditional village governance and leadership. Listening and understanding were also critical in building and maintaining a mixed civilian-military team.

**Tactical Patience: Follow the “48-Hour Rule”**

In conventional warfare, when conducting high-tempo, synchronized kinetic operations, pausing instead of taking quick and decisive action could prove fatal. Yet the best course of action was to resist the impulse to act quickly and pause to let situations develop when dealing with Afghan village elders, tribal leaders, and government officials. An oft-repeated maxim of the Afghan conflict has been that Western military forces had watches but the insurgents had the time. A focus on results, on meeting timings, on seeking quick resolution to challenges, and on taking forceful, decisive action played into the hands of a patient enemy who had time on his side. When the instinct
was to attack, negotiate aggressively, and push a point to culmination, both the military and civilian leader had to pause, think, and ask “[is our team] doing what the enemy wants us to do? . . . [Is our team] playing into his hands?” This consideration applied not only to conflict but also to interaction and negotiation, particularly in Afghanistan, where decisions were often made by group consensus, over long periods of time, only after periods of oration, negotiation, and demonstration. The military or civilian leaders who failed to understand or account for these considerations, who rushed too soon to commit force, funding, projects, or goodwill, ran the danger of jeopardizing themselves and their mission.

For example, in an attempt to maneuver the BSC into a hasty reaction and force him into a position of relational weakness, the DL refused to occupy his office at the district center (DC). With great public show, stating that he was displeased with security measures at the DC, the DL and staff took up temporary residence in a nearby unoccupied medical office. He quickly passed word to provincial-level officials that the BSC was preventing him from occupying his own DC and consulting with his people. The BSC ordered that business proceed as usual. When questioned, the BSC assured his own staff and his higher headquarters, who were understandably anxious, that the situation would be resolved within 48 hours. Within 24 hours, the DL’s staff, ANP representatives, and the local National Directorate of Security agent met and—with the assistance of the BSC’s staff—spent several hours devising and reviewing an Afghan-led, collaborative security plan for the facility that was amenable to all participants, including the DL. Within 48 hours, the DL had approved the new security plan, returned quietly to his office, and made no mention of his previous exodus. The tactical pause had achieved significant effect and tangibly demonstrated BSC resolve in the face of DL threats. The BSC’s actions allowed the DL to save face by successfully negotiating a resolution to his grievances and demonstrated the BSC’s support, respect, and consideration for the DL and his wishes. It was a tangible and public demonstration of the collective will for ISAF and Afghan government officials to cooperate, despite the often-conflicting demands for both security and access to the population that partnered facilities create.

As a second example, in front of a collection of tribal elders, the DL remonstrated that “Canadians did nothing for the people” and loudly lambasted a military staff officer. Rather than rushing out facts
and figures to prove him wrong or taking umbrage at the allegations, the staff officer politely concluded the meeting and ensured he had no further interaction with the DL for the remainder of the day. The next day, the DL cordially invited the same officer to sit with him, treated him to chai, assured him that he was pleased with the number and type of ongoing projects, and apologized profusely for his poor manners. Pausing and refusing to rise to provocation demonstrated that military staff were not subordinate to the DL and paved the way for a more cooperative working relationship for the remainder of the rotation.

**Civilian-Military Teams Come in Various Forms, not Just with Donor-Nation Personnel, but Also Host-Nation Police and Military Partnering**

Partnering may sound like a theoretical construct that is impossible to execute in real life, but it can be invaluable. In the fall of 2009, an ANSF element partnered with B Squadron conducted patrols in and around a contentious village. Partnered patrolling caused local insurgents significant consternation and positively influenced the population so well that the insurgent leadership panicked. An information source indicated that a local insurgent commander had harangued his fighters to immediately place improvised explosive devices in the road and on the tracks where the ANSF element had been patrolling. Despite protests from insurgents on the receiving end of the order, the local commander ordered his fighters to “do something immediately.” The partnered nature of the operation overwhelmed the insurgents’ command and control, which caused a local insurgent commander to panic and needlessly sacrifice his fighters.

Civilian elements of the team enhanced partnering in several ways. During the course of interactions with local government officials, they communicated and emphasized the effectiveness of both ANSF and ISAF in working together. Due to the sometimes fractious nature of Afghan government workings, there could have been a divide between Afghan government and security force elements that would range from slight mistrust to overt hostility. Indigenous military and police working together, presenting unified, consistent messages, would have demonstrated trust and cooperation and would have helped bridge this divide.
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Battle Procedure Must Be Applied to Civilian-Military Engagements

Kinetic operations are never conducted without proper battle procedure, war gaming, and rehearsals whenever possible and are followed up by after-action reviews. Military commanders and their civilian counterparts needed to plan nonkinetic operations together, including jirgas, shuras, or meetings with locals. Civilian-military teams had to be inculcated with the understanding that every interaction and activity needed to be a deliberate operation whenever possible.

Afghan tribal leaders, village elders, and local officials, accustomed to gaining power and influence through negotiation and building consensus through the shura and jirga systems, were practiced in exploiting opportunities to gain concessions, promises, or favors. The civilian-military team had to test scenarios, identify lines of discussion, delegate discussion issues, review critical messaging, and explore issues that participants may have used to maneuver the discussion.

For example, in February 2010, heavy rains caused extensive flood damage, and GIRoA asked ISAF to support its flood relief efforts. The morning after the rainstorm, the DL demanded an immediate meeting with the BSC and the district chief of police. The BSC, his civilian stabilization officer, and other key staff paused and conducted a quick planning session. They assessed that the DL would attempt to castigate ISAF in front of the district staff and a collection of notable village elders for not supporting the population with flood relief or supplies. Based on this assessment, the team role-played through a number of different situations that could have occurred during the meeting. This role-playing rehearsal enabled the team to determine collectively how to address contentious discussion issues and who would speak about which issue. They were also able to identify key speaking points and exit strategies for avoiding contentious, yet irrelevant, issues that could detract from the core discussion. The team also determined that it was absolutely critical to show that the situation was being resolved by Afghans executing an Afghan government plan, reaffirming that ISAF was supporting the Afghan solution to the problem and demonstrating the government’s legitimacy and ability to care for its population. During the subsequent meeting, after the formalities and pleasantries of greeting, the BSC opened the discussion with a generous statement of support for ANSF efforts and a selection of facts and figures concerning ANSF aid efforts to date. It
also provided a description of efforts taken by ISAF soldiers in the district to support the Afghan government in a second-tier fashion.

The BSC further leveraged the discussion to demonstrate the effectiveness of the newly created OCC-D. The DL acknowledged that the partnership offered benefit to the district's people and pledged further cooperation. Had the interaction not been carefully planned and rehearsed, the outcome could have been markedly different and the elders negatively influenced, which would have harmed future ISAF credibility in the district.

Conclusion: Consider “a” War, not Just “This” War

Debate has continued in offices, at mess tables, on hangar floors, and in schools throughout Canada's army on the relative merits of orienting training and efforts to focus on preparing for COIN at the expense of mechanized, high-intensity unit and formation-level warfare skills. COIN, particularly as practiced in the limited scope of one of many Afghan districts, may not define all future operations, but failing to recognize, understand, and apply lessons hard-won through experience would be shortsighted. One of Afghanistan’s lessons was the value of mixed civilian-military teams: their effectiveness compounded by the wide mix of skills and perspectives that civilian partners brought to the military commander. While operations in other theatres and in future conflicts will present a host of tactical, enemy, environmental, and human challenges that differ from those found in Afghanistan, these lessons form a framework of principles, proven in operations, that future civilian-military teams may well find useful in whatever conflict they may face.

Notes

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2. Task Force Kandahar 3-09 was comprised of a provincial reconstruction team, a battle group, a national support element, a task force headquarters, and a host of smaller elements, many of which operated in the same terrain. While predominantly a military organization, it worked in close conjunction with civilian personnel from Canadian government ministries and agencies including, but not limited to, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Corrections Canada.


6. David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” in Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29; and Program for Cultural and Conflict Studies, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Analyzing the Taliban Code of Conduct: Reinventing the Layeha, Understanding Afghan Culture, Occasional Paper series no. 3 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 6 August 2009), 10. This piece offers the text and an analysis of the 2009 Layeha, or Taliban code of conduct. On page 11, guideline no. 59 states that “the Mujahedeen must have a good relationship with all the tribal community and with the local people, so they are always welcomed and are able to get help from the local people.” A note from Mullah Omar written on the back page directs fighters to “keep good relationships with your friends and the local people, and do not let the enemy divide/separate you.”

7. C. J. Radin, “Afghan Security Forces Order of Battle,” Long War Journal, 15 April 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/oob/afghanistan/index.php. This work contains a comprehensive description of ANSF organization, manning, training, budgets, and development, current as of 15 April 2010. In common terms, ANSF generally refers to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), while smaller police elements such as the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) also interact with ISAF elements. Not mentioned in the reference is the National Directorate of Security (NDS), an internal security and intelligence gathering body reporting to the Ministry of the Interior with wide powers of arrest and detention. NDS methods have been called into question as indicated in Gil Shochat, “Tories Alerted to Afghan Secret Police Legal ‘Risk,’” Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News, 6 April 2010,
http://www.cbc.ca/politics/story/2010/04/06/afghan-detainee-transfers.html. In the Dand District, one CID officer and one NDS detachment were collocated with the ANP in the district centre compound.

8. As indicated during a series of briefings from the commanding officer and key staff of the Kandahar Operational Coordination Centre–Provincial (OCC-P[K]) to Operational Coordination Centre–District (OCC-D) commanders, January 2010. At time of writing, the reference was not available from any open source or online repositories; this information was taken from the author’s personal notes.


10. Combat teams and battle groups are based on either an armour or an infantry organization but contain elements of both, plus battlefield enablers such as artillery forward observation teams and combat engineers. Doctrinally, Canada’s infantry seeks to close with and destroy the enemy, while armour seeks to defeat the enemy through the aggressive use of firepower and battlefield mobility, although none can operate effectively in combat without the other—hence, the value of the combined arms team. Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, B-GL-300-001/FP-001–Land Operations (English) (Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario: Army Publishing Office, 2008), 1-4–1-7, http://info.publicintelligence.net/CanadaLandOps.pdf. This publication contains further information about Canadian land force organization.


12. Howard Chafe, stabilization manager, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, personal correspondence with the author, 22 January 2011. Chafe identifies that this approach, while applied successfully by two successive Dand District BSCs, one Canadian and one American, is not always applied consistently by every military commander. Matching actions in planning, mind-set, and conduct of operations to stated verbal support of civilian partners and COIN thinking is critical to ensuring that subordinates at all levels understand and apply the same principles in operations.


In a practical context, atmospherics are the confluence of thoughts, feelings, attitudes, postures, perceptions, and general perspectives that are observed and felt during interaction. Atmospherics can often only be gauged effectively after protracted presence in a village, in order to separate first impressions from enduring attitudes and to understand their context. For example, children throwing stones at patrols may not be an indicator of hostility to local forces. Instead, it may be an indicator of a weak village leader that places less stock in proper respect for visitors than other village leaders. When forces become familiar with and accustomed to operating in a particular area, they become quite adept at gauging atmospherics and noting changes.


16. Many different elders and leaders repeated this complaint frequently during a series of security shuras throughout the district.


18. Ward, “ ‘Model’ District No Safe Haven,” states that two suicide bombers attacked the Dand District Centre in March 2009, severely damaging the main building that is the seat of Afghan governance in the Dand District. On 30 December 2010, an IED destroyed a Canadian vehicle less than 2,000 m from the district centre, killing five. Throughout 2009 and 2010, Dand District government and police officials were frequently threatened and targeted by attacks on several occasions.

19. A paper from the Naval Postgraduate School identifies that drinking chai (tea) is an important element of Afghan Pashto culture and a mark of honour and respect. Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Operational Pashtunwali—Understanding Afghan Culture, Occasional Paper Series no. 1 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 15 June 2009), 4.

20. This practice is reinforced at every level of army leadership training and is part and parcel of Canada’s current military culture.

21. Often these are collectively known as “key leaders.” Interactions with them are known as “key leader engagements.”

22. For reasons of operational security, names have been omitted; however, all accounts are factual, experienced personally by the author, and the information provided is taken from author’s notes.
In Afghanistan, and in other conflicts for the foreseeable future, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to respond to unconventional and asymmetrical conflicts that will require a comprehensive approach by the military as well as civilian agencies. NATO’s success against such threats demands effective, complementary civilian-military operations combining hard and soft power.

The reluctance of Germany and other European allies to accept a leading combat role as part of their NATO commitment was at the root of the clash between American and European leaders on Afghanistan policy and had consequences for NATO’s strategic concept and Germany’s national security. Germany’s constitutional approach to the use of its Federal Defense Force, the Bundeswehr, emphasized the government’s commitment to protect human dignity. In other words, the Bundeswehr’s primary mission was not combat.

Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, explained her country’s reasons for deployment in Afghanistan in terms of policy and grand strategy objectives and necessary operations: “No development without security and no security without development—this mutual dependence we see everywhere.”

The German parliamentary mandate, authorizing the participation of German soldiers in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is based on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1386, which authorized the use of force against the Taliban. The German government allowed “all necessary means,” including the use of military force, to fulfill the United Nations (UN) mandate, providing and prioritizing for the protection of human rights. In principle, the UN mandate included combat against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. However, the German parliament interpreted the protection of human rights as a guarantee not to harm any civilians, so that, as a practical matter, German soldiers were constrained to use
defensive force only if they were attacked and in medical evacuation situations. Heavy weapons (self-propelled guns or mortars) left the German bases and did not support long-range patrols or reconnaissance missions. German airplanes were prohibited from engaging ground targets. The primary German goal was to assist ISAF in preparations to turn governing responsibilities over to the Afghan government.2

In other words, the Bundeswehr, the third-largest NATO troop contingent in Afghanistan, functioned almost exclusively in peacebuilding, reconstruction, and stabilization roles. The German public was deeply averse to the use of force by the Bundeswehr, and in response, the elected Bundestag (lower house of parliament) limited the Bundeswehr rules of engagement in combat roles, except under specific, narrowly defined parameters. Each Bundeswehr deployment depended on a mission-by-mission parliamentary approval decision, which had a political rather than military character. In the case of Afghanistan, the mandate explicitly limited the Bundeswehr to non-kinetic, peacebuilding operations and to force protection.

The United States came to expect relatively less combat contribution from Germany and other European allies. Steven Erlanger explained that the United States viewed Europe as a partner that was “not a problem for the [United States], but not much help either.”3 In his farewell to NATO on 3 June 2011, Robert Gates, US secretary of defense, expressed his concern about the viability of NATO and its capacity to carry out combat and civilian-military operations, stating that “in the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance: Between members who specialize in ‘soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping and negotiation tasks, and those conducting the ‘hard’ combat missions. . . . [NATO is] here today. And it [the two-tiered system] is unacceptable.”4 This farewell comment followed his address about NATO’s strategic concept in which he expressed concern about what he perceived to be demilitarization by European powers, even in the face of serious twenty-first-century threats. The collapse of the Dutch government in 2010 and the public opposition toward military deployments to Afghanistan in many European countries heightened his concern.5

As NATO incorporates new initiatives for civilian-military collaboration, lessons learned from German military deployments can help inform the debate from the tactical and operational level to help identify novel approaches to meet and defeat current and future threats to US security.
Germany’s Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan and Lessons Learned

There is no doubt that the absence of a comprehensive German security strategy led to ambiguity in the political decision-making process on troop deployments. German history and domestic political conditions set the caveats for the Bundeswehr in NATO missions and raised the question of German willingness to use military force. Civilian nation-building was the primary military mission in NATO’s comprehensive approach deemed “networked security” (Vernetzte Sicherheit) for the Bundeswehr.

Since German reunification in 1990, German parliamentarians have voted repeatedly for Bundeswehr deployments in NATO and UN missions, slowly urging the German public to allow the Bundeswehr to be more involved militarily and even to accept a rapid-reaction military combat role in NATO operations. Looking forward, if NATO is to count on Germany as an effective ally during the next 20 years, German politicians will need to overcome public resistance and historical French, British, Polish, and Russian resistance to an expanded German combat role as well.

Deploying the Bundeswehr followed Germany’s political consensus-building process that decided the international deployments of the Bundeswehr on a case-specific basis, which took constitutional requirements and both historical and current circumstances into account. Peacebuilding through Vernetzte Sicherheit included civilian operations, functions which were described by Friedel Eggelmeyer in the Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Magazine for Europe und International Affairs, including the following:

- Civilian and military actors must work together in Afghanistan in coordination with each other. Then (and only then) can they make achievements in development to improve living standards.
- To achieve stability, peace, and security in conflict zones, the cooperation of military and civilian actors is imperative.
- Through deployment in northern Afghanistan, German military forces carry a special responsibility for security. At the same time, they support development policy, civilian reconstruction, and economic, social, and political development.
• Germany increased its investments in reconstruction efforts from €200 million in 2008 to €430 million per year from 2010 through 2013.6

As evidence of achievements in improving living standards in Afghanistan, the magazine cited several successes, including an increase in annual per capita income from $100 to $500, a 10-fold national revenue increase, and a reduction in child mortality rate by one-third. The German emphasis was on economic development, water and energy supply, elementary and primary education, and governance. Finally, the German Foreign Ministry assisted with other support efforts in the health sector, civil aviation, cultural preservation, and higher education. German civilian-military operations were in the areas of security assistance with the development of the Afghan army and police forces.

**Germany’s Security Debate: From Militarism to Peacebuilding**

It was important to track where Germany traveled in terms of military and security policy since it was reunified on 3 October 1990. Reunification restored full sovereignty and with it the duty to provide and protect Germany’s freedom and security as well as to promote prosperity for all its citizens, East and West. Reunified Germany kept its NATO membership and accepted the obligations of common defense of all other members.

There was to be no renationalization of security policy and no return to militarism. Germany remained in NATO and the European Union (EU), distancing its current politics from the past. This unconditional recognition of Germany’s ties to the West represented an important watershed in party politics. Meeting these military obligations was a serious turning point in Germany’s domestic politics and its security debate.7 That security debate in reunited Germany has encompassed four important themes:

• aversion to the use of force that comes from West Germany’s culture of restraint;
• territorial defense against the Soviet (Russian) and Warsaw Pact threat;
• abhorrence of expeditionary combat missions; and
• protecting, when vitally necessary, the inviolability of human dignity under Article I of the constitution, the German Basic Law.\(^8\)

In the debate over the use of force, Germany embraced the essence of the protection of human dignity, which embodied its raison d’être in the constitutional mandate of the Basic Law. The Basic Law set out legally binding language of basic rights: “Human dignity shall be inviolable and to respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. . . . Basic rights shall bind the legislature; the unified Germany kept its NATO membership and accepted the obligations of common defense of all other members executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.”\(^9\)

Two considerations, remaining in NATO and repatriating Russian soldiers, dominated German security policy in the first four years following reunification. Obstacles to developing a usable security strategy come from West German traditions of pacifism, moralism, and resistance to the use of military force. The ideological motto that “never again shall war arise from German soil” (*Nie wieder Krieg vom Deutschen Boden*) was widely shared across the political spectrum and reflected the responsibility that weighed heavily on that generation of German leaders. A second set of traditions come from European integration, NATO membership, UN multilateralism, and political commitment to democratization, all of which have strengthened the belief in political solutions without the use of force.\(^10\)

Germany’s relationship to Russia during World War II and the Cold War and the stationing of Russian soldiers in East Germany complicated the transformation of Germany’s new armed forces in NATO. When Germany combined the Bundeswehr with the East German armed forces, called the National People’s Army (*Nationale Volksarmee*, or NVA), the Soviet/Russian military was still stationed in the eastern part of reunited Germany. In the reunification agreement, Germany agreed to limit the number of soldiers in its combined military to 370,000 to emphasize its previous role in territorial defense and its determination not to move to aggressive combat missions.\(^11\) The Russians could be reassured Germany would not be aggressive against Russia, which remains a political theme today.
Soviet forces remaining in the former East Germany led to delicate talks about how to manage the departure of all Soviet/Russian troops from the territory of the former German Democratic Republic after reunification. In the end, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, agreed to a four-year process of repatriation of Soviet forces, a decision foreshadowed by his UN speech in 1988 in which he stated that sovereign countries could decide on their own which alliances to join. Germany won agreement to repatriate all Russian soldiers from Germany by August 1994, which ended the Soviet/Russian military presence in Germany.

The Germans remember that their country was divided and occupied in their lifetimes as a result of the catastrophe of World War II. In reaching the agreement on repatriation, NATO agreed with Gorbachev not to move its forces eastward where Soviet forces were still stationed. Consequently, during the repatriation period, NATO refrained from deploying its forces on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. Throughout the repatriation period, the territory was given special status, and only Bundeswehr-Ost, a territorial defense force of the new national army, was stationed there.

After reunification, German generals Klaus Naumann and Jörg Schönbohm were tasked with dissolving the East German army. General Schönbohm created the new Bundeswehr-Ost command with 11,000 NVA officers, and other ranks were integrated into the Bundeswehr. In addition, Naumann and Schönbohm carried out the Bundeswehr reform, adapting the forces to new post-Cold War political and security requirements, as well as making them operational in the event of an international crisis. The NATO decision to station its forces in the eastern part of Germany would be delayed until the last Soviet soldiers departed Germany after reunification day (3 October 1990). In September 1994, NATO officially accepted the former East German territory, a former Warsaw Pact member, as its first new member.

Over time, the role of the Bundeswehr would be to develop component capabilities and train soldiers for crises. The new combined army would plan and train for missions, including

- territorial defense for sovereign Germany’s democracy;
- NATO defense missions and contributions for crisis management;
- early warning and analysis capabilities;
• collective security missions beyond NATO;
• interoperability and international cooperation; and
• confidence-building, cooperation, and verification.\(^{15}\)

The capability to take on these future missions that were intended to be achieved by 2000 would face an early challenge. The breakup of Yugoslavia demanded military force in 1991, almost a decade before 2000. Germany’s culture of military restraint was soon tested when a bold act in 1991 led the way for international diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, essentially turning the civil war into an interstate conflict in which European powers more or less took sides.\(^{16}\) That national push for internationalizing the war in Yugoslavia did not end the conflict. Rather, war and ethnic cleansing challenged the Germans to act. The limitations on the military role, which had grown strong, also dragged the United States into the conflict despite its lack of vital interests in the area. When Germany and the EU were unable to prevent the escalating military conflict, a bitter experience ensued for the United States, Germany, the EU, and the UN. This early transatlantic rift over deploying the military, including the authority to use force, continued in disputes over military capabilities and in debates about war, peacekeeping, and nation-building.

Military missions in the breakup of Yugoslavia were challenged, as noted above, in the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court, which decided on 12 July 1994, that German forces could participate in out-of-area NATO missions under the constitution. The high court decision came down during US Pres. Bill Clinton’s 1994 visit in Berlin.

When the United States learned of the high court decision that German soldiers could be deployed out of Germany but only as part of an alliance and with the explicit consent of the Bundestag, German chancellor Helmut Kohl, in his news conference with President Clinton, immediately declared that the decision did not mean that Germans were to be sent to the front. Nevertheless, the decision meant exactly that.\(^{17}\) A closer look at that court decision is warranted.

After the 1994 decision, the court set the rules for deployments. Although the court reasoned that the new strategic concept of NATO was not an amendment to the treaty and did not require a new parliamentary approval, deploying German soldiers was not a straightforward decision. The court relied on Article 24.2 of the Basic Law, which required that Germany’s deployments be part of a collective security system, and Article 59.2, which stipulated that the Bundestag must approve
the mutual collective security system. The Bundeswehr became a parliamentary army with this decision.

The next major political development came when NATO considered accepting new members. NATO enlargement would mean more German responsibility for its neighbors; however, that responsibility was again territorial defense, not a change in strategy toward expeditionary forces or force projection outside of Germany. President Clinton moved in 1996 to enlarge NATO and extend security guarantees to former Warsaw Pact countries. Chancellor Kohl was willing to support NATO enlargement in 1997 for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The decision to help protect and defend those three countries was a major step in Germany’s acceptance of new security responsibilities in NATO.

Following the Dayton Accords in 1995, in which US ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke and German Foreign Office political director Wolfgang Ischinger played key roles, the German defense and foreign ministers led the way for the decision to deploy the Bundeswehr to Bosnia. The Bundestag subsequently decided on requests for Bundeswehr logistics and support troops in Bosnia, approving the use of Panavia Tornado electronic combat/reconnaissance aircraft in support of combat missions and eventually infantry on the ground. By 1997 US Army general William Crouch, the Stabilization Force commander, chose a Bundeswehr general to be his chief of staff. Naming a German general to the chain of command, with decision making authority over combat missions, was a critical political step in the developing German security policy, but the German public still met it with skepticism.

Protecting the inviolability of human dignity would take center stage with the NATO decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo to end ethnic cleansing. Madeleine Albright, US secretary of state, and Joschka Fischer, German foreign minister, led the debate, and the decision was reached, with other European allies, to authorize NATO to bomb in Kosovo. That humanitarian/military intervention ended Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s genocidal campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Already in October 1998, NATO authorized Operation Eagle Eye, an aerial surveillance in which 350 Bundeswehr soldiers were to participate and for which the German government sought Bundestag approval. On 25 February 1999, the Bundestag debated and approved a German contribution to international troops for Kosovo that would be under NATO command. Protecting the inviolability of human dignity
took center stage with the NATO decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo to end ethnic cleansing. This vote laid the foundation for Bundeswehr participation in Kosovo Force (KFOR). From January to March 1999, the conflict intensified, and the UN Security Council condemned the Racak massacre—in which Serbian troops killed some 45 Albanians. On 18 March 1999, the Kosovar, American, and British delegations attending a peace conference just outside of Paris, which aimed to avoid war in Kosovo, signed the Rambouillet Accords, calling for the Yugoslavian government to grant Kosovo a wide degree of autonomy. The Russian and Serbian delegations staunchly rejected the proposed peace agreement. Consequently, to enforce the accords and in an all-out effort to end Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO conducted a bombing campaign against Serbian forces from 22 March to 11 June 1999. This was the first time since World War II that the Luftwaffe, the German air force, participated directly in combat missions.

There was no formal declaration of war by NATO; instead, the bombing was characterized as a military action to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. The Serbs withdrew, KFOR entered Kosovo on 3 June 1999, and the conflict ended on 11 June 1999.22 The effort to define German security interests advanced in April 1999 when the German Foreign Office stated the following objectives for the operations in the Kosovo crisis:

- bringing violent ethnic conflicts under control as a precondition for lasting stability throughout Europe;
- preventing migration caused by poverty, war, and civil war;
- getting democracy, human rights, and minority rights to take root as a goal of a foreign policy guided by values;
- building up market economies with stable growth to reduce the prosperity gap in Europe;
- creating economic interests (expandable market outlets and investment sites); and
- establishing cooperation and credibility for international organizations in which Germany plays an active role (EU, NATO, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe [OSCE], and UN).23
The consequences for the German security debate were important. After that aggressive use of force in Kosovo, the German slogan “Nie Wieder Auschwitz” (Never Again Auschwitz) took on a new meaning: Germany had to use force to prevent genocide. The old motto that “no war could be allowed to emanate again from German soil” was no longer sufficient to protect human dignity, end ethnic cleansing, or prevent war. Acting with NATO in the aggressive use of force, Germany was true to its postwar constitutional mandate to protect the inviolability of human dignity. This humanitarian military intervention led to the UN Principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which allowed international military intervention to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

The Twenty-First-Century Bundeswehr Goes Global

At the time of writing this chapter, the Bundeswehr’s Afghanistan mandate and German security debate had not yet led to a new German security strategy. The sad fact is that after Gerhard Schröder, former German chancellor, said no to deployments in Iraq, German politicians conflated Iraq with Afghanistan, which confused the threat assessment, leaving the public with the view that Afghanistan was more of a civilian development project than a war. Understanding the difficulties of civilian reconstruction and development in Afghanistan has also been badly underestimated. Defining a civilian role for some countries that have well-functioning institutional systems that could partly be used for rebuilding was critical for defining the mission, and Afghanistan had virtually no governing institutions, no civil society, no civic organizations, or any grassroots customs. That difficult challenge called for long-term commitment, but the government was looking for a way to turn over governance responsibility to the Afghans and withdraw its soldiers rather than debate complex operations and change the rules of engagement, which would have allowed more aggressive combat operations. German politicians who sent soldiers to war and then limited them to civilian operations did the soldiers no favor.

Another conflict in the German role in Afghanistan arose in September 2009 when Bundeswehr colonel Georg Klein called in a NATO airstrike against a group of Taliban who had hijacked two fuel trucks in Kunduz, intending to use the trucks as bombs against the
German troops. Klein popped the illusory bubble that Germany was not at war. The Kunduz attack changed the debate; Germans in Afghanistan were at war, and war was rejected by a significant majority of Germans at home. After the Kunduz attack, which took place in the midst of the September 2009 German election campaign, Chancellor Merkel had to intervene in the parliamentary debate with a statement to the Bundestag. That statement effectively shut down the Afghanistan debate during the election campaign at a time when approximately 60 percent of Germans wanted an immediate withdrawal. The Financial Times reported on 23 February 2010 that 56 percent of those polled believed the NATO mission would fail and nearly 70 percent called for withdrawal.

The new mandate’s rules of engagement only allowed the Bundeswehr to be stationed in the ISAF regions of Kabul and the northern provinces (Faryab, Sar-e Pol, Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakshan). Recognizing that the most intense fighting was in the south, the mandate did allow the Bundeswehr to deploy in other regions for a limited time for missions that ISAF itself could not fulfill. It also allowed the Luftwaffe to fly Tornado aircraft in surveillance missions in all ISAF areas. The underlying reasoning that was acceptable to the Bundestag was that the new strategy was designed to prepare for withdrawal of German troops. Guido Westerwelle, German foreign minister, explained the goal of withdrawal by 2014 as Afghan president Hamid Karzai had proposed. Germany’s mission was to enable a responsible handover to the Afghan government, which was critical in allowing the withdrawal of German soldiers. Germany’s mission in Afghanistan was designed to prevent attacks on Western values from terrorists in Afghanistan, to demonstrate solidarity with the international community, and to participate in the UN-mandated mission there as carried out by NATO.

The German military mission as part of ISAF was also clear: to ensure security of Bundeswehr forces, to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists, and to fulfill constitutional obligations to fellow human beings. The focus of the debate was whether German reliance on civilian operations and US reliance on military operations could lead to a joint strategy and integrated operations. Even without an articulated national strategy, on 26 February 2010, the Bundestag approved a new mandate for continuing the deployment of German soldiers to Afghanistan as part of ISAF. Lawmakers voted 429 to 111 with 46 abstentions to increase the number of soldiers allowed
to serve from 4,500 to 5,350. The numerical increase, however, came with politically necessary operational conditions. To secure sufficient votes, German leaders had to emphasize the civilian reconstruction efforts and minimize aspects of the mission authorizing combat operations. The new mandate’s rules of engagement allowed the Bundeswehr to be stationed only in the ISAF regions of Kabul and the northern provinces.

Public support in early 2010 for sending more soldiers to the Hindu Kush Mountains in Afghanistan was weak: only 25 percent favored the decision, while 69 percent opposed it. The collapse of the Dutch government in the wake of disagreement about Afghanistan could have caused a political ripple effect and reduced or eliminated support for the mission in other European countries. A consensus between German elite and public opinion did not exist, and Germany, above all, had to convince its public that the mission in Afghanistan served the vital collective security interests of the country and its European partners.

The Future of German Military and Civilian Roles

As Robert Gates intimated, a comprehensive approach toward civilian-military teams is needed to ensure that NATO can succeed. Such operations will likely play an increasingly important role in NATO strategy that combines civilian and military operations to fight the wars of the twenty-first century. While Germany has not articulated a comprehensive national security strategy, it has, after 20 years, defined its first principles. Politically, and through the high court, Berlin has affirmed its willingness to act militarily in solidarity within its alliances, NATO, EU, and UN. It will remain mindful of Russian interests in light of agreements on reunification and according to national interests. While responding to Germany’s singularly focused approach to complex operations and the nation’s aversion to the use of force must be adjusted to overcome resistance from its citizens and its neighbors to its alliance obligations, the Bundeswehr will retain its territorial defense mission. Its aversion to the use of force supports its priority to provide training, civilian reconstruction, and stabilization operations. Germany will use force to protect victims of genocide and to prevent crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
Ethnic cleansing. It will not support the use of force in preemptive attacks, such as the invasion of Iraq.

It will take time for the German Bundestag to fully accept the adage of Frederick the Great: “Diplomacy without arms is like a concert without a score.” The Germans at reunification kept their full membership in NATO and have deployed the Bundeswehr in out-of-area missions to Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Congo, and Afghanistan. Germany has maintained its strategic vision, if not a fully developed national strategy. In other words, Germany’s aversion to military force and belief that military force alone cannot solve security issues in the twenty-first century are twin positions that have broad public support in Europe; however, that does not mean Germany is demilitarizing. Debates such as those over involvement in Afghanistan need to address the political will to use military force as a last resort to protect vital interests, as was done in Kosovo.

Volker Rühe, German defense minister from 1992 to 1998, from the beginning of his time in office made clear that Germany must live up to its growing international role and that the Bundeswehr would be deployed if the UN asked for it to do so, as it did in Somalia and Cambodia.

In Afghanistan, as noted in US Army Field Manual (FM) 3–24, Counterinsurgency, the primary objective of counterinsurgency (COIN) was to foster effective governance by legitimate government. NATO policy should immediately aim to develop local legitimacy through a combination of civilian and military teams. When the NATO mission finishes, the use of force should be transferred from NATO to the Afghan government. Unless it has the consent of the governed, Afghanistan is likely to again become a failed state.

A forceful argument could be made that an approach different from centralized governance in the region is desperately needed. The Afghanistan-Pakistan region was one primarily of ethnic groups that wanted to govern themselves separately (as warlords, tribal leaders, and princes). These ethnic groups continue to largely reject the exclusive control of the central government in Kabul. Without legitimacy, the Kabul government will fall back on coercion against regional powers and will likely cooperate with the Taliban to use its own military force to maintain power when NATO departs.

Legitimacy for the Afghan government and NATO’s success in Afghanistan will likely be based on shared power among local leaders who can form the basis for sustainable governance in Afghan society.
Good governance might be possible if the Karzai government can share power with (devolve power to) local leaders. A decision by the Afghans to convene a *loya jirga* (grand council) to decide to share power between Kabul and regionally antonymous leaders would be a powerful tool for NATO. Such a grand council could examine the role of the central government, decide on changes that would devolve power to local leaders, and establish a balanced power-sharing relationship with the presidency in Kabul. Unfortunately, at the time of this analysis, the constitution does not genuinely command deep support and cannot contribute to national stability in that form; thus, NATO needs to be able to transfer power to Afghans to ensure their own security.

COIN doctrine in FM 3-24 addresses unity of effort when integrating civilian and military activities at the operational level. This integration for operations in the field also provides a template for integrating at the policy level. However, over the past few decades, civilian agencies of the US government have lost the capacity to deliver civilian projects. Although efforts such as the creation of the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization began the process of internal capacity-building, those efforts take years. In the meantime, European and especially German civilian capabilities can be integrated into US kinetic and nonkinetic operations, as called for in the field manual.

As NATO forged a common transatlantic policy on Afghanistan and complex operations, the United States had to continue to look to Europe and to Germany in particular. They were the partners the United States came to expect to help secure peace in Afghanistan. Berlin could have led the policy debate to integrate NATO complex reconstruction and stabilization projects, while Washington could have taken the lead in shaping the consensus on training and operating joint combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Yet both also needed to engage fully in combat and noncombat roles in all their complexities. As long as US special forces in Kunduz did not train jointly with the Bundeswehr forces stationed there, NATO missed an opportunity for greater combat-readiness and integration. Likewise, civilian-military forces could also be integrated in reconstruction and peacebuilding projects.

Overcoming the German public’s residual aversion to the use of force is difficult but necessary, if Germany is to accept full NATO engagement. The German public has understood and accepted the
importance of collective actions and the collective security purpose of the alliance. German leaders should act more boldly to guide the public discussion and persuade the general public of the necessary adjustments to the security strategy, which genuinely serve German and European interests. The Bundestag, noting the principle of solidarity with the NATO strategy of collective defense and German interest in stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan, should likely continue to support the deployment and might also approve rules of engagement required for joint military operations. NATO’s goal, after all, was to turn over these missions to the Afghans, and that goal was to be achieved in 2014. From my own experience in the Third Infantry Division, I believe that unless operations are jointly planned, trained for, and executed, they remain separate and thereby weakened and undermined in effectiveness.

Finally, German political leaders need to summon the political will to confront the German public with the reality of the need to use force to defend German interests, while continuing to provide development assistance. Likewise, the US government needs to confront its public with the need to fund civilian agencies to build US capacity for civilian projects. One such project might include the establishment of joint US–German brigades to support a common two-track, but unified, combat and complex operations operational force. Such a capacity would follow policies and operations for joint, dual-hatted, civilian-military missions that could lead to a security strategy sustained by both publics.

NATO has placed primary responsibility for nation-building operations in the hands of civilian agencies and left the Bundeswehr with primary roles focused on force protection and coordination of nongovernmental organization (NGO) and development agency efforts. Germany’s military operation, as part of NATO, was filled with caveats on military/combat operations that conflicted with its obligations for greater involvement in COIN operations.

Germany’s constitutional ruling on the need for Bundestag mandates for German forces to be deployed abroad will not change. The Bundeswehr could be deployed in complex operations, but they will still need a parliamentary mandate to deploy. However, for the German development ministry, police, and other civilian agencies, there is no such restriction. In Afghanistan, following the turnover of combat missions to the Afghan army, peacebuilding missions required collaboration among international military and civilian components
and local populations. One approach to such civilian-military missions could be served by exploring civilian-military concordance theory and targeted partnerships, which Rebecca Schiff argues create a temporary and synergistic collaboration of civilian and military boundaries. Targeted partnership is a short-term distillation of concordance theory that offers the opportunity for policy makers and military leadership to achieve nation-building objectives that marshal diverse civilian and military perspectives in a protected space of dialogue and encourage discourse leading to effective policy and military strategy. Targeted partnership does not superimpose a Western-bound civilian-military relationship on a host nation's indigenous cultures and institutions.

The ultimate goal is to achieve concordance in Afghanistan, where agreement between political elites, military, and citizenry can occur among the four concordance indicators: 1) officer corps composition, 2) political decision-making process, 3) recruitment method, and 4) military style. Concordance among these four indicators results in broad institutional and cultural agreement regarding the purpose and role of the Afghan armed forces. Targeted partnership is a distillate form of concordance theory and provides policy architecture and mediation within the political decision-making process indicator that can be augmented during the state-building process.

One of the lessons of ISAF is that the deployed force did not have the civilian reconstruction and stabilization capacity that was needed in the Afghanistan conflict. Schiff suggested in her targeted partnership theory that nation-building conditions may have met limitations that required more fluidity among the concordance partners, especially with respect to a nation’s decision-making process. This process referred to the specific channels that determined the needs, allocation, and strategic direction of the military such as budget and materials, military size and structure, and military strategy. While the decision-making process involved the citizens empowering political elites who in turn oversaw these military decisions, situations often called for the chain of command to be more like a “chain of collaboration.” Organizing the Afghan military and police, NGOs, and other civilian agencies therefore primarily required a worldview that was not focused on US- and Western-bound, civilian-military separations.

In Afghanistan, civilian-military separations in policy planning or a unique blend of military and society roles determine the composition and role of the armed forces. The overarching objective is to achieve concordance among the political elites, the military, and the
local citizenry as well as the political elite and military with respect to the mission and role of the armed forces. One practical way to achieve concordance was to encourage dialogue and interaction among military and civilian actors who took these opportunities toward achieving specific goals regardless of their traditional roles in society. Schiff suggested that targeted partnership brought these players together, as often as needed, while embracing indigenous institutional and cultural differences. ISAF military officers and German police officers, for example, may have needed to partner on common ground in order to attain and implement objectives that efficiently defined and coalesced these important institutions within the context of the Afghan political and cultural landscape. While specific roles may have evolved for civilian and military institutions, targeted partnership encouraged these roles to be redefined through the deliberate institutionalization of spaces fostering dialogue and reconciliation.

One example of this policy-level partnership idea for civilian-military collaboration is the double-hatted German provincial reconstruction team (PRT) deploying foreign office officials as the partner for the military commander, similar to other PRT teams. The German diplomats were tasked with creating reconstruction and stabilization programs and with coordination of civilian German NGO programs to strengthen governance in Afghanistan. Soldiers were not familiar with or trained to control and monitor civilian development agency or NGO projects. The experts in those projects come from the German civilian agencies such as the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development or the Association for International Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [GIZ]). As a German federal enterprise, GIZ supported the German government in achieving its objectives in the field of international cooperation for sustainable development.

Military engineers and patrols drew from the Bundeswehr experience in the Balkans (Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and KFOR), and coordinated with village leaders to conduct security operations and some small-scale development projects. Lacking civilian capacity, the military has had some mission creep and has taken on some reconstruction tasks, particularly with local construction companies. The collaboration with local construction made it easier to transfer credit for road or bridge construction to the local government. NATO should have established the civilian chain of command in this structure. At the time of this analysis, only the military
chain of command rose from the PRT to the top German commanders in the ISAF area of operations. At each command level down to the PRT, the field officers needed to have the authority to report to both the civilian and military senior officers without resorting to the stovepiping that traditionally occurs. Temporary comingling of military and civilian forces with clear lines of authority would allow success in terms of the objectives and necessary operations set out by Chancellor Merkel.

Implications for German Security Policy—Military Intervention in Libya

The Afghanistan experience with limited German combat operations has implications for the future of German expeditionary deployments. One case in point is Germany’s struggle to understand and to define its global responsibilities and leadership during the 2009–2011 Euro Crisis and the war in Afghanistan when confronted with obligations under the UN principles of the R2P in Libya with its NATO allies. The political debate in Germany has taken the country’s policy discourse through more turns than a stock car racetrack. Tracking Germany’s direction is confusing, not only in its Afghanistan deployments. German decisions in the Libya case raised fundamental questions about whether, how, and when Germany will be prepared to act militarily in support of the UN, NATO, or the EU.

In the Libya case, Germany abstained on the UN Security Council vote on UNSC Resolution 1973, which served as the legal foundation for international armed intervention in the Libyan civil war. The resolution passed. However, Germany’s de facto “no” vote and its subsequent decision to withdraw its naval warships from NATO operations in the Mediterranean created doubts about Germany’s willingness to use legitimate military force to protect the inviolability of human dignity in concert with its allies. These decisions seem self-interested national concerns rather than being in the broader interests of transatlantic relations. Germany’s actions have raised the question of its role in NATO as a partner in security and defense policy.

Protecting Libyans from genocide would have been consistent with Germany’s constitutional commitment to protect human dignity and UN principles of R2P. There was no doubt Mu’ammar Gadhafi’s threat to kill his own countrymen was credible. His bombing of
the Berlin La Belle Disco in 1986, which killed a woman and two US service members and injured more than 230 people and the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 with his approval were acts of terror. The call from the UN and the Arab nations to protect Libyans demonstrated the broad validity of his threat and urgency to counter it. Germany’s insistence on a political solution and claims that in Libya there could be “no military solution” negatively contributed to the strain in NATO solidarity that stressed the alliance. The German decision was not understandable or acceptable to its NATO allies and the debate continues over German security policy.

In the future, NATO needs effective stability and reconstruction capabilities to implement its comprehensive approach. In the report *Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century*, Daniel Hamilton and his team at the Washington NATO Project note that “although many of the necessary capabilities—civilian as well as military—exist within the EU, NATO and the Partnership for Peace, they are not organized into deployable assets that can provide cohesive, effective response.” Hamilton and company called for a NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (SRF) to work with the EU, NATO, UN, and OSCE to form a multinational security support component. The SRF would organize, train, and engage the military and police with reconstructing government institutions, economies, and infrastructure. Once there is sufficient consensus within NATO on the tasks defining military stabilization and reconstruction operations, it should establish such operations as a core NATO mission on par with major combat operations and establish appropriate responsibilities. The development of an SRF could improve Bundeswehr effectiveness through deeper military integration within the EU and NATO, and deeper integration is needed.

The Bundeswehr’s missions—combat, police and leadership training, stabilization measures, logistics, and civilian-military cooperation—were certainly supportive of the ISAF mission. However, two parallel tracks were not amenable to joint operations and poorly supported each other. German armed forces need to be fully integrated in military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda as well as in complex reconstruction, stabilization, and government capacity-building activities. The Afghanistan mandate certainly highlighted the differences between the US and German approaches to the use of force, planning, personnel recruiting, provision of adequate equipment, and training for the implementation of complex operations. A reluctance
to use military force diminished the continental European contributions to common strategy and joint operations.

Another avenue to explore would be to have NATO focus on Germany’s nonkinetic role in complex operations and consider embedding civilian-military capabilities in maneuver enhancement brigades (MEB) in stabilization operations. MEB elements could play an important role in achieving some of these objectives. They could combine the combat role for COIN and a capacity-building unit integrated in the command structure to coordinate civilian agencies and capabilities. MEBs might conduct initial triage and minor repairs to critical infrastructure. As soon as possible, the MEB should hand off to an engineer brigade such as the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and government agencies. Engineer brigades can coordinate for specialized engineer elements, facilitate engineer detachments, power specialists, and USACE Field Force Engineering assets. They can link back to USACE centers and laboratories using “tele-engineering” capabilities. To support complex or extended missions, the MEB would require theater assets to augment capabilities. With civil affairs augmentation, the maneuver MEB’s engineers, military police, security, and other elements would conduct civil military operations and hand off to local agencies.

Collaboration with NGOs and the host society is an additional critical operational element of a targeted partnership strategy to achieve civilian-military objectives. For example, the US Army V Corps has established these civilian-military objectives that call for targeted partnerships:

- create a secure environment (establish civil order, eliminate arms caches/paramilitary threats, and train security personnel);
- facilitate establishment of local governments (to include leadership, infrastructure, bureaucracy, schools); [and]
- support economic developments (identify local and regional economic centers of gravity; restore utilities, healthcare, food distribution, and public services; and develop commerce and financial institutions).

On the force protection and combat side, the experience in Afghanistan could cause European NATO allies to come to grips with the inadequacy of their military capability and insufficiency of their military equipment to conduct effective twenty-first-century missions. This is
cautious optimism. In that case, they might begin to take steps to address structural problems.

Germany’s change to an all-volunteer military, its expeditionary force, and its reorganization of the command structure away from a territorial defense posture to a twenty-first-century force is a change that warrants cautious optimism. As one example of the modernization, the Bundeswehr is phasing out the Mercedes-Benz Wolf-class armored personnel carrier (APC), which is vulnerable to improvised electronic device attacks, as German soldiers discovered when engaged in conflict in Afghanistan.

The German government has begun to modernize its forces as well. They have purchased many new armored vehicles, including the newest versions of Mercedes-Benz Enok light armor patrol vehicles; Krauss-Maffei Wegmann Dingo 2 mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles; Multi-A-4FSA heavy transport trucks; and the heavily armored MOWAG Eagle IV APCs. Since the end of May 2011, the Bundeswehr has replaced many aging and inadequate Wolf-class APCs and Hägglunds Bandvagn (BV) 206 small unit support vehicles with the Eagle IV. In addition to the Eagle IV, many Dingo 2 and Enok vehicles have also deployed in-theatre. Finally, in addition to these improved combat capabilities, the German military closed a deal to send more and newer salvage and towing vehicles into Afghanistan, which will help to return damaged vehicles back to service more quickly.48

**Conclusion**

For many contemporary security challenges, including Afghanistan, singular emphasis on either military/combat or on civilian operations alone will fail. A two-track (not two-tiered) approach—combat and civilian-military operations—is imperative. Germany’s foreign policy approach has focused on being a peace builder in the EU and in NATO. German military and security policy has evolved during the 20 years since the country was reunified, including during the 12 years in Afghanistan. Germany won broad support among political elites, but not widespread popular support for Bundeswehr missions, by unequivocally putting civil operations ahead of war-fighting ones, which need not tend toward the two-tiered NATO that Secretary Gates warned against. The security posture of Germany has
had a positive, if not linear, trajectory over the past two decades, and civilian-military contributions support that cautious optimism of Bundeswehr deployments.

Germany has built its policy on its reliability and commitment to respect for human dignity and the rule of law. This redefinition of Germany embedded in Western values came only after the end of a devastating world war and the Holocaust. Following World War II, West Germany fought the twin demons of Prussian militarism and of the “Final Solution” that led to the Holocaust. The rejection of Prussian militarism resulted in a reshaped security policy, deeply rooted in an alliance-based, territorial defense role for the Bundeswehr, committed to Innere Fuehrung—introspection—totally different from earlier German armies, paired with an obligation under the Basic Law for the respect for human dignity and democratic values. Although the Balkan wars of the 1990s challenged united Germany’s defensive security policy and necessitated that the German military deploy out of NATO’s area (but under the auspices of the NATO alliance) to end ethnic cleansing, Germany has fulfilled the obligation to protect innocent lives with forceful military intervention. When the wars in Yugoslavia broke the country apart and the Serbs perpetrated genocide against the Bosnians and Kosovars, Germany rose up in defense of human life.

When, however, Gadhafi’s threat to annihilate innocent civilians like “rats” and to use military forces for murder was not sufficient for Germany to act under a legitimate UN R2P resolution, which was also supported by the Arab League and other Arabs, it raised the question of how great a humanitarian threat is needed to mobilize German politicians. Leadership that relies on public opinion polls at the expense of principles is destined to fail.

Germany’s decisions in the Libya case were quite baffling; leaders seem to have gone totally against their governing philosophy, and the decision conflicted with past German support for the multilateral operations of NATO and the UN— institutes that have been pillars of German foreign policy. The political decisions taken against the Libyan humanitarian intervention have raised issues of policy reversal and possible retrenchment that have undermined and done long-term damage to Germany’s reputation for reliability.

Recognizing that the primacy of politics is essential to obtain support for NATO, provincialism and isolationism may be tempting policy choices, but they would be wrong. Germany’s leadership had
made the country’s role predictable, but after Libya it was no longer so. As stated at the beginning of this discussion, Germany’s constitutional approach to the use of the Bundeswehr emphasized the government’s commitment to protect human dignity. That emphasis on stability and reconstruction operations and the US emphasis on combat missions strikes to the heart of the disagreement between the United States and its allies, and it threatens to build a two-tiered alliance. In any case, it is just such capabilities in policing, rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection that fit well with German constitutional requirements, while it shuns combat military engagements.

Germany will define its comprehensive role to meet the threats of the twenty-first century and its engagement with NATO’s comprehensive approach. If peacebuilding is Germany’s military mission, how German leaders operationalize their soft power approach and civilian-military teaming will determine NATO’s capacity to carry out combat and civilian-military operations. This is the opportunity for Germany to dispel Secretary Gate’s concern that NATO might turn into a two-tiered alliance between members who specialize in soft humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and negotiation tasks and those conducting the hard combat missions.

Notes

2. Presse-und Informationsstab BMVg., “Überblick: Befugnisse der Soldaten in Afghanistan,” Bundeswehr, 24 August 2010, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/bwde/!ut/p/c4/FcxBDomwDEtRE9Xes-MUFHZOGFJLxCAcQOL0uJrd19PwxDGTS4s03UxW_yKYtUs3pXsGQc0F7QFVdQ8BI3VZaMbZPP9wJGg7pFDChYLBB7-p3vEKjza9skSkPda-xcEuaAl/.


9. Ibid.


15. Ibid., 171–72.


22. Ibid., 35.

23. Ibid., 36.

24. Author’s evaluation.


27. Ibid.


32. Weisser, Strategie als Berufung, 181.


34. Jörg Schönbohm, interview with the author, Berlin, Germany, 30 November 2011.


36. Ibid.

37. Matthias Kock, cultural advisor to the PRT commander, e-mail interview with the author, Kunduz, 21 October 2011.


42. Ibid.


45. Ibid.

46. Nelson, “How Should NATO Handle Stabilization Operations,” vii. Definition: Stability and reconstruction (S&R) is the process to achieve a locally led and sustainable peace in a dangerous environment. The military role in this process is halting residual violence and ensuring order and security, including those reconstruction efforts required to repair enough damage to enable restoration of the most essential services.


50. Ibid.
Chapter 14

The Norwegian Approach to Afghanistan

Civilian-Military Segregation

Karsten Friis

In a way, one could consider Norway a typical example of a small International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partner in Afghanistan—with 400 troops at its disposal and responsible for one of the 26 provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). Norway is a signatory to the Atlantic Pact and a staunch North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member. At the same time, the people and the government of Norway—like those in many European countries—share reservations about the extraterritorial use of military force. They consider Norway to be a “peace-nation,” a small state without strategic global interests. Norwegian foreign policy favors the multilateral institutional approach, providing stability and predictability through the United Nations (UN). The government of Norway has to balance military needs with civilian demands for humanitarian aid and the support of human rights—in particular women’s rights. In Afghanistan, Norwegian civilian aid priorities included the strengthening of Afghan governance capacities, rule of law, education, and rural development.

Understanding Norway’s approach to civilian-military relations in international operations requires one to look at both the tactical/operational (theater) and the strategic levels. Challenges identified in the field are often rooted in higher-level differences in policy among ministries, departments, and agencies. There is a certain tendency to overlook this fact in studies of PRTs, civilian-military coordination, and other instances of civilian-military interaction. Therefore, this chapter begins with an exploration of the Norwegian strategic approach to Afghanistan and then proceeds to the tactical, PRT application. I will demonstrate that there was deep-rooted resistance among civilian actors to close collaboration with the military, based on a fear of “militarization of aid.” This resulted in strong divisions and stove-piping in the PRT. While Norwegian civilian aid has several positive features compared to many other donor countries, I also argue that the insistence on separation of all civilian and military efforts is based
to a large extent on a flawed conflation of humanitarian and development aid and the reluctance by the government to prioritize among security, development, or humanitarian efforts.

Strategic Level

Norwegian Aid and Foreign Policy Traditions

The Norwegian government has a long tradition of utilizing civil society in providing aid and support to development overseas—both in crisis response and development aid. UN agencies and Norwegian nongovernmental organizations (NGO) have often been the implementers of Norwegian humanitarian and development programs. This outsourcing has provided the government with flexibility, as it could respond quickly to crises by supporting local and international NGOs already present in the field. Furthermore, it has sometimes shielded the government from criticism as the implementers have been “nongovernmental” and therefore not representatives of official Norwegian foreign policy. However, this policy has also strengthened the NGO community in Norway, and that community has become a significant political player. Some commentators describe it as an “aid industry,” with too much influence on foreign development policies.1 Per capita, Norway is an “aid superpower,” having more than tripled its development budget since 1990, and is one of the few countries that meet the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development target of aid, amounting to seven-tenths of one percent of the gross national income.2 Yet, Norway has been reluctant to attach conditions or political demands to these vast aid resources.3 Furthermore, the Norwegian government and public have considered the aid to be apolitical, founded on altruistic principles and universal values, even if such aid simultaneously promotes politically laden concepts such as “the principles of the rule of law, political pluralism and democracy.”4

Consistent with this apolitical policy position, Norway has nurtured a self-image as a peace nation—for example, it awards the annual Nobel Peace Prize and strongly supports the UN. It is well-positioned to gain trust from all parties in conflicts. Thus, Norway welcomes the opportunity to use its good reputation, good offices, and good economy to mediate numerous contentious international disputes from
the Middle East to Sri Lanka to Sudan. In other words, Oslo has the will and the way. While these mediations have not always been successful, they have enhanced Norway’s international standing and self-image.5

Norway’s ISAF participation in Afghanistan came as something new and challenging to this altruistic peace identity, since it implied taking sides in a conflict and using military means. Norway suddenly became a more political actor than had previously been the case, with the military helping the Kabul government to expand control over its sovereign territory and to help fight against insurgents. Norwegian military and civilian actors in the PRTs had to find a new paradigm for working alongside each other in the field. These changes proved difficult to reconcile with Norway’s identity as a nonpolitical, altruistic, peace-loving nation and complicated the previously harmonious or neutral relationship between the Norwegian government and civil society actors.

The Norwegian Approach to Afghanistan

According to former Norwegian foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre, Norway’s participation in Afghanistan advanced the goals of establishing security and stability, preventing terrorism, and fostering development in a manner appropriate for Afghan society:

First, the purpose of Norway’s presence in Afghanistan is to promote social and economic development in the country and stability in the region. We will help to build Afghan capacity to provide security and development, and we intend to strengthen the UN’s coordinating role.

Our aim is to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base for international terrorism.

Afghanistan must therefore be further stabilised. Social and political nation-building and state-building in Afghanistan are not merely goals in their own right; they are measures to make the country more stable. . . .

Second, there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. . . . A political solution must therefore be found. And it must be firmly rooted in Afghan society.

Third, a military presence will be necessary on the way towards a political solution. Not just as a means of resolving the conflict, but [also] to provide sufficient security to create a space in which political and economic development are possible.6

Based on these stated goals, it appears that the security and civilian dimensions were well integrated in Norwegian strategic thinking.
The interdependence of civilian, political, and military progress was explicit. To facilitate such coordination, the government established a cross-ministerial body, called the Afghanistan Forum. Here the state secretaries (deputy ministers) of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Defence (MOD), and Justice (MOJ, equivalent to a Ministry of Interior), as well as the Office of the Prime Minister, politically coordinated Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan. They prepared the government decisions related to all Afghanistan policy and supplied the government with coherent input and advice on priorities. They also traveled jointly to Afghanistan. The higher level of the civil service, where the chief officials coordinated policy implementation, mirrored this political structure. The Norwegian embassy in Kabul was also partly linked to this structure. Thus, the purpose was, by and large, to streamline Norway’s policy and to expand ownership of its Afghanistan engagement beyond the MOD and specialized MFA circles.

However, this was an ad hoc arrangement established for engagement in Afghanistan only. It was not backed up by a permanent secretariat or a formalized organization of any kind. Furthermore, in contrast to many other similar-sized countries, such as Sweden and Finland, there existed no government-level political strategy paper for the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan or stability operations as a whole. Only partisan statements by government representatives when addressing the parliament or the media indicated the Norwegian strategy, like the previously mentioned quote from former foreign minister Gahr Støre. The Afghanistan Forum appeared to operationalize such sentiments supporting civilian-military coordination. Despite this, the interaction became much less apparent in the specialized ministries or branches.

**Development Aid**

Norwegian support to Afghanistan was significant because it targeted and aimed at sustainability, providing the host authorities some leverage to actually run their own country. Norway was a significant contributor to Afghanistan development aid in relation to Norway’s gross domestic product and spent almost as much on development aid as on military operations. The Norwegian government pledged approximately $120–130 million dollars annually in humanitarian and development aid for the period 2010–2015. In 2009 the bilateral aid amounted to $126 million, which was distributed as follows: 37...
percent to economic development and trade, 30 percent to good governance, 19 percent to health and education, and 14 percent to humanitarian aid.9

A leading principle for Norwegian donor funds was that they were dispersed without earmarks or conditions and in close collaboration with local authorities and major international actors (like the World Bank and United Nations Development Program) and to Norwegian and international NGOs. Approximately one-third of the Norwegian support to Afghanistan was channeled through a World Bank-administered trust fund: the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. This and other similar funds provided the Afghan government with resources to cover budgetary expenses, such as salaries, while the World Bank maintained a level of influence and controlled corruption or the misallocation of funds. This model also provided the Afghan authorities the opportunity to define their own development priorities and the resources to implement projects.

A common challenge for foreign donors in Afghanistan was that too often local or international contractors and NGOs distributed the funds directly to the field. Additionally, the funds dispersed to the local government often were earmarked. It was estimated that about two-thirds of all development expenditures in Afghanistan bypassed the government. As a result, local Afghan authorities were effectively undermined.10 In this context, Norway did relatively well, channeling aid through the trust funds.

Furthermore, Norwegian foreign aid strategy did not “buy stability” or “reward instability” in the sense that it was being spent in the parts of the country where the insurgency was the strongest. Several commentators have pointed out the paradox of the international community spending most of its funds on troublesome areas to win the peace, while communities are, in a sense, “penalized for being peaceful.”11 Norwegian aid largely attempted to counter such trends by focusing on the central government. Only approximately 15 percent of the above-mentioned $126 million in civilian funds were allocated to the Faryab district, where the Norwegian PRT was located. Some of these funds were later allocated to Faryab, but it was accomplished through national authorities.12

However, the Norwegian development and humanitarian aid approach appeared to have been formed in relative isolation from the security and military priorities. There was no reference, for example, to the ISAF priorities in the documents of the Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation (NORAD)—except a statement that Norway promoted regular contact with the armed forces. Nowhere was the role of development aid in relation to security discussed and defined, and there were no guidelines or priorities from the government in this regard. Norwegian policy appeared to largely ignore the fact that security was a key priority in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Afghan Millennium Development Goals (MDG).\(^1\) Hence, despite the words of the government and the existence of an Afghanistan Forum, coordination between the security and development domains was largely nonexistent. As shall be described, this transcended to the tactical level as well.

**Tactical Level**

**Guiding Principles**

From the outset, the Norwegian humanitarian and development communities and many sections within the MFA were skeptical about the very idea of a PRT with respect to the integration of military and civilian roles. For them, separation of civilian and military activity was crucial and the primacy of UN principles of humanitarian assistance was deeply rooted. The Norwegian government thus referred to UN guidelines and principles for civilian-military interaction.\(^1\) A key document in this regard was the 1994 UN *Oslo Guidelines*, regulating the use of military assets in disaster operations, and the subsequent 2003 UN *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*.\(^1\) The UN developed several other guidelines for Afghanistan specifically, including the 2008 *Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan*.\(^1\) The Afghan PRT executive steering committee also issued guidelines.\(^1\)

All these guidelines recommended a clear distinction between humanitarian and military activity. The guidelines issued by the Afghan PRT executive steering committee stated that “humanitarian assistance is that which is *life saving* and addresses urgent and life-threatening humanitarian needs. It must not be used for the purpose of political gain, relationship building, or ‘winning hearts and minds’” (emphasis in original).\(^1\)
In addition, the PRT Guidelines also stressed that United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was the lead agency when it came to provincial development and that “the PRTs should [have] support[ed] UNAMA offices and follow[ed] guidance provided by UNAMA and other concerned donors on this issue.” Based on such guidelines and the strong support for the UN in the NGOs and the MFA, the government sought to keep civilian and military efforts strictly separated in its Afghan policy and in the PRT.

The Norwegian PRT Structure

The mandate of the NATO PRTs in Afghanistan was to promote security and good governance and to facilitate development and reconstruction—all in close collaboration with the government of Afghanistan and the Afghan National Security Forces.

The Norwegian-led PRT consisted of approximately 400 soldiers (including 100 from Latvia) and some 10 to 20 civilians. They were based in Meymaneh in the Faryab district in northwestern Afghanistan. The civilian group typically had a civilian coordinator, a political advisor, development advisors, police advisors, and prison advisors, mainly from Norway but also from Iceland and Latvia. The civilians and the military were colocated and were placed under certain common military security regulations but operated otherwise separately.

The civilian members of the Norwegian-led PRT were divided into at least two groups: the police and prison advisors and the political and development advisors. The role of the political and development advisors was to oversee the implementation of development programs; liaise with the local authorities, the UN, and others; and help to develop new projects and programs funded by the MFA through the embassy in Kabul. As in most other PRTs, none of the civilians were under the command of the military contingent. They coordinated with the embassy in Kabul and with relevant ministries and directorates in Oslo.

Nor was the military under civilian command. The military chain of command went through Regional Command North, ISAF HQ, and the rest of the NATO structure, in addition to the Norwegian Operational Command and the MOD in Norway.

Therefore, in practice, there were two parallel structures sharing the same compound. There was no tactical (Meymaneh/Faryab) or operational (Kabul) headquarters or equivalent of the Oslo Afghanistan
Forum. The civilians and the military may have coordinated, but it was all based on goodwill, not on institutionalized procedures or regulations. There was no common higher level of command to refer to in case of conflict.22 As a result, the degree of cooperation differed significantly from contingent to contingent, and the institutional memory was limited. It was only recently that the civilian and military structures initiated joint exercises prior to deployment. Different rotation cycles also hampered these exercises.

An additional challenge was the absence of a common plan. A “Faryab strategy” was developed in 2009, but it represented more of a lowest common denominator between ministries and other relevant agencies than a strategy.23 As in the United States and elsewhere, good ambitions were plentiful, but they were not organized in a prioritized way in terms of time or resources. This all seemed to represent a compromise and not a political agenda, and as a planning tool, it was of limited value for the PRT.

Furthermore, the political and development advisors may have been considered the extended arm of the embassy, but they had weak direct links to Oslo. The civilian coordinator and political advisors typically were younger civil servants, not career diplomats with a good foothold and network in the embassy or MFA in Oslo. Being deployed to the PRT was not career-boosting for diplomats, so recruitment was difficult. The development advisors were also externally recruited personnel without much network in the MFA or NORAD. Therefore, they were not in a particularly strong position for implementing Norwegian foreign policy or influencing the more senior PRT commander—typically a lieutenant colonel in rank. There was little doubt that the military was the stronger component, both in terms of personnel and operational capacity. The Norwegian armed forces have gradually transformed from a peacekeeping-style force to a credible counterinsurgency (COIN) force, with better equipment and better fighting skills. This may have deepened the divisions with the civilians further. As a result, there was no common Norwegian political strategy—no common planning, monitoring, or evaluation of the efforts made in the various sectors where Norway was engaged in Faryab. The civilian and military activities and projects were not being knitted together into a comprehensive strategy to maximize the political effects and fulfill the mandate.

As previously mentioned, the Norwegian NGOs were particularly critical of the PRT concept in its early years. They viewed PRTs as
disregarding or blurring the lines between humanitarian and military spaces. The civilian actors feared being subsumed to the military operations and being regarded as the extended hand of the military. They typically argued that militarization of aid was shortsighted and unsustainable and that military-driven aid projects, aid aimed at winning hearts and minds, threw money at a problem rather than addressing the underlying cause of the instability. Furthermore, many Norwegian NGOs contended that using money as a weapons system was not only unsustainable, it may also have unintended adverse effects and even create instability. Pumping money into local societies often led to corruption, tribal infighting over access to the funds, and increased revenues to the insurgency groups. Such critiques were widely referred to in the Norwegian debates, further legitimizing and strengthening the policy of separation of military and civilian roles. Given the previously mentioned strong role of the NGOs in the Norwegian public discourse, the government was not willing or able to confront them and generally complied with their demands for such separation.

However, the military had also criticized the government and NGOs for bypassing local authorities when implementing projects in Faryab and for ignoring the political and social considerations. It was argued that unevenly dispersed aid contributed to strengthening insurgents in the province. The government and the NGO community have resisted attempts by the military to strengthen coordination. As a result, the military faced difficulties in implementing the COIN strategy directed from ISAF command. While conducting successful “clear” operations, they lacked the “hold” and “build” elements required to succeed. A replacement for the reluctant Norwegian partners was to some extent found in USAID, which began implementing projects in the Faryab region thereafter. For the Norwegian PRT, cooperation with USAID proved more fruitful, as that organization appeared more inclined to cooperate toward a common COIN goal. The Norwegian NGOs predictably criticized this cooperation.

**Conflation of Humanitarian and Development Aid**

There was, however, a fundamental flaw in the position of the Norwegian civilian component, which was primarily the NGO position. While humanitarian aid in principle could be regarded as apolitical, development aid, it can be argued, was inherently political. There could be little doubt that the Norwegian objectives in Afghanistan,
like those of the UN and the wider international community, were highly political. Development programs aimed at, for example, poverty reduction were political, as they recommended one set of principles over others, whether governance, economic, or legal. It was a question of taking sides in an internal violent conflict, supporting one set of values (liberal-democratic) and one set of actors (the authorities). The model advanced typically was based upon Western or UN best practices, supporting liberal-democratic values over those of authoritarianism and usually implying redistribution of resources, changes in power structures, or strengthening of a group of actors. Therefore, the defense of the humanitarian space could not rightly be expanded to include development aid or other programs in which NGOs were engaged. The previously mentioned guidelines of the UN and PRT executive steering committee all referred to the relationship between the military and the humanitarian actors, not the development actors. But many NGOs and the Norwegian government tended to ignore this fact.

The insurgents tended to object to several elements of the MDG, the ANDS, and the Norwegian development aid criteria. They also found objectionable many key Norwegian values, like democratization, empowering women, and the rule of law.

By conflating the humanitarian and development programs, the NGOs were denying the political role and potential powerful political influence such programs wielded, while simultaneously, unnecessarily resisting cooperation with other actors, such as the military. Furthermore, insufficient political analysis and sensitivity may have caused development projects to aggravate rather than mitigate tensions. An internal report by NORAD revealed that there was an ethnic imbalance in Faryab, in the sense that the Uzbek communities received substantially more aid than the Pashtuns. This caused tensions in the latter group which already had been a recruitment base for local insurgents.

Despite arguments for keeping humanitarian and military operations separate, there are valid reasons why development programs should plan and evaluate in a coordinated manner with the military to ensure that resources are coherently spent and to maximize political efficiency. In principle, all Norwegian development aid to Afghanistan should have aimed at the same political objectives—those defined by the Afghan and Norwegian authorities. If civilian agencies were concerned with the militarization of aid, there were even more
reasons for them to engage with the military and confirm that political development efforts were done “right.”

All actors seem to agree that to achieve sustainable security, military solutions alone are insufficient. Yet civilians can be reluctant to contribute to the security domain or to fill the gaps unaddressed by the military. Many NGOs do not consider security to be their priority, and thus design their projects based on other sets of criteria, such as advancing health, well-being, and human rights. As long as the Norwegian government accepts and supports the separation of development aid and security operations, NGOs are unlikely to change their position. Only through donor guidance can development projects be tuned toward achieving long-term political effects that enhance the security situation.

Of course, it may be argued that with only 400 troops in a district (Faryab) of approximately one million people, it would not have made much difference whether the civilian-military coordination was better. There were arguably far too few boots on the ground to be able to provide security for all citizens or to play a decisive political role. That may very well be the case, but the purpose in this analysis is to draw operational lessons for future deployments. Improved coordination will in most cases increase efficiency, reduce expenses, and possibly save lives—even if it by itself is not sufficient to win a war or build peace.

**Conclusion**

Norway was not alone in many of the challenges facing the civilian-military relationships described above. All those who were engaged in the Afghan field had to contend with conflicting mandates, visions, priorities, and perceptions among civilian and military partners. Despite these pressures, the Norwegian approach to civilian-military interaction had certain positive features. The civilian aid was significant, almost equal to the military spending, and a large chunk of the civilian aid was provided to the local authorities through established multilateral mechanisms such as trust funds. This approach promoted local ownership and sustainability, as it countered the tendency to reward instability and allowed for higher levels of development aid. As such, these characteristics go beyond the tactical use of aid and contribute to a strategic approach. The development aid generally
supported the greater international programs in Afghanistan, and considerable discretion was afforded to those operators in the field rather than policy makers sitting in Oslo.

On the negative side, the Norwegian conflation of humanitarian and development aid promoted a perception of the militarization of aid and humanitarian space, and thereby stalled a potentially fruitful cooperation between development and military actors. Despite former foreign minister Gahr Støre’s emphasis on political-military interdependence, this was hardly followed in practice. Political development aid was not designed in conjunction with security/military efforts. This was also the main reason why there was no operational level coordination, for example in the embassy in Kabul, between the military and civilian development actors. It may also explain why Norway did not have an official strategy generally for Afghanistan or specifically for Faryab (the existing one was a strategy in name only), as it would have forced the government to spell out priorities between the security, development, and humanitarian sectors.

Instead the political elite tended to avoid this debate altogether, continuing to attempt several things at the same time. The underlying assumption must have been that these ends could be achieved independent of each other, or at least that they were not in conflict, so that tighter coordination was not needed. This was a questionable assumption that reflected the wider problem facing the international community in Afghanistan. As long as key actors had significantly different perceptions, objectives, and solutions and were reluctant to acknowledge these differences, the prospects for enhanced civilian-military cooperation and for sustainable peace remained grim.

What appeared to be the trend among many ISAF countries is to lower the expectations for civilian-military cooperation. This is partly due to challenges such as those Norway faced, but also a general “Afghanistan-fatigue” among donors as a result of limited progress in both security and development. The military component is increasing its efforts to train local security forces and is, to a lesser extent, engaged in the whole civilian spectrum of efforts as prescribed in the COIN doctrines.

Perhaps the vision of civilian-military cooperation became too ambitious in Afghanistan. The military could not and should not become dependent upon developments in the civilian sector to achieve military ends. The COIN doctrines had very valuable insights into the importance of understanding the political-cultural context and
the need for sustainable governance. However, such doctrine may have confused war and nation-building. The latter usually requires a political settlement to succeed; it is a way to stabilize a fragile peace agreement. It is far more challenging—if indeed possible—to build a state to win a war, as some of the COIN proponents seem to argue.

What do these lessons from Afghanistan bode for future operations? First, for civilian-military cooperation to work it must be on all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. The military operations should be in support of the political objectives, not vice versa. Whatever is done on the tactical level should reinforce and support long-term civilian strategies on the higher levels. If not, there is a risk the disconnect will undermine overall stability efforts.

Second, civilian efforts should reward peace—for example, by concentrating on those areas in the theater where there is political stability. The example of prosperous development is a strong signal to other regions.

Third, local ownership is key. Only local people, not foreigners, can build sustainable peace. Civilian funds should avoid bypassing local structures even if it means less efficient aid delivery at the outset.

Fourth, and as a result of the previous points, civilian-military cooperation is most efficient in the stabilization phase of a war, when it can reinforce a political settlement. Civilian efforts usually require more time to achieve the desired political effects than military efforts do. As a result, civilian-military cooperation in offensive operations is less likely to succeed.

Civilian-military cooperation remains crucial in today’s military operations. Campaign phases are not linear, and the stabilization phase, with significant civilian-military cooperation, may suddenly slide back to violent conflict with less such cooperation. In the same way, different geographical areas of the theatre may also experience different levels of stability and hence different degrees of civilian-military interaction. This fluidity in today’s conflicts requires all actors to know each other well and to be able to support each other when it is in their common interest. Improved awareness and knowledge of each other are preconditions for this and represent the best way to avoid disappointments, frustrations, and false expectations.

Notes


8. Gahr Støre, “Address to the Storting.”


12. It may be argued that the very idea of building a strong centralized state in Afghanistan is futile, given the relative traditional strength of the regions and districts, but that is not the topic for this article.


20. The “humanitarian space” refers to purely humanitarian projects, which are considered nonpolitical and based on international humanitarian law. The guiding principle for humanitarian agencies is often referred to as the “humanitarian imperative” and often summarized as independence, impartiality, and neutrality. See International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1995).


22. For more details on the PRT model, see de Coning et al., Norway’s Whole-of-Government Approach, 29–33.

23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice and the Police, Government of Norway, A Strategy for Comprehensive Norwegian Civilian and Military Efforts in Faryab Province, Afghanistan (Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Min-
Chapter 15

So You Are Going to Be Working with the United Nations

A Few Insights on Integration

David C. Becker

Introduction

There is a growing literature discussing how civilians and the military can work more closely and effectively together in “complex environments”—in stabilization or counterinsurgency missions, in disaster assistance and humanitarian relief efforts (domestic or international), and even in “steady state” situations furthering the government’s efforts to provide security and development assistance effectively in foreign countries.

Underlying the analyses, in the United States at least, is an ethnocentric viewpoint that leads to a common misunderstanding. It presumes that the civilians and the military that need integration are both from the same country. In fact, civilian-military coordination is able to cross boundaries among various donor nations and between the donors and the host governments. Other cultural boundaries include the marked differences in values and motivations of civilians from the humanitarian relief communities and their self-identified differences for military personnel and other civilians working with donor and host governments.

Much of the contemporary literature is an outgrowth of the US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. The lessons learned from those searing expeditionary challenges will stay with the United States for a long time. Both conflicts were major American interventions in which the United States spent lives and vast sums of money to achieve goals that turned out to be much harder to reach than originally envisioned. Regardless, Washington clearly was making the decisions and responsible for achieving positive outcomes.
However, in the future, the United States will not simply be trying to better integrate civilians and military to achieve a goal. The challenges are going to be more complicated than that. Some of the lessons US personnel think they learned in Iraq and Afghanistan may turn out to be the wrong lessons.

One major reason for this is that the United States will probably not be in the lead in future interventions and will be working with a hodgepodge of other nations and their forces. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) admittedly was a force provider in Afghanistan and international contributors played significant roles in Iraq as well, the United States was clearly in charge in those conflicts. However, NATO’s 2011 Libyan intervention is a better analogy for the future than a decade of US efforts in Afghanistan. The United States is less likely to engage unilaterally in the future, relying on the work of others to achieve US goals. In other words, it is time to learn lessons about how to work with the military, police, and civilians of other nations.

For the purposes of this analysis, it is impossible to address the entire panoply of combinations of interventions and interlocutors that might be possible in the future. However, one particular organization stands out as a future US ally: the United Nations (UN). With the probable withdrawal of the US government from essentially unilateral interventions, UN civilian organizations and military forces assigned to peacekeeping duties will probably continue to be key players in many future disasters, interventions, and stabilization missions. The United States already provides 25 to 27 percent of the budget for the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations, which indicates that the United States already finds it worthwhile to fund the UN rather than intervene directly. In the future, despite the desire to spend less on the UN, the United States probably will still find it cheaper and more politically acceptable to continue to fund UN interventions than to deploy US forces for some situations. As noted in the RAND monograph *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*, “the cost for fielding a U.S. or NATO force is about $200,000 per soldier per year. The cost of fielding the typical UN peacekeeping force is about $45,000 per soldier per year.” The United States may still have large forces on the ground where the UN is present, but even more likely is that US personnel will have a smaller military unit of trainers or US government civilians on the ground, working on parallel, combined, or completely independent projects that may rely on UN support. I have spent most of my Foreign Service career in conflict countries
and, over the past two decades, have had the opportunity to collaborate with UN military missions in countries like Haiti and Ethiopia and to work with UN development agencies in those and other conflict zones. Almost by definition, it is not easy to work in a multilateral environment, especially in an organization like the UN with so many conflicting interests. If one is likely to see more US-UN multilateral efforts, it may be useful to provide a few observations for US civilian or military personnel who may have to integrate their efforts successfully with a UN mission on the ground.

A word of warning: this is a tactical and personal view on the challenges of successfully working with those troops and civilians assigned to the UN in foreign environments, based mostly on personal observations and conversations with UN military and civilian staff in different countries rather than a strategic analysis of the problems of US-UN cooperation on an international level. Much of this chapter may sound like a criticism of the UN and its operations. That is not the case. There are many dedicated and imaginative leaders in the UN who work hard to improve the world. However, the UN is what it is: a large, unwieldy, international organization with many different groups and members vying for attention, funds, and personnel. Some readers may note the parallels to US government overseas operations.

**Evolution of United Nations Missions**

UN interventions have changed over time. Twenty years ago, UN missions tended to be short, small, and relatively simple. Few if any UN missions included more than UN military forces, in for a short stay, then planning to leave as soon as local security conditions permitted. UN civilian development agencies often followed, sometimes with an increase in bilateral assistance from other countries. Now most missions are considerably more far-reaching, often encompassing police monitors, mentors, and trainers—relatively new roles for the UN in trying to implement rule of law reforms and increase security and stability. As the United States has learned, rule of law and police reform are among the most difficult challenges to implement, regardless of who is doing so. However, the definition of a successful UN mission now often includes an understanding that simply disarming factions is not success.
From the perspective of the US government, this means that working in a foreign environment requires working successfully with the UN and the forces assigned to that organization. Rarely are the UN forces leaving as the US government civilian development and security specialists are arriving. Thus, the UN forces overlap with the US government stability forces; meanwhile, the United States contributes very few personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Given the United States’ superpower status, it would be politically ludicrous for US forces to intervene under an ostensibly neutral UN banner except in very specialized circumstances. In addition, the United States has a long history of rarely putting US forces under foreign command. At the most, the United States provides one or two staff members to a mission. This lack of involvement means there is very little accumulated US government experience from “inside the beast,” regarding working with the UN.

The Mandate

Every UN mission starts with a UN member-approved document that outlines the goals and objectives of the UN intervention, and particularly, the limits on everything from the use of force to the location of units. Why should one care? Because everyone else—for example, all other UN member states—will have read the mandate, studied it closely, and will argue its parameters and limits. Mandates are a result of a highly political negotiation process in New York. UN nations carefully parse and select words, sometimes with an aim to obscure disagreements between UN members. This leaves the unenviable task of reading the mandate “tea leaves” for guidance on proposed actions up to the UN mission head in country, the special representative of the secretary general (SRSG). Mandates typically come up for renewal every year, and each year there is a new flurry of discussion on what modifications are needed to the limits, the timeline, and goals (not to mention the budget).

Even if the troops and civilian staff are forward leaning and mission oriented, willing to push the envelope a bit to achieve results, the national government will have lawyers looking at every UN action from the viewpoint of stopping “mandate creep.” Their job is to defend whatever sovereignty their country still has—even when the national government is in favor of UN intervention and is asking for more troops or staff (and the money that comes with them). A problem with
some mandates is a timeline that is really too short, and the mission begins to spend more time on transition, handovers and departure planning than on actually achieving goals. At the same time, it often takes two or three years of modifications to the mandate to start getting the rules of action sufficiently clarified and established so that a mission can really address the root causes and begin to make progress. Thus, the successful outside observer needs to understand the legitimate mandate constraints that a UN mission operates under, but also needs to recognize that some members of a mission may simply hide behind a too restrictive interpretation of the mandate to avoid taking responsibility for action. In such cases, referring the interpretation question back to Washington and New York can help to shake things up a bit if necessary.

Clash of Cultures

The first and most obvious fact on the ground is that a UN peacekeeping mission is virtually a pickup game. The UN has little to say over who comes to the show. Peacekeeping troops do have a training program before they deploy, but even such training cannot overcome the challenge created by differences in military culture—that the various participants are from different places, speak different languages, and have very different baselines of domestic training and doctrine. Contributing countries select units for service with the UN based on national goals. Sometimes this means that they send their best, and that can be quite good—professional and well trained. Often the reason for sending a unit may be to give that unit a chance to benefit from training and experience that it cannot afford at home. Sometimes countries participate because the pay and benefits for UN troops are better than at home and thus nations can support a larger force than they could on their national budget. In addition, a country may offer a tour overseas as a reward for political support or good service at home. This translates into a whole host of issues for an outsider attempting to coordinate operations with the UN.

One manifestation of these differences is an overemphasis on hierarchy. While civilians may think that all militaries are rank and status conscious, many are far more hierarchical than the US military. Meeting a military officer at his unit can become a Kabuki dance of authorizations from headquarters, waiting for written approvals, and prior coordination between civilians and military within the UN, not
to mention probing questions about what you intend to discuss. One may be able to drop into a field unit and talk one's way into a polite meeting, but discussion will not always be fruitful. Partly, this is because some countries are more serious about rank and hierarchy. Nevertheless, the UN reinforces that bureaucratic tendency because it has to work hard to enforce a common standard of expectations over a wildly diverse group of units from different backgrounds.

In the same vein, compared to a Western military, decision making is centralized. Again, this is both a culture issue and a bureaucracy issue. Many of the nonwestern militaries provide far less latitude to their lower-ranking officers to make decisions. Those who are more used to working with the US military rapidly run headlong into a field situation with a small unit led by a sergeant or lieutenant who will not be able to cooperate, may not be interested in cooperating, and even if he does want to help, possibly cannot even communicate to a superior to get a decision. Again, headquarters consciously or subconsciously encourages centralization of command in an attempt to ensure that every unit, no matter how different, is on the same sheet of music.

What this means is that one needs to start from the center and work outwards, reaching out to those in the capital and then gaining permissions to talk to the officers in the field. Even if one's organization is highly decentralized and one works in the field, there may be no parallels. Moreover, because of the bureaucracy, this coordination will take longer than expected, and it will be less successful than one would like.

To complicate things further, individual national military contingents in a given UN mission may be answering to two masters. Before obeying orders from the UN force commander or the directions of the SRSG, the civilian heading the UN political and aid mission of some contingents may face the practical reality of having to confirm orders, especially the ones involving the use of force, with the respective national governments. This may manifest itself in contingents refusing to conduct operations as ordered, or simply avoiding the implementation of orders through delays and other staffing obfuscation. Should these situations arise, the UN force commander is limited in his authority to force contingents to comply compared to national recourses in military law or command authority over subordinate commanders. Such issues would be more typically resolved at the
diplomatic and political level between the contingent’s government and the UN.

**Command Vis-a-Vis Communication**

Another reason coordination will be less successful is that the “chain of command” is not the same thing as the “channel of communication.” Pity the UN commander who knows that his staff is filled with people from three or four countries, usually speaking a foreign language inside the command, and usually speaking yet another language outside the command. Coordination meetings are required, take longer, and happen more often, given the need to ensure that all are on board. This results in longer decision cycles, and even after making a decision, someone must implement it. HQ issues an order; staff translates it into English (usually) and then transmits it to the field and someone retranslates it into the language of the local unit. This takes time and energy and often results in confusion, so a natural response is to avoid issuing too many orders, instructions, or briefings. The amount of information that flows down to the field unit commander is often a fraction of what you would expect in even a normal bureaucracy. What actually reaches the small unit leader is a fraction of that. Worse, the flow of information upwards from the grassroots is often more restricted.

Given these limits on the communications channels, achieving action in civilian-military coordination requires an extensive process of briefings, arranging appointments in new lower or higher units, more verbal briefings, arranging more appointments, and so forth. In other words, getting an approval at the top is only a partial step to getting action at the bottom. Direct personal follow-up is required, and one’s English presentation or briefing paper will be probably unread, unless one is there to hammer it home. If one can provide papers in the unit language or have someone on staff who speaks the unit language, things change more rapidly. The small touches of personal contact often count for a lot for a unit overseas in a strange country, working for an international and complicated bureaucracy.

**Clash of Cultures II: Civilians and Military**

Much literature now discusses the differences of cultures between the US military and civilian agencies. The 3Ds mantra of development,
diplomacy, and defense is virtually a cliché now as the United States attempts to merge efforts in a more efficient fashion.

While the United States is still struggling with its “whole of government” approach, the UN is even less integrated. The special nature of the UN efforts overseas contributes to this integration problem. Outwardly, there are some parallels in the task of a US ambassador in a fragile or failing state and a UN SRSG. Both are assigned to a country, in charge of UN or US civilian and military organizations, to support reforms and stabilization efforts. However, the US ambassador has a certain tradition on his or her side, as the US embassy was there usually long before establishment of the UN mission. In essence, norms are clear for the embassy, while the SRSG must quickly establish his or her bona fides as a leader. UN development agencies often have been present for long periods, but they have not had to report to the SRSG. They have independent budgets and development plans, and the agency career staff is often not impressed by the arrival of a new high command in the form of the SRSG and his staff. In their view, their agency will still be there when the UN mission has come and gone. So the first job of a new SRSG is not to deal with the host government but instead to get a handle on the activities of the UN agencies in country.

Further, the underlying tensions between the “blue” and “black” UN in countries where both a peacekeeping mission (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) and technical UN agencies (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, World Health Organization, etc.) are present on the ground adds to the difficulties for outsiders to establish effective liaison with the UN. To note, this color coding of UN components is informal; it refers to the fact that vehicles of peacekeeping missions (military, police, and political components) use black UN letters, whereas UN technical agencies use vehicles with the blue logo of their organizations. The tension between the blue and the black parts of the UN in mission comes from a separation of functions, but also from different methods of operations. The UN Security Council tasks the “black” peacekeeping mission to undertake inherently political functions, which usually are not perceived as equally neutral or beneficial by all parties to a given conflict. UNAMA in Afghanistan, for example, was mandated to both support the national government and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This created a sometimes uncomfortable divide with the “blue” technical agencies, whose mandate was more focused on
providing relief and social services to populations. Further, “blue” agencies tend to center their operations in conflict areas on the traditional humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality to gain acceptance from all parties to manage security of their staff and access to beneficiaries. Through complex internal political dealings, the UN has moved in recent years to force the unity of effort and coherence of all UN components in countries, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan. However, the inherent tension between the political and humanitarian activities can lead to agencies being seen as distancing themselves, sometimes calling for complete physical and operational separation, from the peacekeeping mission. At times these dynamics within the UN can seem incomprehensible to the outside observer (including to the parties to the conflict), but it may help explain why UN agencies sometimes appear to resent that liaison by US representatives on humanitarian issues that was first initiated with the peacekeeping mission rather than directly with the “blue” agency.

This split of cultures can lead to some serious infighting over priorities within and between the different UN agencies. One option is to name the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) head as the deputy for development within the new UN mission, but that still does not make it easy to establish common priorities over civilian agencies as diverse as UNICEF and the UN International Drug Control Program (UNDCP). For an outsider, speaking to the UN SRSG staff is only part of the answer; there is still a need to reach out and pull in individual UN agencies in planned efforts.

At the same time, working with the UN civilians can often be easier for a US outsider, compared to working with the UN military. Recruitment for individual UN civilian staff members is completely different from UN military forces. A country supplies UN forces for its own national reasons. The UN has little to say about quality or quantity. On the other hand, the UN recruits career employees competitively. In addition, many times, top mission staff are individually headhunted from other missions or programs by the SRSG or his or her supporters, moving from one mission and conflict or disaster to another. This enables them to be highly experienced. In addition, staff are often from Western nations, or have the benefits of Western educations, speak several foreign languages (one is always English), and often understand others’ bureaucracies as well as their own, due to their experience in other locations. The HQ staff are also more tech
savvy, using e-mail and web sites to do their jobs and aid in coordination, while the military forces may have limitations.

On the negative side, the majority of UN staff, either working for the “Black” UN side of the political mission or the “Blue” side with the technical UN agencies, are not permanent employees. Many staff members on UN contracts have been working for the UN on the basis of six-month or annual contract renewals for many years. In addition, UN recruitment standards may vary between missions and agencies. In the past 10 years, the UN has deployed substantial efforts to bring more consistency and transparency to recruitment practices (such as the Galaxy recruitment portal), but gaps remain in the profile and experience of staff, especially at the field officer level (the UN P-2 and P-3). Consequently, individual field staff members may not be as knowledgeable about the workings of the UN system or about the key cultural elements of UN staffers compared to the larger international organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGO), like Doctors without Borders. These groups place great emphasis on recruitment and cultural education of their staff to the values and internal procedures of the organization.

Development versus Security

UN civilian staff coordination with the UN military forces often stumbles on the same issues that an outsider faces. Differences in culture, language, and communication styles can slow understanding and cooperation. In addition, the question of the priority of security versus development activity can often cause the same frictions seen, for example, in a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Afghanistan.

The multiplicity of UN organizations can often overwhelm a military unit in the field, as everyone from UN High Commissioner on Human Rights to the UNIDCP drops in to the unit’s zone, each with its priorities and plans, each expecting support. Often, coordination of the field activities of the different UN agencies occurs around the conference table of the military unit in that part of the field, as the different UN agencies visiting from the capital discover who else is in the zone (NGOS, other donors, other UN). These meetings can be long and difficult, but often valuable, especially if relevant NGOs or a donor program can attend, or if necessary, host. Often, simply asking the
different organizations to show up makes an enormous difference in plans and provides a chance to prove the bona fides of your program.

To the civilian NGO and UN community, the use of “development” as a catchall terminology to identify all civilian efforts outside of diplomatic and political efforts (such as its use by NATO in Afghanistan to describe one of the lines of operations) is misleading. Civilians tend to self-associate very strongly with either the “development” community, understood as focusing mostly on long-term, poverty reduction efforts outside of conflict situations, and the “humanitarian” community, traditionally associated with emergency efforts in conflict situations to reduce suffering and preventable mortality and morbidity caused by the conflict. Civilians may be militant about this self-association, because the key values and methods of operations of development and humanitarian action are different. Broadly speaking, development workers tend to focus more on long-term community involvement to build sustainable advancements in the economic and social services conditions of beneficiary populations. Humanitarian action sees itself as a fast response to save lives in the immediate term in conflict areas and in situations of natural disasters, where the drive to save lives now often overrides the focus on building sustainable solutions or involving host communities. While these tribal affiliations in the civilian field community may not be as clear in practice from individual to individual, it is well worth mentioning, especially for military personnel trying to build relations with UN agencies or NGOs.

Although both the development and humanitarian communities have evolved since the early 1990s in their perception of military personnel through numerous opportunities to work side by side in the field and participate in training events, some individuals may still harbor deeply held beliefs against soldiers (the “baby killers vs. tree-huggers” model). As with all cross-cultural communications, a little investment by military personnel to better understand the key values and founding mythologies of both development and humanitarian communities can greatly facilitate relationship-building at field level. On this point, military personnel should also make themselves aware that they need to turn down the volume on their own cultural tendencies that may miff civilians, such as the compulsion to “take charge” in the face of seemingly disorganized civilian coordination of interagency efforts.
Rotations

Making all of this harder is the fact that military units rotate on a different schedule from the civilian staff of the mission or the staffs of the UN agencies. Military units usually rotate on a six-month schedule, swapping in and out with another unit usually of the same nationality. If there are complaints from the US battlefield forces about the difficulties of 12-month tours (fighting the same war 10 years in a row), the situation is only worse for the UN forces. Time after time, in the stabilization efforts in Haiti of which I was a part, the team would establish good fluid relations with local military staff, only to realize a month or two later that the team would have to start over. Headquarters staff stayed much longer, often two years, but relations at that level did not guarantee quick action at the local level.

United Nations Intelligence: Not a Contradiction in Terms

UN missions overseas need information just as badly as any other organization to be successful. With rapid military unit rotations at the grass roots and the language problems in reporting, the amount of information collected from military sources is limited, often biased by using too few sources, or dated. One shining exception is the UN civilian political officers, assigned from the headquarters of the SRSG. If they have been in their field location for a year or more, as is often true, they may well have a better understanding of local concerns than any US embassy staff who can merely visit from the capital. For the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, there was a parallel political officer group focused on national/capital issues, which was often equally well informed. In Haiti, a successful innovation was the effort to pull together and analyze all sources of information via the UN Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC), which developed its own sources in the Haitian criminal community as well as drawing from the military units, police observers, and political officers. It reported to the SRSG. The JMAC also had regular exchanges of information with key embassies, including the United States, Canada, France, and Brazil, a contact that was useful to all parties. The JMAC model is more and more popular for UN operations. Establishing contacts on the intelligence side as well as the operations side is valuable and provides
another avenue for promoting project concepts and recruiting allies. However, in the majority of contexts, NGOs do not readily contribute information to the UN, especially to the military side of the mission, mostly out of fears that the UN or other governments will misuse humanitarian information for political and military purposes. To be fair, every NGO is ultimately individually responsible for managing its own field security and access to beneficiaries, which relies on the acceptance of local actors. Agencies will measure their capacity to share information according to their own operational position in a context, and mostly if sharing improves their capacity to serve their target beneficiaries and not compromise the security of their expatriates and national employees. Information sharing by the NGOs may be better with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, but even then, the quality of the information shared is limited.

**Working with the United Nations Police**

For those working on stabilization, security, rule of law, and justice reform, the UN’s police monitors and trainers are theoretically a key asset. The reality is extremely variable. UN missions in the past usually did not cover police work. At best, the mission had some police monitors to report to military or civilian leadership on what the local police were doing and assist in humanitarian efforts. As did US policy makers, over time the UN also recognized that police were key parts of any solution. UN mandate tasking changed from monitoring, to interim law enforcement (e.g., Bosnia), to training new police, to advisory support, to police leadership, to operational support, to local police, and now to full scale police reform and law enforcement capacity building. As this evolution occurred, the numbers of police brought along on each mission increased from a few thousand police a year 20 years ago to more than 14,000 police worldwide this year. Unfortunately, the quality of the police doing these increasingly complex missions has not kept up with the quantity required. If existing military units suffer from language difficulties, different doctrines, and styles of leadership, it is even worse with individual police officers recruited from a variety of countries, often from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Haiti had UN police officers from 47 different countries, for example. However, other smaller missions still had 10 or 12 different countries represented. This can be perplexing to a
national government attempting to reform its civilian security force. It also means confusion for an outside observer working in the rule of law or police reform field. Different police in the same UN mission seem to have wildly different estimates of their role. I have met UN Civilian Police (CivPol) officers who clearly state that they are merely observers and do nothing but watch and report statistics to HQ (when they are visible at all). In the same police station on different rotations, I have also met UN CivPol officers who embody the role of mentor and advisor to police leadership at whatever level, working side by side with their counterparts.

This difference is partly a matter of professionalism and training as much as it is a matter of language skills and cultures. It does not help that UN police officers rotate almost as frequently as UN military units rotate and move from station to region to headquarters on the same short tour. For the outsider, apart from checking what the mandate allows and what mission instructions are from the UN SRSG, the best advice is to find those who come from a Western or even narrower Anglo-Saxon legal system background, in order to find the most common language and interpretations of legal requirements. However, fewer and fewer police are from the United States or Western European countries, especially as a percentage of the total numbers. Knowing the Western-educated officers would be merely a jumping off point for coordination and introductions to a wider range of officers.

**The United States’ Role in United Nations Missions**

For all one might criticize the UN overseas, the United States does little to support it directly with personnel on the military side or even on the civilian side. There may be one or two US military officers assigned to the UN in any mission, if that. The Pentagon keeps tours to one year or less for the officers assigned, and thus any US contribution suffers from the same short-timer problems as observed with UN military units. Predeployment training is often limited, meaning that much of the training occurs on the job in that single year. Even so, US officers are sought-after commodities, with their skill at integrating multiple streams of intelligence, or their professionalism in working within a large bureaucracy, or their knowledge and training from past deployments overseas in combat operations. They are also a
key asset to any embassy or US employee, able to provide useful insights and introductions, once they have their feet on the ground. One caveat: they work for the UN, not for the US government, and must maintain a strict silence about sources, methods, and internal discussions.

Final Notes

These have been very narrow-scope observations of who and where to plug in. Stepping back, in general the US government in country usually works with the UN through the ambassador directly with the SRSG. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) works within the donor coordination mechanism, often led by UNDP. Sometimes there is a UN CivPol or security mechanism as well. However, this may not be enough, as US and UN programs increasingly overlap. Taking these comments and observations as a whole, I am advocating for an approach that ties in at lower levels, formally and informally. Conceivably the US government and UN could hold a formal meeting of multiple embassy elements with multiple UN elements on an occasional basis, with the opportunity to follow up more regularly via informal channels, e-mail, or distribution of planning documents. In the field, there is potential for something resembling a PRT approach, with donors’ representatives, their contractors, and the UN mission housed jointly on a single compound. However, this remains a controversial issue for some UN agencies and NGOs.

I have been pointing out some of the understandable and perhaps unavoidable limitations of working with the UN. Nevertheless, US military and civilians will be sharing the space and missions with the UN, most likely in a supporting role. US government observers need to learn and understand the cultural differences between UN agencies, the backgrounds and recruitment of individuals and units, and the requirement to coordinate both at headquarters and in the field. For US personnel, there is no substitute for developing relationships with all components of a UN mission and NGO presence on the ground. This is true given that there is no such thing as a single point of liaison within the UN community that is both completely effective and perceived as legitimate by all civilian players. If one oft-stated goal for the United States is to develop a “common operating picture”
of the “battlespace,” the same requirement extends to the UN and its mission.

Notes


4. UN mission leadership and senior staff, conversations with author, Ethiopia, 2001–02; Haiti, 2007–10; Washington, DC, 2011; and UN HQ, January 2013 (unattributed citation).
PART 5

Nongovernmental and Other Perspectives

Sharing the Space
Chapter 16

Civil Society Experiences of, Conflicts with, and Recommendations for Civilian-Military Teams

Lisa Schirch

Most discussions about civilian-military teams focus on coordinating government civilians and their civilian contractors with military personnel. Internal coordination within these civilian-military teams proved to be such an overwhelming task over the last 10 years that little attention has been given to the military’s relationship with other kinds of civilians—namely nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the larger group of civil society organizations (CSO) that are independent from government. However, in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and elsewhere, US military personnel encounter a wide range of civilians. Military doctrine on stabilization, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, information-support operations, and other areas increasingly instructs military personnel to engage with civilians outside of government. Current US counterinsurgency guidance, for example, identifies the importance of influencing local populations to interact effectively with their own government.¹

Most government and military personnel recognize that they know very little about NGOs and CSOs and candidly admit they hold negative attitudes toward NGOs. Among these attitudes are perceptions that NGOs “clog up their battlespace,” “act like naïve treehuggers,” “aid and comfort the enemy,” “constantly call on military forces to rescue them,” and “must be unpatriotic since they won’t work with us.”² With little military guidance or training and even less research on military relations with CSOs, these stereotypes and biases tend to continue unchallenged. This chapter provides a description of CSOs that are working in places long before military forces and their civilian government counterparts arrive in the midst of a complex crisis environment. Ultimately, improving civilian-military teams requires that civilian government, civilian contractors, and military forces in these teams reduce tensions and come to understand and work in ways that complement these other civilians outside of government.
Governments and military forces increasingly look for cooperation with both international NGOs and local CSOs. A comprehensive approach recognizes the key roles that CSOs play in providing humanitarian assistance and building a stable, peaceful society. A comprehensive approach, according to US military stability operations doctrine, integrates cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the US government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), multinational partners, and private-sector entities such as civilian contractors to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. Yet NGOs and other CSOs widely oppose these moves toward civilian-military integration, especially when they are referred to as “force multipliers” for military goals or assumed to work like contractors who follow orders and take commands.

In this chapter, I address this current civil society–military animosity. I focus on civil society’s experiences of, conflicts with, and recommendations for its relations with military personnel. Research for this chapter took place in Afghanistan and the United States in the form of five structured dialogues between civil society and military personnel, along with interviews with civilian government personnel. I aimed to map tensions, increase understanding, identify common ground, and explore possibilities for deconflicting these relationships. I have spent much of the past 10 years participating in military conferences, training military forces and government civilians, and facilitating dialogue between civil society and military forces with these goals in mind.

I begin this chapter by defining civil society, noting the wide diversity of types of “civilians” that military personnel may encounter. I then explore different mechanisms for how civil society can relate to military personnel in diverse contexts. Using Afghanistan as a case study, the chapter describes the tensions and differences between local and international civil society groups carrying out humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding programs and the United Nation’s (UN) International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) stabilization efforts. The chapter concludes with recommendations for addressing these tensions and restructuring communications. The recommended new approach focuses on problem solving, taking into account the needs and interests of all relevant stakeholders and improving communication channels between CSOs and governmental civilian–military teams such as provincial reconstruction teams (PRT).
Defining Civil Society

Civilians working on behalf of government agencies are different from civilians working for civil society organizations. CSOs are groups of citizens not in government that organize themselves on behalf of some public interest. NGOs and private voluntary organizations are types of CSOs. This chapter uses the term CSOs to include both local NGOs (LNGO) and international NGOs (INGO).

An active local civil society is an indicator of a functioning and democratic state. Civil society works both in partnership with the state to complement and supplement its capacity and in opposition to the state in order to hold the state to account for its responsibilities and transparent governance. There is no single representation for civil society’s vast diversity. CSOs represent a wide variety of views and do not agree on all issues.

Local and international CSOs include religious, educational, media, community-based organizations, business and trade associations, traditional and indigenous structures, sports associations, musicians, artists, and more. CSOs conduct a wide variety of activities including economic development, health, agriculture, human rights, conflict resolution, participatory governance, security-sector reform, as well as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and fostering moderation and coexistence.

Humanitarian NGOs hold a unique position among CSOs. Humanitarian agencies trace their history to early efforts of civilians to go onto the battlefield to help wounded soldiers on all sides of the conflict. Depending on their neutral, impartial, and independent status for access, early humanitarian efforts secured the acceptance of their presence from all sides of an armed conflict. As civilians themselves increasingly became caught in the midst of war, humanitarian agencies began helping both civilians and wounded soldiers on all sides of war. These civilian humanitarian efforts worked to gain support for international humanitarian law (IHL), or the law of armed conflict. IHL defines the conduct and responsibilities of belligerent nations, neutral nations, and individuals engaged in warfare in relation to each other and to protected persons, usually meaning civilians.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the related Protocol of 1977 detail the legal basis for protection of NGO humanitarian workers in conflicts. The cardinal principles of IHL in the conduct of hostilities include the need for distinction of military personnel and targets
from civilians, *proportion* of military benefit to harm to civilians, and military *precaution* to prevent harm to civilians.

Following IHL guidance, humanitarian NGOs attempt to follow a strict code to ensure armed groups accept their presence and allow them freedom of movement to alleviate suffering of people on all sides of a conflict. IHL specifies that consent of the parties is necessary for humanitarian action. Humanitarian NGOs depend on the acceptance of all those receiving assistance as well as armed groups that hold formal and informal responsibilities or control over an affected population. An “acceptance strategy” refers to how NGOs gain and maintain consent for and acceptance of humanitarian assistance activities from beneficiaries, local authorities, belligerents, and other stakeholders. Adhering to humanitarian principles is essential to obtaining consent of all of these stakeholders. As such, humanitarian NGOs incorporate the following principles into their work.

**Humanity**: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being.

**Impartiality**: Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of humanitarian need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions.

**Neutrality**: Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.

**Independence**: Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military, or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

*Figure 16.1. Humanitarian principles. (Derived from UN General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 46/182 and 58/114.)*

CSOs fall along a spectrum, with some making much more effort to be neutral, impartial, and independent than others. It is important for military forces to recognize that not all NGOs are the same. Humanitarian NGOs are distinct in their pursuit of these principles. Multimandate NGOs will make more compromises to achieve *general* political goals such as promoting democracy, women's empowerment, or human rights. However, working on these general goals still
requires impartiality and independence. By definition, CSOs do not take sides with political parties or explicit political goals. CSOs may work with governments where shared goals exist. However, most CSOs will hold on to their independence and impartiality to ensure local acceptance and trust with communities they serve.

Even nonhumanitarian CSOs attempt to be independent and impartial, making decisions and program plans regardless of the identity of those suffering, political goals, ideologies, or military missions. It is generally accepted among all CSOs—humanitarian NGOs and multmandate organizations that may work at promoting democracy and human rights—that an organization’s actual and perceived impartiality and independence are determining factors in guaranteeing the CSO’s ability to carry out these programs and ensuring the security of CSO staff and the local communities that benefit from their programs. When some groups perceive CSOs as being partial to explicit political or security goals, when CSOs take sides with political leaders, and when they are dependent on funding or security from donors with explicit political or security goals, they are less likely to be accepted by all stakeholders, may be perceived as a threat by some groups, and may be targeted by armed groups.

All CSOs attempt to “do no harm” in their relationships and emphasize local consultation and accountability to local people. CSOs negotiate access with official governments, armed groups, informal traditional governing bodies such as tribal elders or religious authorities, and others who may control access, including local authorities at airports or ports or armed actors at checkpoints. Most NGOs receive special training in negotiating access with these stakeholders.

The chair of the UN’s High-Level Panel on Civil Society and Global Governance states, “The legitimacy of civil society organizations derives from what they do and not from whom they represent.” While the Westphalian state structure is still a relatively new system of governance, CSOs have been operating since the beginning of time as people work together to achieve common goals. In countries like Afghanistan and Somalia, tribal leadership structures provide governance in areas untouched by formal governments. In Colombia and the Philippines, the Catholic Church and other religious leadership provide governance functions like helping communities organize themselves to access clean water and maintain rule of law and respect for human rights.

Like government and military organizations, CSOs suffer from some common challenges including dealing with incapable and corrupt CSOs
operating in the midst of legitimate CSOs, maintaining consistent funding despite donors’ shifting priorities, evaluating their work, and dealing with growing government repression of civil society, which restricts CSO activities. Local populations trust some CSOs and distrust others. Some CSOs also exacerbate conflict and violence. To address these issues, CSO networks in many countries have thorough vetting systems that can help distinguish legitimate from illegitimate CSOs. In addition, most governments require that NGOs must meet specific legal requirements for organizational oversight and accountability.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines on security-sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) call for civilian oversight and participation working with military personnel when shared goals exist. Yet operationally, there is little contact in many conflict-affected regions between the local and international CSOs conducting SSR and DDR activities and military or government actors, even though many of these CSOs have a long history of working on these security-sector reform issues and are eager to share their lessons learned and provide advice to the international community.

**Comparing Civil Society Organizations to Military-Led Stabilization Programs**

In many stabilization contexts, international military forces and government personnel assume they share goals with NGOs and CSOs. However, this is not the case. Both local and international CSOs frequently question the legitimacy of stabilization missions, national or international, when military forces may act without the consent of local populations and when no legally enforceable mechanism exists to hold forces accountable to legitimate local political decision-making bodies. In many countries, CSOs cite a long legacy of military forces acting against the interest of local citizens to achieve access to resources or geopolitical gains.

The different goals of the military and CSOs lead to different types of programs. CSOs focus their programs on relieving suffering, poverty alleviation, good governance, participatory decision-making, and human rights. Military-led humanitarian and development stabilization missions often rely on quick impact projects (QIP) or “hearts and minds” activities. The United Kingdom’s (UK) Stabilization Unit
defines QIPs as “small scale, low cost, rapidly implemented projects that serve as down payments on promises of political and economic progress buying time for, and confidence in, a government.” The UN policy paper on QIPs describes them similarly as efforts to build confidence in UN missions and peace processes and specifically notes they are not intended as forms of humanitarian or long-term development assistance. The US military uses stabilization activities for a range of effects, including addressing the root causes of instability.

The chart in table 16.1 summarizes the different goals and principles inherent in the different approaches.

Greater consultation with CSOs before and during military interventions could help achieve greater legitimacy, consent, and collaboration on shared human security goals. Many local CSOs complain that the international community more often undermines their interests in good governance by framing state building as solely a government to government task rather than nurturing a healthy relationship between the state and society.

There are many examples of positive civil society–military relations where groups worked together to achieve shared goals. In Ghana, CSOs, government, and security forces coordinate rapid response to potential violence via a “National Architecture for Peace.” During the 2008 elections civil society leaders mediated between political candidates to deescalate impending election-related violence. In the Philippines, Filipino military leaders attended training at a local civil society–led peacebuilding institute on negotiation, mediation, and peace processes. Military leaders then asked for a peacebuilding training program for thousands of military personnel. In Thailand, local civil society worked with the military to write the national security policy for the southern border provinces from 1999 to 2003. The process of developing this strategy together changed how top military leaders saw their role in supporting a human security agenda.

In Afghanistan, the Department of State and ISAF had a staff person with the title “NGO liaison.” The ISAF NGO liaison helped build momentum around a successful local CSO pilot program to improve SSR and police-community relations. And the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties consulted with Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, and Somali community leaders. DHS drew on this group for crisis rapid-response phone consultations and broader community consultations to identify concerns and brainstorm solutions and to develop DHS cultural competency.
Table 16.1. Comparison of CSO and military goals

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<th>General CSO Goals</th>
<th>General Military Goals in Stabilization Programs</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Assistance</strong>: to save lives, alleviate suffering, and uphold dignity</td>
<td><strong>Address Drivers of Instability</strong>: to address perceived root causes of violence, for example, developing job creation programs such as rebuilding factories or large public works projects to address unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development Assistance</strong>: to alleviate poverty through long-term capacity-building programs to improve governance in all sectors</td>
<td><strong>Win Loyalty of Local Population for Local Government</strong>: to gain support of local populations for US and coalition efforts to support the local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respect for Rights</strong>: to ensure that local populations are able to exercise their human rights</td>
<td><strong>Win Loyalty of Local Elites/Host Nation Support</strong>: to supply local elites with public goods such as humanitarian aid, schools, or bridges to increase and extend the state’s local legitimacy and authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Ownership</strong>: to support locally identified needs and local leadership and participation in decisions and actions to achieve local solutions</td>
<td><strong>Gain Access/Information</strong>: to provide an opportunity to gain access to, and information about, local populations and potential targets of military action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable</strong>: to identify solutions that will make a lasting impact</td>
<td><strong>Force Protection</strong>: to convince local populations of US military goodwill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability</strong>: to consult and be accountable to local people through transparent programs</td>
<td><strong>Undermine Insurgent Recruitment</strong>: to reduce numbers attracted to insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independence</strong>: to make decisions, program plans, and have strategies free from explicit political goals</td>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Access</strong>: to provide humanitarian assistance in insecure areas where the UN and NGOs are not able, as per Geneva Conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impartiality</strong>: to provide resources regardless of the identity of those suffering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutrality</strong>: to not take sides in armed struggles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Do No Harm</strong>: to avoid harming others (intentionally or unintentionally)</td>
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Mechanisms for Civil Society–Military Relations

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) defines a spectrum of military relations with humanitarian NGOs at the operational level. This type of CSO-military relationship depends on whether missions align. The first category, “curtail presence,” refers to situations such as the height of the Iraq war, when it became impossible for CSOs to operate because of a lack of security, and there were widely held concerns among CSOs about the legitimacy of a military mission with large numbers of civilian casualties without the IHL principle of proportionate military benefit given the absence of weapons of mass destruction. CSOs generally felt they were forced either to take sides by explicitly supporting the coalition forces or to withdraw. Neutrality was nearly impossible.

The second category represents a situation where there is minimal contact or communication between representative CSOs and military personnel such as in more recent years in Iraq and Afghanistan. As detailed later in this chapter, CSOs did not perceive that they shared an understanding of the driving factors of conflict in Afghanistan or that they shared a mission with military personnel in these types of contexts. In Afghanistan, NGOs perceived a wide gap between their work to reduce corruption, empower women, and foster democracy and the policies of Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s regime. As such, they recognized that they would not have access or acceptance in many Afghan communities if their explicit goal was to support the Karzai regime or work directly with ISAF. However, most communities did accept NGOs that held general goals of supporting democracy and women’s rights while being impartial to any specific political party and independent of direct ISAF control.

In contexts like Haiti, where there was a shared understanding and commitment to a humanitarian mission, there were more efforts that looked like coordination and cooperation between CSOs and military personnel. The diagram in table 16.2 illustrates the spectrum of levels of communication and coordination between civil society organizations and military forces.
Table 16.2. Spectrum of civil society–military coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Curtail Presence</td>
<td>Where it becomes impossible for CSOs to operate safely, international CSOs may pull out and local CSOs may go into hiding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coexist/Communicate</td>
<td>Where CSOs, government, and military operate in the same space but their missions do not align, only basic communication on logistical details takes place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate</td>
<td>Where CSOs, government, and military missions partially align, there may be some basic coordination to promote CSO core values in human security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>Where CSOs, government, and military missions partially or fully align, there may be collaboration on joint projects, particularly in disaster relief or DDR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coordination can take a variety of forms. Where there is no coordinating body, groups working in the same area coordinate informally or via “Heineken diplomacy,” as individual people build relationships in informal settings over a beer. Coordination by command refers to some type of government-led civilian-military operations center or international coordinating agency, such as OCHA, that has legitimacy through formal authority, the rewards for being coordinated (e.g., funding), or the punishments for not following commands (e.g., denial of access to certain areas or refugee camps).

NGO expectations for civilian–military relations in Iraq and Afghanistan grew out of their experience of coordinating with military personnel in places like Kosovo and East Timor. In both of these places, UN Security Council resolutions authorized a peacekeeping mission distinct from previous combat. Given the mission clarity, humanitarian NGOs and military conducted some planning for the provision of humanitarian assistance as well as discussing end-states for transitioning out. In both contexts, the military provided security for NGOs and international organizations to deliver humanitarian assistance. The UN coordinated the effort, allowing NGOs to distance themselves from political decisions and ensuring that groups on the ground perceived them as neutral and independent.

In other contexts, there has been coordination by consensus where CSOs participate voluntarily with a recognized coordination body that they helped to establish. This type of coordination builds consensus
among CSOs, governments, and military to work in ways that complement rather than conflict. In Rwanda, for example, the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office successfully led this type of coordination by consensus. Co-leaders from UN and NGO backgrounds were able to co-facilitate participatory meetings in a neutral location separate from UN military offices.17

In Haiti, OCHA played this role; however, many local Haitian NGOs, religious organizations, and other local groups were left out of this coordination forum. Unfortunately, this type of coordination body was also missing in Afghanistan, where OCHA provided coordination to international humanitarian actors but not for local civil society groups or nonhumanitarian groups focused on longer-term development or peacebuilding.

In sum, coordination works better when there is a shared understanding and mission between CSOs and military personnel. Coordination mechanisms can be effective when there are clear incentives to coordinate and/or when CSOs participate actively in the design and facilitation of such coordination mechanisms. However, these existing coordination mechanisms have been applied only to humanitarian CSOs, predominantly large INGOs. To date, they have largely left out CSOs focusing on long-term development and peacebuilding and usually exclude or limit the participation of local CSO efforts. These groups also want and need to communicate with military personnel in conflict-affected regions. Afghanistan offers an example of a perfect storm in civil society–military relations. A lack of coordination mechanisms accompanied by tensions over assessment and mission culminated in a sharp increase in tensions.

**Civil Society–Military Tensions in Afghanistan**

As US forces entered Afghanistan in 2001, international forces led by the United States set up a series of improvised coordination mechanisms with humanitarian NGOs. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) invited INGOs and IOs like the UN for the initial planning phase of their intervention. NGOs advised military planners on issues relevant to their work. For example, NGOs cautioned against bombing critical infrastructure such as airfields that would be needed to deliver humanitarian assistance. Interviews with INGO and USCENTCOM
staff at these initial planning meetings attest to the value of the dis-
cussion for all stakeholders.18

Once on the ground in Pakistan and Afghanistan, INGOs, the UN,
and US military started patching together field-level mechanisms
such as the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell that, among other
things, coordinated humanitarian assistance flights into Afghanistan.
A new NGO network, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
(ACBAR), represented both LNGOs and INGOs. ACBAR members
wanted UN leadership in all coordination efforts, but they questioned
the UN’s political goals and saw it as incapable of coordinating even
among its own agencies.

NGOs expressed frustration over military forces dropping food
rations, critiquing it as wastefully expensive and ineffective at allevi-
ating suffering compared to other methods of delivering food aid.
Tensions skyrocketed as military personnel began wearing civilian
clothing and traveling in unmarked white trucks. NGOs argued they
had a long reputation of using white vehicles to deliver assistance,
and the military employing such resources essentially blurred the
distinction between unarmed, independent NGOs and military per-
sonnel. Despite urgent pleas from NGOs, it took the military several
years to address these issues. The delays contributed to a sense among
NGOs that the military did not really care about their security or
delivering humanitarian aid.19

News of these tensions traveled back to the United States, where
the US Institute of Peace facilitated the development of a set of Guidelines for Relations between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental
Humanitarian Organizations (NGHOs) in Hostile or Potentially Hos-
tile Environments with the NGO umbrella network InterAction and
the Department of Defense.20 ACBAR took the lead in developing
civilian-military Guidelines for Afghanistan. The commander of ISAF
and leaders of the NGOs and the UN reportedly all signed onto these
guidelines. However, according to a civilian-military dialogue on the
topic, the paperwork with the signed copies of the guidelines went
missing.21 The UN, tasked to carry out training on the guidelines, did
not follow through until years later.22
Opposition to Civil Society Organization–Military Coordination in Afghanistan

Meanwhile, NGOs and IOs came to reject the idea of an ongoing coordination mechanism for reasons detailed below. Instead, the humanitarian community embraced an ad hoc approach. Some NGOs turned to the UN to host meetings and asked international military forces to send a representative when specific issues required discussion.

1. Location on Military Compounds

In order to attend civil society–military coordination meetings, NGOs had to pass through intensive security screening in Iraq and Afghanistan. Walking in and out of a military base is a dangerous act for unarmed civilians returning to their homes or offices. Such contact puts a mark on an NGO as a possible military collaborator or spy. NGOs were afraid that attending such coordination meetings with the aim of communication to deconflict activities would give a perception that NGOs were not independent of the international military forces that were increasingly raising animosity with the local population due to night raids, home searches, and drone bombs.23

2. Information Operations

NGOs provided information to military planners in coordination meetings on where their staff was traveling and where their organizations were providing assistance. However, military personnel were not able to provide NGOs with timely information about population flows, conditions for internally displaced peoples, safe travel concerns, and locations where future combat operations would occur. Military forces were slower to provide information to NGOs partly because it was not a military priority to find information to help NGO planners and partly because such information was slow to be declassified. NGOs stopped attending coordination meetings because many became convinced that the meetings were being used to extract information from NGOs that would be used to identify possible targets or to persuade NGOs to support the military mission. A RAND study that interviewed military personnel about their relationships with NGOs found that they did gather information from these meetings that helped them better understand the ground truth.24
3. High Turnover

INGO staff and military personnel turn over frequently. Military rotation schedules are often as little as every six months. The dialogue between CSOs and military personnel had to start over every six months with new personnel. This meant there was little institutional memory or protocol.

4. Too Few Civil Affairs Officers

International military forces were heavy on logistics and light on civil affairs personnel, deeming the latter a low priority or a luxury. This meant there were not enough civil affairs personnel to pay attention to the growing challenges of monitoring and assessing military civic assistance programs or to coordinate with civilians of all types.

5. Competition over Civil Society Organization Representation

Large humanitarian INGOs tend to hold the most power and sometimes actively exclude others from participating in civilian-military coordination forums. INGOs urgently need information on issues such as population movements and scheduling flights. Smaller NGOs that focus on longer-term development and peacebuilding and local CSOs have a different set of issues on the table for discussion with military personnel. Sorting out the legitimate NGOs from the illegitimate is a challenge for those coordinating these forums. However, the exclusion of distinct CSO voices in civil society–military discussions eventually harms any concept of local ownership or transition toward civilian leadership. In Afghanistan, relationships between INGOs and LNGOs were strained and scarce.

Military Motivations for Quick Impact Programs in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, international military forces (IMF) used hearts-and-minds QIPs to communicate their intentions to be allies and not enemies of Afghan civilians and to win local allegiance to the side of the IMF. By 2002, the small, Kabul-focused ISAF was conducting 200 projects to demonstrate its goodwill toward local people. Military personnel touted success stories of military-led hearts-and-minds
efforts in places like Deh Rawood, where US forces built schools, clinics, and a bridge to reduce local hostility generated after they had accidentally bombed a wedding party.\textsuperscript{27} According to early documents, the PRTs’ mandate was to provide “interim structures” to “assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable SSR and reconstruction efforts.”\textsuperscript{28}

Military personnel cite specific positive outcomes from their QIPs, such as gaining access to communities or facilitating reconciliation between tribes. They argue hearts-and-minds efforts help civilians in tangible ways. They also assert that their QIPs go through a careful and complicated review process. In Afghanistan, for example, the IMF used the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) priority list of schools that needed rebuilding. Since military personnel were already on the ground, planners argued their QIPs were actually less expensive than comparative NGO efforts.

**Civil Society Organizations’ Perceptions of Quick Impact Programs**

Widespread civil society opposition to hearts and minds and quick impact projects fuel civil society–military tensions. CSOs oppose the integration of development and security goals and the military’s use of the term “humanitarian” to describe QIPs’ security or political purposes in a stabilization mission. They say these programs aim to achieve a military purpose and thus should not be confused with humanitarian efforts that primarily aim to relieve short-term suffering without any political purpose. CSOs charge that military-led and military-directed QIPs lead to quick collapse and thus ineffective and unsustainable development for a variety of reasons, which are outlined below.

CSOs generally do see that poverty plays a key role in driving conflict.\textsuperscript{29} Yet despite decades of development expertise, even many CSO development projects still fail to address causes of poverty and do more to fuel local conflict than mitigate it. Development and peace-building CSOs have undergone extensive training in a “do no harm” methodology to avoid negative impacts of their work.\textsuperscript{30} CSOs note that learning how to deliver humanitarian assistance and do development
is not an “add-on” skill that military personnel can pick up in weekend courses. The potential for making major mistakes that undermine the cause of development or stabilization is high. CSOs note that untrained military personnel conducting humanitarian assistance and development activities are not aware of the complexity of the task or cognizant of that lack of understanding. Moreover, the following nine issues are among the most frequently mentioned criticisms of QIPs:

1. Unsustainable and Ineffective

Some donor countries like the United States evaluate QIPs according to the monthly “burn rate.” In other words, they measure development inputs or dollars spent rather than measuring real impacts and outcomes. As Congress pressed for a development surge to accompany the troop surge in Afghanistan, PRTs had cash to spend. However, their research does not support the claim that more money equals more stability. To the contrary, countries can only absorb a certain amount of development dollars at a time. Excess funds fuel corruption and may destabilize communities.

A tribal leader in Paktia province in Afghanistan explained to Oxfam researchers, “[Our people] really do not need somebody to distribute biscuits to us and do not need construction projects that fall down after a year.” Half a world away on Capitol Hill, Congressional Armed Services Committee members interviewed PRT staff who concluded, “the lack of planning led PRTs to pursue short-term ‘feel good’ projects (with success measured by money spent or satisfaction of the local governor) without consideration of larger strategic and capacity-building implications.” Oxfam reports that QIPs focus on “capital-heavy, highly-visible ‘hardware’ like school buildings or refurbished markets,” but fail to budget for the essential “software” like schoolteachers or health care workers that sustainable development requires.

The US General Accounting Office (GAO) and the congressionally appointed special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction (SIGAR) and Iraq reconstruction (SIGIR) verify NGO concerns via their own research on the military-led civic assistance programs. These reports note billions of dollars of US taxpayers’ money have been used for reconstruction efforts characterized by considerable waste with scant evidence of positive effects. SIGAR’s July 2013 report revealed that the $49 billion spent in reconstruction had questionable
impact. SIGAR’s July 2013 report repeated previous recommendations for the US Army to prevent US reconstruction funds from directly funding the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan, noting these recommendations had not yet been implemented and evidence suggested counterthreat financing may still be happening through US reconstruction funds. The SIGIR March 2013 report also raised serious concerns about the widespread corruption and waste in the $60 billion the United States used for reconstruction in Iraq.

2. Divert Funding Away from Sustainable Development

Research on military-led QIPs in situations ranging from the Rwandan refugee crisis in 1994 to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami concludes such projects cost considerably more than civilian alternatives. In Kenya, for example, the US military spent five months and $250,000 digging two wells that did not work. These wells would have only provided water for some 20 nomadic families. The main goal for the well digging was gathering information and establishing relationships as part of the regional counterterrorism plan. In comparison, wells dug by NGOs cost approximately $10,000 and first require an assessment regarding local needs and a plan for ongoing maintenance. In the end, instead of a real project, the remaining shells of failed QIPs endure as lasting symbols of wasted money that could have gone into sustainable projects.

CSOs view QIPs in places like Afghanistan, where they are carried out by PRTs and Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, as diverting international funds away from legitimate donor pools that aim to strengthen governance and build in mechanisms to assess, monitor, and evaluate development efforts to maximize their effectiveness and sustainability. At the same time, they set up parallel structures to address public needs, thus inadvertently undermining the very host-nation government they ostensibly aim to support. CSOs view QIPs as an impediment to strategic, coordinated, and sustainable development efforts.

The CERP budget in Afghanistan was larger than the Afghan government’s combined budget for education, health, and agriculture, totaling $1.5 billion in 2010. However, CERP funds could be spent only on QIPs and not the needed infrastructure projects. In a wide variety of reports, NGOs argued that the international community would have done far more to support stability and security if they invested
in major repair and construction and infrastructure projects that NGOs were not able to do and that were needed for economic growth.42

3. Use Aid Coercively for Information and Cooperation

Throughout history, groups have used humanitarian assistance to achieve goals other than the relief of human suffering to gain cooperation. Missionaries in Africa built schools and offered education as long as locals converted to Christianity. Development literature widely condemns these colonial practices. So NGOs decry reports of QIPs that expect communities to provide information about insurgents or support the presence of armed forces in their communities, even if locals perceive that the QIP actually endangers them by creating a symbolic target for insurgents.43 At the same time, governments put conditions on humanitarian grants offered to CSOs in Afghanistan, which required them to adopt military terminology and strategy into their humanitarian assistance efforts. For example, there was a requirement for NGOs to add counterinsurgency indicators to measure their impact and directions to operate in areas where NGOs could be used to stabilize regions as part of the “clear, hold, build” approach to counterinsurgency. Many INGOs refused large sums of funding from governments because of these conditions. Some smaller LNGOs did take funding with these conditions, but then reported that the coercive leveraging of funds for cooperation endangered their lives and undermined their relationships with communities, making their work more difficult—if not impossible.

4. Counterproductive to Stabilization

CSOs ask critical questions about the concept of stability itself: stabilization for whom and for what purpose? Government and military personnel tend to use the concept of stability in different ways. Often, the concept of stability refers to bolstering support for specific political regimes that support short-term US security or economic interests rather than stability for longer-term US interests in democracy or human rights. In the 2010 revolutions in the Middle East, US political leaders sometimes spoke of “stability,” reflecting their desire to maintain support for US-friendly regimes in the region, regardless of their authoritarian and repressive characteristics. Other times the United States sided with the people’s movements, calling for “change.”
US civilian doctrine on stabilization, on the other hand, defines the term as applying to efforts to help a country move from violent conflict to peace. It rightly describes stabilization aimed at achieving a safe and secure environment, rule of law, governance that allows people to share, to access, or to compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state, a sustainable economy, and more generally social well-being, where people coexist peacefully.

CSOs tend to see strengthening governance as a long-term effort that sometimes means that local CSOs will challenge their government or stand apart from it to hold it accountable. Supporting good governance sometimes means critiquing corruption, lack of capacity, or lack of political will of a particular government. CSOs often see short-term stabilization via QIPs as counterproductive—endangering and undermining long-term development and peacebuilding, wasting development funds, and inadvertently fueling both corruption and insurgency. CERP funds used to build schools and wells in Afghan warlords’ districts fell into the hands of corrupt contractors who turned out shoddy work. The funds resulted in increased support to regional leaders who opposed the Afghan government, thus undermining the very government the funds were supposed to support.

Moreover, CSOs question the underlying assumption that QIP-type development activities contribute to stability or security, noting research that disproves the link. When CSOs reduce poverty by investing in education and creating livelihoods, the economic payoff may translate into greater political stability in the longer term. In the Horn of Africa, for example, intertribal clashes occur as land and water for pasturing cattle are in short supply. A variety of NGOs help to diversify economic livelihoods and support local pastoralist associations that manage resource disputes through mediation in what they refer to as “community-led stabilization.” Military QIPs to build schools and latrines may gain the military short-term access, but NGOs point out that QIPs do not address the key drivers of conflict.

5. Undermine Civilian Security

When militaries and governments begin to deliver humanitarian aid as a means of winning over local populations, it becomes difficult if not impossible for local people to tell the differences between humanitarian efforts aimed exclusively at relieving suffering and those
that are aimed at invoking the support of the population for one side of the conflict. In this case, the opposing side sees humanitarian assistance as helping their enemy and thus may directly attack those delivering aid or prevent them from reaching people in need. Where humanitarian groups have secured the consent of all armed groups to conduct their work according to principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, armed groups do not target those delivering the aid and do not block their work. However, in practice, armed groups are attacking and killings NGOs in increasing numbers each year. The historic principles of humanitarianism are under threat from a variety of trends.  

CSOs report QIPs act like a magnet for armed opposition forces; when the military uses development as a weapon of war, as explicitly detailed in the US Army publication *Money as a Weapons System*, armed opposition groups naturally try to destroy that weapon, regardless of whether it is a school or health clinic. Afghanistan is the apex of these tensions, though similar stories are also told of military-led efforts in other parts of Asia and around Africa and Latin America. An elder interviewed in one village noted, “[Our people] are very poor and need development projects but [our people] know that wherever the international forces go, the Taliban follow them.” Military involvement in education and health increases the risks that health clinics or schools will be attacked. In 2008 CSOs reported that “on average every four days three Afghans are summarily executed for their association with the government or international forces.” On the other hand, where there is local ownership and leadership for schools and health clinics, greater levels of safety for communities exist. Armed opposition groups seem to recognize that these development efforts are not weapons of war or legitimate targets, and attacking them would serve no purpose other than alienating the community.

Trends monitoring NGO kidnapping and murders in Afghanistan show a shocking increase since the early 2000s. Many NGOs assume a variety of factors—including blurred lines between integrated military and civilian actors—are making NGOs the “soft targets” or front lines of the military forces. NGOs report that they regularly receive warnings that any perceived association with military forces will make them a target. In many areas, NGO offices and staff have been searched for links to the military and threatened with severe consequences if such links are established. Likewise, NGO projects have been forced to close due to visits from PRTs or foreign donor agencies
in heavily armed escorts. In the aftermath of such visits, communities have informed NGOs that they can no longer guarantee the safety of project staff.\textsuperscript{53}

NGOs note that this dynamic not only endangers NGOs, it makes it difficult for NGOs to earn the trust of and to gain access to local communities who do not want to begin development projects if it will increase threats against their community. Some NGOs report they feel more secure in Taliban-controlled areas than in areas with PRTs. The Taliban is not necessarily opposed to development.\textsuperscript{54} Rather, development becomes a target where there is a more open battle for legitimacy and authority.

NGOs seek access to, acceptance by, and dialogue with all armed groups to carry out their humanitarian and development work so that it can avoid being the victim of targeting by armed groups. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors without Borders) negotiated directly with Taliban leadership and had access as long as its workers wore vests with the logo for MSF identified on front and back. ACBAR would have liked to have the same dialogue with other armed forces—to be equidistant from IMF and all armed opposition groups so as to gain access and acceptance by all sides to carry out development activities regardless of the political geography of the war. However, some perceived CSO work in Taliban-controlled areas as legitimizing the Taliban, who could have taken credit for these development projects.\textsuperscript{55} The literature on “do no harm” or conflict-sensitive development seeks to assess the legitimizing impact of development aid on local armed groups.\textsuperscript{56}

The Afghan National Security Office (ANSO), a project that informed and advised NGOs on safety conditions, examined the trends in NGO security and humanitarian space. Despite NGO concerns, ANSO’s 2010 report concluded that “there remains no evidence to suggest that AOG [armed opposition groups] deliberately target NGOs (except for deminers) or that [ANSO] will not retain space for [the] operation.”\textsuperscript{57} In my many years of training the military, I have frequently observed military personnel questioning claims that QIPs undermine NGO security, noting many NGOs rely on government funding and so their programs may also have been seen as politically motivated. Military personnel also charged that NGOs have political and social goals, such as women’s empowerment and participatory democracy that were similarly ensconced in NGO humanitarian assistance efforts. Unfortunately, there were few opportunities for
NGOs to explain to the US military that Afghan communities and even armed opposition groups accepted their presence if these NGOs were working on behalf of general political goals such as human rights or even women’s empowerment and even working in coordination with the Afghan government. Some armed opposition groups were explicit in their rejection of only those NGOs who worked directly with ISAF. In other words, the level of independence and impartiality seemed to matter. These were not discrete categories; rather NGOs fell along a spectrum of independence and impartiality. Their access to communities and the safety of their staff seemed to be dependent on where they were on that spectrum.

6. Undermined by Enemy-Centric Approaches

A number of reports document that enemy-centric tactics such as drone bombs, house searches, and night raids significantly undermine the intent for QIPs to win hearts and minds. CSOs assert that from their perspective IMFs were losing hearts and minds faster than they could win them. CSOs support a human security paradigm that looks toward the protection of civilians. In Afghanistan, the extent of civilian deaths due to “targeting errors” during enemy-centric efforts to kill armed opposition groups increased CSO-military tensions. Referring to how hearts and minds impacted civilian casualties, a US government observer noted, “One strike negated 100 projects.” Similarly, a RAND study concluded that “the United States might have been better advised to address the public security needs of the country at an earlier stage and to have included the establishment of a secure environment in the mission of the US and coalition forces.”

7. Lack Local Ownership

CSOs charge that QIPs’ short-term time frame means there is a lack of proper needs assessment, monitoring, community engagement, and buy-in. A range of PRT lessons learned and research reports on both Iraq and Afghanistan note the lack of engagement with local government and civil society, and even with the national forces and police. In a 2009 joint statement, a group of NGOs working in Afghanistan stated, “Given the particular cultural and social mores of Afghanistan, and mistrust of foreign forces, Western military-led institutions are unable
to achieve a sufficient level of local engagement and ownership necessary for effective long-term development.”

8. Assume a Naïve Public

The Feinstein Research Institute examines public perceptions of military-led stabilization and reconstruction efforts. They reported that people in East Africa, as in other countries, saw through QIPs and wondered, “Do they think we’re stupid?” Local people question the intentions and transparency of motivations for QIPs. They assume the military is not providing development assistance just for the sake of helping them. They want to know the real reasons why the military is building schools or hospitals. Military references to “population control and pacification” as well as the metaphor of “human terrain” raise suspicions, misunderstandings, or confusion of military objectives among civil society.

Research asserts that Afghans perceived QIPs as military programs, not development programs, even when civilian PRT members conducted them. Moreover, Afghans did not seem to make a distinction between civilian and military foreigners working within the PRT. A civilian USAID worker traveling in an armed convoy, wearing body armor, and living in a PRT compound was a signal to local people that the USAID and military staff at the PRT were the same. Local people saw QIP funds as easier to access quickly, and they didn’t require local people to invest in the project themselves or to help carry out the project, which runs contrary to key principles of sustainable development practices. However, locals also correlated ease of access to the proliferation of new local contractors who were perceived to be corrupt and producing low quality work.

Afghan public support for international military forces was linked to progress on security or justice issues, not development. QIPs may have won short-term access or consent to enter a community but may not have translated into long-term support for military goals. Afghan civilians wanted PRTs to protect civilians’ honor and dignity not only from attacks by insurgents but also from abuses by corrupt government officials, local criminals, warlords, and international forces. Afghan citizens wanted ISAF to focus on security and justice; they cared less about whether the PRT provided a health center or school. Similarly, the UK-funded research *Drivers of Radicalisation* found that perceived government failures to perform and the behavior of foreign
forces had a greater influence on radicalization of individuals joining insurgent groups in Afghanistan than the oft-cited hypotheses that unemployment or religious fanaticism is chiefly responsible. Respondents highlighted the perceived failure of the state to provide security and justice, people's experiences of predatory and oppressive security-sector institutions (including the police), and the behavior of IMF in terms of night raids, house searches, and civilian deaths (and not necessarily the sheer presence of foreigners) as key drivers of radicalization. Furthermore, the research found that PRT hearts-and-minds projects seemed to have little impact on people upset about the perceived humiliation or deaths caused by international forces.

9. Disempowering Local People

Local CSOs around the world often complain that military personnel and foreign governments do not take the time to consult with local civil society on local social, political, and economic factors driving conflict. They note that the “we know best” attitude ignores democratic principles and the will and capacity of local CSOs to provide cultural advice. For example, Afghan civil society groups asserted that international policy makers did not engage them or the Afghan government when drafting the 2004 development document Securing Afghanistan’s Future. As evidence of the international community’s exclusive and exclusionary approach, the report was published in English and not translated into Dari and Pashto, the two major languages of Afghanistan. Afghan CSOs critiqued this imbalance of input, suggesting that while internationals were needed as partners in Afghanistan’s development, they should not have developed plans for Afghanistan without broad consultation with diverse Afghan stakeholders. Military personnel meanwhile may have wished to consult CSOs, but had no way of identifying whom they should consult or how to have communication with Afghans. Underfunded and understaffed USAID offices were often not aware of NGO capacity.

In response to wide criticism and a felt need to understand local cultures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military created human terrain teams (HTT) that embedded anthropologists and other social scientists with military troops, with the goal of helping them understand relevant cultural history, engage locals more respectfully, build greater support for local government and police, and support tribal
traditions in conflict resolution. However, the American Anthropologists Association warned that HTTs gathered intelligence related to enemy identification rather than cultural understanding and violated the professional association’s code of ethics in a number of ways. Some anthropologists went on to specifically denounce the terminology of “human terrain” as sending a message that human beings could be treated as geographical “objects” to be manipulated and controlled rather than “subjects” who could be further empowered to shape their environment according to their own priorities.

Military “take charge” decision-making processes aim for quick, hierarchical outcomes rather than concepts like local empowerment and consultation. “[Government] efforts tend to focus on the substance of state building rather than on techniques for facilitating locally owned and managed processes. Instead of training personnel to reform institutions and make new policy for conflict countries, efforts should be focused on training interveners to be catalysts for change.”

While there is much talk of empowerment and building local capacity, in practice international organizations like the UN and INGOs relate to local CSO leadership in much the same way as the military. That is, they either do not reach out at all to these leaders and implement programs without their guidance and advice, or they work around these existing leaders and go straight into their business.

Recommendations

Improving civil society–military relations requires a problem-solving approach that addresses the needs and interests of all stakeholders. The research for this chapter, a series of dialogues between CSOs and military personnel in the United States and Afghanistan, identified a range of recommendations for improving the CSO-military relationship. These included a set of recommendations for further research, training, and operational mechanisms for coordination. These recommendations required joint effort between CSOs and military personnel and also involve Congress, contractors, and IOs like the UN.
Research

Improving civil society–military relations requires far more research, training, and coordination on a variety of topics. Military and civil society participants identified a range of potential steps to improve the relationship, which I have detailed here.

1. Deconflicting Roles and Time Horizons

Part of the CSO critique regarding QIPs is the way short-term programs undermine rather than complement long-term development efforts. Military leaders argue that security imperatives require QIPs that yield results within a six-month period and not a 10-year time frame. Research should find examples and lessons learned on how to design short-term programming that contributes toward long-term goals and how to design long-term programming that better supports legitimate short-term objectives that do not conflict with CSO missions.

2. Focus on Security and Participatory Governance More Than Quick Impact Programs

CSO research suggests that PRTs would make more of a contribution if they would focus on security, monitoring corruption, and fostering good governance rather than development. CSOs recommend thinking through desired end states and appropriate roles. In places like Afghanistan, there seemed to have been little planning for transition from military personnel toward local civilian actors. Research should recommend strategies for a more balanced two-pronged approach to “participatory” governance that includes supporting a citizen-oriented government and an active civil society that holds government to account.73

3. Monitoring Hearts-and-Minds Quick Impact Programs

Local communities and civil society desire better ways of providing feedback and more transparency and accountability for military QIPs. CSOs recommended that there be a central repository of lessons learned to which they could contribute. To enable better CSO monitoring and safety in communicating with military personnel, better monitoring systems should be put in place. This could include
putting phone numbers for call-in feedback from communities on the outside of PRT buildings and on radio so that people have a channel for communicating without having to visit a PRT, which may endanger their security. A CSO called Integrity Watch Afghanistan helps communities build their capacity to provide such feedback. This system of community consultation could also be used so that communities would help PRTs choose contractors for PRT projects and monitor corruption or counterthreat financing.

4. Integration versus Distinction

The comprehensive approach assumes development must be integrated with security efforts. From a CSO point of view, the basic assumptions underlying field-level civilian-military teams are unproven. Even before 2001, there was recognition that military and civilians had different missions, separate objectives, different time frames, and competing priorities. Recognizing these fundamental contradictions and tensions between approaches, the UN’s 1999 Strategic Framework tried to deconflict humanitarian and military approaches by directing that humanitarian and development efforts should take place “only where it can reasonably be determined that no direct political or military advantage will accrue to the warring parties in Afghanistan.” The UK Department for International Development (UK DFID) concluded in its 2007 report on Afghanistan’s Helmand Province that different programs such as counterinsurgency and development were “not necessarily mutually reinforcing.” CSOs conclude that a comprehensive approach that respects the independent and distinct roles of civil society is most likely to enable their long-term contributions to human security.

Planners should consult widely to assess the ramifications of integrating civilian tasks or civilians themselves with military personnel. CSO-military communication and coordination may be more important at the strategic level by focusing on joint conflict assessment and joint discussion of mission, and then allowing for greater differentiation at the operational level. Research should examine the real benefits of the integration model to security, the costs of this model to humanitarian space, and the alternatives to the existing civil military “integration” model.
5. The Relationship between Military Development Efforts and Nongovernmental Organizations’ Insecurity

NGO security and the issue of humanitarian space is a major source of tension. Military personnel question the relationship between hearts-and-minds QIPs and NGO security, pointing to the increased attacks by insurgents against all kinds of civilians. More research is needed to document the relationship between military-led QIPs and NGO security.

Training

Improving civil society–military relations requires increased training for both civil society and military forces.

1. Do-No-Harm Training for Military

Despite decades of development expertise, even many CSO development projects still fail to address causes of poverty and do more to fuel local conflict than mitigate it. Development is complex and can easily produce unintended negative second- and third-order effects of legitimizing unpopular leaders, fueling corruption, or further causing division and violence. CSOs have undergone extensive training in a “do no harm” methodology to avoid negative impacts of their work. The UK and Australian military receive training from their respective aid agencies to understand the potential for harm in providing civic assistance. All security forces carrying out orders to do civic assistance or development-like work should first be trained in the do-no-harm methodology to recognize the potential negative impacts of building a school or a health center or handing out backpacks to kids.

2. Training on Civil Society Organization–Military Relations

Neither military services nor CSOs receive sufficient training on how to approach and conceive of the other. Military personnel often lump all NGOs and CSOs together or misunderstand the concept of civil society. Some military personnel perceive CSOs as naïve, unpatriotic, illegitimate, or corrupt. On the other hand, CSOs often lump all armed actors together as “belligerent forces” or may not distinguish
between the local national security police and military personnel and international forces—a lack of distinction that offends some military personnel who see important differences. Yet people who join the military or CSOs share some similar values. They see themselves as making personal sacrifices to serve the public or a larger principle that puts their own self-interest and security at risk when they put themselves on the front lines.

Ordinary civilians, CSO staff, and military personnel all lack understanding of key issues in civilian-military relations. Knowledge of existing humanitarian NGO guidelines and international humanitarian law is lacking. Citizens in countries with a heavy international military presence need more news media coverage and public education about civilian-military relations. Military personnel need training in the concept of civil society, its role in stabilization, and how to work toward empowerment and local ownership rather than pacification. CSOs and military need training and skills for managing their interactions. New curricula and training opportunities could assist CSOs and military to advance their understanding of key civilian-military issues.

**Operational Mechanisms**

At the field level, improving civil society–military relations requires building better communication and coordination mechanisms to allow a safe and secure forum for both civil society and military forces to address challenges of sharing operational space. Four types of forums may be helpful.

1. **Monitoring Civilian-Military Guidelines**

In Washington, DC, the US Institute of Peace hosts a civil military working group that developed the “Guidelines for Relations between US Armed Forces and Humanitarian NGOs.” This provides a discussion forum. However, a joint CSO-military monitoring effort should hold operational capacity to document incidents where there are accusations that guidelines are not followed. Currently, there is no research arm that can monitor and investigate such accusations. Research could inform how to develop mechanisms for remediating harm or changing behaviors to avoid future violations.
2. Mechanisms for Multistakeholder Consultations

Any “comprehensive approach” or “unity of effort” requires unity of understanding and unity of mission. The comprehensive approach cannot have a unity of effort including CSOs until there is a shared understanding of the causes driving conflict and violence and a shared mission that includes broader human security.

CSOs see communication, not structural integration, as necessary for a comprehensive approach. Many CSOs resist terms that name them as “force multipliers” or requests for them to “coordinate” with or “implement” a mission and strategy perceived as different from their own. However, many CSOs do recognize the benefits of policy dialogue and “communication” with government and military personnel. Yet few consultation structures exist to engage with those CSOs willing to provide policy advice, share conflict assessments, or discuss overlapping human security goals.

The future of civil society–military relations will depend on whether there are skilled facilitators and coordination mechanisms hosted outside of military structures to provide a safe and secure place to bring local and international CSOs together with key policy makers, the international community, and the national government. In consultation with CSOs, government and military personnel should design mechanisms to consult with CSOs who want to share conflict assessments and advice on policy options, address field-level issues, or discuss overlapping human security goals.81

3. Mechanisms for Funding Civil Society Organizations

NGOs seek more mechanisms to provide consultation, advice, and feedback on current funding mechanisms to the donor community than do government and military leaders. In consultation with CSOs, government and military personnel should explore alternative funding mechanisms such as channeling development dollars through embassy development offices, national governments, or international donor pools to ensure that all civic assistance efforts are coordinated into one strategic plan.
4. Development of Shared Standards

The plethora of international and local actors working on development, governance, and security creates a sense of impunity and chaos on the ground when problems arise. There is an information gap. The public has no idea how much money is being spent, where the money is coming from, and who is accountable for funding. CSOs, governments, and military personnel doing development all share similar challenges of fostering local ownership, accountability, and monitoring what is working and what is not. CSOs oppose military-led QIPs. However, they argue that if QIPs must exist, the programs should, at the very minimum, follow a set of shared standards for accountability, evaluation, monitoring, and transparency on cost and sustainability.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed to map tensions, increase understanding, identify common ground, and explore possibilities for deconflicting relationships between military forces and civil society organizations such as NGOs. Research for the chapter documented both military perceptions of NGOs and the challenges and perceptions identified by CSOs in sharing operational environments with military forces. My recommendations for addressing these tensions and restructuring communications outline specific measures for improving research so that both military and civil society better understand the nature of the challenges they share. Recommendations for expanding training and coordination aim to provide military leaders and civil society organizations with an agenda for action. The recommended new approach in this chapter focuses on problem solving, taking into account the needs and interests of all relevant stakeholders and improving communication channels between CSOs and governmental civilian-military teams. There may always be challenges in relationships between military forces and civil society organizations; however, the challenges documented here are not without solution. In this chapter, I provide concrete ideas, informed by military, government, and NGO research efforts, for how to improve relationships between military and civil society and ultimately improve human security and stabilization goals.
Notes


2. I provide training to US forces and the US Foreign Service Institute on best practices for military relations with NGOs and civil society. I collected these quotes at multiple training seminars since 2002.


24. Oliker et al., Aid during Conflict, 87.

25. Ibid., 95.

26. Ibid., 71.

27. Ibid., 73.


33. Ibid., 18.

34. House, Committee on Armed Services’ Sub-Committee on Oversight and Investigations, Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility (Washington, DC: GPO, April 2008), 72.
36. Government Accountability Office (GAO), US Congress, Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts (Washington, DC: GAO, 8 February 2012). This report highlights that DOD engagement in these activities can be counterproductive.
42. Oliker, et al., Aid during Conflict, 90.
46. Oliker et al., Aid during Conflict, 79.
51. Ibid., 18.


56. Mary Anderson, *Do No Harm*.


60. Oliker, *Aid during Conflict*, 64.

61. Ibid., 102.


64. “Caught in the Conflict,” 5.


66. Participants shared these statements in a civil society–military dialogue in Kabul, Afghanistan, on 20 October 2011. This author organized and facilitated the dialogue as part of her research on this topic.

67. Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al., *Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds*.

68. Ibid.


78. Oliker, et al., *Aid during Conflict*, 100.

79. Anderson, *Do No Harm*.


Chapter 17

Achieving Coordinated Results in Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Postwar Peacebuilding

Lessons from the US Civilian-Military Experience in Afghanistan

Andrea Strimling Yodsampa

Eventually, we had to move from a process to a results orientation, but initially we had to develop some process with a mutual coming-together.

—Maj Gen Jeffrey Schloesser
Interview with the author

Policy makers and practitioners increasingly recognize that civilian-military coordination is necessary for stabilization, reconstruction, and postwar peacebuilding. As retired Army general Robert E. Durbin relates of his command in Afghanistan, “When I arrived in Afghanistan, I was focused on command and control, ownership, directing activities. I quickly found that I owned very little, controlled very little, could direct very little. . . . The new C2 [Command and Control] was about cooperation and collaboration, not command and control, influence not direction. We had to create forums, bring key stakeholders to convene, so we could collaborate.”

The US government, its multinational partners, and intergovernmental organizations have poured resources into efforts to enhance coordination, creating myriad coordination mechanisms, processes, and tools. Coordinated results, however, have proved largely elusive, and fragmentation of efforts remains the norm. The costs of the continued lack of coordination in postwar environments are measured not only in dollars wasted but also in lives lost.

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Coordination is, of course, extraordinary challenging. Postwar contexts are complex and rapidly changing. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of civilian and military, governmental, nongovernmental, expatriate, and local actors. They have different interests, priorities, timelines, resources, cultures, and operating principles. Perhaps the most significant challenge is that no one is fully in charge. While the United Nations (UN), other intergovernmental organizations, and key donor nations often assume leadership roles, they cannot direct the actions of sovereign nations, independent nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and other autonomous actors. As US ambassador Christopher Dell states, “Civilian-military integration is all about the process. It’s the process that gets you to a result. . . . Everyone has to surrender some sovereignty and autonomy of planning and come to the table and together come up with a common plan.”

Given these challenges, how can coordination be enhanced, strengthening international stabilization, reconstruction, and peacebuilding efforts? This chapter identifies key institutional systems and processes necessary for effective coordination. To do so, it draws on a multiyear research project on interagency, civilian-military, and multinational coordination, including an in-depth case study of US civilian-military coordination in Afghanistan from fall 2001 to spring 2009. While the United States was only one among many actors in Afghanistan, US civilian-military coordination is necessary for broader multinational coordination. Moreover, the analysis of US civilian-military coordination offers insights of relevance to other sets of actors and activities.

The reasons for coordination failures are well-documented and understood. The factors that explain successful coordination have received far less attention. Therefore, this project focused on illuminating and explaining concrete examples of successful coordination. It focused on coordination among the US Department of Defense (DOD), the US Department of State (DOS), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), analyzing institutional systems and processes at three levels of decision making (strategic, operational, and tactical) and across four distinct time periods, delineated by the US ambassador to Afghanistan.

The research involved in-depth, semistructured interviews with 118 senior and mid-level officials who worked in or on Afghanistan between fall 2001 and spring 2009, supplemented by additional interviews with analysts and scholars. The interviews were used to identify concrete examples of successful coordination and determine the key
factors that made them possible. The content of the interviews was confidential, in that interviewees were assured that no information or quotations would be attributed to them without their permission.3

US civilian interviewees included all four ambassadors to Afghanistan during the period studied, the majority of deputy chiefs of mission and USAID mission directors, political advisors (POLAD), development advisors (DEVAD), USAID field program officers (FPO), and other civilian experts who served on the ground. Military interviewees included both commanders of US Central Command (USCENTCOM), commanders of Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC–A) and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), brigade commanders, provincial reconstruction team (PRT) commanders, and other officers. In addition, interviews were conducted with senior policy makers and other experts at the DOD, the DOS, USAID, and the National Security Council (NSC) and with several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), UN, European Union (EU), and NGO officials with firsthand knowledge of US interagency coordination.

Close-to-verbatim notes were taken during the interviews. The interview data then were coded and analyzed using qualitative analysis software.4 Four sets of criteria were used to determine which interview data rose to the level of evidence: frequency and consistency; supporting detail, evidence, and/or internal logic; indication of learning; and dissenting opinions.5 Interview data were supplemented by primary and secondary documentation.

The Afghanistan Case Study

Afghanistan, in the decade following the 2001 military invasion, served as an incubator and testing ground for numerous coordination mechanisms, processes, and tools, both on the ground and at headquarters around the world. Many of these efforts were innovative and effective. Nevertheless, the reality on the ground consistently fell short of what the United States and broader international community deemed necessary in terms of coordinated action.

Indeed, by 2010, virtually every analysis, policy document, and speech about international efforts in Afghanistan called for enhanced coordination. Two US congressional hearings in 2010 were aptly entitled “An Urgent Need: Coordinating Reconstruction and Stabilization in Contingency Operations.”6 Pres. Barack Obama, in remarks about
the US strategy in Afghanistan, “pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts.”7 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates repeatedly affirmed their commitment to enhanced coordination among defense, diplomacy, and development (3-D coordination). General David Petraeus, US Army, then commander of USCENTCOM, in his March 2010 testimony to the Armed Services Committee emphasized, “Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan poses the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility and requires complementary and integrated civilian-military, whole-of-government approaches.”8

US multinational partners, including the government of Afghanistan, likewise called for enhanced coordination among the broad array of expatriate and local, governmental and nongovernmental actors engaged in Afghanistan.9 NGOs, while appropriately wary of any perceived or actual loss of autonomy, increasingly raised concerns about negative interactions among activities on the ground. They argued for not only whole-of-government but also whole-of-community approaches, recognizing the critical role of civil society in peacebuilding.10

By 2010, calls for enhanced coordination had reached crescendo levels. The urgency with which policy makers focused on the issue reflected awareness that coordination failures, both among US agencies and with the broader array of governmental and nongovernmental actors engaged in Afghanistan, had wasted precious resources and undercut international stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

Evidence of coordination failures was ubiquitous. Schools had been built, furnished, even equipped with libraries—only to sit idle for lack of trained teachers. Free veterinary clinics had been offered to local communities, but in the process efforts to build local veterinary capacity had been undercut. Short-term counterterrorism objectives had been achieved, but in the process countless civilians had been killed or injured, deeply alienating the people whose support was essential to achieve US counterinsurgency goals.11

Coordination failures, however, were not the entire story. Amidst what often appeared as a sea of coordination failures, there also were significant successes. Intensive multinational, civilian-military, and governmental-nongovernmental coordination made the 2004 Afghan presidential elections possible. Early failures in road construction gave way to increasingly effective coordination, in which military and civilians leveraged complementary resources and capabilities to build an extensive roads network. Counterterrorist “clearing” operations were
increasingly followed by the relief and development necessary to “hold” and “build” those areas. Ongoing civilian-military coordination, both among expatriates and with the local Afghan leadership, made possible counternarcotics achievements in Nangahar Province. Civilians and military at key PRTs were able to leverage their complementary resources and expertise to realize shared goals.

What were the key factors that distinguished coordination successes from failures, and how can leaders enhance coordination moving forward? Before I summarize the case study findings, it is necessary to define “successful coordination.”

**What Are Coordinated Results?**

Scholars and policy makers often use the term *coordination* to refer interchangeably to process and results. This causes confusion and undermines analytic rigor. Therefore, this project distinguishes explicitly between coordination systems, processes, and mechanisms on the one hand and the results they are intended to deliver on the other. The project introduces a new term, *coordinated results*. It then identifies four types of coordinated results, drawing on prior research and theory as well as empirical experience.

The four types of coordinated results are avoidance of negative interactive effects, efficiency, complementarity, and synergy. The first two types are defined in the negative. Practitioners often refer to them as “deconfliction.” The third and fourth types of coordinated results reflect positive, more ambitious, goals.

**Avoidance of Negative Interactive Effects**

At a minimum, coordinated results are achieved when past or potential negative interactions between activities are avoided or mitigated. Thus, if the US military changes the way in which it provides veterinary assistance to local communities to avoid undermining parallel USAID capacity-building efforts, negative interactive effects are avoided.

**Efficiency**

The next step up from avoidance of negative interactive effects is efficiency. Efficiency is achieved when wasteful duplication is avoided, enabling actors to redirect limited resources where they are needed.
For example, two agencies may discover they have plans to build a school in one community, while a neighboring community goes without any schools. If one agency subsequently decides to build its school in the neighboring community, efficiency is achieved. In some cases, of course, duplication of efforts may be deliberate and beneficial. The focus here is on eliminating inadvertent wasteful duplication.

**Complementarity**

Complementarity is achieved when agencies’ different resources, expertise, and capacities are brought together to achieve a shared output. If one agency constructs a school building and another agency trains and equips teachers, complementarity is achieved.

**Synergy**

Synergy is achieved when multiple outputs, often in more than one sector, add up to more than the sum of their parts. Thus, if road construction interacts synergistically with counterterrorism operations and economic development, synergy is achieved. In the interviews, these were sometimes referred to as “game changers.”

As is evident in the above discussion, coordinated results are defined in terms of the interactions among activities, not the impacts of those activities. Nevertheless, coordinated results are necessary for effective peacebuilding. Synergy, in particular, is necessary for sustained, positive impacts.

The four types of coordinated results, representing increasing degrees of coordination, are summarized in table 17.1.13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 17.1. Types of coordinated results</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TYPE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Avoidance of Negative Interactive Effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complementarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Synergy</td>
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Framing the Problem: No One in Charge

Many argue that the only way to achieve coordinated results is by establishing a strong, overarching coordination authority, what the military refers to as “unity of command.” Establishing a unified chain of command over US agencies in Afghanistan and other reconstruction and stabilization efforts could have been an important part of the solution. Indeed, many argue that the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) system employed by the United States in Vietnam offers a powerful model. However, unity of command is not an option when dealing with the broader array of sovereign nations, independent NGOs, and other autonomous agencies engaged in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. These actors simply will not accept an overarching coordinator with the authority to direct from above. As the maxim goes, everyone wants coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.

In short, no one is, at least fully, in charge. This is the current reality, and it is likely to be a defining feature of complex contingencies in the foreseeable future. Calls for a unified chain of command over US agencies in Afghanistan, however valid, should not have crowded out attention to identifying concrete steps agencies could have taken to achieve coordinated results when no one was in charge.

Why Focus on Institutional Systems and Processes?

How are coordinated results achieved when no one is in charge? Many practitioners argue that the answer lies largely in personalities. They explain, for example, that if the commander of a PRT is committed to civilian-military coordination, has strong leadership skills, respects his or her civilian colleagues, and is able to forge productive working relationships with them, coordinated results will naturally emerge. If, on the other hand, people in leadership positions do not have the requisite attitudes, skills, and relationships, coordination failures ensue.

There is no question that attitudes, skills, and relationships affect coordination. They feature in virtually every story of coordination, successes as well as failures, and their importance is well-documented in prior research. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that coordination depends on the “luck of the draw” in terms of which
people happen to be in which positions at which times. Commitment
to coordination is heavily influenced by professional incentives and
accountability systems. Attitudes and relationships evolve over time,
as people have an opportunity to engage in joint planning processes
and learn from one another. Skills are developed through predeploy-
ment training as well as structured guidance in the field.

Thus, beneath the individual and idiosyncratic factors that affect
coordination, there are deeper institutional factors. The key to en-
hancing coordinated results is to identify and institutionalize systems
and processes. The systems and processes necessary for coordinated
results are highlighted below, illustrated with examples from the Af-
ghanistan case study.

**Agreement on Goals and Strategy:**
The Most Important Factor

The analysis of US civilian-military coordination in Afghanistan
showed that agreement on at least some high-level goals and strategy
was the most significant and direct factor affecting coordinated re-
sults. When there was agreement, coordinated results were possible.
When agreement was lacking, coordination failures ensued. Thus,
the consensus on the importance of the 2004 Afghanistan presiden-
tial elections and the strategy for implementing them was a major
factor contributing to coordinated results. Ongoing disagreement
about a national counternarcotics strategy, by contrast, led to coordi-
nation failures.

Agreement is necessary at all levels of decision making, from the
policy to the tactical levels, and agreement at one level affects agree-
ment at other levels. Agreement on the part of the senior civilian and
military leadership on the ground is particularly significant, as it has
the potential to influence perceptions both up and down the respec-
tive chains of command.

It is important to emphasize that agreement on high-level goals is
possible, even in the context of different interests and priorities. Thus,
while the military and civilians increasingly agreed on the need for
road construction, the military emphasized security effects, and USAID
focused on longer-term contributions to economic and political de-
velopment. However, their interests converged over time. For exam-
ple, increasingly the military appreciates the importance of longer-
term capacity building and economic development, and USAID increasingly recognizes the need for projects that generate shorter-term stability. This convergence of interests suggests a virtuous cycle of agreement on high-level goals enhancing coordination, which in turn fosters learning, contributing to deeper levels of agreement.\textsuperscript{15}

**What Systems and Processes Are Necessary?**

Coordinated results depend on a combination of interorganizational and intraorganizational factors. At the interorganizational level, convening or colocation, joint analysis and planning, and information sharing are necessary to bring key stakeholders together and forge agreement.

Once there is agreement on overarching goals and strategies, intraorganizational factors—including empowerment, incentive and accountability systems, and information sharing within organizational hierarchies—become paramount. It is not surprising that information sharing ranks as a top factor both among and within organizations. Information sharing is the foundation upon which joint planning and coordinated action depend.

These key interorganizational and intraorganizational factors are identified in table 17.2 and discussed below.

**Table 17.2. Interorganizational and intraorganizational factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interorganizational</th>
<th>Intraorganizational</th>
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<tr>
<td>Convening (and Colocation)</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Analysis and Planning</td>
<td>Incentives and Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
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1. **Joint Analysis and Planning**

One of the most significant lessons that emerged from the analysis of US interagency coordination in Afghanistan was the importance of integrated, multilevel joint analysis and planning at all levels of decision making. Agreement on goals and strategy does not emerge on its own. Organizations differ in their priorities, timelines, operating principles, underlying assumptions, and theories of change. Structured
Joint processes are necessary to identify shared goals and develop a joint strategy to achieve them, including a division of labor.

Joint analysis and planning processes range from ad hoc, relatively informal processes to highly structured, formal planning processes. Where agencies fall along this spectrum depends on many factors, including their interests and concerns about the coordination process itself.

Joint planning must include rigorous joint analysis. Agencies must take the time to share and understand their respective goals, priorities, interests, and assumptions. They must identify and build on common ground, while surfacing and finding ways to deal with the very real differences that often remain. Indeed, acknowledging and probing differences is an essential part of the joint planning process. Without it, organizations run the risk of forging “false coherence,” undermining mutual learning and prospects for long-term coordination.

The experience with the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group (ICMAG) in Afghanistan illustrates the importance of joint processes at all levels of decision making. Until 2007, joint planning at the tactical level was sporadic and ad hoc. PRTs varied in the degree of joint analysis and planning between the military and civilians. Where PRT-level planning was conducted, it was not nested within planning at higher levels of decision making. Therefore, tactical coordinated results often failed to add up to broader strategic successes.

In 2007, US civilian and military personnel initiated a process of integrated planning. The military leaders on the ground were concerned about ongoing coordination problems in Regional Command (RC) East. With the support of their counterparts from the embassy, they requested assistance from the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the DOS.

Two S/CRS representatives led planning processes at each of the US-led PRTs. The S/CRS team facilitated the process, the PRT leadership provided input, and the S/CRS team then drafted the plan and gave it to the PRT for feedback and correction. The team was invited back in 2008, with the goal of developing an integrated plan for all of RC East. They began the planning process at RC East, went to each brigade combat team, and then went to the PRTs in an iterative roll-up and roll-down process. The result was an integrated plan for RC East, completed in July 2008. As military and civilians increasingly saw the value of the process, they extended it to other areas.
In November 2008, the ICMAG was stood up at the embassy, institutionalizing the integrated planning process. By spring 2009, it had become a full-time group of people, working together on a daily basis. It included the two S/CRS staff members facilitating the process, military planners from Bagram and USFOR–A, representatives of CSTC–A, and USAID technical experts.\textsuperscript{19}

The ICMAG process was broadly credited with facilitating agreement on goals and strategy in a number of important issue areas. Many plans, however, were not fully implemented, demonstrating that joint analysis and planning, while necessary, are not sufficient for coordinated results. Other factors identified below are necessary for joint plans to be implemented.

2. Information Sharing

Coordinated implementation requires information sharing. The failure to share information among agencies fueled many coordination failures in Afghanistan. Inadequate information led to wasteful duplication, gaps, and negative interactions among activities.

One of the most striking illustrations of the early failures to share information involved so-called “clear-hold-build” operations. Early in the case study, the military conducted counterterrorism clearing operations without advance dialogue with USAID. As a result, USAID was unable to follow quickly enough with the relief and development necessary to hold and build those areas. The same pattern repeated itself in other arenas, with inadequate information sharing a major cause of coordination failures.

As both the military and civilians became aware of the problem, they worked together to expand information flows. One of the challenges they faced was that the military organized information geographically, while USAID organized information by development sectors, such as infrastructure, education, and health. They needed systems that would bridge the gaps in how they organized and shared information.

Toward the latter part of the case study, USAID officials in Kabul developed the “Playbook,” a detailed list of what USAID was doing in each province.\textsuperscript{20} The Playbook was a laudable achievement, organizing information about USAID activities geographically and thus making it more accessible to the military. However, the Playbook was not directly tied into a joint planning framework, and the military did not fully appreciate the lead time USAID needed to deliver aid. Together, these
factors undermined the military’s ability to interpret and leverage the information in the Playbook. A USAID official explained:

The Playbook was a big product. A lot of effort went into it. Not sure if it accomplished much. . . . The military had a hard time understanding what development work was about, so they may not have really comprehended what was in there. The military is used to being able to turn on the funding spigot at will. . . . We don’t have that same flexibility. . . . We gave them the Playbook, but it was not an accurate interpretation of how easily or quickly those programs could be turned on or off or modified to support military operations.21

This, along with related findings from the case study, shows that information sharing must be nested within joint analysis and planning processes to be of maximum value.

Information sharing is equally important within agencies. A USAID example illustrates this point. USAID FPOs at the PRTs often had insufficient information about the national programs controlled by USAID officers in Kabul. This not only undermined coordination within USAID, but it also had direct, negative impacts on civilian-military coordination in the PRTs, since the PRTs were unable to leverage or complement USAID’s national efforts. As USAID became increasingly aware of this problem, they took steps to enhance information flows between headquarters in Kabul and the field, strengthening coordination.

3. Convening and Colocation

Coordination depends on regular, face-to-face communication. While information technology has a role to play in coordination, connectivity is limited in complex contingencies. Moreover, rigorous joint analysis and planning, including probing of different interests, concerns, and underlying assumptions, require at least some face-to-face interaction. This can be achieved by convening organizational stakeholders on a regular basis or by colocating them in the same working or living spaces.

Colocation of civilians and military in Afghanistan was one of the most significant factors contributing to coordinated results. Colocation was a central design feature of the PRTs, enabling civilians and military to engage in daily information sharing and joint problem solving, if not formal joint planning. It also facilitated mutual learning and the development of strong working relationships. Colocation of POLADs and DEVADs at the various levels of the military struc-
ture on the ground likewise facilitated information sharing, joint analysis and planning, and mutual learning.

Colocation, of course, was not the only factor that affected coordination, and not all colocated units achieved the same degree of coordination. Nevertheless, colocation was an important factor contributing to the coordinated results that were achieved. A senior military officer emphasized the importance of “proximity . . . working next to people . . . physically having access to their vision, their understanding of the area, sharing each other’s understanding of the area. If you operated together, moved together, saw the problem set together, you could develop coordinated solutions.”

Colocation at higher levels of decision making is equally valuable. From 2003 to 2005, US Army lieutenant general David Barno worked and lived at the US embassy with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. Lieutenant General Barno also detailed several military planners to the embassy, who worked on a daily basis with their civilian counterparts. The colocation at the embassy facilitated information sharing, joint decision making, and development of strong working relationship. It also had important symbolic effects, affecting perceptions of civilian-military coordination up and down the respective chains of command. As a senior military officer explained, “Colocation . . . was a physical manifestation of integrated machinery. . . . Colocation isn’t essential, but it bloody well helps.”

When military and civilians are not colocated, or when, as in Afghanistan, larger numbers of agency representatives were required than could be colocated, convening is necessary. Convening is most effective when done regularly and over time. One of the processes broadly cited for enhancing coordination in Afghanistan was the monthly convening of civilians and military at Bagram Airfield. Shortly after US Army lieutenant general (then major general) David Rodriguez assumed command of RC East, he and several members of his command met with senior civilian leaders from the embassy and agreed to work together to strengthen coordination. From this first step emerged monthly, full-day meetings, usually convened at Bagram.

The Bagram process was “tri-led” by the deputy chief of mission, the USAID mission director, and the deputy commanding general (Support) of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)–82RC East. Participants included representatives of USAID’s technical offices, the DOS, other civilian agencies, and the military. The meetings typically began in plenary, providing opportunities for updates and information
sharing. Participants then broke out into technical working groups (e.g., infrastructure, education, water, and energy) for joint analysis and problem solving and, to some extent, planning. Senior civilian and military leaders met separately. At the end of the day, the full group reconvened in plenary.

The meetings initially focused on sharing information and “deconflicting” activities, a term often used to refer to avoiding negative interactions among activities, eliminating duplication, and filling gaps. As the process evolved, participants became more ambitious, setting their sights on higher levels of coordination. Among the most significant early outcomes was agreement that the Afghan National Development Strategy would guide military, in addition to civilian, efforts. This experience not only demonstrates the significance of information sharing and joint analysis in building agreement on goals and strategy but also highlights the importance of US interagency coordination in contributing to the broader multinational coordination.

The Bagram process contributed to concrete coordinated results. There were many examples in which military and civilians avoided and mitigated negative interactions between their activities. In one case, participants discovered that USAID was building a road through an airstrip that was being paved with Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding. They quickly made the changes necessary to correct the problem. In another case, USAID and the military “deconflicted” their road-building standards to reduce the susceptibility of newly constructed roads to improvised explosive devices. Beyond specific projects and sectors, the Bagram process led to synergistic coordinated results. For example, the military used CERP funds for quick-impact projects in RC East, while USAID focused on longer-term development. The Bagram process also enabled the US military to support, in coordination with USAID, Afghan-led planning at the provincial level.

4. Empowerment

Joint analysis, coordinated planning, and information sharing are necessary, but not sufficient, for coordinated results. Military and civilians on the ground must be empowered to implement agreed strategies and make use of the information available to achieve coordinated results. Empowerment is especially important at the tactical level, where decisions affect the achievement of higher-level strategic goals.
In Afghanistan, the limited empowerment of USAID FPOs at the PRTs consistently undermined coordination. USAID programs were controlled from Kabul, and FPOs had to seek approval for projects and funds. Many FPOs were private service contractors with limited experience navigating the USAID bureaucracy. This undermined their ability to respond quickly to emerging opportunities and challenges.

The problem was exacerbated by the relatively high level of empowerment of their military counterparts, who were able to allocate significant financial resources through CERP. The disparity in empowerment between the military and civilians undermined their ability to respond quickly and collectively to emerging opportunities and challenges at the tactical level. As time progressed, USAID took steps to enhance the empowerment of FPOs. Nevertheless, the disparity in empowerment continued, undermining coordination.

Empowerment is not only a function of formal decision-making authority. Experience, skill, and relationships also affect individuals’ ability to make decisions and garner resources and thus their de facto empowerment. At PRTs with relatively senior, experienced FPOs who could navigate effectively within their bureaucracy, the institutional barriers to decision making were less of an issue, and coordinated results were achieved more consistently.

5. Incentives and Accountability

Empowerment is essential, but it must be combined with incentive and accountability systems that promote coordination. When such systems are in place, individuals use their decision-making authority and access to resources to advance agreed goals. When such systems are not in place, information sharing and joint decision making become highly dependent on individual attitudes, motivations, and relationships, and thus coordinated results are achieved inconsistently. This was evident at many PRTs, where perverse incentives to spend money quickly and lack of accountability for downstream results undermined coordinated results.

When professional incentives and accountability systems are strengthened, coordinated results increase. The military planners Lieutenant General Barno detailed to the embassy from 2003 to 2005 reported not only up their military chain of command but also to the USAID mission director, who wrote their evaluations. This strengthened their incentives to coordinate and made clear that they would be
held accountable for doing so. Likewise, Amb. Christopher Dell, who served as deputy chief of mission from 2007 to 2009, changed the position requirements for civilians at the embassy to promote active participation in the ICMAG planning process discussed above. These and related changes in incentive and accountability systems enhanced coordinated results.

**Facilitative and Directive Leadership**

Effective leadership is essential for coordinated results. However, leadership is often understood as only the exercise of formal authority. The systems and processes identified above require strong facilitative leadership, in addition to directive leadership. Facilitative leadership refers here to the exercise of leadership without authority.25

In a context such as Afghanistan, in which no one is fully in charge of all the actors involved, facilitative leadership is necessary to convene agency representatives and enable information sharing and joint analysis and planning. The success of the Bagram process, for example, depended on the strong facilitative leadership of Rodriguez; his deputy, US Army major general (then brigadier general) Rodney Anderson; and their civilian counterparts at the embassy.

Military and civilians at lower levels in their respective chains of command also exercised facilitative leadership. USAID technical experts facilitated working groups at the Bagram meetings. Likewise, a small team of facilitators from S/CRS at the DOS led the ICMAG planning process. While there was initially resistance to facilitation by an agency with perceived “organizational equities” at stake, the facilitators’ substantive and process (facilitation) expertise contributed to their acceptance and effectiveness.

Facilitative leadership, while necessary, is not sufficient for coordinated results. Directive leadership within organizational hierarchies is often essential. This is not inconsistent with the no-one-in-charge premise of this chapter, which assumes that no one is fully in charge of all the agencies involved but acknowledges the role hierarchy plays within organizations.

Directive leadership played a key role in coordination in Afghanistan. In 2005, for example, US Army major general Jason Kamiya, commander of CJTF-76, temporarily reduced the PRT commanders’ authority to allocate CERP funds. The objective was to make clear his
expectation that they would coordinate with their civilian colleagues in making decisions. Once Major General Kamiya was confident that the requirement to coordinate was understood, he reinstated the authority to allocate CERP funds. Civilian leaders also exercised directive leadership. In 2007 Ambassador Dell, then deputy chief of mission, directed civilians under his chain of authority to participate actively in the ICMAG process. This was necessary to overcome initial resistance to participate.

Thus, directive leadership operates in concert with incentive and accountability systems to promote information sharing and joint analysis and planning. Once joint processes are under way and participants recognize their value, the need for directive leadership often recedes. This finding is consistent with organizational theory, which emphasizes the importance of facilitative leadership not only among but also within organizations.

**Individual and Organizational Learning**

One of the most compelling and promising findings from the analysis of US civilian-military coordination in Afghanistan was the learning that emerged from and fed back into coordination systems and processes. For purposes of this research, learning was defined as increased knowledge and understanding of organizational goals, priorities, assumptions, values, strengths, and limitations; the broader systems within which one is operating; interactions among activities; the impacts of coordinated results and coordination failures; and the factors that affect coordination. Learning also may include enhanced skills, in particular the convening, facilitation, and consensus-building skills necessary to participate in and lead joint analysis and planning processes.

Joint analysis and planning played a critical role in fostering learning. Through these processes, participants developed a greater appreciation of common ground and differences; became increasingly attuned to the effects of their decisions on the broader systems they were seeking to influence; and developed working relationships, networks, and skills that fed back into broader coordination efforts. This was particularly true of processes in which participants worked together to surface and understand differences in interests, values, and assumptions. Skillful facilitation contributed to these efforts. The role learning plays in joint analysis and planning brings to mind Dwight
D. Eisenhower’s famous quote: “In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

Colocation also fostered mutually supportive learning. By living and working together on a daily basis, civilians and military learned about and from one another and developed strong working relationships. One FPO explained that colocation made it possible for the PRT to respond quickly and collectively to a crisis in the province: “I was living on the PRT. I knew the guys. Day in, day out, we were living together, so there was no need to do relationship building when the crisis hit.”

The enhanced understanding and strengthened relationships at the individual level carried over to their organizations. The military’s understanding of development principles and respect for USAID expertise increased. USAID developed greater appreciation of the need to address short-term security imperatives while also working toward longer-term development goals. This transformed the relationship between USAID and the military. A USAID officer, reflecting on the value of joint analysis and planning, explained that “the military guys learned a lot about USAID. . . . We learned about their corporate culture. Resistance to working with the military melted away. . . . We saw mutual value. Team building emerged. It made the broader USAID-military relationship smoother.”

The learning highlighted above fed back into the system, strengthening the institutional systems and processes necessary for coordinated results. Increased mutual understanding, including the ability to bridge differences of organizational culture and lexicon, led to more effective joint processes. As the military and civilians identified complementary resources, expertise, and capacities, they leveraged them in support of shared goals. They also took steps to strengthen incentive and accountability systems.

Nevertheless, the impressive degree of learning and innovation on the ground did not translate into the sustained institutional changes necessary for consistent, long-term coordinated results. The constant turnover of personnel and inadequate systems to ensure that incoming rotations would learn from and build upon what had come before led to frequent “reinventions of the wheel.” Moreover, the institutional changes civilian and military leaders were able to make on the ground were at the margins of vast bureaucratic systems. Sustained organizational change required decisions of senior policy makers in
Washington who were far removed from the reality on the ground and faced their own institutional and political constraints.

**Putting It All Together: A Model of Coordination**

The discussion above raises the question of whether all of the institutional systems and processes are necessary for coordinated results, or whether there is a subset of critical factors. The case study identified three key factors, without which coordinated results are not possible: civilians and military on the ground must agree on one or more concrete goals; they must be empowered to make decisions and allocate resources in support of those goals; and they must have information about one another’s current and planned activities, resources, and needs.

When only these minimal conditions are met, however, coordinated results are achieved inconsistently. In the absence of rigorous joint analysis and planning, agreement on goals depends largely on issue area, since agreement in some issue areas is easier than in others. Without incentive and accountability systems conducive to information sharing and joint decision making, coordinated results depend on the willingness of individuals to put shared goals above immediate agency imperatives. If planning on the ground is not linked to planning at headquarters, tactical-level coordinated results will not add up to synergistic results at the strategic level.

Thus, to achieve consistent, strategic-level (synergistic) coordinated results, (1) all of the systems and processes identified above must be in place and institutionalized, and (2) planning and decision making must be integrated across all levels of decision making.

This brings us to related questions. If all of the systems and processes discussed above are necessary for coordinated results, are they sufficient? Can they overcome systemic barriers to coordination, including resource and power disparities?

The analysis of US civilian-military coordination in Afghanistan showed that the continued underresourcing of the civilian side of US efforts in Afghanistan, both in absolute terms and relative to the military, undermined coordination at every level of decision making. The financial resources imbalance was profound. Of the $32.9 billion the US invested in reconstruction in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2009, $18.5 billion went to the DOD, $4.6 billion to the DOS, and
$9.2 billion to USAID, with the remainder divided among other agencies. These figures do not include the massive investment in war fighting during this period.

The imbalance in human resources was equally striking. As of November 2009, there were approximately 67,000 US military personnel in Afghanistan as compared with several hundred civilians. While efforts were under way to create a “civilian surge,” the target number for 2010 was 1,000 civilians—still a small fraction of the military personnel. In this context, the perception voiced by a USAID officer that the military saw civilians as “arrows in the military’s quiver” was not surprising.

The inadequate civilian resources undermined coordination in many ways. Civilians had more difficulty than their military counterparts absorbing the opportunity costs associated with coordination, as well as supporting military initiatives that required the investment of substantial civilian resources. The effects of power disparities on coordination processes were even more significant. The most visible manifestation of this effect was at the PRTs, where military vastly outnumbered and often outranked civilians. This affected civilians’ ability to gain a seat at the table and thus to influence interagency decision making. PRTs with relatively senior civilian representation often were able to overcome these hurdles. At most PRTs, however, the military dominated decision making.

The resource and power disparities on the ground directly reflected those in Washington. Despite increasingly urgent calls, including from Secretary of Defense Gates, to invest in the civilian side of US foreign policy, the DOD continued to garner the lion’s share of resources. The congressional budgeting process thus played a critical role in civilian-military coordination, undermining it at every level.

Does this mean that the institutional systems and processes discussed above were meaningless? No. They made significant contributions to coordination. In the context of profound resource and power disparities, however, there were limits to what even the best systems and processes could achieve.

The institutional systems and processes that are the focus of the analysis in the context of the other factors that affect coordinated results, including leadership, learning, and resources and power, are depicted below in figure 17.1. The curved arrows with “L” next to them indicate feedback loops between learning and other variables.
Recommendations for Policy and Practice

The above analysis and the broader research project upon which it is based suggest the following recommendations for policy and practice.

1. Focus on Results

Coordination processes are important, but they must generate concrete results to merit the financial and human resources invested. Civilians and military must be incentivized to engage in coordination processes and held accountable for the downstream, interactive results of their activities.

2. Colocate and Convene

At least some face-to-face interaction is necessary for the information sharing and joint analysis and planning upon which coordinated results depend. While information technology has a role to play, it should supplement, not supplant, in-person communication. Colo-
cate civilians and military at multiple levels of decision making. When colocation is not possible, invest in regular, structured convening.


   Joint civilian-military planning is necessary for coordinated results, and plans must be integrated across levels. This is easier said than done. Civilians and military differ not only in their planning frameworks and tools but also in their understanding of what planning entails. Build agreement on processes, frameworks, and tools for joint civilian-military planning.

4. **Ensure Rigorous Joint Analysis at All Levels of Decision Making**

   In addition to identifying and leveraging common ground, joint planning must surface and address differences in interests, concerns, priorities, assumptions, and values. This requires skillful facilitation. Invest in facilitators who have technical expertise as well as process skills in convening, facilitation, and consensus building.

5. **Institutionalize Systems and Processes**

   To achieve sustained, high-level coordinated results, agencies must institutionalize the necessary systems and processes. Some systems and processes may be established on a standing basis within or among organizations. Others may be incorporated into doctrine or standard operating procedures. This will reduce dependence on the decisions of individual leaders and the tendency for incoming rotations to “re-invent the wheel.”

6. **Design Systems and Processes to Foster Learning**

   Learning is at the heart of coordination, and individual learning must be translated into sustained organizational change. Design systems and processes not only to enhance short-term coordination but also to promote ongoing learning. Invest in joint predeployment training and systems to maximize continuity across rotations.
7. Invest in Civilian Capacity

Power disparities undermine coordination. The resource disparity between US civilians and military is an urgent problem. For US efforts in complex contingencies to benefit from the complementary expertise and capacities of military and civilian actors, civilian agencies’ financial and human resources must be increased.

8. Support Multinational and Government–Civil Society Coordination

US interagency coordination is necessary but not sufficient for effective stabilization, reconstruction, and postwar peacebuilding. The United States must coordinate more effectively with its multinational partners, the UN, regional organizations, and NGOs. Coordination with the governments and civil societies of the countries in which the United States is working is particularly important. For US efforts to yield sustainable, positive results, they must align with and support the goals, priorities, and activities of local actors.

9. Identify, Illuminate, and Analyze Successful Coordination

Coordination failures are well-documented and understood. Successful coordination has received insufficient attention and analysis. While this study has attempted to illuminate and explain coordinated results, further research is necessary to test the findings in contexts other than Afghanistan and determine their relevance to coordination among the broader set of actors whose activities bear on the achievement of stabilization, reconstruction, and postwar peacebuilding goals.

Policy makers in the United States and beyond increasingly recognize the urgent need for enhanced coordination. This has created a window of opportunity to invest in the institutional changes necessary for sustained coordinated results. By expanding information flows, investing in joint civilian-military analysis and planning at all levels of decision making, empowering people at the lowest possible levels, and holding them accountable for the downstream interactive effects of their activities, civilians and military will enhance coordination, strengthening international stabilization, reconstruction, and postwar peacebuilding efforts.
Notes


3. The interviews were conducted between 2009 and 2011. Interviewees spoke in their individual, not official, capacities, and most authorized publication of their names. No information or quotations are attributed to individual interviewees without their permission.

4. To ensure the validity of the analysis, interview data were triangulated across categories of interviewees and supplemented by primary and secondary documentation.

5. Information and explanations that were most frequently and consistently cited across interview categories and that provided supporting detail, documentation, and/or internal logic were treated as the strongest evidence. The written analysis also included data if they provided significant detail, supporting evidence, and/or internal logic to support or contradict arguments; indicated learning; or indicated a dissenting opinion, the inclusion of which was necessary for accurate portrayal of a range of perspectives on controversial issues.


10. For an analysis of the key role civil society plays in peacebuilding, see Lisa Schirch’s chapter in this volume.

11. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and the senior diplomats and military commanders on the ground expressed grave concern about the continuing high numbers of civilian casualties and the associated deleterious impacts in terms of US counterinsurgency goals.

12. For a more complete discussion of the four types of coordinated results, see Andrea Strimling Yodsampa, “No One in Charge: A New Theory of Coordination and an Analysis of US Civil-Military Coordination in Afghanistan 2001–2009” (PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2011).


14. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Operations, 27 February 2008, A-3, distinguished unity of command and unity of effort as follows: “Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a
common objective. . . . In the absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort.” ADP 3.0, Unified Land Operations, has since superseded FM 3.0, Operations.

15. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, a virtuous cycle is “a condition in which a favorable circumstance or result gives rise to another that subsequently supports the first.” For a systems-theory analysis of vicious and virtuous cycles, see Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990).


17. In her earlier-cited dissertation, Andrea Strimling Yodsampa cites a DOS official (interview 16) who described the lack of coordination in RC East in early 2007: “RC East had a problem with civilian-military integration. No one was talking to each other. Everyone was running down their own thing.”


19. Ibid., confidential interview 92. An executive working group, chaired by the deputy chief of mission, sat above the ICMAG and served as a type of deputies committee, identifying questions that arose in the planning process for resolution.

20. Ibid., confidential interview 57.

21. Ibid., confidential interview 71.

22. Ibid., confidential interview 104.

23. While the study focused on coordination on the ground, it also showed the value of colocation at headquarters in the United States. For example, the colocation of the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group, although only partially realized, contributed to information sharing and joint analysis at that level.


30. Of the $223.2 billion the United States spent in Afghanistan, only $32.9 billion was dedicated to reconstruction. Anthony H. Cordesman, Resourcing the Afghan War: An Overview (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009).

31. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Afghanistan’s Security Environment (Washington, DC: GAO, 2009). There were approximately 360 civilian personnel in Afghanistan in January 2009. The aim was to increase the number to 1,000

32. Green, “The Other Surge.”

Chapter 18

Civilian-Military Engagement in Afghanistan

How Market-Based Approaches Enable and Enhance Counterinsurgencies

Joanna Buckley and Ryan Gawn

Introduction

Counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts have required adaptation to a nontraditional model that converges civilian and military operations and recognizes the civilian component as the key enabler. The complex civilian-military approach recognizes sustainable development, in the broad sense of the term, as the prize of stability and conflict prevention operations. Military operations and funding should complement civilian efforts to stimulate the local economy.¹

In this chapter we argue that civilian-military teams in Afghanistan should have been better equipped and enabled to positively impact the local economy in support of the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) central mission.² Reorientation of ISAF priorities through an Afghan First procurement policy was a core step toward repositioning both military and civilian teams as core actors in COIN delivery. Ultimately, this market-based approach was characterised by local engagement and capacity building with the local private sector and could have extended the political settlement to the wider population.³

In understanding the local marketplace and procuring local goods/services to the highest possible degree (in a conflict-sensitive manner, recognizing the risks of aid militarization), jobs can be created, economies can be stimulated, taxes can be revenue generated, and hope and aspirations for progress can be realized. This chapter presents a range of recommendations on how this can be best achieved, such as increased prioritization of local procurement, better understanding of the dynamics of the private sector at a local level, collective buy-in, best practices, and improved expenditure tracking.
The Afghan Private Sector

The Afghan marketplace was underdeveloped, and the limited local manufacturing sector was largely unable to meet both domestic demand and demand from the international community present in Afghanistan. Approximately 85 percent of the products, services, and human resources used by international agencies in support of in-country operations and program implementation were imported, providing few jobs for Afghan workers.\(^4\) The conflict in Afghanistan did not fundamentally alter the economic structure of the country. The manufacturing sector was historically limited, and agriculture was the main source of income for the majority of the population. Both foreign military and civilian spending could have had significant positive impact on the development of the local economy. This chapter is focused on how foreign military funds can be harnessed in support of civilian-military efforts that aim to build a stable and sustainable local economy. In not only choosing relevant sector-specific development projects in support of the mission but also spending locally and transparently, international military forces can be significant contributors to local marketplace development.

While underdeveloped, the private sector in Afghanistan began to thrive from 2001, despite security and economic challenges. Exports increased more than fivefold between 2003 and 2009, small- and medium-enterprise production expanded and cell growth grew exponentially.\(^5\) Between 2005 and 2008, industrial- and service-sector gross domestic product (GDP) doubled, and Afghan business revenue grew on average 220 percent.\(^6\) Some of the key areas of military operation that were supported by the local business sector included construction services, office supplies/services, life support, logistics/transportation, furniture, and telecommunications and information technology services. For example, there were several thousand Afghan construction firms operating in all corners of Afghanistan; some abided by international standards, due to years of experience gained working with and for international forces. These companies were contracted for military base improvements, community development projects, and subcontracting on large-scale development projects. Internationally certified PVC piping was manufactured locally. Life support services such as laundry and housekeeping services, container supply and manufacture (e.g., connexes for offices, living quarters, showers, and such), and textile services (e.g., uniform
and boot manufacture and repair) were locally sourced from competent Afghan companies.

The Importance of Job Creation

Job creation has been described as “critical to undermine extremists’ appeal in the short-term and for sustainable economic growth in the long-term.” The assumption of this argument is “that insurgency is a full-time job, that it is a low-skill occupation, and that the key limit on violence is the number of fighters insurgent organizations can recruit.” This has been subject to limited empirical testing. However, where livelihood opportunities were developed and enhanced, increased opportunities for overall economic development flourished. This was seen as a keystone to postconflict programs both in the development sector, led by international nongovernmental organizations (INGO), and the military, which were focused on reorienting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and ISAF resources toward the Afghan private sector.

Economic Development and Its Role in Advancing Counterinsurgency Goals

The development of a robust private-sector community—vital to investment, growth, and employment opportunities for ordinary Afghans—and the creation of links to the international community through business transactions stabilized the Afghan economy and society, thereby advancing COIN goals. For many years, civilian agencies established economic development programs to advance growth of the private sector.

Evidence has shown that the private sector is the main driver of economic growth and that both economic growth and diversification of the economy away from reliance on a few sectors controlled by a few dominant players decrease the likelihood of countries returning to conflict. In addition, economic diversification results in missions with a larger local impact due to the increased ability of international agencies to procure locally.

Developing the private sector also created opportunities to give the Afghan population a stake in peace—the “peace dividend.” This was a key objective for the military and the Afghan population since
“in the absence of peace and security, there [was] no incentive for people to invest in the legal economy. Restoration of peace and security [made] the legal economy viable again.”12 As Achim Wennmann warns, “omission of economic provisions can have negative consequences for peacebuilding, including the empowerment of spoilers, the persistence of seemingly unbridgeable differences, and the absence of overall peace dividends.”13

With a big purse and demand for goods and services—including road building, solar energy, fuel, mineral water, and mobile phone cards—the military is a buyer whose spending power can be harnessed to create a significant impact on the local economy. Injecting money into the local economy has the ability to provide employment and build skills across the private sector, with both direct and indirect benefits such as local engagement, capacity building, and the generation of important tax revenue. At the same time, such spending can also embolden spoilers and fuel corruption if not spent in an inclusive, conflict-sensitive manner, driven by informed marketplace knowledge and supported by robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

The Military’s Current Involvement

Country-specific data shows that the United Kingdom spent £7.28 million in local contracts between April 2009 and January 2010, employing over 2,300 Afghans. This represents $2.94 million for the Afghan economy per annum. From 2005 to 2009, the US government procured more than $4 billion in local goods and services, employing more than 20,000 Afghans.14 An additional increase in local spending of 10 percent was estimated to generate an additional 5 percent in Afghan GDP.15

In 2009 and 2010, the US government, US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR–A), and ISAF contracting officers adopted Afghan First policies. The institutionalization of the Afghan First local procurement policy encouraged increased prioritization of local procurement in support of the military mission, collective buy-in, and improved tracking of spending. While the main priority of procurement policy remained to enable missions to be both adequately supplied and effective, secondary benefits were recognized for both Afghanistan and ISAF-contributing nations: “Procuring goods and services from Afghan companies promote[d] sustainable economic development. . . .
Afghan firms knew the market and [could] often provide quality goods and services at competitive prices. With a shorter supply chain, local procurement [was] often the best way for the buyer to maximize value and the timely delivery of needed goods and services.”

This policy ensured that local procurement was insulated from the effects of personnel turnover and that there was greater incentive, participation, and consensus from contracting personnel.

The US Agency for International Development claimed the Afghan First local procurement policy led to the contract of work worth $1.12 billion to 4,227 Afghan firms, which employed 85,650 Afghans. At the end of the two-year trial period, it was vital that further reviews of policy impacts were conducted in order to enable appropriate adjustments.

Additional monies available included the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) fund, which enabled US military commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by providing projects and services that immediately assisted the local population. These projects and services were to be sustained by the local population or government to a value of less than $500,000. The commander of US Central Command (USCENTCOM) must approve projects exceeding $1 million, and the deputy secretary of defense must approve those over $5 million. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, appropriated $200 million for CERP for FY 2013, increasing total cumulative funding to nearly $3.64 billion.

Leaders could have increased local spending through a continued emphasis on prioritization of awards to local companies as well as improved contracting and bidding procedures.

Risks and Effectiveness of Aid Militarization

The US military has labeled aid as a nonlethal weapons system, as described in the Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System (2009). It is a critical tool for gaining the trust and “buy-in” of the local population and “one of the primary weapons used by warfighters to achieve successful mission results in counterinsurgency and humanitarian operations,” allowing the military to “win the hearts and minds . . . to facilitate defeat [of] the insurgents.” This approach has led to widespread concerns around the militarization of aid, as aid
was channeled through military forces or civilian-military teams. Many leading INGOs believed such militarization would lead to a lack of sustainability and local ownership, increased operational risk to INGOs and humanitarian space, and a weakening of the role of Afghan institutions. Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, supported this view, accusing the provincial reconstruction teams of undermining efforts to develop the state's institutions. In addition, some questioned the positioning of the military as an actor in the development sphere. Andrew Wilder, the research director at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, supported this critique, claiming that such aid could have been destabilizing, especially by fueling corruption and asserting that it made “little sense to waste billions of dollars on the dubious assumption that money [could] buy Afghan hearts and minds.” For some, spending should have been conflict sensitive, taking a contextual view, seeking to ensure that action did not exacerbate political or societal divisions, and giving actors a vested interest in maintaining conflict levels. “Conflict-sensitivity require[d] development agencies, companies and others to: Understand the context in which they operate[d] especially [in] latent and open conflict dynamics; understand the actual and potential mutual impacts between [that] context and their own actions; act on [that] understanding in order to identify future risks, avoid negative impacts, and maximize positive impacts.”

In addition to the risks of aid militarization, there were doubts concerning the effectiveness of military development interventions. The report by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction emphasized that USFOR–A required improved oversight and assessments and stated that in order to address concerns about CERP sustainability new provisions required improved reporting on how proposed reconstruction projects were to be sustained. As the report stated, “USFOR–A lack[ed] a coordinated, results-oriented approach to determine whether CERP projects achieved their goals, [we]re being used as intended, and [we]re being sustained.”

Afghan First Procurement Policy: A Case Study

In countries where conflict has destroyed or stalled the economy, recovery is badly needed to create a sustained settlement. Developing and enhancing livelihood opportunities supports economic development,
which reduces poverty and is associated with lower levels of conflict. However, the transformative impact of the influx of development, humanitarian, and military spending is diluted when this money is spent elsewhere. Researchers have estimated that only 37 percent of official development assistance spent in Afghanistan in 2006 reached the Afghan economy, inhibiting inclusive economic growth, income generation, tax generation, and stabilization.\(^\text{28}\)

The Afghan First policy provided a groundbreaking framework that enabled the military to engage with the local market while repositioning both military and civilian teams as core actors in COIN delivery and supporting the military’s revised operational framework. That framework, over the past 15 years, has altered to increase responsibilities and requirements to improve stability, foster economic growth, and engage and support reconstruction activities.\(^\text{29}\)

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181, Section 886, January 2008) first codified the Afghan First policy.\(^\text{30}\) In 2009–10, the US government institutionalized the policy across its agencies, and implementation was under way with the recognition that contracting Afghan contractors and purchasing Afghan goods was a key element of COIN.\(^\text{31}\) In April 2010 NATO joined with US efforts, launching the NATO Afghan First policy, which aimed to increase NATO-ISAF support to the Afghan local economy.

Since the inception of Afghan First policy there has been continued documentation of the operationalization of Afghan First policy. The US Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned published the 2009 Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System, incorporating Afghan First policy and COIN contracting guidance into USCENTCOM contracting command acquisition instructions. Additionally, Gen David Petraeus released a memo that emphasized the strategic gains and risks inherent in local contracting; the necessity to develop local partnerships, build capacity, and consult and involve local leaders; and the need for oversight and enforcement mechanisms.\(^\text{32}\)

One of the most notable cases of the Afghan First policy was the $365 million, five-year set-aside contract to produce clothing and equipment for the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army.\(^\text{33}\) Proposal training support for over 60 Afghan businesses led to the selection of three companies employing hundreds of Afghan women.\(^\text{34}\) This enabled local textile manufacturing capacity to be built up, increasing the probability of future local procurement for police and military clothing. Building Markets, an INGO supporting local procurement, states it
provided services (such as an online directory of verified businesses in order to facilitate connections between international and domestic firms) which resulted in contracts valued at over $1 billion, which in turn created or sustained 65,000 full-time jobs.

The Afghan First local procurement policy did not receive the critique that CERP had. However, from military and business perspectives, diverse challenges created obstacles to engagement with the private sector. These included, but were not limited to, limited access and information sharing between international buyers and local vendors, an underdeveloped marketplace, poor infrastructure and utilities, and the high cost and low reliability of imports related to low levels of domestic manufacturing. Contracting teams, donors, and INGO staff were frequently unable to give this author a clear overview on what was obtainable in the local marketplace, a breakdown of local spending, and a review of how local spending had adjusted since the organization in question had become operational. Businesses in Afghanistan also identified challenges specifically related to international contracts, including perceptions of disinterest in local procurement; an inability to access information on new business opportunities, procurement systems, and tenders; and a lack of confidence and/or knowledge in accessing international contracts.

Prioritization of local procurement through Afghan First began eight years after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, preventing the movement from being fully recognized. It is a valuable component of COIN, but its effectiveness can be increased through commitment in the first phase of intervention. This mission objective needs to be supported through expanded civilian effort capabilities. These should complement military expertise in reconstruction and stabilization with local marketplace knowledge, relationship building with the local business community, and the use of regular assessments to link actions to impact and reduce corruption. Expertise in these fields will result in a military able to facilitate growth while trying to stabilize the regions in which it is engaged.

The next sections detail measures that can be used to counter the challenges mentioned in this section and manners in how to develop programs focused on sustainable development, economic stimulus, and active relationship building.
What Can Be Done?

One of the main themes of current COIN literature is the recognition of sustainable development as the prize. Donor country military operations should aim to complement civilian efforts in stimulating the economy and use local goods and services to the highest possible degree and in a conflict-sensitive manner.

This is a pragmatic solution that, to succeed, requires strong and transparent tracking of local purchasing, identifying new areas of local opportunity, and a thinking out and resourcing of civilian effort capabilities supporting mission objectives in collaboration with the local business community. Some of the key ways in which civilian-military teams can foster active relationships with local populations and private-sector development are detailed below.

1. The Means

Implementing a market-based approach grounded in enterprise and private-sector development. This enables the growth of industries that are demand-driven, reducing the risk that ensuring a scale-down of military operations could create a vacuum that prejudices security. Sustainable sectors that were valuable to the longer-term recovery of Afghanistan included transport networks, telecommunications, electricity (including fuel and renewable), and light manufacturing. By supporting businesses capable of diversifying once the military effort was reduced or removed, civilian-military teams would have increased the likelihood that industries were sustainable.

2. Civilian Expertise

It is important to improve predeployment preparations for civilian and military personnel responsible for contracting and procurement and increase access and quality of information about the local marketplace and its capabilities. Civilian-military teams should be used to improve awareness of the types of businesses that exist and are capable of meeting contractual requirements in country and to create expertise and capacity that is critical to developing a stable, viable market that will exist beyond the international community’s presence. Rotations that include ample handover time are crucial in ensuring that good relationships, local market-specific knowledge, and
a developed understanding of local nuances are successfully managed. This could involve linking civilian personnel with country-specific, private-sector expertise or organizations that could provide local marketplace information.

3. Best Practice

One must disseminate lessons learned when using an economic approach in early recovery environments and consult with the public and private sectors to understand what needs to be done to unleash, enable, and stimulate economic activity.

4. Monitoring

The sheer volume of money available to be spent locally inherently means that there must be robust monitoring and evaluation to ensure that engagement with local businesses brings long-term and accountable business practices that meet program objectives. Reporting and evaluation mechanisms should be aligned through joint civilian-military teams in order to build coherence and adequate feedback loops and forge long-term stability and development of civilian-military expertise. A good example of coordinated civilian-military planning and effort was demonstrated in Regional Command–South through the creation of the Partner’s Coordination Board, aimed at creating regional understanding, with voluntary participation by each province’s senior civilians and mandatory attendance by task force commanders, and the civilian-military cell that supported planning, identified problems, and served as the sole interlocutor within ISAF that accessed both donor and diplomatic networks. It was this kind of coordinated civilian-military effort that was required to gather Afghan First procurement data and establish baseline measurements on which success would be built.

Conclusion

The traditional role of the military is changing, as the focus on COIN and the reorientation of ISAF funding towards engagement with the Afghan private sector demonstrated. The military’s spending power positioned it as a key buyer in Afghanistan. Through the inception of Afghan First local procurement policy, the military coordinated
with civilian donor efforts and took an innovative step in engaging with the local marketplace. In order to ensure this new approach was not only innovative but also effective, the expertise of the civilian and military personnel needed to become increasingly converged in order to realize both COIN and sustainable development opportunities for the Afghan population in a manner that was most beneficial to the mission mandate and the local private sector. In order to achieve this, military efforts focused on economic development need to show measurable and transparent results of progress in order to avoid the pitfalls that plagued CERP.

Military intervention in areas of instability presented key opportunities to impact local economic development when substantial resources were committed to recovery and reconstruction efforts. When these funds were spent locally, they generated economic activity, including employment and income- and capacity-building opportunities, which played a critical role in restoring and sustaining peace and stability. Because of this, and in spite of concerns about the militarization of aid, the military could not be ignored as a key actor with both the funds and policy mandate to promote sustainable economic development in support of Afghanistan’s transition to stability.

The inception of socioeconomic procurement policy reoriented ISAF priorities towards the market and recognized that the objectives of peace and stabilization alongside private-sector development were not mutually exclusive goals. With a foundation of success based on understanding and engagement with the local private-sector, future civilian-military teams are highly likely to have the skills, experience, and potential to play a key role in delivering this approach, which can lead to wider societal and security benefits, contributing towards peace, stability, and sustainable development.

Notes

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “About ISAF,” Afghanistan: International Security Assistance Force (web site), n.d., http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html. ISAF’s mission is to "reduce the capability and will of the insurgency . . . and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.”


12. Ibid.


14. NATO, “NATO Afghan First Policy.”

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


22. Jackson, Quick Impact, Quick Collapse.


24. Jackson, Quick Impact, Quick Collapse.


36. Afghan business owners and international agencies, interviewed by the authors, 2009–2011.


39. Private-sector development refers to the harnessing of the market and support of private enterprise in order to assist poverty alleviation and growth and deliver results for the poor.

PART 6

Training, Resourcing, Roles, and Missions
Chapter 19

Training the Civilian-Military Team in the Twenty-First Century

Omer C. Tooley

The Atterbury-Muscatatuck Experience

More than a dozen years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us that in an environment where neither peace nor war prevails and the desired end state is a civilian-led peace, the civilian-military team approach offers the optimum solution capability. Of course, complex problem sets, especially in an increasingly urbanized world, defy simple fixes. Nevertheless, the ability to rapidly assemble capabilities from across agencies, governments, and the private sector and to weld them into integrated, effective teams that must be deployed and sustained over long periods of time has been and will continue to be an essential requirement of the community of nations. Cooperative training will be the vehicle by which this is achieved.

The Atterbury-Muscatatuck team has been deeply involved in the effort to promote, enable, and execute cooperative training directed toward preparing civilian-military teams for employment in foreign and domestic operational environments. Initiating mobilization training support for uniformed personnel in February 2003, the team became involved in the preparation of civilian capabilities in fall 2009, when it became the host for the first of four programs involving civilians—three of which were civilian-centric. The fourth, provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), was primarily composed of uniformed personnel drawn from all services.

The training of the PRTs followed a traditional military model and is not the subject of this article. The remaining three—the Department of State (DOS) Civ-Mil Training program, the Department of Defense (DOD) Civilian Expeditionary Workforce program, and the DOD Ministry of Defense Advisors program—were conducted under the cooperative training model that is the subject of this article. Cooperation in these three cases was among the National Guard, who brought to the effort the military capabilities required (forces,
facilities, and military trainers), the DOS and/or the DOD, which provided the civilian capabilities (personnel, training aids, and civilian trainers), and most recently First US Army, which expanded its involvement beyond its long-time role in preparing PRTs—including providing military trainers for the three civilian-centric programs.

My role in this effort was that of senior mission commander for the National Guard capabilities and cointegrator with my civilian counterparts from the DOS and the DOD. Together with my DOS, DOD, and First US Army counterparts, we made every effort to place equal emphasis on civilian and military training in all aspects of preparation for deployment. What follows are lessons learned derived from my personal observations serving in this context for the past four years.

The first of these lessons is that the civilian component must become more adept at operating in a security-compromised environment with less externally provided personal security. This applies for both military-provided security, whose presence can detract from the civilian personnel’s effectiveness, and for contractor-provided security, with its associated high costs and potential for negative perceptions. In other words, civilians, from the operator on the ground to the supervisor working from perhaps a more secure setting, must acquire the training and experience that reduces their need for external physical security. Basic survival skills at the operator level, coupled with risk analysis and mitigation skills at higher levels, will go a long way toward increasing nonkinetic capabilities in hostile environments.

To this end the Atterbury-Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations (AMCCO) team created a full-immersion experience in which civilian team members are placed into a training environment where they sleep, eat, train, and socialize with their military counterparts, sharing in the hardships and simulated dangers of their future common operating environment. Managed by team member McKellar, Inc., a private contractor with extensive experience in interagency, nonkinetic capabilities, training has been conducted employing a format in which the civilian capability was the supported element and the military the supporting element—a role reversal of most contemporary civilian-military training. Civilian lead in the training experience is critical to developing the skills and experiences required for the civilian component to assume the guiding and directing roles in this ambiguous environment.
Along with training as the lead agent, civilians have to learn to read the human dimension of the operating environment. This environment is the main source of threats and opportunities. A contemporary example of forward thinking in this area is advanced situational awareness training (ASAT). Provided to AMCCO trainees by Orbis Operations, LLC, another AMCCO team member, ASAT provides the civilian-military team member the basic ability to accurately interpret the human and physical terrain of the operational environment. It inculcates the ability to “feel” that is so necessary to effectively anticipate what is happening or will soon happen on the ground.

The second lesson is that in circumstances where it is appropriate to employ the civilian-military team, the military team’s behavior should more appropriately approximate a constabulary—committed to the minimum use of force—rather than a traditional military force. Civilian-military teams are employed to promote the host community’s ability to regain control of the instruments and systems of government. Modeling the Western ethos of civilian control of the military should guide US actions in supporting that goal. Thus, in the twenty-first century, the military component of the civilian-military team must assume a lower profile in the common effort, focusing strictly on establishing a “good enough” secure environment for local capabilities to become established.

Police-like training will become the norm. Minimum use of force, careful escalation of force, and use of nonlethal weapons become the core of training. The predisposition to demur to civilian leadership in the public spotlight at all levels—consciously downplaying the military role—will be a critical skill set for the military in the future. This will be perhaps the most challenging aspect of military component training, because it will require behaviors that are in direct opposition to traditional military culture and ingrained responses.

The third lesson is that, when it comes to core capabilities, no agency has the knowledge, skills, abilities, or experience to determine, direct, or evaluate the training of other contributing agencies. Each agency must be responsible for its personnel. While necessity and resources have driven military-centric training enterprises, particularly in the area of resource intensive, “field-based,” full-immersion training, this has not necessarily been the most effective approach. Military-centric training has often been a major inhibitor to effective civilian-military team training. Simply put, organizational cultures, languages, and ethos are extraordinarily difficult to reconcile and
defy any single agency’s ability to master or to confer upon itself the authority to direct common actions.

What I and the team have seen emerge to mitigate this problem are four changes in the collective training model that the military has used over the past 30 years. First, the training event itself is designed by a “team of equals,” composed of experts representing all agencies involved in the training. This ensures that the training objectives of each agency are accounted for and that control measures are emplaced to ensure that all training objectives are given a reasonable opportunity for attainment. Second, participating agencies must contribute to the creation of an observer/controller cadre composed of subject matter experts. Third, while after-action reviews remain the heart of the training experience, these are increasingly scripted, managed, and conducted in accordance with the language, culture, and traditions of the responsible agency. Approaching the design and execution of the full-immersion training experience as a “team of equals” executed on a “level playing field” has been and will continue to be critical to success. The fourth lesson is that to build an effective civilian-military team, money must be taken off the table. My observation has been that the “team of equals” rapidly falls apart when value and voice are weighted by monetary contribution. This seems to be particularly true when it comes to cooperative training, where the AMCCO team has observed a law of nature that whoever puts the most money into a training event assumes the right to dictate how the training will unfold. This promotes an environment in which the less endowed participants feel as if they are being considered as nothing more than training aids for the alpha donor, which inevitably leads to their walking away from the effort.

It is hard political reality that certain agencies and activities receive more resources than others and that allocation is not necessarily based upon a balanced and reasoned analysis of value and contribution. For more than seven decades, the bulk of resources have been directed toward enhancing military kinetic capabilities. If there is any truth in the mantra that “whole-of-government,” “whole-of-society,” or “whole-of-whatever” is in fact the optimum solution set to the complexities the United States will confront in the twenty-first century, one of two approaches must be taken: either nonkinetic capabilities must be resourced at a level that brings them more on a par with their kinetic counterparts or the kinetics must underwrite the nonkinetics without expecting a concurrent right to dictate their actions.
This is particularly true in the area of training. Resourcing and investment trends over the past century have provided the military with the infrastructure, organizations, and systems required to support high-fidelity, full-immersion, live collective training. Nothing on the civilian side comes close to matching this capability. In the current and anticipated future economic environment, there is little hope for the civilian component to be able to independently develop sufficient capabilities in this area. Civilian agencies will most likely be incapable of “just paying their share” when it comes to combined training experiences. Therefore, rules, regulations, and—the biggest challenge of all—bureaucracy will have to allow and encourage the leveraging of military capabilities by nonmilitary entities in support of building effective civilian-military teams. Such allowance has to be combined with restraint on the part of the military to assume the right to direct the common actions.

Conclusion

These are the lessons that I have derived over the course of the last four years working with those agencies and activities that collectively comprise the civilian-military team. My strong belief is that the twenty-first-century world will demand that the United States will need the ability to rapidly assemble, prepare, deploy, and support capabilities from across agencies, governments, allies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. In other words, the United States will need well-trained civilian-military teams that can hit the ground running. To do so the United States must recognize that size does not determine value, resources do not measure contribution, and money does not dictate position. In the final analysis, achieving the state of a “team of equals” coming together on a “level playing field” for the purpose of collectively preparing for the harsh realities of the twenty-first-century operating environment will be the foundation of meaningful civilian-military team training.
Chapter 20

Civilian-Military Teaming

The When, Where, and How

Mike McCoy

Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti kindled renewed interest in civilian-military teaming, sparking the hope that perhaps the United States will apply the lessons learned to develop a doctrine for teaming. Such doctrine should provide the basis for how the US government will respond to any contingency with its complete set of assets from the largest cabinet department to the smallest independent agency.

Civilian-military teaming has been going on for decades and exists at all levels: strategic, country/operational, and field/tactical. Generally, teaming first occurs when the military has been called to assist in complex operations, for example, counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, and transition to postconflict reconstruction, where there is a high possibility of slipping back to conflict. However, the United States also does civilian-military teaming as a matter of course during normal day-to-day business at the national or regional strategic levels. These normal teaming procedures work fairly well when a contingency occurs. However, several organizations are looking to improve the process during a contingency, especially at the regional strategic level, where there is a major physical separation between the military combatant command and the Washington-based regional offices of the civilian agencies.

Teaming at the country/operational level has a few guidelines, which the various civilian and military regional offices and commands have developed to allow for successful interaction during noncontingencies and a select few contingency events. However, these differ from region to region and sometimes, for good reasons, from country to country in the same region. This creates confusion when a contingency develops where guidelines do not exist and the fallback to existing guidelines is incomplete or inadequate for the particular contingency. As the regional strategic-level civilian-military teaming is being reviewed for better effectiveness, hopefully it will address some of these shortfalls.
At the field/tactical level the United States lacks a concise set of doctrine, policy, or direction that allows the government to be effective. Several agencies are writing on the subject, but these analyses often are conducted in isolation and too often are intended to promote the primacy of the home agency’s mission or objective.

In general, when the US government scrutinizes civilian-military teams, it tends to focus on two main elements: who is in charge and who is paying for the mission, providing the human and financial resources. However, delving more deeply, it is necessary to examine the “when, where, and how” of training and deploying these teams. The “where” tends to be easier to answer, and the “when” is more complex in that it is dependent on the nature of the situation—humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or internal conflict. Finally, the “how” is often the most challenging and the most dependent on the answers to the first two variables. My primary focus in this chapter is the field/tactical civilian-military team, with an objective approach to when, where, and how the civilian-military team will be deployed. I examine those contingencies most commonly faced: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

**Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance**

Within these two areas various US government agencies have identified certain guidelines for domestic and foreign events. However, the latter is often complicated by divergent norms for operations standards that can run into conflict between agencies. This potential for complication was highlighted during operations in Haiti due to the scope of the contingency response.

Within the domestic response, all departments and agencies have agreed to follow the National Response Framework. This arrangement has established teaming enterprises and provides for a unity of effort through a singular command structure at all levels. By decree, the Federal Emergency Management Agency is the lead agency whenever the local and state authorities can no longer handle the contingency on their own and have requested assistance from the US government. If it is determined that the contingency is criminal in nature or an act of terrorism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation will take the lead after the initial response and assessment. Regardless of who is in the lead, the framework allows for the integration of the
various local, state, and national management systems and complements their individual efforts. At the field/tactical level the emergency operation plan delineates who will be the incident commander. All agencies, through the proper networks, provide support to this individual. This framework has proven effective overall. However, as the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated, federal government agencies must be reminded that they are in a supporting role and that direction within the field/tactical level must come from the local incident commander with approval and validation through the agencies’ frameworks. This provides for the best use of funds and resources and assures accountability of these resources to the public.

For foreign disaster relief, the US ambassador is generally in the lead, while assistance is directed through the deployed personnel of the US Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA has developed broad guidelines, and participating agencies have agreed to follow these guidelines, albeit with caveats.

The combatant command will establish a joint task force to encourage unity of effort and harmonize the various laws governing use of monies and personnel. Until the joint task force and the country team establish their interlocutors, the various military and civilian field/tactical teams operating within the same area can be at odds, and they often duplicate efforts. This problem is primarily caused by the nature of the planning models, if any, used by the various agencies. As all actions must be done quickly, contingency planning occurs and often things are missed. Frequently, there are no instructions on how to interact with other US agencies. Though this appears minor, it often has a long-range effect. As was discussed during the 2008 John F. Kennedy School of Government/Strategic Studies Institute colloquium “Civil-Military Relations in a Post-9/11 World,” there is a long history of this distrust, and events have made it harder to maintain the bonds of trust and partnership.¹

Because of immediate needs of the local people, a strong leadership personality from either team, plus the general will of both of these teams, often overcomes initial shortcomings. The individual field/tactical elements end up working together with little written direction until the operational management addresses the problem.

OFDA’s current guidelines could become the foundation for a National Response Framework for foreign disaster relief, defining roles and responsibilities to include funding streams, and would allow for
responders to understand how and where they fit within the response. Such a framework could have a separate annex to address regional, combatant command, or country-specific peculiarities. This could be accomplished through agreements among agencies, as long as such arrangements comply with congressional funding oversight requirements.

Humanitarian assistance appears to have fewer conflicts between the civilian and military agencies. Normally, military involvement rests within the transportation and supply support of the assistance. Thus, the teaming between the military response team and the country team happens quickly, as the military sees itself as a support mechanism not an action mechanism. This relationship is delineated in the tasking order. This, however, does become complicated if conflict is involved, as will be examined later in this chapter.

Leadership

The question of “who is in charge” may become an issue. Unity of effort entails the idea that no operation can truly succeed unless there is multilevel commitment and support—from the citizens and government of supporting countries, the supported citizenry, the government of the supported country, and the myriad of other organizations including intergovernmental, nongovernmental (NGO), private volunteers, or businesses. It is unity of leadership that focuses a country’s entities on a task. Unity of leadership takes precedence over unity of effort.

At the core of any teaming at the field level is leadership. Yet the existing congressional oversight structure makes this difficult to achieve. The various titles that regulate the different agencies preclude the use of domestic agency money on foreign operations and do not allow for one agency to supervise personnel of another agency. The effect is often duplicative or conflicting programs. Looking historically at Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in Vietnam and the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) program in the later stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, central leadership at the team level has evolved to a more focused approach with less conflict between agencies. The exception to this is in relation to how funds are distributed. Various laws govern money distribution, and quite often individual departments or agencies at the operational or country level control distribution. Here the conflict is not at the
team level but between the team and the operational levels. In Operation Enduring Freedom a “unity of effort” approach is used where there is no central leadership. Personalities have been the key to success or failure. The force of personalities fills the gap, yet the constant personnel rotation environment dooms the team to failure in the long run. In all three cases described above, national programs have affected the field teams’ operations either by duplicating effort or, in some cases, running contrary to what the field team has found effective. When a team is given an area, it must have control of all programs to ensure that the orderly intertwining of projects and actions provides for a single thrust of US efforts. This is not to say that the field usurps the country team, but the field team must be the manager at the field level. Therefore, civilian-military teaming at the field level should foster a leadership hierarchy for focused operations.

Conflict Response

When a conflict develops, observers can describe warring nations as progressing through various stages. Different authors name and designate these stages differently, but for the purpose of this chapter, I will categorize them as indicated in table 20.1. In the case of the United States, its government complements these stages with different forms of diplomatic and military phases as the nation progresses through these stages. These phases have different names also. As with most terminology, the diplomatic and military nomenclatures do not match. In table 20.1 I attempt to provide a guide to distinguish between these terms and how they may line up with the conflict stage.

As the United States navigates these stages/phases, it is important for the president to avoid disputes between all, working closely with Congress, the military, our allies, and other interested parties ensuring the actions to be taken are clearly understood and clarifying why those decisions were made.

Yet there are no distinct lines between each stage/phase, and various phases can exist in different parts in one country. The discussion below is an attempt to provide some clarity between these stages/phases and how the diplomatic and military phases interact.
Table 20.1. Conflict stages align with diplomacy and military phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Stage</th>
<th>Diplomacy Phase</th>
<th>Military Phase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durable Peace</td>
<td>Peacetime Diplomacy</td>
<td>0 – Shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latent Conflict</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict Emergence</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
<td>1 – Deter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict Escalation</td>
<td>Crisis Management</td>
<td>2 – Seize the Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hurting/Stalemate</td>
<td>Conflict Management/</td>
<td>3 – Dominate</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-escalation/Negotiation</td>
<td>Conflict Termination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postconflict Peace-building</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>4 – Stabilize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 – Enable Civil Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable Peace</td>
<td>Peacetime Diplomacy</td>
<td>0 – Shape</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Durable Peace/Latent Conflict**

During these stages of conflict, foreign assistance aims at enhancing the local government’s capacity, solidifying relationships, and influencing behavior. Quite often, foreign assistance programming is done along departmental or agency lines, and rarely is there a need for a civilian-military team at the field level. However, at both the strategic and country/operational level, these teams exist to ensure unity of effort. In addition, if the country sinks back toward conflict, then military effort alone may be insufficient. Diplomatic and development elements are mutually supportive with military efforts in conflict prevention.

This team should be at the request of the host nation and be small in nature. Its prime mission should be to advise the host country’s government entities in the area, both civilian and military. Finally, this team should be civilian led from an agency that would best benefit the local population.

**Conflict Emergence/Conflict Escalation**

When a country or region slips back into conflict or when conflict escalates, insurgency becomes the norm and will likely increase its reach throughout the host country. Like the earlier stages, the prime focus in attempting de-escalation will be through independent de-
partemental or agency teams. However, as the level of instability increases there may be an increased demand that security for US citizens be provided by US forces. The mood of the American people and the desires of the host country will dictate US military involvement, with some regional or international buy in. If the US military has an increased presence, civilian-military teams need to be in the field where there is a preponderance of US forces. During this period of crisis and unstable peace, US government agency in-fighting would only aggravate the problems. Thus, civilian-military team unity is of critical importance.

The conflict prevention team should be made of personnel from departments and agencies that have an effect on the region. In addition to providing assistance to host-nation security forces and security to US diplomatic and development efforts, the military should provide team support in planning, intelligence, logistics, medicine, and communications. At the same time, civil affairs personnel should be prepared to augment the team when there are insufficient numbers of personnel or needed experts from other departments or agencies. Ensuring security in an area will have a significant impact on whether the team is in a supporting or a supported role. This, to some degree, may affect whether there is a military or civilian lead for the team. It is still highly desirable that the team be civilian led in these stages, as efforts should still be more diplomatic than military. However, if the military is not chosen as lead, it is extremely important that the deputy team lead be a military officer. The military presence in the top leadership chain increases the effectiveness of the interplay between the team and the maneuver unit.

**Hurting/Stalemate**

This stage has two possible scenarios of distinct application of civilian-military teams. The first deals with the United States assisting the host nation militarily in combat operations. The second involves the United States deciding to effect a regime change.

The first scenario of this stage is a result of insurgency turning to full war. With heavy combat, the need for a more agile team with a combat background becomes paramount. This might include the use of military personnel trained to work within the nonsecurity force sectors or civilians to operate in a lethal environment. The lead in this case could be civilian; however, due to the combat nature of
this environment, it may be better suited for a military lead. With light combat, the team has less need for a team lead with combat experience. The lead for this team should be civilian. Regardless of which case is involved, efforts for the team should focus on reconstruction efforts and those projects or engagements that will enhance stabilization in the area. The use of the coalition humanitarian liaison cells or “Chiclets” in Afghanistan provides an excellent example of an effective combat team for reconstruction and initial stabilization efforts.

The second scenario requires a great deal of planning and coordination among the several departments and agencies. There has to be a concerted effort by all involved to ensure security is maintained, human needs are met, and a temporary government is in place until a legitimate authority comes into power. As the teaming is somewhat complex, further discussion follows later in this chapter.

**De-escalation/Negotiation**

The use of civilian-military teams at this stage is an extension of the previous stage with civilian personnel having an increased presence. The focus of the team at this stage should be on reconstruction and engagement efforts that will enhance stabilizations and lead to developmental action. The efforts typically include repair of infrastructure and those things that will encourage a return to normal day-to-day activities. An assessment of the needs of a given area should determine the team composition. Therefore, the initial team and its efforts should be generic with assessment and planning personnel; however, a plan should be in place to bring the necessary personnel in place quickly. Due to high demand–low volume expertise, this may require use of other methods such as “circuit riders” to provide the necessary expertise. If it is not already operating under such parameters, the team lead should be a civilian with the military component composed as discussed in the conflict emergence/conflict escalation section.

**Postconflict Peacebuilding**

In this final stage of conflict before returning to a durable peace, efforts by the civilian–military team will move from those associated with the previous stage to those related to how the United States operates in a nonconflict environment. As the level of insurgency diminishes and the host nation’s ability to control things increases, the
need for the military element also diminishes, with the logistics and communication pieces normally the last to disappear. The lead on the team should be civilian, as development becomes more the focus of the team. Each department and agency has his or her developmental elements, which the team will be required to locally manage initially.

The team is looking in this period to enable the host-nation authorities. It is also transitioning its efforts to the local authorities or to the country development team. The PRT model used in Iraq in the last few years of that conflict provides the best example of an effective civilian-military team operating within this stage.

**Regime Change**

When the United States elects to effect regime change, this is normally done at the hurting/stalemate stage. Yet there is a high probability that anarchy will fill the void where there is no government. Security must be provided to ensure that the local population has its basic needs met and to mitigate the changes of popular unrest and insurgency. Meeting basic human needs will require a national-level governance team and qualified civilian-military teams that act as the provincial, district, and local government levels and deliver goods and services. This model will continue until such time as a legitimate government is formed at its respective levels. Depending on the conflict stage the area is in at that time, it will then follow the related models discussed above.

Typically, with a substitution function as described above, either the United States does it alone or a multilateral or regional organization manages the operation. The latter is preferred, as it provides for worldwide legitimacy to the operations. This legitimacy, be it a mandate from the UN Security Council, request by belligerent parties, or brokered requests by third parties who asked for help, ensures that the operations are within international norms on the use of military forces and regard for humanitarian principles. It is important that there be broad support among nations that a change in regime is warranted. Without such support, the new regime may be considered illegitimate and not recognized by the international community, affecting its economic and political ability to completely recover from the conflict and encouraging the root cause(s) of the conflict to continue to fester, leading the country through yet another conflict.
Conclusion

The when, where, and how of civilian-military teaming is dependent on many variables. The chief among these are the will and objectives of the United States as expressed by the president and through other elected officials, the needs of the host country, and the environment in which the team must operate. US government departments and agencies must establish the necessary paradigms that will allow the civilian-military team to exist and operate. Efforts are ongoing to achieve these objectives. I believe that looking at the post–World War II model, CORDS in Vietnam, the Chiclets in Afghanistan, and the later version of the PRT model in Iraq will provide the way ahead for developing the field civilian-military teams and the support hierarchy. Yet civilian-military teams are losing popularity. If the United States forgets these lessons, we are doomed to painfully relearn them. As the philosopher George Santayana opined, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

Notes

2. A “circuit rider” is someone who travels throughout a given territory to provide services normally unavailable because of a scarcity of individuals to perform those services.
Chapter 21

Learning to Negotiate Shared Space

US Civilian-Military Roles in Unsecured Environments

Marcia Byrom Hartwell

Following the US military invasion and subsequent “transformative occupation” of Iraq, there were expectations by military forces that the US civilian interagency organizations—including the US Department of State (DOS), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Department of the Treasury (TREAS), the US Department of Justice (DOJ), the US Department of Commerce (DOC), and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA)—would provide “deployable experts” who would oversee the stabilization and reconstruction tasks necessary to guarantee political success. In this scenario, the military would do the fighting, and its nonmilitary partners would take the lead for “winning the peace.” Both the military and civilian sectors nurtured these expectations, based mostly on an untested theory of how things ought to work, and the US military had included such expectations in its training throughout the 1990s.1 Unfortunately, these assumptions failed to take into account the significant disparities between military and civilian capacity, capability, and budgets and the organizational cultural differences that would need to be addressed. While US civilian–military collaborations quickly assembled for Iraq and Afghanistan provide a context for basic understanding, it is essential for decision makers to rethink and redevelop a more nuanced strategy with synchronized goals and leadership to successfully address volatile situations in the future.

This chapter draws upon the author’s experiences as an embedded US Army civilian advisor in Iraq and previous research and fieldwork examining early postconflict transitions. It focuses on organizational challenges, different ways that military forces and civilians perceive personal risk, and how US military and civilian actors can determine their roles and negotiate shared space in unsecure environments.
Managing Expectations

In 2003 US military and government personnel in Iraq found themselves launching an operation where military force, though often necessary, would “rarely be sufficient” to establish security, stability, and functionality. Unable to reform the Iraqi government on its own, a formidable task under the best of circumstances and initially not part of the job description, the US military sought partnerships with US civilian agencies and international organizations that could provide the expertise, aid, and resources necessary to ensure that the fragile country would become stable and high functioning. The result was that Iraq became an unexpected testing ground for US military and civilian actors learning how to support each other’s organizational strengths and mitigate differences.

Following the 2003 invasion, there were huge gaps between US military and civilian organizational capacity. In 2004 there were approximately 138,000 US troops in Iraq, with four more Army brigade combat teams—with up to 4,000 soldiers each—added in the 2007 surge. This stood in contrast to the initial grand total of 2,000 USAID officers deployed worldwide and 6,000 DOS foreign service officers (FSO), whose primary function was to serve as diplomats in 270 embassies, consulates, and international posts. Other US agencies were in a similar situation. By 2009 there were thousands of civilians surrounded by approximately 150,000 troops in postsurge Iraq. At the end of FY 2010, USAID employees had increased to 8,610, including foreign service and civil service officers, with 6,199 deployed overseas. The DOS had more than 13,000 FSOs and drew upon a civil service corps of over 10,000 employees to provide continuity and expertise. Despite hiring thousands of private contractors and temporarily reassigning and appointing government employees, significant gaps remained.

This discrepancy continued as civilian and military teams outlined the final transition from military to civilian leadership in preparation for the 2011 military withdrawal. Capability gaps between civilian organizations and military forces rose from differences in employee training, focus, and organizational goals. Many of the civilian agencies simply did not do the same kinds of activities as the military, and any programs falling into this category would have to be dropped when forces withdrew. The difference in budget allocations—the Department of Defense (DOD) budget (FY 2012 request for $670.9 billion)
had always dwarfed the DOS (FY 2012 total approved for the DOS/USAID budget was $47 billion, 1 percent more than FY 2010 levels) and other interagency partners—further limited the scope of transfer. Underlying these issues were very different organizational cultures and views that contributed to occasional misunderstandings and mutual frustration. The military, a clearly defined hierarchal system, excels in logistics and tasking and in performing a defined set of goals with anticipated concrete outcomes. It is a fighting force standing ready to launch into action at any moment while using constantly changing acronyms that even its members do not always understand.

FSOs in the DOS have been trained as diplomats to observe and report. While actively engaged with top leadership in their host country, when possible they prefer to consider a range of outcomes for longer periods of time before reacting. USAID, within the DOS organizational umbrella, has a different history of initiating and implementing projects focused on economic growth, agriculture, trade, global health, democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance. They understood the fundamentals of sustainable development projects but lacked control over development projects initiated by the US military in Iraq. Depending on their mission and background, other interagency civilian organizations—US Departments of Labor, the TREAS, the DOJ, Homeland Security, the USDA, Energy, the DOC, the Department of Transportation, and the Central Intelligence Agency—had their own internal dynamics that usually fell somewhere between the DOS and USAID and US military forces.

The Joint Campaign Plan, outlining the transition from military to civilian leadership, was written in 2009 following a year of strenuous negotiations. An incoming rotation of personnel (US Forces–Iraq and US Embassy–Baghdad), many with cross-organization experience, began to discuss capacity, capability, and budget issues. The result was a smooth, flexible operation that reconfigured military to civilian transition, which was further reduced by unexpected congressional cuts in the DOS budget. Even so, the DOS assumption of leadership in Iraq at the end of 2011 was its biggest overseas operation since World War II.
Managing Threats

Moving civilian-military teams within war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted different views toward acceptable levels of personal risk between US military forces and civilians without prior military background. Adapting and reacting to threats are essential to survival; however, these reactions can affect engagement between civilian-military teams and local populations. In many instances, this can be attributed to organizational and individual views that I will discuss in the following subsections.

Different Tolerances for Risk Taking

Military forces are trained to engage in direct combat and react with deadly force if they find themselves in dangerous situations. They are organized and equipped for logistics and travel in dangerous areas. As a result, military forces will often decide to undertake movements on the ground if they gauge threats to personal safety as potentially high but manageable. Civilians experienced in maneuvering inside dangerous areas will have a developed sense of danger but use different criteria to evaluate risks. In general, unarmed civilians in war zones and unstable areas understand the inherent dangers to personal security, but many will take the view that intentionally putting oneself in harm’s way is inviting unnecessary trouble.

Collective versus Individual Perceptions of Threats

Members of the military forces have a collective view toward personal threats and are trained to depend and fall back on the cohesiveness of their unit and team to protect each other under fire. On the other hand, civilians who do not have military backgrounds—especially members of diplomatic, humanitarian, and aid development organizations—do not carry weapons and are trained to mitigate threats by enacting individual strategies and actions that minimize personal risk.

Professional Hazard and Circumstantial Threat

Members of the armed forces understand that death, though undesired, is a potential consequence of choosing a profession that utilizes
lethal weapons. (In the absence of a compulsory draft, joining the US military is a professional choice.) There is great ritual involved in the language of serving, and each military member knows that he or she will receive public acknowledgment of his or her ultimate sacrifice and community support for his or her loved ones. While dealing with the possibility of death has become part of their professional training, excessive violence that threatens US civilian professionals is directly related to their current circumstances, similar to that experienced by other unarmed civilian researchers and practitioners. However, unlike their military counterparts civilians are not guaranteed communalized public ritual or extended support.

It is worth mentioning that, unknown to many American civilians and military forces, there are groups of unarmed civilian practitioners and researchers that have long worked on developing aid projects and conducting fieldwork without military escorts in dangerous areas. These mostly international groups have developed extraordinary coping mechanisms and sensitive barometers for reading violence that reasonably assure their personal safety.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is one of many international humanitarian aid groups that are increasingly operating in volatile environments while seeking to protect refugees and internally displaced persons forced from their homes by extreme violence and emergencies. They have well-honed personal protection strategies in place that caution workers to be aware and alert of their surroundings. UNHCR's *Handbook for Emergencies* (2007) emphasizes observing the behavior of local populations that know more about potential threats to security than aid workers. There are admonitions to avoid traveling alone or after dark if it can be avoided, and there are other warnings: do not carry large amounts of money, tell someone your destination when leaving and when you expect to return, keep vehicle doors locked and windows rolled up when travelling, and park vehicles for a fast exit. Workers are to refrain from taking photos of or around military personnel or installations and to have cash, documents, and an emergency bag packed and ready to go at all times. Above all they are advised to be polite and courteous to local officials, police, and military, as rude behavior could have negative consequences for them and other members of their staff.7

International and US academics from a range of disciplines have utilized ethical codes and personal protection strategies when collecting
ethnographic interviews in potentially dangerous environments. A 1995 landmark book, *Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*, documented anthropologists’ personal stories and strategies for conducting fieldwork in areas affected by political violence. US anthropologist J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat, who has worked for years among violent gangs in Haiti, lists strategies for understanding and adapting to threats that include listening to local advice on what is happening and where, organizing a safety support system that consists of calling in and/or showing up at an appointed time and place, developing specific strategies for very dangerous areas (no visible notebooks, recorders, or note taking of any kind, including speaking on mobile phones), and most importantly knowing how to recognize when you should terminate research and evacuate for personal safety.

Franker discussion, understanding, and negotiation among US military forces and civilian organizations working together in dangerous environments are needed on this issue. Much has changed as terrorist organizations increasingly have targeted international humanitarian organizations and researchers in recent years; however, many civilians still have ambivalent feelings about whether working with military forces increases their personal security or puts them and the populations they serve at greater risk. While keeping their distance from political and military actors may be desirable for most, their efforts to project independence and neutrality while cultivating relationships with local actors and communities are not always viable security strategies. When civilian personnel face threats from criminal organizations or nonstate actors who see little advantage in allowing humanitarian agencies or academic researchers to operate freely, these personnel become targets along with the populations they are trying to protect.

**Learning to Negotiate Shared Space**

Looking into the future, US forces and civilians will face a different set of emerging global threats that include organized crime, trafficking, domestic unrest due to global economic shocks, and terrorism. Conflict prevention, human security, and justice will become increasingly important focuses in developing projects and implementing strategies and alliances. Social media and communication technologies
such as satellite and cell phones will continue to accelerate the pace of change, narrowing the window of opportunity for the United States to support positive transformative processes. This will be accompanied by increased caution and pushback against US civilian and military intervention by countries that, having observed events in Iraq and Afghanistan, will want more control on the pace, range, and visibility of US involvement in their country.

In 2009 the US Institute of Peace (USIP) and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) coauthored a groundbreaking “how-to” manual for civilians, Guiding Principles for Stabilizations and Reconstruction, as a companion publication to the 2008 Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations. (Both have since been replaced and/or revised.) It provided the necessary “comprehensive strategic guidance” for civilians engaging with military organizations to make decisions, plan, and develop education, training, and implementation “on the ground.” In their 2010 coauthored book, The Ultimate Weapon Is No Weapon, US Army lieutenant colonel Shannon Beebe and Prof. Mary Kaldor (London School of Economics) advocate use of traditional military “hard force” in a nontraditional way to escort children to school in “zones of insecurity” and to assist the local military, police, and parents to protect their children. They focus on issues of human security and underlying conditions leading to conflict that include “weak rule of law, unemployment, criminality, surplus weapons, loss of livelihoods, and extremist ideologies,” which are often worse after the conflict than before.

Military humanitarian interventions have been hotly debated for years in the international development world. In 1994 Alex de Waal and Raklya Omaar maintained that military humanitarian intervention had its own logic, which was difficult to reconcile with the demands of peacemaking and reconstruction, as it was never “clean or quick” and could not solve humanitarian crises—it could only alter them. As these debates have evolved, a restructuring of military and civilian roles has been anticipated and put into practice by members of the international community.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) closely monitored interactions with US forces and the private security sector in Iraq through operational mandates described in their 2004 Guidelines for Humanitarian Organizations on Interacting with Military and Security Actors in Iraq (updated August 2008 as Guidelines for UN and Other Humanitarian Organizations on Interacting with Military,
Non-State Armed Actors and Other Security Actors in Iraq. Civilian-military interactions were defined as “interaction between civil, military and other security actors, which [are] necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and pursue common goals as appropriate, . . . [which] will be further guided by a commitment to ‘do no harm.’” It stated that UNAMI humanitarian efforts in Iraq were “best served through a clear division of labour,” where humanitarian actors provided “adequate assistance and protection,” and military actors concentrated on “security related tasks under established mandates.” Their “agreed interaction” was to not compromise the independence, neutrality, and impartiality of UNAMI operations or the security and safety of staff or Iraqi civilians and to make every effort at policy and operational levels to ensure that any potential civilian-military coordination would neither contribute to furthering the conflict “nor harm or endanger civilians, including the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.”

Despite organizational differences and occasional clashes in leadership style and personality, many in the international community viewed US civilian-military collaborations to be working relatively well in 2009 in Iraq. While there were differences in strategy, both military and humanitarian agencies often intersected in execution of their agendas. Drawing from observations in Iraq, areas where military forces may have a significantly positive role are discussed in the following subsections.

Security-Sector Reform

Based on shared experience and mutual understanding, military forces were effective in implementing security-sector reforms with both state and nonstate armed groups in Iraq. They trained national security forces, and former insurgents who wanted to renounce their outlier status preferred turning themselves in to US forces and occasionally the Iraqi army. This rapport between armed groups could be used to the advantage of civilian organizations who assist host countries in developing capability and capacity for civilian oversight of security forces and who provide political, economic, social, and legal assistance in support of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former insurgents into local communities.
Providing Secure Travel and Work Environments for Humanitarian Actors

Providing secure military transport and physical protection for international humanitarian actors was ongoing in Iraq. All branches of US forces provided embedded advisors to UNAMI. In a June 2009 report to the United Nations Security Council, the military advisors provided by member states were cited as “essential” for supporting UNAMI’s expansion of activities across Iraq and for liaising with Iraqi and multinational forces. It stated that input provided by military advisors in conducting joint capability assessments, determining future available operational support, and coordinating mechanisms with Iraqi forces had significantly aided the UNAMI security section in shaping the future concept of operations in anticipation of final transition to civilian control.16

Developing and Implementing Security Strategies for the Elections

In early 2008 the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) of Iraq requested that Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki reactivate the High Committee on Election Security for governorate council elections originally slated for January 2009. A national security plan was developed and endorsed by the prime minister, Iraqi security forces, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I), IHEC, and UNAMI. Security was planned in three layers: an inner ring consisting of Iraqi police, a middle ring monitored by the Iraqi army and other members of the Ministry of Defense, and the outside perimeter secured by MNF–I (later replaced by US Forces–Iraq [USF–I]). In the elections for the Iraqi parliament’s Council of Representatives, UNAMI took the lead in advising, supporting, and assisting the government of Iraq as mandated by the 2007 law stating that IHEC must seek the UN’s assistance to prepare and conduct elections. UNAMI worked in partnership with other UN organizations to assist Iraqis in implementing elections while USF–I, as mandated, provided security and logistics during an increasingly dangerous period leading up to elections that were delayed until 7 March 2010.17 Areas where civilians tend to excel are discussed in the following subsections.
Initiating and Implementing Sustainable Development Projects

Due to inexperience and misunderstanding of the intricacies of implementing sustainable international development projects, US military forces have been vulnerable to manipulation by the intended recipients in host countries. Funded by the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, inexperienced local commanders in Iraq were pushed to address “urgent” small-scale humanitarian relief, reconstruction projects, and services to local populations by using aid as a “nonlethal weapon.” Urgent, in this case, was defined as “any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that in the judgment of the local commander calls for immediate action.” Having made similar errors in the past, USAID and international humanitarian organizations have long reviewed lessons learned and developed best practices to implement projects in conflict-affected and fragile countries. Humanitarian aid and development practitioners identified a gap between emergency relief and long-term sustainable development projects in the 1990s that emphasized better coordination of efforts while demanding a longer view of development, incorporating institution building and conflict transformation into their strategy and operations. As humanitarian and development organizations increasingly found themselves involved in areas of armed conflict, many chose to work on civilian peacebuilding activities and to build civilian capacity to oversee security-sector reform during postconflict transitions. According to a Danish Institute of International Studies report, “the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Agenda from 2001 also provided a rationale for interaction between armed forces and humanitarian organizations.” USIP and the US Army PKSOI maintained that security forces needed better understanding of the underlying principles for sustainable development, while the development community must learn to apply “conflict-sensitive approaches to S&R [stabilization and reconstruction] environments.”

Community Peacebuilding

USIP began to assist Iraqis in developing community-driven efforts by training conflict mediators and peace builders in the flash-point areas throughout Iraq in 2004. One of USIP’s accomplishments was facilitating a 2007 peace agreement (requested by USAID with strong military support) between tribal leaders and the Iraqi government in
an area known as the “Triangle of Death” in the city of Mahmoudiya, south of Baghdad. Assuming a role as “an honest broker,” USIP hosted a series of meetings in Amman, Jordan, where it helped convince local Iraqi sheiks who had fled there to return home. The Iraqis subsequently reached a peace deal and, with the assistance of the United States and Iraq, drove out insurgents who had overrun the area. USIP peacebuilding activities in Iraq were most effective when initiated and led by local civilian-based organizations and individuals in minority and vulnerable communities where populations experienced extreme human rights abuses and were targeted by all sides.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

Ranging in quality and accomplishment, Iraq provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) were interagency teams that, along with USIP, provided the rare but long-desired US “civilian face” to Iraqis. These civilian-military teams, established by the DOS in 2005, attempted to promote stability in Iraq “by bolstering moderates, promoting reconciliation, fostering economic development and building provincial capacity.” The goal for all teams was to promote stability and development” while focusing on five main areas: governance, national unity, rule of law, and economic and political development at the provincial level. They were staffed from various agencies including the US Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Agriculture; USAID; US Army Corps of Engineers; contracted subject-matter experts; and local personnel. At their peak they provided a primary regional connection between the United States, coalition partners, and provincial and local governments in all Iraqi provinces. Seven PRTs were embedded with military brigades following the civilian-military surge in 2007 and phased out by 2010. As the military to civilian transition progressed, PRTs were disbanded in late 2011, turning their projects over to the government of Iraq.

**Looking Ahead**

As future challenges loom, the civilian and military experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have the feel of distant history. In an ongoing era of budget cuts and weakening political will, more large-scale combat operations will be unlikely and the old American habit of
throwing money at a problem rather than attempting to develop strategies that address underlying issues is over.

Aided by information and communication technologies, unfettered international communication is now taking place on both macro and micro levels. US military forces and civilian organizations, learning to do more with less in an era where geopolitical threats show little sign of waning, are beginning to engage creatively with their international counterparts as they attempt to develop effective, flexible strategic and tactical responses to fast moving specific threats. International civilian humanitarian and development organizations are beginning to acknowledge that these types of conversations are essential to safely administer their services while protecting their volunteers and employees in increasingly unpredictable and unsecure environments.

While operational lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan are important, it is the shared experience in developing civilian-military relationships that will be increasingly valuable in meeting future challenges. Accepting differences, focusing on common goals, developing creative problem-solving skills, and inviting wider input into decision-making processes will facilitate effective responses in politically driven, technology-fueled environments. Complex crises and emergencies will require more sophisticated analysis, evaluation, and operational techniques. While there are underlying commonalities, accepting at the onset that there is no “right” answer for every situation will require that civilian-military relationships and operational frameworks be renegotiated on an ongoing basis to produce better outcomes for all.

In a world filled with iPhones, iPads, and laptops and where democratic movements are launched through social media, it may be time to turn toward innovative, simpler ways to build human bridges. Internet and communication technologies offer populations directly affected by crises an opportunity to communicate imminent or potential danger in real time. These technologies provide a platform for relaying messages, give a voice to “anonymous” and deliberately silenced populations, and allow individuals who might otherwise never talk a chance to exchange their views. One Iraqi summed up this back to basics approach: “It’s time for the United States and the Islamic world to get to know each other better as individuals. Why does one need big money just to talk with another? Why couldn’t a school in the United States just Skype a classroom in Iraq?”
Notes


PART 7

Preparing for the Future
Chapter 22

Developing Intelligence Capabilities for Counterinsurgency and Stabilization

Learning from the US Experience with Sociocultural Analysis in Iraq and Afghanistan

Nathan White

Introduction

At their core, counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are armed contests for influence over people. To be successful, a counterinsurgent force must utilize lethal and nonlethal tools to address root causes of an insurgency, thereby influencing the behavior of people with the potential to prevent or contribute to stability (referred to in joint doctrine as relevant actors). Thus, when engaged in operations of this nature, it is necessary for a counterinsurgent force to identify and better understand the actors who are relevant to the conflict. Only then can the planning, execution, and assessment of both lethal and nonlethal actions be tailored in an operationally relevant manner.

COIN scholars and practitioners have long recognized that relevant sections of the indigenous population are among the most important...
actors to understand and influence in a COIN operation. The indigenous population is important because it has the potential to offer recruits, sanctuary, political support, and other benefits to an insurgency. It also has the potential to help a COIN operation through denying such benefits to insurgents, providing intelligence, and offering political support and additional forms of assistance to the counterinsurgent force.

Despite this recognition by so many, the question of how best to develop an operationally relevant understanding of the indigenous population for COIN was never resolved for US personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. In a 2012 study conducted on behalf of the US Joint Staff, the *Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis* describes how an inability to properly understand this aspect of the environment impeded mission success over the past decade of war. The study states, “In operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, a failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals.” It depicts the operational environment as encompassing not only the threat but also the “physical, informational, social, cultural, religious, and economic elements of the environment,” highlighting that “each of these elements was important to understanding the root causes of conflicts, developing an appropriate approach, and anticipating second-order effects.” The study goes on to specify that one of the four primary reasons for the failure to properly understand the operational environment was the limited understanding of indigenous populations. It argues that “a nuanced understanding of the environment was often hindered by a focus on traditional adversaries and a neglect of information concerning the host-nation population.”

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States had limited understanding of the population and society at the outset of operations, which challenged the ability of personnel to accomplish the mission. With instability in the wake of initial military operations and the rise of various insurgent elements, the requirements for analysis of the indigenous population grew as interagency teams worked to better understand their areas of responsibility and target effects outside of a conventional military context. Demand increased further as more military and civilian personnel sought to inform strategies under the population-centric COIN paradigm. That shift was exemplified by Gen David Petraeus, US Army, retired, who declared that “the human terrain is the decisive terrain.”
To meet new requirements, civilian agencies, military organizations, and government contractors rushed to devise solutions for enhanced sociocultural analysis of the Iraqi and Afghan populations. Their efforts led to the development of many formal and informal approaches to collecting, organizing, analyzing, managing, and sharing sociocultural data. Increased attention was paid to the engagement of key leaders and influential people in order to enable greater situational awareness and partnership in deployed areas. While back in the United States, various methodologies and social science innovations for assessing societies were developed with the purpose of facilitating better visibility of sociocultural dynamics.

Despite these efforts, comprehensive understanding of the requirements for sociocultural analysis at all levels of command was never achieved. A common description of what operationally relevant sociocultural understanding of the population and society entailed and how best to get the right analysis into the hands of those who needed it most remained elusive. In many circles, enhanced sociocultural analysis capabilities implied improving a database or information technology (IT) system. In others, sociocultural analysis may have meant PowerPoint briefings to commanders and their staffs in theaters of war. In budgeting circles, understanding the population and society often took the form of requests for language training or episodic culture classes. In each instance, service providers, decision makers, and tactical implementers fit old models to new vocabulary in the hopes of acquiring resources.

The result was that the defense and intelligence communities never coalesced to enable development of sociocultural analysis capabilities in an efficient and relevant manner across the force. As each operation matured, limited societal situational awareness and poor understanding of the local population continued. Several attempts were made at improving collection, analysis, and information management capabilities in support of sociocultural understanding. Nevertheless, most tended to fall short and were limited to isolated or only partially coordinated efforts, with little synchronization. A proliferation of operating systems, databases, and IT solutions complicated management and understanding of information already collected. Additionally, little progress was made toward mitigating the loss of continuity, corporate memory, and relationships of influence, as units and individual personnel deployed and redeployed in and out of theater.
In this chapter, I seek to answer the question of why the United States had such difficulty meeting sociocultural analysis requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan. I argue that the failure to meet sociocultural analysis requirements was a result of institutional barriers within the US government. Initially, I point out that the United States went into Iraq and Afghanistan with an intelligence posture that was a relic of the Cold War and past intelligence priorities. The US military and interagency communities were thus not equipped to meet new sociocultural analysis requirements at the outset of the conflicts. Then, I explain that when the approaches being pushed by some leaders for Iraq, and later for Afghanistan, began to shift toward population-centric COIN, the absence of an agreed upon concept of mission, strategy, and desired end state among civilian and military organizations in both countries complicated the generation of operationally relevant intelligence requirements. Subsequently, I show that even as sociocultural analysis improved, many impediments to intelligence fusion continued to hinder development of a more comprehensive picture. Thereafter, I describe the limited attention devoted to determining how sociocultural analysis could best be integrated into the planning, execution, and assessment of operations. This meant that even when helpful sociocultural analysis was available, it did not always lead to improved understanding among operators and decision makers. Next, I discuss legacy human resources (HR) processes and training programs and their inability to adapt to meet an increased need for expertise relevant to sociocultural analysis. Thereafter, I identify lessons related to sociocultural analysis for consideration by those charged with the design and conduct of future operations.

US National Security Priorities and Intelligence for Iraq and Afghanistan

Due to US national security and foreign policy priorities during the pre–9/11 era and the early years of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, intelligence organizations did not prioritize sociocultural analysis of foreign populations. As a result, the US intelligence community (IC) was not prepared to support the sociocultural analysis requirements of the COIN operations that eventually unfolded.
Pre–9/11 Intelligence Priorities

In a 1998 article, Gen Anthony Zinni, US Marine Corps, retired, observes the lack of pre–9/11 preparedness to meet requirements for sociocultural analysis. Zinni argues that US decision makers need cultural intelligence; they need to know what makes faction leaders and people tick, and who makes the decisions. Moreover, Zinni states that analysts need to know what makes the society in which the US military is operating “so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think, compared to my values and the way I think in my Western, white-man mentality. . . . What you need to know isn’t what our intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, and to present to you.” The United States backed various insurgencies and participated in numerous COIN and stabilization efforts during and after the Cold War. However, these conflicts did not necessarily shape priorities of force development for the defense and intelligence communities. Therefore, the defense and intelligence architectures of the US government were not geared to meet operationally relevant requirements for the population-centric COIN approaches eventually pushed by some US leaders.

The focus of intelligence collection during this time period was largely shaped by missions such as supporting highly kinetic major combat operations like those in Operation Desert Storm, security and force protection, counterproliferation, counterterrorism against al-Qaeda and other terrorist threats, high-level state politics, and revolution-in-military-affairs concepts. All of these missions tended to pay short shrift to sociocultural analysis capability development, which was understandable given this set of priorities. Interestingly, Robert Komer, former CIA officer turned RAND researcher, captured a similar lack of preparedness for sociocultural analysis within the IC over 30 years earlier in his 1972 study of Vietnam titled *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam.* Komer observes, “The massive U.S. and [South Vietnamese] intelligence empires focused mostly on that with which they were most familiar, the size and location of enemy main-force units, to the neglect of such other vital targets as the opponent’s politico-military control structure.”
Early Post–9/11 Iraq and Afghanistan

The intelligence footing from the pre–9/11 era still seemed somewhat appropriate in the early days of the Iraq and Afghanistan operations. Although the US-led coalitions partnered to some degree with Afghans and Iraqis, understanding the population and society at the local level was not an initial priority. After all, population-centric COIN was not the initial mission in either country. The primary mission was regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. As CIA officer Cofer Black stated in a 2012 interview with 60 Minutes, “my mission was not to ensure that little girls go to school in Afghanistan. My mission was not to establish, you know, a legal system in Afghanistan. Was not my mission. My mission was to destroy al-Qaeda. And to do that, we had to overthrow the Taliban.”

National-level intelligence priorities that did not stress sociocultural analysis—such as high-level politics, counterterrorism, force protection, and support to initial major combat operations—ruled the day. Even as insurgencies and other destabilizing factors emerged in each country and various commanders began applying COIN and stabilization principles in some pockets, the whole-sale approach did not immediately change to COIN. Therefore, the need to understand and influence the population and society was still not seen as a priority.

As the importance of adapting to population-centric approaches became more widely accepted in some circles, those tasked with filling the sociocultural analysis gap found that the government support structures for such work simply did not exist. William J. Olson, professor at the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, illustrates the extent of the challenge during this time period, stating that “our institutional arrangements—governments or private industry, our mental frameworks, our technical capabilities, vast and considerable though they are, are all geared to a different ratio than the threat we now face. It is like trying to work on a car using metric standards with non-metric tools. Nothing fits.” Although Olson is speaking more broadly of the United States’ limited preparedness for postmodern warfare, his statement is highly relevant to sociocultural analysis in Iraq and Afghanistan. There was no deputy assistant secretary of defense or official department that handled development of sociocultural analysis capabilities. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not have a designated office or
staff positions focused on sociocultural collection and analysis. A debate over whether sociocultural analysis should even be considered a role for intelligence organizations at all complicated decision making over who should oversee development of these capabilities. Furthermore, intelligence personnel felt that they were already doing this type of work sufficiently, despite the gaps reported by so many of those customers seeking to enhance their sociocultural understanding. In this less than fertile environment for change, different parts of government were forced to throw together solutions on the fly, as best they could, often in ad hoc and piecemeal ways, with whatever resources they could cobble together.

When operations shifted more deliberately toward COIN (2007 in Iraq and 2009 in Afghanistan), the IC found it was unprepared to meet requirements for sociocultural analysis that would inform the understanding, anticipation, and influence of relevant actor behavior within the indigenous population. However, the IC had improved its ability to analyze top-tier political players. The degree to which intelligence could assist with finding, analyzing, and taking direct action against adversary targets advanced far beyond the capabilities of years past. Furthermore, improved intelligence support to security and force protection, especially in the area of counter–improvised explosive device, can be credited with saving countless lives. This progress was highly valuable to force development, as all military operations will eventually require some degree of high-level political negotiations, sound security precautions, and ability to deliver lethal effects against adversary targets. Yet improvements in these areas alone have their limitations when it comes to success in COIN. Dr. David Kilcullen implies as much in his 2010 article when he observes that “while military intelligence agencies tend to focus on threat intelligence, civilian agencies tend to focus on elite-level political intelligence—whereas what most affects the mission may often be grassroots political intelligence, an oft-neglected focus of analysis. This can tend to skew intelligence collection and assessment.” Without a change in priorities that emphasized improvements in analysis of the indigenous population, the other intelligence advances would have limited impact on the success of missions where the behavior of relevant actors within the population was such an important factor.
Fixing Intel or Fixing the Force?

In October 2010 the highest ranking intelligence official in Afghanistan at the time, ISAF director of J2 (Intelligence), Maj Gen Michael T. Flynn, US Army (now lieutenant general and director of the DIA), co-authored a paper titled “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan.” The authors argue that the IC failed to adjust for sociocultural analysis requirements in Afghanistan. They explain that eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, inquisitive about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers—whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers—U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency.

This point of view is certainly consistent with the observations of many who worked in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet one could easily make an argument that in order to fix intelligence, the United States must first fix the force that serves as the intelligence customer base.

Interagency Force Structure and Requirements Generation

Different interpretations of the mission, strategy, and desired end state by civilian and military customers of intelligence operating in Iraq and Afghanistan confused the development of requirements for sociocultural analysis. Because most US government agencies did not prioritize population-centric impact, the majority of intelligence customers were not interested in learning about sociocultural aspects of the operational environment. In this situation, it would have been difficult for any intelligence organization to justify a shift toward sociocultural analysis as a top-tier priority. After all, intelligence is highly driven by requirements from consumers of intelligence. Intelligence producers in the IC certainly conduct a fair amount of initiative-driven intelligence work, but if the majority of operators, key
decision makers, and other intelligence customers are not interested in population-centric questions, the likelihood that sociocultural analysis will be a priority for the IC is low. Thus, any critique of the IC's contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan must take into account the role of intelligence customers.

Interagency force structures challenged the development of shared concepts of operational objectives, methods, roles, and responsibilities, which in turn hampered the development of clear intelligence requirements. In many circles in Washington, it was believed that traditional defense, diplomatic, and reconstruction expertise was all that was needed to carry out COIN along three primary lines of operation: security, governance, and development. However, varied points of view on what specifically was required to be successful within each line of operation marked the point of departure from a shared theory of change for how the interagency force would actually achieve success.

As a result of this ambiguity, agency representatives brought their own agency cultures, requirements, sense of agency mission, training objectives, and personal perspectives. Those perspectives did not necessarily align with the COIN mission and/or the perceived mission of the interagency team to which they were assigned. Prior to the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, experts in security, governance, and development had not been asked to systematically combine their expertise in a coherent COIN or stabilization mission on such a grand scale since the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program in Vietnam. Furthermore, the absence of a unified chain of command capable of focusing all civilian and military entities in a synchronized effort toward an agreed upon series of objectives exacerbated the problem (see fig. 22.1). Intelligence support to interagency operations became difficult in such an environment, since an agreed upon set of requirements did not typically exist on interagency teams.

In 2009 many used this model to depict unity of effort among US civilian and military personnel in Afghanistan. In practice it actually depicts two entirely separate chains of command for civilians and the military. These separate chains of command were only unified when personalities and agency missions—often accidentally—were such that personnel could be unified toward complementary objectives.
In addition, even civilian agencies like the US Department of State (DOS), US Agency for International Development (USAID), and US Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not always agree—nor did offices and individuals in the same agency. Despite efforts like the creation of the Interagency Provincial Affairs office and the formation of senior civilian representatives at each regional platform, personnel from different agencies often still did not operate as a synchronized team—sometimes working at cross-purposes. Also not shown here are the US special operations elements and intelligence agencies that had separate chains of command that did not fall under the battlespace owners. These groups often had different objectives of their own that did not necessarily fall within the strategy being pursued by other organizations in theater. Additionally, the various defense, development, and diplomacy organizations of coalition countries are not depicted here. These groups oftentimes did not coordinate with other organizations in theater and were commonly found to be accountable only to the leadership in their home country capitals.

Crisis of Terminology

The absence of a shared lexicon of terms among organizations created a crisis of terminology of sorts, which added to the confusion. Depending on who was asked, the answer given as to what mission was being pursued in Iraq and Afghanistan could be foreign internal
defense, stability operations, COIN, nation building, or even peacekeeping or peace support operations. Complicating the situation more, people defined terms in different ways, often in not very population-centric ways. The lack of clarity on terminology was problematic for understanding requirements within the IC. The findings of a February 2011 study conducted by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence are illustrative of this, pointing out that “different definitions of terms and associated interpretations of their meaning allow the DOD [Department of Defense] components, including the intelligence components of the military departments and combatant commands and the combat support agencies that are part of the IC, to choose the one(s) they prefer. This, in turn, produces a lack of clarity and causes confusion about what is meant. . . . This failure has a deleterious effect on the DOD and IC’s understanding of the intelligence requirements for effective support of US, multinational, and coalition COIN operations.”

Doctrine and other written guidance are partly to blame, as many returning from the field reported a multitude of conflicting guidance documents that define the mission and associated terms differently. In a November 2011 interview, a senior DOS official who served in Afghanistan argued that COIN could never have worked in a place as complex as Afghanistan and that the concept of COIN was effectively dead. Although the jury is still out on the merit of this assertion, one cannot help but wonder which version of COIN the official meant.

**Agency Core Missions and Sociocultural Considerations**

Making matters more difficult, the conflicting views of the mission, as interpreted by US agencies, tended to have little to do with sociocultural considerations. For sociocultural analysis requirements to be generated in a meaningful way, US agencies would have needed an appetite to analyze the operational environment and construct an approach designed to achieve a sustainable stabilizing COIN impact that was appropriate for the local context and relevant to the nature of the conflict. Yet most agencies failed to approach the operations in this way. Instead, US personnel tended to push forward with their own agency core missions, regardless of the situation on the ground. USAID and the DOS focused their efforts on the top-down national-level democracy and development agendas because it is how they typically operate in their traditional diplomatic and development
missions around the world. This state of affairs was of course not a first-time occurrence for the US interagency community operating in conflict zones. It fact, it closely mirrors the findings of Komer, who highlights similar US institutional constraints to adaptation for population-centric COIN in Vietnam. 23

The result of agencies sticking to their core missions was that even once it was clear that insurgencies were present in both Iraq and Afghanistan, most US government organizations approached the COIN efforts with the intention of making things the way they thought they should be, based on preconceived notions of state building rooted in Western concepts of security, governance, and development. The thought was that if these core agency missions were pursued according to Western standards and normal agency practice, stability would eventually be achieved, regardless of the near-term impact of their actions at the local level. 24

Kilcullen captures this phenomenon as it relates to both intelligence and nonintelligence entities in his article. He writes, “Intelligence services of intervening forces in counterinsurgency operations tend to exhibit several pathologies . . . [including] the tendency to judge success based on progress in creating top-down, state based institutions, while reposing less value and significance in bottom-up societal indicators.” 25 He points out that this challenge is more than just an IC issue: “This pathology may not be confined to intelligence services. Rather, it seems to reflect wider Eurocentric attitudes to the process of state formation. Recent research suggests that the international community, including the vast international aid and development bureaucracy and the ‘peace industry’ associated with international organizations such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, tends to have a strong preference for top-down state formation (‘nation building’) based on the creation of national-level, ‘modern,’ Western-style institutions of the central state.” 26 He continues by connecting this tendency directly to the COIN forces he has studied: “Intervening forces in counterinsurgency environments seem to absorb this broader tendency, with analysts tending to give greater weight to events at the national level, or to elite-level political maneuvering, than to events at the grassroots, civil society level.” 27

In executing agency core missions, the United States tended to focus its efforts on three primary areas:
• support to force protection and defeating the military capabilities of the adversary;
• support to a traditional US diplomatic approach that emphasized engagement of high-level political elites, while promoting a Westernized cookie-cutter version of democratic principles; and
• support to a development approach that focused on developing institutions and infrastructure that correspond to Westernized views of what a country needs in order to be successful.

These lines of operation were frequently pursued with limited effort to adjust and adapt for local realities and preexisting indigenous structures. Therefore, for most US government agencies, impact at the local level was merely an afterthought during the design and conduct of many activities. The influence of these efforts on the behavior of relevant actors among the population was not usually seen as a priority, and therefore, sociocultural analysis was often seen as irrelevant to the perceived mission.

Demonstrating that each organization was pushing forward on the three primary lines of effort was a top priority. On the security side, military and civilian defense leaders needed to show that their areas were going from less secure to more secure by military standards (often discussed as moving from red to green). Numbers of documented significant activities needed to be reduced. Higher numbers of insurgents needed to be killed or captured. The amount of improvised explosive device (IED) incidents needed to drop. Although all of these statistics could certainly be indicative of improved security, they did not necessarily address progress in the population-centric operation that was purportedly being pursued. Did these numbers improve in a given area because the force was succeeding, or was the cause simply the result of fewer coalition or insurgent forces being present in the area during that particular time period? Were more members of the population brought over to the side of the insurgency as a result of a given lethal or nonlethal action by the coalition? What was the impact of the collateral damage from a night raid or a targeted strike on the allegiances and ultimately the behavior of the population in a given village? The traditional approach to security executed by most US military forces in theater was not always interested in or able to account for such questions.

When it came to governance, the DOS needed to show that a strong democratic government was being created in the capital cities.
Linkages needed to be shown down to the subnational level through entities such as shuras and provincial- and district-level councils, which were often stood up with little regard for preexisting indigenous entities. Subnational government posts needed to be checked off as filled, regardless of the people chosen to fill them. Fotini Christia and Ruben Enikolopov explain in their research that it was not necessarily a pursuit of democratic principles that was a problem. Instead, the issue was the way the principles were pursued, with so little adaptation for the local context. One DOS official in Iraq shared that he even saw efforts to engage preexisting governance structures among the indigenous population (e.g., tribal governance) as contrary to the mission, arguing that by engaging informal leaders, the United States was delegitimizing the formal government institutions that it was attempting to implement.

When it came to development, in order to be seen as successful by their own agency standards, USAID personnel needed to show they were building things, executing programming, spending money, and managing budgets—regardless of impact on the population. A senior USAID official in Afghanistan explained this mind-set in 2011, stating that “in the past, development people in the field had a lot of leeway to do whatever it was they wanted. All they had to do was get somebody to take them out to a village, pick a few things that they could focus on over the course of their deployment, and hang their ornament on the Afghan Christmas tree.” USAID personnel operating at the subnational level were forbidden to give any direction to the USAID implementing partners that had been contracted by the agency’s offices in Kabul and Baghdad. This policy directly prevented adapting programming for local nuances. Similar to USAID, military development and reconstruction efforts were also mainly about building things, demonstrating action, and spending money (often referred to as burn rate)—regardless of the impact on stability and the behavior of the indigenous population.

Eventually, attempts were made to prioritize more population-centric impact. Coordinating efforts such as stability working groups in Afghanistan, which included Afghan nationals, and embedding provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) within military units across Iraq were meant to help with this. Nevertheless, even when these coordinating efforts were attempted, most personnel on the ground would find that their ability to contribute to population-centric endeavors was impeded by the inflexibility of their organizations and
agencies, which remained structured along the three primary lines of effort described above. Budgeting, incentive structures, training, education, standard operating procedures, and force structure simply did not change enough in most instances to accommodate the new population-centric approaches.35

In such an environment, an intelligence support system that focused on enhanced sociocultural analysis and developing a better understanding of population-centric issues could be rendered irrelevant. If an intelligence customer maintained a heavily kinetic, adversary-centric interpretation of the mission, without embracing a more comprehensive political strategy that addressed all root causes of insurgency, organizations conducting meaningful sociocultural analysis would not have been seen as having met the customer’s requirements. The fact that different members of interagency teams had such varied concepts of what the coalitions were trying to accomplish and how to achieve success made it difficult to develop relevant sociocultural analysis support. In such an environment, immediate, mainly threat-centric information requirements tend to take priority—to the detriment of the information needed to inform governance, development, and a more broadly focused grassroots political approach. This is not surprising, since in the absence of a clear mission and strategy, the study of issues like land right disputes, tribal dynamics, and local economics can seem peripheral to an analyst amid the rocket attacks, suicide bombings, IED strikes, and contact with insurgents that claimed the lives of so many US personnel.

**Barriers to Intelligence Fusion**

Even when useful sociocultural analysis became more readily available in Iraq and Afghanistan, barriers to fusion prevented the exploitation of this analysis for maximum benefit. Intelligence fusion is important because it leads to the development of a more comprehensive picture of the operational environment. When fusion of all pertinent intelligence and information is not achieved, operators and decision makers are forced to make less informed decisions.
Intelligence Fusion in Counterinsurgency

In US joint doctrine for intelligence, intelligence fusion is described as “a deliberate and consistent process of collecting and examining information from all available sources and intelligence disciplines to derive as complete an assessment as possible of detected activity. It draws on the complementary strengths of all intelligence disciplines, and relies on an all-source approach to intelligence collection and analysis.”36 For COIN the term fusion must place special emphasis on the combination of intelligence from all sources on relevant actors within the operational environment. Intelligence on the most common relevant actors has often been referred to in three color categories: white for the indigenous population; green for the host-nation government, including host-nation security forces; and red for more traditional forms of adversary-centric intelligence and intelligence used to support force protection and kinetic operations.

In COIN one must view the adversary as one aspect of a complex operational environment. Because of the highly political and population-centric nature of these types of conflicts, an adversary’s approach usually reaches beyond violence and into the social fabric of society. Only through a more comprehensive understanding of the operational environment that incorporates red, white, and green intelligence can a COIN force design an approach that is relevant to such a conflict. This is not to say that red intelligence is not important or that insurgent forces and other spoilers need not be captured or killed in such an operation. In fact, kinetic actions by a COIN force can be brutally violent and at times require the projection of massive force and intensive kinetic contact with the adversary. However, in COIN even highly kinetic activity must be part of a larger strategy to ensure a desired political impact that addresses root causes of the insurgency being countered.

In such operations, incorporation of sociocultural analysis during fusion is often crucial. In his book *Insurgency and Terrorism*, Bard O’Neill, professor at the US National War College, illustrates the importance of this through his discussion of what he calls “the human environment.” O’Neill explains that “although students of insurgency have devoted substantial attention to the physical attributes of the environment, the human dimension is even more important. Indeed it is here that one uncovers the causes, or so-called roots, of insurrections. Of primary interest are demography, socio-economic conditions,
political culture and the political system.” Nonmilitary capabilities of individual actors and insurgent groups and how they interact with the population and society must also be understood alongside their military capabilities. Only through this more comprehensive picture that fusion provides can intelligence better inform operations.

“Every Soldier [and Civilian] Is a Sensor”

The IC possesses tremendous human and technological assets capable of collecting massive amounts of detailed information on a range of topics. However, in many cases, the people with the most knowledge of the population and society at the local level are nonintelligence personnel. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, emphasizes that “COIN occurs in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment at all echelons. Commanders and staffs must coordinate intelligence collection and analysis with foreign militaries, foreign and US intelligence services, and other organizations.” Still, integration of potentially useful sociocultural information from all relevant members of the force did not always occur.

USAID, the DOS, the USDA, and other nonintelligence personnel working at the subnational level gained insights into white, green, and red topics that would not have been possible from traditional intelligence collection methods alone. In several instances, DOS employees and other nonintelligence personnel spent time mentoring provincial and district governors and other government officials. Some of these civilians worked among the local population, interacted with local officials on a regular basis, and in some cases, learned the language. These interactions often resulted in a rich understanding of local society within a given community that, if combined with intelligence from traditional intelligence entities, could have led to more complete understanding. Similarly, military civil affairs personnel in both countries at times developed deep knowledge of the population through their work with locals on various projects and their civil-military area assessments. Other entities like human terrain teams, counterinsurgency advisory and assistance teams, Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands program personnel, female engagement teams, British advisors from the defense cultural specialists unit, tactical psychological operations teams, special forces, foreign area officers, and the general purpose forces that made regular patrols through a given area all had valuable intelligence insights. Nevertheless, barriers
to fusion existed that prevented all relevant sociocultural information from being considered by those who would benefit from it.

**Challenges to Fusion in Iraq and Afghanistan**

Despite its importance, many issues stifled intelligence fusion in Iraq and Afghanistan. For instance, both operations illustrated the difficulty that the United States has with incorporating intelligence and information from interagency partners outside of the IC. In general, the lack of standard processes for sharing information was the most common interagency challenge to fusion—an issue that also applied to fusion of intelligence from coalition partner forces. Another interagency challenge, however, was the lack of trust in the interagency community. In some cases, the DOS and USAID personnel were unwilling to share information with the intelligence and military elements in their area of operation. This was mainly rooted in fears held by some DOS and USAID personnel that military and intelligence entities would take their information and use it to support kinetic operations in a manner deemed inappropriate by the civilian agencies. In particular, some USAID personnel believed that defense and intelligence agencies would not be sensitive to protecting identities of local sources of information and local implementing partners. In turn, some defense and intelligence personnel mistrusted the DOS and USAID, sometimes viewing these entities as antiwar and careless with classified information.41

Attempts to draw a distinction between information and intelligence based on ethical considerations established for social science also prevented fusion. This issue was most prominent following the creation of the US Army Human Terrain System (HTS), which embedded social scientists with military units to help improve understanding of sociocultural dynamics in Iraq and Afghanistan.42 The use of social science methodologies by HTS concerned some social scientists due to a perceived risk that HTS products could be used to inform lethal targeting, a clear violation of “do no harm” research ethics. There was also a concerted effort by program management to keep HTS from being absorbed by the IC, since this could prevent HTS from being completely accessible to the units they supported.43 Therefore, in the program’s formative years, many HTS personnel tried to paint their contributions as completely separate from intelli-
gence, often preventing the fusion of important sociocultural analysis with other intelligence.

Assessment practices across the interagency further impacted fusion. In their journal article entitled “Stability Operations: From Policy to Practice,” development experts James Derleth and Jason Alexander explain that the District Stability Framework (DSF) “identifies sources of instability, designs programs to mitigate them, and measures the effectiveness of the programming in stabilizing an area.”

Built into DSF are methods for developing improved situational awareness and understanding of the operating environment to inform this process. However, sociocultural analysis meant to inform DSF in Afghanistan was not always combined with more traditional adversary-centric intelligence. Also, because all civilian and military entities in a given area did not always champion DSF as the primary assessment and planning framework, different partners operating in the same area utilized multiple approaches in parallel to or instead of DSF (e.g., Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, Regional South Stabilization Approach, District Stability Assessment Tool, and in many cases, no organized approach at all). With limited formal mechanisms for pulling this information together, fusion often did not always occur.

Systems and methods were usually absent for comparing different perspectives, reconciling differences, and developing a shared baseline situational awareness from which to plan. As a result, different perspectives about local dynamics and drivers of stability and instability took root among different interagency partners. This challenged unity of effort among all entities conducting lethal and nonlethal activities, thus preventing the execution of a coherent political strategy moving forward.

Classification and access issues also stymied fusion. Multiple operating systems and several sets of rules and regulations for managing and sharing intelligence plagued the interagency and international nature of the coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Legal regulations for one agency or country did not apply for another, and at times, navigating the complexities of the bureaucracy was an insurmountable task. Classification and access issues were particularly difficult when attempting to fuse coalition intelligence with that of the indigenous security forces, especially when those security forces were thought to have been infiltrated by insurgents.
Even when dedicated fusion centers were stood up, the approach to fusion of white and green intelligence did not necessarily occur. The centers were challenged by the overly adversary-centric predisposition of intelligence organizations in support of military operations, which did not prioritize the population-centric nature of the mission. The governance- and development-related sociocultural analyses generated by Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC) teams were often excluded or ignored in Afghanistan fusion centers, for instance. In Iraq, even when disparate intelligence entities were consolidated into fusion centers, tactical success killing and capturing insurgents usually took priority over informing the broader COIN mission, especially in the earlier years. Gen Stanley McChrystal illustrated the limitations of such an approach and the progression that took place, recognizing that sociocultural analysis and addressing the root causes of insurgency would be critical:

In Iraq, when we first started, the question was, “Where is the enemy?” That was the intelligence question. As we got smarter, we started to ask, “Who is the enemy?” And we thought we were pretty clever. And then we realized that wasn’t the right question, and we asked, “What’s the enemy doing or trying to do?” And it wasn’t until we got further along that we said, “Why are they the enemy?” Not until you walk yourself along that intellectual path do you realize that’s what you have to understand, particularly in a counterinsurgency where the number of insurgents is completely independent of simple math. In World War II, the German army could produce x number of military-aged males. In an insurgency, the number of insurgents isn’t determined by the population, but by how many people want to be insurgents. And so figuring out why they want to be insurgents is crucial. And that’s something we had never practiced.

The more recent conceptualization of intelligence into separate categories has also been detrimental to intelligence fusion. Ben Connable, a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, explains, “Treating complex environments, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, as a system that can be broken into simply labeled component parts leads analysts to make unhelpful and logically unsound assumptions regarding human identity. These assumptions, in turn, undermine analytic effectiveness. Instead of fusing available information in a way that accurately reflects the inherently complex ‘shades-of-gray’ ground truth, military analysts—influenced by systems analysis and conventional military doctrine—often channel their thinking and efforts into three artificially color-coded categories: red, white, and green.” The failure to properly fuse information that
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was categorized according to system or color posed devastating risks for the accuracy of analysis. So too did the act of categorization itself. For instance, a district government official might have various ties to insurgent elements, a series of forthright relationships with different villages in the district, and formalized relationships with provincial and national government officials—all while being paid under the table for assistance to the drug trade. Analysis of only the white and green aspects of this scenario or only the political and economic systems of the environment, in isolation of adversary systems, would risk missing the complete picture. This in turn would then lead to only partially informed decision making. In many instances, both Iraqi and Afghan leaders chose to play both sides for maximum benefit, acting as insurgents one day and as seemingly competent coalition partners the next. Many cases also occurred where individuals appeared to be cooperating with the enemy by choice, but in reality, this cooperation was due to destabilizing security or economic issues, as opposed to being driven by individual loyalties. Categorization and poor fusion in cases like this made identifying the true nature of actors among the indigenous population extremely difficult.

From Sociocultural Analysis to Increased Understanding

British doctrine explains that enhanced understanding is “the ability to place knowledge in its wider context to provide us with options for decision-making. In the national context, understanding underpins the decision-making process that informs the application of national power. It also enables us to understand the implications of our decisions for our adversaries, allies or bystanders.” Understanding is a critical component when identifying realistic ends, ways, and means for operations. For sociocultural analysis to be useful, it needs to enhance understanding by operators and decision makers during planning, execution, and assessment of operations. However, best practices for dissemination and knowledge management of sociocultural analysis were slow to emerge. Thus, improvements in sociocultural analysis did not necessarily lead to more developed understanding.
Making Sociocultural Intelligence Analysis Useful to Consumers

New intelligence requirements eventually generated increases in sociocultural intelligence, which poured in at all levels of command. Different customers had different requirements. A battalion commander in the Zhari District of Kandahar Province, for instance, had different requirements than the Regional Command–South commander or the International Security Assistance Force commander. Similarly, DOS officials working at district support teams (DST), PRTs, regional platforms, and embassy levels all needed different intelligence to do their jobs, with some overlap.

It was not well understood how best to ensure that the increased sociocultural analysis would lead to the right types of products for the right people or how to guarantee it would be properly integrated into decision making for operations. In their article “Integrating Intelligence and Information,” brothers Lt Gen Michael Flynn and Brig Gen Charles Flynn explain that part of the problem is that integration has a different meaning for the intelligence community than it has for the operational community. The intelligence community sees integration with two components (collection and analysis), while the operational community seeks an outcome, an action, a result from the enormous amount of collection and analysis it performs.

The intelligence community must align its thinking with those who have to decide or execute the findings from collection and analysis. Think of it as a three-legged stool. The intelligence community has responsibility for two of these legs, when in fact, the third is the most important and least understood inside the broader intelligence community.51

With efforts to improve sociocultural analysis, measures of performance often took primacy (e.g., reporting of information on the population stored within a database or information system), with less attention paid to measures of effectiveness (e.g., disseminating the right information to the right people, in an easily accessible and digestible format and in a manner that would ensure incorporation into the correct phases of a decision-making process for improved planning and execution of operations). Rebecca Zimmerman captures this state of affairs in Afghanistan in her article “Know Thine Enemy.” She claims that “the greatest portion of information needed to sufficiently understand Afghan population dynamics is known but acted
on in ways that are not effective. . . . Granular information is transferred from the warrior on the ground to higher echelons. . . . But to date, this process has simply involved reporting events and information in ever-greater numbers. . . . [As a result], military staffs are buried to their necks in information without ever being able to cultivate the understanding possessed by those on the front lines.”52

Although higher echelons of command often need to understand broader contextual issues and societal dynamics, they do not necessarily need to know every single detail about the population in a given operational area. Decades of COIN research have highlighted the necessity for what has been referred to as “mission command,” which calls for more decentralized command structure—with responsibility for specifics of operations delegated more to field level. It is certainly a commander’s job to provide left and right limits in providing guidance, based on a general understanding of key contextual issues, but the level of detail required at the higher levels of command is usually far less than that at lower levels—where soldiers and civilians are charged with tailoring operations to suit the local context. A former SOIC analyst in Afghanistan says that what the higher levels of command need are “the bigger, overarching assessments which give them puzzle pieces that they can then fit together with other similar assessments coming from units/groups in other geographic areas.”53 In a related statement, Zimmerman goes on to explain how information overload to a command staff can have negative implications: “This creates a twofold problem: It is assumed, on the one hand, that the increasing information must be mastered in order to act and, on the other, that processing all of this information equals understanding the population. While lip service is paid to the primacy of the commander on the ground, a false sense of understanding at higher echelons often enables micromanagement.”54

Knowledge Management and Information Technology

Early on in the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, reports often cited limitations in knowledge management and information technology (KMIT) resources as an impediment to intelligence storage and sharing. However, eventually the more pressing challenge became the overabundance of costly and disparate systems, which made leveraging this intelligence difficult. As the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan matured, some preexisting and many new IT solutions
were introduced to assist with the collation, analysis, storage, management, and dissemination of information—with the goal of improving accessibility to consumers. Different civilian and military entities had diverse pots of money, distinct chains of command, and different perceived immediate needs, leading to an uncoordinated and ad hoc proliferation of many KMIT tools. Data uploaded on one system was often not shared with and/or legally transferable to others. Each system brought its own set of operating instructions and regulations. The DOS, USAID, the DOD, the USDA, various intelligence agencies, and the corresponding agencies of our international allies all had unique reporting and information management requirements, inside and outside of theater.

Instead of making this situation a planning factor prior to deployment, units and teams continued to arrive in theater without a plan for navigating the complex KMIT environment. As a result, massive duplications of effort and financial waste took place. An epidemic of stovepiping and access challenges unfolded. In Afghanistan for instance, PRT and DST reporting on governance, development, and political situations at the subnational level was carried out differently in each province. Information was housed on different portals and websites—each requiring different procedures for access. In fact, key intelligence offices working Afghanistan and Pakistan issues, including the DIA AF/Pak Task Force in the Pentagon, did not gain regular access to the reporting of these teams until early 2011, almost a decade after the first PRT was fielded in Afghanistan.

Systems for updating the analysis that had been conducted in the past were also lacking. Outdated and incorrect intelligence was occasionally used to inform operations. For instance, operators at times sought partnerships with tribal leaders previously identified as key leaders—only to find these individuals had since been killed, had moved away, or had shifted allegiances. In many instances, hard-won important intelligence was simply lost. It was this situation that led many, in years past, to utter a version of the common criticism that Iraq and Afghanistan are “where databases go to die.”

**Overreliance on Technology and the Human Element**

An overreliance on technology hindered the utilization of socio-cultural analysis for maximum benefit. A 2005 field test of a computer program called Cultural Preparation of the Environment (CPE)
is indicative of this problem. CPE was developed to “provide command-ers on the ground with a tool that [would] allow them to understand operationally relevant aspects of local culture; the ethno-religious, tribal and other divisions within Iraqi society; and the interests and leaders of these groups.” After field testing CPE in Iraq, Steve Fondacaro, the retired Army colonel in charge of evaluating the program’s performance, drew the following three conclusions:

First, brigade staffs were already overloaded with gadgets that they had no time to learn, manage, or employ. Thus, the CPE in its current form was likely to become an expensive footrest. Second, military personnel did not have sufficient baseline knowledge to enable them to validate the information and derive the conclusions needed to develop courses of action within the staff decision cycle. Third, military units needed embedded social scientists on their staffs who could do research, derive lessons learned from the unit’s experience, and apply them to the development of effective nonlethal courses of action that would make sense to the population.

In reality, social scientists and formal social science methodology are less necessary to understand population dynamics than has been argued by some. Social science is, after all, just one tool of many at the disposal of the interagency force that can be useful to understanding the population and society in a given area. Yet Colonel Fondacaro, who currently serves as a senior operations trainer (G3) at the consulting firm Knowledge Point, makes a sound observation that personnel in the field often lacked the capacity to spend time working with multiple computer databases and extracting information for use in the decision-making process, which prevented the force from achieving maximum benefit from all available intelligence.

Units did experiment with the integration of sociocultural analysts into planning processes. Many commanders in the field saw this as useful, as the analysts were directly able to inject their expertise into the planning process on a regular basis. Those with a strong understanding of operationally relevant sociocultural issues were useful participants in civil affairs, information operations, and other working groups, helping to ensure operations and messaging were suitable for the local context and advising on potential second- and third-order effects. Unfortunately, this type of integration did not take place for the most part in any meaningful way across Iraq and Afghanistan until later on in each conflict. Even when this did occur, it did not always play out in any deliberate or organized fashion.
The lack of focus on the human elements of knowledge handover across deployments also prevented sociocultural analysis from being exploited for maximum understanding. As different units and individuals deployed in and out of theater on different time schedules, limited attention was given to the transferring of pertinent sociocultural knowledge during military right-seat-ride exercises and turnover of civilian positions. The handover of electronic databases and disks with sociocultural data was not enough to mitigate the loss of continuity, corporate memory, and relationships of influence with the indigenous population as units and individual personnel deployed and redeployed in and out of theater. This issue was particularly destructive to the relationship between the US government and relevant actors within the indigenous population, who were bewildered by repeated questions about sociocultural aspects of their neighborhoods each time a new US individual or team arrived. Frustrated by the disorganized mass of thousands of electronic documents he received upon arriving in theater, a medical officer who had worked with the indigenous population on health issues in Kandahar shared his frustration. He argued that the main obstacles to continuity of effort were the lack of a formalized process and the fact that continuity tended to be thought about at the end of a deployment as opposed to being made a priority from the start.58

Recruiting and Training

The increased emphasis on sociocultural analysis required additional personnel with different expertise than those previously sought for intelligence support to operations. Preexisting frameworks for recruitment and legacy training and education programs were not suitable for placing the right people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) for sociocultural analysis in appropriate positions. In fact, the “right people” was an ambiguous concept in itself, since personnel qualifications for sociocultural analysis were never specifically identified for either conflict.

Recruiting

A 2011 Director of National Intelligence–sponsored study highlights the importance of recruiting to adaptation of the IC for twenty-
first-century requirements. The study states that “recruitment and selection is [sic] especially important because the quality of the HR pool assembled in this first step facilitates or constrains an organization’s subsequent ability to build and develop its workforce. A failure to maximize the talent pool at this step cannot be rectified by subsequent efforts.” Despite this recognition, requirements for sociocultural analysis in Iraq and Afghanistan were passed to HR departments that had been prepared for an entirely different mission. The defense and intelligence communities were bursting at the seams with highly qualified intelligence operators and analysts experienced in working with adversary-centric intelligence. Regardless, the standing up of new entities like HTS and the SOICs, as well as the adjustment of preexisting organizations for new requirements, implied a need to recruit personnel with different backgrounds and expertise. One senior intelligence officer says that “80 percent of useful operational data for counterinsurgency does not come from legacy intelligence disciplines. . . . Good intelligence on counterinsurgency exists outside the traditional intelligence organizations. Anthropological, sociocultural, historical, human geographical, educational, public health, and many other types of social and behavioral science data and information are needed to develop a deep understanding of populations.”

Government agencies had limited personnel with relevant language skills and expertise in studying foreign societies. In many cases, contractors were brought in to fill the new personnel requirements, often with individuals who were ill-suited for these new positions. Commonly, the primary recruiting method for contractors and government agencies for specialty positions was to post job announcements on websites. Although candidates with experience in defense or intelligence would know to search certain websites to find job postings, many people with advanced KSAs relevant to the new requirements were not necessarily tied into the defense communities, and therefore, they never knew the jobs existed. Computer systems and inexperienced government HR personnel often prematurely weeded out qualified candidates who did know the jobs existed and applied, simply because these systems and personnel did not detect enough of job-specific buzz words in the candidates’ resumes. Various agencies sent recruiters out to job fairs and universities for general recruitment efforts, but recruiting specifically for this specialized work was not the norm.
Contractors bore some of the responsibility for providing inadequate personnel, but government agencies that drafted the contract requirements and position descriptions were equally at fault. Understanding of populations and societies for COIN had not been much more than an afterthought in most cases until the shift to COIN approaches in Iraq and Afghanistan, and many government officials responsible for the contracts did not know what was needed to fill these new roles most effectively. Therefore, many of the position descriptions and hiring qualifications lacked specifics that would facilitate hiring the best candidates for the job.

Quality control measures regarding hiring were also limited. Forcing functions were commonly absent for contractors and government HR offices to distinguish between an advanced degree from a top-tier university and a degree from a bottom-rung university. Requirements for interviews and reference checks were not always enforced, to the extent they were not written into contracts at all, so employees were often hired with very little screening. This led to hiring of people with disqualifying physical ailments, uncooperative temperaments, clear personality disorders, dubious qualifications, or track records of poor performance in the workplace who might have otherwise been passed over. As long as contractors and government HR systems could check the boxes and say that they met the minimum standards, they were clear of any potential backlash from hiring substandard performers.

Training

In the past, the typical training and education of many intelligence and nonintelligence personnel had little relevance to understanding foreign populations. Few intelligence personnel had actually spent time supporting COIN or stabilization missions, and only a limited number had worked in, lived in, or studied countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Many analytical methodologies for adversary-centric intelligence that were employed by intelligence professionals and taught in the intelligence schoolhouses were not suitable for new requirements, and new approaches had to be developed. Military intelligence schools and other intelligence training programs were slow to adapt and to incorporate lessons from the field. This meant that many of the intelligence personnel tasked with sociocultural requirements had not been trained to do more in the sociocultural realm than fill
out spreadsheets that categorized some pertinent data in the proper boxes using doctrinal frameworks such as political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) and areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE).

As training and education programs worked to adjust, such efforts were complicated by ambiguity over what KSAs needed to be satisfied prior to recruitment, which ones needed to be developed in training and education programs, and what expertise could only be developed once working on the job. Confusion over how much training and education should focus on culture, history, language, COIN theory, and so forth was never resolved. Flexibility was not built into contracts for training, which meant that even when necessary KSAs became clear, or when additional needs were identified as a result of shifting dynamics in theater, the old contracts could not be adapted fast enough to meet new requirements.61

Considerations for the Design and Conduct of Future Operations

The following considerations are worthy of attention from those charged with the design and conduct of future COIN and stabilization operations. This list is by no means comprehensive. Also, this list should be read with the recognition that every conflict scenario is different. The US interagency footprint will tend to vary widely in size, role, and construct depending on the circumstances, and therefore, incorporation of these considerations must be tailored, as appropriate, for each individual conflict.

Respond to Current and Perceived Future Priorities

It must not be assumed that preexisting intelligence support architectures are flexible enough for all operations. Intelligence support must be planned and adjusted for current and perceived future intelligence priorities. Great care should be taken to ensure that intelligence capabilities developed to address past intelligence priorities are suitable for the operational approach being pursued and that capability gaps are filled where appropriate. A little more work on the front end figuring out what will be required moving forward, what will be needed system-wide to meet those requirements, and how to incorporate flexibility
into the system to account for an ever-changing operational environment can pay large dividends in developing the right force structure.

**Demand Clear Shared Understanding of Mission, Strategy, and End State**

Clarity of mission, strategy, and desired end state for an operation enhances the ability to meet intelligence requirements in support of operations. It also helps defense and intelligence organizations better understand what sociocultural analysis is operationally relevant. Future operations must ensure that the mission, strategy, and desired end state are clear and that intelligence support architectures are established to support these clearly defined concepts.

**Management Is Just as Important as Leadership**

Many of the problems with sociocultural analysis could have been avoided if strong management of the conflicts had been employed. There is often a focus in high-level positions of government on the need for strong leadership. However, good managers are needed with the skills to identify the desired end state and then backward plan based on a theory of change rooted in sound intermediate objectives and logical approaches to staffing and resourcing. Of specific importance, managers and leaders must ensure that incentives, training, standard operating procedures, and force structure are adapted appropriately for the mission. Only then can a force truly adapt to new requirements for operationally relevant sociocultural analysis.62

**Develop a System for Fusion That Works**

Future operations should be planned with a system in place for the fusion of information on the adversary, the host-nation government (including its security forces), and the indigenous population present in the area of operations into an evolving holistic framework. Great care should be taken not to degrade important ongoing intelligence activities. The system for fusion must also incorporate relevant contributions from all intelligence and nonintelligence entities and disciplines. Fusion helps lead to better-informed planning, execution, and assessment of operations. Furthermore, fusion helps facilitate unity of effort through helping develop shared situational awareness among interagency teams from which to plan.
Ensure Continuity of Effort

As units, teams, and individuals deploy and redeploy in and out of theater, continuity of effort and maintenance of corporate memory regarding sociocultural analysis already conducted must be prioritized. The common description of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts as a series of "one-year wars" is a relatively accurate explanation of what took place. However, it is an oversimplification in that what transpired was actually more chaotic. Different civilian and military personnel deployed for different periods of time and not all at once over a single year. This issue is an inevitable friction point in war, but strategies must be developed to mitigate the challenges to sociocultural analysis created by staff turnover, which are much more detrimental in COIN than in conventional military operations.

Intelligence for COIN and Stabilization Is an Interagency Responsibility

Intelligence support to COIN must be seen as an interagency task that is more than just the responsibility of intelligence personnel. It must incorporate relevant intelligence and information from international allies and coalition partners to the extent such data exist. It also must incorporate relevant contributions from host-nation government officials and security forces, as these personnel tend to understand their areas much better than a third-party force.

Make Sociocultural Analysis Beneficial to Consumers

Producers and consumers of intelligence must develop a better understanding of the types of intelligence that are required at the various levels of civilian and military command and how to disseminate and integrate intelligence at all levels for maximum benefit during the planning and execution of operations. It is not enough to simply improve intelligence support to operations under the blanket requirement of enhancing sociocultural analysis. Intelligence support architectures must be structured in a way that ensures the right people get the right information in a suitable format within an appropriate timeframe.
Incorporate Analysts into Planning, Execution, and Assessment

In order to improve integration of sociocultural analysis into planning, execution, and assessment of operations, it is critical to include analysts with sociocultural expertise in these processes. Having personnel with an understanding of the population and society involved in both kinetic and nonkinetic processes helps ensure that operationally relevant population-centric considerations are better accounted for in all activities of the counterinsurgent force.

Understand the Limits of Technology

Designers of future intelligence architectures for COIN must be wary of overreliance on technology solutions. The various units and interagency teams that benefit from sociocultural analysis lack the time and, in many situations, the access to make efficient use of too many data repositories and systems. Information in databases also grows outdated and is not always updated. There is also a limit to how much understanding can be gained from accessing databases.

Plan for and Tackle the Challenge of Multiple Databases and IT Solutions

As planning for future operations occurs, the number of databases and information management systems should be limited to the very minimum number required. Arranging accessibility of the databases for all cleared interagency partners is also important. Although leaders should limit the number of databases, one single database or system will never meet all requirements. Leaders should also follow the advice of a senior intelligence official serving in Afghanistan who stated that “the number of databases and operating systems could certainly be reduced, but multiple databases and systems must become a planning factor rather than something that catches people off guard when they arrive [in theater].”

KMIT Acquisition Requires Strong, Thoughtful Management

The guiding principle for KMIT acquisition in future conflicts must be a system of systems approach, rooted in strong leadership and management. Leaders must educate themselves on the nature of the true requirements of the force, as well as the preexisting KMIT
systems, before making decisions on acquisition of new products. Only then can the duplication of effort, illogical approaches, and waste that occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan be avoided for KMIT. For any KMIT solution to be effective, the proper utilization of KMIT tools must be incorporated into training, personnel performance requirements, and rating systems as a forcing function toward personnel compliance with established norms.

**Recruiting and Human Resources Must Be Updated**

HR departments must be forced to quickly adapt when a campaign requires personnel with KSAs that do not exist in the IC. At a minimum, future attempts to staff positions for sociocultural analysis require a careful assessment of what KSAs are needed for each job. Contracts must be written with forcing functions that ensure contractors and government HR departments will provide acceptable personnel in each position. Hanging job announcements on websites and general agency recruiting at job fairs are not effective ways to recruit the right people for specialized sociocultural analysis positions. A system is also needed for moving new hires that are critical to operations ahead of noncritical personnel for security clearance and other predeployment processing.

**Adapt Training for the Conflict at Hand, While Maintaining Flexibility**

Great care needs to be taken to ensure training and education develops the KSAs needed for support to operations. Legacy training programs do not necessarily meet new requirements, and contracts for trainers must be written in a manner that promotes adaptation of training to the realities of a dynamic campaign. It needs to be made clear from the start what attributes a candidate must have prior to joining the organization, what skills a candidate should gain in training, and what expertise a candidate can only gain once on the ground in theater. Only then can a training program be crafted appropriately.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to move beyond the now generally accepted premise that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan required
greater emphasis on understanding the indigenous population. It has focused on analyzing systemic barriers and capturing key issues to ensure future planning builds on past experience instead of starting from scratch. It is unclear whether improvements on any of the issues mentioned above would have changed outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both operations were highly complex endeavors that would have challenged even the most prepared COIN force. At the very least, however, the development of true solutions to the sociocultural analysis gap across the force would have meant that the United States was prepared to support the population-centric COIN and stabilization strategy many leaders claimed to be pursuing.

Many efforts were eventually made throughout the course of both operations that resulted in progress on the issues highlighted above. This was especially true of efforts by fusion centers in the later stages of both operations, which in many instances worked to better combine red, white, green, and blue information in a manner that sometimes resulted in more informed decision making. Future operations may benefit specifically by the yet to be captured lessons from the fusion center in Afghanistan's Regional Command–East. The “Regional Information Fusion Center” reportedly improved fusion there by incorporating traditional red-layer analysts, signals analysts, human intelligence personnel, and imagery analysts with governance and development analysts. Also included were corruption analysts, negative and positive influencer analysts, atmospherics reporters, and HTS personnel. One fusion center analyst shared that “this approach has worked a lot towards providing a holistic view of all the layers of RC-East.”

Despite some improvements, in most cases solutions were the product of what many call “building an airplane in flight.” Some attempted solutions were helpful, and some others were unnecessary and even counterproductive. Most stopped short of institutional fixes representative of standardized best practices. Connable expressed his concern about this issue in a 2009 article covering DOD efforts to develop what he labeled “inorganic” solutions to the sociocultural analysis problem. He writes that there are two approaches to filing the sociocultural analysis gap. The first is what he calls “comprehensive change.” In this approach, the military would “take all the criticism of military cultural training and intelligence analysis to heart, applying recent doctrine to long-term knowledge and cultural terrain analysis programs. Forcing the services to view the cultural terrain as a co-
equal element of military terrain—without abandoning core warfighting capabilities—would ensure the kind of all-inclusive focus on culture that the Army and Marine Corps applied to maneuver warfare theory in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{65} The other approach would be to create “an immediate solution in the form of nonorganic personnel, new equipment, and the direct application of external academic support.”\textsuperscript{66} Writing specifically about the HTS, Connable states that it “essentially adds a quick-fix layer of social science expertise and contracted reach back capability to combatant staffs. This ‘build a new empire’ proposal is based on the assumption that staffs are generally incapable of solving complex cultural problems on their own.”\textsuperscript{67} The latter approach appears to be the method of choice for many efforts to improve population-centric capabilities, as exemplified by the creation of the many ad hoc teams and programs meant to either better understand sociocultural factors or improve population-centric impact: HTTs, PRTs, DSTs, AF/PAK Hands, cultural support teams, and female engagement teams.

Despite the ad hoc inorganic approaches of the past, there is evidence that some producers and consumers of intelligence are in the process of developing more normalized institutional capabilities. Recently, sociocultural analysis has been given increased attention within the US armed forces as part of the discussion on the “human domain” in warfare. In their white paper for the US military’s Strategic Land Power Task Force, Gen Raymond Odierno, US Army; Gen James Amos, USMC; and Adm William McRaven, US Navy, explain that “given the fundamental premise that people are the center of all national engagements, it is equally self-evident that war, or more broadly, conflict, is also an inherently human endeavor.”\textsuperscript{68} They argue that the human domain is present in every conflict, and it is currently being discussed as a sixth domain of warfare. In their work for the task force, Frank Hoffman and Thomas X. Hammes have defined the human domain as “the aggregate of the moral, cognitive, social, and physical aspects of human populations in conflict. It includes the interrelationships of socio-economic, cognitive, and physical aspects of human activity in the operational environment.”\textsuperscript{69} The DOD has also championed many other sociocultural analysis developments across the IC through the work of the Defense Intelligence Sociocultural Capabilities Council. Furthermore, US Central Command developed its own intelligence cell for sociocultural analysis, and US Special Operations Command has developed a human engagement strategy
and is working on integrating human domain concepts into its force development efforts. Human geography has emerged as a doctrinal concept in the geospatial intelligence field. Additionally, as director of DIA, General Flynn coauthored another article that reveals his appetite to reform defense intelligence for improved institutional sociocultural analysis. The authors write,

Hard lessons learned during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterterrorist operations across continents, and the Arab Spring all contributed to a growing recognition within the IC of the importance of understanding the “human terrain” of operating environments. DOD, its Service branches and combatant commands, and the broader IC responded to the demand for sociocultural analysis (SCA) by creating organizations such as the Defense Intelligence Socio-Cultural Capabilities Council, Human Terrain System, and US Central Command’s Human Terrain Analysis Branch, among others. For large bureaucracies, DOD and the IC reacted agilely to the requirement, but the robust SCA capabilities generated across the government over the last decade were largely operationally and tactically organized, resourced, and focused. What remains is for the IC to formulate a strategic understanding of SCA and establish a paradigm for incorporating it into the intelligence process.70

For the IC and broader interagency community to make sense of the past and prepare for the future, more than a leader is required. A true manager is needed to develop an approach that supports future sociocultural analysis requirements for COIN and other operations. As one intelligence official remarked in 2011, “My contention is that in order to support whole of government operations across the interagency and with allies, we need a football coach. There are too many people in pockets around the defense IC, defense planning community, COCOM [combatant command] staffs, the CIA, USAID, State INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research], HIU [Humanitarian Information Unit] that are doing amazing work and probably most of you are pulling your hair out going, who’s actually synchronizing us?”71

If acted upon, many of the lessons and observations from Iraq and Afghanistan require broad sweeping reforms that are likely outside the ability of most agencies to handle on their own. Management of this process requires the ability to reach across several US intelligence and nonintelligence agencies to coordinate improvements in the IC and the intelligence customer base. It also requires the ability for innovation while navigating the realities of preexisting bureaucracy.

Hard decisions will have to be made about what to cut and what to retain, taking great care not to degrade other intelligence capabilities
that remain necessary but that do not relate to COIN or sociocultural analysis. Legacy intelligence methodologies and social science disciplines will need to be reviewed to determine best practices for operationally relevant sociocultural analysis. These are daunting tasks in the face of decades-old status quos. Rice bowls will be threatened, and floodgates will be opened for others to take advantage. Through tailoring careful analysis of past successes and failures to future national security challenges, the US government can and must develop the systems and practices necessary for operationally relevant sociocultural analysis for COIN and other operations. If the United States has learned anything in recent conflicts, it is that the need for this more comprehensive, mission-relevant understanding of the operational environment can no longer be ignored.

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 November 2013, now conceptualizes action against the root causes of insurgency as simultaneously addressing the opportunity, motive, and means of an insurgency, using both lethal and nonlethal tools of state power.

2. This chapter embraces the explanation of relevant actors published in the 2013 revised version of JP 3-24, which explains on page IV-2 that in counterinsurgency the most important component of the OE [operational environment] are the relevant actors. These include the population, the COIN force, the HN government, and the insurgents. Other relevant actors may include supporting state actors and non-state actors (e.g., transnational terrorist or criminal organizations) and/or the NGO community. By first understanding who the relevant actors are and learning as much as possible about them, the JFC develops an approach that may influence the actors’ decision-making and behavior (active or passive) in a way that is consistent with the desired end state of the operation. In a COIN environment, individuals may fit into more than one category of actor (e.g., a tribal leader may also work as a district governor, while also working behind the scenes to provide financial and material support to the insurgency).

3. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Decade of War, vol. 1, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of War, Joint Staff J7 publication (Suffolk, VA: JCOA, June 2012), 3.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.


7. The relevance of sociocultural analysis has been poorly explained in the past. However, see Christopher J. Lamb, James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies, and
Theodore T. Pikulsky, “The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 70, no. 3 (2013), 26, in which the research team notes that to explain HTT performance, it is first necessary to explain why commanders typically rated HTTs more highly than the people who managed or studied them did, and second, to identify the optimum role HTTs could play in an integrated cultural intelligence architecture. It is clear that the large majority of commanders thought their HTTs were useful. However, it is not immediately apparent why commanders valued HTTs (or not).

To determine levels of commander expectations for HTT performance, we categorized commander praise and criticisms of HTTs according to three levels of cultural knowledge previously postulated by some subject matter experts. The levels roughly equate to the social science objectives of accurate description, explanation, and prediction:

First level: Cultural awareness. Basic familiarity with language and religion and an understanding and observance of local norms and boundaries. This roughly equates to good description of human terrain. It was often observed by commanders that such description is needed at the tactical level, down to battalion and company levels if not below.

Second level: Cultural understanding. The “why” of behavior embodied in perceptions, mind sets, attitudes, and customs. This roughly equates to explanation of human behaviors. Perhaps because brigade commanders were the focus of interviews, it is not surprising that this level of understanding, which presumably is important at all levels, was emphasized at the brigade level.

Third level: Cultural intelligence. The implications of these behaviors and their drivers. This roughly equates to anticipation of popular behavior. The ability to anticipate reactions can shape theater-level decisionmaking.

8. Until September 2013, a clear definition of what sociocultural analysis was and the purpose that it served was not available in any widely circulated US government document. This in itself served as a hindrance to the development of enhanced sociocultural analysis capabilities.


11. Ibid., viii.


14. This observation is rooted in various discussions among the author and DIA and CIA personnel (currently serving and retired) between 2011 and 2013. (unattributed)

15. This paragraph was informed by anonymous discussions with a SOIC team leader from Afghanistan and written comments from the former HTS senior social scientist, Montgomery McFate.


18. Ibid.


20. CCO Iraq and Afghanistan interview database. The database consists of over 200 interviews with military and civilian US personnel who served in Iraq and Afghanistan.

21. Interview with senior DOS official, by the author, Washington, DC, November 2011. (unattributed interview)

22. JCOA, Decade of War, 4–5.


24. This observation is based on the author’s own observations while serving in Iraq and the author’s analysis of many comments shared during interview transcripts in the CCO Iraq and Afghanistan interview database.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. The assertions in this section are certainly generalizations. It should not be forgotten that many individuals, groups, and units did attempt to pursue efforts that were more tailored to the local context and appropriate for the nature of the conflict. Rajiv Chandrasekaran wrote an article about one such individual, Dr. Carter Malkasian, who worked multiple years with the Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan, learning to speak local languages and facilitating population-centric impacts of value. Interestingly though, Malkasian was not a career state official at the time. In fact, senior career state officials, who were interviewed by this author, viewed his efforts as a violation of the rules for DOS officials serving in the field. The contributions of the USAID Office of Civil Military Coordination, the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, and the USAID stabilization unit in Kabul are all examples of USAID attempts to adapt to more population-centric and stabilization-focused approaches. However, the resources and manpower devoted to each were minimal, compared to those of the main USAID development mission. Those organizations were also often seen as the red-headed stepchildren by the main offices of the organization, which had little motivation for straying from their traditional national development model. Contrary to most general purpose forces, the US special forces were particularly adaptable for local nuance and the population-centric nature of the conflict, especially once the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police program developed more formally following several other smaller-scale attempts to develop local defense forces. At the end of the day, it is hard to judge the success or failure of any of these organizations and individuals, since the main contributing offices of civilian and
military organizations (military general purpose forces, main DOS, and main USAID) did not adapt in any comprehensive manner.

29. This observation is based on the author’s own observations while serving in Iraq and the author’s analysis of many comments shared during interview transcripts in the CCO Iraq and Afghanistan interview database.


31. Ibid.

32. CCO Iraq and Afghanistan interview database. 33. Interview with a senior USAID official, by the author, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2011. (unattributed interview)

34. This observation is based on the author’s own observations while serving in Iraq and the author’s analysis of many comments shared during interview transcripts in the CCO Iraq and Afghanistan interview database.

35. Categorizing precursors for adaptation in this manner was informed by the unpublished 2013 PhD dissertation of Iraq veteran Joshua S. Jones of American University titled “Protecting the Mission: The Case of the Army.”


39. Although the DOS has its own limited intelligence capabilities through INR, the DOS in this paper refers to non-INR personnel. The DOS personnel referred to in this paper are mainly those serving at the embassies and those serving in the field, working at the subnational level in Iraq and Afghanistan.


41. This observation is based on the author’s personal experiences in Iraq and on discussions between the author and civilian and military personnel in Afghanistan during an April 2011 research trip.

43. Informed by a comment by former HTS senior social scientist, Montgomery McFate, who witnessed and engaged in many US government discussions about the HTS relationship with the IC.

44. James W. Derleth and Jason S. Alexander, “Stability Operations: From Policy to Practice,” PRISM 2, no. 3 (June 2011), 128. See the chapter by Jason S. Alexander, James W. Derleth, and Sloan Mann in this publication for a more thorough description of DSF.

45. A major improvement in Afghanistan came in the form of stability working groups, in which interagency partners would meet regularly, eventually also with Afghan partners, to share information and develop collaborative approaches toward stabilization.

46. Feedback from SOIC analyst in 2012 on earlier drafts of this paper.


49. This concept was informed by a presentation at the 7th Annual Lessons Learned Conference, hosted at National Defense University, 30 November–2 December 2011. Panelists presented under Chatham House Rule for nonattribution.


53. SOIC analyst, recently returned from serving in Afghanistan, discussion with author, February 2012. (unattributed)

54. Zimmerman, “Know Thine Enemy.”

55. Author interviews with task force and PRT members in Washington, DC, and Kandahar respectively, 2011. (unattributed interviews)


58. Interview with a medical officer, by the author, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 2011. (unattributed interview)


61. The author made these observations while working in Iraq, serving in the Human Terrain System training directorate, and again during lessons learned research on training for Afghanistan at the Department of State Foreign Service Institute.


63. Intelligence fusion center leadership, interview by the author, Afghanistan, April 2011. (unattributed interview)

64. HTS social scientist, interview by the author, 2011. (unattributed interview)


66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.


71. Statement made by a presenter at a March 2011 event at National Defense University entitled “Interagency Human Terrain Projects and Programs.” All presentations and discussions were unclassified but held under Chatham House Rule for nonattribution.
Improvisation characterized many aspects of the civilian-military rebuilding experience in Iraq. For want of established management architecture to execute stabilization and reconstruction operations (SRO), the United States established a series of temporary offices to satisfy the exigent demands of the ever-evolving Iraq mission. This array of offices, amounting to an “acronymic adhocracy,” became necessary because the US government then lacked an existing capacity to plan and manage contingency reconstruction operations. It still lacks it today.

The first ad hoc office was the short-lived Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, followed quickly by its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which existed for 13 months and created many new temporary offices like the Program Management Office (PMO). The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) succeeded the PMO. A Department of Defense (DOD)–run entity, the PCO sought, with limited success, to work with the Department of State’s (DOS) Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. The latter was succeeded by the Iraq Transition Assistance Office, which, in turn, was succeeded by the Iraq Strategic Partnership Office. This mash-up of ad hoc offices and their frequently short-shrifted projects unsurprisingly failed to produce the consistently effective outcomes necessary for strategic success. Notwithstanding this adhocracy, all was not lost.

One of the most notable—if not the most notable—innovations during the Iraq SRO was the development and implementation of the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) program. The challenges encountered and painfully overcome by this novel enterprise during its six-year lifespan constitute a microcosm of the broader Iraq reconstruction experience. The lessons drawn from the PRT program emphasize the need to develop an integrated civilian-military system for SRO management.
From its inception in 2005, the PRT program struggled to gain traction because of staffing shortfalls, funding limitations, and doctrinal disputes. My office, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), documented these challenges in five audits of the PRTs. During the course of these reviews, SIGIR auditors visited numerous PRT locations, repeatedly finding that the extemporaneous nature of the overall effort exacerbated weaknesses inherent in a reconstruction operation carried out under fire.¹

With the September 2011 closure of the last four—Basra, Erbil, Ninewa (Mosul), and Tameem (Kirkuk) PRTs—the full extent of the program’s lasting effects on Iraqi governance capacities remained to be judged. However, one outcome was clear: the PRTs contributed to the growth of provincial governance capacities, despite limitations imposed by various management adhocracies.

### The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Comes to Iraq

In the face of a growing insurgency that enveloped Iraq in 2004 and 2005, the reconstruction program stalled. The Baghdad-centric nature of the effort made it difficult to plan and implement projects across the provinces. Innovation was needed. It came in late 2005 when US ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, in conjunction with Gen George Casey, US Army, commander of Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I), established the PRT program.²

The lingering legacy of Ba’athist socialism, with its focus on centralized planning and control, made it essential that this new initiative spread well beyond the limits of Baghdad’s fortress-like “Green Zone.” Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s statist economy had a byzantine administrative structure. Baghdad-based bureaucrats drove budgeting and service delivery through ministries that funded and controlled government operations across the country.

The CPA sought to supplant this anachronistic power structure, devolving governance to the local level and empowering provincial and city officials to manage service provision. However, the CPA had neither the time nor the resources to move this ambitious vision beyond its initial stages. Security problems overwhelmed the initiative, as they did with regard to virtually everything else in Iraq during 2003 and 2004. Subsequent to the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty to
the Interim Iraqi Authority and Amb. John Negroponte’s subsequent funding shifts bolstering security programs, Ambassador Khalilzad reenergized the decentralization initiative, opening the first three PRTs in the fall of 2005.

Baghdad Cable 4045, issued jointly by the US Embassy–Baghdad and MNF–I in October 2005, formally established the program. Ambassador Khalilzad modeled the initiative on a similar effort he shaped in Afghanistan, where he had served as ambassador from 2003 to 2005. Pursuant to Khalilzad’s vision, the PRTs would provide integrated multidisciplinary civilian–military teams composed of US and coalition personnel to work with provincial and local Iraqi officials on improving their core competencies in governance and economic development. Reflecting the diverse nature of the effort, the PRTs comprised personnel from the DOS and the DOD, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Agriculture, the US Army Corps of Engineers, coalition partners, and a wide variety of contractors. Unlike in Afghanistan, the majority of PRT personnel in Iraq were civilians.

Start-Up Struggles

Given the deteriorating security situation in 2006, the PRTs’ initial operations proved extraordinarily challenging. A SIGIR audit found that, of the nine PRTs and four satellite offices reviewed, four were generally capable, four were somewhat capable, three were less than capable, and two were deemed unable to carry out the mission.

The most difficult challenge in standing up the program was finding enough qualified persons willing to operate in the dangerous environments dominating Iraq in 2006. To compensate for the paucity of personnel, MNF–I provided staffing from its civil-affairs components. This infusion enabled the PRTs to function better, notwithstanding that too many of these personnel did not possess the skills necessary for the positions to which they had been assigned—an unfortunate and oft-repeated theme in the Iraq rebuilding story.

The PRT program’s growing pains, perhaps an ineluctable consequence of a novel war-zone initiative, were exacerbated by the DOS and the DOD’s inability to form a synchronous working relationship at program inception. For example, when the US embassy and MNF–I jointly resolved to establish the program, they agreed that the embassy
would support PRTs at DOS sites and MNF–I would support the
PRTs at military sites. However, in April 2006 the Multi-National
Corps–Iraq Staff Judge Advocate ruled that the DOS was responsible
for the entire PRT mission and that DOD operations and mainte-
nance funds could not be used to support any PRT. This decision
stopped the program in its tracks.

The consequent delay in signing a crucial DOD/DOS memorandum
of agreement on sharing operational requirements and responsibilities
impeded PRT progress in Iraq.8 This bureaucratic quandary, finally
rectified in mid-2006, cost the program six months of progress at a
crucial point during the Iraq rebuilding effort.

The 2006 SIGIR visits to the PRTs at Ninewa (Mosul), Tameem
(Kirkuk), Salah Al-Din, and Diyala Provinces catalogued serious
support problems, a consequence of this DOD/DOS imbroglio.9 The
shortfalls included inadequate office space, limited information tech-
nology support, and a severe lack of basic supplies. For example, the
Salah Al-Din PRT had few computers, no copiers, and only three
phones to accomplish its mission. The PRT’s members commonly
used their own computers at the office.10

The first PRTs lacked sufficient funding for operational activities,
functioning without the dedicated budgets necessary to support basic
operations. PRT members often used personal funds to host lun-
cheons for Iraqi officials. According to PRT team leaders interviewed
by SIGIR, an inordinate amount of time went to solving support
problems, as opposed to substantively engaging in the mission. One
team leader estimated spending 40 percent of her time in 2006 work-
ing on logistical support problems.11

Another issue that faced the early program was the shortage of staff
that spoke Arabic and understood Iraqi culture and history. Although
bilingual bicultural advisors (BBA) were critical to the program, less
than 5 percent of all PRT team members in September 2007, or 29 of
610 positions, were BBAs. While the mission tried to identify and vet
Iraqi BBAs, meeting staffing needs was an enormous challenge.12

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams’
Role in the Surge

On 10 January 2007, Pres. George W. Bush announced the “surge”
of five additional combat brigades into Iraq. Concomitant with this
troop increase came an expansion of the number of PRTs, supplementing the existing 10 with another 15, most embedding directly into MNF–I brigade combat teams. These “embedded provincial reconstruction teams” (ePRT), one-third of which were in and around Baghdad, operated in unstable neighborhoods, working with Iraqi district and municipal leaders to pacify zones of conflict.\(^\text{13}\)

### The Creation of the Office of Provincial Affairs

On 8 May 2007, Amb. Ryan Crocker, the US chief of mission, established the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) to oversee the expansion of the PRT program.\(^\text{14}\) Under the leadership of an ambassador-level coordinator, OPA was charged with synchronizing the governance, reconstruction, security, and economic development activities of the PRTs. Creating OPA’s management structure proved difficult, and the new office encountered significant challenges in integrating several hundred new personnel and standing up more than a dozen new PRTs. There were a significant number of obstacles:

- A significant number of civilian and military staff members finished their employment contracts or tours of duty before their replacements arrived.\(^\text{15}\)
- Several senior OPA positions—including the director and chief of staff—were filled on temporary-duty orders until permanent replacements could be identified.
- Many junior OPA positions, including program assessment and provincial desk officers, remained vacant for long periods.
- The OPA coordinator, a retired ambassador, spent less than three weeks in Baghdad before returning to Washington for several weeks to fulfill predeployment training requirements.\(^\text{16}\)
- Staffing assignments were frequently changed and guidance on job descriptions and individual performance expectations was poor.\(^\text{17}\)

Over time, OPA improved field support on policy and programmatic initiatives. However, according to former senior OPA staff and PRT members, the focus on implementing the surge and the standing up of the new ePRTs came at the expense of fully supporting the existing PRTs.\(^\text{18}\) OPA had an enormously challenging first year, with continuous
demands piling up as the management team sought to steady the organization's structure in the face of growing violence. As with the security situation in Iraq, OPA's operational capacity improved post surge.

**Measuring Performance: A Continuing Challenge**

The PRTs were rushed into the field not only with inadequate resources and personnel but also with ill-defined missions and weak systems for measuring effectiveness. In an October 2006 audit report, SIGIR recommended that the secretaries of state and defense take action to better define the PRTs' objectives and performance measures and to develop milestones for achieving the objectives.19

A follow-up July 2007 SIGIR audit noted the following challenges still confronting OPA's management oversight and reporting on the program:

According to current and former officials responsible for managing the assessment program for OPA, there is no linkage between the monthly reports generated by the PRTs and what the PRTs are expected to accomplish in their work plans, such as assisting the provincial governments in planning, developing, and implementing a provincial development strategy and executing their budgets. The current performance-monitoring system was not designed to provide information on what was being accomplished by the PRTs. Furthermore, PRT officials told us that OPA has not provided them any feedback on their monthly assessment reports or guidance on whether to modify or adjust their work plans. According to PRT officials and managers, a successful performance monitoring system must allow for assessing PRTs individually, not collectively, because each function in unique economic and political environments.20

Responding to SIGIR's findings, OPA developed a performance-assessment system called the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) assessment process. The CMM required each PRT to submit a quarterly assessment of its province's capacity based on five lines of activity: governance, political development, economic development, political reconciliation, and rule of law.

According to OPA's *Planning and Assessment User Guide*, the CMM was to serve as the basis for preparing work plans to address activities needing attention. However, a January 2009 SIGIR audit of the performance-measurement process found that only about one quarter of PRTs had updated their work plans based on CMM assessments.21 Moreover, assessments of provincial capacity were derived largely from the subjective impressions of PRT personnel and Iraqi-supplied
data, rendering their utility questionable. As a rule, self-oversight rarely works well.

### Anbar PRT: An Example of Effective Civilian-Military Integration

After traveling to Ramadi in April 2011 to meet with PRT personnel and local Iraqi officials, SIGIR found that the Anbar PRT had the best coordination between civilian and military components of any visited by SIGIR over the past four years. This is attributable in part to the fact that some team members had spent three to five years at the same location. There were also several US military and civilian personnel embedded with provincial government officials at their offices. According to PRT officials, all Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects and nearly all Quick Response Fund projects had received about 50 percent of their financing from Iraqi sources. In addition, these projects had Iraqi support from the start because they obtained input from local communities, nongovernmental organizations, or provincial government officials.22

### Weak Unity of Effort

SIGIR’s findings on PRTs resonated in a report by Blake Stone, a Naval War College professor who spent 18 months with the Baghdad PRT between 2008 and 2010.23 His observations stem from events witnessed firsthand several years after the program’s inception. Stone noted that neither the embassy nor OPA ever issued “guidance to the field that was of any benefit” to the PRTs.24 Moreover, he recollected that PRT projects were often undertaken without coordinating with the local government of Iraq representatives.25 Finally, there appeared to be little linkage between the strategic and tactical levels of reconstruction operations, resulting in wasteful disconnects between “projects and other reconstruction efforts executed at the local level and the achievement of [the United States] strategic end state.”26

Criticizing the DOS and the DOD for chronically failing to coordinate reconstruction efforts, Stone observed that PRT attempts to develop local capacity were repeatedly undercut by US commanders, “who evaluated relative ‘success’ by the amount of CERP money obligated.”27 In Stone’s estimation, there was an “almost complete lack of
unity [of] effort” between the civilian PRTs and local military commanders, hampering both the civilian-led reconstruction effort and the military’s kinetic operations. 28

The United Kingdom’s PRT effort in Basra encountered similar challenges. In a lessons-learned report on the activities of the Basra PRT, the British government concluded that the failure to integrate the efforts of its various ministries involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations caused “substantial administrative difficulty” and that the program “failed to achieve its potential.”29 Several key findings from this report buttress the argument for an integrated approach to planning and executing SROs:

- When conducting SROs, integrated planning is as important as integrated execution.
- Integration is not divisible, nor can it be imposed. The civilian-military relationship cannot be fashioned in an ad hoc manner.
- Where integrated bodies such as the PRT are raised in the future, they should be recruited by a single authority. Ideally such groups would train together and deploy as a formed body, with that single authority financially and administratively responsible for the operating requirements of the group.
- A whole-of-government approach requires procedural and structural change at all levels of government if it is to be successfully undertaken.30

Reforming Civilian-Military Efforts in Contingency Operations

The PRT experience in Iraq strongly supports the widely evident need to reform the US government’s approach to SROs. Previous reform initiatives indicate that the US government will review and revise SRO management systems when needed. However, the previous attempts—such as the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)—have had limited success; indeed, the interagency community as a whole has yet to settle on an enduring workable solution.

The DOS December 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review proposed creating a new Bureau of Crisis and Stabilization
Operations (CSO), subsuming S/CRS. It is still not clear, however, to what extent CSO can exercise greater authority in planning for SROs. Notwithstanding CSO’s impressive advent, there still is no single US government agency that devotes its mission to planning, executing, and overseeing SROs. For the DOS, the DOD, and USAID, SROs are an additional duty of those large agencies’ much more expansive missions.

To resolve the diffusion of responsibilities, SIGIR proposed the creation of the US Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO). USOCO would unify, streamline, and integrate the varied SRO mission elements now scattered across the government, including the DOS CSO-S/CRS paradigm, the DOD stabilization and reconstruction programs, the DOJ international police-training office, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. This reform would consolidate or coordinate existing SRO elements, eliminating the layering that currently exists. The efficiencies achieved by reducing redundancies and integrating resources would produce a more unified and cost-effective approach to contingency operations, while increasing the likelihood of mission success.

Cognizant of the need for better civilian-military integration, several North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies formed SRO management offices, including the UK (the Stabilization Unit or SU) and Canada (Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force or START). Along with similar SRO agencies from Denmark and the Netherlands, the SU and START deployed personnel to Afghanistan, where they contributed subject matter experts to several PRTs.

Operating under chief of mission authority and in close coordination with the combatant commander, USOCO would serve as the locus for planning, funding, staffing, and managing SROs, replacing the fragmented process that now exists, and USOCO would also solve the so-called “lead agency” dilemma. In the words of one former senior National Security Council official, “lead agency really means sole agency, as no one will follow the lead agency if its direction substantially affects their organizational equities.” The creation of an office explicitly responsible for managing SROs will answer the question of which agency is in charge.

USOCO would capture the best practices from the Iraq and Afghanistan SROs, improve upon them, and institutionally preserve them for future use. The wisdom of a well-ordered local capacity development program—which OPA and the PRTs, at their best, represented—should
be practiced and prepared so that when such a capacity is needed next in an SRO, it need not be pulled together on an ad hoc basis. A wise man once said, “Proper planning prevents poor performance.” True, but with reference to SROs, this directive needs a structure for its promise to be realized. That structure could be USOCO, but the US Congress must act for the idea to become a reality.

Notes

1. These reports are accessible at http://www.sigir.mil.
3. National Security Presidential Directives 36 and 44 provided the policy and organizational framework for US civilian-military organizations to implement reconstruction and stabilization programs.
5. SIGIR, SIGIR-06-034, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq.
6. Ibid.
8. SIGIR, SIGIR-06-034, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq.
9. In June 2006, with the closing of Forward Operating Base Courage, the Ninewa PRT was relocated to Forward Operating Base Marez. Kirkuk PRT members were divided between the regional embassy office in downtown Kirkuk and Forward Operating Base Warrior on the city’s outskirts.
10. SIGIR, SIGIR-06-034, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq.
11. Ibid.
13. SIGIR, SIGIR-07-014, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Expansion in Iraq.
14. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office was established as a temporary organization under National Security Presidential Directive 36 and was responsible for providing operational guidance and direction to the PRTs. US Code Title 5, § 3161, states that temporary organizations have a life span not to exceed three years. It was established on 11 May 2004 and was dissolved on 8 May 2007.
15. SIGIR, SIGIR-07-014, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Expansion in Iraq.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. SIGIR, SIGIR, 06-034, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq.
20. SIGIR, SIGIR-07-014, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Expansion in Iraq.
22. SIGIR interviews with Anbar PRT personnel and Government of Iraq officials, April 2011. (unattributed interviews)
24. Ibid., 151.
25. Ibid., 152.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 157.
28. Ibid., 154.
30. Ibid., 1–2.
Chapter 24

Fostering Effective Civilian-Military Integration

The Need for a Standardized, Field-Based Stabilization Methodology

Jason S. Alexander, James W. Derleth, and Sloan Mann

Insanity is repeating the same mistakes and expecting different results.

—Narcotics Anonymous

The attacks of 11 September 2001 fundamentally altered America’s perspective on national security. Examining the causes of the attacks and the responses required to diminish the likelihood of future attacks, the Bush administration undertook a comprehensive national security review. Two significant findings emerged. First, contemporary threats facing the United States cannot be sufficiently mitigated by military force alone. And second, it is necessary to stabilize failing or failed states to diminish the grievances terrorists and other spoilers use to mobilize support for their causes. The Obama administration’s May 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) reinforced these findings, stating that “[the United States] must address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders and to be our [US] partners in addressing common challenges.”1 However, almost a decade after first identifying threats emanating from unstable countries, the United States still lacks the ability to effectively counter these challenges.

The NSS further stated that the United States must take steps that include “more effectively ensuring the alignment of resources with [US] national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination.”2
Searching for solutions that would bring together the knowledge and skills required to mitigate sources of instability at the tactical level, an old idea was resurrected: integrated civilian-military teams. The provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and Iraq are the contemporary iteration of this concept. This chapter examines the history of civilian-military teams from Vietnam to Afghanistan. It identifies recurring challenges that limit their effectiveness: an inability to overcome bureaucratic obstacles, irrelevant metrics, and the lack of a common, standardized tactical-level stabilization assessment and planning methodology. It proposes the adoption of the Interagency District Stability Framework to address these challenges.

Background: Civilian-Military Teams in Vietnam

Integrating civilian and military capabilities in support of foreign policy goals is not a new phenomenon. Civilian-military teams have been deployed numerous times this century. Perhaps the most noted example is the Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam.

CORDS was the first effort to integrate the numerous activities conducted by the military, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of State (DOS), and other US government agencies into one program. Under CORDS, US government civilians worked with US and South Vietnamese military personnel to establish programs designed to win popular support, mitigate North Vietnamese political influence, enhance South Vietnamese government legitimacy, and diminish popular support for the insurgency.3

Robert Komer developed and initially led CORDS. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson personally selected Komer because of his strong personality (his nickname was “Blowtorch Bob”) and his ability to overcome administrative obstacles. Identifying the bureaucracy as a major impediment to an integrated civilian-military effort, Komer attempted to merge various government entities into a unified organizational structure with a common mission. His rationale centered on the notion that “[it was] realistically concluded no one of these [individual agency] plans—relatively inefficient and wasteful in the chaotic, corrupted Vietnamese wartime context—could be decisive. But together they could hope to have a major cumulative effect.”4 CORDS personnel were to supervise the formulation and execution of both civilian and military plans, policies, and programs.5 The breadth of CORDS's mandate
and President Johnson’s personal support gave Komer considerable influence. Not only did Komer’s authority stretch “over seven civilian agencies, he also had considerable say in the mobilization of military resources to support the President’s pacification commitment.”

The CORDS program was pioneering on many levels. CORDS district advisors had few security restrictions and were able to move freely among the population. They also had extensive language training and served tours that often lasted a year or more. These factors allowed them to gain a detailed understanding of the local operating environment. District advisors also had direct access to resources, allowing them to quickly take advantage of opportunities.

Nevertheless, CORDS faced numerous challenges that limited its effectiveness. While it attempted to mitigate bureaucratic obstacles, it was still not immune from attempts to undermine it:

Even after Ambassador Komer was in position as Deputy Military Assistance Command, Vietnam for CORDS—and a more dynamic and forceful Washington-savvy power-broker would be hard to find—the struggle continued. Komer had to fight any number of attempts to chip away at the CORDS structure, limit its scope, or keep additional pacification-related programs from falling under his sway. Komer’s challenges in the field were compounded by continual challenges with gaining backing and financing from Washington. Perhaps the most unfortunate result of these bureaucratic difficulties was the time it took for the critical nature of the situation to become evident before the various agency interests could be forged together into one structure.

Although CORDS made some progress in fostering a unified civilian-military effort, a May 1970 report by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense noted its limits, claiming that “what is required in addition to improved management, a more rational use of forces, better integration and coordination of both efforts and resources, is a more balanced political-military structure. Emphasis must be shifted to the political arena at the village level.” In short, CORDS was unable to overcome interagency challenges in Vietnam.

While CORDS was a population-centric strategy focused on enhancing local governance, economic capacity, and security to stabilize an area, the military remained focused on traditional enemy-centric warfare. This often undermined CORDS’s approach. These different strategies revealed deep conceptual differences within the US government.

As an illustration, in 1969 the US Marine Corps (USMC) launched Operation Russell Beach/Bold Mariner, described as a “clearing” operation that directly supported the US pacification strategy.
the USMC considered the operation a “successful invasion of an enemy sanctuary” and the province advisor called it a symbol of the successful expansion of government control, these ‘gains’ proved ephemeral. Allied forces had entered a communist stronghold but failed to eliminate it. Vietcong forces in the area continued to levy taxes and abduct local officials. Over eleven thousand people had been uprooted and their homes destroyed.”  

Louis Wiesner, a former CORDS official, noted the effect of these types of operations: “When relocated people are then left without adequate assistance by the GVN [Government of Vietnam], their enmity is further increased. . . . The GVN is bringing groups of the enemy into its midst and hardening their hostility by the callous treatment it accords them. This is a good recipe for losing the war.”

This example illustrates the challenge of competing strategies and priorities, a recurring problem that faced civilian-military teams conducting stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As one civilian-military veteran noted, it is very difficult to persuade field combat commanders to support nonlethal civil operations with people, resources, and operational influence when field commanders considered themselves on “war footing.” This situation persists despite directives from strategic-level commanders to support civilian-military teams. While it is understandable for bureaucracies to default to core missions and competencies, an important lesson from Vietnam is that even with a unified command structure, without a common strategy based on local conditions, civilian-military teams will be ineffective.

Another substantial CORDS shortcoming was its assessment metrics. Komer realized showing “progress” was crucial for continued political support. To demonstrate progress, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was created. Its goal was to quantify the effectiveness of programs in pacifying an area. Critics claimed it was too complicated and subjective, since it was filled in by district advisors, who had a stake in reporting positive results. This failing was the result of the HES being designed as a tool for strategic-level policy makers, not field personnel.

Although focused on security, HES included some “development” indicators covering issues such as economic growth or public works. Noteworthy, the hamlet evaluation worksheet (HEW) questionnaire did not include local perceptions or questions about local sources of instability (SOI). If SOIs were not directly related to an HES question, they were not officially recorded and reported. The lack of local perception data undermined the basic premise of stabilization programming,
for example, identifying and mitigating the local sources of instability as seen through the eyes of the local population.

Realizing this shortcoming, leaders developed the Pacification Attitude Assessment System (PAAS). As with the HES, the new system’s primary purpose was to inform strategic-level policy makers on overall pacification progress, not assist district advisors develop locally tailored stabilization programs. Although the HES and PAAS helped practitioners understand their operating environment, it was ultimately up to each individual district advisor to determine how best to stabilize his or her area. While CORDS developed innovative systems of civilian-military integration and data collection, it failed to develop metrics to assist tactical and strategic decision makers choose informed policy decisions.

Another limitation of HES was tremendous pressure to meet reporting deadlines, leading to inaccurate assessments. One CORDS veteran noted:

The intent of these [HES] reports was good, but like so many good bureaucratic intentions, the idea was weakest at the point of practical application. I saw DSAs give the reports they should have filled out themselves to their less informed and less experienced subordinates. Sometimes the instructions would be to just fill in the blanks with anything that seemed reasonable. Meeting the deadline for submission of the report was the important thing, not accuracy. Often reports on hamlets were filled in when the hamlet had never been seen by the DSA or any of his team members. Instead of a firsthand look, the overworked DSA might take the word or opinion of a local Vietnamese official about the situation in some remote hamlet. While the Vietnamese colleague might in fact know of the situation in that hamlet, his motives in giving an opinion might have been viewed with some skepticism.17

Perhaps the most important factor that limited the effectiveness of CORDS was the lack of a comprehensive stabilization methodology. While CORDS collected a lot of data, it never developed an analytical methodology practitioners could use to gather local input, combine it with other sources of information to identify local sources of instability, design programs to mitigate them, and measure their effectiveness. This led district advisors to implement a variety of programs, many of which had no link to local sources of instability. While some practitioners flourished in this environment, the overall effort suffered. An effective stabilization methodology may well have led to different outcomes in Vietnam, particularly if implemented in the early years of US involvement.
Following Vietnam, the CORDS program was quickly forgotten as the US military returned to its “primary” mission—fighting conventional wars—and cash-strapped civilian agencies returned to their core bureaucratic missions. Consequently, lessons learned from civilian-military experiences in Vietnam were ignored or forgotten.

Contemporary Civilian-Military Teams

To foster a whole-of-government approach in support of US foreign policy goals, civilian-military teams were resurrected in Afghanistan and Iraq. Known as provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), their mission was to “stabilize an area through an integrated civilian-military focus . . . [which] combines the diplomatic, military, and developmental components of the various agencies involved in the stabilization and reconstruction effort.”

Before creating the PRTs, planners examined various historical civilian-military models (Vietnam, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Iraq, Somalia, etc.) to “develop the initial concept and stand up of the PRTs in Afghanistan.” Attempting to incorporate lessons learned from previous iterations of civilian-military teams, the PRT designers believed they created a structure that built on earlier successes and mitigated historical challenges.

At first glance, PRTs and the CORDS program seem remarkably similar. However a closer examination reveals several substantial differences. Most noteworthy are their scope and administrative structure. CORDS had a much broader scope, including programs taken from other agencies and consolidated under it. With few exceptions, “all American programs outside of Saigon, excluding American and South Vietnamese regular military forces and clandestine Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations, came under the operational control of CORDS.” In contrast, PRTs have a much more limited scope. PRT personnel serve more as facilitators for their parent agencies’ programs rather than integrating their efforts to identify and target local sources of instability.

Administratively, PRTs were never organized as independent, integrated entities. The teams were placed under the purview of the Office of Provincial Affairs and Interagency Provincial Affairs Office in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively, but individual team members were still directly subordinate to their respective agencies. Because of
limited resources and a lack of bureaucratic support, at first they were not very effective in linking and syncing civilian-military stabilization efforts. This can be noted in the multiple lines of authority PRTs must respond/report to in Afghanistan (fig. 24.1).

![Figure 24.1. PRT lines of authority.](Adapted from Center for Army Lessons Learned, Handbook 11-16, Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team, February 2011, 32.)

In contrast, CORDS was a distinct agency with its own chain of command and was directly integrated into the US government command structure in Vietnam. Although the CIA and USAID maintained their autonomy distinct from CORDS, many of their personnel and programs were folded into CORDS once it was established. This fostered more effective civilian-military integration and strengthened their bureaucratic position (fig. 24.2).
Recurring Challenges

There are three key recurring challenges that continue to limit the effectiveness of civilian-military teams. They can be broadly divided into three areas: bureaucratic obstacles, ineffective metrics, and the lack of a standardized stabilization methodology.

Bureaucratic Obstacles

The major bureaucratic constraints limiting the effectiveness of civilian-military teams: standard operating procedures (SOP), personnel evaluation, and training deficiencies. Bureaucratic SOPs force civilian-military teams to operate in a manner that limits their effectiveness. For example, USAID’s mandate is humanitarian assistance and development. Even though stability planning and programming is different from long-term development, in Afghanistan and Iraq USAID continued to implement its traditional large-scale, nationally
focused, long-term multisector development programs. While USAID has some stability programs, in Afghanistan they comprised less than 10 percent of total USAID funding. CORDS also suffered from agency SOPs as its personnel brought their agency training and outlook with them when they became district advisors. The personnel evaluation system for civilian-military team members magnified this challenge.

PRT members reported to—and were evaluated by—their parent agency. This had two significant ramifications. First, even if a member of a civilian-military team wanted to do something outside of his or her agency’s normal SOPs to stabilize their area of operations, they would be reluctant to do so knowing it could affect their performance assessment. This could be seen in the area of security. While CORDS members frequently travelled without security details to build rapport with the population and to avoid creating an imposing security footprint wherever they went, in most locations PRT members would be sacked if they attempted travel without security. Second, civilian and military members of the PRTs were usually evaluated on what they did during their deployment. This often equated to the number of dollars spent or the number of projects initiated. These numbers tell us very little about whether an area was more stable. However, since this data was used in personnel evaluations, it created the perverse incentive to spend as much money as possible, whether or not the projects fostered stability, to improve performance reviews. Spending large sums in unstable environments could have numerous destructive side effects—corruption of local officials and leaders, decreasing the legitimacy of local government, and so forth—all of which could foster instability. Regardless, team members received positive evaluations because they had “bullet points” for their evaluations. The CORDS evaluation system negated the first problem as CORDS personnel were evaluated by other CORDS personnel. Nevertheless, the system was still based on output rather than effect. This gave personnel an incentive to implement programs, regardless of their effect.

Another recurring obstacle was the lack of training. Because of political pressure to quickly deploy, civilian PRT members received approximately one month of training, far too little to be effectively trained in stability operations and in understanding the complex environments where they were working. While CORDS employees received much more predeployment training, as it was considered crucial to mission success, specific stability operation training was not included.
Metrics

Another major challenge to effectively implementing stability operations was irrelevant measures of success. Civilian-military teams too often made the assumption that the number of activities completed or dollars spent measured their success in stabilizing an area. For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq there was a perception that job creation programs had a transformative effect on the environment—the thought being that gainfully employed men are less likely to join or sympathize with insurgents. Thus, the creation of jobs was viewed as success. However the number of jobs created tells us nothing about the behavior of young men who hold them. A more useful measure of stability would have been a reduction in the number of young men joining militias, insurgent groups, antigovernment forces, and so forth. Although it was much easier to track and report the number of new jobs, it had little to do with stability.23

Reporting requirements exacerbated this problem. Civilian-military teams were required to report on their activities, usually in the form of a laundry list of ongoing and completed activities. In senior-level briefings, the number of projects completed, the number of trained security forces, or the amount of money spent dominated discussions. The pressure to demonstrate results had the unintended consequence of influencing program design, implementation, and evaluation. A former PRT member elaborated on this challenge, stating “every time a new commander comes in he’s got to have his fitness report and he’s going to do a lot of things to drive the numbers. He can’t just say, ‘I made this governor a better governor.’ He’s got to say, ‘I built this many schools, I built this many miles of roads.’”24 As the inability of hundreds of thousands of projects—costing billions of dollars—to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq clearly show, output was not the same as effect.

The lack of effective metrics also made it difficult to determine whether or not civilian-military teams were effective, and if not, what changes were required. Describing the metrics reported by PRTs, one analyst noted, “There is a need for both an agreed set of objectives for PRTs and an agreed set of metrics for measuring their performance. Absent a means of determining whether PRTs are effective, it is difficult to determine whether alternative mechanisms might better achieve [one’s] purposes. Lack of a means of evaluating PRTs has not prevented their proliferation in Iraq and Afghanistan and discussion
of establishing them in future operations. Before this occurs, it is time for some objective scrutiny of measures of effectiveness.”

Although the CORDS HES was designed to measure overall effect, it too focused on outputs. Because it was designed to inform strategic decision makers in Saigon and Washington, it did not provide the information needed by district advisors to design effective, sustainable, stabilization programs. In addition, both CORDS and PRT metrics exclude local perceptions. As an illustration, the system used to measure PRT effectiveness in Iraq—the Maturity Model—focused on measuring increases in civil capacity from the US government’s perspective, not whether the local population perceived the area as being more or less stable. Going forward, until standardized interagency stability-based metrics that incorporate local perceptions are mandated, the effectiveness of civilian-military teams will be difficult to discern.

**Lack of a Standardized Stabilization Methodology**

Perhaps most importantly, the effectiveness of civilian-military teams was limited by the lack of a standardized, tactical-level stabilization assessment and planning methodology. This situation allowed members of civilian-military teams to define stability either through their organizational mandate or their own experience, which may or may not have been relevant to the mission and environment. Although integrated civilian-military plans were drawn up in both Iraq (Maturity Model) and Afghanistan (Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan), neither included a standardized analytical framework to identify sources of instability or indicators that would indicate whether an area is becoming more stable.

This situation points to the need for a common standardized planning and assessment methodology which would identify local sources of instability, prioritize the employment of scarce time and resources to target them, and most importantly, measure whether programs were stabilizing the area. Additionally, it would allow practitioners and policy makers to measure stabilization progress over time and provide the information required to adjust planning and programming as required. This approach would place the focus of metrics at the appropriate level—the local practitioner.

While PRTs had some successes, overall they did not foster effective civilian-military integration or stabilize the areas where they operated.
Bureaucratic obstacles, irrelevant metrics, and the lack of standardized tactical stability planning and assessment framework continue to limit the effectiveness of America's civilian-military teams.

**District Stability Framework**

Recognizing the need for a standardized, comprehensive methodology to foster effective civilian-military integration, USAID’s Office of Military Affairs, in collaboration with the Department of Defense (DOD), developed the District Stability Framework (DSF) (fig. 24.3). Combining USAID’s Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) and military planning tools such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) and political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII), the DSF provided a framework to help civilian and military personnel understand complex operating environments. It gathered population-centric information, identified local sources of instability, developed programs to mitigate them, and measured whether stability was increasing.

By providing a common platform for collaboration and joint planning, the DSF reduced the tendency for interagency stove-piping or focusing on individual agency mandates. In complex and unstable environments, each government agency brings something unique to the table. To stabilize an area, each agency should collaboratively participate in problem solving regardless of whether the solution fits within its operational mandate. The DSF facilitated this process by focusing users on identifying the underlying sources of instability. With a common view of the sources of instability, it was easier to foster an interagency approach to mitigate them.

The DSF used four “lenses”—operational, cultural, popular perceptions, and the dynamics of stability and instability—to gain population-centric situational awareness. This information drives the analysis phase, which identifies local sources of instability. Once identified, the design phase develops activities to diminish the sources of instability. In the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) phase, the DSF assessed the effect of activities in stabilizing an area, not simply the number of dollars spent or number of projects completed. This allowed practitioners to determine whether activities should be continued, ended, or increased.
The DSF methodology had three significant benefits. First, it focused on identifying and prioritizing local sources of instability. It distinguished between individual and community needs—things required to improve human development—and the underlying issues fostering instability. Sources of instability may or may not be the same as community needs. Until the fundamental issues responsible for violence and a breakdown in the normal functioning of society are addressed, responding to needs is tantamount to placing a Band-Aid on a gushing wound.

The DSF also gave field personnel a standardized framework to monitor and assess activities. While developing indicators for monitoring and evaluating activities is not new, the DSF methodology created measures of success that were based on the overall stability goal, for example, mitigating sources of instability, not the accomplishment of individual activities. For example, if traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms were not functioning and it was determined spoilers were filling the role, the DSF would create measures of success based on the objective of fostering the restoration of traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms. Examples could include increased number of disputes resolved by traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, decreased number of disputes resolved by spoilers, and so forth.
Third, the DSF included standardized qualitative and quantitative indicators to assess overall stability trends. These indicators helped practitioners determine whether overall stability in an area was increasing or decreasing. Establishing baselines for these indicators was critical to tracking trends such as local violence, nongovernmental organization (NGO) presence, economic activity, support for the government, and so forth. These features were unique to the DSF and provided civilian-military teams with a comprehensive framework with which to conduct stability missions.

Fostering Effective Civilian-Military Integration

Mandating the use of the DSF would have significantly improved the effectiveness of civilian-military teams. Gaining a holistic understanding of the causes of instability in an area requires both civilian and military skill sets. For example, integrating intelligence and civil information not only identifies local spoilers, but also resiliencies—the processes, relationships, and institutions that enable a society to function and regulate itself peacefully. Once resiliencies are identified, they can be strengthened to negate destabilizing forces.

The effectiveness of the framework can be seen in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. In summer 2009, Marine Corps Battalion 1/5 moved into Nawa District. The USMC, trained in DSF and supported by a small team of US government civilians, took a population-centric approach, working closely with Afghanistan government officials and community leaders to stabilize the area. Leaders tasked every patrol with building relationships with locals, listening to their concerns, and taking visible action to address those concerns. In addition to living with and partnering with the Afghan National Police, the USMC initiated a comprehensive vetting and training program to ameliorate police corruption, a chief source of local residents’ anger and a source of instability. In a matter of months the security situation improved to the extent that the marines no longer wore their personal protective equipment in the crowded bazaar area. Government officials and civilians from aid agencies were able to move freely and work collaboratively with the community. With more trust in the police, the community began to provide information about local insurgents. The combination of working and living with the population
and identifying and addressing local sources of instability measurably stabilized the area.

**Overcoming Challenges with the District Stability Framework**

To be effective, civilian-military teams must be able to identify local sources of instability and prioritize and synchronize efforts across agencies. However, bureaucratic stovepipes—separate and distinct agency objectives and timelines—make integration difficult. Because the DSF is an interagency framework focused on stability, it helped mitigate bureaucratic stovepipes by fostering effective civilian-military collaboration.

DSF's emphasis on a whole-of-government approach facilitated this collaboration. During the analysis phase of DSF, a stability working group (SWG) was created. It brought together interagency actors (the DOD, USAID, the DOS, and the US Department of Agriculture) who worked in the area to identify SOIs and create a plan to mitigate them. Each actor brought a unique view of the environment and the different resources required to mitigate the sources of instability.

When possible, representatives from the host nation and local stakeholders such as civil society organizations, community groups, NGOs, or interested citizens should be included in SWGs. Thus, the SWG becomes a coordination mechanism and forum for communication and collaboration. It helps synchronize US government programs with local government and stakeholders working in the area. In addition to gaining local perspectives regarding the sources of instability, inclusion of relevant local actors facilitates the development and/or strengthening of community and governmental capability and capacity, fostering long-term stability.

The DSF also mitigated the challenge of irrelevant metrics. Since it focused on fostering stability, it measured the effectiveness of activities designed to mitigate local SOIs. It did this by differentiating between measuring outputs and measuring effects.

The DSF also helped focus programming on targeting local sources of instability. This goal was facilitated by not initiating activities until a source of instability, and the desired end state, had been identified through the DSF framework. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives utilized this approach in its Afghan Stabilization Initiative program.
Initial success led Regional Command–East in Afghanistan to mandate use of the DSF as the common interagency planning and program management framework for identifying and mitigating local sources of instability.

**Civilian-Military Integration across the Intervention Spectrum**

Because it was focused on identifying and diminishing local sources of instability, the DSF could be used by civilian-military teams for a wide variety of missions, from humanitarian assistance to conflict prevention.

**DSF and Humanitarian Assistance**

As an illustration, while the goals of humanitarian assistance—saving lives, alleviating suffering, and minimizing the economic costs of conflict, disasters, and displacement—are clear, identifying and prioritizing activities to accomplish these objectives are not. Too often incorrect programming assumptions are made. For example, after the onset of an emergency, well-meaning international donors and NGOs often provide warehouses full of clothes and supplies when soap and jerry cans are the critical items required to stave off disease. Shipping large quantities of the wrong supplies does more harm than good, clogging airports and ports and delaying the provision of emergency supplies desperately needed to save lives. Using the DSF to identify and prioritize humanitarian assistance would increase efficiency and effectiveness.

Another common problem with humanitarian assistance is the centralization of aid in easily accessible locations near large cities or major displacement camps. Affected people outside of population centers often receive only limited assistance. This encourages migration to areas where assistance is being delivered. The devastating 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti illustrates this point. Humanitarian aid was largely concentrated in Port-au-Prince, leaving rural areas in dire need. This concentration of aid not only contributed to overcrowding in the capital, but it also overwhelmed the ability of the international community and host nation to respond, increasing instability. DSF can help mitigate these problems by targeting aid to areas most in need of assistance.
Because the DSF includes a simple survey tool to systematically gather local perceptions and incorporates them into an analytical framework, it could increase responders’ understanding of where assistance will be most effective. This would mitigate the likelihood of increased instability. Since perception data often varies depending on who conducts the surveys and the survey methodology, it is important that surveyors are effectively and uniformly trained. If not, the incorporation of local perceptions can actually foster instability as needs are emphasized at the expense of diminishing the sources of instability which limit humanitarian assistance.

**DSF and Conflict Prevention**

The DSF can also be employed as a conflict prevention tool. Traditional development programs attempt to address classic development challenges such as poverty, education, health care, infrastructure, governance, and so forth, using standard metrics specific to that sector. However, if these programs do not take into account their effect on stability, they will be unsuccessful. For example, a microfinance program in an unstable environment that does not address sources of instability through its activities could further destabilize the area by encouraging corruption and/or placing program participants in danger.

Although development programs have different objectives and metrics than stability-focused programs, using the DSF to identify civil vulnerabilities and potential sources of instability would help foster sustainable development. For example, militant groups operating in northern Mali gain support because of popular disillusionment with the government. The resulting instability limits the ability of development practitioners to work in the area. Understanding of the underlying causes of popular discontent combined with knowledge of the means and motivations of the militants could foster focused activities which both decrease instability and foster long-term development.

**Obstacles to District Stability Framework Implementation**

Although USAID led the DSF development effort, DSF training is far more prevalent at military training centers than within USAID and the DOS. Bureaucratic culture is one of the primary reasons why the military has taken the lead in using the DSF. In contrast to their
civilian counterparts, the DOD is generally more mission focused and wants simple, effective tactical tools. Conversely, civilian officials take a longer-term view and are more often guided by higher-level mandates. As an illustration, with the exceptions of Afghanistan and Iraq—and in contrast to their military counterparts—USAID and the DOS officers do not usually work directly with communities in unstable areas. USAID typically implements programs through NGOs and for-profit development firms that are evaluated on the amount of deliverables they provided and/or how much money they spent (“burn rates”), not the effectiveness of their program in stabilizing an area. Consequently, USAID officers are often little more than managers tasked with tracking contract implementation. USAID does not have the trained officers necessary to directly implement and study the effects of their programs. This forces them to rely on contractors, who have their own agendas.

Bureaucratic culture also limits the use of DSF. Even though the DOD issued training guidance stating that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations” and “integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations,” implementation of this training directive varies significantly by unit. Many commanders continue to believe proficiency in core combat skills is far more important than training for nonlethal missions, even though the end state for most military operations is a “stable” environment. As a result, military units fell back on what they knew best, taking the fight to the enemy. This ignores the centrality of the local population in making military gains permanent.

Civilian entities face a similar challenge. Without leadership forcing the design and implementation of focused stability programs in unstable environments, program managers will continue to implement top-down needs-based sectoral development programs. In summary, without effective, integrated civilian-military stability training for both civilian and military personnel and high-level leadership support, successful civilian-military operations will continue to be the result of luck rather than the application of a comprehensive, uniform, whole-of-government approach.
Conclusion

Regretfully, the challenge of integrating US government capabilities and capacities into effective civilian-military teams would be just as familiar to a district advisor working in Vietnam in 1967 as it was to a field program officer serving on a PRT in Iraq or Afghanistan. In these conflicts, recurring challenges—bureaucratic obstacles, measuring output instead of effect, and the lack of a common, standard assessment and planning methodology—continued to limit the effectiveness of civilian-military teams. The ability of failed or failing states to threaten US national security has led to a growing realization that the US government must alter its approach to conflicts. A crucial component will be the fielding of effective civilian-military teams to help stabilize the situation. Although there has been some progress, the DOD, the DOS, and USAID have started to recognize stability programming is different from their traditional mission sets; the challenge has been to turn doctrine and guidance into practice. While not a panacea, mandating the use of the Interagency DSF will help overcome some of the challenges faced by civilian-military teams. By identifying local sources of instability, it will assist field personnel to push back against ineffectual, top-down bureaucratic programming. Its emphasis on measuring effect rather than output provides decision makers with more accurate ground truth information. Without a mandated, standardized, tactical, field-based stabilization methodology, the ineffectiveness of civilian-military teams will continue to limit the US government’s ability to stabilize the areas that threaten its security.

Notes

2. Ibid., 14.
Keeping and Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 17 September 2008), 12.


9. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) began in November 1968 as a way to expand government control over and secure contested hamlets. The various pacification programs that CORDS supported could not take root in areas where the communists intimidated, taxed, or recruited. After a modicum of security was established, the Americans believed “the process of development could begin—electing local officials, stimulating rural economic growth, and opening roads.” See Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (New York: Westview Press, 1995), 172. Note: APC is comparable to the modern counterinsurgency theory of “clear, hold, and build” employed in contemporary counterinsurgency environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan.


11. Ibid.


13. “Komer, a former CIA analyst, was a shrewd and energetic bureaucrat whose sensitive antennae were attuned to Johnson’s desires. Once, after producing an implausible buoyant ‘progress’ report on Vietnam for the White House, he was discussing its contents with a group of correspondents. ‘Come on, Bob,’ said one of the journalists, ‘you know damned well that the situation isn’t that good.’ Komer, undaunted, replied in his nasal twang: ‘Listen, the president didn’t ask for a ‘situation’ report, he asked for a ‘progress’ report. And that’s what I’ve given him—not a report on the situation, but a report on the progress we’ve made.’” Quoted in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 515.

14. The HES used a hamlet evaluation worksheet (HEW) to create an assessment for each hamlet. “The 18-question HEW and the 10-question Hamlet Problem document required the DSA [CORDS District Advisor] to select from pre-determined multiple choice ratings in order to arrive at an overall ‘score’ for a hamlet. . . . DSAs had to assign a rating from ‘A’ (best) to ‘E’ (worst) for each of the 18 indicators. . . . The HEW tracked 18 broad indicators of pacification progress, nine measuring security and nine measuring development.” See David Gayvert, “Teaching New Dogs Old Tricks: Can the Hamlet Evaluation System Inform the Search for Metrics in Afghanistan?” Small Wars Journal Blog, 8 September 2010, 3–5, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/531-gayvert.pdf. These indicators are similar to contemporary “lines of effort” (LOE). These ratings were then converted into a numerical scale (A = 5, E = 1; VC-controlled hamlets received “0” ratings).

16. The first step in stabilizing an area is to identify the local sources of instability. Sources of instability are things that (1) directly undermine support for the government, (2) increase support for spoilers, or (3) otherwise disrupt the normal functioning of society. Examples include land disputes, government corruption, political discrimination, etc.


22. Although training timelines varied depending on the position to which an officer was assigned, in most cases they had a minimum of six months of predeployment training and up to an additional six months for Vietnamese language training. Many CORDS veterans believed extensive language training was crucial for their mission. See Asia Training Center, *Debrief of a CORDS Management Consultant (Administration), Saigon, Vietnam 1967–1968* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii and USAID, 1968).

23. Research in Afghanistan on the stabilization effects of hundreds of projects shows “little evidence that aid projects are ‘winning hearts and minds,’ reducing conflict and violence, or having other significant counterinsurgency benefits. In fact, our research shows just the opposite. Instead of winning hearts and minds, Afghan perceptions of aid and aid actors are overwhelmingly negative. And instead of contributing to stability, in many cases aid is contributing to conflict and instability. For example, we heard many reports of the Taliban being paid by donor-funded contractors to provide security (or not to create insecurity), especially for their road-building projects. In an ethnically and tribally divided society like Afghanistan, aid can also easily generate jealousy and ill will by inadvertently helping to consolidate the power of some tribes or factions at the expense of others—often pushing rival groups into the arms of the Taliban.” Andrew Wilder, “A ‘Weapons System’ Based on Wishful Thinking,” *Boston Globe*, 16 September 2009, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/09/16/a_weapons_system_based_on_wishful_thinking/.


26. The Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) in Baghdad initially ordered PRTs to report “accomplishments” and “milestones” in the five focus areas: governance, political development, reconciliation, economics, and rule of law. Realizing the irrelevance of these indicators, in 2009 OPA issued new guidance. It noted, “The PRT mission in each province must be shaped not by a single analytical tool but by the JCP [Civ-Mil Joint Common Plan], existing security situation, Iraqi willingness to cooperate, PRT resources, and other events on the ground in each province.” Center for Army Lessons Learned, Handbook 11-03, 87. Although a step forward, the guidance still neglected local perceptions and lacked standardized stability indicators. Consequently, different PRTs used different criteria to measure stability.

27. In 2009, a civilian-military team at the US embassy in Kabul wrote an “Integrated Civilian-Military Support Plan for Afghanistan.” The work includes 11 “transformative effects,” which, if attained, suggest Afghanistan will be stable. To measure progress along the way, each transformative effect has a series of measurable “main efforts” (95 in total) at the community, provincial, and national levels. If there are 95 main efforts, in reality there is no main effort. In addition to taking a significant amount of staff time and field resources to simply gather the requisite data, more importantly, most of the main efforts are output indicators (measures of performance) and do not measure whether an area is more stable. There are two main reasons for this situation. First, many people do not understand the difference between impact (measure of effect) and output measures. Second, sources of instability are local. None of the higher-level civilian-military stability operations plans that were examined attempted to identify local sources of instability before developing lines of effort (LOE) or stability measures of effectiveness. Consequently, the LOEs determine the sources of instability rather than the sources of instability determining the LOEs. This is a recurring problem as plans and indicators are often created either by people who do not understand stability operations or by policy makers, leaders, or practitioners who conflate their values and experiences with what locals consider important. See US Embassy–Kabul and US Forces–Afghanistan, *United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* (Kabul: US Embassy–Kabul, 10 August 2009), http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0908eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf.


29. ASCOPE is a collection framework tool used by the US military to help identify key aspects of the civil environment. PMESII is a collection framework used by the US military to help identify key aspects of the operating environment.

31. Since perception data can vary depending on who conducts the surveys and the survey methodology, it is important that surveyors are properly trained. If not, the incorporation of local perceptions could actually foster instability. DSF training includes a “gathering local perceptions” module to diminish this concern.


Chapter 25

A Civilian Center of Excellence as a Mechanism for Civilian-Military Coordination

James Kunder

When a civilian-military team functions well on the ground in a complex environment, this is due in large part to the tactical relationships occurring at the field level: the selection of well-qualified civilian and military team members; clear rules of engagement for the team and within the team; adequate resources, financial and technical, to address local problems; and good relations with other reconstruction and stabilization organizations, local and international, operating in the team's area of responsibility. The study and analysis of these tactical relationships and dynamics are important.

Well-functioning civilian-military teams are also the result of a series of activities occurring at the strategic and operational levels, many of which should be in place long before the civilians and military team members link up. That is to say, sound tactical performance of civilian-military teams is the result of a unified and comprehensive system that puts the right civilians and military personnel together with the right mission and with the correct, tested, and shared toolkit.

It is at this level—creating a systemic interface between civilian and military operations—that a civilian center of excellence (CCOE) could contribute to enhanced civilian-military coordination in field operations. The Secretary of State's Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization's (S/CRS) Civilian Response Corps (CRC) mandate, its whole-of-government approach to complex operations, and its dedication to systematic planning linking civilian and military responses were intentionally designed to substantially enhance civilian-military coordination and thereby foster effective stability and peacebuilding operations.

Despite the best intentions of many dedicated professionals in the US government, civilian-military coordination in complex operations will succeed only if the practice is embedded in a single overarching US government system and if the US government builds a standing capacity. This chapter describes one possible institutional framework to enhance coordination, a CCOE for crisis prevention
and response built within the US Department of State and better utilizing the mechanisms and tools developed by the former S/CRS—the CRC, the Interagency Management System (IMS), and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). Through these three mechanisms and tools, the USG maintained a standing cadre of active and standby civilian personnel dedicated to complex operations, developed a planning capability, established systems for interagency collaboration and coordination, captured lessons and integrated these lessons into training, and formulated the civilian equivalent to military doctrine.

**Historical Mission and Function of S/CRS**

The impetus to create S/CRS was an intense debate within the Bush administration over how, in the wake of the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions, the US government’s civilian response to fragile states and conflict prevention policy be improved. The debate culminated in the issuance of the National Security Policy Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which outlines the basic architecture of the secretary of state’s duties, delegated to the S/CRS.1 This directive is the core assessment of why an entity like S/CRS was needed and remains relevant:

To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities and (ii) to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. The relevant situations include complex emergencies and transitions, failing states, failed states, and environments across the spectrum of conflict, particularly those involving transitions from peacekeeping and other military interventions. The response to these crises will include among others, activities relating to internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.2 (emphasis added)

S/CRS defined its mission as follows: “To lead, coordinate and institutionalize US government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”3 For example, the S/CRS team deployed to Panama undertook a conflict prevention mission. When the US and Panamanian governments
received indications that Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels were beginning to drift into Panama’s semiautonomous Darien region, S/CRS dispatched a team to facilitate a conflict assessment to identify stability factors and drivers of conflict. As S/CRS’s documentation describes, this assessment led to the establishment of a Darien stabilization office within the host nation presidential secretariat to address issues of stability.4

In 2008 Congress responded to a request from the Bush administration to add a cadre of civilian reconstruction and stabilization experts from across US government civilian agencies. S/CRS and interagency partners established the CRC, which was comprised of experts from the Departments of State, Transportation, Energy, Health and Human Services, Justice, Agriculture, Homeland Security, and Commerce as well as USAID.

**Drivers of Civilian-Military Cooperation**

Throughout the period of its existence, an important role for S/CRS was to enhance US government civilian-military coordination in reconstruction and stabilization environments. NSPD-44 itself notes that the secretary of state, while coordinating the US government civilian response to crises, shall “coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing US military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”5 NSPD-44 also describes the secretary of state’s responsibility to “coordinate United States government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing US military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases; [and] develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine.”6 Moreover, the 2008 congressional authorization establishing the CRC specifically referenced the NSPD-44 mandate for Department of State (DOS)–Department of Defense (DOD) coordination, noting that “the Secretary [of State] and the Coordinator [of the CRC] are also charged with coordinating with the [DOD] on reconstruction and stabilization responses, and integrating planning and implementing procedures.”7
The former S/CRS’s website contained abundant references to the office’s role in civilian-military coordination. For example, the organization claimed a key role in facilitating “improved coordination and integration among US government and partner nation civilian and military communities to support effective reconstruction and stabilization operations.”

DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, was listed as an important “framework” on the S/CRS website, and US Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, was cited as an S/CRS “tool.” During their mandatory initial training, CRC members—active and standby—received information on US military structures, culture, and operations. This potential to provide systematic interface between civilian and military operations resided in three aspects of S/CRS’s approach: first, in S/CRS’s maintenance of a cadre of personnel dedicated to managing complex operations; second, in S/CRS’s organizational doctrine for responding to crises; and, third, in its approach to planning.

S/CRS offered the potential of institutionalized improvement in civilian-military coordination in complex operations, as would the creation of a standing CCOE based on the S/CRS architecture and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development (QDDR) policy guidance. In large measure, S/CRS’s potential was in its creation as an entity focused specifically on US government-wide coordination issues, and specifically in pre- and postconflict environments, with a permanent staff to provide continuity. Furthermore, S/CRS consistently welcomed civilian-military liaison, and numerous S/CRS officers worked to advance civilian-military coordination and collaboration in its operations and through military exercises and experiments.

Previous attempts by the US government to increase civilian effectiveness during complex operations, most notably the Clinton administration’s 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, foundered on the staffing issue. PDD-56 recognized the importance of establishing interagency coordination within the US government, mandating the creation of “executive committees” within the NSC to manage complex crises, and mandated the writing of “political-military implementation plans,” when crises arose.

Thus, the policy discussions leading to the issuance of NSPD-44 addressed this need for a standing US government civilian surge capacity—a crisis management process agreed upon by the US gov-
ernment civilian agencies in a whole-of-government approach. It was dramatically clear that operational gaps included the following:

1. there was no equivalent of the military joint staff or the staffs of regional combatant commanders, whose primary function it was to plan for these complex operations;
2. no serious force generation or surge capacity existed within key civilian organizations;
3. very few civilian federal employees possessed the applied skill sets in greatest demand in stabilization and reconstruction operations; and
4. there was no equivalent of the military joint task force doctrine to serve as a template for organizing civilian deployments to the site of operations. These gaps were all too apparent in US government responses in complex settings in which I personally participated, including especially the run-up to the Afghanistan and Iraq deployments, where civilian agencies scrambled ineffectively to support military forces once the latter had taken the ground. For the first several months after the US government reopened the US embassy and USAID mission in Kabul in January 2002, a woefully inadequate handful of civilian employees attempted to engage with the fledgling government of Afghanistan and jump-start the stabilization and reconstruction processes in a nation-state almost completely destroyed after decades of conflict.

In short, the first important contribution to civilian-military coordination that S/CRS brought to the table was a standing entity to coordinate and collaborate with military counterparts, with dedicated staff at headquarters, and within the CRC. For the first time, the US government civilian component had a sizeable cadre of employees—approaching 300 between its core staff and CRC Active members combined—trained and ready to link up with military colleagues in the field. Each of these recruited individuals received at least a modicum of complex operations-specific training, as well as predeployment training in security aspects of insecure environments. Whether or not it was utilized to its fullest capacity, the CRC Active’s presence offered previously unimagined opportunities for improved US government civilian-military teams.

CRC personnel brought to bear a wide range of needed skill sets:

- conflict assessment/planning/operations/management, including assessment planning, base set-up, operations management, and strategic communications;
rule of law, including advisors for criminal law, legal defense, transitional justice, legal administration, access to justice, police and corrections;

transitional security, overlapping with rule of law, and including security-sector reform and civilian-military coordination in these lines of effort;

governance, including civil administration, democracy and good governance, and civil society/media development;

essential services, including public health, public infrastructure, education, and labor assessment;

economic recovery, including agriculture, rural development, commerce, taxes, monetary policy, and business/financial services; and

diplomatic and border security, including support to US embassies in assessing and planning for security/force protection requirements in support of broader contingency and field operations.13

Were S/CRS and its successor, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), ultimately to have 2,000 trained CRC members with these essential skill sets, this would have institutionalized the interface between US government civilian and military personnel in the field during complex operations. The CRC teams had the potential to dramatically improve the performance of civilian-military teams in both preventive and conflict environments.14 Moreover, S/CRS's cadre of trained, full-time civilian conflict experts opened up new avenues of longitudinal interface with military colleagues. This standing cadre had the capability of (1) training, planning, and exercising with military units prior to deployment; (2) linking up rapidly during crises; and (3) participating in after-action reviews, lessons-learned exercises, and the capture of best practices. Too often in the past, even when civilian-military teams have worked well together in the field, the deployment process allowed little predeployment coordinated training or preparation, and after the tour of duty was completed, civilian and military colleagues disappeared back to their previous postings without systematic harvesting of civilian-military successes and failures. A major improvement brought about by the S/CRS and CRC personnel system was the opportunity for better team interface before, during,
and after deployments; the capturing of lessons learned; and applying lessons to future complex operations.

S/CRS’s second contribution to civilian-military interfacing was in the development of the IMS. Designed by S/CRS in conjunction with US military planners, the IMS was approved first by an interagency deputies committee and then by the NSC’s Interagency Planning Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization in 2007, establishing for the first time a clear, doctrine type of deployment framework for civilian US government personnel operating in reconstruction and stabilization environments. The IMS provided, at several levels, for enhanced civilian-military coordination in complex operations. However, as described in more detail below, the IMS system became the focus of resistance at the DOS to a “heavy” S/CRS that was never implemented during an actual crisis.

The IMS provided policy makers in Washington, chiefs of mission (COMs), and military commanders with flexible tools to achieve the following: (1) integrated planning processes for unified US government strategic and implementation plans, including funding requests; (2) joint interagency field deployments; and (3) a joint civilian operations capability including shared communications and information management. Inspired by the US government’s National Interagency Incident Management System for domestic crises, the IMS specified who would report where, under what circumstances, as part of what command and control system, and for what mission, during complex contingency operations. Prior to the introduction of the IMS, US government civilian teams linking up with US military colleagues in an ad hoc manner, characterized by idiosyncratic arrangements, relearned each time a new complex crisis arose.

The S/CRS IMS framework consisted of interagency teams operating at the regional combatant command level and embassy/field level (including subteams at the provincial or district level). The Washington team was designated the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG); a team deployed to the RCC headquarters was designated an integration planning cell (IPC); and the team deployed to the American embassy was designated the advance civilian team. If provincial- or district-level teams were required, these were designated as field advance civilian teams—comparable to the well-known provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Of particular importance to better civilian-military coordination, the IPC envisaged in the IMS was to be comprised of trained S/CRS
and/or CRC personnel detailed to the headquarters of the RCC, specifically to ensure that civilian and military planning processes are aligned and that gaps or duplications would be identified early in the process. Although the IPC reported to the CRSG in Washington, its embedding within relevant staff sections at the RCC—likely the J3 or J5—was intended to increase significantly the likelihood that civilian and military plans would be harmonized and that coordinated missions would be provided for individuals deployed to field-based civilian-military teams.

The US military responded favorably to the establishment of the IMS, sending a large number of military personnel for training in the IMS at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) or National Defense University, where S/CRS sponsored courses of instruction and utilized IMS structures in military exercises and games. US Joint Forces Command published a *Handbook for Military Participation in the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization*, which was “intended to be used as a guide to help explain the roles and responsibilities of military participation within the IMS to better integrate all elements of national capacity in response to an overseas contingency or in support of military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities.” Its primary purpose was “to better prepare military planners and implementers for interaction, coordination, and communication with IMS participants through the identification of key interagency relationships and standardization of basic processes.”

In addition to its standing cadre of crisis responders and development of the IMS construct, S/CRS contributed to enhanced performance of civilian-military teams in a third way. It created a civilian-integrated planning and execution process—a formal planning system for the management of complex crises far exceeding in detail any prior civilian process—and trained the CRC in its use. Since a major impediment to civilian-military coordination in the field is the disconnect between the military’s deliberate planning process and relatively less formal civilian approaches, S/CRS’s emphasis on formal planning held promise for enhancing civilian-military coordination at all levels.

The foundation for the S/CRS planning function was described in NSPD-44, which mandated S/CRS to “lead interagency planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated US government reconstruction and stabilization efforts...
for those states and regions and for widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate.”

The major elements of S/CRS planning consisted of a four-stage process that military planners, despite some obvious differences in terminology, will immediately recognize:

- An “Initial Guidance and Parameter Setting” stage, during which the scope of the reconstruction and stabilization task was defined; the central problem framed; and parameters for the operation established. This stage culminated in a formal “Guidance and Parameters Decision Memo.”

- A “Situation Analysis” stage, during which the conflict environment was mapped (utilizing analytical tools S/CRS promulgated specifically for this purpose, such as the “Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework,” or “ICAF”); information gaps were located; so-called “critical dynamics”—the essential problem sets facing the society in conflict—were identified; US interests were calibrated; and planning assumptions were made explicit. This second stage also produced a formal output, the “Situation Analysis Memo.”

- A “Strategy Development and Implementation Planning” stage, during which the overall US government goal was defined; the “transformational hypothesis”—in practical terms, the definition of what success would look like in the conflict zone—was developed; subelements of the transformational hypothesis, including objectives, subobjectives, and tasks were delineated; an organizational approach (which agencies or units, in which configuration, will be deployed) was designed; and a metrics plan completed to gauge success or failure. This stage produced several products, including a “Strategic Plan,” “Operational Plan,” and “Resource Plan,” with “Task and Synch Matrices.”

- An “Execution” stage, during which “Implementation Actions” were distilled, leading to “Implementation Decisions,” “Course Correction Decisions,” and “Decisions to Revise the Plan.”
Challenges to Success

S/CRS, despite its accomplishments, faced numerous obstacles to success. First, congressional members backing the president’s directive were slow in reaching consensus. From 2005, when the Lugar-Biden bill was introduced that would have authorized S/CRS and the CRC, to 2009, when the bill became law in the National Defense Authorization Act, appropriations were ad hoc, through wartime supplements and DOD funds transfers. Once authorized and funded, recruitment and hiring for the CRC proceeded too slowly to satisfy Congress, and deployments were not sufficiently robust.

Additionally, a wariness existed within the DOS itself to embrace the crisis coordination mission, which some saw as a challenge both to traditional diplomacy and to the embassy-centric management ethos of the DOS. This skepticism manifested itself in the relatively limited deployment footprint of S/CRS in relation its potential capacity. Of the 20 deployments it undertook, only three—Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan—consisted of teams larger than 10 individuals in the field at a given time. In fact, most of the deployments were characterized by small assessment missions that resulted in studies or analyses, often intended to shape future operations and resource allocations. Second, successive secretaries of state deferred to the regional bureaus rather than delegate a prominent leadership role to the S/CRS when international conflicts arose or threatened. More often, the S/CRS exerted a secondary, supportive role. Furthermore, the IMS was never fully implemented, despite the obvious need for a civilian organizational template during high-intensity operations. Interestingly, the 2010 QDDR called for an International Organizational Response Framework—an organizational template detailing agency lines of responsibility, as the IMS was de facto decommissioned—for use in crisis situations.21

Another obstacle S/CRS faced was the limited support it received from a wary USAID. My former colleagues at USAID tended to view S/CRS not as a useful enhancement to the work of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, and similar USAID conflict management entities. They saw S/CRS as an institutional interloper duplicating and undercutting USAID’s achievements. Institutional tussles between the DOS and USAID on the
respective role of each in the reconstruction and stabilization arena only magnified USAID’s resistance to a strong, vibrant S/CRS. Perhaps most crippling to S/CRS was Congress’s unwillingness to provide adequate funding for S/CRS to perform its mandate. Even after S/CRS was authorized, Congress was unsupportive of establishing an ongoing crisis response fund. Thus, S/CRS managed no independent funding that would have enabled it to respond to crises and prevent conflict. S/CRS’s operational plan was compelled to continue to rely on voluntary funds transfers from the DOD. S/CRS’s inability to bring to the engagement a consistent pool of funding resources stood in sharp contrast to the capabilities of other civilian crisis response entities, like USAID’s OFDA or OTI, each of which manage large appropriations accounts. In response to repeated requests for such independent funding for S/CRS, Congress, as part of the FY 2010 Omnibus Appropriations Act, created a new Complex Crises Fund (at the $50 million level). However, this was established within USAID, rather than the DOS.

Seemingly on the positive side, S/CRS was subsumed into a bureau, per policy guidance of the QDDR of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The 2010 QDDR reiterated the foreign policy priority of conflict prevention and response within fragile states. With the aim of further improving DOS crisis and conflict management capabilities, the QDDR proposed the establishment of a new undersecretary of state position for civilian security, democracy, and human rights (J), to replace the undersecretary for global affairs (G). This new undersecretary would manage, in addition to several existing bureaus, a newly created CSO, subsuming S/CRS.

**Recommendations**

For civilian-military teams to succeed in a complex environment, they must operate in a US government system that promotes coordination and collaboration. Given the evolution of S/CRS and the policy established under the QDDR, the coordination function originally envisaged for S/CRS could more effectively be accomplished in an organizational unit embedded in, and drawing authority directly from, the Office of the Secretary of State, rather than through an independent bureau. The need continues for a DOS entity to play a leadership role in synergizing civilian-military coordination, including
conflict prevention and postconflict stabilization. The way forward requires taking what S/CRS built and completing the architecture envisaged in NSPD-44 and outlined in the QDDR, establishing a centralized office that can coordinate the interagency. The following steps are required:

- The secretary of state must institutionalize the function of “senior advisor on conflict and instability,” as described in the QDDR of 2010. The IMS must be resurrected and formally promulgated to enable civilian and military partners within and outside the US government, to train to a standard deployment template, and to enhance civilian-military interface.

- The CRC should be reconstituted and training for all CRC members, including standby members, must be reestablished and increased—especially with regard to understanding military operations and field operations—in order to enhance civilian-military synergy during deployments. Given budgetary constraints, the CRC standby should be the emphasis, and the partner home agencies should be reimbursed for services only when these experts deploy or are engaged in pertinent training and exercises.

- The CSO assistant secretary must design and implement a more rigorous, sustained training and exercise/gaming regimen for the restored CRC members, including increased participation in military games and exercises, in order to enhance readiness and retention in the CRC.

- Congress must provide at least a minimal crisis response fund to the DOS for rapid interventions during crises.

- The DOS must systematically harvest lessons learned by participants on civilian-military teams, model such reviews on the military-style after action reviews, and provide wider distribution of these findings to future team members.

In summary, forging high-performing civilian-military teams for complex operations requires sustained US government investment at multiple levels and the establishment of a standing CCOE designed for this purpose.
Notes

2. Ibid., 2.
5. White House, NSPD-44, 2.
9. It should be noted that S/CRS was “not the only game in town” in terms of enhancing systematic civilian-military interface at the Washington and regional levels. Significant enhancements were made in civilian-military coordination during complex operations through greater use of USAID liaison officers at regional combatant commands (RCC) to backstop the traditional role of the combatant commander’s political advisor. Many RCCs had joint interagency support groups or similar structures to increase interactions with US government civilian agencies present in their respective areas of operation. US Africa Command created an organizational structure that integrated civilian US government employees into its command structure at a high level.
11. The author was the USAID representative to the series of NSC meetings on NSPD-44 and personally participated in these discussions.
12. It should be noted that a number of civilian US government entities have regularly deployed highly skilled individuals into complex operations but for very specific functions and without an overall coordination responsibility for civilian operations. These entities include the DOS Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration; the Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training; and the USAID OFDA and OTI.
13. The source for these data is the S/CRS-sponsored training course RS 500, Foundations of Conflict Prevention and Response, taught at the DOS FSI. The author was a contract instructor in that course, which was required for all new CRC members, whether active or standby.
14. The standing cadre of S/CRS employees and CRC members, in addition to providing a pool for deployment to complex crises, also permitted the systematic harvesting of lessons learned and best practices from prior deployments to integrate
into future doctrine and training. S/CRS maintained an Office of Knowledge Management and Informational Technology.


16. In May 2011 the author participated in a USMC Command and Staff College exercise—designated “Nine Innings”—that included an S/CRS CRSG cell and exercised a Panama-based scenario.


18. Ibid., 3.


22. The secretary of state designated S/CRS to take the lead role within the DOS on coordinating, along with the DOD and USAID, distribution of the “Section 1207” DOD funds. As described by S/CRS,

In 2006, Congress passed section 1207 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, which authorized the transfer of up to $100 million in 2006 and 2007 from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State for programs that support security, reconstruction or stabilization. The 1207 authority is intended to improve US capacity and interagency coordination for immediate reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance to maintain peace and security in countries that are unstable. Section 1207 had a strong civilian-military coordination and cooperation component, which meant that it focused on reconstruction and stabilization via civilian coordination with the security sector and civil society.

Chapter 26

What Is the Way Ahead for Rigorous Research on Civilian-Military Teams in Complex Contingencies?

Christopher J. Lamb and James Douglas Orton

The previous chapters in this volume are a treasure trove of insights on civilian-military relations in general and civilian-military cooperation in complex contingency operations in particular. The chapters cover challenges like different national experiences in civilian-military relations, civilian-military planning at the operational or theater level, and the tactical experiences of civilian-military teams, both historically and in current North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations in Afghanistan—mostly concerning provincial reconstruction teams. The observations and recommendations proffered are based on firsthand experiences in most cases, making them all the more valuable. One unifying theme throughout the diverse chapters and personal experiences is the need to collaborate across organizational boundaries. Virtually every author acknowledges the importance of this key requirement for success in complex contingencies, and most offer positive recommendations on how to achieve it. Unfortunately, the richness of the insights and perspectives and the lack of common definitions and presumptive explanatory variables make it difficult to compare and substantiate individual recommendations. Looking to the future, the challenge will be to distill a common set of best practices from such wide-ranging individual perspectives. The purpose of this chapter is to recommend a way forward for doing that by providing a framework for future research that will permit best practices for cross-organizational collaboration in complex contingencies to be identified and substantiated.

The need for cross-organizational collaboration is well acknowledged. The private sector has worked the issue for decades, and more recently national security experts have been making the case for better cross-organizational collaboration. In national contexts, the topic is generally referred to as interagency cooperation or whole-of-government solutions. Since the subject matter of this book includes cooperation with other nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), we
will not use the term “interagency,” which implies cross-organizational cooperation among one nation’s executive departments. Instead, we will refer to the small groups of functional experts who must collaborate to solve civilian-military problems in complex contingencies as “cross-functional teams”—the term most often applied in the private sector.¹ The term is helpfully descriptive. The members of such small groups represent different functional bodies of expertise, and they must interact as a team in order to be productive. Broadly construed, the bodies of expertise represented are civil or military in origin. For the purposes of complex contingencies, they are typically described as diplomatic, defense, and development related. The bodies of functional expertise could be broken down with even greater specificity, but the goal remains the same: to combine different bodies of functional expertise to arrive at a better solution to a complex problem.

Many blue-ribbon panels and commissions of one type or another have recommended cross-functional teams as a potential solution to modern security problems and particularly for irregular warfare threats.² At National Defense University in Washington, DC, a small team of researchers has been researching small cross-organizational teams assigned to solve complex national security problems to determine the factors that best explain success or failure in such endeavors. To date their historical descriptive accounts indicate interagency teams can indeed perform with great effectiveness, but the analysis also suggests that interagency team effectiveness is not widespread, easily replicated, or well understood.³ Further research is needed to better understand how effective cross-functional teams in complex contingencies can be built and maintained with a high assurance of success. As we have described elsewhere, this requires attention to theory and social science best methods.⁴ In particular, those researching civilian-military teams in complex contingencies need a typology of such teams and a presumptive list of key explanatory variables to guide case study research so that the body of knowledge is comparable and can produce substantiated generalizations on which variables best explain team effectiveness.

To obtain a cross-functional team typology and a presumptive list of key explanatory variables, we reviewed the literature on team effectiveness—particularly 12 comprehensive literature reviews published between 1982 and 2008.⁵ We found that the literature on teams has many of the same advantages and disadvantages of the diverse
chapters in this book: it is extensive and full of important insights, but its collective value is limited by ambiguous definitions, lack of common categories, and failure to identify which explanatory variables best explain performance. The literature has not yet produced a consensus on the distinguishing characteristics of groups, teams, and cross-functional teams, and it has not yet converged on a well-structured list of variables that explain small group and team performance. Therefore, those studying civilian-military teams in complex contingencies need to impose some definitional rigor, methodological clarity, and plausible categorization in order to make progress toward cumulative knowledge. In the rest of this chapter, we recommend a way to do just that.

Groups, Teams, and Cross-Functional Teams

The first problem is that many researchers do not consistently distinguish between types of small collaborative groups, thus confusing and undermining the relevance of their findings. Many researchers do not distinguish teams from groups and, in fact, often use the terms interchangeably. However, absent some agreed-upon defining characteristics for what distinguishes a team from other organizational groups, teams and their effectiveness cannot be studied systematically. Performance expectations and explanations for one type of group might not apply to another. The solution we propose is to distinguish between groups, teams, and cross-functional teams and to do so by the level of task interdependence.

The level of task interdependence is a well-accepted concept among organization theorists, developed by James D. Thompson in the 1950s and 1960s. Thompson, in his classic 1953 case study on US B-50 bombers, identified three different types of task interdependence: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal. We believe these three levels can be used to distinguish teams from groups and cross-functional teams from teams more generally.

Pooled interdependence is the minimal level of task interdependence group members might experience. Members of the group benefit from the efficiencies derived from sharing leadership, tools, office space, and/or identities, all of which are manifestations of pooled interdependence. Many groups never exceed this level of task interdependence but can nonetheless prove effective—as long as they
are not expected to perform at a higher level of task interdependence. For example, at US combatant commands, a joint interagency coordination group that only shares information and offers advice is best categorized as a group, because its level of task interdependence is low. It can perform information sharing quite well but should not be expected to actually solve more complex problems.

Sequential interdependence is a moderate level of task interdependence that requires some division of labor or specialization among group members and standard operating procedures, calendars, schedules, and at least some degree of team leadership to coordinate the activity. Assigned tasks that demand sequential interdependence require group members to coordinate their activities and thus satisfy the minimum qualification for designation as a team. Some civilian-military planning teams rise to this level of task interdependence as they coordinate a plan that originates in one source but passes through other members who coordinate the product with their parent organizations until all parties approve a generally agreed-upon plan.

The performance expectations for many provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) described in previous chapters imply the need for the third and highest level of task interdependence: reciprocal interdependence. A cross-functional team’s task environment typically requires reciprocal interdependence. According to Thompson, activities that require rapid coordination of diverse functional expertise require “mutual adjustment” among the functional specialties on an ongoing basis. All teams may experience some level of mutual adjustment between specialties, but effective cross-functional teams do so routinely and rapidly. For example, PRT members need to work out the relative value and timing of infrastructure investment projects, which, according to Mike McCoy’s chapter, “Civilian-Military Teaming: The When, Where, and How,” remains contentious and difficult. PRTs have to reconcile these competing perspectives on an ongoing basis, just as any cross-functional team composed of members with different functional specialties must do.

Cross-functional teams are such a prominent feature in the private sector that they have been called a “quiet revolution,” and they are thoroughly researched. Researchers have paid far less attention to cross-functional teams that are assigned national or international security missions, which is one reason this book is such a helpful addition to the literature. PRTs and other civilian-military teams are, by definition, “cross-functional”—insofar as their members represent
major functional specialties (military, diplomacy, homeland security, economics, law enforcement, intelligence, etc.). Since civilian-military teams are the equivalent of cross-functional teams, and we want to know more about what best explains their performance, we examined the literature for insights on the most important explanatory performance variables.

Some previous research indicates it is important to distinguish among different types of cross-functional teams. Two criteria for differentiating between types of teams are managerial scope (strategic, operational, or tactical) and temporal duration (standing or temporary). The resulting classification scheme in table 26.1 yields six types of teams and some corresponding examples of the types from the national security realm and the labels often used in the literature to distinguish them. The first criterion—managerial scope—simply calls attention to the fact that major differences in levels of managerial scope correspond with large qualitative differences in the type of work performed. We can postulate that the relative import of performance variables may change depending on the scope of the team’s mission or tasks.

Table 26.1. Six types of cross-functional teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Standing</th>
<th>Temporary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic (top mgmt)</td>
<td>Executive Teams (e.g., Senior Interagency Strategy Team at National Counterterrorism Center)</td>
<td>Project Teams (e.g., Task Force for Military Stabilization in the Balkans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational (middle mgmt)</td>
<td>Parallel Teams (Joint Interagency Task Force–South)</td>
<td>Command Teams (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization’s “integration planning cell”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical (first-line mgmt)</td>
<td>Production Teams (embassy country teams)</td>
<td>Action Teams (PRTs, high-value targeting teams, human terrain teams)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Similarly, we assume that the duration of the team and its mission could change the relative importance of performance variables. In particular, we would postulate that the differences between cross-functional teams of long duration and those thrown together ad hoc
will manifest major differences in terms of team culture, decision making, and other performance variables—if for no other reason than the fact that the loyalty of the individual to the team might vary according to the expected duration of its affiliation with the team. Presumably, it might be harder to integrate a person from a different functional specialty into a team, if that individual knows he or she will soon return to his or her functional organization where he or she would be rewarded for how well he or she protected the equities of his or her parent organization. Conversely, if a functional specialist joins a team permanently, his or her ability to contribute functional expertise would deteriorate over time, thus eroding his or her usefulness to the team. In any case, the team dynamics on the relative reliance on authority versus culture or other integrating factors could be quite different on ad hoc versus long-term cross-functional teams.

Ten Core Variables

It is important to differentiate between types of teams so that we don’t erroneously assume that best practices for one type of team will be the same as for another. To determine whether this is the case or not, we must start with a common set of variables and examine them across multiple types of teams. From our literature review, we identified 10 tentative key variables that seem to best explain team effectiveness in general. We emphasize the word tentative, because we acknowledge these variables are extracted from a rich literature base and are not well substantiated by a cohesive body of research that is team-type specific. We organize the variables in three sets: one at the organizational level, one at the team level, and one at the subteam level. Team purpose, team empowerment, and team context have all been shown to be necessary organizational conditions for team effectiveness and often depend upon organizational factors beyond the immediate control of the team. Team structure, team decision making, team culture, and team learning are all variables directly controlled by the team. Team composition, team rewards, and team leadership are all variables at the individual level of analysis that are strongly related to team effectiveness.

Each of the variables has been the topic of many hundreds of studies and dozens of literature reviews and meta-analyses. By examining this body of research, we identified subsidiary team characteristics
that researchers have shown affect team effectiveness and that use-
fully illustrate the range of variation within each of the variables. The
net result is a range of performance characteristics for what we pos-
tulate are the most important 10 explanatory variables for perfor-
mance. Drawing upon cross-functional team research literature and
using illustrative examples from earlier chapters in this book or from
research under way in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at
the National Defense University, we explain these variables in table
26.2. The authors and other researchers in the institute are using
these variables and their performance characteristics to better under-
stand the performance of interagency teams in the US national secu-
rity system. A book with a set of in-depth case studies is being read-
ied for publication. The purpose here is simply to illustrate the value
of the variables to guide future research on civilian-military teams in
complex contingencies.

Table 26.2. Ten core variables (and subvariables) affecting civilian-
military team effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational-level variables</th>
<th>Team founding</th>
<th>Strategic consensus</th>
<th>Strategic concept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Team founding</td>
<td>Strategic consensus</td>
<td>Strategic concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
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<td>Support</td>
<td>Organizational relationships</td>
<td>Supportive organizational context</td>
<td>Team-based organizations</td>
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<th>Team-level variables</th>
<th>Team boundary spanning</th>
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<td>Design</td>
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<td>Decision making</td>
<td>Heterogeneity</td>
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<td>Culture</td>
<td>Climate</td>
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<td>Learning</td>
<td>Exploitation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual-level variables</th>
<th>Personality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>Attractive motivations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
</tr>
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Purpose, Empowerment, and Support

Team purpose is the broad, long-term mandate given to the team by its management, alignment of short-term objectives with its strategic vision, and agreement on common approaches within the team. In chapter 4 of this volume, Rufus Phillips’ firsthand account of difficulties faced by civilian-military teams in Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s usefully illustrates the importance of team purpose as a characteristic of effective cross-functional security teams. First, he notes that a clear sense of purpose was generally missing: “US agencies, civilian and military, did not coordinate or unify in purpose. Instead, they followed separate agendas.”12 He then observes that the great value of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was that it “unified the US pacification effort from top to bottom.”13 Absent this unified purpose, it was impossible for the many departments and agencies of the US government that were pursuing pacification objectives to make much progress.

There is a widespread belief in management literature that managers should not dictate team objectives with too much specificity, because it might prevent the team from identifying the real problems and best ways to solve them. However, the literature on teams suggests they may require at least initial broad direction as to their purpose.14 One of the reasons that the Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–South) has been so effective is that it has a focused strategic consensus on its purpose (interdict drugs) and over time has been able to translate that narrow purpose into a well-shared operational concept for team performance of how things are done at JIATF–South.15 In contrast, many civilian-military teams are sharply divided in their assessment of mission purpose. As Lisa Schirch notes, for example, in her chapter, “Civil Society Experiences of, Conflicts with, and Recommendations for Civilian-Military Teams,” there is a basic tension between development specialists and military leaders over the value of “quick impact programs” designed to influence local populations rather than contribute to longer-term development goals. Many of Schirch’s recommendations are designed to remove this impediment to civilian-military cooperation by reconciling short- and long-term goals.

Team empowerment is the capacity to accomplish the team’s purpose.16 Three types of team empowerment have been linked to team effectiveness: resource empowerment, structural empowerment (for example, authority, power, and control), and psychological empowerment
(confidence, efficacy, and potency). McCoy, in “Civilian-Military Teaming: The When, Where, and How,” notes that most PRTs are not sufficiently empowered. Rather, resources are retained by the parent agencies: “The various titles that regulate the different agencies preclude the use of domestic agency money on foreign operations and do not allow for one agency to supervise personnel of another agency. The effect is often duplicative or conflicting programs.”

Concerning directive authority, and to quote Andrea Strimling Yodsampa in chapter 17 of this volume, many observers “argue that the only way to achieve coordinated results is by establishing a strong, overarching coordination authority, what the military refers to as ‘unity of command.’” In the case of a single nation where executive authority is concentrated in the hands of a chief executive, delegation of such authority is still uncommon—but at least a possibility. As Strimling Yodsampa goes on to point out, however, “Unity of command is not an option when dealing with the broader array of sovereign nations, independent NGOs, and other autonomous agencies engaged in stabilization and reconstruction efforts. These actors simply will not accept an overarching coordinator with the authority to direct from above. As the maxim goes, everyone wants coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.”

The good news, though, is that some research on cross-functional teams demonstrates that it is possible to forge an effective team without explicit, formal, or preexisting directive authority. This is true, for example, both in the high-value targeting teams pioneered by US special operations forces and at JIATF–South. However, the evidence suggests that the absence of such authority makes the teams fragile and slow to develop.

The lack of tangible resource empowerment described by McCoy and the lack of structural empowerment described by Strimling Yodsampa can separately and in combination lead to a lack of the psychological empowerment necessary for a team to be effective. Corporations routinely allocate resources from corporate headquarters into cross-functional teams that are seen as strategic investments for the organization. In contrast, cross-functional teams in the national security system are not typically given the resources necessary to accomplish their tasks. Even when such groups agree on objectives, they commonly cannot agree on which departments and agencies will provide the resources necessary to achieve those objectives. There are exceptions, such as Plan Colombia, which was successful in
large part because it received needed resources. Sandy Berger, Pres. Bill Clinton’s national security advisor, created the Plan Colombia team in the summer of 1999 to reverse Colombia’s slide into a cocaine-driven illicit drug economy. Amb. Thomas Pickering, who led the interagency team, later explained that one of the reasons behind the success of Plan Colombia was the fact that the US Congress allocated $1.6 billion to the effort. \(^{22}\) Pickering believed that this significant infusion of resources eliminated much of the friction that normally bogs down interagency teams.

**Team support** is the set of relations that connect a team to other levels of the organization. It can matter a great deal whether teams benefit from the cooperation of the rest of the organization, receive ambivalent noninterference, or operate against opposition from the rest of the organization. Numerous team researchers have found that organizational support is a primary determinant of the effectiveness of the team. \(^{23}\) Contrary to the common prejudice that hardworking and well-intentioned lower-ranking officials will work out interagency differences if left alone, most successful interagency teams benefit from substantial senior leadership support. Anecdotally, it seems extremely difficult if not impossible for an interagency team to be successful without some broader level of support from the national security system and its leaders.

Unfortunately, US cross-functional security teams often work in organizational contexts that make it difficult for them to accomplish their missions. The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) experience is a common one. Created in 2001 to bring together diverse counterintelligence capabilities across the US national security system, the NCIX found it difficult to get operating quickly:

> For the administrative support system, anything that is different is a problem at least initially, because it does not fit into the known set of rules and procedures. This effect is multiplied when the objective is to wire together disparate security regimes governing computer systems, personnel practices, and physical space. . . . One of the enduring problems we encountered was in recruiting capable personnel to work in the new [counterintelligence] office. All national “centers” have an inherent personnel problem: you want and need the best and brightest, but there are never enough of those to go around. . . . Even if a given individual is personally disposed to take an assignment with the national office, getting their line management’s okay is far from easy. \(^{24}\)

Some organizations are purposefully managed to provide quick and effective support for cross-functional teams, and the teams thrive
in such fertile ground. The US national security system, however, is not engineered to provide such team-based organizational support and does so only on an exceptional basis. Thus, it is much more difficult for teams to quickly start up and prove effective.\textsuperscript{25}

**Structure, Decision Making, Culture, and Learning**

*Team structure* refers to the mechanics of teams: their design, collocation, and outreach or “boundary spanning” dynamics.\textsuperscript{26} In general, research shows that effective team structures are small, collocated, and embedded within powerful networks. Team design encompasses decisions about the tasks performed by the team, nature of subunits within the team, specific number of team members needed, and tenure of the team. Cross-functional teams vary significantly by type and design. A standing national-level team near the top of the organization may require a different design than a temporary action committee at the bottom of the organization. Size is another team design variable that is subject to the type of team task being performed. Here we can perhaps extrapolate from the Harvard Business School’s classic guide to managing meetings to recognize the practical size limit on productive group efforts with its 8–18–1,800 rule.\textsuperscript{27} If the purpose of a cross-functional team is mere “coordination” or simple communication of information across multiple organizations, the group can be quite large (for example, up to 1,800 people or as many as an auditorium or listserv will hold). If the purpose is nonbinding “cooperation,” such as brainstorming or perhaps the accomplishment of a common and relatively simple objective, the team should be much smaller (18 people in a conference room or on a conference call). If, though, the purpose is “collaboration,” or creative decision making that integrates different viewpoints to solve complex problems, the cross-functional team must be small (eight people around a table or on a videoconference) because a “large number of people—by virtue of their size—have trouble interacting constructively as a group, much less agreeing on actionable specifics.”\textsuperscript{28}

Cross-functional teams at all levels—the National Security Council committees, JIATFs, or field operations such as PRTs—are under pressure to let more organizations send representatives to participate in the decision process. Research on cross-functional teams suggests, however, that teams cannot be effective if they are too large. In this
regard the sizes of the Norwegian/Latvian PRTs described in Friis’s chapter in this volume on the Norwegian approach to Afghanistan are so large that they would require a small management team in order to be effective—at least according to organizational literature we have surveyed. In addition to underscoring the need for intelligent team designs, team structure research also suggests that the core team must network well both internally and externally to be successful. In high-performing cross-functional teams, it is common to find that members have a detailed understanding of the role that other members play, sometimes referred to as “transactive memory systems.” Practically speaking, the team members know “who knows what,” “who can do what,” and “who has access to people outside the team who can solve specific problems.” Shared transactive memory has been shown to increase resilience through a process known as “deference to expertise,” in which problems migrate to the people most likely to have the ability to solve them, rather than centralizing at the top of the organization. This phenomenon has been observed, for example, in cardiosurgical teams and wildland firefighting teams. Effective teams also compensate for their small size by networking externally with other bodies with access to needed expertise. For example, brigade commanders in Afghanistan sometimes encourage their human terrain teams to collaborate with PRTs so that they can better perform their mission of providing commanders with sociocultural knowledge.

Team decision-making processes are employed to make sense of and solve a variety of complex problems faced by the team. Understanding the factors that distinguish effective team decision-making processes from less effective ones is a high priority in organizations because marginal improvements in decision quality can result in benefits, and marginal degradations in decision quality can result in catastrophes. Given the diverse functional perspectives they embody, cross-functional teams are by their very nature prone to experience conflict within the team’s decision-making process. Conflict is not necessarily bad, but it must be managed productively. Schirch provides an example of how easily civilian-military cooperation can be derailed by unresolved conflicts within decision-making processes. She states that “NGOs expressed frustration over military forces dropping food rations. . . . Tensions skyrocketed as military personnel began wearing civilian clothing and traveling in unmarked white trucks. NGOs argued they had a long reputation of using white
vehicles to deliver assistance, and the military employing such resources essentially blurred the distinction between unarmed, independent NGOs and military personnel. Despite urgent pleas from NGOs, it took the military several years to address these issues. The delays contributed to a sense among NGOs that the military did not really care about their security or delivering humanitarian aid.”

Apparently it was not possible for the military authorities in this case to see things from the NGO perspective. National security events have been studied from the vantage point of team decision-making processes for over 50 years, and one consistent finding is that multiple points of view are beneficial in order to avoid “groupthink.” Subsequent research shows that groups with high levels of cohesiveness may suffer from the inability or unwillingness of individuals to contest emergent team decisions. Sometimes teams that have been together for a while lose their effectiveness because the team members converge on a common viewpoint and lose their capacity to engage in constructive team conflict. Researchers now recognize two different types of team conflict: emotional conflict (“a condition in which group members have interpersonal clashes characterized by anger, frustration, and other negative feelings”) and task conflict (“a condition in which group members disagree about task issues, including goals, key decision areas, procedures, and the appropriate choice for action”). Research shows that emotional conflict leads to poor decisions, while task conflict can lead to better decisions. The objective in team decision making is to ensure a productive clash of divergent views while forging agreement on the best way forward—something much more easily said than done.

*Team culture* is the combination of norms, values, and beliefs shared by team members. Effective cross-functional teams require team cultures that are cohesive, foster a climate of shared values, and are based on high degrees of trust. There is a great deal of literature on how different organizational cultures stymie cross-organizational collaboration, including many of the preceding chapters in this book. The creation of effective team cultures is a major challenge for any cross-functional team, but this is especially true for those with particularly diverse representation. In this respect, ambassadors face a growing challenge when trying to weld their country teams into a cohesive whole. As Amb. Robert B. Oakley and researcher Michael Casey Jr. state, “Not only must ambassadors coordinate major government activities such as diplomacy, commercial relations, use of
force, and intelligence activities, but they also must provide inter-agency coordination for numerous sub-specialties within a given area. With over 30 government agencies now dispatching employees overseas, non–State Department personnel often outnumber diplomats.  

With so many diverse organizational cultures represented on the country team, the ambassador has a major problem establishing cohesion. Creating a cohesive culture is further complicated when country team members distrust the ambassador. As one major study of country team performance concluded, other members of the country team do not typically see the ambassadors as an overarching national representative; instead, they see the ambassador as a representative of the Department of State who pursues Department of State interests. Thus, “agencies encourage their personnel on the country team to pursue their own objectives and lines of operation, without adequate consultation or coordination.”

Marcia Byrom Hartwell’s chapter in this book does a good job of charting the “very different organizational cultures and views that contributed to occasional misunderstandings and mutual frustration” in Afghanistan. Research on cross-functional teams shows that teams with a high level of trust are more innovative, learn more quickly, have higher degrees of cooperation, and experience less damaging conflict. The creation of a team culture with a high degree of trust is not easy, as Hartwell points out. Team members come from different parts of the national security system, each of which has a powerful culture of its own. As Hartwell argues, effective cross-functional security teams need to create their own team cultures—stronger than the distant organizational cultures of the organizations from which the team members originate.

Team learning is an ongoing process of action, reflection, and change, through which teams acquire, share, combine, and apply knowledge. Effective teams not only make good decisions but also rapidly acquire new knowledge and embed that knowledge into the team’s structure, processes, and culture. In rapidly changing global environments, teams that learn accurately and quickly have a significant competitive advantage over teams that learn poorly and slowly. As some of the previous chapters suggest, sometimes the first learning experience for a new member of a cross-functional team is to appreciate the value of different perspectives. With this in mind, many of the authors recommend cross-functional training and team-building exercises as a first step toward improving civilian-military cooperation.
Decision makers can design cross-functional security teams to efficiently replicate old knowledge, to artfully experiment with old and new knowledge, or to plunge headfirst into new knowledge domains. Historically, “exploitative learning,” a belief in replicating past successes, has dominated the US national security system. Presumably future interagency national security teams will want to focus more on learning capacity. Effective experimental learning teams place a high value on after-action reviews, lessons-learned exercises, and agile retrospectives in order to learn how to improve their strategy, organization, and processes. Effective exploratory learning teams survey their environments through sense making, scouting, and mental “map-making activities.” Facing the unknown can be disconcerting and may incline a team to ignore the unfamiliar, but good exploratory practices make the unfamiliar comprehensible and facilitate action.

**Composition, Rewards, and Leadership**

*Team composition* refers to the characteristics of individuals chosen for the team, the presence of subcultures or factions within the team, and the amount of diversity in attitudes, demographic characteristics, and functional boundaries. Composition is a core theme throughout this book. R. Scott Moore makes the point that the military can do and has done most civilian-military tasks itself in conflict environments, recruiting or training the requisite functional expertise. However, the rest of the authors contributing to this book acknowledge that teams composed of diverse civilian and military personnel are necessary and more likely to solve complex problems than teams composed of personnel from one organizational background. For example, after noting the advantages of civilian (soft power) over military (hard power) skill sets, Christopher Holshek concludes that “the question is not whether to employ hard or soft power, but what balance and combination ought to be used. Utilized together appropriately, they are comultipliers, which may be the greatest argument as to why the military may still play a role, albeit limited and subordinate, in humanitarian assistance and development—as long, however, as it does not attempt to cloak its engagements as “humanitarian,” when it is clear this is not the ultimate objective.”

In cross-functional team literature, a number of member characteristics are believed to affect performance, including demographic,
attitudinal, and functional diversity. Leaders can choose team members to accentuate homogeneity or heterogeneity and to create subunits, factions, or subcultures. Still, all team members may benefit from some common baseline team skills, which the large literature on team training addresses. Similarly, studies of “team personality” consider selection, socialization, and strategy processes to ensure that each member has the necessary personality characteristics, goal orientations, or other individual-level attributes to contribute.

It would be easier to manage cross-functional team composition if the parent organizations that supply the membership kept track of which personnel participated on such teams. Unfortunately, time spent away from the parent organization typically is considered time lost for productive career management. Recent National Defense University research on interagency teams used in Iraq found that the Department of Defense makes no effort to track which personnel participated in and led interagency teams well. The human capital files of people who already have had significant experiences on interagency teams are not “tagged” so that their interagency experience is evident. Thus, these experienced cross-organizational veterans cannot be located easily to obtain insights, rewarded for complex and successful assignments, or identified for future cross-functional or interagency assignments.

Team rewards are systems of attractive motivations, material reinforcements, and emotional benefits that direct team members toward the accomplishment of the mission. Effective reward systems not only encourage individual members in their discrete responsibilities as team members but also provide significant rewards for team accomplishments measured against the team’s criteria for success. Conversely, inconsistency between a team’s purpose and its reward system can undermine the effectiveness of the team. Although not the subject of either of the excellent chapters in this book addressing the CORDS program, the point often made about that organization was that it rationalized incentives (or rewards) for personnel in the unique interagency program by “placing nearly all civilian and military interagency assets involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian manager.” Consequently members of CORDS could cooperate with one another on a common mission without being subject to undue influence from their parent agencies.

Cross-functional teams can benefit from three types of team rewards. Rewards can be used to attract high-performing professionals,
convincing them to jump out of their safe career paths within an organization and serve in what may be a more demanding and less highly valued position on a cross-functional team. Material (financial and other) rewards can be used within the team to create incentives for members to achieve individual and collective team objectives. Finally, members of effective teams frequently report being motivated by the exhilaration that comes from participating on a successful cross-functional team solving complex problems. Research on interagency teams at the Institute for National Strategic Studies supports the contention in the literature that the third type, what some may call “psychological rewards,” is by far the most effective. Members of high-value targeting teams in Iraq described the strong positive emotions that intelligence analysts experience when they see their work immediately translated into action. Multiple interviewees with experience at JIATF–South reported that working there was the high point of their careers. Similar sentiments were expressed by every member of the interagency team that managed the US government’s military stabilization program in Bosnia as part of the Dayton peace accords. Under the right circumstances, participation in interagency teams can create extraordinarily positive team emotions.

Team leadership is broadly defined as the collection of strategic actions that are taken to accomplish team objectives, ensure efficiency, and avoid catastrophes. Although it flies in the face of popular opinion that assumes good leadership is the key to success in virtually everything, over 50 years of organizational research shows that a good leader in a dysfunctional system is likely to fail, while a bad leader in a well-organized system is likely to succeed. Good team leaders are successful not because they are forceful, decisive, charismatic, or inspirational, but because they build good teams that then create the desired outcomes. Good cross-functional teams require leaders who can secure critical resources for the team, exercise authority without suffocating the creativity of the team, and manage the team’s effective performance.

Leadership within the US national security system is usually defined in near-Napoleonic terms of individuals, hierarchies, and chains of command. However, Donald Phillips and James Loy’s description of leadership in the US Coast Guard stands in stark contrast to this “great man” approach. In this paradigm, “every person is a leader” in contrast to “most studies of leadership [that] involve a single person—one leader who has made a difference in an organization.”
As one study notes, “leading well in a distributed leadership model requires different skills, such as encouragement and listening. In the shared leadership model, the [leader] must ensure that team members, as well as their parent agencies, always know their contribution is valued and that they are empowered to take action.”63 These are not skills normally associated with assertive traditional top-down leadership style, yet more experience with complex contingencies may increasingly incline national security organizations to see the benefits of a distributed leadership model. Maj Mark Popov emphasizes the importance of shared leadership on a successful Canadian civilian-military team in Afghanistan: “The DDCT [Dand District Combat Team] included its civilian personnel as full, integral members of the team. The CIDA [Canadian International Development Agency] Stab O [stabilization officer] sat directly next to the combat team commander during every orders group and daily coordination session. All understood and emphasized that from an organizational perspective, the CIDA Stab O was their combat team commander’s equal and advisor, not a subordinate, and treated her as such.”64

Some research suggests that new teams, particularly those established on an ad hoc basis, may benefit from a more traditional leadership style initially. However, as the team establishes itself over time and develops a collaborative culture, traditional leaders can actually become a liability.65

**Conclusion**

The increasingly complex security environment demands cross-functional solutions—and thus, cross-functional security teams. Anyone interested in successfully managing complex contingencies must understand how to make cross-functional teams perform better and do so at all levels. Rigorous research can help in this regard. The place to start is with accurate descriptions of cross-functional team experiences. Many of the chapters in this book are particularly valuable for their insightful descriptions of cross-functional teams based on close personal evaluations and insider accounts. However, most authors emphasize one or a few variables that made the greatest impression in their personal experience, and they rarely compare them for explanatory efficacy.66 Readers are left with a wealth of insights on important factors affecting unity of effort but no means to compare
and contrast the findings in similar situations. Thus substantiating the findings by testing them across a range of experiences is not possible.

Nevertheless, from such a solid base of empirical information, we can move to explanation, treating the individual insights as hypotheses that must be tested and substantiated. We need to categorize teams so that lessons from one type of team are not misapplied to teams that must operate in substantially different circumstances. In addition, any given explanatory variable must be weighed against alternative explanations. Therefore, agreeing on a broad set of organizational variables that have proven efficacious in previous research on cross-functional teams is a good place to begin.

In this regard, the 10 variables offered in this chapter are just a start. We do not presume the proposed set of variables is definitive. Over time, we may find that some of the variables are prerequisites for high performance on civilian-military teams and that others merely help cement gains or improve performance on the margins. Additional research also may indicate the need to revise the range of subvariables within each broad explanatory variable (see table 26.2). For the time being, however, we think the broad theoretical framework proposed here befits the sprawling nature of small group and team literature, providing structure for further research without imposing too narrow a set of lenses for examining performance.

Notes

4. This chapter is based on previous research by the authors: James Douglas Orton with Christopher J. Lamb, “Interagency National Security Teams: Can Social Science Contribute?” *PRISM* 2, no. 2 (March 2011): 47–64.


8. Ibid., 54.

9. Ibid.

10. See Parker, *Cross-Functional Teams*, 4, for the definition of cross-functional teams and 8–9 for differentiating factors.


13. Ibid., 84.

31. Ancona and Bresman, *X-Teams*.
32. Interviews from a forthcoming study of human terrain teams, Organizational Performance Team, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.


34. Lisa Schirch, “Civil Society Experiences of, Conflicts with, and Recommendations for Civilian-Military Teams” 308.


41. Ibid.


WHAT IS THE ROAD AHEAD FOR RIGOROUS RESEARCH


64. Mark N. Popov, “A Whole Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts, or If It Was Only Army Stuff It Would Be Easy,” 223.


66. Andrea Strimling Yodsampa’s chapter, “Achieving Unit of Effort without Unity of Command,” is an exception. Strimling Yodsampa reviews eight variables self-consciously, many of which overlap to some degree with the 10 we have proposed in this chapter. We believe her prescriptions for better unity of effort are more compelling since she examined the issue through a wider range of organizational variables.

67. To facilitate such research, the authors can provide interested parties with a more detailed explanation for the range of subvariables they selected from the literature. Douglas Orton with Christopher Lamb, “Key Performance Variables for Effective Interagency Teams,” unpublished paper, 68 pages. To request a copy, send an e-mail to James.Orton@ndu.edu or lambc@ndu.edu.
Abbreviations

ABP Afghan Border Police
ACBAR Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief
ACOTA Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ADT agribusiness development team
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia
AMCCCO Atterbury-Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations
ANA Afghan National Army
ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANDS Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
ANSO Afghan National Security Office
APC Accelerated Pacification Campaign
APC armored personnel carrier
ARCENT United States Army Central Command
ASAT advanced situational awareness training
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ASD–SO/LIC Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
AU African Union
BBA bilingual bicultural advisor
BCT brigade combat team
BSC battlespace commander
BTA Business Transformation Agency
CA civil affairs
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned
CCATF Combined Civil Affairs Task Force
CCO Center for Complex Operations
CCOE Civilian Center of Excellence
CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program
CFC–A Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CID Criminal Investigation Division
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA Stab O</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency stabilization officer</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>commander in chief, Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CivPol</td>
<td>Civilian Police (United Nations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>combined joint task force</td>
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<td>CJTF-180</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force 180</td>
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<td>CMM</td>
<td>Capability Maturity Model</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>construction management organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOTF</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMISAF</td>
<td>commander, International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>CPE</td>
<td>Cultural Preparation of the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps</td>
</tr>
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<td>CRSG</td>
<td>Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>district center</td>
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<td>DDCT</td>
<td>Dand District Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVAD</td>
<td>development advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRI</td>
<td>Defense Institution Reform Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJS</td>
<td>director of the Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>district leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Department of Commerce (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSF</td>
<td>District Stability Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>district support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFT</td>
<td>electronic funds transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ePRT</td>
<td>embedded provincial reconstruction team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXCOM</td>
<td>executive committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fad'H</td>
<td>Force Armee d’Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual (United States Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPO</td>
<td>field program officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSI</td>
<td>Foreign Service Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>foreign service officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accountability Office (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOL</td>
<td>Government of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HES</td>
<td>hamlet evaluation system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEW</td>
<td>hamlet evaluation worksheet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTS</td>
<td>Human Terrain System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTT</td>
<td>human terrain team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>intelligence community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAF</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMAG</td>
<td>Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHEC</td>
<td>Independent High Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>international humanitarian law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>international military force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>Interagency Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>international nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Interagency Provincial Affairs Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>integration planning cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>IRMO</td>
<td>Iraq Reconstruction Management Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>information technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCAC</td>
<td>Joint Civil Affairs Committee</td>
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<td>JCC-I</td>
<td>Joint Contracting Command–Iraq</td>
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<td>JIATF</td>
<td>Joint Inter-Agency Task Force</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Center (United Nations)</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JTSCC</td>
<td>Joint Theater Support Contracting Command</td>
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<td>KERP</td>
<td>Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMIT</td>
<td>knowledge management and information technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>knowledge, skills, and abilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>KTF</td>
<td>Kuwait Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNGO</td>
<td>local nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOE</td>
<td>line of effort</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>military assistance advisory group (United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAWS</td>
<td>Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>military decision-making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>maneuver enhancement brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Force–Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médicins Sans Frontières or Doctors without Borders</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Military Support Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCIX</td>
<td>Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGHO</td>
<td>nongovernmental humanitarian organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>national security policy directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>Nationale Volksarmee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC-D</td>
<td>district-level operational coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC-P</td>
<td>operation control center–provincial</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)</td>
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<td>OCO</td>
<td>Office of Civilian Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (United States Agency for International Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>Office of Provincial Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives (United States Agency for International Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>Public Attitude Analysis System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Project and Contracting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>presidential decision directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>provincial development plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDST</td>
<td>provincial development support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Program Management Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>political advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-OMLT</td>
<td>police operational mentor liaison team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>provincial reconstruction team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>quick impact project</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect (United Nations principle)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>regional command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>regional combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>regimental combat team (United States Marine Corps)</td>
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<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>stability and reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>sociocultural analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFP</td>
<td>Strong Foods Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject-matter expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOI</td>
<td>source of instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOIC</td>
<td>Stability Operations Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)</td>
</tr>
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<td>SRO</td>
<td>stabilization and reconstruction operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security-sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>stability, security, transition, and reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWG</td>
<td>stability working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCAPF</td>
<td>Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3Ds</td>
<td>defense, diplomacy, and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLR</td>
<td>transition of lead responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLSR</td>
<td>transition of lead security responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIM</td>
<td>Training Relations and Instruction Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK DFID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
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</table>
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UN-CIMIC United Nations Civil-Military Coordination
UNDCP United Nations International Drug Control Program
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
USACOM United States Atlantic Command
USAF United States Air Force
USAFRICOM United States Africa Command
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
USF-I United States Forces–Iraq
USFOR-A United States Forces–Afghanistan
USIP United States Institute of Peace
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USOCO United States Office for Contingency Operations
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
VC Vietcong
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This comprehensive book is in itself a model of civilian-military cooperation, bringing together a superb group of practitioners with a deep understanding of these two communities, and their success and failures in working together. This volume will make an invaluable contribution to the classroom, and should be required reading in all institutions that share conflict management and peace support responsibilities.

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Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding
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