DEFENSE INSTITUTION BUILDING
AN ASSESSMENT

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A key element of the Department of Defense’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is building the capacity of partner nations to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. To implement this goal, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy uses several security cooperation and security assistance programs to help partner countries build the capacity of their defense ministries. In addition, the combatant commands and services engage in defense institution building (DIB) in response to the security cooperation focus areas in the Guidance for Employment of the Force. DIB includes activities that develop accountable, effective, and efficient defense institutions. The primary objective of many existing programs is to help partner nations develop and manage capable security forces subject to appropriate civilian control.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the RAND Corporation to conduct a study to recommend a set of policy goals and objectives for DIB, develop a strategy for achieving them, and propose associated Defense Department roles and responsibilities for implementation, coordination, assessment, and monitoring and evaluation of DIB activities with partner countries.

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A key element of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is building the institutional capacity of partner nations’ defense ministries.¹ To implement this goal, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) uses several security cooperation programs, such as the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), the Wales Initiative Fund–Defense Institution Building (WIF-DIB), the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program, and the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS).² In addition, the combatant commands (CCMDs) engage in defense institution building (DIB) in response to the security cooperation focus areas in the *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF).³ These DIB efforts include activities that help develop accountable, effective, and efficient defense institutions. The primary objective is to help partner nations develop and manage capable security forces subject to appropriate civilian control.


² The Wales Initiative Fund was formerly the Warsaw Initiative Fund. The Warsaw Initiative Fund was created to help Partnership for Peace countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia strengthen their defense institutions. In September 2014, the Secretary of Defense expanded the fund to include countries in the Mediterranean Dialog (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Qatar). See Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, “Wales Initiative Fund Eligibility,” Memorandum for the Director, Training, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, September 2014.

DIB activities include episodic, periodic, or one-time visits by DoD personnel participating in defense management exchanges, professionalization seminars, military-to-military dialogues on defense institution topics, and other events and activities related to a partner nation’s defense institution capabilities and capacity. One exception is MoDA, where engagements are more persistent. Partner defense institutions consist of the group of institutions that includes ministries of defense, joint/general staffs and commands, their supporting institutions of the armed forces, service headquarters, and national-level defense agencies. This group of institutions is collectively responsible for national-level defense oversight, governance, and management.

**Study Objectives and Research Questions**

The objectives of this study are to (1) recommend a set of policy goals and objectives for DIB and develop a strategy for achieving them; (2) identify criteria for selecting and prioritizing partner nations; (3) develop a strategy for harmonizing DIB with other security cooperation activities; (4) recommend effective accountability and assessment procedures for DIB activities; and (5) propose associated DoD roles and responsibilities for implementation, coordination, assessment, and monitoring and evaluation of DIB activities with partner nations. These objectives lead to the following research questions:

1. How can DoD determine appropriate goals and objectives, and what role should partner nations’ requirements have in determining those objectives?
2. How should DoD select and prioritize partner nations for DIB investments?
3. What programs, activities, and engagements best support a program strategy aimed at achieving DIB goals and objectives?
4. What actions can be taken to harmonize DIB activities with other security cooperation activities?
5. How can DoD best assess, monitor, evaluate, and track DIB activities?
6. What organizations should provide oversight of DIB activities, what should their roles be, and how can the various, seemingly unconnected DIB programs be better managed?

Defense Institution Building Goals, Objectives, and Guidance

DIB is unique among security cooperation activities in that it focuses specifically on partner nation defense institutions. Although the United States has worked with partner institutions for many years, DIB is a relatively new term, first introduced in 2010 to unify security cooperation activities targeting partner nation defense institutions. DIB integrates four major security cooperation programs: DIRI, WIF-DIB, MoDA, and DIILS. These are distinct programs with unique objectives and oversight mechanisms. Thus, unifying them, along with other DIB activities at the CCMD level, presents a challenge. It requires a detailed understanding of DIB—from the highest strategic policy level down to the country team.

Omitted from this discussion is the question of strategies needed to achieve the stated goals and objectives. This is one of our research objectives, but it is not addressed as a separate topic in this report. Rather, strategies to achieve desired DIB goals, objectives, and end states are discussed along with topics dealing with assessment. For example, U.S. European Command has established five lines of activity (LOAs) that address DIB objectives. To achieve these objectives, it has adopted a milestone system that consists of several implementation tasks that lead to defined outcomes, which subsequently support the LOAs.

We found that the DIB objectives align closely with GEF security cooperation focus areas and the goals set forth in Presidential Policy

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Footnote: For purposes of this report, DIB programs refers to DIRI, WIF-DIB, MoDA, DIILS, and components of other security cooperation programs engaged in DIB activities. Appendixes A and B describe these programs and the regional centers in detail.
Directive (PPD) 23, “Security Sector Assistance (SSA).” However, at the CCMD level, we found that guidance was not always disseminated in a timely manner. We also found that the timelines for developing and revising goals and objectives are synchronous across levels and organizations and the role of partner nations in setting goals for their countries varies among the CCMDs.

Selecting and Prioritizing Partner Nations

Next, we focused on processes for selecting and prioritizing partner nations and activities for DIB investments. At the CCMD level, selecting partner nations is generally simple, as CCMDs usually know which nations are willing and able to accept assistance in developing their defense institutions, which will benefit from such investments, and which engagements are consistent with guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Although selection of partner nations within a CCMD is not that difficult, deciding the amount and type DIB investments for each nation selected can be difficult.

For DIB programs, assessing partner nation requirements can be more difficult, given that, with the exception of WIF-DIB, their mandate is generally global. DIB engagements—and security cooperation engagements more broadly—are often demand-driven, with DIB programs receiving requirements from OSD, CCMDs, country teams, and, at times, other DIB programs. There is no common process across DIB programs for selecting among these requirements, and, as a result, each program has developed its own selection process.

Security Sector Assessment

The security sector assessment process evaluates a candidate nation’s need for DIB and other SSA investments. It does not establish criteria for selecting the partner nation or for prioritizing selected nations;

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rather, it identifies gaps in security that might include deficiencies in ministerial-level management.

Several directives, frameworks, and planning processes are associated with SSA: (1) PPD-23 is designed to improve how the U.S. government enables partner nations’ abilities to provide security and justice for their own people and respond to common security challenges; (2) PPD-23’s SSA planning process describes how to incorporate interagency assessments, planning, and evaluations into interagency planning processes; (3) the U.S. Agency for International Development Interagency SSA Framework document provides a common foundation for government agencies to assess partner nation security and justice sectors and to recommend reforms as needed; and (4) the Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool (DSART) designed by RAND for DoD provides the assessment team with a set of questions designed to provide a qualitative and quantitative assessment of a partner nation’s defense sector, its institutions and processes, and its capacity to carry out operations.

**Formal and Informal Factors Determining Country DIB Engagements**

In general, CCMDs should consider two major factors for country selection: U.S. interests in the region, and partners’ willingness and ability to absorb and maintain the assistance. The theater campaign plan (TCP) is the primary instrument used to inform the country security cooperation plan (CSCP). TCP guidance flows through the GEF and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The three GEF focus areas that apply to DIB are institutional capacity building activi-

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ties that enable a partner nation to better (1) manage human resources, (2) develop and sustain military capabilities, and (3) manage military justice.\(^\text{10}\)

Three additional elements help determine where country DIB engagements should take place: (1) requirements from other U.S. agencies, (2) activities other countries are undertaking (to avoid duplicating these activities and, ideally, to be able to complement them), and (3) high-level interventions from either the U.S. government or the partner nation.

### DIB Program Selection and Prioritization Process

We examined the different prioritization schemes that DIB programs have developed. There is no agreed common selection and prioritization process for all DIB programs—each has put into place a specific process to address requirements and prioritize DIB recipients. However, what all have in common is a set of first principles that apply equally to the CCMD partner nation selection and prioritization process: (1) consider OSD priorities, including the regional deputy assistant secretaries of defense (DASDs); (2) consider CCMD priorities; (3) consider country team priorities; and (4) select from among the countries that comprise the intersection of the three interests of those that are willing and able to absorb DIB investments.

However, we found that the DIB programs tend to lack a regional perspective, largely because they do not always communicate well with CCMDs. As a result, DIB programs’ country selection processes tend to be largely demand-driven and focus on the specific requests of partner nations.

### CCMD Partner Nation Selection and Prioritization

CCMDs play a key role in assisting the country teams and, in particular, the security cooperation officers (SCO), in channeling requirements from partner nations, and the various DIB programs. CCMDs also coordinate with DIB program directors to fine-tune the implementation of DIB activities in their areas of operation.

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\(^{10}\) DoD, 2010.
particularly useful in this role because of their comprehensive knowledge of the countries in their areas. This gives them the ability to prioritize among the nations, as well as among activities based on the nations’ needs. Although all CCMDs select and prioritize countries according to their respective TCPs, they also use various additional criteria—especially when prioritizing countries. We examined the different selection and prioritization processes that CCMDs have adopted. These procedures, however, change frequently as the commands try to streamline the process.

We found that CCMDs generally follow top-down guidance more closely than the DIB programs. Based on the GEF and TCPs, they generally have a clear view of U.S. strategic interests and priorities in their regions. They also receive bottom-up requirements from country teams, which contribute to their knowledge of each country’s needs and institutional environment.

Harmonizing DIB and DIB-Related Activities

U.S. security cooperation activities, DIB included, rely on a mosaic of programs that are managed and implemented by multiple providers, of which DoD is but one. Other providers include U.S. civilian agencies, bilateral partners of the United States, and regional and international organizations. We examined what security cooperation programs beyond DIILS, DIRI, MoDA, and WIF-DIB engage in DIB. The variety of such programs represents an opportunity for the U.S. government, but also increases risks of conflict and overlap. A number of coordination mechanisms exist—from clearinghouses for security cooperation activities to information-sharing events. We conclude with recommendations to improve these mechanisms and possibly merge some existing programs.

We identified 50 security cooperation programs that contribute or could contribute to DIB at some level. We defined three levels of DIB engagements, ranging from simple familiarization to full defense
We found that although several coordination mechanisms exist, no actor or agency has a clear picture of the many DIB programs happening in a given country, and communication between some important DIB providers remains limited. We concluded that better

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Level 3: Defense management</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Types of Activities</th>
<th>Number of Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assisting partner nations to institute organizational changes that will lead to better and stronger management of defense institutions</td>
<td>• Ministerial advisors&lt;br&gt;• Creation of new institutions&lt;br&gt;• Ministerial engagement</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<th>Level 2: Defense professionalization</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Types of Activities</th>
<th>Number of Programs</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Assisting partner nations to form a professional military and defense civilian elite through education and training</td>
<td>• Education and strategic training (including acculturation)&lt;br&gt;• Conferences&lt;br&gt;• Seminars&lt;br&gt;• Workshops</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<th>Levels 1a and 1b: DIB familiarization</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Types of Activities</th>
<th>Number of Programs</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Familiarizing partner nation defense establishments with best practices through episodic engagements, such as exercises, seminars, and other venues (1a), or prolonged engagement, such as the deployment of liaison officers or the exchange of personnel (1b)</td>
<td>• Tabletop exercises&lt;br&gt;• Wargames&lt;br&gt;• High-level contacts&lt;br&gt;• Information and data exchanges&lt;br&gt;• Liaison officers&lt;br&gt;• Exchange of personnel</td>
<td>16</td>
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When a program could be categorized on more than one level, we assigned it the highest possible one. For instance, WIF-DIB activities include ministry-to-ministry engagement (Level 3), professional military education (Level 2), and high-level meetings (Level 1a). Consequently, it is presented in the database as a Level 3 program.
coordination mechanisms are required to ensure that information is shared in a timely manner and that programs complement, rather than undermine, each other. Our recommendations to improve coordination mechanisms include establishing an effective DIB clearinghouse, increasing the effectiveness of CCMD conferences by expanding their agendas to include security cooperation, and generalizing good practices to a larger number of agencies or CCMDs. Some programs may also benefit from some degree of consolidation, which would clarify the DIB picture by reducing the number of actors and chains of command.

Roles and Responsibilities

In this section, we discuss roles and responsibilities of organizations involved in DIB, as defined in the draft DIB Department of Defense Directive (DoDD),\(^\text{12}\) and examine the application of DIB from the policy to the execution levels. We discuss linkages and gaps in DIB oversight and program management at policy, program, and project levels, and present recommendations on how to improve the process. We also suggest mechanisms to improve Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD[P]) guidance through to the project execution level.

- **Policy-level oversight:** The DASD for Security Cooperation is responsible for providing DIB guidance to regional offices. There is a coordinating relationship among State, OSD(P), and the Joint Staff J5 (JS-J5). The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is the branch responsible for coordinating DIB and other security cooperation issues with OSD(P) and JS-J5. The State Department has the lead on planning, execution, and assessment of all SSA/security cooperation activities (which include DIB). The draft DIB DoDD mandates that all of DoD will work to integrate its activities with the interagency. For the regional

centers, the policy-level relationships are mainly with the regional and functional DASDs. The regional DASDs provide guidance on “who to teach,” while the functional DASDs—particularly the DASD for Security Cooperation—provide guidance on “what to teach.”13

- **Program-level oversight:** In practice, various organizations have oversight and control of DIB programs. From the policy perspective, the DASD for Security Cooperation retains guidance, directive, and some program management control of DIB programs. However, it implements DIB activities largely through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Post-Graduate School. Although the draft DIB DoDD does not mention CCMR at all, in practice CCMR plays a role in DIB activities. It provides administrative support to DIRI and WIF-DIB, but not MoDA and DIILS. MoDA receives strategic direction from DSCA and the DASD for Security Cooperation. DSCA resources DIRI program execution through CCMR.

- **Project-level oversight:** The relationship between DIB programs, CCMDs, and regional centers varies by geographic area. Although unique and tailored relationships are ideal, a decentralized approach also risks competition replacing collaboration. Thus, it is beneficial to consider what successful relationships look like and try to mirror or parallel them across commands. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is a good example. DIRI has a close relationship with SOUTHCOM because a representative in J9 closely coordinates with DIRI, and includes DIRI events and activities in their Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) and SOUTHCOM planning, execution, and assessments of activities.

In general, we found that roles and responsibilities are not adequately defined at the program and project levels: They are either not

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13 The regional centers build partner capacity through courses, seminars, workshops, research, and academic outreach.
defined at all, or the relationships are so complex that organizations resort to ad hoc relationships based, at times, on personalities. In particular, the relationship among the regional centers, CCMDs, and DIB programs is not adequately defined in current policy or guidance documents.

Assessment: Monitoring, Tracking, and Evaluating DIB Activities

Once goals and objectives have been established—along with a strategy in place to achieve them—the next questions become whether we are making progress toward achieving these goals and objectives and how the effectiveness of DIB engagements will be measured. The problem with assessing DIB activities is that they are generally episodic, whereas their effects are designed to be persistent and sustainable. Hence, planners are faced with measuring the effect of a single engagement on the long-term goal, for example, of strengthening a partner nation’s defense resource management. Often, we resort to measuring such inputs as the number of engagements with the partner nation, the number of seminars, the number of students from partner nations attending regional center classes, etc. As tempting as this may be, inputs are not outcomes; the outcome is what we must assess.

We address this rather difficult topic by examining how DIB engagements are monitored, tracked, and evaluated by the DIB programs, the CCMDs, and—to some extent—by the regional centers. We first discuss monitoring and tracking DIB engagements before dealing with the heart of the assessment process: evaluation.

- **Monitoring** is a continuous function that provides regular feedback and early indications of progress or lack thereof. Monitoring examines actual performance against what was planned or expected. In the context of DIB engagements, monitoring generally involves observing the implementation processes, strategies, and results. Monitoring also offers the opportunity to recommend corrective measures.
• **Tracking** is essentially effective bookkeeping, or some formal process to record and update essential information about DIB engagements. There are two main OSD databases used to track security cooperation (including DIB) engagements: the Concept and Funding Request (CFR) database and the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (GTSCMIS) now required for tracking all security cooperation engagements.

• **DIB program evaluation:** In most cases, the DIB programs plan engagements in close consultation with the CCMDs so the objectives of these engagements are consistent with those of the CCMD. Engagements may be demand-driven (i.e., requests for certain engagements from CCMDs, country teams, or other in-country or regional sources) or they can be program-driven, as when the DIB program creates a periodic plan. These objectives serve as the basis for the assessment of progress toward achieving long- and short-term goals. For all programs, evaluation is a subjective process producing a qualitative assessment of progress.

• **CCMD evaluation:** DIB and security cooperation in general are managed by various staff elements within the CCMDs. In addition, some commands view DIB differently. For example, U.S. Africa Command views DIB primarily as strengthening operational forces, while U.S. Pacific Command considers it to be a minor subset of security cooperation. In addition, many commands conflate DIB with DIRI. In general, the evaluation of DIB engagements at the CCMDs is part of an annual process that is linked to the development of the TCP and the subsequent country plans. The basic objectives for the region and each country are articulated in these plans and therefore form the basis for evaluation. The objectives are generally in the form of lines of effort, activity, or operation and, in some cases, are subordinate to intermediate military objectives.

We found that tracking individual DIB events is complicated because of the use of multiple systems: CFR, the GTSCMIS, a modified TSCMIS, and the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared
Information System (OHASIS). We also found that the DIB community has expended considerable effort at developing suitable methods to measure the progress of their investments. However, there is some unevenness in the approaches.

Findings and Recommendations

Chapters Two through Six cover the five major topics, list findings, and make recommendations. These are recorded in tables at the end of each chapter. Table S.2 records the major findings and recommendations.

Challenges

There are three major challenges associated with implementing the recommendations suggested in this report:

- **Complexity**: The DIB enterprise is complex in terms of the large number of programs doing DIB. Additionally, the processes in place to oversee, guide, manage, and coordinate DIB activities are relatively intricate. The challenge will be to develop a coherent management structure able to draw on both Title 10 and Title 22 authorities to conduct DIB activities. Rationalizing and overseeing the many programs considered to be DIB programs is another challenge.

- **Measuring success**: This is a problem in most activities where quantifying success is not possible. For DIB, success measurement is even more complicated because effects are long term, but activities are short term and, in most cases, episodic. The challenge here will be to connect the success of short-term episodic events into achieving successful long-term goals and objectives.

- **Selecting partners and DIB activities**: What countries make the best partners? What activities in those countries will contribute most to achieving goals and objectives? What do the selected partner nations want from DIB? What are they willing to contrib-
These challenging questions affect the application of DIB. We have identified the rather disconnected methods used by the DIB programs and the CCMDs in selecting partners and then in selecting activities to be conducted. The challenge will be to develop a process to answer these questions in a way that is more integrated.

Table S.2
Major Findings and Recommendations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: Involvement of partner nations in setting DIB objectives at the CCMD level is inconsistent.</td>
<td>Take account of the partner nation’s level of capability and willingness to make effective use of the assistance offered when determining the U.S. level of involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: DIB programs have developed processes for selecting countries and prioritizing their DIB activities.</td>
<td>DIB programs should establish a routine consultation process that ensures all affected parties can contribute to the selection of planned DIB investments.</td>
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<td>Chapter Four: More and better coordination mechanisms are needed to avoid the implementation of redundant security cooperation programs.</td>
<td>Create a clearinghouse, from either the current entities that oversee one or more DIB programs, or ex nihilo. Also, increase the impact of CCMD conferences by expanding the agenda to include an assessment of all security cooperation programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: The principle of “unity of command” is lacking in the DIB community.</td>
<td>There should be a single entity between OSD and the CCMDs responsible for managing all DIB program activities. A DIB enterprise director should be appointed to serve as a bridge linking policy to program to project-level DIB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six: Although the entire DIB community has expended considerable effort at developing suitable methods to measure the progress of their investments, there is some unevenness in the approaches.</td>
<td>To the extent possible, 1. objective monitoring processes should be implemented for all DIB activities 2. CCMDs should develop a strategy aimed at achieving DIB goals and objectives over a long period 3. evaluation processes should focus on both the effectiveness of DIB investments and how well they are performed 4. suitable standards or criteria should be established to evaluate both the effectiveness and performance of DIB activities 5. a mechanism needs to be in place to terminate or significantly alter an ongoing DIB activity if necessary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Several people were instrumental in helping the authors produce this volume. The support provided included interviews (sometimes repeated interviews), documents, and, in a few cases, demonstrations. Among all the people we interviewed, the authors wish to extend special thanks to the following people:

OSD: Amanda Dory, Jennifer Walsh, Dan Folliard, and Lahlan Colquhoun
OSD(P): David Cate, Erik Leklem, and Aaron Jay
DSCA: Jennifer Zakriski, George Dryden, and Oz Sanborn
CCMR: Richard Hoffman
DIRI: Jeanne Giraldo
DIILS: Jeff Stefani
WIF-DIB: Steve Peterson
DISAM: Ron Reynolds
IDARM: Elizabeth Wright
CENTCOM: Wallace “Jack” Dees
PACOM: Kerry Nichols and Thomas Roark
SOUTHCOM: Laura Coy
EUCOM: Robert Kloecker and Judith Ried
SOCOM: MAJ Adam Kordish and COL Devon Athey
Perry Center: Kenneth Laplante
APCSS: Richard Sears and James Hirai
Marshall Center: LTG (Ret.) Keith W. Dayton, Dr. James MacDougall, John Kane, and Ben Reed
Our reviewers, Nora Bensahel and Rebecca Zimmerman, provided excellent insights and suggestions that have improved this report substantially. In addition to the defense DIB community, we received considerable assistance from several of our RAND colleagues: Heather Peterson, Lisa Saum-Manning, Bernie Rotsker, Al Stolberg, Henry “Chip” Leonard, and Mike McNerney.
A key element of the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) is building the institutional capacity of partner nations to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.\(^1\) To implement this goal, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) uses several security cooperation programs, such as the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), the Wales Initiative Fund–Defense Institution Building (WIF-DIB),\(^2\) the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program, and the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS), to help partner nations build the capacity of their defense ministries.\(^3\) In addition, the combatant commands (CCMDs) engage in defense institution building (DIB) activities in response to the security cooperation focus areas in the Guidance

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\(^2\) The Wales Initiative Fund was formerly the Warsaw Initiative Fund. The Warsaw Initiative Fund was created to help Partnership for Peace countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia strengthen their defense institutions. In September 2014, the Secretary of Defense expanded the fund to include countries in the Mediterranean Dialog (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Qatar). See Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, “Wales Initiative Fund Eligibility,” Memorandum for the Director, Training, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, September 2014.

\(^3\) Throughout this report, *DIB programs* refer to the four security cooperation programs: DIRI, WIF-DIB, MoDA, and DIILS. We also include components of other security cooperation programs engaged in DIB activities. A detailed description of these programs is included in Appendixes A and B.
Defense Institution Building activities include advisors and advising teams working in or with partner nation ministries of defense, joint/general staffs, and other national-level defense institutions. These activities include episodic, periodic, or one-time visits by DoD personnel participating in defense management exchanges, defense professionalization seminars, military-to-military dialogues on defense institution topics, and other events and activities related to a partner nation’s defense institution capabilities and capacity.5

Partner nation defense institutions are collectively responsible for national defense oversight, governance, and management. Operational headquarters or commands overseeing tactical units are not considered within this definition, and are only included by exception (e.g., small or nascent partner nations with limited defense and military infrastructure, personnel, and forces).6

6 USD(P), 2014b.
Defense Institution Building’s Origins

One of the earliest uses of the term defense institution building can be found in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) June 2004 Istanbul Summit and its “Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building.” NATO, until recently, was the main user of the term. As a result, most of the literature on DIB focuses on European countries.

The concept behind DIB, however, is much older than the term. The idea of promoting capable, transparent, and accountable defense institutions has been particularly widespread since the 1990s, when Western governments started engaging the Central Asian and Eastern European countries that had just emerged from communist rule on improving their civil-military relations. It was during that decade that it “became increasingly accepted that democratic governance of the security sector is essential to security.”

Security sector governance (SSG) is one term that predates DIB but encompasses most of its definition. SSG involves improving management of security bodies (including, but not limited to, defense), enhancing accountability, and improving professionalism. On its “Security Sector Governance” web page, for instance, the U.S. Institute of Peace says that it “helps to build professional, sustainable, and locally supported security institutions that promote democracy and the rule of law.”

The most frequently encountered term, however, is security sector reform (SSR), along with the slightly narrower defense sector reform. If SSG is the objective to be pursued, SSR is the main instrument with which to pursue it. A number of bilateral and multilateral actors have

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played a key role in the development of SSR since the 1990s. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom were precursors in this regard.\textsuperscript{12} On the multilateral side, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Bank, NATO, the United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations played key roles.\textsuperscript{13} Some of these organizations have issued documents that provide guidance on SSR. The earliest of these are the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s 1994 *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security* and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.\textsuperscript{14}

**Study Objectives**

There are several agencies, programs, and commands involved in conducting DIB activities. As might be expected, the rapid growth of the DIB enterprise has resulted in several DIB engagements being conducted in several countries with little or no coordination. In addition, some of the fundamentals of management, oversight, and guidance are lacking or inconsistent. The objective of this report is to identify these lapses in coordination and consistency and recommend corrective measures.

Specifically, the objectives are to (1) recommend a set of policy goals and objectives for DIB and develop a strategy for achieving them; (2) identify criteria for selecting and prioritizing partner nations; (3) develop a strategy for harmonizing DIB with other security cooperation activities; (4) recommend effective accountability and assessment procedures for DIB activities; and (5) propose associated DoD roles

\textsuperscript{12} Ball, 2004, pp. 510 and 521.

\textsuperscript{13} Hänngi and Tanner, 2005, p. 21. For more on each of these institutions, see Hänngi and Tanner, 2005, pp. 22–26.

Introduction

and responsibilities for implementation, coordination, assessment, and monitoring and evaluation of DIB activities with partner countries.

These objectives lead to the following research questions:

1. How can DoD determine appropriate goals and objectives, and what role should partner nations’ requirements have?
2. How should DoD select and prioritize partner nations for DIB investments?
3. What programs, activities, and engagements best support a program strategy aimed at achieving these goals and objectives?
4. What actions can be taken to harmonize DIB activities with other security cooperation activities?
5. What organizations should provide oversight of DIB activities, what should their roles be, and how can the various, seemingly unconnected DIB programs be better managed?
6. How can DoD best assess, monitor, evaluate, and track DIB activities?

Strategies to achieve desired DIB goals, objectives, and end states (research question 1) are discussed in Chapter Five, along with topics dealing with assessment. For example, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has established five lines of activity (LOAs) that address DIB objectives. To achieve these objectives, EUCOM has adopted a milestone system that consists of several implementation tasks that lead to defined outcomes, which subsequently support the LOAs.

Approach

To answer the research questions, we began by seeking to understand how the various organizations manage DIB today. We gathered considerable data concerning funding levels, activities conducted, and engagements with partner nations. Our focus was on all partner nation countries, but Iraq was not mentioned directly, and Afghanistan only with reference to MoDA. Our approach was to (1) systematically interview subject-matter experts (SMEs) and stakeholders, including NATO
Defense Institution Building

staff, the CCMDs, staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), DIB program managers, and personnel at the regional centers; (2) conduct a thorough literature review; and (3) collect as much data as possible (financial as well as descriptive) about DIB activities to ensure a data-informed analysis.

Our approach was to conduct a top-down assessment of the DIB enterprise, starting at the OSD level and stopping at the CCMDs. Although we did not visit any of the country teams, we did interview former security cooperation officers (SCOs) whose new duty assignments were with the CCMDs.

Interviews

We interviewed a total of 108 individuals, some more than once, in 22 agencies with some level of responsibility for directing, guiding, implementing, and assessing DIB-related activities in partner nations. In several cases, we were able to follow up on interviews through e-mail contact to clarify more-complex issues. We developed interview protocols and debriefing forms for each interview (see Appendix C).\(^\text{15}\) Since not every respondent was able to address all six research areas, and not all had the same perspective, we developed separate interview protocols for each of the three levels:

- **Policy level:** The interview protocol at this level focused on OSD guidance, direction, and oversight of the DIB enterprise. It was used for interviews with OSD staff and OSD agencies, such as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Post-Graduate School.

\(^{15}\) These interviews are attributed anonymously throughout the document in compliance with the U.S. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (also known as the Common Rule). Both RAND’s Institutional Review Board and human subjects protection reviewers with DoD approved of this research method for this study. Organizational affiliation is included in the citation for each anonymous interviewee to give a sense of one’s background and experience, but it should be noted that interviewees were not asked to represent their organizations in a confidential way. While study subjects were asked to respond based on their professional experiences, they were speaking for themselves in all cases, rather than for their organizations in an official capacity.
• **Program level:** This protocol was used in interviews with DIB program managers and their staff. The focus was on the management of specialized DIB engagements, such as professional legal engagements conducted by DIILS. The protocol was also used in interviews with the regional centers and those CCMD staffs charged with managing security cooperation.

• **Project level:** At this level, the protocol focus was on understanding the issues associated with actually implementing DIB engagements in partner nations. It was used for interviews with country team staff and interviews with personnel with knowledge of the issues at the implementation level.

The debriefing forms recorded transcribed interview notes in a structured way. The form instructed the interviewer to categorize interview information into one of six topics, each dealing with one of the research questions. Respondents’ identities were protected through the use of an anonymizing system; interviewees were told that their responses would not be attributable. In general, we found that our conversations with respondents produced frank—and sometimes critical—assessments of the DIB enterprise.

Prior to visiting each organization, our point of contact was sent a brief, one-page description of the project and a copy of the appropriate interview protocol (both available in Appendix C). Some interviews were one-on-one, others were in groups. Table 1.1 lists the organizations visited and the number of people interviewed at each.

**Document Reviews**

We obtained official published documents and background documents to support this research, and these are listed in the references section of this report. In addition, we obtained several informal documents associated with management procedures, guidance to subordinates, organization and operations documents, and policy directives. These data were provided by OSD, the DIB programs, the regional centers, and the CCMDs.
### Table 1.1
Interviewee List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Offices/Directorate Visited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>DASD African Affairs; DASD Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia; DASD Strategy; OSD Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department/ Country Team</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ambassador, Office of Security Cooperation, defense advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>WIF Program, MoDA, Principal Director for Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall Center</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Director and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry Center for Hemispheric Studies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deputy Director (Acting Director)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dean of Students, PACOM Liaison Staff, Dean of College of Security Studies, Workshop Program Manager, Course Manager/Alumni Manager, Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Center for Strategic Studies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chair of Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>J-5 staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>J7-TA Theater Analysis and Assessments, J-5/8 Partnering Directorate, J-9 Interagency Partnering, J-6, J-5/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Office of Security Cooperation, Plans, and Policy (J5-SC Planning); Central Asian States J-5-SC Branch; WIF-DIB Program Office; J-5-1206; J-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>J-55–Strategic Planning Division; Perry Center representative to SOUTHCOM; J-59 Political-Military Affairs Section; J-73–Security Cooperation Planning and Engagement Division; Theater Engagements Directorate; J-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>J-45 Security Cooperation Division; DIRI representative to PACOM; J-83 Strategic Assessments Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Innovations Laboratory, International SOF Coordination Center, J-55 International Engagement Program, Joint Lessons Learned Information System and GTSCMIS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About This Report

This report is structured around the six research questions listed earlier. Each chapter concludes with findings and recommendations summarized in tabular form. Chapter Two addresses the first and third questions, concerning goals, objectives, and strategies to achieve them. Chapter Three focuses on partner nation selection and prioritization. Chapter Four discusses harmonization of DIB activities with other security cooperation programs. Chapter Five covers roles and responsibilities. Chapter Six takes up the difficult topic of assessments. Finally, Chapter Seven offers conclusions and recommendations. Three appendices are also included: Appendix A lists the various DIB and DIB-related programs; Appendix B describes the major DIB programs and all of the regional centers; and Appendix C presents the interview protocols and debriefing forms used in the study.
While this report addresses DIB globally, a forthcoming companion report focuses more closely on DIB in Africa. Conducting DIB in Africa is particularly challenging because of widespread instability and resistance to foreign interference in many of the continent’s 53 countries. For this reason and because U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is a relatively new command, RAND was asked to assess the extent to which DIB activities in North and Northwest Africa are advancing regional and functional (e.g., peacekeeping and counterterrorism) objectives. The Africa DIB report will address the same topics included in this report, but in significantly more depth.

16 Michael J. McNerney, Stuart E. Johnson, Stephanie Pezard, David Stebbins, Renanah Miles, Angela O’Mahony, Chaoling Feng, and Tim Oliver, Defense Institution Building in Africa: An Assessment, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1232-OSD, forthcoming.
DIB is a unique form of security cooperation in that it focuses specifically on partner nation defense institutions. Although the United States has worked with partner institutions for many years, DIB is a relatively new term, first introduced in 2010 to unify security cooperation activities targeting partner nation defense institutions. DIB integrates four major security cooperation programs: DIRI, WIF-DIB, MoDA, and DIILS. These are distinct programs with unique objectives and oversight mechanisms. Thus, unifying them, along with other DIB activities at the CCMD level, presents an unmet challenge. It requires an understanding of DIB at all levels, from the highest strategic policy level down to the country team. The purpose of this chapter is to (1) track existing DIB-related goals and objectives from national policy through the DIB programs to project-level activities; (2) evaluate the DIB goals and objectives as outlined in the draft DIB Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) in relation to other guidance documents; (3) identify gaps that exist in DIB objectives and guidance; and (4) provide recommendations on how to address the identified gaps.

**Defense Institution Building Goals and Objectives**

In a November 2013 report, DoD’s Office of the Inspector General criticized program officials of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

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1 These programs and the regional centers are discussed in detail in Appendix B.

2 USD(P), 2014b.
(DASD) for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (PSO) for administering the DIRI program since 2009 without defined and published programs and goals, a program strategy, and performance measures. In addition, the Inspector General criticized the USD(P) for not developing DIB policy to guide the DIRI program or any other DIB-related efforts. It recommended that USD(P) issue guidance defining the DIRI program’s missions and goals, program strategy, and performance measures. Thus, a DoDD addressing these issues was drafted. This draft DoDD tasks USD(P) with establishing policy for all DIB activities, in consultation with the heads of OSD and DoD components, to ensure that DIB activities are aligned with DoD policy. The draft DIB DoDD specifies that DoD work with partner nations to develop capabilities and capacity of other nations’ defense institutions to

1. advance U.S. interests and strategic goals by promoting
   a. good governance
   b. transparent and accountable oversight of security forces
   c. rule of law
   d. respect for human rights and international humanitarian law
   e. the foundation for democratic governance, where possible.
2. prevent or mitigate instability, conflict, and authoritarian governance
3. increase partner nations’ responsibility for their security needs and their contributions to regional/international security and stability
4. improve sustainability and impact of other U.S. security cooperation investments and activities

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5 USD(P), 2014b.
5. support stronger partner nation and U.S. whole-of-government and/or ministry-to-ministry relations
6. improve bilateral defense relations and understanding between the United States and other nations, defense institutions, and armed forces.6

The draft DIB DoDD is designed to serve as the nexus of all the strategy-, program-, and project-level documents. Its content and development was most directly informed by the GEF; the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP); Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, “Security Sector Assistance”;7 and several DoD directives and instructions.8 The draft DIB DoDD is designed to inform plans for organizations and entities responsible for conducting DIB (such as CCMDs). In this study, we tracked linkages from the highest-level policy documents to the country-specific objectives specifically relating to DIB. Figure 2.1 depicts the documents reviewed at each level and the guidance linkages and serves as the overview of the more-detailed discussions that follow.

Strategic Policy Goals
Several national strategic policy documents are sources for DIB goals and objectives and, thus, should be directly linked to DIB objective development. Figure 2.2 depicts the guidance linkages from strategic policy documents to the policy goals outlined in the draft DIB DoDD.

National Security Strategy: Sources for DIB objectives begin with the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS). One of the elements of the strategic approach in addressing U.S. key interests is investing in the capacity of strong and capable partners and, in so doing, fostering security and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict, pursuing sus-

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6 USD(P), 2014b.
sustainable and responsible security systems in at-risk states, and preventing the emergence of conflict. As stated in the NSS,

American diplomacy and leadership, backed by a strong military, remain essential to deterring future acts of inter-state aggression.
and provocation by reaffirming our security commitments to allies and partners, investing in their capabilities to withstand coercion, imposing costs on those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms, and embedding our actions within wider regional strategies.\(^9\)

Building the capacity of capable partners is directly related to all DIB objectives as outlined in the draft DIB DoDD, but is particularly geared toward increasing partner nations’ responsibility for their security needs and their contributions to regional and international security and stability.10

**Defense Strategic Guidance:** The 2012 DSG outlines two primary missions directly related to DIB. The first is to provide a stabilizing presence by conducting a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises. The second is to conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations that emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments.11 Both of these missions defined by the DSG are directly related to the DIB objectives as outlined by the draft DIB DoDD. However, they are most directly linked to the following DIB objectives: prevent or mitigate instability, conflict, or authoritarian governance; support stronger partner nation and U.S. whole-of-government and/or ministry-to-ministry relations; and improve bilateral defense relations and understanding between the United States and other nations, defense institutions, and armed forces.12

**The Quadrennial Defense Review:** The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the most recent review to be released. Based on the DSG 2012, this document outlines three objectives: protect the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively. The second of these three objectives is directly related to DIB—an inherent part of building security globally is extending the U.S. commitment to world events to deter and prevent conflict and to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to our shared security.13

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10 USD(P), 2014b.
12 DIB objectives 2, 5, and 6. See USD(P), 2014b.
Chairman’s Strategic Direction for the Joint Force: The 2012 Chairman’s guidance includes the following DIB-related goals: deepening and strengthening military-to-military relationships throughout the world, developing and evolving relationships with interagency and international partners, and defining and enforcing interoperability standards to operate across the joint interagency intergovernmental and multinational environment.\textsuperscript{14}

Core Defense Institution Building Guidance Documents

As depicted in Figure 2.1, the GEF, PPD-23, and DoDD 5132.03 are the direct authoritative sources driving the DIB-related policy goals in the draft DIB DoDD. Both of these policy documents state that DIB is a subset of security cooperation and security sector assistance (SSA).\textsuperscript{15} Thus, it follows that the DIB policy goals should be closely aligned to both of these documents, but focused at the institutional level. As part of our analysis and evaluation efforts of DIB policy goals, we closely compared GEF security cooperation focus areas and PPD-23 policy

\textsuperscript{14} Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Chairman’s 2nd Term Strategic Direction to the Joint Force}, Washington, D.C., undated.

\textsuperscript{15} The draft DIB DoDD (USD[P], 2014) defines SSA and security cooperation as follows:

Security sector assistance (SSA) refers to the policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to: a.) engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector; b.) help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and c.) enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.

Security cooperation: Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. Includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: (1) Build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; (2) Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and (3) Provide Service members with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.
goals with those of the draft DIB DoDD to ensure consistency and alignment across DIB-related policy documents.

**Guidance for the Employment of the Force**

The 2010 GEF defines ten security cooperation focus areas. Six of these focus areas inform the DIB objectives. Figure 2.3 depicts the alignment of the GEF focus areas and DIB policy goals. The first column lists the DIB-related GEF focus areas by number, and the second column records their title. The last column lists the numbers of the DIB-related policy goals. These goals are listed in the numbered blue boxes at the top of the chart.

![Figure 2.3 Alignment of GEF Security Cooperation Focus Areas and DIB Policy Goals](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security cooperation focus area #</th>
<th>GEF security cooperation focus areas supported by</th>
<th>DIB DoDD goal #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Operational capacity and capacity building</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Human capacity/human capital development</td>
<td>1, 2, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Institutional capacity</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Support to institutional capacity/civil-sector capacity building</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization</td>
<td>3, 4, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>International suasion and collaboration</td>
<td>3, 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: DoD, 2010; USD(P), 2014b.

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16 DoD, 2010. As of this writing, the 2014 GEF is still being staffed and has not yet been released. Its anticipated release date is December 2014. The other four 2010 GEF security cooperation focus areas that were not directly related to DIB are (6) Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action; (7) Intelligence and Information Sharing; (8) Assurance and Regional Confidence Building; and (9) International Armaments and Space Cooperation.
Presidential Policy Directive 23

PPD-23’s SSA goals and objectives are also closely aligned with the DIB objectives in the draft DIB DoDD.17 PPD-23 was written to strengthen the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their security capacity, consistent with principles of good governance and rule of law. It articulates a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process. It emphasizes interagency collaboration; the judicious use of SSA resources; and informing policy through rigorous analysis and assessments.18 It presents a framework to improve unity of effort in the SSA community by mandating that the National Security Staff develop national-level SSA guidance derived from the NSS and other national-level guidance documents. SSA guidance is to include priority countries, regions, and functional areas, as appropriate. In addition, PPD-23 mandates that departments and agencies incorporate national-level SSA guidance into internal regional and functional strategies. It designates the Department of State (DoS) as the lead agency for coordinated interagency SSA planning and synchronization. Figure 2.4 depicts the alignment of the policy goals in PPD-23 with DIB policy objectives. As in Figure 2.3, the column at the right records the DIB policy goal(s) that support the indicated PPD-23 goal.

Defense Institution Building–Related Activity Objectives

In addition to the DIB policy goals and objectives, the draft DIB DoDD also specifies several specific objectives related to DIB activities. Although the activities are not specified, the instruction provides guidelines for engaging with partner nations to strengthen their defense institutions:

- Promote or establish democratic, civilian control of the armed forces.

17 A more detailed discussion of PPD-23 can be found in Chapter Three.
18 Office of the Press Secretary, 2013.
Figure 2.4
Alignment of PPD-23 and DIB Policy Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PPD-23 #</th>
<th>PPD-23 goals supported by</th>
<th>DIB DoDD goal #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Partner nations build sustainable security capacity</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Disrupt and defeat transnational threats</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Sustain public safety, security, and justice institutions</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c</td>
<td>Support legitimate self-defense</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1d</td>
<td>Contribute to urgent U.S. or partner military operations</td>
<td>2, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1e</td>
<td>Maintain control of their territory and jurisdiction waters</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1f</td>
<td>Indigenous forces assume greater responsibility</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Military access to airspace and basing rights</td>
<td>4, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>Improved operability and training opportunities</td>
<td>4, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Cooperation on law enforcement, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, combating trafficking</td>
<td>1, 4, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Civilian oversight of security, rule of law, accountability</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a</td>
<td>Partner nation capacity to contribute to peacekeeping missions</td>
<td>3, 4, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b</td>
<td>Facilitate regional cooperation exercises</td>
<td>3, 5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4c</td>
<td>Encourage adoption of U.S. products and technology</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** USD(P), 2014b; Office of the Press Secretary, 2013.

- Establish, build, reform, or improve national-level defense institutions.
- Align the defense sector with government-wide structures (including executive, legislative, and judicial branches) to advance democratic governance of the security sector.
- Define roles, missions, functions, and relationships within the defense sector, including subordinate military forces.
- Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military.
- Create and improve the administrative, legal, personnel, resource management, policy and strategy, logistics, acquisition, and similar authorities and systems necessary for the effective functioning
of defense governance and execution of operational and tactical activities.¹⁹

These objectives provide clear guidance that indirectly suggests the types of sanctioned engagements—even though the type of engagements are not specified. In addition, a close examination of the activity objectives and the DIB-related policy goals confirms that they are aligned (see Figure 2.5).

**Defense Institution Building Program Objectives**

For our purposes, we consider DIRI, WIF-DIB, MoDA, and DIILS to be DIB programs, and we examine their stated goals and objectives to see how well they align with the national-level DIB-related policy goals and objectives.

**DIRI Goals and Objectives**

DIRI’s global defense management model is designed to develop “effective, accountable, professional and transparent partner defense establishments in partner countries that can manage, sustain and employ national forces.”²⁰ The model consists of five “components,” all of which translate to goals and objectives. Table 2.1 lists the components and the corresponding goals and objectives.

Figure 2.6 records the linkages between the DIRI program objectives and the DIB activity objectives. The DIB activity objectives are listed and numbered in the panel above the tables and the DIRI program objectives appear in the rows of the first chart at the left. The columns at the right indicate which DIB activity objectives are supported by the program objectives. This same pattern applies to the WIF-DIB, MoDA, and DIILS (Figures 2.6 and 2.7) discussions below.

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¹⁹ USD(P), 2014b.

Based on this coding, DIRI program objectives do not explicitly focus on promoting civilian control of the military (activity objective 1). DIRI program objectives are concerned more with improving partner nation defense institutions (activity objectives 2 and 3).

**WIF-DIB Goals and Objectives**

WIF-DIB funds 16 developing countries participating in the PfP program, at least six nations of the Mediterranean Dialog, at least four...
nations of NATO Partners Across the Globe, and at least four nations of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Its objectives are to

1. build efficient and effective ministries of defense
2. increase transparency and accountability in personnel and resourcing systems
3. strengthen democratic control of the armed forces
4. reform defense and military education systems
5. enhance reform efforts in niche operational and tactical areas.

Figure 2.6 illustrates how the WIF-DIB program supports the DIB activity objectives. WIF-DIB explicitly supports the draft DIB DoDD objectives of democratic control of partner nation militaries and robustly supports all other DIB activity objectives.

21 Only the 16 PfP countries are fixed. The other three alliances have the number of constituent nations mentioned, but other nations with possible ties to these alliances could be considered for membership.

MoDA “partners [DoD] civilian experts with foreign counterparts to build ministerial core competencies such as personnel and readiness, logistics, strategy and policy, and financial management.” MoDA is a new program, still in development. Program objectives focus on providing partner nations with expert advice in establishing, strengthening, or reforming their defense institutions. MoDA requires the partner nation to fully support the program because it consists of having a full-time advisor embedded at the ministry level. The stated program objectives are as follows:

---

1. Provide institutional, ministerial-level advice and other training to personnel of the partner nation ministry to support stabilization or post-conflict activities.

2. Assist building core institutional capacity, competencies, and capabilities to manage defense-related processes.

3. Forge long-term relationships that strengthen the enabling and support capabilities of a partner nation’s defense ministry.\textsuperscript{24}

Figure 2.7 records the linkages between the MoDA program objectives and the DIB activity objectives, as well as the linkages between the DIILS program objectives and the DIB activity objectives. MoDA program objectives align most closely with the DIB activity objectives to improve partner nation defense systems and the defense sector in general.

**DIILS Goals and Objectives**

DIILS strives to develop and implement effective programs to build partner legal capacity—including equitable, transparent, and accountable security sectors; civilian control of the military; human rights; and representative, elected governments—through its mobile education teams (METs), resident courses, and other engagements.\textsuperscript{25} The four major program objectives are listed in Figure 2.7. DIILS appears to support all DIB activity objectives.

**Overlapping Goals and Objectives**

Although we discuss the “harmonization” of DIB activities in Chapter Four, it is instructive to highlight the broad overlap areas (see Figure 2.8). Some of the programs, such as WIF-DIB and DIILS, have niche missions and therefore have some objectives that do not overlap with other programs. WIF-DIB focuses on a limited number of


nations, and DIILS focuses on helping partner nations develop their defense legal capacity.

**Figure 2.7**
MoDA and DIILS Support of DIB Activity Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MoDA #</th>
<th>MoDA program objectives support</th>
<th>DIB program objective #</th>
<th>DIB activity objectives (draft DIB DoDD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Provide institutional advice to support stabilization or post-conflict activities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Promote civilian control of the armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Assist building core institutional capacity to manage defense-related processes</td>
<td>3, 4, 6</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Forge relationships that strengthen the enabling capabilities of a partner state’s defense ministry</td>
<td>3, 5, 6</td>
<td>Align defense sector within government-wide structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIILS #</th>
<th>DIILS program objectives support</th>
<th>DIB program objective #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Provide partner nation with the legal capacity to develop transparent and accountable security sectors</td>
<td>2, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Provide partner nation with the legal capacity to establish civilian control of the military</td>
<td>1, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Provide partner nation with the legal capacity to protect human rights</td>
<td>5, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Provide partner nation with the legal capacity to establish representative, elected governments</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Defense Institution Building Project Objectives**

DIB projects consist of the engagements with partner nations at the ministerial level, including joint and general staffs, service headquarters, and other appropriate armed forces institutions. These engagements can be funded by the four DIB programs or by the regional CCMD. In some cases, the CCMDs are supported by the four regional
centers. These centers generally provide education and training for partner nations’ future military leaders. DIB engagements by either the DIB programs or the CCMDs must be consistent with DIB goals and objectives. Figure 2.9 illustrates the chain of guidance and implementation for DIB engagements.

- **CCMDs**: The regional commands are guided by the GEF, the JSCP, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy (OSD[P]). They generally have a clear goal and strategy development processes. The GEF guides the development of their theater campaign plans (TCPs), which in turn inform the individual country security cooperation plans (CSCPs). The type of DIB engagements and which countries in their area of operations are selected to receive DIB support are generally decided annually in conjunction with the country teams, the regional centers, and the DIB programs. We discuss this more fully in Chapter Three.
**DIB programs:** The DIB programs take their guidance from OSD(P). However, in practice, they generally coordinate closely with the regional commands, the regional centers, and the country teams to ensure their activities are consistent with CCMD priorities.

**Other agencies and countries:** Other U.S. agencies are also engaged in partner nations in some way or other. Most notably,
DoS is active in all partner nations and the local ambassador heads the country teams. Other agencies can also be involved, such as the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. These other agencies are not subject to DoD guidance. However, with the implementation of PPD-23, SSA should be more integrated—at least between DoD and DoS. Foreign countries also operate in partner nations. Spain, for example, has interest in some South American countries, as does China.

Findings and Recommendations

**Finding: DIB Objectives Align Closely with GEF Security Cooperation Focus Areas and PPD-23 Goals**

When published, the draft DIB DoDD can serve as the principal rationalizing document for the overall DIB program. Tracing the goals and objectives through the several existing management layers was a rather difficult process. However, the DIB-related goals and objectives outlined in the draft DIB DoDD are informed primarily by two documents: the most recent GEF, and PPD-23. The GEF is consistent with strategic policy goals (as depicted in Figure 2.1), and PPD-23 is a national-level statement of SSA (and DIB-related) policy goals and objectives. These two documents form the basis of a rational set of goals and objectives for DIB that can provide guidance to the DIB programs, the regional centers, and the CCMDs.

GEF security cooperation focus areas 3 (Institutional Capacity) and 4 (Support to Institutional Capacity/Civil-Sector Capacity Building) are aimed specifically at the institutional level, and thus are the most closely aligned with the DIB policy goals. Focus area 3 specifically addresses security institutions, while focus area 4 addresses DoD assistance to non–security sector institutions. DIB policy objective 4 discusses improving the sustainability and impact of SSA investments and activities and is consistent with PPD-23 priorities. In addition,

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26 The draft DIB DoDD cites the 2008 GEF and PPD-23. The latter, however, cites the 2010 GEF and several other policy documents.
DIB policy objective 5 emphasizes U.S. whole-of-government relations, which is also one of PPD-23’s top priorities.

**Recommendation: Ensure DIB Goals and Objectives Focus at the Institutional Level**

Our review and comparison of the draft DIB DoDD objectives with those outlined in the GEF and PPD-23 revealed a close alignment; however, DIB policy objective 2 is simply listed as “prevent or mitigate instability, conflict, and authoritarian governance.” Although this objective is tangentially linked to the goals in the GEF and PPD-23, it is much more broadly focused than the other objectives in the draft DIB DoDD, and does not include language connecting it to the institutional level. We recommend revising the objective as follows: “Prevent or mitigate instability and conflict by building capacity at the institutional level, encouraging democratic governance.”

**Finding: Inadequate Dissemination of Guidance Inhibits Understanding of DIB**

One of the most important aspects of ensuring that goals and objectives are consistent from the policy to project levels is that appropriate policy guidance is disseminated and accessible to those developing strategies and plans at the various levels of DIB planning. The dissemination of DIB guidance to the CCMDs appears to be uneven. Part of the issue is sharing information and releasability of certain key documents. The GEF, for example, is still not distributed throughout the DoD community. For example, an AFRICOM planner admitted to not having access to the GEF during development of AFRICOM’s security cooperation objectives and strategy.\(^\text{27}\) In addition, it is difficult to get access to the newer versions of the GEF. The 2010 GEF was limited to 100 published copies, and the 2012 GEF is currently available only on classified networks. As the capstone document for DoD security cooperation planning, the GEF directs planning for near-term (two years) operational activities and incorporates input from DoS and

\(^{27}\) OSD interview 20140109-001, January 9, 2014.
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).\textsuperscript{28} It is a crucial document that should guide goal, objective, and strategy development at the operational and execution levels, which it cannot do if those levels cannot access it. One solution would be to make the security-sector focus areas available to the CCMDs. These focus areas were not classified in the 2010 GEF, and, if this is true for subsequent GEFs, providing the CCMDs with extracts would be helpful.

**Recommendation: Ensure DIB Guidance Is Sufficiently Disseminated and Accessible**

The most recent version of the GEF should be disseminated and accessible to all DoD parties who need it. DIB policy objectives appropriately align with the focus areas included in the GEF. Consequently, within the DIB community, issues associated with sharing the GEF can be overcome with the timely publication, dissemination, and subsequent revision of the DIB DoDD. The GEF accessibility problem emphasizes the need to ensure that PPD-23 and the DIB DoDD (when published) are disseminated by OSD(P) across the DIB community. These documents should reach all relevant parties and should be accessible to anyone who needs to reference them. Since they are unclassified documents, this could mean partner nations as well.

**Finding: Understanding of DIB Differs Among CCMDs**

Currently, CCMD interpretation of DIB differs significantly, so DIB-related events and activities are referred to by several different terms. For example, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) refers to DIB as “defense security sector reform” (D/SSR),\textsuperscript{29} and DIB-related activities fall under the D/SSR intermediate military objective (IMO) of SOUTHCOM’s TCP. In addition, while DIB is not considered one of U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM’s) major lines of effort (LOEs),


\textsuperscript{29} Recent communication (December 2014) with the command indicates that D/SSR will be called DIB shortly.
“building strong relationships” is considered one of the ways that cuts across all LOEs. Although PACOM has a separate theater security cooperation plan (TSCP), which includes DIB-like activities, DIB is treated as a minor subset of security cooperation. AFRICOM views DIB to be strengthening operational forces, but, as a relatively new command, it is still working to develop its objectives and TCP. Furthermore, most CCMDs conflate DIB with DIRI and do not realize that other elements, such as MoDA and DIILS, are part of DIB.

**Recommendation: Improve CCMD Understanding of DIB**

A better understanding of DIB to include the enterprise goals and objectives can be affected by three closely related actions:

- **Documentation:** CCMDs and country teams need a clearer understanding of DIB. This will be partly resolved once the draft DIB DoDD is published and disseminated to the CCMDs and country teams.

- **Education:** A basic DIB “familiarization” module should be part of the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) / SCO and attaché training at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) before deployment.

- **Clarification:** The draft DIB DoDD currently includes definitions of both “defense institutions” and “defense institution building.” These definitions are included in Chapter One of this report. DIB activities consistent with both definitions should be explicitly identified and defined in the DIB DoDD, and the entity implementing the activity should also be identified in the DIB DoDD.

**Finding: Timeline for Developing and Revising Goals and Objectives Is not Compatible Across Levels and Organizations**

The timeline for setting and revising DIB goals and objectives should be coordinated and sequential. Goals and objectives at the country level should be informed by the regional, program, and policy levels. Although there is good coordination between CCMD TCP and CSCP development (CSCPs are generally developed and revised during
the CCMD TCP revision and development process), this coordination does not necessarily translate to the program and policy level. In fact, since the understanding of DIB differs across CCMDs, it is not uncommon for DIB country objectives to be developed separately from CCMD objectives.30

It is also important that the development of DIB goals and objectives align with those of relevant strategic policy. Some respondents at the program level and below complained about insufficient guidance. SOUTHCOM, for example, reported receiving almost no guidance from OSD on DIB priorities. Although aware of the draft DIB DoDD, much of SOUTHCOM’s DIB activities were initiated from within, without higher-level policy guidance.31 Coordination at this level is extremely important because it is essentially where OSD policy is translated into execution at the country team level. Several policy documents do exist, such as Joint Publication 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense.32 This document explains the security cooperation process from strategy development through assessment and evaluation. PPD-23, released in April 2013, goes through the strategy development, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation processes in considerable detail. Finally, the draft DIB DoDD assigns specific responsibilities to all levels involved in the DIB process.33

The timeline of goal and objective development should be consistent across departments as well. We found that, from the country team level, DoS development of integrated country strategies (ICS) is not on the same timeline as DoD’s TCP and CSCP development. DIB goals should be completely integrated into the ICS, as should CSCPs, but the timelines are not structured to accommodate this.34 PPD-23 man-

30 For example, a DIRI project manager in Colombia admitted to developing DIRI objectives for Colombia separately from the TCP or CSCP. CCMR interview 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.
32 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Publication 3-22, July 12, 2010.
33 Because it is still in draft form, this document has not been disseminated and does not officially serve as a policy directive for DIB.
34 SOUTHCOM interview 20140407-003, April 10, 2014.
dates that DoS will be the coordinating agency for all SSA events and activities, and that ICSs will likely be the primary strategy documents guiding activities in-country; however, this has not yet been executed across the SSA and DIB communities.

**Recommendation: Develop Consistent Timelines Between Levels and Organizations**

The timeline for the development and the revision of DIB-related goals and objectives, from the policy to program to project levels, should be aligned to be more sequential with the higher policy-level objectives informing objectives at the CCMDs, DIB programs, regional centers, and country teams. In the reverse direction, the program and project levels should provide input into the review processes at the policy level to ensure consistency. This means that CCMD strategies and objectives should be informed by OSD(P)-level objectives, and the goals and objectives of all DIB activities in different countries should be coordinated through the CCMD and should be reflected in the CSCP and DoS’s ICSs. Since the ICSs are defined in PPD-23 as the nexus of all SSA activities in-country, DIB programs should actively work to ensure DoD priorities are accurately reflected in these strategies by aligning the timelines of objective and strategy development with that of ICS and DoS.

**Finding: Involvement of Partner Nations in Setting DIB Objectives at the CCMD Level Is Inconsistent**

Ideally, setting goals and objectives at every level should be deliberate, and should not be driven by resources or bias from any party involved.

- *Regardless of U.S. objectives, partner nations should not be offered DIB assistance they cannot absorb or are unwilling to accept.* In some cases, partner nation wants and capacity are ignored. This can lead to implementing a wide range of engagements, events, and activities driven almost solely by U.S. interests.35 Partner nations do not always want what the U.S. wants them to have.

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35 OSD interview 20140124-001, January 24, 2014.
For example, certain partner nations are hesitant to accept U.S. training and assistance (e.g., India, Argentina) while others accept it blindly without asking questions (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]).

- **Partner nations should be involved in setting goals and objectives for their countries.** Although there is some disagreement concerning the level of partner nation involvement in setting DIB goals for their countries, all agree that the partner nation should be involved in some way.³⁶

**Recommendation: Clarify the Role of Partner Nations**

U.S. relationships with partner nations vary considerably from that of an equal partner to one in which the partner nation is willing to accept anything offered. At present there is no agreed level of partner nation engagement in determining DIB investments. To ensure that U.S. investment is worthwhile and effective, the partner nation’s level of capability and willingness to accept the assistance offered should be taken into account in determining the U.S. level of involvement.³⁷ The objective is to preclude forcing assistance on a country that does not want it or cannot absorb it.

**Finding: Special Operations Command’s DIB Role is Unclear**

As a new entity contributing to DIB, U.S. Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM’s) role in the DIB community and relationships with other CCMDs is still evolving. SOCOM contributes to TCPs through its theater special operations commands (TSOCs). The command is developing the *Global Campaign Plan for Special Operations* (GCPSO), which will serve as its campaign plan for operationalizing the special operations forces (SOF) strategy—including DIB.³⁸ However, SOCOM has no regional mandate except through TSOCs, which are the regional elements aligned with the CCMDs. In addition, although

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³⁶ OSD interview 20140115-001, January 14, 2014.

³⁷ In Chapter Three, we discuss this in the context of partner nation selection and prioritization.

³⁸ SOCOM interview 20140408-001, April 8, 2014.
the GCPSO addresses the SOF strategy for global involvement, it is not clear how SOCOM will contribute to regional engagements through the TSOCs.

**Recommendation: Continue to Engage and Coordinate with SOCOM**

Although SOCOM’s role in the DIB community and relationships with other CCMDs is still evolving, it is a global command operating at some level in 78 countries. The CCMDs are the SOF customers. There are similarities between SOCOM and the DIB programs, so as SOCOM’s DIB role evolves, it may be a good model for global DIB strategy development. Similar to DIB programs, SOCOM must prioritize its engagements and global involvement based on available resources and competing demands. Thus, it will be useful and important to closely involve SOCOM in the development and evolution of the DIB programs and community, so that global engagements continue to align.

Table 2.2 summarizes this chapter’s major findings and recommendations.

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39 SOCOM interview 20140408-002, April 8, 2014
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendation(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIB objectives align closely with GEF security cooperation focus areas and PPD-23 goals</td>
<td><em>Ensure DIB goals and objectives focus at the institutional level:</em> We recommend revising DIB DoDD objective 2 to read as follows: “Prevent or mitigate instability and conflict by building capacity at the institutional level, encouraging democratic governance.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate dissemination of guidance inhibits understanding of DIB</td>
<td><em>Ensure DIB guidance is sufficiently disseminated and accessible:</em> OSD(P) leadership should create an unclassified, stand-alone security cooperation extract of the GEF that could be disseminated and made accessible to all DoD parties who need it. Within the DIB community, issues associated with sharing the GEF should be overcome with the timely publication, dissemination, and subsequent revision of the DIB DoDD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of DIB differs among CCMDs</td>
<td><em>Improve CCMD understanding of DIB:</em> A better understanding of DIB to include the enterprise goals and objectives can be affected by three closely related actions: (1) improved documentation, (2) adding a DIB “familiarization” module as part of ODC/SCO and defense attaché training at DISAM before deployment, and (3) clarification of activities consistent with DIB DoDD definitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeline for developing and revising goals and objectives is not compatible across levels and organizations</td>
<td><em>Develop consistent timelines between levels and organizations:</em> The timeline for the development and the revision of DIB-related goals and objectives should be aligned to be more consistent with higher policy-level objectives development. In the reverse direction, the program and project levels should provide input into the review processes at policy levels to ensure consistency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of partner nations in setting DIB objectives at the CCMD level is inconsistent</td>
<td><em>Clarify the role of partner nations:</em> To ensure that U.S. investment is worthwhile and effective, the partner nation’s level of capability and willingness to make effective use of the assistance offered should be taken into account in determining the U.S. level of involvement. The objective is to preclude forcing assistance on a country that does not want it or cannot absorb it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM’s DIB role is unclear</td>
<td><em>Continue to engage and coordinate with SOCOM:</em> Since SOCOM is a global command, it may be a good model for global DIB strategy development. Similar to DIB programs, SOCOM must prioritize its engagements and global involvement based on available resources and competing demands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER THREE
Selecting and Prioritizing Partner Nations

Next, we focus on processes for selecting and prioritizing partner nations and activities for DIB investments. At the CCMD level, selecting partner nations is generally simple, as CCMDs usually know which nations are willing and able to accept assistance in developing their defense institutions, which will benefit from such investments, and which engagements are consistent with OSD guidance. However, allocating resources to the selected countries can be problematic, in that it requires the implementation of a prioritization process.

For DIB programs, assessing partner nation requirements can be more difficult, given that, with the exception of WIF-DIB, their mandate is generally global. DIB engagements—and security cooperation engagements more broadly—are often demand-driven, with DIB programs receiving requirements from OSD, CCMDs, country teams, and, at times, other DIB programs. There is no common process across DIB programs for selecting among these requirements and, as a result, each program has developed its own selection process.

PPD-23 does provide guidance on partner nation SSA by requiring that “The United States Government . . . introduce common standards and expectations for assessing [SSA] requirements, in addition to investing in monitoring and evaluation of [SSA] programs.” The objective is to gain an understanding of the partner nation’s security environment, its willingness, and “[its] propensity to implement and

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1 Office of the Press Secretary, 2013.
sustain assistance, improve institutional capacity, and build capabilities in the context of U.S. country objectives.”

In this chapter, we begin with a short section on DoD’s partner nation security sector assessment process. Nations selected for DIB investments can be assessed to determine if their security and political environments are such that they can absorb and sustain DIB engagements. Next, we examine formal and informal factors determining country DIB engagements for all sectors of the DIB enterprise, from DIB programs to CCMDs. We then review the processes that DIB programs have put into place to prioritize among OSD, CCMD, and country team requirements. Finally, we examine how CCMDs prioritize partner nations and select the most appropriate activities for each of them.

Security Sector Assessment

Although not exclusively a process to assess a candidate partner nation’s readiness to absorb DIB engagements, the security sector assessment process evaluates a candidate nation’s need for DIB and other SSA investments. It does not establish criteria for selecting the partner nation or for prioritizing selected nations; rather, it provides an understanding of a selected nation’s security sector, thereby identifying gaps in security that might include deficiencies in ministerial-level management and oversight. We include it here because it can be effective in identifying gaps in capabilities—especially in the structure and functioning of partner nations’ defense institutions.

What follows is a discussion of the directives, frameworks, and planning processes associated with SSA. It begins with PPD-23, followed by DoS’s SSA planning process. Next, we discuss the USAID Interagency SSA Framework, aimed at providing a common foundation

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for security sector assessment. Finally, we refer to a country rating tool developed by RAND for DSCA.

**PPD-23**

The PPD dealing with SSA is designed to improve the way the U.S. government provides SSA throughout the world. DIB is one element of SSA and therefore falls under this directive. The overall objective is to improve how the U.S. government enables partner nations’ abilities to “provide security and justice for their own people and [respond] to common security challenges.” The directive establishes four SSA goals:

1. Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges.
2. Promote partner support for U.S. interests.
3. Promote universal values, such as good governance.
4. Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and institutions.

Clearly, achieving these goals will require capable and efficient defense institutions.

The document also lays out policy guidelines aimed at achieving the PPD goals and objectives. These guidelines form the foundation of the security sector assessment process described later. When considering SSA for a partner nation, the United States will

- ensure consistency with broader U.S. national security goals
- foster U.S. government policy coherence and interagency collaboration
- build sustainable security sector capacity
- be more selective and use resources for greatest impact

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4 Office of the Press Secretary, 2013.

5 Office of the Press Secretary, 2013.
Defense Institution Building

- be responsive to urgent crises, emergent opportunities, and changes in partner nation security environments
- ensure short-term investments are consistent with long-term goals
- inform policy with rigorous analysis, assessments, and evaluations
- analyze, plan, and act regionally
- coordinate with other donors.

Basically, SSA implementation policy guidance consists of three central mandates: (1) ensure investments are enduring and that partner nations are willing and able to absorb the investment(s), (2) ensure that investments are internally and regionally consistent, and (3) implement SSA investments using a whole-of-government approach as much as possible.

**SSA Planning Process**

DoS has been designated as the lead agency responsible for SSA policy, management, and supervision. State was directed by the National Security Council to “draft a plan describing how State will incorporate interagency assessments, planning, and evaluations into existing and projected interagency planning processes.” The SSA planning process developed by State consists of four major steps: planning, budgeting, managing, and measuring. Each major step consists of two or three parts. Partner nation assessment is part of the planning process, and it addresses the various types of assessments associated with developing a basic understanding of a partner nation’s security sector.

The assessment part of the SSA planning process describes four types of assessments:

- **Country assessments:** Country SSA assessments focus on the development or review of the country’s ICS. The assessments address such topics as the willingness of the country to assume

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6 DoS, 2013b.

desired security roles, the nature of its security-sector institutions, its legal framework, and its political leaders.

- **Technical assessments**: Technical assessments bore into a single subsector of SSA to support resource and program decisions. One example would be a technical assessment of border security in a partner nation. These assessments address such topics as the institutions, systems, legal framework, reform processes, etc. Such assessments are conducted by teams of SMEs.

- **Functional assessments**: Functional assessments deal with some specific element of the security sector, such as counterterrorism or weapons of mass destruction. The objective is to understand the country’s strategy or plan for dealing with the specified security element, the capability of the country to deal with it, and its priority. Functional assessments directly support the development of functional plans.

- **Regional assessments**: Regional assessments deal with geographic areas. They may also focus on subregions, such as the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, etc. Although they may have a regional functional focus, they mainly address the changing security environment in the region, the strengths and weaknesses of existing regional security and justice institutions, and the success of recent or current regional security efforts. Regional assessments directly support the development of regional security plans.

SSA assessments are the first step in the planning element and therefore are the first step in the planning process. Although its focus is the security sector, it is an interagency, whole-of-government process. The expertise needed to effectively conduct security sector assessments cuts across multiple agencies.

**The USAID Interagency SSA Framework**

USAID published its framework in October 2010, long before the publication of PPD-23 and the DoS SSA planning process document. Nevertheless, it is still used because it offers a useful framework for

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8 USAID, 2010.
assessment and analysis that is consistent with current SSA assessment policy. The stated purpose of the document is to provide a common foundation for government agencies to assess partner nation security and justice sectors and to recommend reforms as needed.

The framework consists of ten steps, as depicted in Figure 3.1. The objective is to follow the ten-step framework to “measure the quality of security sector governance and the capacity of the [partner nation] government to deliver security, public safety, and justice services.”

- **Step 1: Conduct background review.** The focus of this step is on gathering political, historical, economic, geographic, and demographic information.
- **Step 2: Assess the security context.** Examine national security interests, priorities, and threats. Examine regional and transnational security issues.
- **Step 3: Map actors, institutions, and procedures.** Focus is on actors relevant to the issues, threats, and challenges identified in Steps 1 and 2.
- **Step 4: Assess governance and capacity.** More than any other step in the process, this one relates most closely to DIB. This step is at the heart of the process in that it focuses on civilian oversight of security forces, human and institutional capacity, and institutional transparency.
- **Step 5: Prioritize issues and targets of opportunity.** This step is essentially a gap analysis—what are the issues that need resolving and in what order?
- **Step 6: Conduct a stakeholder analysis and consider political will.** This step follows naturally from Step 5. Once the gaps are

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9 USAID, 2010, p. 6. DIRI developed an assessment framework patterned after the USAID’s. DIRI made some changes to it so it was closer to their approach, but felt that the USAID format did not quite capture how DIRI does assessments, so the document describing the DIRI approach is still in draft form. DIRI feel that there were some changes that could be made to better reflect the approach that needs to be taken. DIRI plans to make these revisions early in 2015. (Personal communication with Director, DIRI, November 2014).
identified, the officials involved in each are identified and their willingness to resolve the issues is assessed.

- **Step 7: Research existing partnerships.** The task here is simply to see where the U.S. government can complement and supplement existing activities.

- **Step 8: Reprioritize issues and targets.** After reviewing the information gathered in preceding steps, reprioritization of issues and targets may be in order.

- **Step 9: Conduct a risk assessment.** The risks center on the balance of power between civilian and military actors. Reforming
the security sectors may shift this balance, potentially causing conflict.

- **Step 10:** Provide recommendations for strategy and programs. Prepare a written document outlining the findings from applying this process and recommend activities and strategies to close the gaps found.

This process is designed to be implemented by an interagency country assessment team. The idea is to gain a clear understanding of the target country’s security sector environment. As mentioned earlier, this and all the processes and procedures discussed in this section are not designed to select and prioritize partner nations; rather, they are designed to gain a better understanding of a selected nation.

**The Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool**

The Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool (DSART) performs a function similar to the USAID Interagency SSA Framework, but instead of a broad narrative set of assessment instructions accompanying each step, the DSART provides the assessment team with a set of questions designed to capture qualitative and quantitative (using a one to five rating scale) assessments of a partner nation’s defense sector, its institutions and processes, and its capacity to carry out operations. The tool focuses on six security characteristics: defense institutions and processes, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, border and maritime security, counterpiracy, and post-conflict stabilization.10

Like the USAID framework, the DSART predates PPD-23 and the State Department’s security sector assessment process by four years. Nevertheless, it is consistent with these documents and provides a more structured assessment process. For each of the six security sector characteristics depicted in Table 3.1, a series of questions have been formulated aimed at scoring the nation with respect to the characteristic.

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For each of these characteristics, several questions are posed for the assessment team to consider when scoring the characteristic. The scoring form for one characteristic, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities, is depicted in Table 3.2. Depending on the answers, these questions might inform multiple counterterrorism and counterinsurgency functions listed in Table 3.2. The following are the questions posed for this characteristic:

- Is the military involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities?

### Table 3.1
DSART Security Sector Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Sector Characteristic</th>
<th>Assessment Parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense institutions and processes</td>
<td>How the country’s defense sector matches up to U.S. views of “critical capacities” and prospects for reform in areas where deficiencies are found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities</td>
<td>Country’s military capabilities to carry out “critical functions” to respond to terrorism and insurgency threats and prospects for improvements in capabilities where deficiencies are found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counternarcotics capabilities</td>
<td>Country’s military capabilities to carry out “critical functions” to respond to threats from illicit narcotic trafficking and prospects for improvements in capabilities where deficiencies are found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border and maritime security capabilities</td>
<td>Country’s military capabilities to carry out “critical functions” to respond to threats across its borders and its maritime operations and prospects for improvements in capabilities where deficiencies are found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpiracy capabilities</td>
<td>Country’s military capabilities to carry out “critical functions” to respond to piracy threats and prospects for improvements in capabilities where deficiencies are found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities to stabilize post-conflict situations</td>
<td>Country’s military capabilities to carry out “critical functions” to attain post-conflict stabilization and prospects for improvements in capabilities where deficiencies are found</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Shaefer et al., 2010.
Table 3.2
Example Assessment Form: DSART Areas for Improvement in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Counterterrorism/Counterinsurgency Functions</th>
<th>Qualitative Assessment</th>
<th>Quantitative Assessment&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintain security throughout the country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect and analyze intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide policing and law enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect critical infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry out military surveillance and interdiction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrate strategic communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold territory and control roadways, waterways, and airspace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to the design and delivery of an overall integrated government strategy and operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train military forces for counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disrupt financing by terrorist or insurgent groups from within or outside the country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny support to terrorist or insurgent groups from domestic populations or from outside the country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Schaefer et al., 2010, p. 17.

<sup>a</sup> The quantitative assessment is an interval scale from 1 (lowest score) to 5 (highest score).
• How well does the military operate with law-enforcement agencies in counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency operations?
• Are sufficient numbers of military forces involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities?
• Does the military have planning, doctrine, and logistics support geared toward counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations?
• Are the military and police adequately trained in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics?
• Does the military have adequate equipment to conduct counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency operations?
• Does the government have the right type of information on terrorists or insurgents (e.g., what areas they are operating in, their prospects for expanding their operations, how they align themselves, their grievances)?
• Does the government have an understanding of the support given to terrorists and insurgents by other states or international groups?
• Is the military able to combat the tactics used by terrorists and insurgents from inside and outside the country?
• Is the military able to process and share intelligence with other states effectively and quickly?
• Does the government have sufficient ties to the domestic and international financial sector to disrupt terrorist financing?
• Does the military include civil affairs units to conduct civil-military reconstruction/infrastructure projects aimed at winning over local civilians’ support?11

Answers to these questions then inform the qualitative and quantitative scoring chart depicted in Table 3.2.

As mentioned at the outset, country security sector assessment is not a partner nation selection or prioritization process, but an assessment of a selected partner’s security sector capabilities.

11 Taken from Schaefer et al., 2010. Similar sets of questions and scoring forms are included in the referenced document for the other five security sector characteristics.
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the selection processes currently in use at the CCMDs, the DIB programs, and the regional centers.

**Formal and Informal Factors Determining Country DIB Engagements**

A formal guidance structure for country selection and prioritization is depicted in Figure 3.2. The chart depicts a simplified view of the guid-

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**Figure 3.2**

Selecting and Prioritizing Partner Nations for DIB Investments

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- OSD Policy
- DSCA
- CCMR
- DIRI
- WIF-DIB
- MoDA
- DIILS
- Other DIB

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**Guidance for Employment of the Force**

- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
- Theater Campaign Plan
- Country Security Cooperation Plans
- Country DIB Engagements

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**Integrated Country Strategies**

- Other U.S. agencies
- Other countries

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**DoS Bureau of Political Military Affairs**
Selecting and Prioritizing Partner Nations

ance issued to both the CCMDs and the DIB programs to drive the partner nation selection and prioritization process. CSCPs and ICSs are the two key documents that provide guidance to CCMDs, OSD, and DIB programs on country DIB engagements. Within the CCMD, the TCP is the primary instrument used to inform the CSCP. Overall TCP guidance begins with the NSS and flows through the GEF and JSCP.

The GEF provides instructions for preparing TCPs and contingency plans for review and assessment. It specifies security cooperation in several focus areas. DIB guidance in the GEF is specified under the security cooperation focus area. The most relevant DIB areas include conducting institutional capacity building activities that enable a partner nation to better (1) manage human resources, (2) develop and sustain military capabilities, and (3) manage military justice. In general, CCMDs should consider two major factors for country selection: U.S. interests in the region, and partners’ willingness and ability to absorb and maintain the assistance. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the preparation of TCPs via the JSCP:

The JSCP translates broad GEF guidance into specific strategic and operational planning directives to [combatant commanders]. It links strategic guidance and the joint operation planning activities and products that implement the guidance. For TCPs, the JSCP provides direction for developing campaign plans and expands on global defense posture, force management, and security cooperation matters found in the GEF.

Besides CSCPs and ICSs, four additional elements help determine where country DIB engagements should take place. First, DIB planners must take into account requirements from other U.S. agen-

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12 This is a simplified version of Figure 2.9.
13 Figure 2.3 lists the six specific security focus areas in the 2010 GEF.
cies. Examples include the Department of Justice and, especially in SOUTHCOM, the Drug Enforcement Agency. Second, they need to know what DIB activities other countries (especially U.S. allies) are undertaking to avoid duplicating these activities and, ideally, be able to complement them. This coordination is generally done at the CCMD level. SOUTHCOM, for instance, has worked with Spain to conduct DIB-related courses in Spanish in countries in its area of responsibility (AOR).\textsuperscript{16} Third, DIB planners need to look at individual requirements from DIB programs. Finally, high-level interventions from either the U.S. government or the partner nation can also trigger DIB events. This political factor cannot be taken into account in any formal model of country selection, but may play a role in influencing the direction of DIB activities.\textsuperscript{17}

In theory, DIB programs’ engagement activities should be driven primarily by OSD(P) (see Figure 3.3). For instance, DIRI has implemented OSD(P)’s guidance to focus on countries that have sufficient institutional capacity and willingness to absorb DIB engagement activities.

\[\text{A recommendation not to conduct a DIB activity} \text{ may be based on an evaluation that the project will face a low probability of success . . . [or] a determination that other areas within the government need developing before DIRI’s work in the defense sector will have a sustainable effect.}\textsuperscript{18}

OSD(P) also provides a regional view of priorities, with regional DASDs providing guidance to the regional centers. Such guidance, however, is not systematic. Regional DASDs show different levels of interest in DIB. For example, DASD Central Asia does not provide guidance to

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with SOUTHCOM Strategic Planning Division (J55) personnel, April 2014.

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with CCMR personnel, April 2014.

\textsuperscript{18} DIRI, \textit{DIRI Country Project Management: Phases of a Country Project}, December 20, 2012 (emphasis added).
DIB programs on partner nation selection and prioritization. DASD Africa relies on the GEF for such guidance but meets with practical challenges to communicate it due to the limited distribution of the GEF Security Cooperation section for countries in the region. Furthermore, key guidance documents—such as DSCA strategic plans, the draft DIB DoDD, and PPD-23—do not address the issue of partner selection and prioritization. As a result, the selection of countries and engagements within these countries is often an ad hoc process.
DIB Program Selection and Prioritization Process

This section examines the different prioritization schemes that DIB programs have developed. Each DIB program has put in place specific processes to address requirements and prioritize DIB recipients.20

Wales Initiative Fund

Selecting partner nations for DIB investments is a bit easier for WIF-DIB than for other DIB programs, since partner nations eligible for WIF-DIB investments are somewhat limited, while others are global. Previously, eligibility requirements for WIF funding included (1) participating in NATO’s PfP program, (2) being on the World Bank’s list of “developing countries,” and (3) not being part of other NATO programs.21 However, under new guidance, WIF funds may be used “to support other nations that have sufficiently formal and substantive relationship to NATO.”22 In general, “WIF-funded activities with non-PfP partners will be NATO-focused and dedicated to achieving NATO partnership goals, as applicable.”23

The process of prioritization of WIF-DIB activities in the eligible countries is conducted by the CCMDs and is discussed in detail later in this chapter. The reason for this is that there are several funding sources for DIB activities in WIF-eligible countries—not just WIF-DIB. In addition, planning for engagements in eligible countries generally includes the full spectrum of security cooperation activities—not just DIB.

Defense Institute of International Legal Studies

DIILS’s small size—approximately 30 people, including contractors—limits its ability to intervene in all the countries where its presence is

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20 For a description of the various DIB programs and the regional centers, see Appendix B.


23 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, 2014
requested. There is, however, no formal country selection process in place, and intervention is decided on a case-by-case basis. As one interviewee put it:

We need to consider what DIILS can do and the capacity to absorb and sustain engagements with the [host nation]. DIILS has a very limited capacity to support perceived needs because of personnel constraints.24

The same interviewee acknowledged that such a process is much needed, with criteria that could include the absorption capacity of potential partners and other DIB activities taking place at the same time. Limited capacity also prevents DIILS from sending advisors for several months at a time in countries that would require such long-term engagement, and limits multiyear engagement to one or two countries.25 More specifically, the respondent offered these criteria for selection:

Selection should be based on whether countries have established [a] legal advisor construct within their systems currently. This speaks to absorptive capacity of [the] country to accept and utilize training, and this is better to work into a multi-year, multi-phase approach and engagement with the country.26

Its size makes it impossible for DIILS to assign representatives to the CCMDs, even though such representatives would play an important role in channeling back to DIILS the needs and capacity of countries in the region.

Another constraint under which DIILS operates is funding sources, which are not necessarily fungible across the different types of engagements that DIILS can offer. For instance, Section 1206 funding can only go to defense ministry entities that have a counterterrorism mission, meaning that other activities—police training, for instance—

24 DIILS interview 20140326, March 26, 2014.
25 DIILS interview 20140326, March 26, 2014.
26 DIILS interview 20140326, March 26, 2014.
Defense Institution Building

must be funded through other sources. These limitations further constrain DIILS’ choice of countries to engage.

Based on these constraints, DIILS has adopted a mostly “bottom-up” country selection process. It engages countries based on either country team requests or the references of other U.S. government entities, such as embassies and the National Defense University NDU.

Defense Institution Reform Initiative

When DIRI started in 2009, its initial country selection process relied on calls for nominations from all CCMDs, the Joint Staff, and country teams. DIRI centralized these nominations on a spreadsheet and selected countries that received more than one nomination, as well as countries that received only one nomination but served U.S. objectives. DIRI further refined this initial list of countries through discussions with country teams to provide more information on each country. This “fact checking” of the initial list suggested that the selection was appropriate about half the time. One issue was the fact that small countries, where few programs were taking place, tended to weigh more heavily on nominations. Meanwhile, the process failed to capture some important priorities at the OSD(P) and CCMD levels.

These shortcomings led to a revision of DIRI’s country selection process. Rather than relying on a spreadsheet, DIRI adopted a more conversational or consultative process with the different institutional actors involved. In particular, DIRI tries to identify with CCMDs what the command’s priorities are, what DIRI can do, and what countries can absorb. The new selection process follows four steps: (1) Consultations with OSD, including regional and functional DASDs; (2) consultations with CCMDs; (3) consultations with country teams; and (4) elimination from the list those countries that are

27 DIILS interview 20140326, March 26, 2014.

28 DIILS interview 20140326, March 26, 2014.

29 DIRI interview 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.

30 DIRI interview 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.
not willing to accept DIB activities. Figure 3.4 illustrates the process. Partner nation selection devolves to the intersection of the four communities’ nominations: OSD, CCMDs, country teams, and willing and able countries.

Figure 3.4
DIRI Partner Nation Selection Process

31 DIRI interview 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.

32 DIRI has issued a project management guide that discusses four DIB project phases: project scoping, project design, project implementation, and project culmination. During the project scoping phase (phase 1), DIRI examines whether it should conduct a DIB engagement in the given country. The decision to proceed is based on these four steps. However, included in the document is this telling statement: “In many cases, the DIRI team may be directed by PSO to proceed to part 2 of the scoping process.” Part 2 follows a decision to proceed with the engagement. DIRI, 2012b.
This process is not without bias: Activities tend to cluster in CCMDs where the conversation goes well, since more countries from these CCMDs’ AORs end up on DIRI’s priority list. For instance, DIRI has a good working relationship with SOUTHCOM and, as a result, is highly involved in Central and South America—particularly Colombia and Uruguay, due to high demand from these two countries.33 Conversely, country selection becomes more difficult when different stakeholders disagree on which countries or activities should take priority. In the AFRICOM AOR, OSD and AFRICOM are engaged in such a disagreement, resulting in limited DIRI involvement overall.34 Having full-time regional managers at CCMR who would be responsible for coordinating with CCMD commanders may alleviate this issue to some extent.35 CCMR, however, has not yet been able to fill CCMD regional manager slots due to reduced funding.36

Finally, another factor that constrains the choice of countries for DIB engagement is the security situation and the ability of the DIRI team to operate safely in a given country. A planned effort in Libya was postponed shortly before it was due to take place because of such security concerns, among other things.37

**MoDA**

MoDA was initially restricted to Afghanistan, but its recent extension to the global level—the first MoDA engagement outside of Afghanistan took place in Kosovo in August 201338—makes it necessary to have a country selection process in place. Both DoD (OSD[P] and CCMDs) and DoS (regional bureaus and country teams) play a role in nominating countries, but DoD is in charge of the final selection, in

33 SOUTHCOM interviews 20140410-002 and 20140410-003, April 10, 2014.
34 DIRI interview 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.
35 CCMR interview 20140424-001, April 24, 2014.
36 CCMR interview 20140424-001, April 24, 2014.
37 DIRI interview 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.
coordination with DoS, country teams, CCMDs, DSCA, and partner nations. To be selected, a country must fulfill two conditions: (1) have a clear DIB requirement, and (2) be willing to work with an in-country advisor. Activities in these countries must fulfill two more conditions: (1) to advance U.S. objectives and desired end-states, and (2) complement other U.S. security cooperation activities.39

The list of 16 countries nominated as candidates for MoDA in fiscal year (FY) 2013 suggests that the program does not show, at this point, any regional preference, as it includes three countries in Europe, four in Asia, three in Central and Latin America, four in Africa, and two in the Middle East.40

**Combatant Command Partner Nation Selection and Prioritization**

CCMDs play a key role as an interface among country teams and SCOs, who channel requirements from partner nations, and the various DIB programs. CCMDs also coordinate with DIB program directors to fine-tune the implementation of DIB activities in their AORs. CCMDs are particularly useful in this role because of their comprehensive knowledge of the different countries in their AORs, which gives them the ability to prioritize among partner nations as well as among activities based on these partner nations’ needs. Although all CCMDs select and prioritize countries according to their respective TCPs, they also use various additional criteria—especially when prioritizing countries. This section examines the different selection and prioritization processes that CCMDs have adopted. However, these procedures change frequently as the commands try to streamline the process, so what is described here is valid at the time of this writing.

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39 DoD, undated a, pp. 3–4.
40 DoD, undated a, p. 4.
U.S. European Command

EUCOM has developed a strategy that links national guidance to operational activities (including DIB activities). The EUCOM strategy articulates the ways that EUCOM will achieve national strategic objectives. The strategy is implemented in four phases: planning, resourcing, execution, and assessment.

As part of the resourcing phase, EUCOM convenes the EUCOM Strategy Implementation Conference (ESIC) in the fall of each year. Security cooperation engagements—including DIB engagements—are discussed at this conference. One of the conference’s major objectives is “to begin identifying the specific activities and actions to be undertaken over a . . . future horizon to support the prior-established execution plans of ongoing [LOAs].” For each country, a team made up of in-country U.S. defense representatives, EUCOM staff and components, and other stakeholders develops its plan for security cooperation engagements for the next fiscal year. These plans are governed by the execution plans developed by the task leads for the EUCOM LOAs, which are driven by formalized EUCOM country steady state plans. In general, the LOAs are based on guidance from the GEF and other DoD directives and guidance. In addition, these plans are frequently “complemented by ‘proposals’ from sources who participate in the conference: National Guard State Partners, DIB Management Team members, and other ‘providers’ of managed programs and funding.”

The core resourcing team—consisting of the senior defense official/chief, ODC, the EUCOM J5 country desk officer, and the LOA office

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42 E-mail correspondence with EUCOM ECJ5-R, November 14, 2014.
43 E-mail correspondence with EUCOM ECJ5-R, November 14, 2014.
44 Robert L. Kloecker, “Implementing the Strategy of Active Security Plan: Executive Overview,” briefing, U.S. European Command, April 29, 2014b. SASPlan (also SAS PLAN) is a software application hosted on SIPRNET and is used to manage the myriad of detail principally in the execution, resourcing, and assessment of the country cooperation plan. It also refers to the body of practices and procedures principally focused on the LOA concept.
45 E-mail correspondence with EUCOM ECJ5-R, November 14, 2014.
of primary responsibility—collaborates in the process of identifying those activities and actions that support the ongoing LOAs.

These strategic value scores are recorded in a matrix arrayed as depicted in Figure 3.5. DIB engagements are included, as well as other security cooperation activities. The matrix is referred to as the “Chiclet chart,” because it consists of small colored squares with the scores inside. Although the scores inform the setting of priorities for proposed DIB management team (DMT) events, they are not the only input to the process; contextual information (political considerations, security issues, even-handedness, etc.) can sometimes cause low-scoring activities to gain precedence.46

Figure 3.5
The EUCOM “Chiclet” Chart

SOURCE: Adapted from Kloecker, 2014b.
NOTE: The numbers in this chart are notional. Only 11 of the 23 nations in the EUCOM AOR are represented and the number of engagements/activities is notional as well. The blue shaded cells are averages: the average strategic value score for country A is 5.5 and the average strategic value score for engagement/activity C is 5.8.

46 EUCOM interview 20141113-007, November 13, 2014.
Prior to the ESIC—and near the end of the planning phase of the planning cycle in June—each LOA in each country cooperation plan is examined and the tasked LOA is awarded a “strategic value” score based on how well the LOA supports the objectives and priorities in the commander’s strategy. Ideally, the DIB LOAs are derived from the DMT-recommended country action plans during the planning phase, and those DMT plans are supportive of the theater commander’s strategy and country plans.47

The objective of this process is to determine the strategic value of each LOA in a country plan, not just a score. In addition to the contextual component, strategic value captures the degree to which the LOA supports the objectives of the country plans; how the effort ranks in the CCMD’s theater priorities; and, finally, the weighting given to the effort by the functional proponents, such as a EUCOM staff directorate or a service component’s priorities.48 In Chapter Five, we discuss the composition of the strategic value score and its use in the DIB investment evaluation process.

EUCOM also solicits DoD’s input through formal guidance and informal consultations on which countries of engagement should be prioritized.49 Finally, funding sources represent another, sometimes limiting, factor determining levels and types of engagement. For instance, EUCOM’s engagement is relatively robust for the nine countries in its AOR that are WIF-eligible.50

U.S. Southern Command
Through its educational and professional exchange programs, SOUTHCOM promotes security sector reform among the nations in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. The command teams with programs such as DIRI and the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies to strengthen regional defense institu-

47 E-mail correspondence with EUCOM ECJ5-R, November 14, 2014. Detailed components of the strategic value score are discussed in Chapter Five.
48 EUCOM interview 20140429-004, April 29, 2014.
49 EUCOM interview 20140430-001, April 30, 2014.
50 EUCOM interview 20140430-001, April 30, 2014.
tions. The objective is to help partner nations develop accountable, professional, and transparent defense institutions.51 SOUTHCOM’s commitment to building partner capacity is outlined in the command’s posture statement to Congress in March 2015:

Our engagement—through our humanitarian and civic assistance programs, defense institution building efforts like the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, and the U.S. Southern Command-sponsored Human Rights Initiative—helps partner nations strengthen governance and development, professionalize their militaries and security forces, and increase their ability to conduct peacekeeping, stability, and disaster relief operations. Our military components are at the forefront of these engagement efforts and perform superb work in strengthening our security partnerships.52

The SOUTHCOM commander selects a few priority nations based on four criteria: (1) U.S. and SOUTHCOM strategic interests; (2) the level of access granted; (3) political will—i.e., the degree to which the selected country is willing to accept assistance; and (4) SOUTHCOM’s ability to sustain the effort. In some cases, a partner nation may approach SOUTHCOM to solicit assistance with its defense reform efforts. While that generally demonstrates political will and access, it may not always be in the strategic interest of the United States or SOUTHCOM to provide that assistance. Alternatively, there may be instances where the United States would benefit from providing institutional assistance, but the country in question may not be prepared to absorb or sustain this assistance.53


52 John F. Kelly, Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps, Commander, United States Southern Command, before the 114th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 2015.

53 SOUTHCOM interview 20141204-001, December 4, 2014. The respondent related the following example:
The country prioritization process is a bit more complex. It is an annual process that begins with the approval of the command’s TCP in December:

- **DIB activity nominations:** Once the TCP has been approved and the country cooperation plans derivative of this plan are in place, the CCMD accepts DIB activity nominations from a variety of sources, including the major DIB programs (mainly DIRI and DIILS), the Perry Center, the country SCOs, the components, and elsewhere. However, as yet, DoS has not nominated any activities. The nomination period generally begins in January and continues through June. However, in some cases, nominations are accepted beyond June.

- **Validation:** In all cases, nominated activities must support TCP and country cooperation plan objectives. The SME for DIB is required to validate or decline all DIB activities—regardless of the nomination source—in order for the activity to be funded and approved for execution in the region. Any activities conducted in the AOR must have country SCO approval as well. ICSs do not play much of a role in the nomination of activities, since they are in a different planning cycle than the TCP and lack specificity with regard to defense sector reform requirements. The CCMD relies mostly on the SCOs to coordinate their plans with DoS representatives in country. The ambassador is the final arbiter of all activities taking place in country; therefore, reliance is placed on the SCO coordination and recommendations.

- **DIB activity selection:** Validated nominations are entered in the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) database. Once in the TSCMIS database, a spread-

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54 SOUTHCOM still uses the TSCMIS instead of the Joint Staff–mandated Global TSCMIS (GTSCMIS). SOUTHCOM has been granted a deferment because the GTSCMIS does not yet have the capabilities needed at SOUTHCOM. SOUTHCOM interview 20141204-001, December 4, 2014.
Selecting and Prioritizing Partner Nations

sheet, such as the one depicted in Figure 3.6, with pertinent information about each validated activity is entered. Approval is then granted after a series of meetings of interested parties where each activity is discussed. Selection is a subjective process done in committee. The final arbiter is the SOUTHCOM commander, who grants approval to all future-year security cooperation activities, typically, in August of each year.

- Resource constrained selection: Nominated and validated activities are aligned with the LOEs they support. The LOEs

![Figure 3.6](image)

**Figure 3.6**
SOUTHCOM’s Requirements Funding Prioritization Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOE</th>
<th>Defend southern approaches</th>
<th>Counter transnational organized crime</th>
<th>Counter-terrorism</th>
<th>Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief</th>
<th>Defense/security sector reform</th>
<th>Critical access and relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Personal communication between author and SOUTHCOM J9.  
**NOTE:** Tier 1 lists all of the activities that support both the commander’s designated priority LOEs and focus countries; Tier 2 lists the activities that are in a focus country, but are not supporting a priority LOE for that region; Tier 3 lists activities that support an emerging requirement or address a specifically identified need not aligned with a priority country or LOE; and Tier 4 lists all other activities. Once all the activities have been aligned within the matrix, funding is applied to activities by tier, left to right.

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55 Participants include the SOUTHCOM staff, the SCOs, the Perry Center, DIRI and DIILS representatives, the components, and others with an interest in DIB activities in one or more countries in the AOR.
(Figure 3.6) are themselves prioritized so activities that support the most important LOE are considered for funding first. However, the process is similar to the unconstrained selection process: interested parties meet to discuss and “bin” the activities into tiers—funding starts with the top tier and continues until funds are exhausted.

The planning process described above for all activities (including DIB) takes place between January and June and ends with a program plan for the next fiscal year. Following combatant commander approval, a theater security cooperation execute order is issued. Some changes to the program plan may occur at the last minute due to emergent requirements or funding increases/decrements, so the January-to-June planning window is not firm.

In FY 2014, SOUTHCOM introduced a prioritized set of LOEs to capture its IMOs, effects, and key tasks. DIB activities fall under LOE 4, defense/security sector reform. The IMOs fall under the LOEs.

- LOE 1: countering transnational organized crime
- LOE 2: counterterrorism
- LOE 3: humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
- LOE 4: defense security sector reform
- LOE 5: maintaining critical access in the region.

SOUTHCOM appoints SMEs for each LOE, and these SMEs can recommend approval for nominated activities in the validation process. The DIB SMEs include experts in legal reform, human rights, military health readiness, intelligence policy development, and defense institutions.

The Perry Center supports SOUTHCOM’s security cooperation mission by conducting such educational activities (in residence and in partner nations) as seminars, workshops, and other courses aimed at

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56 D/SSR will shortly become DIB. SOUTHCOM interview 20141204-001, December 4, 2014.
developing partner nations’ national security strategies. Participants include both military and civilian personnel from the partner nations. Classes include both the foundational courses that aim to build a common defense perspective and the more specialized courses, such as cybersecurity and countering transnational organized crime. However, recent budget cuts seriously curtailed their activities. Although the Perry Center liaison officer to SOUTHCOM was not affected through FY 2015, the future is uncertain.

**U.S. Pacific Command**

At PACOM, security cooperation initiatives, including DIB, are managed by the Security Assistance and Cooperative Division, J45. The division is guided in setting priorities by the *Security Cooperation Funding Business Rules*, published in January 2014. This document is primarily a directive outlining the process for submitting a security cooperation project for approval.

Although submissions are made by PACOM program managers, SCOs play an important role in the prioritization process because of their direct knowledge of partner nation needs and capacity. Program managers and PACOM planners also follow high-level guidance—namely, the PACOM TSCP. In order to prioritize events within selected countries, program managers and PACOM planners rely on input from service components and J5 as well.

Submissions of proposed projects are entered into two databases: the GTSCMIS and the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared

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58 PACOM interview 20140429-001, April 29, 2014.

59 PACOM interview 20140429-001, April 29, 2014.

60 PACOM, 2014.

61 GTSCMIS is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. According to Joint Staff J5, Deputy Director for Partnership Strategy, *Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS): Business Rules (Release 1)*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1, 2013:

GTSCMIS is a management information system, designed to manage security cooperation data from the initial event or activity entry to the completion and assessment phases.
Information System (OHASIS). Submissions are forwarded to the J45 in mid-March. Prioritization takes place in April using a scoring system. Three organizations score the projects based on the project’s contribution to the TCP, as embodied in the CSCP, complementing or in support of the country team’s ICS or mission resource request, and supported in the service component’s engagement resource plan. The three scoring offices are: the SCO/country team, service component/PACOM staff, and the J45. Any one project can accumulate up to 300 points, 100 from each of the three offices scoring the projects: 30 points for supporting the TCP, 25 points for supporting the CSCP priorities, 20 points for supporting the service component engagement resource plan, 15 points for supporting the ICS/mission resource request, and 10 points for multilateral initiatives (supporting more than one element).

Provisions are made for exceptions such as projects involving several countries, projects submitted by outside entities, out-of-cycle submissions, etc.

**U.S. Central Command**

Conducting security cooperation operations (including DIB) is one of CENTCOM’s eight LOEs. The objectives of security cooperation operations LOEs are to (1) ensure regional stability, (2) strengthen security agreements, (3) build regional and national defense capabilities, (4) enhance interoperability, and (5) advance economic development and good governance. Priority is given to DIB and other security

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62 OHASIS enables humanitarian assistance offices, including embassy staff, country team members, CCMD leads, and DSCA to manage the full life cycle of overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid projects. As a result, OHASIS has been provided to all of the geographic CCMDs and to country team members throughout the world for nominating projects. OHASIS is currently used to manage the full life cycle of over 3,000 projects. Additionally, OHASIS provides a mechanism for the U.S. government to share its appropriate releasable DoD humanitarian assistance information to other organizations, including both governmental and non-governmental organizations. See Army Geospatial Center, “OHASIS,” web page, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, undated.

63 PACOM interview 20140429-001, April 29, 2014.
cooperation projects that purport to advance these objectives. Unlike PACOM, there is no formal structured process to score individual project nominations. Instead, projects that support the desired end-states of the security cooperation LOE are given priority. The end-states aims are that partner nations

- remain accessible and cooperative with the United States
- maintain cooperative interest-based relations with their neighbors to enhance regional stability
- are capable of deterring, defending, and cooperating against attack; controlling their borders; and mitigating ungoverned areas.\(^{64}\)

CENTCOM’s AOR is relatively small (18 countries), which makes the country selection and prioritization process easier. Only a few of these countries are eligible for DIB engagement once the wealthy industrialized countries, countries at war, and countries that will not accept U.S. support or cannot absorb it are removed from the list. CENTCOM’s biggest security cooperation partners (including DIB) as of April 2014 were Yemen and Lebanon, followed by Jordan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia.\(^{65}\)

To some extent, different sources of funding command different priority countries and activities. CENTCOM can use WIF funding only for PfP countries (the Central Asian states) and, even then, WIF funding applies only to institutions that are placed under the authority of the ministry of defense. For a country like Tajikistan, where the Ministry of Interior is in charge of the military, DIB activities must be funded through other sources. In Turkmenistan, however, WIF funds can be used to engage the Ministry of Emergency Services, since it is under the Ministry of Defense.\(^{66}\) In the case of Section 1206 funds (dedicated exclusively to counterterrorism training), country teams

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\(^{65}\) CENTCOM interview 20140407-001, April 7, 2014.

\(^{66}\) CENTCOM interview 20140407-003, April 7, 2014.
identify counterterrorism gaps that can be addressed through training activities and send proposals to CENTCOM. These proposals are then prioritized based on several criteria, such as how much foreign military financing a country is receiving, how much it spends for its own counterterrorism activities, and how well it fits the GEF’s priorities. These proposals are submitted to DoD and DoS for approval.

**U.S. Africa Command**

Security cooperation projects are initially prioritized at the Annual Theater Synchronization Conference held in September. However, DIB projects are not considered in this process. AFRICOM is concerned that partner nations are able to function effectively at the operational level and that DIB is funded by OSD separately. This and several other workshops and various informal meetings are part of the country cooperation plan resourcing process that starts in January and delivers final funding decisions in December.67 Participants in these gatherings include country team representatives, country desk officers, the AFRICOM J5 staff, and other stakeholders.

However, in all of this, there does not appear to be an established set of criteria that might be used to prioritize candidate security cooperation—and especially DIB—projects. Interviewees indicated that “[selection and prioritization] is broken in the system. . . . The command can’t agree where to ask for [DIB] efforts to be applied.”68 OSD(P), in frustration, went around AFRICOM to obtain nominations directly from the country desk officers within the office of the DASD for African Affairs. With these nominations, the countries’ Offices of Security Cooperation/defense attachés were contacted directly—AFRICOM was cut out of the loop.69 AFRICOM has recently appointed a DIB coordinator with experience in other commands, reflecting a recognition that the DIB project prioritization process needs improvement.

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68 Interviews with OSD and AFRICOM staff, summer 2014.
69 Interviews with OSD and AFRICOM staff, summer 2014.
Like CENTCOM, AFRICOM has established LOEs, but security cooperation is not one of them. Instead, it is a component of all six LOEs—i.e., it cuts across all of them. This makes it more difficult to establish criteria for selecting and prioritizing countries and DIB projects that might help achieve security cooperation goals. Instead, AFRICOM focuses on the ten GEF security cooperation focus areas by expanding them to 38 AFRICOM focus areas. Several of the 38 areas do indeed focus on DIB, such as human resource management (HRM) and logistics and infrastructure management, but they are not recognized as such.

**U.S. Special Operations Command**

SOCOM’s DIB engagements target partner country institutions involved in countering violent extremist organizations, drug trafficking, human and weapons trafficking, and piracy. SOCOM bases its selection of partners on different indicators, including level of SOF access; partner nation SOF capability; level of terrorist threat; governance indicators (e.g., state legitimacy, respect for human rights); and socioeconomic factors (e.g., trade indicators, population density, access to water). These indices provide a picture of where the partner stands in relation to institutional capabilities and internal and external threats. A second step is to look at the partner’s willingness to contribute to the DIB effort. Finally, SOCOM examines the comparative advantages that some U.S. allies may enjoy with U.S. partner nations, making these allies better positioned than the United States to undertake DIB engagement.

The command refers to its security cooperation activities (including DIB) as “building partner capacity.” Its Directorate of Force Management and Development conducts capacity-building engagements that support the CCMDs, the TSOCs, and SOCOM’s International

70 SOCOM interview 20140408-002, April 8, 2014. Later in this chapter, we make a similar recommendation for selecting partner nations.

71 SOCOM interview 20140408-003, April 8, 2014.

72 SOCOM interview 20140408-005, April 8, 2014.
Engagement Program. The focus of these engagements is on increasing partner nation SOF capacity. Although the emphasis is on exercises and training (seemingly operational and tactical activities), their mission clearly states that they are about institution building:

[Building partner capacity] helps build institutional capacity and human capital of partner nations (PN) Special Operations Forces. Engagement begins at the strategic level and flows to the tactical level.

SOCOM is developing the Global SOF Network, which is designed to be a globally networked force of SOF, interagency partners, and allies able to respond rapidly to regional contingencies and threats to stability. Its goals for this global network are supported by two activities: capacity building and low-level presence. To help guide these activities and prioritize engagements, SOCOM places special operations liaison officers (SOLOs) within selected partner nations’ U.S. embassies. To date, SOLOs are serving in 14 nations with at least one in each of the six major CCMDs.

Findings

The CCMDs generally have a clear view of U.S. strategic interests and priorities in their AOR, based on the guidance from the GEF and the development of their TCPs. Like DIB programs, they also receive “bottom-up” requirements from country teams, which contribute their knowledge of each country’s needs and institutional environment. Both types of input are critical in evaluating whether DIB initiatives are feasible, and how they can be most effective.


74 Allaire, 2014.

DIB programs, however, tend to lack a regional perspective—largely due to the fact that they do not always communicate well with CCMDs. In some cases, DIB programs have regional office representatives within CCMDs. However, budget and personnel constraints limit this ability. As a result, DIB programs’ country selection processes tend to be largely demand-driven and focus on the specific requests of partner nations. Although this bottom-up approach gives DIB programs a lot of flexibility, it may also distract them from more strategic priorities and risks.

There are three aspects of the selection and prioritization process: partner nation selection, partner nation prioritization, and DIB project prioritization within a country. In addition, there are three communities involved in implementing DIB activities: the major DIB programs, the CCMDs, and the regional centers.

The geographic combatant commander provides direction, assigns tasks, and designates regional priorities and objectives to the regional centers; for that reason, we include the centers in the recommendations for the CCMDs.76

**DIB Programs**

DIB programs have developed processes for selecting countries and prioritizing their activities. These processes must respond to individual country-level requests without losing sight of high-level guidance. They must also ensure proper coordination of partner nation selection between CCMDs and DIB programs. We recommend that the DIB programs institute a consultative process involving OSD, the CCMDs, the country teams, and—ultimately—the partner nations. We recommend that, in selecting DIB partner nations and in selecting DIB projects within selected nations, all DIB programs consult as follows:

- **OSD**: Countries selected and DIB projects must support the goals and objectives set out in the draft DIB DoDD.77 Political imperatives can also determine which countries should be consid-

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76 DSCA, “DOD Regional Centers,” web page, undated b.

77 USD(P), 2014b.
For example, countries with bilateral or multilateral treaties with the United States may have precedence. In any event, guidance from OSD should be sought.

- **SSA planning**: DIB programs should consult the implementation plan for the SSA planning process written in response to tasking in PPD-23. Among other things, this plan establishes several criteria to be applied when considering a country or region for SSA—including DIB.78

- **CCMDs**: DIB programs should consult routinely with the CCMDs. The CCMDs know the countries within their AOR. They routinely prioritize nations for several reasons, including those nations that can benefit most from DIB engagements. To the extent possible and budget permitting, DIB programs should post a liaison officer with the CCMD staff element responsible for security cooperation.

- **Country teams**: DIB programs should consult with country teams when prioritizing DIB projects to be implemented within the country. The country teams also have some say in selecting the countries within the CCMD AOR.

- **Other DIB and security cooperation programs**: There is always a clear danger that partner nations become overwhelmed with well-meaning projects—and sometimes these may overlap. DIB programs should consult with other DIB and security cooperation programs to deconflict operations as much as possible.

- **The partner nation**: Finally, the host nation should be consulted to determine its needs before deciding to select the country for DIB investments and what activities to implement. The country must be willing to absorb the engagement, it must “buy in” to the activity by contributing some resources to its implementation, and there must be a reasonable expectation that the country and the region will benefit from the engagement in the long run.

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78 DoS, 2013b; and Office of the Press Secretary, 2013.
Combatant Commands

The CCMDs are in the best position to assess the relative importance of countries in their AOR with respect to DIB investment priorities. They respond to guidance from the GEF through the JSCP (Figure 3.1), and their TCPs address security cooperation initiatives in response to guidance from OSD(P). The DIB programs operate in their AORs and are supported by the regional centers, whose mission is “to facilitate engagement with and among foreign participants.”

As discussed above, all CCMDs have implemented procedures for selecting and prioritizing countries for security cooperation investment (including DIB). Most have identified LOEs or LOAs that delineate the command’s priorities in executing its mission, generally manifested in the form of IMOs. AFRICOM procedures appear to be the least developed and SOCOM’s selection and prioritization procedures more closely resemble those of the major DIB programs. The procedures we recommend are an amalgam of the selection and prioritization procedures currently in effect within the CCMDs:

- **Security cooperation (DIB) LOE:** Ensure that at least one LOE, LOA, or line of operation addresses security cooperation, including DIB. In two commands, security cooperation is considered a “cross-cutting” effort—meaning that all LOEs have a security cooperation component. On the surface, this may seem desirable, but in resource-allocation decisions, there is a tendency to focus on the named LOEs and to relegate security cooperation to a separate allocation process. This includes partner nation selection and prioritization.

- **Consultations:** There are many stakeholders in a CCMD’s AOR, each with some equity in the country or countries selected for DIB investment. As discussed in the DIB program recommendations, it is important that OSD, the country teams, and—most importantly—the partner nation be in accord concerning any proposed DIB activity. In addition, other agencies and other

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security cooperation programs should be consulted as well. This would be greatly facilitated by implementing the recommendations included in the next chapter on harmonization of DIB and security cooperation efforts. In most commands, the regional centers are partners with the CCMD in executing security cooperation and DIB through classes, seminars, and workshops. They should be included in this consultative process.

- **Scoring:** Once a security cooperation/DIB LOE has been established, the next step is to identify characteristics of supportive DIB activities. For example, PACOM has a system that awards a varying number of points to proposals that support TCP priorities. Proposed projects can then be evaluated with respect to the degree they possess the identified characteristics. The scoring system need not be numerical; it may be a qualitative assessment that ranks the proposed projects.

- **TCP:** Most commands have instituted a process designed to update the TCP on an annual basis. The plan generally looks out multiple years (usually five). The process usually consists of examining the IMOs in terms of the supporting LOEs, LOAs, or lines of operation and in the context of current and projected events in the region. If security cooperation and DIB are included as a separate LOE in support of an IMO, selecting and prioritizing DIB projects and countries becomes part of this process.

- **TSCP:** In some cases, the development of a TSCP can provide added visibility to security cooperation and DIB issues and thus facilitate the selection and prioritization process.

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**A Structured Approach to Partner Nation Selection**

Above, we discussed the several ways the DIB programs and the CCMDs selected partner nations for DIB engagements. The methods were varied, and some were quite simple in that the list of countries available to the program was proscribed. WIF-DIB, for example, is restricted to PfP countries, while the CCMDs are restricted to the countries within their AOR.
Nevertheless, for the DIB programs, we found that a consultative regime consisting of the following four criteria dominated the process in most cases:

- consultations with OSD, including regional offices
- consultations with CCMDs
- consultations with country teams
- elimination from the list those countries that are not willing and able to accept DIB activities.

In almost all of these consultations, subjective assessments—based perhaps on political imperatives, perceived country needs (determined by the security sector assessment process), and the perceived ability of the candidate nation to absorb and benefit from DIB engagements—decided the issue.

**Recommendations**

The recommendations below extract what we consider to be best practices from the processes currently in effect within all three communities. In this section, we propose a more structured and objective process that can use external factors to help decisionmakers evaluate a country for possible DIB investments.

SOUTHCOM lends itself as an illustrative example for determining potential partner nation DIB program implementation. In the following pages, we examine potential metrics that could be widely implemented throughout other CCMDs as a means to effectively measure potential risk, as well as potential success of the program to be implemented.

**An Objective Process**

A 2011 RAND report focusing on partner nation security cooperation integration proposed a systematic selection process that would allow for partner nation prioritization without adding to the workload of DIB program directors:
• **Select treaty nations:** As a first screening, select as priority partners those countries that have joined in treaties or alliances with the United States. The rationale here is that working with these nations is in the interest of the United States. However, a counter argument might be made that looking at non-alliance states might expand U.S. influence in the world.

• **Alter the priority partner list:** Recognizing that such a process, although objective, may include nations deemed no longer viable candidates or that there are nations not on the list that may be viable, the list is adjusted.

• **Filter through external indicators:** Next, we select priority candidates based on need and ability to gain from DIB investment by consulting several readily available indices, such as the rule of law and respect for human life. Other indicators, such as per capita gross domestic product (GDP), might also be used.\(^80\)

**SOUTHCOM as an Example**

To illustrate the process, we selected the countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR. There are 33 nations from Central America, the Caribbean, the Andean Ridge, and the Southern Cone. All of these countries are members of the Organisation of American States, so each has some affiliation with the United States. However, if we add in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio treaty), the list is narrowed to 16 countries (Table 3.3). Other agreements, such as membership in the World Trade Organization or free trade agreements, might expand or narrow the set.

**Indices**

The next step was to identify the appropriate indices that can be used to reflect a country’s likely need, ability, and willingness to absorb DIB investments. The indices we selected for demonstration are listed in Table 3.4, along with the source of the index, its measure, and its metric range.

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### Table 3.3
Countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR with Treaties or Alliances with the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Rio Treaty</th>
<th>OAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curacao</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next step was to decide index values that were potentially more favorable for DIB investments and which may be less. A detailed assessment of the individual indices has not been conducted, but for demonstration purposes, we used the following ranges for prioritization of DIB investments—that is, any country whose index score falls within the ranges below might be considered a priority for DIB.

- Rule of law: $[-1, +1]$
- Political stability: $[-1, +1]$
- Transparency and accountability: $[-1, +1]$
- Democracy: $[6, 8]$
- Respect for human rights: $[10, 12]$

The upper bounds on all the indices were not set at the maximum reasoning that countries with perfect or near-perfect indices may not need a DIB intervention. However, this can be altered depending upon the circumstances. Table 3.5 records the index values for the countries listed in Table 3.3.
Many of the countries have mixed scores; that is, some indices are in the priority range and some are not. The temptation to create a composite index should be resisted. The scores measure different things and combining may create some meaningless indicator. Instead the type of DIB investment should be considered. For example, if DIILS is considering deploying Mobile Education Teams to some of these countries, they might consider those countries with a priority rule of law score and perhaps a priority political stability score. Looking at countries that might not be a priority under this construct, the list includes: Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras. However, the United States has strong ties to Colombia and is developing ties with Guatemala. Therefore it may be the case that sometimes political factors that are not included in this index will matter as well.

Table 3.4
Priority Partner Nation Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Value Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>–2.5 to 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability</td>
<td>World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators</td>
<td>Political stability Absence of violence/terrorism</td>
<td>–2.5 to 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and accountability of security forces</td>
<td>World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators</td>
<td>Control of corruption</td>
<td>–2.5 to 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (non-authoritarian government)</td>
<td>The Economist Democracy Index: 2012</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1 to 10(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for human rights</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>Personal autonomy and individual rights</td>
<td>0 to 16(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>In dollars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) The democracy index is further scaled as follows:
- 1.0 to 3.9: authoritarian regime
- 4.0 to 5.9: hybrid regime
- 6.0 to 7.9: flawed democracy
- 8.0 to 10: full democracy.

\(^b\) Similarly, for the respect for human rights index, the lower values indicate a weak human rights record and the larger values a strong human rights record.
This index method for prioritizing partner nations for DIB investments is just one more tool to supplement the common-sense approach described above. It provides a mechanism to structure the prioritization process and to approach it more objectively. What this method provides is a more-analytic examination of various aspects of a partner nation’s security, stability, human rights record, and economic well-being.

Summary Findings and Recommendations
Table 3.6 summarizes this chapter’s major findings and recommendations.
Table 3.5
Country Index Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Transparency</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>GDP per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>–0.71</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>–0.49</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$14,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>–0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>–0.07</td>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$11,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>$15,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>–0.39</td>
<td>–1.40</td>
<td>–0.43</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$8,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$10,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>–0.70</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>–0.83</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$5,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>–0.75</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>–0.38</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$3,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>–1.10</td>
<td>–0.65</td>
<td>–0.61</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$3,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>–1.34</td>
<td>–0.79</td>
<td>–1.24</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>–1.17</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>–0.94</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$2,157</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
<td>–0.23</td>
<td>–0.15</td>
<td>–0.39</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$11,819</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>–0.87</td>
<td>–0.84</td>
<td>–0.84</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$4,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>–0.61</td>
<td>–0.86</td>
<td>–0.39</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$6,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>–0.19</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>–0.29</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>$20,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$16,714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6
Findings and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIB programs have developed processes for selecting countries and prioritizing their activities.</td>
<td>The DIB programs should establish a routine consultation process: The objective is to ensure that all affected parties can contribute to the selection of planned DIB investments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In selecting DIB partner nations and in selecting DIB projects within selected nations, all DIB programs should consult OSD: Countries selected and DIB projects should support the goals and objectives in the draft DIB DoDD. Political imperatives can also determine which countries should be considered.</td>
<td><strong>DIB programs should consult the implementation plan for the SSA planning process written in response to tasking in PPD-23:</strong> Among other things, this plan establishes several criteria to be applied when considering a country or region for SSA—including DIB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DIB programs should consult routinely with the CCMDs:</strong> The CCMDs routinely prioritize nations for several reasons, including those nations that can benefit most from DIB engagements. DIB programs should post a liaison officer with the CCMD staff element responsible for security cooperation.</td>
<td><strong>DIB programs should consult with the country teams when prioritizing DIB projects to be implemented within the country:</strong> The country teams also have some say in selecting the countries within the CCMD AOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DIB programs should consult with other DIB and security cooperation programs to deconflict operations as much as possible:</strong> There is always a clear danger that partner nations become overwhelmed with well-meaning projects—and sometimes these may overlap.</td>
<td><strong>DIB programs should consult the host nation to determine its needs before deciding to select the country for DIB investments and what activities to implement:</strong> The country must be willing to absorb the engagement, it must contribute some resources to the implementation of the activity, and there must be a reasonable expectation that the country and the region will benefit from the engagement in the long run.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The CCMDs are in the best position to assess the relative importance of countries in their AOR with respect to DIB investment priorities.

**CCMDs should ensure that at least one LOE or LOA addresses security cooperation, including DIB:** There is a tendency to focus on the named LOEs and to relegate security cooperation to a separate allocation process if not designated one of the three “lines.” This includes partner nation selection and prioritization.

**CCMDs should consult with OSD, the country teams, the partner nations, and other agencies when selecting countries for DIB investments:** There are many stakeholders in the CCMD’s AOR, each with some equity in the country or countries selected for DIB investment. In most commands, the regional centers are partners with the CCMD in executing security cooperation and DIB through classes, seminars, and workshops. They should be included in this consultative process as well.

**CCMDs should establish some form of “scoring” process to prioritize DIB investments:** For example, PACOM has a system that awards points to proposals that support TCP priorities. Proposed projects can then be evaluated with respect to the degree they possess identified characteristics. The system need not be quantitative.

**CCMDs should include DIB and security cooperation LOEs in the annual TCP update process:** The process usually consists of examining the IMOs in terms of the supporting LOEs or LOAs and in the context of current and projected events in the region. If security cooperation and DIB are included as a separate LOE in support of an IMO, then selecting and prioritizing DIB projects and countries becomes part of this process.

**CCMDs should consider development of a TSCP:** In some cases, the development of a TSCP can provide added visibility to security cooperation and DIB issues and thus facilitate the selection and prioritization process.
The partner nation selection process at the DIB program level could use more structure. CCMDs should consider a structured approach to partner nation selection by developing an index system consisting of standard indices of security and economic well-being. Three country screenings are recommended: (1) select, from among all nations, those that have joined in treaties or alliances with the United States; (2) remove nations from the list that are deemed no longer viable candidates, or add nations to the list from among nations considered to be candidates for other reasons; and (3) select from the candidates based on need and ability to gain from DIB investment by consulting several readily available indices, such as the rule of law and respect for human life.
U.S. security cooperation activities, DIB included, rely on a mosaic of programs that are managed and implemented by multiple providers, of which DoD is but one. Other providers include U.S. civilian agencies, bilateral partners of the United States, and regional and international organizations. The resulting picture is exceedingly complex, making it difficult to keep track of the many activities taking place simultaneously in a partner nation.¹ This chapter examines security cooperation programs—beyond DIILS, DIRI, MoDA, and WIF-DIB—that engage in DIB efforts. The variety of such programs represents an opportunity for the U.S. government, but also increases risks of conflict and overlap. A number of coordination mechanisms exist, from clearinghouses for security cooperation efforts to information-sharing events. This chapter concludes with recommendations to improve these mechanisms and possibly merge some existing programs.

¹ OSD interview 20140124-001, January 24, 2014.
curity cooperation programs, we assembled a comprehensive database of DIB-related programs. This section details the method used to build this database and highlights the “niche” DIB capabilities that these additional programs can offer.2

Developing the RAND DIB Programs Database

The RAND DIB database is based on two existing repertoires of U.S. security cooperation mechanisms: the U.S. Army’s *Army Security Cooperation Handbook* (hereafter DA-PAM 11-31)3 and a 2013 RAND report on security cooperation mechanisms used by CCMDs to build partner capacity.4 Although these are not the only existing repertoires of programs in existence,5 they were chosen because they specifically identify those activities that are DIB-related to some degree.

First, we selected all mechanisms with DIB listed as one of their purposes in either publication or both. This allowed us to flag 65 and 24 security cooperation mechanisms conducting DIB in RAND’s 2013 database and DA-PAM 11-31, respectively. Nineteen were cited in both publications and, after removing obsolete mechanisms, we were left with a total of 69 unique mechanisms identified as DIB-related (see Table 4.1).6

Second, we asked SMEs whether they could identify any glaring omission in the resulting list of mechanisms, including some too recent to have been included in either publication. In this way, eight more mechanisms were added to the list, raising the total to 77.

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2 The complete database can be found in Appendix A.


6 In some instances, mechanisms are nested within each other. For instance, International Defense Acquisition Resource Management (IDARM) and the Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) are part of CCMR; DIILS activities can be WIF-funded.
Third, we sorted these mechanisms between programs, authorities, and funds. A program is a set of activities or events, or the institution carrying out these sets of activities or events; an authority is the specific approval source to use certain funds for certain purposes; and a fund is a source of money set aside for a specific purpose. Although all three categories are relevant to DIB, we chose to focus on programs so as to highlight the events and activities that get implemented in partner nations, rather than the mechanisms (or financial resources) that allow such events and activities to take place. Out of the 78 security cooperation mechanisms, we found 70 programs, four authorities, and four funds.

Fourth, we ensured that all the programs outlined in the database were current and matched the definition of DIB given in Chapter One.\textsuperscript{7} According to this definition, a program is considered to be engaged in DIB if it fulfills two conditions. First, it should engage a partner nation’s defense institutions, defined as one or more of the following: ministries of defense, joint/general staffs and commands, service headquarters, and, as appropriate, other institutions of the armed forces that are not operational headquarters or command elements. Second, its activities should have one or more of the following objectives:

- promote democratic civilian control of the armed forces
- establish or improve national-level defense institutions
- align the defense sector within government-wide structures
- define relationships within the defense sector
- professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military

\textsuperscript{7} \textit{USD(P)}, 2014b, p. 10.

### Table 4.1
**Initial Selection of DIB Mechanisms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Security Cooperation Mechanisms</th>
<th>Security Cooperation Mechanisms with DIB as a Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RAND 2013 database</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>65 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA-PAM 11-31</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24 (45%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities.

A total of 20 programs out of 70 did not fit these criteria, leaving only 50 actual DIB programs, for which we outline activities and purposes, as well as geographic focus (see Appendix B).

Fifth, we categorized the resulting DIB programs according to three levels, based on their focus and type of activities. Table 4.2 provides a definition of the levels, the types of activities included at each level, and the number of programs in each.8

Categorization Results
As expected, Level 3 (Defense Management) programs include the activities of all major DIB programs: MoDA, DIILS, DIRI, and WIF-DIB. However, it also includes five additional defense management programs:

• The Security Governance Initiative (SGI) is a recent program that was announced at the August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. This initiative shares a number of similarities with DIRI, in that it provides institutional needs assessments and plans strategies to address the gaps identified. However, it goes beyond the defense sector to also look at other aspects of the security sector, including justice. SGI also involves some follow-on assessments for the partner nations that benefit from the initiative, to ensure that the strategy is properly implemented and needs have not evolved. Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia are the first six SGI recipients.9
• The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, conducts lessons-learned seminars, courses,
and briefings within the United States and elsewhere as requested by DoD agencies or CCMDs. The Center plays a role in building new defense institutions through one of its lesser-known activities, which is to assist partner nations in setting up their own lessons-learned centers as requested by U.S. Department of the Army Headquarters or the Training and Doctrine Command.\textsuperscript{10} Although providing partner nations with a lessons-learned capa-

\textsuperscript{10} U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 23.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Types of activities</th>
<th>Number of programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Level 3: Defense management | Assist partner nations to institute organizational changes that will lead to better and stronger management of defense institutions | • Ministerial advisors  
• Creation of new institutions  
• Ministerial engagement | 9 |
| Level 2: Defense professionalization | Assisting partner nations to form a professional military and defense civilian elite through education and training | • Education and strategic training (including acculturation)  
• Conferences  
• Seminars  
• Workshops | 25 |
| Levels 1a and 1b: DIB familiarization | Familiarizing partner nation defense establishments with best practices through episodic engagements, such as exercises, seminars, and other venues (1a), or prolonged engagement, such as the deployment of liaison officers or the exchange of personnel (1b) | • Tabletop exercises  
• Wargames  
• High-level contacts  
• Information and data exchanges  
• Liaison officers  
• Exchange of personnel | 16 |
bility is not the Center’s primary mission, it is one that, if implemented, can contribute to DIB.

- The Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) aims to reform and expand the PME capacity of NATO PfP countries through peer-to-peer mentoring, curriculum revision, and workshops on learning methods. This program includes mentoring partner nation faculty, transforming curricula, and encouraging changes in teaching methodologies—potentially combining to provide a rather extensive overhaul of the partner nation’s PME institutions.¹¹

- The African Military Education Program (AMEP) offers activities similar to DEEP’s to partner nations in sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. experts (and multinational experts in the case of DEEP) on faculty and curriculum development assist partner nations in improving the quality of their defense education institutions. Unlike DEEP, which DoD conducts in tandem with NATO, AMEP is run by the State Department’s Africa Bureau with the Africa Center for Security Studies (a DoD entity) as executive agent. Since its inception in 2012, AMEP has engaged or plans to engage 13 countries.¹²

- The State Partnership Program (SPP) contains as many different types of initiatives as there are partnerships between U.S. states and partner nations. Only a few cases are DIB, such as the Pennsylvania National Guard’s effort to help Lithuania establish a non-commissioned officer (NCO) academy.¹³ This example, however, illustrates how SPP can be another conduit for DIB, capitalizing on the various skills found at the state level to undertake a wide range of DIB activities. SPP can, for instance, be a useful way of


¹² Interview and email exchange with AMEP representative, August and September 2014.

bringing expertise from the civilian world to partner nations on “niche” areas such as cybersecurity.\textsuperscript{14}

Beyond the nine defense management programs, the database highlights 25 education or training programs that do some degree of DIB. This rather large number underscores the variety of DIB programs offered by the U.S. government to respond to the specific needs of partner nations. For instance, partner nations can learn about counterterrorism from the CTFP; resource management from the Defense Resource Management Study; medicine and nursing (foreign participation in the Uniformed Services University of the Health Services); or U.S. values (field studies program for international military and civilian students and military-sponsored visitors). This variety of programs highlights the fact that although most DIB programs are relatively recent (with the exception of DIILS, created in 1992), many other programs have been doing DIB under another name for much longer. The Defense Resource Management Study program, for instance, has been in operation since 1965.\textsuperscript{15}

Overall, this database highlights the extent and range of DIB programs, many of which do not see their primary mission as DIB—and are not always seen as such by DoD planners and implementers. This suggests that expanding DoD’s DIB capabilities may not require the creation of new programs. Instead, some existing programs that already have the capacity to do DIB can be steered in that direction. This, however, can have the effect of increasing conflict and overlap between programs.

\textbf{A Recognized Need to Deconflict DIB Programs}

Considering the large number of U.S. security cooperation programs that engage in DIB, some degree of overlap is inevitable. The U.S. DoD

\textsuperscript{14} EUCOM interview 20140430-002, April 30, 2014.

Inspector General’s report on DIRI highlighted the “overlapping missions in DOD’s DIB-related efforts.”\textsuperscript{16} It pointed out, in particular, similarities in missions between DIRI and the regional centers, potentially creating some conflict.\textsuperscript{17} This tension was confirmed in one of our interviews, with one regional center respondent acknowledging initial hostility toward DIRI when the program was created in 2009 because he felt that its role was too similar to his center’s.\textsuperscript{18} PPD-23 recognizes this challenge and mentions fostering “United States Government policy coherence and interagency collaboration” as one of its policy guidelines for SSA. It also calls for coordination, as well as synchronization, of agency efforts and reduction of redundancies.\textsuperscript{19}

In addition to sharing a number of similar objectives, the primary DIB programs also have several types of activities in common (see Table 4.3). WIF and DIRI, for instance, both offer military-to-military contacts and workshops, as does DIILS. If a workshop addresses legal issues, then it is clearly a DIILS activity. However, a WIF workshop or a DIRI workshop may cover the same topics.

DIB or DIB-related programs often do not function independently. For instance, DIILS conducts WIF, international military education and training (IMET) and CTFP engagements;\textsuperscript{20} DIRI may reach out to DIILS to get legal experts on the teams they send to advise foreign ministries of defense;\textsuperscript{21} IDARM supports WIF-DIB, DIRI,

\textsuperscript{16} Office of the Inspector General, 2012b, p. 5.
\hfill
\textsuperscript{17} Office of the Inspector General, 2012b, p. 10.
\hfill
\textsuperscript{18} Regional center interview 20140421, April 21, 2014. The interviewee subsequently resolved this tension by distinguishing between his center’s “horizontal” approach (covering all security cooperation issues, including, for instance, justice) and DIRI’s more “vertical” approach (focusing on defense only).
\hfill
\textsuperscript{19} Office of the Press Secretary, 2013.
\hfill
\textsuperscript{20} DIILS, 2013, pp. 5–6.
\hfill
\textsuperscript{21} Phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014.
Harmonizing DIB and Other Security Cooperation Activities

Some DIB programs combine more than one source of funding. For instance, DIILS draws on Title 10 funding for its activities geared toward improving military justice systems and Title 22 funding for its IMET and other training activities. This, in turn, has an impact on how programs are implemented, with one interviewee stating that “funding drives priority, as the source of funding gets to decide what type of activities will be undertaken even when the relevant CCMD would have made a different choice based on its knowledge of the partner nation or prior engagements.” Another interviewee cited Africa

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**Table 4.3**  
Activities of Main DIB Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRI</th>
<th>WIF-DIB</th>
<th>MoDA</th>
<th>DIILS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry-to-ministry engagements</td>
<td>Military-to-military contacts</td>
<td>Training advisors (mental skills, cultural knowledge, safety and resilience)</td>
<td><strong>Seminars and workshops</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops</td>
<td>Personnel exchanges</td>
<td>Deploying advisors to partner nation ministries of defense and/or interior</td>
<td>Legal assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoping visits</strong></td>
<td><strong>Seminars</strong></td>
<td>Ministry-to-ministry engagements</td>
<td>Planning visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military-to-military contacts</strong></td>
<td>Workshops</td>
<td>Personnel exchanges</td>
<td><strong>Curriculum development</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**NOTE:** Activities presenting similarities are italicized.

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22 OSD interview 20140226, February 26, 2014.

23 OSD interview 20140312, March 12, 2014.

24 DIRI interview 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.

25 OSD interview 20140226, February 26, 2014.
as a particularly bad example of a region with multiple and confusing funding sources for activities.26

Overall, a comprehensive picture of what DIB activities are taking place where is lacking, thereby increasing risks of conflict and waste of resources. Although duplication may be of value in certain instances, with some partner nations benefiting from a “double dose” of activities, some coordination processes are required to increase the efficiency and impact of parallel engagements, and avoid conflicts that could undermine the U.S. DIB effort and/or the U.S. relationship with the partner nation. For example, with the expansion of WIF, it is increasingly likely that both DIRI and WIF-DIB could be engaged in DIB activities in the same country. In the future WIF-DIB and DIRI will require closer contact to ensure compatibility of activities.

Coordinating with U.S. Partners’ DIB Efforts

A number of U.S. allies are present in certain regions (e.g., France in Western Africa, Spain in Latin America) and engage in DIB activities as well. In a context of limited resources, this calls for some degree of bilateral coordination to ensure that the efforts of the United States and its allies are not duplicative. Coordination, however, only works to avoid duplication where U.S. goals and objectives coincide with those of our allies operating in the same country. Coordination is particularly useful in countries or regions where the United States has higher strategic priorities elsewhere and where it can leave the DIB lead to other international actors, provided U.S. and allied interests coincide. U.S. partners may also have better access to certain countries based on their specific bilateral history.27 Some countries have also developed specific capacities that they are willing to export. Norway, for instance, created a Norwegian Special Operations Command, and Norwegian Special Forces have been advising the Afghan National Police’s elite Crisis Response Unit since 2007. Closer to home, they have also been train-

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26 OSD interview 20140115-001, January 15, 2014.

27 SOCOM interview 20140408-002, April 8, 2014.
ing Latvian and Lithuanian special forces.™ Partly as a result of this, coordination with other donors is highlighted in PPD-23 as another policy guideline: “The United States Government will establish a division of labor with other bilateral, multilateral, and regional actors based on capacity, effectiveness, and comparative advantage. Such coordination will be aimed at sharing the burden across a greater number of interested parties and maximizing leverage on the partner governments when appropriate.”™

Of countries that have become increasingly important, another category is those that received U.S. assistance in the past and are now capable of exporting their skills in their region. One example is Colombia, which is receiving funds from the United States through the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan (CAP), a presidential-level initiative, to undertake security cooperation activities in Latin America.™ As of April 2014, Colombia was executing 85 activities in six countries.™ The goal is that the countries with U.S.-trained security forces that are now engaging their neighbors will eventually be able to do so with their own funds. As of early 2014, other countries under consideration for arrangements similar to the CAP include Chile, Brazil, and Peru.™ Similarly, in Europe, the United States has been building institutions within NATO countries allowing them to conduct DIB in Afghanistan.™

Finally, regional and international organizations play an important role as well, due to the large variety of skills they can bring to the table. Since they are often perceived by partner nations as more neutral than individual partner countries, their assistance may be more easily

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28 SOCOM interview 20140408-005, April 8, 2014.
29 Office of the Press Secretary, 2013.
30 SOUTHCOM interviews 20140410-001 and 20140410-004, April 10, 2014.
31 SOUTHCOM interview 20140410-004, April 10, 2014.
32 SOUTHCOM interview 20140410-004, April 10, 2014.
33 SOCOM interview 20140408-005, April 8, 2014.
acceptable when it comes to the politically sensitive issue of defense reform.\textsuperscript{34}

This array of potential partners to conduct DIB offers a large range of options to the United States. It can, in particular, supplement its strong military capacity with partners that have a strong civilian capacity, such as the European Union, whose Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya helps Libyan authorities develop a national border management strategy.\textsuperscript{35}

International coordination can be difficult, however. Working with allies to conduct DIB or DIB-like activities requires that both the United States and the ally agree on goals and objectives and that both nations desire to combine their efforts.\textsuperscript{36} Finding the right information-sharing platform and the appropriate level of classification are challenges that extend largely beyond DIB.\textsuperscript{37}

### Organizational Coordination Procedures

Not all institutions involved in DIB efforts have the same degree of visibility over the range of activities that are going on at a given time. Some are better positioned to spot redundancies and inefficiencies and, as a result, they have the potential to play a key role in harmonizing DIB efforts. This is the case of OSD regional offices (now DASDs); CCMDs; and country teams, particularly the security cooperation or defense office in the embassy. DSCA may seem to be a natural place for deconfliction as well, since it controls OSD funding for all four main DIB programs (DIILS also receives funds from DoS). However, fund-

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{34} Phone conversation with a French defense official, March 21, 2014.
\item\textsuperscript{35} European Union External Action, “EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya),” fact sheet, January 2015.
\item\textsuperscript{36} SOCOM interview 20140408-005, April 8, 2014. This issue largely extends beyond DIB. For an example of how it applies to U.S. disaster relief and humanitarian efforts, see Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Stephanie Pezard, Laurel E. Miller, Jeffrey G. Engstrom, and Abby Doll, \textit{Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region}, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-146-OSD, 2013, pp. 99–100.
\end{itemize}
ing does not automatically provide visibility. DSCA was never mentioned during our interviews as having good visibility over the activities of all programs, and was specifically highlighted by one DSCA interviewee as not having a role in harmonization.  

Views are mixed on the extent to which OSD(P) and, in particular, regional offices have visibility over the activities carried out in a given country. One interviewee claimed that OSD(P) received the most complete information from country teams. Another saw implementers often failing to coordinate with regional offices, limiting the degree of control the latter could exert on the former. In at least one instance, some DIB support appears to have been provided at the ministerial level in Afghanistan without the relevant regional office being consulted.

Coordination at the Combatant Commands

CCMDs have a unique vantage point over the entire DIB process. CENTCOM country desk officers, for instance, are in constant contact with country teams, and are partially responsible for harmonizing different efforts and activities. They track events, if only to ensure that they are in line with overall objectives for their AOR. For instance, EUCOM links objectives to activities and to LOAs.

Although in theory CCMDs should be informed of everything that is happening in their AOR, in practice this is not the case. CCMDs tend to have most visibility over the activities they fund or implement but for military-to-military contacts, for instance, CCMDs are only

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38 DSCA interview 20131112-001, November 12, 2014.
39 DSCA interview 20140312, March 12, 2014.
40 OSD interview 20140124-001, January 24, 2014.
41 OSD interview 20140124-001, January 24, 2014.
42 CENTCOM interview 20140407-001, April 7, 2014.
43 Phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014.
44 APCSS interview 20140430-001, April 30, 2014; phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014.
45 Phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014.
notified of high-level events. In some cases, components answer to their own service headquarters rather than their CCMD commander, who may have an incomplete picture of the activities undertaken in their AOR as a result. Finally, there is no unique way to manage and deconflict security cooperation activities across CCMDs. Only some CCMDs have a training and education coordination officer who can rationalize and harmonize training and education activities. We illustrate the different approaches to deconfliction with two examples from SOUTHCOM and EUCOM:

- **SOUTHCOM’s security cooperation activities deconfliction process:** The planning process for security cooperation begins every year with a “pony blanket” (or “pre-horse blanket”) in early May. The service components, IMO leads or managers, directors, and SCOs meet to examine each individual event recorded on the TSCMIS and deconflict the events if needed, starting with the eight priority countries of SOUTHCOM. The process is lengthy, with approximately 3.5 hours spent per country. After this initial process, SOUTHCOM identifies the gaps that need to be filled to meet objectives. Emerging events are also under consideration as the year goes on. In June, the “horse blanket” is constructed. This involves a review of all countries and IMOs to identify gaps or overlaps, and reassign activities and resources based on priorities. SOUTHCOM has also worked with non-U.S. providers of security cooperation, such as Canada and Spain, who are both active in the SOUTHCOM AOR. Canada has its own representative within SOUTHCOM. Finally, SOUTHCOM

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46 Phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014.
47 DIRI interview 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.
48 SOUTHCOM interview 20140410-004, April 10, 2014.
49 SOUTHCOM interview 20140410-004, April 10, 2014.
50 SOUTHCOM interview 20140410-001, April 10, 2014.
51 SOUTHCOM hosts seven more international liaisons from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay (U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti*
coordinates with other CCMDs. It hosts a U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) liaison officer to work on issues related to Mexico. SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM attend each other’s theater security campaign conferences.52

- **EUCOM’s security cooperation activities deconfliction process:** EUCOM has developed a relatively mature cyclical process for coordinating security cooperation activities, including DIB activities, executed under different authorities in its AOR. In December, EUCOM organizes a Strategy Implementation Conference to which providers and key OSD and Joint Staff participants are invited, as well as representatives from DSCA and DoS. The group reviews the past year’s assessments, the current year’s execution plans, and has an initial discussion to outline the following fiscal year’s plan. Throughout the winter, updates on guidance from OSD are incorporated in the country plans. In March, EUCOM hosts a European Strategy Conference that reviews DoS and NATO plans for the AOR, as well as service component and Special Operations Command Europe plans, and updates strategy and plans for the current year. In June, the CCMD produces the LOA task order for the coming fiscal year. Detailed planning takes place for the next three fiscal years, resource requirements are estimated for the coming two fiscal years, and execution begins. Within approximately two months, the next Strategy Implementation Conference is convened.

**Country Team Coordination**

Finally, country teams (and more specifically the security cooperation or defense offices in the embassies) are generally seen as the institutional element with the most visibility on all security cooperation activities taking place in a country.54 Being “closer to the ground,” they view and

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52 SOUTHCOM interview 20140410-004, April 10, 2014.
53 PACOM interview 20140429-004, April 29, 2014.
54 Phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014.
track U.S. and non-U.S. activities in their country. Country teams act as the interface between the partner nation and U.S. security cooperation providers and are in close contact with CCMDs. In Guatemala, for instance, most of the coordination takes place through the MilGroup at the embassy. The MilGroup keeps track of all ongoing activities, receives requests from the Guatemalan authorities, and engages potential force providers that could address Guatemala’s requests.

Because of this unique access and visibility, country teams are generally responsible for gathering information on, and deconflicting, security cooperation activities. Such deconflicting may be challenging, however, as different components of the country teams (DoS, USAID, offices within DoD) often have different objectives, raising the difficult issue of determining whose priorities come first. In addition, they do not always have all the necessary information. Some events may take place without their knowledge, particularly if the country is easy to access and little support from the embassy is required. Due to personnel rotations, the ODC lead may not be aware of some activities that were planned under his predecessor’s watch. Finally, although SCOs are supposed to know everything that goes on in their country, in practice the extent of this knowledge highly depends on the diligence of the individual who happens to hold that position.

55 Phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014.
56 Phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014; CENTCOM interview 20140407-001, April 7, 2014.
57 Phone conversation with RAND researcher (B), February 26, 2014.
58 OSD interview 20140115-001, January 15, 2014.
59 DSCA interview 20140312, March 12, 2014.
60 DSCA interview 20140312, March 12, 2014.
61 SOUTHCOM interview 20140410-003, April 10, 2014.
Coordination Mechanisms

In the absence of a single entity with perfect visibility over the entire DIB process that could act as a clearinghouse, security cooperation planners have to rely on other types of coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms include formal coordination processes, such as conferences, liaisons, the Global Center for Security Cooperation, and informal processes through which the different actors involved share information and coordinate their activities. PPD-23 introduces new ICSs that intend to provide a higher degree of coordination at the interagency level, but this new mechanism had yet to be generalized. According to this directive, DoS will be the lead agency in charge of integrating interagency SSA efforts; and the Chief of Mission will lead the integration at the country level. DoD is not entirely excluded from this integration role, as it “assumes the lead SSA integrator role in specific cases as deemed appropriate and consistent with authority granted by Congress.”

Global Center for Security Cooperation

In his response to the DoD Inspector General’s report on DIRI, highlighting the risks of conflict between the program and other DIB implementers, the DASD PSO mentioned the Global Center for Security Cooperation as one of the ways “the DIRI Program’s relationship and outreach to other security cooperation activities are addressed.” Based at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, the Global Center for Security Cooperation was formally established in 2006 with the mission of being a hub for knowledge sharing on training and education events. It has built a consortium of security cooperation institutions that share information on their activities (as well as after-action reports and SME biographies) via a calendar accessible through a web

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62 Event tracking, which is another key element of any coordination process, will be examined in Chapter Five.

63 Office of the Press Secretary, 2013. Note the discussion of PPD-23 in Chapter Two.

64 Office of the Press Secretary, 2013.

In FY 2013, the Center covered 1,544 events in 129 countries. The Center plays a role in the harmonization process, in that it has the ability to identify events that do not match OSD and CCMD guidance and priorities or present some risk of overlap or conflict, and can consult with implementing agencies, CCMDs, and or country teams to resolve these issues. Increasingly, however, consortium members have been using the portal to spot potential issues and resolve them without involving the Center.

Ideally, the Center would be a clearinghouse for all security cooperation activities worldwide. In practice, there are strong indications that the Center has not been used to the extent it could be. Not all relevant organizations are part of the consortium. Out of the more than 100 entities that engage in security cooperation, only 29 are part of the consortium. Of the more DIB-oriented programs and organizations, only DIILS, the regional centers, and the Defense Resource Management Institute are members. This leaves aside not only programs like MoDA, DIRI, and WIF, but also other DIB activities implemented by DoS, USAID, or CCMDs. Another issue has been the fact that this repository of information is useful only if consortium members consult it to identify potential duplication or conflict. Interviews with regional center representatives conducted by RAND in 2013 indicated that a number of consortium members do not actively use that information.

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66 Email correspondence with the Global Center for Security Cooperation, March 25, 2014.
68 Email correspondence with the Global Center for Security Cooperation, March 25, 2014.
69 Email correspondence with the Global Center for Security Cooperation, March 25, 2014.
70 Email correspondence with the Global Center for Security Cooperation, March 25, 2014.
71 Global Center for Security Cooperation, undated.
and find the Center of limited relevance. The Global Center for Security Cooperation has been formally disestablished.

**Informal Mechanisms**

Another way to address potential conflicts between events highlighted by the DASD PSO in his response to the DoD Inspector General’s report on DIRI was of an informal nature. He mentioned “periodic telephone conferences or meetings with other programs, and coordination with the appropriate U.S. Embassy country team, among other means.” Informal coordination seems to be the most prevalent way information is shared. For instance, the MoDA annual report for FY 2013 noted that: “To the greatest extent possible, the global MoDA program is implemented in coordination with DoD’s Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) program, which provides baseline needs assessments and detailed implementation plans for new-country programs. DIRI also conducts complementary activities, as necessary, and periodically assesses the progress of institutional reform efforts.”

DIRI has also been working with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) and the Perry Center. In one instance, the Perry Center helped Guatemala update its National Security Strategy and Defense Policy, and DIRI subsequently provided training and capacity-building at the institutional level.

Coordination takes place extensively at the individual level. As one interviewee put it, “It is about knowing who to call and ask.” This also means that the quality of communication is highly variable. It can be excellent if individuals are diligent about keeping other actors in the loop—relations between DIRI and SOUTHCOM were cited as such.

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73 Hanauer et al., 2014, pp. 75–76.
75 DoD, undated a, p. 5.
77 SOUTHCOM interview 20140328, March 28, 2014.
78 DSCA interview 20140312, March 12, 2014.
an example—or if the individuals involved have either the type of connections or experience that allows them to identify potential issues early on. One example is Guatemala, where the CCMR representative used to be the MilGroup commander for several years.

The deconfliction task is also largely left to each individual program. MoDA, for instance, uses scoping visits—which constitute a standard element of its engagement process—with new partner nations to review other ongoing U.S. security cooperation activities, usually through discussions with the country team. MoDA representatives also use this opportunity to find out whether there are any assistance efforts from non-U.S. actors that could interact with theirs. With regard to international coordination, DIILS has been partnering with Australia and New Zealand to work with them in the PACOM AOR. Classified information has been a recurrent challenge, but efforts are under way to limit its impact on coordination. SOCOM has spent a considerable amount of money on command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence networks to share information with U.S. partners. Its new international sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) is designed to bring partner nations together and includes workstations for all foreign representatives, as well as smaller rooms that could serve as SCIFs for individual partners to keep their own classified information.

Conferences
CCMDs host different types of security cooperation conferences aimed at bringing all relevant actors together to discuss planning and promote awareness of their respective activities. These conferences are important venues for all DIB providers to coordinate their action. For instance,

79 DIRI interview 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.
80 DIRI interview 20140424-001, April 24, 2014.
81 Correspondence with MoDA official, April 29, 2014.
82 DIILS interview 20140326, March 26, 2014.
83 SOCOM interview 20140408-002, April 8, 2014.
84 Email correspondence with RAND researcher.
PACOM and country teams use this opportunity to approach APCSS with nominations for students. One respondent noted that the most successful meetings aimed at harmonizing security cooperation activities are those conducted by the CCMDs, because they have the resources needed to undertake such efforts, are close to partner nations, and have a good understanding of partner nation’s needs and strategic significance for the United States.

Each CCMD hosts a Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group (SCETWG) that sets priorities and allocates resources for all upcoming education and training events. CCMDs host additional conferences that may differ in level of granularity (e.g., going through each event or not) and participants. In general, such conferences gather, at the very least, OSD country desk officers, country teams, and DoS political-military officers. SOUTHCOM hosts a “horse blanket conference” every year to ensure security cooperation activities are aligned with TCP priorities (see discussion earlier in this chapter). CENTCOM convenes an Action Officer Working Group every May, during which plans are elaborated and signed off by the general officers present. One respondent mentioned a CENTCOM meeting that she referred to as an ambassador’s conference with DoS and OSD representatives who harmonized their respective programs for the CENTCOM AOR. Another, however, expressed regret that while the CCMD conferences have interagency representation, they are conducted at the O-6 level and lack consistent high-level leadership.

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85 APCSS interview 20140430-001, April 30, 2014.
86 DSCA interview 20131125, November 25, 2013.
87 Hanauer et al., 2014, p. 76.
88 Phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014.
89 Phone conversation with RAND researcher (A), March 6, 2014.
90 Hanauer et al., 2014, p. 76.
91 CENTCOM interview 20140407-003, April 7, 2014.
92 DSCA interview 20131125, November 25, 2013.
93 DSCA interview 20131125, November 25, 2013.
Liaisons and Exchange Officers

Coordination between CCMDs, agencies, and programs can also be accomplished through liaisons and exchange officers. DIB programs and implementers generally have a representative in the most relevant CCMD(s). APCSS has PACOM liaisons who work closely with PACOM staff. This is, for instance, one of the ways it gets recommendations for candidates to attend APCSS courses. The Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies has a liaison at SOUTHCOM whose role is to ensure that Perry Center events are aligned with SOUTHCOM’s objectives. The Marshall Center has a liaison at EUCOM, whose role is to deconflict academic program engagements with partners and allies to reduce the resource burden on the CCMD. WIF has a program representative at CENTCOM who coordinates with other program managers (e.g., for Section 1206 or the Global Peace Operations Initiative) to gain awareness of, and potentially deconflict, activities.

The special operations community has its own type of liaisons: SOLOs, who are embedded in country teams to synchronize all in-country SOF activities. SOLOs fall under the Chief of Mission and answer to the SOCOM commander. They act as a liaison between the partner nation SOF, TSOC commander, and the country team, but also connect across countries in the region. The geographic CCMD/TSOC annually reviews the SOLO list and approves or revises it based on access and/or priorities. In addition, the TSOC commander can man a temporary billet on an as-needed basis. As of 2014, there were 13 SOLOs, a number that is planned to reach 40 by 2019. SOCOM also hosts foreign liaisons. As of early 2014, it had representatives from 11 countries and was hoping to increase that number to 30.

94 APCSS interviews 20140430-004 and 20140430-002, April 30, 2014.
95 SOUTHCOM interview 20140410-002, April 10, 2014.
96 APCSS interview 20140430-003, April 30, 2014.
97 CENTCOM interview 20140407-004, April 7, 2014.
98 SOCOM interview 20140408-003, April 8, 2014.
99 SOCOM interview 20140408-002, April 8, 2014.
In spite of their coordination role, foreign liaison officers and exchange officers in CCMDs have some limits: They depend on the quality of the individual in charge for obtaining and disseminating information, and liaison positions can also be costly for small organizations or programs. They also have to operate under a certain number of constraints: Liaison officers cannot be tasked by the CCMD with which they liaise, while exchange officers directly work for the U.S. chain of command but are limited in their ability to communicate freely with their home country.\textsuperscript{100}

**Findings and Recommendations**

Although several coordination mechanisms exist, no actor or agency has a clear picture of the many DIB programs happening in a given country, and communication between some important DIB providers remains limited. A U.S. official interviewed for this study noted that the organization of DIB providers is too fractured and too distributed to communicate properly.\textsuperscript{101} Another underlined that the current security cooperation construct is woefully inadequate for harmonization, and allows partner nations to “play” the United States by obtaining funds and support from different departments and agencies that would have gained from knowing about their respective efforts.\textsuperscript{102}

Better coordination mechanisms are required to ensure that information is shared in a timely manner and programs complement, rather than undermine, each other.\textsuperscript{103} Recommendations to improve coordination mechanisms include establishing an effective DIB clearinghouse; increasing the impact of CCMD conferences; and generalizing good practices to a larger number of agencies or CCMDs. Some programs may also benefit from some degree of consolidation, which

\textsuperscript{100}SOCOM interview 20140408-004, April 8, 2014.

\textsuperscript{101}DSCA interview 20140312, March 12, 2014.

\textsuperscript{102}OSD interview with 20140115-001, January 15, 2014.

\textsuperscript{103}OSD interview with 20140115-001, January 15, 2014.
would clarify the DIB picture by reducing the number of actors and chains of command.

**Create a Better Coordination Mechanism**

Several U.S. officials interviewed for this study called for a central clearinghouse that would have visibility over security cooperation activities in each country. This entity would be in charge of deconflicting all DIB (and, potentially, security cooperation to a larger extent) programs.\(^{104}\) It would also provide clear guidance to CCMDs and country teams on DIB efforts.\(^{105}\)

One way to create such an entity would be to put key DIB programs under a common management that would de facto have that visibility.\(^{106}\) A first option would involve having regional policy desks oversee DIB programs taking place in their respective geographic areas. A number of officials interviewed for this study, however, expressed concerns about this possibility, as they feared that giving OSD(P) control over these programs would result in a loss of effectiveness at the tactical level.\(^{107}\) Another risk is to have DIB programs becoming overshadowed by other issues considered more pressing by regional policy desks. MoDA, for instance, would have to be run by an Afghanistan desk that is already exceedingly busy.\(^{108}\) One interviewee suggested that a clearinghouse should be located between OSD and the CCMDs, rather than within OSD.\(^{109}\)

If programs are not merged and a clearinghouse needs to be either chosen among the current entities that oversee one or more DIB programs or created ex nihilo, it will be important to identify lessons from the experience of the Global Center for Security Cooperation to understand why it did not fully play its intended role as a clearinghouse.

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104 DIRI interview 20131112-001, November 12, 2013.
105 DIRI interview 20131112-001, November 12, 2013.
106 APCSS interview 20140430-005, April 30, 2014.
107 DSCA interview 20140312, March 12, 2014.
108 DSCA interview 20140312, March 12, 2014.
109 DIRI interview 20131112-001, November 12, 2013.
This would require further investigation of why some key organizations chose not to be part of the Center’s consortium; and why some consortium members made so little use of the information it offers. Answering these questions would be key to understanding whether the consortium’s information-sharing structure is a good model at all, what its shortcomings are, and what other models could complement or replace it.

One opportunity to increase the impact of forums such as CCMD conferences would be to extend SCETWG’s to include all security cooperation activities, rather than simply education and training—allowing them to capture more DIB events than is currently the case. To address the fact that interagency representation at CCMD conferences is not always at a high enough level (O-6, generally) and that there is no consistent leadership, one respondent recommended a joint DoS-DoD leadership conference to review, prioritize, and harmonize projects across both agencies.¹¹⁰ Such harmonization early in the process could facilitate later planning conferences at the CCMD level. SOUTHCOM offers a good example of an effective deconfliction process at the CCMD level, through the two-step process of the “pony blanket” and “horse blanket.” Although requiring some time investment, since it can only work with extensive discussions among the participants, this process has been successful in identifying gaps and overlaps in the security cooperation activities taking place in SOUTHCOM’s AOR. EUCOM’s process, too, presents a useful model with its annual Strategy Implementation Conference that gathers key U.S. government DIB providers. Other participants to these conferences should include other CCMDs, when relevant, and representatives of key partner nations who also undertake DIB efforts in the AOR. If classification issues arise, representatives of partner nations may be authorized to take part in a smaller subset of sessions, which would be designed to be the most relevant for their purpose. Such a process would ensure that coordination takes place not only at the U.S. government level but also with international DIB providers. While some CCMDs have already made engaging such institutional actors part of their standard

¹¹⁰ DSCA interview 20131125, November 25, 2013.
procedures (for instance, EUCOM’s annual European Strategy Conference examines NATO’s plans for the AOR), all would gain from making this inclusion systematic.

**Merge Some Programs**

Some mergers seem relatively straightforward, such as combining DIRI and WIF-DIB. Both programs are similar in their objectives and types of activities, but focus on different regions; however, with the expansion of WIF, the regional disparity may not exist for long. A second option would be to have an overall DIRI/MoDA program, since, as one interviewee put it, DIRI has the experience to diagnose institutional problems while MoDA is the tool to fix them. In many countries, this could also result in a combination of MoDA and WIF-DIB.

However, merging programs is not without risks. A first difficulty is finding the right agency to manage the larger programs. One interviewee also feared that combining DIB programs would just create another office likely to conflict with regional offices. In this perspective, merging programs would complicate the process rather than simplify it. This interviewee advocated breaking up security cooperation by region instead. A third issue is the potential vulnerability of a larger program to budget cuts, a prospect that is likely to create resistance to consolidation efforts from all actors involved.

**Summary Findings and Recommendations**

Table 4.4 summarizes this chapter’s major findings and recommendations.

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111 DIRI interview with 20140424-002, April 24, 2014.

112 DIRI interview 20131112-001, November 12, 2013.

113 DIRI interview 20131112-001, November 12, 2013.

114 OSD interview 20140124-001, January 24, 2014.

115 OSD interview 20140124-001, January 24, 2014.

116 DSCA interview 20140312, March 12, 2014.
# Table 4.4
Findings and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td>More and better coordination mechanisms are needed</td>
<td><em>Create a clearinghouse either from the current entities that oversee one or more DIB programs or ex nihilo:</em> It will be important to identify lessons from the experience of the Global Center for Security Cooperation to understand why it did not fully play its intended role as a clearinghouse. This would require further investigation into why some key organizations chose not to be part of the Center’s consortium and why some consortium members made so little use of the information it offers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merging DIB programs to facilitate their management has been discussed in the community</td>
<td><em>Increase the impact of CCMD conferences:</em> One option would be to extend the SCETWG to include all security cooperation activities, rather than simply education and training. This would allow the working group to capture more DIB events than is currently the case. Another is to create a joint DoS-DoD leadership conference to review, prioritize, and harmonize projects across both departments. Such harmonization early in the process could facilitate later planning conferences at the CCMD level. A third option is SOUTHCOM’s effective deconfliction process at the CCMD level, through the two-step process of the “pony blanket” and “horse blanket.” Although requiring some time investment, since it can only work with extensive discussions among the participants, this process has been successful in identifying gaps and overlaps in the security cooperation activities taking place in SOUTHCOM’s AOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merging DIB programs to facilitate their management has been discussed in the community</td>
<td><em>As tempting as this may be, we recommend against such a move and we recommend creation of a DIB enterprise director, as described in Chapter Five:</em> Merging programs brings serious risks. A first difficulty is finding the right agency to manage the larger program. In addition, there is the potential vulnerability of a larger program to budget cuts, a prospect that is likely to create resistance to consolidation efforts from all actors involved.</td>
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</table>
In this chapter, we discuss roles and responsibilities of organizations involved in DIB, as defined in the draft DIB DoDD,\(^1\) and examine the application of DIB from the policy to execution levels. We discuss linkages and gaps in DIB oversight and program management at policy, program, and project levels, and present recommendations on how to improve the process. We also suggest mechanisms to improve OSD(P) guidance through to the project execution level.

**Definitions and Relationships**

An ongoing source of tension in the defense community that plagues the institutionalization of the DIB concept is a lack of a coherent or well-understood lexicon for security cooperation events and activities. For example, DIB-like activities are often referred to as security cooperation, building partner capacity, security assistance, security sector assistance, security sector reform, and foreign internal defense, depending on circumstances. SOUTHCOM, for example, refers to them as defense/security sector reform. However, the use of the word “reform” has recently become controversial, and the community has been moving away from using it. According to the draft DIB DoDD, DIB is a subset of DoD security cooperation and part of U.S. security force assistance (SFA) policy initiatives. DIB activities then fill the security

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\(^1\) USD(P), 2014b.
cooperation/SFA niche at the ministerial/national institution level. In addition, DIB activities will be conducted with both the supporting institutions of foreign military forces, as well as defense governance institutions that direct and oversee the employment of foreign military forces.  

The following sections explain how roles, responsibilities, and relationships currently exist in the DIB community, and discuss findings and recommendations regarding guidance and oversight at the policy, program, and project levels.

**Policy-Level Oversight**

Figure 5.1 depicts the roles and relationships at the policy level overseeing DIB. There is a coordinating relationship between DoS, OSD(P), and the Joint Staff J5 (JS-J5). DASD Security Cooperation is responsible for providing DIB guidance to regional offices. The DASDs report to the assistant secretaries of defense, who report to the USD(P). The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is the branch responsible for coordinating DIB and other security cooperation issues with OSD(P) and JS-J5. According to PPD-23, DoS has the lead on planning, execution, and assessment of all SSA/security cooperation activities (which includes DIB).

DoS International Security is the branch responsible for coordinating with OSD(P) and JS-J5. However, there is little evidence that DoS has initiated any efforts outlined in PPD-23. The draft DIB DoDD mandates that all of DoD will work to integrate its activities with the interagency: “The Department will incorporate DIB into DoD planning and implementation of U.S. government-wide security sector assistance efforts. DIB planning and implementation will be coordinated with interagency partners, through existing security cooperation mechanisms.” However, these efforts to integrate cannot begin until they are initiated by DoS.

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2 USD(P), 2014b, pp. 2–3.
3 USD(P), 2014b, p. 4.
Figure 5.2 depicts the policy-level relationship between OSD and the regional centers. Regional DASDs provide guidance on “who to teach,” while the functional DASD for Security Cooperation provides guidance on “what to teach.” According to DCSA, the objective of these centers is to “build partner capacity by addressing regional and global security issues with strategic level military and civilian leaders through courses, seminars, workshops, research and dynamic outreach in an educational environment.”

In addition, USD(P) released “FY 13–14 Priorities for the Regional Centers for Security Studies,” a document outlining guidance and policy priorities for the regional centers. Guided by the 2012 DSG, this document directs the shift in regional center priority from prevailing in today’s wars to preventing, deterring, and prevailing against future threats. Regional center priorities are outlined as follows:


1. Promote better understanding of the U.S. system of government, defense establishment, and our approach to national security priorities as a basis for successful partnering.

2. Communicate and share regional reactions to U.S. policies and report these to OSD(P), especially any changes states make to their policies/posture in response.

3. Build approaches to partnering that engage the “whole of government”—for both the United States and its ally/partner.

4. Contribute to DoD’s effort to codify lessons learned from the past decade’s experience with counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and SFA.

5. Assist in horizon-scanning and the identification of future trends regionally and globally that will shape the future security environment in the decades ahead.6

6 USD(P), undated.
The guidance for regional centers also provides specific guidance and policy priorities for each center, including research and outreach priorities. Regional center representatives discussed their use of this policy in developing their own priorities and strategies for the year.

Program-Level Oversight

As depicted in Figure 5.3, the current roles and responsibilities for DIB programs are complex. In practice, various organizations have oversight and control of the DIB programs. From the policy perspective, the DASD for Security Cooperation retains guidance, directive, and program management control of all the DIB programs. However, it does so through DSCA and CCMR, which do not have a simple relationship with the DIB programs. DSCA manages contracting and funding of DIB programs and regional centers.³⁷ According to the draft DIB

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³⁷ There is no formal coordination process. One interviewee likened the disparate programs and activities contributing to DIB to having a number of ingredients without a recipe (or coherent strategy) that will never yield a consumable product (or achievable objective).
DoDD, DSCA will provide guidance and oversight of DIB programs, coordinate with SCOs to ensure successful DIB program execution, and manage DIB program funding.\(^8\)

The draft DIB DoDD does not mention CCMR at all. However, in practice CCMR plays a role in DIB activities. It provides administrative support to DIRI and WIF-DIB, but not MoDA and DIILS. MoDA receives strategic direction from DSCA and the DASD for Security Cooperation. DSCA and CCMR have a coordinating role, although this role is not defined. DSCA resources DIRI program execution through CCMR.

**Project-Level Oversight**

The relationship between DIB programs, CCMDs, and regional centers also varies considerably. Since the relationships and roles will vary by geographic area, this is not unexpected or necessarily undesirable. However, although unique and tailored relationships are ideal, competitive relationships between DIB, CCMDs, and regional centers are not. Thus, it is beneficial to consider what successful relationships look like and try to mirror or parallel them across commands. For example, SOUTHCOM is a good example of workable relationships. DIRI has a close relationship with SOUTHCOM because of a representative in the J9 who closely coordinates with DIRI, and includes DIRI events and activities in its TSCMIS and SOUTHCOM planning, execution, and assessments of activities. However, it is important to also note that SOUTHCOM dominates the DIRI budget (about 40 percent) because it is mostly consolidated in Colombia.\(^9\) In addition, at PACOM, DIRI has had a contractor representative in the J45 on a constant basis. However, DIRI (CCMR) staff is too small to send one representative to each CCMD.\(^10\)

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8. USD(P), 2014b, p. 8.
10. DIRI interview, 20140424, April 24, 2014.
Another example is the strong relationship between PACOM and APCSS. APCSS has civilian and military liaisons responsible for managing all relationships with PACOM (see Chapter Four). These liaisons are integrated into all phases of campaign planning, from TCP and theater campaign order (TCO) development, all the way through participating in PACOM’s assessment process. APCSS events are planned, coordinated, and tracked in TSCMIS. According to APCSS representatives, APCSS uses policy and guidance from OSD and PACOM, as well as from country teams, to inform workshop participation and content. In addition, PACOM had a DIRI representative (a contractor), who managed and represented DIRI engagements in the PACOM AOR. Unfortunately, at this writing, DIRI has been unable to renew his contract, so the position is vacant.\footnote{APCSS interview 20140430-002, April 30, 2014} In addition, co-location of APCSS and PACOM was noted as crucial to their ability to openly communicate.

Most of the CCMDs include OSD(P) guidance in their TCP development. CCMDs develop their TCPs on a yearly basis and incorporate guidance and direction from OSD and the CCMD commander. They also incorporate assessment results from the previous year, as well as input from the country teams in developing the CSCPs. Typically, the directorate at the CCMD responsible for writing the TCP (J5) assigns SCOs responsibility for writing draft plans based on their perspectives and understanding of country requirements and capabilities as the experts on the ground. The J5 then incorporates all these levels of guidance into the updated TCPs, which are then staffed through the CCMD commander and OSD for approval. Table 5.1 summarizes the relationships between CCMDs, regional centers, and DIB programs.

**Findings and Recommendations**

The major finding is that roles and responsibilities are not adequately defined at the program and project levels. They are either not defined at all, or the relationships are so complex that organizations resort to...
ad hoc relationships based, at times, on individual personalities. In par-
ticular, the relationship among the regional centers, CCMDs, and DIB
programs is not adequately defined in current policy or guidance docu-
ments. Table 5.1 outlines some of the relationships we observed. This
lack of clarity has the tendency to sow confusion among the various
organizations that have oversight and control of the DIB enterprise.
For example, DIILS answers directly to DSCA General Counsel, but
must also answer to the DoD General Counsel. The DIILS director is
under the direct command of the director, DSCA, but also responds
directly to OSD(P) requirements. In addition, although there are no
direct linkages, DoS funds many DIILS programs (about one-third
of DIILS funding comes from Title 22 funds), requiring a separate

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### Table 5.1
Summary of Relationships Among Combatant Commands, Regional Centers, and DIB Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCMD</th>
<th>Relationship with Regional Centers</th>
<th>DIB Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Close relationship with the Perry Center, which has a representative on site.</td>
<td>Close coordination with DIRI and CCMR. Planned MoDA for Colombia and possibly Guatemala.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>APCSS has military and civilian liaisons with PACOM and is engaged in TCP and TCO development.</td>
<td>PACOM hosts a DIRI representative who spends time coordinating with both PACOM and APCSS. DIILS also active in the PACOM AOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>Close relationship with the Marshall Center for a large number of activities.</td>
<td>WIF-DIB conducts engagements in NATO PfP countries and other countries with ties to NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>The Africa Center for Security Studies hosts roundtable discussions on Africa’s security and countering violent extremism. Works closely with AFRICOM.</td>
<td>DIILS conducts mobile programs and resident courses in several African nations. DIRI also active in the AFRICOM AOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>SOCOM’s area of operations is global. It operates through the CCMD’s TSOC.</td>
<td>It is not clear how SOCOM will interact with the DIB programs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reporting line to deal with funding. Ultimately, these multiple oversight and direction relationships lead to confusion that can seriously impact the execution of DIB activities.

**Recommendations**

Our recommendations center on establishing a clearer understanding of the relationships among the several participants in the DIB enterprise—including other U.S. government agencies. Below are a few simple remedies:

- The DIB programs should be asked to participate in the annual CCMD TCP and TSCP planning cycle.\(^\text{12}\) The draft DIB DoDD currently mandates that CCMD commanders incorporate DIB into their TCPs and CSCPs, as well as integrate their CSCPs with ICSs. In addition, it mandates coordination with the regional DASDs and the DIB Center of Excellence.
- The final version of the draft DIB DoDD should clearly define the roles and relationships between the following: CCMR and DSCA, CCMR and DIB programs, DSCA and DIB programs.
- The final DIB DoDD should be the authoritative source for defining roles and relationships at the program level.
- Better use of liaison officers to coordinate between regional centers and CCMDs is needed. This relationship should be better defined, either in the DIB DoDD or regional center policy. Adequate funding should be allocated to support an enhanced liaison officer program.

**A DIB Enterprise Director**

There should be one single entity between OSD and the CCMDs responsible for managing all DIB program activities. Many interviewees suggested that this agency should be DSCA. At present, DSCA is not acting in this capacity. Part of the problem is that the guidance is unclear as to what level of management DSCA can actually exercise. Although it funds all of the DIB programs, it exercises manage-

\(^{12}\) CCMR interview 20140424, April 24, 2014.
ment over WIF-DIB and MoDA and exercises direction over DIILS. CCMR on the other hand, does not fund any of the programs, but has some responsibility for DIRI (direction and administrative support) and WIF-DIB. Adding further confusion is the role that DASD for Security Cooperation plays in the administration of the DIB programs. Technically, the DASD’s role is oversight and guidance—in practice, direction takes place as well.

We recommend that a DIB enterprise director be appointed as a bridge linking policy to program to project level DIB, such as the one depicted in Figure 5.4. The draft DIB DoDD directs the establishment of a DIB Coordination Board to “oversee implementation of this directive, promote initiatives, assess ongoing efforts and share lessons learned among DoD Components.”\(^\text{13}\) We suggest taking it a step further, by specifying the creation of a DIB enterprise organization that would provide a single advocate with sufficient standing to interact with OSD(P), DoS International Security, and DSCA. The DIB enterprise director could coordinate the programming of Title 10 and 22 funding authorities, and could harmonize Title 22– and Title 10–funded DIB engagements. An organization like the one recommended

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\(^{13}\) USD(P), 2014b.
mirrors that of the regional centers, which have one director responsible for all coordination with DIB programs and execution entities.

Arguments have been made suggesting more consolidation of DIB programs under a single entity to ease management and control execution of DIB engagements. On the other hand, some have argued for less consolidation, to allow for more freedom and flexibility to operate. One argument against combining all programs into one is that it would create a single program with a budget that consists of the sum of the existing four programs. This presents a tempting target for budget cuts. The DIB enterprise structure we recommend retains the four separate budgets while providing the efficiencies of a single organization.

**Summary Findings and Recommendations**

Table 5.2 summarizes this chapter’s major findings and recommendations.

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14 DIRI/WIF-DIB interview 20131112, November 12, 2013; DSCA interview 20131125, November 25, 2013; and APCSS interview 20140430-005, April 30, 2014.

15 OSD interview 20130124, January 24, 2013. Many also exist at the CCMD level.
### Table 5.2
Findings and Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roles and responsibilities in the DIB community are not adequately defined at the program and project levels. They are either not defined at all, or the relationships are so complex that organizations resort to ad hoc relationships based, at times, on individual personalities.</td>
<td><strong>The DIB programs should have a role in the annual CCMD TCP and TSCP planning process:</strong> The draft DIB DoDD currently mandates that CCMD commanders incorporate DIB into their TCPs and CSCPs, as well as integrate their CSCPs with ICSs. In addition, it mandates coordination with the regional DASDs and the DIB Center of Excellence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The principle of “unity of command” is lacking in the DIB community.</td>
<td><strong>The final version of the draft DIB DoDD should clearly define the roles and relationships between CCMR and DSCA, CCMR and DIB programs, and DSCA and DIB programs.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Better use of liaison officers to coordinate between regional centers and CCMDs is needed:</strong> This relationship should be better defined in either the DIB DoDD or regional center policy. Adequate funding should be allocated to support an enhanced liaison officer program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>There should be one single entity between OSD and the CCMDs responsible for managing all DIB program activities:</strong> At present, DSCA is not acting in this capacity because guidance is unclear as to what level of management DSCA can actually exercise. Although it funds all of the DIB programs, it exercises management over WIF-DIB and MoDA and exercises direction over DIILS. CCMR, on the other hand, does not fund any of the programs, but has some responsibility for DIRI (direction and administrative support) and WIF-DIB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Appoint a DIB enterprise director to serve as a bridge linking policy to program to project-level DIB:</strong> The draft DIB DoDD directs the establishment of a DIB Coordination Board. We suggest taking it a step further, by specifying the creation of a DIB enterprise organization that would provide a single advocate with sufficient standing to interact with OSD(P), DoS International Security, and DSCA. The DIB enterprise director could coordinate the programming of Title 10 and 22 funding authorities, and could harmonize Title 22– and Title 10–funded DIB engagements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once goals and objectives have been established, along with a strategy in place to achieve them, the next question is whether things are going as planned. Is progress being made toward achieving these goals and objectives? How should the effectiveness of DIB engagements be measured? One problem with assessing DIB activities is that they are generally episodic, whereas their effect is designed to be persistent and sustainable. Hence, planners are faced with measuring the effect of a single engagement on the long-term goal of, say, strengthening a partner nation’s defense resource management.\footnote{This is one of DIRI’s stated goals recorded in Chapter Two. See Table 2.1.} Often, we resort to measuring such inputs as the number of engagements with the partner nation, the number of seminars, the number of students from partner nations attending regional center classes, etc. As tempting as this may be, inputs are not outcomes, and the outcome is what we must assess.

In Chapter Three, we described the processes used to assess a partner nation’s security sector—a country assessment. The idea was to identify and prioritize security gaps and to gauge the willingness and ability of the partner to support engagements aimed at reform. In essence, the identification of security sector gaps discovered during the assessment process leads to selective engagements aimed at filling these gaps. In this chapter, we discuss how the CCMDs and others determine whether these engagements are achieving their stated objectives.

We address this rather difficult topic by examining how DIB engagements are monitored, tracked, and evaluated by the DIB pro-
grams, the CCMDs, and—to some extent—the regional centers. We first discuss monitoring and tracking DIB engagements before dealing with evaluation, the heart of the assessment process. Much like Chapter Three, which examined partner nation selection and prioritization, this chapter examines the evaluation processes currently in use for each of the DIB programs and at the CCMDs.

The processes at each CCMD for selecting countries for DIB engagements and which engagements to select for each selected country speaks only peripherally to procedures for declining or terminating DIB engagements. It is true that, for each of the commands, security cooperation initiatives including DIB are generally discussed in a rather lengthy, all-inclusive TCP process, so that everyone interested in the country and the type engagement has a hearing. However, little is said about the criteria to be applied to continue a DIB engagement once it has been initiated or what criteria is applied to disapprove a recommended engagement.

**Monitoring**

Monitoring is part of the DIB engagement assessment process designed to help evaluate whether the activity is having the desired impact. It is a continuous function that provides regular feedback and early indications of progress—or lack thereof—in the achievement of DIB engagements. Monitoring examines actual performance against what was planned or expected. In the context of DIB engagements, it generally involves observing the implementation processes, strategies, and results. An important feature of monitoring is the opportunity to recommend corrective measures.

Once projects are implemented, it is important that periodic checks be made to see how they are progressing and if they are staying on track. For example, one of WIF-DIB’s goals is the improvement of

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HRM in Georgia. To do this, DIRI schedules regular in-country visits, working in tandem with the ODC, EUCOM, and a local contractor.

**DIB Program Monitoring**

WIF-DIB and DIRI monitor progress of DIB engagements by visiting the partner nations periodically. In some cases, contract personnel are permanently located in the partner nation to help with the implementation of DIB initiatives or with the area’s major command. For example, DIRI has a permanent representative to the PACOM J5. In addition, contact teams make periodic visits to see the progress made by the country ministries in implementing reforms resulting from previous engagements.

In the case of DIILS, visits consist mainly of METs conducting courses; therefore, the focus is on how well the course is presented. The same is true of the resident courses. DIILS continually monitors the political, military, legal, and justice environments in the countries it supports to gauge the effect of MET courses. DIILS’s annual reports provide a brief summary of the conditions in major regions of the world as they are likely to affect legal engagements and the rule of law.

The MoDA program is still rather nascent, having only recently emerged from its exclusive focus on the Afghanistan Defense Ministry to include other countries. Given that it has a constant presence in the partner nation, it is better able to periodically report on the status of its engagement with the country ministry. Because of the primary objectives of the MoDA program, effective monitoring depends on the ability to recruit and train U.S. government personnel with the skills needed to assist the country ministries in improving their institutional competencies.

**CCMD Monitoring**

DIB activities sponsored by the CCMDs are generally monitored by various staff elements, the country teams, and, at times, service components. In addition, the DIB programs sponsor activities in countries within the CCMD AOR and therefore contribute to the monitoring process. The schools associated with the regional centers also recruit students from countries in the AOR and monitor their academic prog-
Defense Institution Building

In some AORs, such as SOUTHCOM, the regional center (the Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, in this case) posts a permanent representative with the command to help recruit for resident courses, suggest courses to be conducted in-country, and help monitor progress post-academic instruction.

Tracking

Tracking, in this context, is essentially effective bookkeeping: some formal process to record and update essential information about DIB engagements. There are two main databases used to track DIB and, more generally, security cooperation engagements: the Concept and Funding Request (CFR) database—mandatory for WIF-funded engagements—and the GTSCMIS, now required for tracking all security cooperation engagements. Once WIF-DIB events are recorded in the CFR database, they are then added to the GTSCMIS.

The Concept Funding Request Database

The CFR database is used to record information about a given engagement, from funding amounts to after-action assessments. It is also mandatory for securing funds to support a proposed engagement. The WIF DMT has adapted the CFR database to better track DIB engagements. In addition to some administrative information, the database records information concerning the implementation of the event and a summary of accomplishments. Figure 6.1 is a partial CFR entry. The following is taken from the instructions contained in the DIB CFR event form:

- **Program/project line:** Describe the project line that this event is associated with and the project pillar (functional area) it relates to.

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4 PACOM uses an additional database management system, OHASIS, in addition to the GTSCMIS. However, not all DIB projects are managed using OHASIS; for those that are, information must be entered in both OHASIS and GTSCMIS.
NOTES: Missing from the form are the following columns: Objectives, Deliverables, and—for DIB after-action reports—Activity Personnel, Background, Accomplishments, Challenges, DIB Lessons Learned, and Next Steps.
How does this event fit into the sequence of events for the project line?

- **Background:** What event(s) in this project line and relevant developments have occurred prior to this event?

- **Purpose:** Tell us what this event aims to achieve and how it moves the DIB project along to its next milestone and ultimate goal. How did this event come about?

- **Content:** What will this event include, what is being discussed and reviewed, and how will activities be conducted? Tell us about your approach and what it includes.

- **Objective:** What overall project/program objective are you seeking to achieve? Will this event alone achieve an objective or serve as the capstone to a series of events? Place this event in the context of the particular objective cited.

- **Deliverable:** What is the specific deliverable for this event?

- **Other:** Is there any other relevant information (e.g., related work being performed by other organizations)?

In addition to the WIF-DIB CFR event entry (referred to as an activity report), the DMT also required that planners complete an after-action report. The following is taken from the form instructions:

- **Activity personnel:** What personnel were part of this event? Provide the name and title of the team lead and other SMEs.

- **Background:** Provide two to three paragraphs on the background of this activity. How did it come about, where is it in a series relative to other activities, and what has come before? Tell us what an uninformed reader should know before reading any farther.

- **Accomplishments:** List any major milestones or key objectives that have been reached or achieved. Did this event move the country along in a significant way?

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• **Challenges:** Provide a bulleted list of specific challenges. Providers may choose to include recommended courses of action in discussion of the challenges.

• **DIB lessons learned:** Provide a few bullets on event DIB lessons learned. Provide lessons learned detail, appropriate practices that could be replicated elsewhere, or other related information.

• **Discussion:** How did the activity go? Review the details of what happened, not a trip report, but an activity report.

• **Next steps/future activities:** Provide a few bullets on next steps needed by either the DIB support effort or the partner nation. Provide an updated list of future activities and add a few sentences on what that activity is designed to do. Put your general recommendations here.

• **Other:** Any other relevant information (e.g., related work being performed by other organizations).

• **Appendices:** (A) Event Participants: Who was there from the partner nation; (B) Event Documents: Organizationally-produced reports, etc.6

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**The Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System**

The GTSCMIS program is a common, web-based, centrally hosted management information system designed to serve as the information focal point for all security cooperation efforts. It provides decision-makers, planners, and other users the ability to view, manage, assess, and report security cooperation activities and events from initiation through completion. When fully implemented, GTSCMIS will replace all existing TSCMIS solutions hosted at and supporting more than 20 DoD agencies, services, and CCMDs. It is not clear if it will replace the CFR database. Nevertheless, a GTSCMIS entry for the activity is required after the CFR entry is complete.

The structure of GTSCMIS is governed by “business rules.” The rules are to “ensure that all security cooperation events and activities

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are entered into GTSCMIS accurately and without duplication.” The goal is to standardize data entry procedures and terminology across all commands, services, and agencies. There are five categories of business rules (essentially instructions on data entry):

- **Overarching:** These entries are global in nature and deal with such things as who can use GTSCMIS, who is authorized to enter data, event type, and establishment of a user account.
- **User type:** This entry identifies just what the user can change in the database. There are three user roles: view-only, event owner, and organizational security cooperation data manager. Each role comes with data entry permissions and restrictions.
- **Data entry:** This is the heart of the database. There are 14 entries in this category, from event title to event evaluation. Considerable emphasis is placed on standardization of entries, with each entry consisting of detailed instructions on format.
- **Event specific:** This appears to be a catch-all category. It consists of three entries that are seemingly disconnected: senior leader visits, consolidation of multiple activities in one event, and international education and training.
- **Resource:** This category simply deals with event funding.

Figure 6.2 depicts entries from SOUTHCOM. At the time these were obtained, SOUTHCOM had not yet converted to GTSCMIS, so these are TSCMIS entries. However, for the purpose of illustration, the differences are negligible.

### Evaluating the DIB Programs

This section discusses the evaluation of DIB engagements, perhaps the most difficult part of the assessment process. The State Department’s SSA planning process states that evaluation “documents the achievement of outcomes and results at the end of an intervention and, in

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7 Joint Staff J5, 2013.
### Illustrative TSCMIS Entries from SOUTHCOM

#### Figure 6.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>DOD Category</th>
<th>Sub Category</th>
<th>Host Country</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(U) - MOCK TRIAL, (DSAMS Import) (687719)</td>
<td>2/17/2014</td>
<td>2/21/2014</td>
<td>Combined/Multicraft Training</td>
<td>DSAMS</td>
<td>IMO: 5.a.3 (IMO Approved, SCO Approved)</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Description: Seminars are customized for each MET based on prior Assessments, Curriculum Planning, and communication between DIHS and the SAO. Topics will vary depending on the unique needs of the host country. This event supports the development of the Colombian Military Justice system and the transition from an inquisitorial process to an adversarial system. It will train Colombian Judges and attorneys in adversarial process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** SOUTHCOM, J9, “SOUTHCOM TSCMIS Report,” undated b.  
**NOTES:** MARFORSOUTH = Marine Forces South; SCSJA = Security Cooperation Staff Judge Advocate; DSAMS = Defense Security Assistance Management System.
some cases, the value of continuing the investment.” This is at the heart of the assessment process and includes collecting and analyzing information about activities to gauge an outcome’s level of success—how well it achieved its objectives. However, these are long-term objectives and no single event can claim to achieve any of them. DIB is a long-term investment, which means that it is difficult to assess the long-term effect of even good outcomes from a single engagement.

What follows is a discussion of how each of the major DIB programs evaluates DIB engagements. Appendix B contains a more-detailed discussion of each of the DIB programs, and the objectives included in the subsections can be found in Chapter Two.

**Wales Initiative Fund**

WIF program guidance lists DIB as the top priority for WIF funding. Started in 2006, WIF-DIB’s mission is to “to help PfP, Mediterranean Dialog and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries develop more professional and transparent defense establishments.” To that end, WIF-DIB’s objectives are to (see Figure 2.6)

- support development of effective ministries of defense
- increase transparency and accountability in personnel and resourcing systems
- strengthen democratic control of the armed forces
- reform defense and military education systems
- enhance reform efforts in niche operational and tactical areas.

The assessment of WIF-DIB–funded activities in partner nations is therefore focused on how well these activities help to achieve these objectives.

A method has been introduced aimed at producing measurable outcomes for WIF-DIB and other security cooperation events. How-

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8 DoS, 2013b.

9 U.S. Government Accountability Office, *NATO Partnership: DoD Needs to Assess U.S. Assistance in Response to Changes in the Partnership for Peace Program*, Washington, D.C., GAO-10-1015, September 2010b, p. 10. The Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperative Initiative countries were added to be consistent with the new WIF structure.
ever, it is not clear that it is in widespread use yet. Taken at face value, it is a more deliberative planning process, making event reporting more deliberative as well. The aim is to begin all activity planning with the partner end goal in mind. This is articulated in the form of desired outcomes that support LOAs. For example, one LOA is titled human resource management (supporting the second of WID-DIB’s objectives) and it is described as focusing on

\[t\]he human resource management processes, structures, policies, laws and regulations that apply to the personnel life cycle, recruiting, retention, and other HRM aspects.\(^\text{10}\)

A few of the 12 outcomes supporting this LOA include achieving the following:

- effective HRM policy
- effective HRM retention policy
- separation and retirement capability
- transparent, judicially based discipline system.

Several activities, called implementation tasks, are designed to achieve these outcomes. The five that purport to support an effective HRM policy are

- develop a cadre of HRM managers
- develop subordinated and support HRM policies
- develop an overarching HRM policy
- develop an HRM strategy
- review/reorganize the current HRM system.

Missing from all of this is any indication that such a system is indeed in use by WIF-DIB in assessing the effectiveness of WIF-DIB sponsored events. For example, did an activity take place in a PfP country aimed

\(^\text{10}\) Taken from a spreadsheet designed as a milestone chart prepared as part of the EUCOM Strategy of Active Security (SAS) process, September 28, 2011. The SAS process is explained in Chapter Three. The method is also illustrated in Judith Reid, “Defense Institution Building,” briefing, European Command, October 13, 2011.
at developing a cadre of HRM managers and, if such a cadre was developed, did it indeed contribute to an effective HRM policy? If so, how was it measured?

The Defense Education Enhancement Program

DEEP is technically part of WIF-DIB. However, we examine it separately because the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC) Education Development Working Group has developed an assessment system that is well-articulated and that has actually been used to assess progress in the PfP countries where DEEP activities have taken place.\footnote{Partnership for Peace Consortium, Education Development Working Group, \textit{Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP)}, December 2014.}

WIF-funded DEEP activities contribute to achieving the fourth of the WIF-DIB objectives: reform defense and military education systems. DEEP is a relatively inexpensive program that is unique among DIB programs in that it draws heavily on PME faculty from NATO countries who volunteer their time and require reimbursement for travel and related expenses only.

DEEP managers use a qualitative assessment of how well the program in a specified country contributes to reforming a PfP nation’s defense and military education systems. The contribution is gauged by examining eight measures of effectiveness (MOEs). Each is defined with some indication of what is needed to conclude that the PME activity was successful. Table 6.1 lists the eight measures, along with a definition of each that includes indicators of success. The definitions are abbreviated.

Each of the nine PfP countries where DEEP has initiated education activities is assessed against these eight measures over the period DEEP has been conducting activities in the country. Although not all measures apply to each country, the ones that do apply are then parsed to gauge how well the activities point to some level of success.

For example, DEEP has advised the Armenian military academic community since 2008. The assessment then covered the period from 2008 to the present. The assessment was based on five of the eight
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOE</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Adoption of modern PME academic structures and degree requirements</td>
<td>The host country or individual host PME institution creates new Western-like academic institutions and/or develops degree programs in accordance with internationally recognized criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Inclusion of modern subject matter into existing course curricula, including development of entirely new courses</td>
<td>Individual host PME institution adapts modern subject matter derived from DEEP curriculum development events and places into separate lessons or entire courses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Adoption of modern teaching methods by PME faculty</td>
<td>Individual host nation PME institution adapts modern teaching methods into the seminar room (e.g., emphasis on critical thinking skills utilizing the Socratic method of questioning students and creating an atmosphere where the students are comfortable to challenge the faculty member, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Adoption of NCO education</td>
<td>Host nation creates new Euro-Atlantic–like NCO academic education/training institutions, or existing host nation NCO academic/training institutions adapt Western-oriented subject matter derived from DEEP curriculum development events and places into separate lessons or entire courses. NCO education instructors also employ modern teaching methods emphasizing critical thinking skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Support of senior-level host nation and defense education institution leadership for PfPC DEEP programs</td>
<td>Senior-level host nation government officials (e.g., minister of defense, deputy minister of defense, chief of defense) and defense education institution leadership approve/participate/express support for PfPC DEEP programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Contribution of host nation educators (military and civilian) in PfPC programs</td>
<td>Host nation educators assume the external contributor role, as opposed to only the internal recipient role for PfPC support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Contribution to NATO/U.S. strategic goals</td>
<td>DEEP program components are directly related to NATO/U.S. strategic goals for relations with the host nation through NATO and partners’ partnership cooperation programs. DEEP objectives are identified, measured, and amended through written requests of partner ministries of defense to NATO, and progress is captured in the assessment of these programs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.1—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOE</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Contribution to meeting partner requirements/goals</td>
<td>DEEP components enable the ability of partners to achieve requirements/goals that they have established to attain designated objectives related to the professionalization of their armed forces and external relations with NATO and/or the United States.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


MOEs. Table 6.2 lists four indicators that the first MOE has met with some success. Table 6.2 also lists the requirements for success (definition), and the evidence for the first MOE only.

Although this process is not perfect, it does represent an attempt to link DIB activities (in this case, DEEP academic initiatives) to outcomes that are designed to support program objectives. The major issues with the method are that (1) it is a self-assessment, which may not be objective, and (2) it relies almost exclusively on the judgment of the evaluators. Neither of these invalidates the process, however, because each can be easily fixed by employing an independent evaluation team,12 and focusing more on easily verifiable observations, such as the ones listed in Table 6.2.

**Defense Institute of International Legal Studies**

DIILS supports U.S. foreign and security policy with rule of law training and education focused on human rights, international humanitarian law, and the law of armed conflict. DIILS conducts resident courses in various aspects of the law and dispatches mobile training teams to do the same. Its main objective is to implement programs in partner nations that support the rule of law, including equitable and accountable security and justice sectors, civilian control of the military, human rights, and democracy. More specifically, its objectives are to (see Figure 2.7)

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12 This is not always a good idea: To be effective, DIB relies on the partner nation counterpart’s trust. Inserting a stranger into the country to evaluate a DEEP (or other) program may not set well.
Table 6.2
Armenia Has Adopted Modern PME Academic Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOE</th>
<th>Required for Success</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of modern PME academic</td>
<td>Host country or host PME institution creates new Western-like academic institutions and/or develops degree programs in accordance with internationally recognized criteria.</td>
<td>The Armenian Military Education Concept, written with DEEP assistance and adopted in 2010, was largely shaped by Western models and new-NATO experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structures and degree requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td>In September 2013, the minister of defence inaugurated the first Armenian Command and Staff Course. DEEP contribution was recognized through keynote addresses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seven functional courses for junior officers have been restructured into two junior staff officer courses, based on similar Western courses designed for career progression of captains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Faculty hiring at the Institute for National Strategic Studies reflects a new generation that is more Western in orientation and thinking. There is a clear willingness to engage regionally, and a proposed cyber security course reflects commitment to engage the broader national security community beyond the ministry of defense.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- provide partner nations with the legal capacity to develop transparent and accountable security sectors
- provide partner nations with the legal capacity to establish civilian control of the military
- provide partner nations with the legal capacity to protect human rights
- provide partner nations with the legal capacity to establish representative, elected governments.
Like many of the other organizations that deal with DIB, DIILS produces an annual report that summarizes its accomplishments for the fiscal year. However, the data presented in the report deal mainly with inputs. That is, it reports on the number of events conducted, the number of countries served, the number of participants in their residence and MET courses, etc. In most cases, the linkage between these data and their effect on achievement of their objectives is missing.

For example, in its 2012 annual report describing activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, DIILS reported the following:

> Since 2008, DIILS programs have reached every DRC military region and have focused on the rule of law and disciplined military operations, respect for legitimate civilian authority, military justice, human rights and international humanitarian law, international criminal law, war crimes/crimes against humanity, investigation procedures, ethics and combating corruption, and sexual and gender-based violence. As of the end of FY12, DIILS organized or integrated its legal expertise in over 160 programs reaching over 5,200 Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) personnel.13

Although the topics were reported, what contribution the 160 programs made to rule of law in the DRC is not clear from this paragraph.

These things are very difficult to assess and, as stated earlier, must be viewed over the long term and not in just one or two short-term engagements. Like many other organizations pressed to assess the effectiveness of security cooperation programs, DIILS does provide some anecdotal evidence that its programs are achieving their objectives. For example, the same annual report adds the following after the above quote:

> A FARDC member of the Supreme Council of Magistrates said: “A few years ago, International Human Rights and the Laws of Armed Conflict were merely vague notions for field commanders. Now, however, commanders are increasingly knowledgeable of those concepts thanks to the familiarization trainings which

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13 DIILS, 2013, p. 4 (emphasis added).
DIILS has provided. Also, they are paying more attention to and taking seriously allegations of human rights violations by their troops, due to the real possibility that they may be held personally responsible.”\textsuperscript{14}

Causal relationships may prove to be impossible to determine, but comments such as this appear quite frequently in reports on the success of DIB engagements. In addition to the end-of-year assessments included in annual reports, DIILS—like other organizations that conduct classes—also polls the students after each class. Unfortunately, the focus is on what they learned and how well they thought the lessons were taught—not on their long-term effects.

**Ministry of Defense Advisors**

Advisors deployed with the MoDA program exchange expertise with foreign counterparts in similar defense specialties while deployed—initially in Afghanistan and Iraq, but now in other countries as well. The objectives of the program are to (see Figure 2.7)

- provide institutional advice to support stabilization or post-conflict activities
- assist building core institutional capacity to manage defense-related processes
- forge relationships that strengthen the enabling capabilities of a partner state’s defense ministry.

MoDA personnel are generally in the grade of GS-13 and above who have had 15 or more years of federal service. They are selected for their expertise in defense policy and strategy, force planning and resource allocation, logistics, personnel and readiness management, and acquisition and procurement.

A 2012 DoD Inspector General report found that “MoDA program officials did not establish a performance management framework to include goals, objectives, and performance indicators to assess

\textsuperscript{14} DIILS, 2013, p. 4.
progress and measure program results.” The DASD PSO responded to the finding by stating at the time that “[MoDA management is] working on a performance management framework to cover MoDA program office responsibilities, including advisor recruiting, training, and deployment performance indicators.” There are, essentially, two MoDA programs: MoDA in Afghanistan and Global MoDA.

**MoDA Afghanistan**

In Afghanistan, the program consists of approximately 80 advisors functioning in several ministries. The program is relatively mature, having existed since 2009. The overall objective of the MoDA in Afghanistan, consistent with the three program objectives above, is to “[Ensure] that Afghanistan Security Institutions and the Afghanistan National Security Forces can . . . provide stability and security in Afghanistan and serve as an effective counter-terrorism partner.” To achieve this, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has adopted an SFA system to manage the transition from unit-based SFA to its new functionally based SFA role. Central to the system are eight “essential functions” with desired end states and means to achieve them:

- **Plan program budget and execute:** The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can plan in accordance with their national security strategy, accurately define multi-year programming requirements, align the budget with their program, and execute a prioritized program within available resources.

- **Transparency, accountability, and oversight:** A comprehensive and sustainable Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense ministerial internal program is established and implemented to inform the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

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NATO, and international stakeholders of transparency, accountability, and oversight in accordance with best practices.

- **Rule of law and governance:** An effectively governed Afghan security institution (ASI) respects the rule of law and operates in accordance with Afghanistan’s domestic laws and international obligations.

- **Force generation:** The ANSF/ASI owns and uses systems to recruit, train, and retain sufficient qualified personnel to meet manpower requirements while managing their employment along career paths through merit-based selection.

- **Force sustainment:** The ANSF/ASI provides effective logistics, medical, and information communication and technology system support at all echelons using resources available.

- **Effective security campaigns and operations:** The ASI is capable of providing effective security within a balanced, affordable, sustainable model through the application of strategic planning and clear operational priorities.

- **Sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes:** The ANSF/ASI is able to plan and execute special, conventional, and police operations using Afghan-derived intelligence.

- **Strategic communications:** The ASI and ANSF communicate with the Afghan population, within the security institutions, and with the international community.\(^{18}\)

Along with planning the new functionally based SFA system, ISAF has concurrently developed an elaborate assessment process:

- Creation of an SFA center to coordinate and synchronize the essential functions
- Daily and weekly reporting on progress
- Staff assisted visits aimed at getting feedback directly from the Afghan Corps
- Monthly essential function reports

\(^{18}\) The titles and end states are adapted from ISAF, undated.
• Development of a problem-solving mechanism using problem sheets and a tracking matrix
• A program of activities and milestones designed to achieve the essential functions’ end-states.

ISAF has not allowed MoDA management to implement a separate assessment protocol in Afghanistan, so it must rely on the internal, functionally based SFA process described above. This complicates assessment for MoDA, in that it is not consistent with Global MoDA assessment, discussed next.

**Global MoDA**

In addition to Afghanistan, where the advisors’ mission is rather extensive and the opportunity to assess progress is limited to participation in the SFA process, MoDA has advisors in several other countries and, as indicated in Chapter Three, 16 countries have been nominated as potential Global MoDA countries. Assessing progress in these countries is less of a problem because MoDA management controls the assessment process. However, there are still difficulties:

- **What constitutes DIB in small countries?** In several of the smaller countries, the entire security force establishment may be fewer than 2,000 military and civilian personnel. Under these circumstances, the lines between strategy, operations, and tactics are blurred. The same minister working on the Strategic Defense Review may also be involved in vehicle maintenance and logistics. Under these circumstances, do we consider support to this minister a component of DIB? Two anecdotes illustrate this dilemma. In Bosnia, the defense ministry was seeking an advisor to help get its fleet of Vietnam-era HU-60’s (the Huey) airborne. A suitable candidate was found and was able to help get the fleet flying again. By any measure, the operation was a success, but was this DIB? A second example is the wounded warrior program in Georgia. During deployments to Afghanistan, several Georgian soldiers lost limbs, much like many of their NATO counterparts. The Georgian defense minister was interested in creating a wounded warrior program and asked for an advisor to help. Again, a suit-
able candidate was found and an effective program was established. Although a success, this was clearly not in line with what we refer to as DIB.19

• **Recruiting and training qualified personnel is critical:** More than anything else, finding the right person with the appropriate skills and the right temperament is critical to achieving success. The MoDA program commissioned a study to identify factors that make an advisor effective and to use these guidelines in the search for acceptable candidates.20 Since the individual advisor is the product provided, it is imperative that he or she be well-suited to the task. In addition to identifying the successful advisor traits, MoDA also sought to design an improved training program for those advisors selected for the program.21

With these issues in mind, the MoDA management team has prescribed a program assessment process that has been implemented in several countries: Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Georgia, to name a few. The plan consists of a country needs assessment,22 an execution plan, and an evaluation plan:

• **Country needs assessment:** Advisors are required to observe ministry operations while offering advice for the first 60 days of their deployment. The idea is to identify areas needing reform. These are discussed with their host nation counterparts to secure agreement.23

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19 Both these anecdotes were related to the authors by a senior MoDA official.


22 The term assessment is used to both describe an evaluation of the state of the country’s defense institutions and to describe the evaluation of the DIB programs implemented to achieve country objectives. See Chapter Three for a discussion of the distinction between these two forms of assessment.

23 This process requires considerable interpersonal skills on the part of the advisor—especially given the likely language barrier. For a discussion of the need for these skills, see Nadia
• **Execution plan:** Once reform areas are agreed, the advisor must prepare an action plan designed to implement the reforms. The plan must include milestones and must have host nation agreement.

• **Evaluation plan:** Once the plan is approved, the advisor must submit monthly reports that consist of an evaluation of progress toward reaching the milestones.²⁴

As with all processes, problems sometimes arise. In Kosovo, for example, the advisor was charged with implementing the recommendations of the Security Sector Review. The problem was that the document was not completed in time for the advisor to complete the assessment and develop a plan. Consequently, he became involved in various projects for the ministry. However, when the document was completed, he was able to complete his assessment and develop a plan.²⁵

Finally, the monthly progress reports are essentially self-reports. There is currently no independent observer team overseeing operations in the host country. Testimony by the host nation ministry can be self-serving as well, given that they are generally pleased to have U.S. assistance. An example of a year-end report summary provided by an advisor in Montenegro makes the point:

This report provides a narrative summary of year one of the Global Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) Program’s Montenegro engagement. As a pilot for the program office, the Montenegro engagement served to identify key operating interfaces across the stakeholder organizations, and to establish practical processes for the conduct of advisor work. Internal to Montenegro, it served to establish a structured presence within the country’s operating environment, to perform a focused assessment of needs and to initiate transformations aimed at addressing those needs. The MoDA became an integral member of the Embassy’s

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²⁴ MoDA management team, December 9, 2014.

²⁵ Anecdote related to the authors by the MoDA management team, December 9, 2014.

Country Team, and an embedded resource within the military helping guide the implementation of program goals and objectives. Working with key leaders, the MoDA developed and delivered key documentation defining future organizational structures, roles, responsibilities, and a governance framework based on general guidance outlined by the Ministry’s Strategic Defense Review, and implemented a program of instruction leading to the stand up new organizational capabilities.26

Although this sounds perfectly reasonable, it is a self-report. It consists of 13 pages of detailed accounts of accomplishments, but there were no contributions from independent observers. Independent observers, in this case, would consist of MoDA management personnel visiting the advisors and their ministry counterparts. This is problematic on two levels: (1) it requires additional staff, which the program lacks, and (2) visits of this nature are not always welcomed by the host nation, because it looks like an inspection.

**Defense Institutional Reform Initiative**

The DIRI program provides direct support for partner nation DIB and focuses on building capacity within the U.S. government’s security cooperation community to support the DIB efforts of partner nations.27 DIRI is a global DIB program whose objectives are to (see Figure 2.6)

- improve partner nation core defense processes
- strengthen partner nation defense strategy and policy
- strengthen partner nation defense HRM
- strengthen partner nation defense resource management
- strengthen partner nation logistics management.

Like the MoDA program, the DoD Inspector General faulted DIRI for not having a “defined and published program, mission and

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goals, program strategy, or performance measures.”28 This prompted a response from the DASD-PSO in October 2012 indicating that performance measures were forthcoming:

We agree that performance measures for DIRI are not yet fully developed, and we believe that the program is sufficiently mature to necessitate this step over the next year.29

The program now has a “defined and published program, mission and goals,” as reported in Chapter Two. DIRI cites the five DIB components and lists its goals and objectives for each (see Table 2.1). Effectiveness and performance measures, however, like all other DIB programs, are more problematic. In some cases, the evaluation of DIRI engagements is included in the CCMD annual evaluation processes. A good example is SOUTHCOM: DIRI works closely with SOUTHCOM in selecting countries for DIB engagement and in selecting the appropriate DIB activity. SOUTHCOM includes all DIRI activities on its TSCMIS report. Consequently, DIRI engagements are evaluated along with all other DIB and security cooperation activities at SOUTHCOM.

**Evaluation at the Combatant Commands**

DIB and security cooperation in general are managed by various staff elements within the CCMDs. In addition, some commands view DIB differently. For example, AFRICOM views DIB primarily as strengthening operational forces, while PACOM considers it a minor subset of security cooperation. In addition, many commands conflate DIB

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29 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, “Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program Elements Need to Be Defined (Project No. D2012-D000J/A-0092.000),” Memorandum for the Director, Joint and Southwest Asia Operations Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, October 10, 2012b. Typically, the Inspector General publishes its final report after it has received responses from the affected parties. This explains the disparity in the dates of the Inspector General’s report and DASD-PSO’s response.
with DIRI. Table 6.3 illustrates the variety of staff managers for DIB. Of particular interest to this section is assessment management. Note that no two commands charge the same staff with assessing DIB. This is not a problem, but it does underscore the differences in approach among the CCMDs. In all but CENTCOM, the assessment is conducted by a different staff element from those conducting planning and implementation. At CENTCOM, the J5 is responsible for all three activities. However, different components within the J5 are responsible for assessment, thus preserving some level of objectivity.

In general, the evaluation of DIB engagements at the CCMDs is part of an annual process that is linked to the development of the TCP and the subsequent CSCPs. The basic objectives for the region and each country are articulated in these plans and therefore form the basis for evaluation. The objectives are generally in the form of lines of effort, activity, or operation and, in some cases, are subordinate to IMOs. For example, DIB activities at CENTCOM fall under IMO 5—“Assist [partner nations] in instituting essential structural reforms that improve the functioning of their defense establishments”—and LOE 8—“Conduct security cooperation.”

Although similarities exist, each command has its own method for evaluating the contribution of the various DIB activities to achieving its LOE or IMO desired end states.

Table 6.3
Managing DIB Assessment at the Combatant Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCMD</th>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>J5/J5</td>
<td>J5/J5</td>
<td>J8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>J9</td>
<td>J9</td>
<td>J73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>J4/J45</td>
<td>J4/J45</td>
<td>J83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J1/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J5</td>
<td>J7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**U.S. Southern Command**

At SOUTHCOM, evaluation (referred to as *assessment*) is a process that focuses on the effects of security cooperation investments, including DIB. Figure 6.3 illustrates the process that was used to assess FY 2013 activities. The TCP used was for FYs 2014 to 2018.

From the TCP, IMOs were derived (these have been replaced by LOEs, as mentioned earlier). The desired effects and the associated tasks are part of the two-tiered assessment process depicted in Figure 6.4. For DIB events, the tasks are the engagements proposed that support the effects desired from the activity. The development of metrics (or indicators, as depicted in Figure 6.4), results in both a set of MOEs and a set of measures of performance (MOPs). The MOEs are designed to gauge the degree to which the desired effects have been achieved. The MOPs reflect how well the activity is progressing according to plan.

Data are collected from the country teams with regard to the activities implemented in their respective countries. The preferred method for the FY 2013 data was e-mailed spreadsheets. Based on these data about the DIB engagements, each activity is scored. A summary “dashboard” is created for each IMO (in this case, IMO 5), as depicted in Figure 6.5.

*Figure 6.3*

**SOUTHCOM’s TCP Assessment Process**


NOTE: TCP-A = TCP assessment.
Using the scores developed from the data collected, an evaluation of the contribution of each activity toward achieving the desired effects is evaluated, resulting in a partner nation effect report, as depicted in Figure 6.6.

The two-tiered assessment structure depicted in Figure 6.4 is critical to the evaluation of DIB engagements. By identifying desired effects to support the IMO, it contributes to the prioritization process described in Chapter Three, as well as the assessment process described here.

In addition to the tasks and effects listed for each IMO, there may be several sub-tasks and sub-effects. For IMO 5, D/SSR, two effects are listed:
IMO 5: USSOUTHCOM supports USG whole of government efforts in key partner nations to implement institutional-level reforms to improve the functioning of partner nation defense/security establishments and promote compliance with international human rights standards.

5a. Partner nations implement and sustain defense/security institutional reforms in order to develop professional, accountable, and proficient defense.

5b. Partner nation military/security forces are professional and respect human rights.

The scores used in the assessment process depicted in Figure 6.4 are accumulated in the effects detail chart in Figure 6.6. Each nation with tasks supporting the second IMO 5 effect is listed and rated on a
scale of 1 to 5. These scores are then combined to produce the overall assessment depicted in Figure 6.6.

At SOUTHCOM, assessment of security cooperation initiatives, including DIB activities, is a highly structured process that takes place over several months. Charts such as those depicted in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 are generated for every IMO and effect, respectively. The output from the process is a report presented to the SOUTHCOM commander for his approval. It consists of the partner nation effect report (a summary of the scoring in Figure 6.6), a summary analysis, and the TCP assessment report.

Figure 6.6
Effects Detail for SOUTHCOM Effect 5b

On track: minor changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country A</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country B</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country C</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country D</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country E</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country G</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country H</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Numbers and color codes are notional.
RAND RR1176-6.6

This is an interval scale, with 1 being the worst score and 5 the best.
U.S. Pacific Command

Unlike the other CCMDs, planning and implementation of DIB activities and security cooperation projects more broadly are managed by the J45, the Director for Logistics, Engineering and Security Cooperation/Assistance. This seems logical for PACOM, given that much of its security cooperation activities focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. PACOM is the only command that highlighted its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid program, which consists of two sub-programs: Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action. In addition, PACOM was the only command that also used OHASIS to track events in these two programs.

Like SOUTHCOM and other CCMDs, assessment (and evaluation) at PACOM is part of an annual process associated with the development of the TCP. The TSCP is developed from the TCP, starting with the issuance of the TCO, a broad statement of command strategy in the form of an order dealing with the impacts of natural or man-made disasters. Figure 6.7 outlines the process, which culminates with the issuance of the TSCP, which becomes an annex to the TCP.

- **TCP issued:** Once the TCO is issued, the security cooperation community (PACOM staff, SCOs, etc.) begins to align theater security cooperation country operations, actions, and activities (OAAs) with CSCPs. The objective is to coordinate theater security cooperation activities to achieve TCP objectives.
- **CDWG meets:** In December, the Capability Development Working Group (CDWG) convenes. It examines the several possible PACOM security cooperation and DIB initiatives and produces proposed country OAAs that have been coordinated and deconflicted, but not yet resourced and prioritized.

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31 PACOM, 2014.

32 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, “Strategy to Task Analysis,” web page, undated. The TCO is designed to support the GEF short of combat operations. The focus is primarily on Phase 0 operations (shaping the environment) and what are referred to as the “all hazards” IMOs.
Resource prioritization: From January to May, submissions for resources are made and prioritized.

The PACSCWG: In June the Pacific Security Cooperation Working Group convenes to synchronize the CSCPs and to resource the year’s activities. The result of this process is the TSCP annex to the TCP.

Assessment continues throughout this process but is embedded more directly in the TCP process. Figure 6.8 illustrates PACOM’s plan, direct, monitor, and assess process. Although focused on TCP activities in general, the process includes security cooperation engagements as well. The TCP consists of sub-campaigns and IMOs leading to the initiation of country OAAs. Assessment then consists of evaluating how well the OAAs contribute to achieving those objectives. However, unlike SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM, there is no IMO or LOE associated with security cooperation, much less with DIB. The view at PACOM is that security cooperation cuts across all IMOs. The result is that DIB and security cooperation initiatives are assessed separately from, but in concert with, the more general assessment process.
The JESB: The Joint Effects Steering Board reviews the recommendations made in the assessment or other processes that require flag officer approval.

Planning: The planning process is led by the J5 but includes the J4’s theater security cooperation efforts that are part of the security cooperation cycle discussed earlier (Figure 6.7).

Directing: Once the plan is approved, the J3 develops the TCO, which signals the start of plan execution. The TCO results in the OAAs designed to support the objectives of the TCP. This includes security cooperation OAAs, as depicted in Figure 6.7.
• **Monitoring:** Monitoring the execution of the TCO through the OAAs falls under several organizations, including the J4’s role in monitoring the execution of the theater security cooperation OAAs.

• **Assessment:** Assessments are conducted for each IMO, sub-campaign, and LOE. Security cooperation, and therefore DIB, activities are not directly part of this process but, because they cut across all IMOs, they are assessed separately in terms of how they support all IMOs. The command will be using a strategic management system for assessments in the future.\(^3\) Currently, SharePoint is used, but it is considered very cumbersome. PACOM has concluded that the best source of information relevant to assessment is from SMEs.

The assessment process at PACOM asks two important questions: (1) Are we doing the right thing? (2) Are we doing things right? The first question focuses on the effectiveness of the tasks initiated (the OAAs) in achieving the desired effects (conditions necessary to achieve objectives) stated in the TCP, and the second focuses on how well the tasks or OAAs are executed. The first question is answered by applying MOE indicators (metrics) that support MOEs, and the second is answered using MOPs.

To assess performance of OAAs and the IMO effectiveness assessment for the sub-campaign, the PACOM J83 uses color-coded charts—much like those used at SOUTHCOM. For performance assessment, the question is “are we doing what the TCO told us to do, and are we doing it well?”\(^3\) Performance of activities is assessed on a qualitative scale:

- performance is to standard
- performance exhibits minor shortfalls
- performance exhibits significant shortfalls
- task attempted but failed
- task not executed.\(^3\)

\(^3\) This is actually a tracking system similar to TSCMIS.

\(^3\) PACOM, undated.

\(^3\) PACOM, undated.
The effectiveness of the tasks (OAAs) in achieving desired effects is also measured using a color-coded qualitative scale. In this case, the measures applied assess the effectiveness of the sub-campaign in achieving IMO objectives. The scale used at PACOM is as follows:

- objective is met
- results are favorable
- results cause concern
- results cause serious concern
- objective not met.36

The output from the assessment process is a series of recommendations addressing the following questions:

- “Do we stay the course . . . ?
- Do we redirect resources and focus more in areas that seem to drive more results?
- Do we make significant changes to the plan and reallocate resources . . . together?”37

**U.S. European Command**

Like the partner nation selection and prioritization process described in Chapter Three, assessment at EUCOM is part of the EUCOM strategy implementation cycle. The process is managed within EUCOM’s Policy, Strategy, Partnering, and Capabilities staff element, the J5/8. Within this staff, the DIB program officer within the Security Cooperation Programs Division prepares the annual DIB assessment report.38 The latest report identified DIB engagements in ten PfP countries that contributed to achieving the following objectives:

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36 PACOM, undated.

37 PACOM, undated.

• Increasing partner nation responsibility for their [sic] security needs.
• Enabling partners to manage their own security and contribution to regional and international security and stability.
• Improving sustainability and impact of other U.S. security cooperation investments and activities.
• Supporting stronger partner nation and whole-of-government bilateral and multilateral cooperation on national, regional, and global priorities.
• Improving bilateral defense relations and understanding with the United States, other partners, defense institutions, and armed forces.39

LOAs are used to identify a result that requires substantial coordinated effort over an extended period (three to five years, for example). LOAs are linked to the strategic goals.40 EUCOM has over 45 “standard” LOAs grouped under five functional categories. These functional categories align with the GEF-defined security cooperation focus areas:

• operational capacity and capability building
• institutional capacity/security sector reform
• support to institutional capacity/civil sector capacity building
• intelligence and information sharing
• international suasion and collaboration.41

For each of these standard LOAs, EUCOM publishes an implementation guide that identifies its strategic intent, as well as organizational roles for the U.S. government and partner nation institutions involved. It also identifies goals, desired results, assessment requirements, and resources required. Finally, it specifies LOA progress reporting—tracking.

39 EUCOM, 2014.
40 Kloecker, 2014b.
41 Kloecker, 2014b.
The DIB LOAs at EUCOM are clustered under the institutional capacity/security sector reform category. There are currently five DIB LOAs managed by EUCOM’s J5 Security Cooperation Programs Division:

- national defense organization
- strategy development
- human resources management
- financial management system
- professional military development.\(^{42}\)

EUCOM has also defined a hierarchy of activities designed to support the LOAs and the strategic goals. Figure 6.9 describes the structure. The arrow at the right is generally used to describe the implementation of LOAs. The green triangles represent intermediate outcomes that generally represent milestones. The tasks depicted are designed to achieve the outcomes. The LOA, the outcomes, and the tasks listed support the indicated DIB LOA. The outcomes are only two of six listed for this LOA.

The assessment process consists of annual progress reporting on the LOAs by the respective office of primary responsibility.\(^{43}\) The report consists of four basic sections:

- **Current status**: Focus is on the outcomes and the tasks implemented to achieve them. It also includes an assessment of the prospects for successful outcomes.
- **Results**: Defined as the impact of recent activity on desired outcomes.
- **Hindrances**: This covers shortfalls in resources, lack or diminished capability to continue, limitations in authorities or permissions, vulnerabilities, and partner nation concerns.

\(^{42}\) Reid, 2011.

\(^{43}\) The office of primary responsibility plans, executes, or supervises all TSC activities associated with its LOA. It coordinates activities among activity providers and produces progress reports. Kloecker, 2014b, and Reid, 2011.
Strategy and plan considerations: Identify risks and opportunities and discuss need to update the LOA or higher-level plans.

In addition, the DIB office of primary responsibility has identified several quantitative and qualitative MOEs for its LOAs. A few of these are listed in Table 6.4.

The strategic value score discussed in Chapter Three is generally used to inform resourcing decisions at EUCOM, but, given that it is applied to the LOAs, it is also a quantitative MOE. What follows is a more-detailed description of the strategic value score and how it is developed. Its use in DIB engagement prioritization is described in Chapter Three.
While the exact composition of the strategic value can be adapted and refined, in general, the strategic value score is a weighted function of three elements: the GEF, the SAS priority, and the component commander/functional area proponent priorities—as depicted in Figure 6.10.

- **GEF**: The GEF score is made up of three weighted elements: the end state priority, the partner nation priority, and the degree to which the LOA is in a “preferred” security cooperation focus area. The partner nation priority is designated in the GEF.

- **SAS priority**: The commander’s priority expressed in the strategy under which an LOA was directed in the country cooperation plan.

- **Component/functional area proponent priorities**: The component commander or functional proponent priorities among the LOAs assigned to them for execution.

The score for the GEF component is the weighted sum of its constituent elements. The scores and the weights are subjectively awarded.
The evaluation of DIB engagements at EUCOM is conducted annually as part of the strategy implementation cycle (assessments). Tasks are initiated in each partner nation designed to achieve outcomes that support the overall attainment of the five DIB LOAs. Evaluation takes place at the LOA level, using MOEs like those listed in Table 6.2 and the strategic value score described in Figure 6.10. Adjustments to the engagements that support the tasks are made if LOAs do not appear to be on a successful track.

**U.S. Central Command**

As in the other commands, security cooperation, including DIB, activities is part of the TCP. The TCP is structured around eight prioritized LOEs that focus CENTCOM plans, operations, and activities to achieve IMO that derive from the LOEs. DIB falls under LOE 8
(lowest priority) of the TCP: conduct security cooperation.\textsuperscript{44} The LOE specifies four tasks:

- Conduct security cooperation and security assistance efforts across the region to ensure regional stability.
- Strengthen security agreements with AOR partners, and bolster their national and regional defense capabilities.
- Enhance interoperability with U.S. forces.
- Support U.S. efforts to advance economic development, good governance, and stability across the region.

DIB activities are considered a major component of each of these tasks because strong defense institutions are required for all of them. The overall security cooperation objectives are that AOR partners

- remain accessible and cooperative with the United States
- maintain cooperative interest-based relations with their neighbors to enhance regional stability
- are capable of deterring, defending, and cooperating against attack
- can control their borders
- can mitigate ungoverned areas.\textsuperscript{45}

Security cooperation—and, therefore, DIB—assessment is part of CENTCOM’s annual assessment process. Given that a separate LOE focuses on security cooperation, it gains the same scrutiny as other LOEs. The assessments at CENTCOM are used primarily to recommend adjustments to plans and resources. It also satisfies reporting requirements from OSD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

\textbf{Assessment}
Structurally, CENTCOM manages security cooperation and DIB activities as depicted in Figure 6.11. LOE 8 is the broad mandate for

\textsuperscript{44} CENTCOM J5, “Security Cooperation Assessment: Briefing for DIB Meeting,” briefing, April 7, 2014. Not available to the general public.

\textsuperscript{45} CENTCOM J5, 2014.
engaging in security cooperation efforts with partners in the region. To further narrow the goals of the security cooperation mission at CENTCOM, several IMOs are identified. These generally focus on individual countries or regions, such as the Central Asian states or the Arabian Peninsula. The one- to five-year goals articulated in the IMOs are used to assess progress. Each of the IMOs is then supported by one or more security cooperation desired outcomes, and tasks are identified to support these desired outcomes. The achievement of the outcomes is then gauged by one or more MOEs.

The assessment process is an annual requirement at CENTCOM. In addition to the LOE-to-MOE assessment structure depicted in Figure 6.11 is an assessment of how well the tasks initiated to achieve the desired outcomes (or effects) are performed. This requires the development of MOPs. Like other commands, CENTCOM tracks the status of these tasks using either the GTSCMIS or the CFR, depending on the source of funds. For WIF-funded tasks, the CFR is used.
All other funding sources use the GTSCMIS.\textsuperscript{46} Country teams also submit annual after-action reports as part of the assessment process.

In addition to the annual formal assessments, less-formal assessments take place more frequently. The command periodically sends out teams to gauge the impact of their security cooperation engagements.\textsuperscript{47} For the Central Asian states, the more formal assessments of DIB activities are conducted by the DMT. According to one interviewee, “CDOs [country desk officers] and country teams are supposed to be doing that but they are so over-tasked it is hard for them to do everything.”\textsuperscript{48}

The IMO assessment summary depicted in Figure 6.12 is used to report on progress toward achieving objectives. The assessment is completely subjective: Unlike the other commands, there is no attempt

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{IMO8x.png}
\caption{CENTCOM Annual IMO Progress Assessment Summary}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Definition of the IMO}
\item \textbf{Opportunities/Limitations}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item The first with entries prefixed by “O” for opportunities
  \item The second with entries prefixed by “L” for limitations
  \end{itemize}
\item \textbf{Assessment Summary—Minor Progress}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item Changes in the operational environment
    \begin{itemize}
    \item Series of entries prefixed by “+” or “−” indicating positive or negative change
    \end{itemize}
  \item Progress toward IMO achievement
    \begin{itemize}
    \item Series of entries prefixed by “+” or “−” indicating positive or negative progress
    \end{itemize}
  \end{itemize}
\item \textbf{Recommendations}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{46} CENTCOM interview 20140407-002, April 7, 2014.
\textsuperscript{47} CENTCOM interview 20140407-003, April 7, 2014.
\textsuperscript{48} CENTCOM interview 20140407-003, April 7, 2014.
to quantify the level of success or failure. The summary consists of five sections:

- **Assessment summary scale:** The first section, in the upper left corner, presents a visual summary of progress along with a description of the IMO. Both the current year assessment and the past year are displayed along a scale ranging from significant regression (in the black region) to significant progress (in the white region). In this case, only minor progress has been observed for the second year running.

- **Opportunities/limitations:** The second section records the observed opportunities to further progress in achieving the IMO, such as expanding the use of FMS, initiate additional exercises, and leverage multilateral engagements. Limitations are essentially impediments to achieving the IMO, such as a reduction in funds for DIB engagements, the lack of a status of forces agreement, and abrupt changes in leadership.

- **Changes in the operational environment:** These changes are rated as positive or negative in effect. Examples are improvements in border security, bilateral agreements among partner nations, and alliance with totalitarian regimes causing regional uncertainties.

- **Progress toward IMO achievement:** These are both positive and negative indicators of progress. For example, minor progress toward completing a national military strategy, or a denouncement of U.S. military activity in the region.

- **Recommendations:** Finally, the chart includes recommendations aimed at correcting observed deficiencies. These are in the form of altered plans or new or redirected tasks.

**Strategy and Plans Integration**

During the 2014 assessment cycle, CENTCOM attempted to align the command’s theater and country strategy more closely with the TCP. Both strategy and planning derive from the GEF through the JSCP, so it seems reasonable to strive for such an alignment. Figure 6.13 illustrates the relationships between the two processes.
The theater and country strategy is depicted in the top box in the diagram. The GEF security cooperation desired end states inform both the theater strategy and the development of the TCP. The theater strategy also informs the development of the TCP, and, therefore, alignment of the two processes ensures consistency.

Along the bottom, the TCP results in a series of LOEs, desired end states, and IMOs, as described above. Annex O of this plan addresses the desired security cooperation end states. Finally, country goals and objectives, desired outcomes, and prescribed activities are listed in Appendix 1 of this annex. There are 18 tabs containing the CSCP, one for each country in the AOR.
U.S. Africa Command

Like the other CCMDs, AFRICOM has developed its own methodology to evaluate whether DIB activities are creating their intended effects or not. However, with AFRICOM being a relatively young CCMD (established in 2007), its assessment process is less developed than the processes at the other major commands.

AFRICOM’s assessment process is currently conducted by the J8, Assessment Division, and, like the other commands, it is based on TCP guidance. The J5 is tasked with the coordination of all assessment criteria between each U.S. Embassy country team, the senior defense official, and the defense attaché. The J5 also provides AFRICOM assessment requirements to support the Global Peace Operations Initiative and Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance programs.

The J5 maintains an online security cooperation database as a data source for steady-state assessments. Like other commands, AFRICOM tracks security assistance (including DIB) activities using TSCMIS.

The basic elements affecting the assessment process in the 2012 AFRICOM TCP are depicted in Figure 6.14. The structure is similar to CENTCOM’s structure depicted in Figure 6.11. The major components are as follows:

- **Theater strategic objectives:** From end states identified in higher-level DoD planning guidance, the AFRICOM TCP develops its own tailored objectives known as “theater strategic objectives,” or TSOs.
- **Lines of effort:** Like CENTCOM, AFRICOM has established LOEs (six in AFRICOM) that align with the command’s theater strategic objectives. The sixth LOE, *strengthen defense capabilities*, supports the command’s security cooperation, but does not include DIB initiatives.

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• **Intermediate military objectives**: Again, like CENTCOM, AFRICOM develops IMOs aimed at supporting the LOEs. The annual assessment process is aimed at gauging how well the command has progressed toward achieving the IMOs.

• **Sub-regional campaign plans**: AFRICOM splits up the theater strategic objectives among sub-regional campaign plans, which helps to narrow the focus to specific areas of Africa. Subordinate campaign plans are assessed against their progress in achieving the IMOs.
• **Country plans:** Lastly, *individual* country plans are developed so that guidance may be implemented and achieved at the country level.\(^{50}\)

AFRICOM’s most recent TCP lists six distinct LOEs that link to AFRICOM’s theater strategic objectives.\(^{51}\) Each has the flexibility to be tailored to a specific country (i.e., at the country plan level). The list is as follows (in priority order):

• Counter violent extremist organizations
• Maintain strategic posture
• Counter piracy
• Counter illicit trafficking
• Prepare and respond to crises
• Strengthen defense capabilities.

*Strengthen defense capabilities* is the only LOE that could be related to achieving DIB objectives. It has the lowest priority, as did security cooperation at CENTCOM. The focus of this LOE is to “improve partners’ generating forces, specifically their institutional systems, in order to produce professional, effective operational forces.”\(^{52}\)

The assessment process, conducted by the J8, measures the degree to which the IMOs have been achieved during the assessment cycle. As in other commands, the IMOs are the foundation for assessments and, as such, they must be specific and measurable. IMOs provide the basis for assessing progress toward desired AFRICOM commander end states and also inform AFRICOM priorities (levels of effort) and future resource allocations for the command.

AFRICOM’s TCP includes several IMOs divided among its sub-regional campaign plans. Several IMOs in support of the *strengthen defense capabilities* LOE describe the intended effects of security coop-


\(^{52}\) Adapted from Commander, U.S. Africa Command, 2012.
eration and assess progress against them, but there are no current IMOs that address DIB directly. Some of the IMOs describe effects that are relevant to DIB, but only indirectly. The IMOs’ intended effects currently rely on objective indicators and therefore cannot take subjective assessments into account, which are crucial to the DIB process. The assessments process is also complicated by rapidly evolving events on the ground that may negate previous baseline assessments conducted by country teams.

Findings and Recommendations

Clearly, evaluation is one of the more difficult tasks associated with DIB investments because the overall strategic goals for DIB can rarely be achieved in the short term. For example, assisting a partner nation to develop defense institutions that respect human rights and international humanitarian law is a long-term commitment with several intermediary steps along the way. So the question remains: How do we know how a classroom course on human rights or the deployment of a MoDA program advisor skilled in human rights policies contributes to instilling a respect for human rights in the partner nation’s defense establishment?

The major commands, the regional centers, and the DIB programs have all attempted to institute assessment processes. The findings listed below are based on the assessment processes currently in place within the DIB community, and the recommendations are based on a combination of what we consider best practices among these processes.

Tracking

Tracking individual DIB events is complicated because of the number of systems used. For WIF-DIB events, the CFR is used—and is mandatory to secure funding. However, because the GTSCMIS is mandated for all security cooperation activities, dual tracking takes place. In some commands, the TSCMIS is used because the GTSCMIS is still inadequate and, in some commands, its use lacks enforcement. In
still another command, PACOM, a third system, OHASIS, is used to manage several DIB-related programs.

Clearly tracking DIB events is critical to the assessment process. It is used to capture event status and for funding approval. We recommend that the GTSCMIS be adopted. Currently, the JS-J5 is responsible for enforcement of GTSCMIS. However, enforcement should include the DIB programs as well as other organizations engaging in security cooperation. Enforcement then would be better executed by an OSD entity, and we recommend that the DIB enterprise discussed in Chapter Five serve in this capacity. The GTSCMIS is a common, web-based, centrally managed management information system and is therefore well-suited to serve as a universal tracking system for DIB. The resource business rules can be expanded to include a funding approval authority.

**Monitoring**

Monitoring is an essential feature of the assessment process for DIB events. It generally consists of site visits to gauge how well events are actually progressing against what was planned or expected. Among the DIB programs and the CCMDs, monitoring is uneven. There are sometimes good reasons for this, such as lack of qualified personnel or limited country access. In some cases, monitoring, like evaluation, consists of self-reports from U.S. implementation teams, which can be biased. Reports from the country personnel benefiting from the engagement may also be biased.

Monitoring is an integral part of the assessment process and, as such, should be encouraged for all DIB investments. In most cases, DIB programs do conduct site visits to monitor progress. It is preferable that monitors be objective and therefore not part of the implementation team. However, this is not always possible because of the trust built up by the implementers. The insertion of personnel that the host nation may perceive as “inspectors” could do more harm than good. Reports from the country team may be a solution because of the trust the team must establish with the host nation to function effectively.
Evaluation

Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process and, as mentioned earlier, the entire DIB community has expended considerable effort at developing suitable methods to measure the progress of their investments. However, there is some unevenness in the approaches. We make several recommendations aimed at improving the evaluation process. As mentioned earlier, most of these are procedures already in place at one or more commands or DIB programs. The objective here is to establish a common procedure based on first principles.

- **Goals and objectives:** The first step is a clear articulation of goals and objectives through the GEF-JSCP-TCP process at the CCMD level. Although the DIB programs have specific strategic goals as reported in Chapter Two, when implementing DIB engagements in a CCMD’s AOR, the objectives of the activities must be consistent with command DIB goals and objectives. DIILS, for example, should ensure that if it is prepared to send an MET to teach a course on the international law of military operations to senior defense officials in Mauritania, it should ensure that doing so is consistent with some AFRICOM security cooperation LOEs. This ensures that the DIB programs are fully integrated with the CCMDs’ security cooperation plans.

- **Strategy:** Because DIB goals and objectives are generally achieved over a long period, the strategy put in place to reach them must take this into account. All the major commands have instituted an annual process that, like EUCOM’s strategic plan development, consists of a series of steps or phases—beginning with planning and ending with assessment. However, the DIB events planned for a given year must be placed in the context of a longer-term process that consists of intermediate milestones. The series of intermediate milestones must in turn sum to the overall goals and objectives. A model might be EUCOM’s hierarchy of activities model (Figure 6.9). The LOA is the ultimate objective, whereas the outcomes can be thought of as intermediate milestones. The activities designed to reach the milestones are the implementation tasks. The model need not be linear (sequentially achieving each
Perf orming and effectiveness: Implemented tasks are effective if they produce desired outcomes, and they are performed well if agreed procedures are followed. Both are necessary for successful implementation of DIB events. Both SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM have recognized the need to evaluate both the effectiveness of DIB events and how well they are performed. There are two reasons that a task may not achieve its desired outcome. The first is that the task was ill-designed or was not completed. For example, if the outcome is to develop an effective education and training system as part of human resources reform, developing a new curriculum for the partner nation’s NCO academy without focusing on instructor training in critical thinking may fall short. The second way a task may not achieve its desired outcome is if it is not performed to standard—for example, if unqualified personnel set out to design the curriculum. Even if instructor training is conducted in parallel, the desired outcome may not be achieved. Both performance and effectiveness must be included in the evaluation process.

MOEs and MOPs: To evaluate effectiveness and performance, suitable standards or criteria must be established. MOEs and MOPs are essentially standards designed to assess just how effective a task is at achieving a desired outcome, and just how well the task is performed. These need not be quantitative, and in most cases they are not when dealing with DIB tasks. Indicators or metrics need to be developed to support both MOEs and MOPs. The SOUTHCOM model described in Figure 6.4 is illustrative.

Allow for course changes: Monitoring and tracking allow us to continuously review progress of DIB tasks. But what if we discern that the task is not on track to achieve its desired outcome or milestone? There needs to be a mechanism in place to modify the task or terminate it completely. This should be part of the annual TCP cycle. Ongoing tasks should be examined during the assessment phase of the cycle. Assessment is indeed part of the
PACOM, EUCOM, and SOUTHCOM cycles, but mechanisms should be in place to deal with off-cycle course changes as well.

**Summary Findings and Recommendations**

Table 6.5 summarizes this chapter’s major findings and recommendations.

**Table 6.5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tracking individual DIB events is complicated because of the number of systems used.</td>
<td>The GTSCMIS should be adopted and its use enforced by an OSD entity, such as the DIB enterprise recommended in Chapter Five, at all DIB programs and CCMDs: Tracking DIB events is critical to the assessment process. It is used to capture event status and for funding approval. The GTSCMIS is a common, web-based, centrally managed management information system and is therefore well-suited to serve as a universal tracking system for DIB. The resource business rules can be expanded to include a funding approval authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among the DIB programs and the CCMDs, monitoring DIB engagements is uneven.</td>
<td>To the extent possible, objective monitoring processes should be implemented for all DIB activities: It is preferable that monitors be objective and therefore not be part of the implementation team. However, this is not always possible because of the trust built up by the implementers. The insertion of personnel that the host nation may perceive as “inspectors” could do more harm than good.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the entire DIB community has expended considerable effort at developing suitable methods to measure the progress of their investments, there is some unevenness in the approaches. A clear articulation of DIB goals and objectives through the GEF-JSCP-TCP process at the CCMD level is needed: When implementing DIB engagements in a CCMD’s AOR, the objectives of the activities must be consistent with command DIB goals and objectives. This ensures that the DIB programs are fully integrated with the CCMDs’ security cooperation plans.

CCMDs should develop a strategy aimed at achieving DIB goals and objectives over a long period: All the major commands have instituted an annual process that, like EUCOM’s strategic plan development, consists of a series of steps or phases—beginning with planning and ending with assessment. However, the DIB events planned for a given year must be placed in the context of a longer-term process that consists of intermediate milestones.
Evaluation processes should focus on both the effectiveness of DIB investments and how well they are performed: Implemented tasks are effective if they produce desired outcomes and they are performed well if agreed procedures are followed. Both are necessary for successful implementation of DIB events. Both SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM have recognized the need to evaluate both the effectiveness of DIB events and how well they are performed.

Suitable standards or criteria should be established to evaluate both the effectiveness and performance of DIB activities: MOEs and MOPs are essentially standards designed to assess just how effective a task is at achieving a desired outcome, and just how well the task is performed. These need not be quantitative, and in most cases they are not when dealing with DIB tasks. Indicators or metrics need to be developed to support both MOEs and MOPs.

A mechanism needs to be in place to terminate or significantly alter an ongoing DIB activity if necessary: Monitoring and tracking allow us to continuously review progress of DIB tasks. But there needs to be a mechanism in place to modify the task or terminate it completely. This should be part of the annual TCP cycle. Ongoing tasks should be examined during the assessment phase of the cycle, and mechanisms should be in place to deal with off-cycle course changes as well.
Defense institution building is key to building the institutional capacity of partner nations to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. DIB’s main goals are to promote good governance, transparent and accountable civilian oversight of professional defense forces, and the rule of law in those countries considered partner nations. The focus is clearly at the defense institution level—ministries of defense and interior. The rationale is that just supporting partner nations at the operational and tactical level—without supporting the basic infrastructure to handle personnel management, logistics, finance, and many other functions necessary to a well-functioning military—would create a partner nation force unable to sustain itself. For these reasons, DIB has become a major security cooperation activity, critical to achieving the Defense Department’s partner nation goals.

**Challenges**

In this report, we have examined the large number of programs, authorities, commands, and regional centers involved in implementing DIB activities. What we observed is a rather complex, unconnected, and, in many cases, redundant collection of activities aimed at achieving some level of improvement in partner nations’ defense institutions. OSD(P) faces challenges going forward:

- **Complexity:** In Chapter Four (and Appendix A), we underscored the complexity of the DIB enterprise in terms of the large number
of programs doing DIB. In addition, in Chapter Five, we illustrated the rather intricate processes in place to oversee, guide, manage, and coordinate DIB activities. The challenge will be to develop a coherent management structure able to draw on both Title 10 and Title 22 authorities to conduct DIB activities. Rationalizing and overseeing the many programs considered to be DIB programs is another challenge.

- **Measuring success:** This is a problem in most activities where quantifying success is not possible. For DIB, it is complicated even more by the fact that effects are long term, but activities are short term and, in most cases, episodic. In Chapter Six, we recorded the several methods the commands and DIB programs use to measure success—usually on an annual basis. The challenge here will be to connect the success of short-term episodic events into achieving successful long-term goals and objectives.

- **Selecting partners and DIB activities:** What countries make the best partners? What activities in those countries will contribute most to achieving goals and objectives? What do the selected partner nations want from DIB? What are they willing to contribute to the process? These are all challenging questions that affect the application of DIB. In Chapter Four, we identified the rather disconnected methods used by the DIB programs and the CCMDs in selecting partners and then in selecting activities to be conducted. The challenge will be to develop a process to answer the questions posed that is more integrated than what we experience today.

**Going Forward**

Dealing with the challenges facing DIB will not be easy. We recommend the first step be to develop something like the DIB enterprise we described in Chapter Five. It will be critical to the smooth operation of DIB in the future for it to be centrally managed by an organization with authority to deal with all the players: OSD, DoS, the CCMDs, the DIB programs, and the regional centers. This is a rather daunt-
ing undertaking, in that the new DIB enterprise may appear to be yet another bureaucratic layer when, in fact, it should reduce bureaucratic churn overall.

Second, it is clear that the new enterprise—whatever form it takes—will have to take charge of its domain. That is, it will not just control the activities of the DIB programs, such as DIRI, WIF-DIB, MoDA, and DIILS, but the DIB activities of other organizations, such as the CCMDs and the regional centers. As we pointed out in Chapter Four, there are also several other non-DIB security cooperation programs conducting DIB activities. Oversight of these and all DIB activities will have to be consolidated under the newly created DIB enterprise—and the DIB enterprise will need the authority to enforce compliance with reporting requirements.

Finally, to assess the effectiveness of DIB activities, a tracking software system is needed, along with the authority to compel organizations engaged in DIB to use it. The GTCMIS currently under development and managed by the JS-J5 is a step in the right direction. However, GTCMIS should not be a CCMD software tool only; it should be used by any organization conducting DIB activities. Its management should be part of a new DIB enterprise charter.

There are several other issues facing OSD(P) going forward, and we identify these in the findings and recommendations charts in Chapters Two through Six. However, the three listed here stand out as critical to the success of DIB.
The RAND DIB database (Table A.1) is based on two existing repertoires of U.S. security cooperation mechanisms: the U.S. Army’s *Army Security Cooperation Handbook*\(^1\) and a 2013 RAND report on security cooperation mechanisms used by CCMDs to build partner capacity.\(^2\) Although these are not the only existing repertoires of programs in existence,\(^3\) they were chosen because they specifically identify those activities that are DIB-related to some degree.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Activities and Purpose</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>DIB Level</th>
<th>Justification (who/what)</th>
<th>DIB Activity Objective</th>
<th>Region/Country Focus</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw Initiative Fund program (WIF-DIB)</td>
<td>Both a fund and a program. Conducts activities ranging from partner nation defense institutions assessment to development of education activities and military-to-military engagement to address organizational gaps</td>
<td>Program/fund</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ministerial engagement</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions; improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>NATO PfP countries</td>
<td>Unpublished RAND research on Warsaw Initiative Fund program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI)</td>
<td>Ministry-to-ministry engagement whereby SMEs conduct organizational assessments of partner nations and establish a roadmap with them to address issues</td>
<td>Program/fund</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ministerial engagement</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions; improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)</td>
<td>Offers resident and mobile courses on legal matters to foreign military officers, legal advisors, and related civilians. Courses focus on human rights, international humanitarian law, and the law of armed conflict. DIILS also assists partner nations in setting up or reforming their military justice systems; and improve accountability and transparency of their legal system</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Defense institutions/new institutions</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions; improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>DIILS, 2013; DIILS, “DIILS Builds Military Justice Capacity in Cote d’Ivoire,” web page, undated a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
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<td>DIB Level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MoDA)</td>
<td>Deployment of senior DoD civilian employees to advise officials of partner nation ministries of defense, interior and other ministries involved with national security. The program matches DoD experts with their foreign counterparts based on requirements identified by the partner nation (e.g., planning, logistics, financial management, personnel and readiness)</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ministries of defense/ministerial advisors</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions; improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>DSCA, undated c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Governance Initiative</td>
<td>Assessments of partner nations’ security sector with a focus on processes and institutions, development of strategies and programs to address institutional gaps, and regular monitoring and adjustment (when needed) of these programs</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Defense institutions/new institutions</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions; improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>The White House, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Military Education Program (AMEP)</td>
<td>Reform and expand the PME capacity of sub-Saharan African countries through peer-to-peer mentoring, curriculum revision, and workshops on learning methods</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Defense institutions/new institutions</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions</td>
<td>sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Interview with AMEP representative, August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>DIB Level</td>
<td>Justification (who/what)</td>
<td>DIB Activity Objective</td>
<td>Region/Country Focus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP)</td>
<td>Reform and expand the PME capacity of NATO PfP countries and members of other select NATO partnerships through peer-to-peer mentoring, curriculum revision, and workshops on learning methods</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Defense institutions/new institutions</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions</td>
<td>NATO PfP countries and partners of select other NATO partnerships</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace Consortium, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned International Engagements</td>
<td>Conducts lessons learned seminars, courses, and briefings in the continental United States and abroad, as requested by DoD agency/command. Also assists partner nations to set up their own lessons-learned center as requested by U.S. Department of the Army Headquarters or Training and Doctrine Command</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Defense institutions/new institutions</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Partnership Program (SPP)</td>
<td>Partners U.S. states with other nations in support of CCMD objectives. Only some cases are DIB—e.g., Pennsylvania National Guard helped Lithuania set up its NCO Academy.</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Defense institutions/new institutions</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>DISAM, 2014, pp. 146–147; for examples of SPP missions, see Kapp and Serafino, 2011, pp. 4–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Army Cyber Command Security Engagement</td>
<td>Cyber-related training events and information sharing designed to build partner nation cyber capability, increase collective cyber security, and promote cyber interoperability between the United States and partner nation</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training/strengthening partner nation's resource management</td>
<td>Improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>GEF-designated critical and key partner countries/regions, Strategic Command/Cyber Command–designated partner countries/regions, and Department of the Army–designated partner countries/organizations; Only UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand so far</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assignments to Improve Education and Training in Information Security</td>
<td>Temporary assignment of a member of a foreign military force to DoD to educate him/her on information security threats, management, and response</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Public Law 112-81, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Section 1051c, Multilateral, Bilateral, or Regional Cooperation Programs: Assignments to Improve Education and Training in Information Security, December 31, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR)</td>
<td>Located at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, CCMR’s objective is to help partner nations address civil-military challenges as well as improve interagency and international cooperation in this domain. Activities include courses, workshops, visits, seminars, research and publications, exercises, and distance learning, all focusing on promoting good civil-military relations, supporting DIB, supporting peacebuilding, and combating violent extremism.</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Center for Civil-Military Relations, “About Us,” web page, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness</td>
<td>Helps GEF-designated critical and key partner countries or regions increase their civil and military disaster preparedness capabilities. First step is to identify partner nation needs. Second step is to develop a multi-year engagement plan with specialized training events tailored specifically to the partner nation.</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ training and education</td>
<td>Improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p.18; Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, “Civil Military Emergency Preparedness (CMEP) Program,” web page, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTFP</td>
<td>Education and training events aimed at mid- and senior-level partner nation defense and security officials, to increase partner nation counterterrorism capabilities and build a global network of counterterrorism experts and practitioners</td>
<td>Program/ fund</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>10 U.S.C., Section 2249c, Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program: Authority to Use Appropriated Funds for Costs Associated with Education and Training of Foreign Officials,“ undated; DSCA, “Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP),” web page, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRMS/ DRMI</td>
<td>Education events on effective allocation of resources in defense organization, including resident courses for international officers O-4 to O-6 and equivalent civilians, international flag and general officers, and senior civilian officials; and mobile courses on defense resources management or more specific topic as requested by partner nation</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ training and education/ strengthening partner nation's resource management</td>
<td>Improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>(“participants have come from more than 160 countries [including the United States]”) Naval Postgraduate School, 2010</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution to Certain Personnel of Education and Training Materials and Information Technology to Enhance Military Interoperability with the Armed Forces</td>
<td>Education and training of partner nation military and civilian educational material to improve partner nation’s ability to take part in multinational operations, including joint exercises, and increase interoperability between U.S. and partner nation forces</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>10 U.S.C., Section 2249d, Distribution to Certain Foreign Personnel of Education and Training Materials and Information Technology to Enhance Military Interoperability with the Armed Forces, undated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Senior Military College International Student Program/Army War College International Fellows Program</td>
<td>Provides opportunities for senior foreign military officers to conduct study and research on security-related topics</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 21</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>Field studies program for international military and civilian students and military-sponsored visitors</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>DISAM, The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book), Edition 34.1, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, August 2015, pp. 14-4 and 14-5; USD(P), United States Field Studies Program (FSP) for International Military and Civilian Students and Military-Sponsored Visitors, Department of Defense Instruction 5410.17, September 15, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Foreign military sales (FMS)</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
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<td>Justification (who/what)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign officers admission to Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td>Provides advanced education for active-duty military officers or civilian government employees of partner nations</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>10 U.S.C., Section 7046, Officers of Foreign Countries: Admission, undated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign participation in the Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps</td>
<td>Foreign students may voluntarily enroll in the basic course or attend basic camp and may participate in the advanced course, but the Army does not actively recruit nonimmigrant aliens</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>Operational and tactical level by exception/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Unknown (likely global)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) Programs, Department of Defense Instruction 1215.08, June 26, 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign participation in the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences</td>
<td>Attendance to one of the three schools for military officers at the Uniformed Services University of Medicine, Graduate School of Nursing, and Postgraduate Dental College</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>Armed forces supporting institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Unknown (likely global)</td>
<td>Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, “About Our Mission,” web page, undated</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign service academy semester abroad exchanges</td>
<td>Up to 24 students from the U.S. Military Academy, Naval Academy, and Air Force Academy take part in an exchange with cadets from foreign military academies and spend a semester abroad</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operational and tactical level by exception/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 49; Moroney et al., 2011, p. 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign student attendance at the service academies/International Cadet Program [for U.S. Military Academy]</td>
<td>Four-year fellowship for a foreigner to attend the U.S. Military Academy</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operational and tactical level by exception/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global. Briefing gives numbers of foreign U.S. Military Academy graduates by country (1889–2006) and numbers of cadets by region</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 50; U.S. Military Academy, “International Cadet Program,” briefing, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Air Forces Academy</td>
<td>Located at Lackland Air Force Base, the Inter-American Air Forces Academy offers 13 courses, including the International Squadron Officer School (ISOS) and courses on intelligence and logistics. It also has mobile training teams (MTT) and subject-matter expert exchanges</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Central and South American countries</td>
<td>Inter-American Air Forces Academy, brochure, Lackland Air Force Base, Tex.: U.S. Air Force, undated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional military education exchanges</td>
<td>Attendance of foreign military personnel at professional military education institutions (other than service academies) in the United States</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>22 U.S.C. Section 2347c, Exchange Training; Reciprocity Agreement, undated</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>Defense Institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Depends on the regional center</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>10 U.S.C., Section 184, Regional Centers for Security Studies, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>DoD institutions studying security issues relating to a specific region of the world. Regional centers involve military and civilian participants and act as forums for research and exchange of ideas.</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operational and tactical level by exception/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants Major Academy International Fellows Program</td>
<td>Foreign equivalents of master sergeants and sergeant majors attend the Sergeants Major Academy courses with their U.S. counterparts to prepare for positions of responsibility within their defense and military institutions</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operational and tactical level by exception/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service academy foreign and cultural exchange activities/U.S. Military Academy Foreign Academy Exchange Program</td>
<td>Cultural immersion experience for U.S. Military Academy and foreign cadets. Foreign participants take part in a visit to Washington, D.C., and New York City.</td>
<td>Program 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operational and tactical level by exception/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 49</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Center of Military History Intern Program</td>
<td>Internship for one or more officer or cadet who receives mentoring and is allocated a workspace at the Center for Military History</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Security Cooperation Training Teams</td>
<td>Army or joint training and technical assistance teams deployed to partner nations in support of FMS cases, providing advice, training, and support on equipment, technology, doctrine, tactics, and weapon systems</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)</td>
<td>Education and training for foreign military, law enforcement, and civilian personnel. Includes a Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) and an NCO professional-development course. Restricted to Western hemisphere partner nations.</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Defense institutions/education and training</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Personnel Exchange Program</td>
<td>Exchange of DoD military and civilian personnel with partner nations. Unlike liaison officers, they do not represent their government.</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ liaison officers</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>DISAM, 2014, p. 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) Program</td>
<td>Deployment of foreign government military and civilian employees</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ liaison officers</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 32; USD(P), <em>Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals</em>, Department of Defense Directive 5230.20, June 22, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-reciprocal exchange of defense personnel</td>
<td>Temporary assignment of civilian or military personnel from DoD to a foreign country, or from a foreign ministry of defense to DoD; temporary assignment of military personnel from a U.S. military unit to a foreign military unit or from a foreign military unit to a U.S. military unit</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ liaison officers</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>DISAM, 2014, p. 137; 10 U.S.C. Section 168, Military-to-Military Contacts and Comparable Activities, Paragraph (c), Authorized Activities, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
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<td>DIB Level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools of Other Nations Program</td>
<td>Attendance of U.S. officers at a foreign military staff or senior service college in order to increase U.S. military presence in partner nation and to build U.S. influence with future partner nation military leadership</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ liaison officers</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 53; see also U.S. Department of the Army, <em>Army Training and Leader Development</em>, Washington, D.C., Army Regulation 350-1, December 18, 2009, Section, 3-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Land Forces Summit</td>
<td>Biennial conference gathering senior land forces officers from the United States and African countries to build relationships, exchange information, and improve cooperation on security matters</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Joint/general staffs and commands/ high-level contact</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Africa only</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 15; Christina M. Bhatti-Madden, “African Land Forces Summit Closes in Kampala,” U.S. Army Africa website, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army-to-Army staff talks</td>
<td>Meeting between land forces staff of the United States and partner nations to build relationships and improve interoperability</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Service headquarters/ high-level contact and information exchange</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions</td>
<td>As of March 2013, was conducted with 18 partner armies but there are no geographic restrictions</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>DIB Level</td>
<td>Justification (who/what)</td>
<td>DIB Activity Objective</td>
<td>Region/Country Focus</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished visitors orientation tours (DVOT) and orientation tour (OT) program</td>
<td>Short and intensive U.S.-based training program designed to familiarize select international military officers and ministry civilians to IMET, e-IMET, and FMS programs. Includes visits of military training facilities, schools, and government agencies. An OT becomes a DVOT when a member is a general flag officer or civilian equivalent</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ high-level contact and information</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Yvonne Eaton, “Distinguished Visitor Orientation Tour and Orientation Tour Program,” The DISAM Journal, Fall 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global research watch program</td>
<td>Monitoring and analysis of military research capabilities of foreign nations to identify opportunities for, and to promote, cooperation</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ high-level contact and information exchange</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>10 U.S.C., Section 2365, Global Research Watch Program, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagery intelligence and geospatial information</td>
<td>Provide partner nations, regional organizations, and U.S. security alliances with imagery intelligence and geospatial information support</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Defense institutions/ high-level contact and information exchange</td>
<td>Improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>10 U.S.C., Section 443, Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial Information: Support for Foreign Countries, Regional Organizations, and Security Alliances, undated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>DIB Level</td>
<td>Justification (who/what)</td>
<td>DIB Activity Objective</td>
<td>Region/Country Focus</td>
<td>Sources</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator Engagement Talks</td>
<td>Meetings at the Air Staff level to build relationships and improve interoperability</td>
<td>Program 1a</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Joint/general staff and commands/high-level contacts and information exchange</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions</td>
<td>Global. 15 countries in the program as of January 2014 [only South Africa in Africa]</td>
<td>“Operator Engagement Talks: Air Force Reserve Plays a Critical Role in Mission Designed to Strengthen Partnerships with Foreign Militaries,” Citizen Airman, January 23, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Chief Counterpart</td>
<td>Visits by foreign chiefs of staff; visits abroad of U.S. chiefs of staff</td>
<td>Program 1a</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Joint/general staff and commands/high-level contact</td>
<td>Establish or improve national-level defense institutions</td>
<td>Global. Countries that adhere to U.S. government sanctions</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>DIB Level</td>
<td>Justification (who/what)</td>
<td>DIB Activity Objective</td>
<td>Region/Country Focus</td>
<td>Sources</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of technical data</td>
<td>Sharing of defense technology with U.S. allies to facilitate interoperability, in accordance with export control and technology security policies</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Defense institutions/high-level contact and information exchange</td>
<td>Improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>10 U.S.C., Section 2320, Rights in Technical Data, undated; USD(P), <em>International Transfers of Technology, Articles, and Services</em>, Department of Defense Instruction 2040.02, March 27, 2014a; DSCA, “C3.1—Technology Transfer,” <em>Security Assistance Management Manual</em>, April 30, 2012b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Center of Military History International History Program</td>
<td>Creates and develops contacts between U.S. and international official military history institutions through joint conferences and publication of conference proceedings</td>
<td>Program</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Defense institutions/high-level contacts and information exchanges</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Activities and Purpose</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>DIB Level</td>
<td>Justification (who/what)</td>
<td>DIB Activity Objective</td>
<td>Region/Country Focus</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Distinguished Foreign Visits</td>
<td>Visits by senior foreign officials to their U.S. Army counterparts</td>
<td>Program 1a</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Defense institutions/high-level contacts and information exchanges</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army International Visitors Program</td>
<td>6,000 official visits per year of international visitors in support of Army security cooperation activities</td>
<td>Program 1a</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Defense institutions/high-level contacts and information exchanges</td>
<td>Professionalize defense personnel, both civilian and military</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Conferences</td>
<td>Conferences allowing the exchange of information to increase interoperability</td>
<td>Program 1a</td>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Service headquarters/high-level contact and information exchange</td>
<td>Improve systems for effective functioning of defense governance and execution of activities</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>U.S. Department of the Army, 2013, p. 48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

Management of Defense Institution Building Programs

The following is a more-detailed description of the several organizations associated with the management and implementation of DIB programs. It includes the major DIB programs, the role of the CCMDs, and regional center activity. All these organizations are mentioned throughout this report, but here we consolidate the descriptions and include additional information, such as funding. We start with a discussion of the four major DIB programs: DIILS, WIF-DIB, MoDA, and DIRI. Table B.1 records their funding for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIB Program</th>
<th>FY 2012 Funding (Thousands)</th>
<th>FY 2013 Funding (Thousands)</th>
<th>FY 2014 Funding (Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Institute of International Legal Studies</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
<td>$3,100</td>
<td>$3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw Initiative Fund-Defense Institution Building</td>
<td>$28,407</td>
<td>$24,365</td>
<td>$34,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Advisors</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$2,247</td>
<td>$11,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Institution Reform Initiative</td>
<td>$12,821</td>
<td>$10,962</td>
<td>$12,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total funding</td>
<td>$42,728</td>
<td>$40,674</td>
<td>$60,828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies

DIILS is the “lead U.S. defense security cooperation resource for professional legal engagement with international military service members and related civilians globally.”¹ The overarching goal of DIILS engagement is to “build partner nation legal capacity through equitable and accountable security and justice sectors, civilian control of the military, enhanced compliance with human rights standards and international humanitarian law, democracy, and democratic rule of law.”²

In 1992, DIILS initially formed under an “offshoot” of the Naval Justice School.³ Since this time, DIILS has trained over “37,000 personnel from 118 countries through its mobile programs.”⁴ One report states that in FY 2011 alone, DIILS conducted “130 mobile programs in 54 countries, reaching some 3,755 personnel.”⁵ In addition to its mobile programs, DIILS runs “nine annual resident courses in Newport, which have trained over 1,380 participants from 131 countries.”⁶

The DIILS charter stipulates the following:

- Under the functional direction of DSCA, DIILS is the lead defense security cooperation resource for professional legal education, training, and rule of law programs for international military and related civilians globally.
- Through mobile education teams, resident, and other programs, DIILS will strive to develop and implement effective programs to support the rule of law, including equitable and accountable security and justice sectors, civilian control of the military, human rights, and democracy.

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¹ DIILS, 2013.
² DIILS, 2013, p. 2.
⁴ Rosenlund, undated.
⁵ Rosenlund, undated.
⁶ Rosenlund, undated.
• DIILS will, first and foremost, plan and conduct all activities in support of OSD priorities and the geographic CCMDs’ theater campaign objectives.

• DIILS will be diligent and responsive in its relationships with and responsibility to its stakeholders, including USD(P), the DoD General Counsel, and the judge advocate generals of the military services.

• DIILS must maintain a flexible and expeditionary capability, with a focus on meeting current strategic requirements with a timely application of uniformed and civilian expertise in all areas promoting the rule of law.

• DIILS is committed to the highest level of professionalism in all its programs, including meeting its responsibilities to international participants by providing unrivaled subject-matter expertise and curriculum in a manner that recognizes and respects cultural sensitivities and encourages diversity of opinion.

• DIILS will maintain an environment that supports the professional growth, safety, and well-being of those uniformed and civilian personnel who accomplish its critical global mission.7

DIILS is currently operational in the AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM areas of operation, is engaged in a variety of programs, and is funded through a variety of mechanisms that include operations and maintenance, IMET, WIF, and CTFP funds.8 Table B.2 lists the DIILS engagements in FY 2012 by CCMD and type.

Wales Initiative Fund

The WIF program was developed in 1994, shortly after the founding of NATO’s PfP program. Until September 2014, it was called the Warsaw

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7 DIILS, undated b.

8 DIILS’s FY 2012 Annual Report notes that 77 percent of its budget is allocated directly to program costs (DIILS, 2013, p. 18).
Initiative Fund. However, during the NATO summit in Wales, it was renamed the Wales Initiative Fund and membership was expanded. The WIF currently provides financial support to developing partner nations, enabling them to affiliate to some degree with NATO and engage in other security cooperation initiatives. The WIF program also seeks to enhance partner capacity and “advance democratic reform of defense establishments and military forces,” which are important DIB processes.

Countries eligible for WIF membership are:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCMD</th>
<th>Resident Courses</th>
<th>Mobile Courses</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Morocco, Tunisia, Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, Ethiopia,</td>
<td>Mauritania, Mail, Guinea, Chad, Djibouti</td>
<td>Nigeria, South Sudan, Uganda, Gabon, DRC,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Ghana,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rwanda, Burundi, Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Egypt, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oman, Yemen, Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>Germany, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Albania, Montenegro</td>
<td>Turkey, Netherlands, Croatia, Hungry, Slovakia</td>
<td>United Kingdom, Estonia, Latvia,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania, Czech Republic, Moldova,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>China, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam</td>
<td>Japan, India, Bangladesh, Thailand,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Cambodia, Philippines, Malaysia,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Marshall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCORE/</td>
<td>Paraguay, Chile</td>
<td>Mexico (NORTHCOM)</td>
<td>Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil, El Salvador, Belize (SOUTHCOM)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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9 For a more in-depth look, see Perry et al., 2013.

10 DSCA, “Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF),” web page, undated d.
• PfP countries that have not formally acceded to NATO
• Mediterranean Dialogue countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia
• Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries, including Bahrain and Qatar
• NATO Partners Across the Globe countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Mongolia, and Pakistan.¹¹

“In addition, WIF may be used to support other nations that have sufficiently formal and substantive relationship to NATO, as determined by the DASD Security Cooperation.”¹²

The DASD Security Cooperation provides program policy and management; CCMR provides coordinated programming of DIB events; and DSCA provides program oversight and resourcing management.

The WIF baseline budget in FY 2012 was $28,407 and was used in the support of over 700 activities in 16 countries in southeastern Europe, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. These activities included “bilateral working groups in which the Combatant Commands worked directly with Partner countries to plan future security cooperation activities; regional and bilateral exercises designed to enhance Partner interoperability.”¹³

WIF programmatic funds are utilized in Armenia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Serbia, Russia, Montenegro, Moldova, Macedonia, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, and Azerbaijan.

Some recent examples of WIF-DIB implementations in PfP countries include the following:

• **Georgia** continued to progress in development of human resources, enhancement of defense resource processes, and development of policy and strategy and staff re-alignments.

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• Serbia continued development and refinement of its defense planning, procurement, and logistics systems.
• Armenia introduced a modern defense planning/defense allocation and management system.
• Azerbaijan recently professionalized the newly established J5/Plans and Policy office within the Ministry of Defense.14

Ministry of Defense Advisors Program

The MoDA program was developed “as a result of operational requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq.”15 The MoDA mission and charter are designed to forge long-term relationships that “strengthen a partner state’s defense ministry.”16 The program seeks to partner senior DoD officials with host-nation defense organizations. When deployed, advisors exchange topical experience with their foreign counterparts.

During its tenure in Afghanistan, the MoDA program partnered DoD civilians with foreign counterparts for up to two years at a time. The MoDA website explains its unique approach to DIB through four main avenues:

• **Extensive training:** The MoDA program offers a comprehensive seven-week training course for U.S. participants that includes professional advisor training; cultural awareness, country familiarization, and language instruction; senior-level consultations and briefings; and an evaluated capstone exercise.

• **Enhanced reachback:** Advisors may reach back to their parent organizations for substantive support, but the MoDA program office also coordinates a reachback mechanism designed to provide DoD-wide support. This resource empowers advisors to develop creative solutions to ministerial development challenges.

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14 DSCA, 2013a, p. 499.
15 DoD, undated b.
16 DoD, undated b.
• **Temporary backfill:** The MoDA program funds a backfill for the deployed advisor. The advisor’s parent organization may hire a temporary replacement to cover the period of absence. This unique feature encourages employers to release experienced volunteers for security missions abroad while ensuring continuity at home.

• **Long-term relationships:** Civilian experts return to DoD and may maintain connections with foreign counterparts. The network of relationships established during deployment promises greater defense cooperation in the future.¹⁷

MoDA currently has over 60 advisors deployed in Afghanistan and is currently holding preliminary discussions to establish global programs with other nations.¹⁸ Since that time, MoDA has “recruited, trained, and deployed advisors to Montenegro and Kosovo, and is currently working to fill advisor requirements in Bosnia, Colombia, and several other countries.”¹⁹

MoDA primarily utilizes operations and maintenance and overseas contingency operations funding, which was approximately $13,892 per year over FYs 2012–2014 (see Table B.1).²⁰

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**Defense Institute Reform Initiative**

DIRI was established in FY 2010 to address desired implementation strategies within the GEF and the QDR.²¹ The DIRI program’s focus is on ministry-to-ministry engagements by providing SMEs to work with partner nations to develop effective defense institutions. To accomplish this task, the DIRI program institutes a two-track approach, which includes providing (1) “direct support for partner nation efforts to

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¹⁷ DoD, undated b.
¹⁸ DoD, undated b.
¹⁹ DSCA, 2014.
²⁰ DSCA, undated c.
²¹ DSCA, 2012a.
develop accountable, professional, and transparent defense establishments that can manage, sustain, and employ their forces and the capabilities developed through U.S. security cooperation programs” and (2) to “focus on building capacity within the United States government’s security cooperation community to support the defense institution building efforts of partner nations.”

Currently, DIRI acts as a “global institutional capacity-building program that supports partner nation Ministries of Defense and related institutions in their efforts to address capacity gaps in such key functions as: development of policy and strategy, ministerial organization, force development, budgets, human resources (including professional defense and military education), logistics, civil-military relationships and interagency coordination.” DIRI programs fill these gaps in host nations through the development of “effective, accountable, professional and transparent partner defense establishments . . . that can manage, sustain and employ national forces,” and by providing SMEs to “work with partner nations to assess organizational weaknesses and establish a roadmap for addressing the shortfalls.”

The DIRI country nomination process resides within the DASD PSO, which solicits CCMD nominations and then vets them with regional assistant secretaries of defense for prioritization of effort. DSCA provides resourcing through the CCMR via separate Title 10 appropriations.

As of FY 2014, DIRI was seeking to increase its interaction with the regional centers, geographic CCMDs, and service components to build a “shared understanding of DIB challenges in all CCMDs especially in AFRICOM and PACOM.”

The DIRI program is currently active in Albania, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Liberia, Libya, and Peru.

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24 Office of the Inspector General, 2012, pp. 2–4
25 DSCA, undated a.
26 DSCA, 2013a, p. 516.
The Regional Centers

The regional centers are DoD institutions that build partner capacity by addressing regional and global security issues with strategic-level military and civilian leaders through courses, seminars, workshops, research, and dynamic outreach in an educational environment. The centers are the department’s primary instruments for regional outreach and alumni network-building among U.S. and foreign military, civilian, and non-government actors. They develop and support DoD professional and personal networks among security influencers and national security establishments.27

There are five regional centers worldwide. These are listed in Table B.3, along with FY 2012 and FY 2013 funding for each. The rest of this appendix discusses their DIB activities and their relation to the main DIB programs and how they support the CCMDs in their regions.

Table B.3
The Regional Centers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Center</th>
<th>FY 2012 Funding (Thousands)</th>
<th>FY 2013 Funding (Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies</td>
<td>$26,895</td>
<td>$26,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies</td>
<td>$16,432</td>
<td>$15,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Center for Strategic Studies</td>
<td>$14,370</td>
<td>$14,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies</td>
<td>$12,084</td>
<td>$11,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies</td>
<td>$15,396</td>
<td>$15,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total funding</strong></td>
<td><strong>$85,177</strong></td>
<td><strong>$83,295</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


27 DSCA, “DOD Regional Centers,” web page, undated b.
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) was formally established by EUCOM on June 5, 1993, in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The GCMC was established to bolster the nascent democratic and security institutions of European countries whose ultimate goal was NATO membership.28

The formative and nearly unchanged29 DoD directive issued in November 1992 stipulates that the main mission of GCMC is to “foster understanding of and appropriate cooperation on defense matters in the context of political democracy, human rights and freedoms, and free enterprise economy.”30 This is achieved by serving as a forum for defense contacts, providing defense education to civilian and military personnel, conducting research on security issues pertaining to the U.S. and European nations, and supporting NATO activities involving personnel of European nations and other newly independent states.31

A RAND report published in 2014 noted how the GCMC addresses two unique and critical needs: (1) “It prepared countries for eventual NATO membership by helping participants understand NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community more broadly,” and (2) it allowed Western countries (and NATO) to “demonstrate their commitment to ensure that these countries would be invited to join NATO at an appropriate time.” The report also stated that, for GCMC stakeholders, “[i]t provides a safe, neutral forum for countries with unresolved disputes to discuss sensitive security issues,” and it “keeps partner countries focused on the utility of adopting the Euro-Atlantic

28 For a more comprehensive historical count of the regional centers, see Hanauer et al., 2014, p. 7.
'model’ as they formulate national security strategy and develop their security sector.”

Although the GCMC is primarily engaged in supporting countries within the EUCOM AOR, it also supports Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in the CENTCOM AOR. The Center also has a “supporting relationship” with Mongolia and Afghanistan. One of the most recent accomplishments in assisting CENTCOM has been the utilization of WIF funds to engage senior Tajik military officers on “the strategic aspects of building and deploying [peacekeeping operations] forces,” and has developed a DIB framework to enable a Tajik-Mongolian peacekeeping partnership. As such, Tajikistan and Mongolia plan to deploy a joint-force that will serve a UN peacekeeping mission.

**Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies**

Following up on the successful implementation of the Marshall Center, the APCSS was established by PACOM in 1995 at Waikiki, Hawaii. The rapid economic growth experienced by Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan necessitated the creation of a “DoD institution to support PACOM by providing innovative, regional approaches to addressing complex security problems in Asia.”

The mission of the APCSS is to build “capacities and communities of interest by educating, connecting, and empowering security practitioners to advance Asia-Pacific security.” The current vision of the APCSS contains five goals aimed at achieving its mission. It strives to become

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32 Hanauer et al., 2014, pp. 8–9.
34 DSCA, 2014.
35 The center moved from Camp Smith to Fort DeRussy in 2000.
36 Hanauer et al., 2014, p. 11.
Defense Institution Building

- the venue of choice for security-cooperation education
- the sought-after facilitator of security assessments and approaches
- the catalyst for leader and organizational capacity-building
- the key node for security information analysis and strategic understanding of complex challenges
- the connector of communities of interest, expertise, and influence related to security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{38}

The APCSS reported that it had trained “928 graduates and participants from 67 countries through 17 resident programs and Track II activities, totaling 18,412 participant days.”\textsuperscript{39} The center has continued to improve on and expand its activities with U.S. allies in the region. In addition to its stated mission, the APCSS has also recently begun to focus on disaster preparedness in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{40}

The APCSS, working in conjunction with PACOM, has developed and utilized DIB programs to enable increased Asia-Pacific partner nation capacity to more effectively address security cooperation in the AOR. Notably, the APCSS has “facilitated the development of Papua New Guinea’s first-ever national security policy, a framework for an Indonesian defense white paper, and Bangladesh’s first comprehensive maritime security strategy proposal for consideration by the prime minister.”\textsuperscript{41} The APCSS has been able to focus on the capacity building of key countries by coordinating numerous leadership workshops that focus on building strategic maritime partnerships.

\textbf{The Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies}

The origins of the Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) were rooted in the experiences of the late 1980s, as many Latin American countries “transitioned to civilian rule after long peri-

\textsuperscript{38} Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, undated.
\textsuperscript{41} DSCA, 2014.
ods of military domination, officials from the region became concerned about government civilians’ lack of experience with security issues and about the fragility of civilian control over military institutions.\textsuperscript{42} Officially, the request for a regional center in this AOR was via a meeting between Latin American civilian and defense officials and members of the U.S. government during the Defense Ministerial of the Americas summit in Virginia in 1995.\textsuperscript{43}

Between 1996 and 1997, members from the U.S. Department of Defense and the National Defense University consulted with representatives from the regional defense and civilian academic ministries to begin preparations for the center. On September 17, 1997, CHDS officially began operations and has remained at Fort Lesley J. McNair on the National Defense University campus in Washington, D.C., since that time.

The mission of CHDS has been to “conduct educational activities for civilians and the military in the Western Hemisphere to foster trust, mutual understanding, regional cooperation and partner capacity.”\textsuperscript{44} In addition, CHDS prides itself as being the “pre-eminent academic institution for teaching, research, and outreach on defense and security issues affecting the Americas.”\textsuperscript{45} CHDS was formally recognized for its major contributions within its AOR at the Fifth Defense Ministerial of the Americas conference in Santiago, Chile, in 2003.\textsuperscript{46}

The CHDS incorporates DIB planning and activities that continue to refine foreign nations’ national security strategies. Most recently, CHDS has conducted workshops with the Guatemalan National Security Council “to develop and refine Guatemala’s National Security Strategy incorporating the concepts of inter-agency cooperation and

\begin{enumerate}
\item William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, undated a.
\item William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, undated a.
\end{enumerate}
In addition, CHDS has begun to respond to new partner institution requests from the defense ministries and universities in Honduras, Mexico, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, and Columbia. CHDS has coordinated its DIB activities to align with DoD and DoS policy objectives that focus on “transnational organized crime.”

**Africa Center for Strategic Studies**

The induction of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) followed discussions between EUCOM and the House Armed Services Committee in June 1995. The bipartisan talks concluded that DoD needed to develop an “African Center for Security Studies” that would “encourage a broader understanding on the African continent of military matters compatible with democratic principles and civilian control.” Notably, it was the “first sustained U.S. government initiative to engage African security leaders in promoting good governance and strengthening security institutions.” In 1999, the ACSS (co-located with the CHDS at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C.) became operational. ACSS also maintains two regional offices in Ethiopia and Senegal.

The mission of the ACSS supports “U.S. foreign security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity of African states to identify and resolve security challenges in ways that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic values, and safeguard human rights.” In addition, ACSS engages African partner states and institutions through “rigorous academic and outreach programs that build strategic capacity and foster long-term, collaborative relationships.”

The ACSS has worked closely with NESA and AFRICOM to enhance DIB efforts in North Africa by enhancing each government’s

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47 DSCA, 2014.

48 DSCA, 2014.

49 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “History,” web page, undated b.


capability to “develop and conduct national security strategy and planning.” Specifically, the ACSS has provided PME to high-level African officials, including six current and former African presidents and 683 cabinet-level officials and general officers. The ACSS plays a vital role in hosting roundtable discussions on the subject of Africa’s security and in countering violent extremism in its AOR and continues to work closely with its associated CCMD.

Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies

NESA is the newest of the five regional centers, dating from 2000. Initial plans to develop the regional center were included in an OSD memo to the Secretary of Defense in 1999 that sought to increase the security cooperation tools available to regional (or geographic) combatant commanders. Specifically, NESA was tasked with enhancing security in the Near East and South Asia by “building sustained, mutually beneficial relationships; fostering regional cooperation on security issues; and promoting effective communications and strategic capacity through free and candid interaction in an academic environment.” Ultimately, the end state would achieve “sustained, engaged communities of influence and partnership among security professionals and leaders in the NESA” AOR.

To achieve its goals, NESA sponsors foundational seminars in Washington, D.C., and has established a forward regional office to

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53 DSCA, 2014.
57 A 2014 RAND report also acknowledged that “the OSD guidance recognizes the NESA Center’s extensive involvement in Track II non-official confidence-building measures and ‘Track 1.5’ back-channel diplomatic initiatives by specifically calling on the center to engage in such efforts, including India-Pakistan confidence-building measures and Israeli-Palestinian dialogues.” See Hanauer et al., 2014, p. 16.
“reach a larger audience of strategic thinkers and adding depth via a robust program of local and in-region engagement activities.”

NESA also works closely within CENTCOM’s AOR to advance top TCP priorities, such as countering Afghan and Pakistani insurgencies, countering other violent extremist organizations in the region, combating weapons of mass destruction, undermining Iranian nuclear intentions, and building partner capacity.

NESA has focused on strengthening DIB in the Middle East, most recently by providing educational staff development and curricula to defense institutions of the United Arab Emirates. NESA has also developed workshops to train foreign nation staff in developing FMS processes.

**Regional Center Alumni**

Alumni networks are clearly major regional center assets. Alumni chapters form in partner nations whose defense personnel participate in either resident courses or in courses held in their countries. When engaging in DIB activities in countries covered by the relevant regional center, implementers frequently contact former students in the countries to gain their support and cooperation. The centers track the careers of former students and maintain contact through the alumni chapters. In addition, former students often contact the centers and, through them, the CCMDs for DIB assistance. To appreciate the scope of these connections, we include an alumni summary for the regional centers in Table B.4.

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58 Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, undated.

59 Hanauer et al., 2014, p. 16.

60 DSCA, 2014.
Table B.4
Regional Center Alumni and Alumni Chapters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Center</th>
<th>Alumni Chapters</th>
<th>Number of Alumni</th>
<th>Region(s)</th>
<th>CCMD(s)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>Latin and Central America</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9,500+</td>
<td>North America, Europe, and Eurasia</td>
<td>NORTHCOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>PACOM, SOUTHCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Center for Strategic Studies</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4,400+</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>AFRICOM, CENTCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,200+</td>
<td>Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia</td>
<td>EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, AFRICOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: According to NESA, government officials are not allowed to hold meetings in the countries NESA covers.
This appendix records the protocols used to conduct interviews to support this research. There were three protocols, one for each organization level—policy, program, and project—described in Chapter One. These are included in the next three sections of this appendix. In addition, after each interview, we recorded the results of our interviews on a debriefing form like the one following the interview protocol descriptions. Finally, prior to each visit, we forwarded a brief, one-page description of the project along with the interview protocol we planned to use. The one-page description is the last section in this appendix.
Hello, my name is ____. I am a researcher from the RAND Corporation, a private non-profit research organization. OSD has tasked RAND to conduct a study to recommend a set of policy goals and program objectives for DIB, develop a strategy for achieving them, and propose associated DoD roles and responsibilities for implementation, coordination, assessment, monitoring and evaluation of DIB activities with partner countries. We would like your insights regarding key aspects of the DIB program.

The information you provide during this interview will be kept strictly confidential and used for research purposes only. Your responses will be aggregated with those of interviewees and any comments or suggestions will not be attributed to specific individuals. Your participation in this interview is voluntary, so if you prefer not to answer a question just let me know.

If you have any questions or concerns about the study, you can contact Stuart Johnson at (703) 413-1100 x 5312 (Stuart_Johnson@rand.org), Walter Perry at (703) 413-1100 x 5228 (Walter_Perry@rand.org), the RAND project leaders, or the RAND Human Subjects Protection Committee at 310-393-0411.

Do you have any questions before we start?

Background Information
First, some background information. We will use this to describe our participants in general terms.

1. What is your current job position?
2. What is your association with DIB?
3. Have you worked previously with DIB? If so, what was your experience?

Familiarity with DIB

1. A new Draft DoD Instruction for DIB is being circulated for initial comment. Are you familiar with its contents?
2. Are you familiar with DIB? Although the focus of our study is on the four primary components of DIB—WIF, DIRI, MoDA, and DIILS—we also welcome your perspectives on the broader range of security cooperation activities that support DIB objectives.

3. Are you familiar with the new Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-23) on Security Sector Assistance?

4. In your view, why is DIB important to achieving U.S. objectives?

DIB-Related Policy Goals and DIB Program Objectives

1. From a policy perspective, what are the key high-level policy goals that DIB supports and what are some detailed program objectives?

2. How are these goals and objectives determined? Who is involved in developing them? How is input/feedback considered from the program and project implementation levels?

3. In your opinion, are these goals and objectives communicated well with subordinate elements (program, project implementation level)? Are they written in a way that facilitates future assessments?

4. Do partner nations’ requirements have a role in developing these goals and objectives?
   a. Is their involvement at the appropriate level? Are any changes needed?
   b. How well do you think these goals and objectives address partner nation needs?

Achieving Goals and Objectives

1. Is there a clear and coherent strategy to achieve DIB-related policy goals and program objectives?

2. How is that strategy communicated down to the program and project implementation level?
3. From your perspective, what programs are implementing DIB well? Which are not?

Criteria for Selecting and Prioritizing Partner Nations

1. What is the current policy guidance issued to WIF, DIRI, MoDA, and DIILS, for selecting and then prioritizing partner nations to engage with?
   a. What criteria guidance is issued for selecting and prioritizing a partner nation?
   b. Should the criteria guidance be the same for all DIB programs?
   c. What role do subordinate elements have in informing the guidance?

2. Are there criteria considered that do not directly support DIB objectives?

3. For which additional countries and for what purpose do you feel DIB is needed? Which countries do you feel are involved in DIB but are perhaps less of a priority?

Accountability Processes and Procedures

1. What are the processes and procedures at the policy level to monitor, track, and assess the progress of DIB activities and programs?

2. Are assessments from all levels incorporated into revised policy guidance? How could policy guidance be improved to facilitate assessments?

3. How do you know if DIB is achieving its goals?

4. Are DIB activities tracked and evaluated against a comprehensive engagement strategy over time?
   a. If so, how well do you think it is done and how can it be improved?
Harmonizing DIB with Other Security Cooperation Activities

1. What other DoD or non-DoD security cooperation programs (besides DIB) are you aware of?
   a. Do you know the objectives and nature of these activities?
   b. In your view, which best complement and which might conflict with or overlap with DIB?
2. At the policy level, are other security cooperation activities coordinated and deconflicted with DIB?
   a. If so, when and how does this coordination take place? Who is responsible?
   b. If not, why not, and what organizations should be involved?
   c. What actions can be taken to better harmonize DIB and other security cooperation activities?

Combining DIB Programs
OSD is considering consolidating DoD-related DIB programs under a single manager.

1. What do you think of this idea in general?
2. Which programs do you think it makes sense to combine?

Roles and Responsibilities

1. What organizations oversee DIB activities? What are their roles in administering this oversight?
2. Do you feel the roles of any of the following organizations should be changed?
   a. OSD(P)
   b. CCMR
   c. DSCA
   d. CCMDs
   e. Uniformed Services
3. What organizations are you aware of that have or should have a part in:
   a. Implementing DIB activities with partner nations?
b. Coordinating DIB activities with other security cooperation programs?

c. Monitoring and evaluating implementation of DIB activities?
Assessing Defense Institution Building (Program)

Hello, my name is ____. I am a researcher from the RAND Corporation, a private non-profit research organization. OSD has tasked RAND to conduct a study to recommend a set of policy goals and program objectives for DIB, develop a strategy for achieving them, and propose associated DoD roles and responsibilities for implementation, coordination, assessment, monitoring and evaluation of DIB activities with partner countries. We would like your insights regarding key aspects of the DIB program.

The information you provide during this interview will be kept strictly confidential and used for research purposes only. Your responses will be aggregated with those of interviewees and any comments or suggestions will not be attributed to specific individuals. Your participation in this interview is voluntary, so if you prefer not to answer a question just let me know.

If you have any questions or concerns about the study, you can contact Stuart Johnson at (703) 413-1100 x 5312 (Stuart_Johnson@rand.org) or Walter Perry at (703) 413-1100 x 5228 (Walter_Perry@rand.org), the RAND project leaders, or the RAND Human Subjects Protection Committee at 310-393-0411.

Do you have any questions before we start?

Background Information
First, some background information. We will use this to describe our participants in general terms.

1. What is your current job position?
2. What DIB program are you associated with? (WIF, DIRI, MoDA, DIILS, etc.)
3. Have you worked previously with DIB? If so, what was your experience?
Familiarity with DIB

1. A new Draft DoD Instruction for DIB is being circulated for initial comment. Are you familiar with its contents?
2. Are you familiar with DIB?
3. Are you familiar with DIB as defined above? Although the focus of our study is on the four primary components of DIB—WIF, DIRI, MoDA, and DIILS—we also welcome your perspectives on the broader range of security cooperation activities that support DIB objectives.
4. Are you familiar with the new Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-23) on Security Sector Assistance?
5. In your view, why is DIB important to achieving U.S. objectives?

DIB-Related Policy Goals and DIB Program Objectives

1. In your view, what are the key high-level policy goals that DIB supports and what are some detailed program objectives?
2. What are your program’s objectives? Are these aligned with DIB-related policy goals? If not, how do they differ?
3. Do you think that DIB-related policy goals and objectives are communicated well from policy to program level? If not, how might this be improved?
4. How well do you think DIB-related policy goals and program objectives address the needs of partner nations?

Achieving Goals and Objectives

1. Do you have a coordinated program strategy to achieve your program objectives?
   a. If so, how are DIB activities, events, and engagements in your program linked to this strategy?
   b. If not, what are the gaps and how can they be mitigated?
2. Do you think the current strategy to achieve DIB program objectives is sufficient? What improvements should be made?
3. Which countries and for what purpose do you feel DIB is needed?
4. In your program/area of operations, where is DIB happening well? Where is it not happening or not happening well?

Criteria for Selecting and Prioritizing Partner Nations

1. What is the current process for selecting and prioritizing partner nations in your program?
   a. How can this process become more transparent?
   b. How are you involved in this process?
2. Are there criteria considered that do not directly support DIB program objectives?
3. Are there any projects that should have a higher priority or receive more funding?

Accountability Processes and Procedures

1. What processes and procedures are currently in place for your program to monitor, track, and assess the progress of DIB activities?
2. At the program level, who monitors DIB activities and how are they monitored?
3. How do you know you are successfully achieving your DIB program objectives?
   a. What criteria are used to determine that you have achieved your DIB program objective or some milestone on the path to achieving the objective?
   b. What metrics are used to evaluate program activities?
   c. What information do you receive from the implementation level, and how is this information compiled at the program level?
   d. Does a system exist to track progress of DIB activities? How might this process be improved?
4. Are DIB activities evaluated at the program level against a comprehensive engagement strategy?
a. How effective is it and how can it be improved?

Harmonizing DIB with Other Security Cooperation Activities

1. Besides your program, what other DoD or non-DoD security cooperation activities are you aware of in your area of operations?
   a. Do you know the objectives and nature of these activities?
   b. In your view, which best complement and which might conflict with or overlap with DIB?
2. Do you coordinate and deconflict with the other organizations conducting security cooperation activities?
   a. If so, when and how does this coordination take place? Who is responsible?
   b. If not, why not, and what organizations should be involved?
   c. What actions can be taken to better harmonize DIB and other security cooperation activities?

Combining DIB Programs

OSD is considering consolidating DoD-related DIB activities under a single manager.

1. What do you think of this idea in general?
2. How might this affect your program?
3. What are the major advantages and disadvantages of combining DIB programs?

Roles and Responsibilities

1. Who oversees your DIB activities? How do they administer this oversight?
2. Do you feel the roles of any of the following organizations should be changed?
   a. OSD(P)
   b. CCMR
   c. DSCA
d. CCMDs

e. Uniformed Services

3. How much do you coordinate with the DIB/security cooperation program implementers?
Assessing Defense Institution Building (Project)

Hello, my name is ____. I am a researcher from the RAND Corporation, a private non-profit research organization. OSD has tasked RAND to conduct a study to recommend a set of policy goals and program objectives for DIB, develop a strategy for achieving them, and propose associated DoD roles and responsibilities for implementation, coordination, assessment, monitoring and evaluation of DIB activities with partner countries. We would like your insights regarding key aspects of the DIB program.

The information you provide during this interview will be kept strictly confidential and used for research purposes only. Your responses will be aggregated with those of interviewees and any comments or suggestions will not be attributed to specific individuals. Your participation in this interview is voluntary, so if you prefer not to answer a question just let me know.

If you have any questions or concerns about the study, you can contact Stuart Johnson at (703) 413-1100 x 5312 (Stuart_Johnson@rand.org), Walter Perry at (703) 413-1100 x 5228 (Walter_Perry@rand.org), the RAND project leaders, or the RAND Human Subjects Protection Committee at 310-393-0411.

Do you have any questions before we start?

Background Information

First, some background information. We will use this to describe our participants in general terms.

1. What is your current job position?
2. What is your association with DIB?
3. Have you worked previously with DIB? If so, what was your experience?

Familiarity with DIB

1. A new Draft DoD Instruction for DIB is being circulated for initial comment. Are you familiar with its contents?
2. Are you familiar with DIB? Although the focus of our study is on the four primary components of DIB—WIF, DIRI, MoDA, and DIILS—we also welcome your perspectives on the broader range of security cooperation activities that support DIB-related policy goals and DIB program objectives.

3. Are you familiar with the new Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-23) on Security Sector Assistance?

4. In your view, why is DIB important to achieving U.S. objectives?

DIB-Related Policy Goals and DIB Program Objectives

1. In your view, what are the key DIB-related policy goals and DIB program objectives?

2. Do you have any role or input in determining DIB program objectives?

3. What do DIB-related policy goals and program objectives mean to you at the implementation level?

4. Do you think that DIB-related policy goals and program objectives are communicated well to the implementation level? If not, how can this be improved?

Achieving DIB-Related Policy Goals and DIB Program Objectives

1. Do you sense that the events, activities, and engagements that you execute are part of a coordinated program strategy to achieve DIB-related policy goals and DIB program objectives?
   a. If so, how are your activities, events, and engagements linked to this strategy?
   b. If not, what are the gaps and how can they be mitigated?

2. What processes do you use to plan and implement DIB activities?

3. Do partner nations’ requirements have a role in driving the DIB activities?
   a. Is this appropriate? Should they have more or less of a role? Please explain.
b. How well do you think DIB-related policy goals and program objectives address the needs of partner nations?

4. Are the DIB activities you execute achieving your objectives? Why or why not?

5. Do you feel that you have sufficient resources for implementing DIB/security cooperation activities?

6. In your area of operations, where is DIB happening well? Where is it not happening or not happening well?

**Accountability Processes and Procedures**

1. What processes and procedures are currently in place to monitor, track, and assess the progress of DIB activities?
2. How do you know you are succeeding in achieving DIB event objectives?
   a. What criteria do you use to determine that you have achieved event objectives?
   b. What metrics do you use and how effective are they?
   c. Do you track how a given activity or activities contribute to achieving goals or achieving milestones? Is this information made available at the program and policy levels?
3. Does a system exist to track progress of your DIB activities?
   a. If so, who tracks the progress? Where does this information go?
   b. How might this process be improved?
4. Do you evaluate your DIB activities against a comprehensive engagement strategy?
   a. How effective is it and how can it be improved?
   b. Who is involved in this evaluation? Are other organizations implementing security cooperation activities involved in this process? Is the partner nation involved?
Harmonizing DIB with Other Security Cooperation Activities

1. What other DoD or non-DoD security cooperation activities are you aware of that are being implemented in your area of operations?
   a. Do you know the objectives and nature of these activities?
   b. In your view, do they complement or are they in conflict with DIB?

2. Do you coordinate and deconflict your activities with other programs conducting security cooperation activities?
   a. If so, when and how does this coordination take place? Who is responsible for this coordination?
   b. If not, why not, and what organizations should be?
   c. What actions can be taken to better harmonize DIB and other security cooperation activities?

Roles and Responsibilities

1. What organization oversees your DIB activities? What are their roles in administering this oversight?

2. Should any other organization be involved in providing oversight? If so, which organization and what should their role be?
Debriefing Form

Interview date: 

Respondent identifier:

Background
Summarize the respondent’s job position, Describe respondent’s association with DIB, including which DIB program (WIF-DIB, DIRI, MoDA, etc.), either in the respondent’s current position or in a previous assignment.

Familiarity with DIB
It is important that we place the respondent’s comments in the context of his or her knowledge of DIB. In this section, summarize the respondent’s familiarity with DIB, the new draft DIB DoDD, and the new Security Sector Assistance PPD-23.

DIB Goals and Objectives
Record the respondents’ views with respect to his or her understanding of DIB goals and objectives. In our project description we state that DIB is about “building the capacity of partner nations in order to share the costs and responsibilities.” What is the respondent’s reaction to this? Record the respondent’s views on the role that partner nations should or do have in setting DIB goals and objectives?

Achieving Goals and Objectives
Record what the respondent recommends in terms of DIB activities that will lead to achieving DIB goals and objectives. Also record other ways to achieve goals and objectives the respondent might suggest.

Criteria for Selecting and Prioritizing Partner Nations
For some of the programs like WIF, the selection process is rather easy, but it will be interesting to hear what the respondent has to say about prioritization. For non-WIF programs, selection will be a bit problematic so we may get elaborate processes like what DIRI proposes or just a shrug.
Accountability Processes and Procedures
We will likely learn more from record examinations than from interviews about assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and event tracking. However, to the extent the respondent has views on the usefulness of existing procedures, process, and records capture them here.

Harmonizing DIB with Other Security Cooperation Activities
Record the respondent’s views on how to harmonize DIB activities the respondent is most familiar with, with other DoD and non-DoD security cooperation programs as well as with broader security cooperation activities relevant to DIB. Some important things to capture include: what other DoD and non-DoD activities are involved in furthering DIB goals? Who controls or manages these activities? Do these activities suggest complement or contradict DIB goals—are they redundant?

Combining DIB Programs
There has been some discussion about consolidating DoD-related DIB programs under a single DIB manager. Summarize the respondent’s reaction and recommendations about combining DIB-related programs.

Roles and Responsibilities
In discussions with the respondent the most likely organization with some role in overseeing DIB activities will be OSD(PSO), DSCA, and CCMR. Record what the respondent views as their role in administering DIB and what role they should have in the DIB programs. Also note other organizations they may suggest.

One-Page Project Description
A key element in the Department of Defense’s Strategic Guidance is building the capacity of partner nations in order to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. To implement this goal, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy utilizes several security cooperation and security assistance programs to work with partner countries to build the capacity of their defense ministries. DIB includes activities that
develop accountable, effective, and efficient defense institutions. The primary objective of the program is to help partner nations develop and manage capable security forces subject to appropriate civilian control.

OSD has tasked the RAND Corporation to conduct a study to recommend a set of policy goals and objectives for DIB, develop a strategy for achieving them, and propose associated DoD roles and responsibilities for implementation, coordination, assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of DIB activities with partner countries.

The RAND study team is interested in gaining insights on the following topics, critical to addressing the study objectives. More specifically, the study team seeks answers to the following questions:

- **DIB goals and objectives**: How can we determine appropriate goals and objectives and what role should partner nations have?
- **Strategy to achieve goals and objectives**: What programs, activities, and engagements best support a program strategy aimed at achieving these goals and objectives?
- **Roles and responsibilities**: What organizations should provide oversight of DIB activities and what should their roles be?
- **Harmonizing DIB with other security cooperation activities**: What actions can be taken to harmonize DIB activities with other security cooperation activities?
- **Accountability processes and procedures**: How can we best assess, monitor, evaluate, and track DIB activities?
- **Criteria for selecting and prioritizing partner nations**: Should partner selection and prioritization criteria be the same for all DIB programs?
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSS</td>
<td>Africa Center for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMEP</td>
<td>African Military Education Program</td>
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<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>APCSS</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies</td>
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<td>ASI</td>
<td>Afghan security institution</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>Center for Civil-Military Relations</td>
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<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<td>Concept and Funding Request</td>
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<td>CHDS</td>
<td>Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies</td>
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<td>CSCP</td>
<td>country security cooperation plan</td>
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<td><em>Army Security Cooperation Handbook</em></td>
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<td>DASD</td>
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<td>DIILS</td>
<td>Defense Institute of International Legal Studies</td>
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<td>DIRI</td>
<td>Defense Institution Reform Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISAM</td>
<td>Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management</td>
</tr>
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<td>DMT</td>
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<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoDD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSART</td>
<td>Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG</td>
<td>Defense Strategic Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/SSR</td>
<td>defense/security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESIC</td>
<td>EUCOM Strategy Implementation Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCMC</td>
<td>George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCPSO</td>
<td><em>Global Campaign Plan for Special Operations</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTSCMIS</td>
<td>Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>human resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>integrated country strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDARM</td>
<td>International Defense Acquisition Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>international military education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>intermediate military objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS-J5</td>
<td>Joint Staff J5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>line of activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOE</td>
<td>line of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>mobile education team (DIILS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoDA</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NESA</td>
<td>Near East and South Asia Center for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAA</td>
<td>operations, actions, and activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODC</td>
<td>Office of Defense Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHASIS</td>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD(P)</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfPC</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>professional military education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD</td>
<td>Presidential Policy Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Strategy of Active Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCETWG</td>
<td>Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIF</td>
<td>sensitive compartmented information facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>security cooperation officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>security force assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGI</td>
<td>Security Governance Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject-matter expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLO</td>
<td>special operations liaison officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>State Partnership Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>security sector assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>security sector governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCO</td>
<td>theater campaign order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>theater campaign plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSCMIS</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSCP</td>
<td>theater security cooperation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operation command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIF</td>
<td>Wales Initiative Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIF-DIB</td>
<td>Wales Initiative Fund–Defense Institution Building</td>
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</table>
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DIRI—See Defense Institutional Reform Initiative.

DISAM—See Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.

DoD—See U.S. Department of Defense.

DoS—See U.S. Department of State.

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A key element in the Department of Defense’s Defense Strategic Guidance is building the capacity of partner nations to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. To implement this goal, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy uses several security cooperation and assistance programs to work with partner countries to support defense institution building (DIB), i.e., build the capacity of their defense ministries. In addition, the combatant commands engage in DIB in response to the security cooperation focus areas in the Guidance for Employment of the Force. DIB has four primary components—Wales Initiative Funds-DIB, Defense Institutional Reform Initiative, Ministry of Defense Advisors, and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies—but includes all security cooperation activities that develop accountable, effective, and efficient defense institutions. The primary objective of many existing DIB activities is to help partner nations develop and manage capable security forces subject to appropriate civilian control.

This report presents an analysis of a range of DIB activities, recommends a set of goals and objectives for achieving them, identifies partner nation and DIB activity selection criteria, develops a strategy for coordinating DIB activities, and recommends procedures for achieving accountability and assessment. It also identifies the most critical challenges DIB programs will face as they go forward: the inherent complexity of the DIB enterprise, the difficulty of measuring the long-term success of short-term endeavors, and the challenges of selecting partner nations for DIB activities.