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Flag flying over the Strength and Wisdom statue, a gift from the class of 2014, capturing the mission, spirit, and history of Carlisle Barracks (photo by Laura A. Wackwitz, Ph.D.).

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A Grand Strategy of Restraint: Neither Grand nor Strategic

David M. Knych

Current United States grand strategy entails an activist foreign policy, a robust overseas military presence, and a vast network of alliances and security commitments. Critics argue that following this grand strategy is proving disastrous to American interests. America, they say, is over-stretched, in decline, and can no longer afford to maintain an ambitious global reform agenda or meet security obligations abroad. Their proposed alternative is to enact a grand strategy of Restraint or Retrenchment that seeks to preserve a narrower, vital set of security interests by reducing overseas presence, security commitments abroad, and shifting burdens to allies and partners. Restraint, however, is not a viable long-term grand strategy. Its proponents fail to account for the many nuances of world economies, leadership, and security. The United States must continue to play a vital role on the world stage, serving as a leader and partner where possible, and securing vital national security interests where needed.

Keywords: Retrenchment, National Security, Liberal Hegemony, Primacy, Decline

The role and reputation of the United States as the global economic leader took a severe hit in 2008 when the world economy was brought to its knees by an American economic crisis. Amid national and international criticism over the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, confidence in U.S. grand strategy began to erode. Speculation that the U.S. was no longer to remain the—or even a—world superpower surged, prompting calls for U.S. retrenchment and restraint. Eight years later, U.S. grand strategy remains under fire from those who maintain that the United States has reached a point of imperial overstretch such that an ambitious grand strategy and activist foreign policy agenda serve to hasten America’s decline.

In Barry Posen’s estimation, for example, the current U.S. grand strategy—what he refers to as Liberal Hegemony—is “wasteful, costly, and counterproductive” and, therefore, disastrous to the United States’ security interests. He argues that the extant grand strategy perpetuates an unnecessarily large and disproportionate military bolstered by a self-interested industrial complex.

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An advanced and expensive military makes it easy for policymakers to resort to force or threat of force when other available instruments of national power might be as effective. Thus, says Posen, billions of dollars are spent on unnecessary wars and assorted military interventions. The strategy, he adds, makes enemies almost as quickly as it dispatches them. The strategy encourages less-friendly states to compete with the United States more intensively, while encouraging friendly states to do less than they should in their own defense, or to be more adventurous than is wise.

Liberal Hegemony, he believes, induces some states to engage in soft, counter-balancing or “low grade diplomatic opposition” rather than encouraging them to bandwagon with the United States. For others (e.g., Russia and China), cooperation is merely a means of constraining the United States and limiting its influence.

If the intent is to cope with a coming multipolar world and alleged decline in American influence, Posen and similarly minded experts recommend the United States adopt a new, less robust grand strategy. The problem, as they define it, is not just the “rise of China” or the “decline of America,” but rather the overall diffusion of power to growing regional players such as India, Brazil, and Turkey. While regional powers will not likely overtake American power and influence, their willingness and ability to push back against perceived American interference continues to grow. Emerging new powers will create fresh opportunities for states to function cooperatively, thereby potentially limiting or countering U.S. influence.

In light of these observations, Posen and others have outlined a case for a new U.S. grand strategy based on the tenets of Restraint or Retrenchment that they believe would help the country preserve both its prosperity and security over the long run. Their proposed grand strategy of Restraint would seek to reduce or eliminate the U.S. military’s overseas presence, scale back and possibly cut its international security commitments, and restrict efforts to advance a liberal institutional order. The United States would back away from a global reform agenda, significantly reduce the size of its military, and focus on narrowly defined vital national security interests. The argument would be compelling were it not inherently flawed. Advocates of restraint, while ostensibly promoting the very survival of the United States are, in fact, urging a course of action that could irreparably weaken the U.S. and its interests at home and abroad.

Current U.S. Grand Strategy

Grand strategy refers to “a set of ideas for deploying a nation’s resources to achieve its interests over the long run.” It orchestrates ends, ways, and means,” and aligns a State’s relative power with its interests throughout both peacetime and war. Grand Strategy incorporates all elements of national power including diplomatic, information, military, and economic authorities. Grand
strategic instruments include “diplomacy, propaganda, cultural subversion and demoralization, trade embargoes, espionage and sabotage.” By establishing foundational principles which serve to inform and drive policy decisions over an extended horizon, grand strategy provides “a coherent statement of the concepts” to deal effectively with the full spectrum of national security threats faced by the state. The absence of a guiding grand strategy forces policymakers to respond reactively as problems develop on the world scene. The result? Policymakers and leaders necessarily resort to expedience which provides, at best, short term solutions often at long term expense. An effective grand strategy, then, is essential and requires articulation of a positive vision and positive principles that must be continuously and publicly advanced. This helps prevent both state and nonstate actors from manipulating “the image of the United States for their own ends.” Despite its importance to long term national security, comprehensive description and understanding of U.S. grand strategy remains somewhat elusive and lacks clear consensus.

Patrick Porter defines U.S. grand strategy as Primacy or Leadership—an effort to preserve the United States as the unipolar guardian of the international order seeking to “remake the World in America’s image” by spreading a democratic foundation and a robust market ideology. According to Porter, while political factions may differ on specific ways to enact the strategy, the end objective of preserving American Primacy as envisioned at the end of World War II endures.

Posen’s description of U.S. grand strategy as Liberal Hegemony is more stark. He argues that by seeking to preserve its “great power advantage” relative to other nations, the U.S. enacts hegemonic control via sustained investment in military power designed to dissuade adversaries or potential challengers from competing. The combination of enforced hegemony with U.S. commitment to advancing democratic governance, individual rights, free market economics, a free press, and the rule of law are deemed essential to U.S. security. By using the term Liberal Hegemony, Posen highlights the centrality of promoting liberal, western values abroad to U.S. grand strategy.

In this sense, Posen shares Porter’s view that America seeks to shape other nations within its own image. But is this a true grand strategy?

William Martel contends that the United States has not really adopted a guiding grand strategy since the Cold War strategy of Containment. He claims current U.S. policies towards Iran, Russia, and China remain unchanged—the “residue” of the Cold War Containment strategy. Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, on the other hand, argue that the United States is engaged in a grand strategy best categorized by Deep Engagement. Far more than either Martel’s “containment” or Porter’s “leadership” (which they dismiss as merely a descriptive condition, not a strategy), Deep Engagement is an enduring, post-WWII strategy that entails:

- managing the external environment to reduce near- and long-term threats to U.S. national security; promoting a liberal economic order to expand the global economy and maximize domestic prosperity; and creating, sustaining, and revising the global

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12 Ibid., 372.
14 Ibid., 8.
institutional order to secure necessary interstate cooperation on terms favorable to U.S. interests. In order to guard its security and to prompt prosperity, the United States has encouraged a liberal economic order and developed close defense relationships with allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—building American military bases all over the globe, patrolling the global commons, and stationing thousands of troops overseas. They argue that this “fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged abroad” has remained remarkably consistent, despite minor differences in policies and approaches between administrations and despite the shifting rationale for the strategy over the years.

The Concept of Restraint

A Grand Strategy of Restraint theoretically bridges the gap between the two poles of Hegemony and Isolationism by simultaneously retracting strategic commitments, maintaining some level of engagement, and pursuing interests vital to U.S. security. Restraint advocates question whether the United States can continue to bear the costs of its long-pursued, ambitious, activist foreign policy, and its propensity to engage in military interventions abroad. In their estimation, most military interventions are not necessary, do not effectively protect vital U.S. security interests, and, in actuality, make the nation less secure. The call for adopting a new approach grows louder in the wake of two costly and exhaustive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the recent global economic crisis, the rise of China and the Asia-Pacific region, and growing instability in a number of regions (e.g., Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen).

To adopt a grand strategy of Restraint, the United States would first step back from an agenda focused on global reform and stick to protecting and advancing only a narrow set of national security interests: countering terrorism, ensuring non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preventing another power from upending the international order. The military would be downsized and sent to war only when absolutely necessary. Second, the United States would reduce its security commitments overseas, systematically removing large numbers of military personnel from forward bases.

On the surface, the tenets of Restraint appear reasonable. They are, however, inherently flawed. Restraint is a grand strategy lacking at least one crucial component: a positive set of principles upon which to base American decision-making. As Martel notes:

The exercise of self-restraint can never be a grand strategy itself. Indeed, a common refrain among scholars and policymakers for some time has been that the United States should exercise greater self-restraint in foreign policy. However, this characteristic alone does not constitute a grand strategy. To be effective a grand strategy must advance positive principles.

In short, self-restraint fails to provide a coherent basis for grand strategy. Simply stating what the United States is against is insufficient. Grand strategy must advance the ideals upon which the United States stands and for which it will strive.

The first component of the Restraint case is the idea that the U.S. should at least reduce, if not entirely abandon, its ambitious agenda for global reform. Posen believes that Washington’s

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ambitions have led the attempts to rescue failing states by military intervention in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya. Military actions were variously undertaken “to defend human rights, suppress undesirable nationalist movements, and install democratic regimes.”\(^1\) Posen’s conclusion is incomplete, failing to recognize that these interventions clearly entailed humanitarian components. To be an effective strategy, Restraint would require the United States to suspend its core underlying values, in particular, those aligned with defending and advancing human rights. The implication is that the United States should simply stand by and do nothing while innocent people are victimized by corrupt regimes, or while they fall victim to civil war or genocidal policies. Intervention in the absence of vital U.S. security interests is, under a strategy of Restraint, entirely unwarranted. Posen draws a hard and fast line, completely ignoring that there may well be times when the U.S. defense of freedom and human rights will help to forestall greater humanitarian catastrophe. If left unchecked, an ensuing instability could be racked with human misery and may, in the near or long term, jeopardize both the interests and global standing of the United States.

In the words of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, “We must avoid the false choice between our values and our interests.”\(^2\) In a democracy, the values held by the state and its citizens help define its interests, and sometimes our values are our interests. The United States has an interest in advancing democracy and stability, economies based on free market principles, and human rights broadly conceived as a means of helping to preserve both prosperity and security by combatting instability abroad. If the United States has the capacity (i.e., resources, reliable partners, and domestic and international legitimacy) then there are times when it should intervene, militarily or otherwise, or at least hold open the possibility of intervention. To base a grand strategy on the principle that the United States will not intervene except under any but the most threatening circumstances, as Restraint advocates propose, is neither realistic nor consistent with long-term U.S. interests or American values.

Rather than attempting to promote a liberal democratic image, Posen suggests that the United States focus its strategy on just three key areas: “preventing a powerful rival from upending the global balance of power, fighting terrorists, and limiting nuclear proliferation.”\(^3\) Bringing stability in unstable regions, advancing democracy, and promoting respect for human rights may be the most effective, least bloody, and least costly means of achieving these objectives in the long-run. Posen overlooks the reality that expansion of democratic and liberal values to other regions of the globe benefits U.S. interests by increasing the likelihood that these states will cooperate to combat terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

The second component of the Restraint strategy is that the United States should eliminate or significantly reduce its security commitments and presence overseas. Doing so would theoretically (a) discourage allies from taking a “free-ride” by requiring them to provide for their own defense, (b) remove the U.S. from the precarious position of defending nascent allies in the event that they provoke a conflict,\(^4\) and (c) prevent the U.S. from intervening militarily to defend allied interests rather than its own. Restraint advocates, however, fundamentally misunderstand the nature of U.S. relationships with allies and partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

In the case of Europe, Restraint advocates call for the removal of all United States forces, citing the overall wealth and security of the European continent. Europe, however, shares many of the same

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\(^1\) Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” 1.


\(^4\) Ibid., 3.
values the United States seeks to promote: human rights, rule of law, democratic governance, and free markets. European countries possess significant military capabilities relative to the rest of the world, and collectively comprise an economic powerhouse that wields significant soft power. Europe includes the United States’ most capable and willing allies and partners. A key reason for this support and cooperation is precisely because the United States maintains a physical presence in Europe. Presence provides access, influence, basing rights, and opportunities to train with allies and partners to preserve security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has brought stability to central Europe, parts of the Balkans, and potentially to Afghanistan. The Allies did not go to these places of their own volition; they went because the United States led them there in pursuit of shared values and common interests. Lastly, the only time the Alliance actually invoked Article V (i.e., its obligation to come to the common defense of an ally) was when the United States was attacked on September 11th, 2001. The United States then became a beneficiary of transatlantic security as well as a guarantor of it. Even while heavily dependent on Russian energy resources, Europe remains one of the largest U.S. trading partners. Any reduction in U.S. presence would constitute an opportunity for Russia to exert leadership and expand political influence.

In the Asiatic region, the U.S. has built lasting security by cementing bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. The U.S. has managed to incorporate these partners into an increasingly liberal world economic framework that benefits the United States economically and enhances both regional stability and economic security. U.S. relationships with Japan and South Korea are vital. They provide stabilizing access and a viable platform for exerting regional influence. From a position of strength that includes presence, the United States and its allies can better engage China and incentivize it to play a responsible role, “while [concurrently] hedging against the possibility of aggressive behavior as China’s power grows.”

Posen’s argument that the U.S. should focus narrowly on preventing a rival from upending the global balance of power, fighting terrorists, and limiting nuclear proliferation fails to explain how these vital interests can be achieved without strong partnerships abroad. The U.S. needs partnerships that entail an overseas presence and include basing, access, influence, and opportunities to build partner capacities and allies in critical regions. Historically, and for good reason, a key component of the United States’ strategy to stabilize world order and counter threats has been its overseas presence and alliances.

Presence and engagement with partners and allies engenders confidence in the United States and serves to enhance capabilities, strengthen alliances, and build partner capacity. The United States, as Restraint advocates correctly note, cannot do everything alone, but to suggest that the U.S. can counter 21st Century threats and maintain strong, reliable, and capable partnerships without a viable presence in key regions seems wishful at best and dangerous at worst.

The Case against Restraint

Proponents of Restraint advance several flawed arguments to justify the strategic shift they propose. These include:

- The United States is overstretched and can no longer afford an activist foreign policy.
- America is in decline and the world is heading towards multi-polarity.

\[^{24}\text{Walt, “The End of the American Era,” 7.}\]
• A less activist foreign policy prevents soft counter-balancing by the likes of Russia and China who are provoked into impeding the U.S. interests through aggressive policies.

• The American public favors less overseas presence and in general a reduction in internationalism.

Christopher Layne warns of America’s “ballooning budget deficits” and argues that U.S. “strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them.”26 The United States, in short, is out of money and can no longer afford to be the hegemonic power and world police. Thus, a grand strategy of Restraint is necessary to slow the coming decline while positioning America to better manage its interests. Charles Kupchan says the United States must be guided from its current state of “overextension” toward a balance “between foreign policy ends and its economic and political means.”27 Defense and foreign policy expenditures over the past several decades, however, have actually declined as a percentage of GDP (see Figure 1).28 Even in 2012, as the United States was still deeply involved in Afghanistan and conducting global counter-terrorism operations, the Department of Defense was still only spending 4.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP): the historical average over the last 60 years. By comparison, the Soviet Union was spending nearly a quarter of its GDP on defense in its final decades.29

![Figure 1: Defense Expenditures and Total Budget in Constant 2009 Dollars and Defense as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historical)

The growing national debt is a genuine concern. Defense and foreign policy expenditures, however, are not necessarily the culprits in debt production, at least not by historical comparison. The vast majority of the growth in the national debt derives from obligated, not discretionary, spending. The real culprit lies with the inability of the U.S. to spend within its means and failure to

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raise revenue commensurate with its desire to spend. Admittedly, slashing the defense budget will produce a positive economic impact, but much greater reforms are necessary to produce fiscal order and a balanced budget.

The claim that Restraint will forestall the decline in American power and influence is speculative at best. The suggestion ignores the real possibility that the United States’ forward leaning, pro-active leadership role actually produces its relative power and global influence. U.S. security commitments effectively reduce competition in key regions, secure an open world economy, provide leverage in economic trade, and foster cooperation that counters threats to U.S. interests.31 If the United States were to eschew its active foreign policy and retreat to the relative safety of its borders, the decline of American influence and leadership may well be hastened rather than forestalled.

A third argument advanced by Restraint enthusiasts suggests that relative power necessarily wanes as the world becomes an ever more multipolar, messier, more competitive environment. The United States, then, cannot afford to be everywhere, to exert influence, and to provide leadership. Moreover, if the United States continues to pursue an ambitious strategy, doing so will actually harm U.S. security rather than help to preserve it. Realistically speaking, however, the United States has never been everywhere, influenced every outcome, or even led in every crisis:

After World War II, the United States had nuclear weapons and a preponderance of economic power, but nonetheless was unable to prevent the ‘loss’ of China, to roll back communism in Eastern Europe, to overcome the stalemate in the Korean War, to stop the ‘loss’ of North Vietnam, or to dislodge the Castro regime in Cuba.32

To be sure, the world is in a transformative period, but the world has always been a messy place and will likely remain so.

In assessing the current security environment, Brent Scowcroft notes that globalization has already eroded national borders and will increasingly disrupt the Westphalian, State-centric system. States will be challenged by outside forces unconstrained by traditional boundaries as exemplified by the growth of trans-border Islamic extremism, resource shortages, criminal networks, and identity and cultural conflict.33 According to the U.S. Army’s Operating Concept, the proliferation of technology and high-tech weaponry will increasingly allow state and non-state actors to employ hybrid strategies to challenge the United States’ competitive and technological advantages.34 In an increasingly information-based world, the diffusion of power to non-state actors will be much more dangerous than power transition between states. As Nye observes, “for all the fashionable predictions of China, India and Brazil surpassing the United States in the next decades, the greater threat may come from modern barbarians and non-state actors.”35 If Nye’s picture of the future security environment is accurate, the world will likely require increasingly more U.S. leadership, engagement, and presence, not less. Cooperation among states as well as international institutions and frameworks will become increasingly important. The network of allies, partners, and multilateral fora initiated and encouraged by the U.S. will play a critical role.

Proponents of Restraint put far too much stock in the idea of America-in-Decline, using the foreign policy “folly” of the 2003 Iraq War and the Economic Recession of 2008 as the primary evidence. According to Stephen Walt, “the twin debacles of Iraq and Afghanistan only served to

accelerate the waning of American dominance and underscore the [increasing] limits of United States power.”

The ensuing economic decline initially prompted retrenchment strategy thinking. Indeed, research by MacDonald and Parent supports the argument that states can forestall decline by “paring back military expenditures, avoiding costly conflicts, and shifting burdens on to others.”

The argument that America is in a state of terminal decline, however, is tenuous. In comparison to other powers the U.S. remains in an enviable position. The United States has a positive demographic profile when compared with China, Russia, Europe, and Japan. The populations of those countries are aging much more rapidly than is the U.S. population. India is confronted by a youth bulge that will likely prove difficult to manage. Geo-strategically, the United States remains relatively secure. The dynamic, free enterprise system enjoyed by the United States is unmatched and the prospects for U.S. energy independence are looming. Before U.S. entrepreneurs developed and implemented Hydraulic Fracturing, or “fracking,” virtually no one imagined the U.S. would be standing on the verge of energy independence with a prospect for becoming an energy exporter. Even after the 2008 financial crisis and resultant recession, the World Economic Forum continues to rank the United States as fourth in economic competitiveness, with China standing 27th. The United States remains the leader in developing new technology sectors such as information technology, biotechnology, and nanotechnology, and American inventors routinely register as many patents per year as the rest of the world combined. While the Iraq War proved costly and the economic recession was a major setback, Nye points out that there was no concomitant collapse of confidence in the dollar and that bond yields actually rose during the crisis (suggesting confidence in the U.S. economy). Even now, the United States remains on a steady path toward economic recovery while the European economy is stagnant and China’s growth is slowing appreciably.

A third argument for Restraint is that the United States provokes other countries into counter-balancing its power. As Posen notes the U.S. enjoys an enviable geo-strategic position in the world, protected by two large oceans, two friendly countries bordering north and south, and an arsenal of nuclear weapons to deter any potential rival. “Ironically, however, instead of relying on these inherent advantages for its security, the United States has acted with a profound sense of insecurity, adopting an unnecessarily militarized and forward-leaning foreign policy. The Strategy has generated predictable pushback.” Pushback from Russia and China comes primarily in the form of soft counter-balancing and/or low-grade diplomatic opposition, designed to thwart U.S. influence and actions. Posen cites Chinese and Russian interference in the 1999 Kosovo Campaign, 2003 invasion of Iraq, and efforts to slow the West’s efforts to isolate Syria as examples. He adds that the U.S. activist foreign policy incentivizes Russian and Chinese collusion despite the “long history of border friction, and hostility between the two countries.”

The counter-balancing claim ignores the very real possibility that even if the United States adapted a less aggressive posture and smaller presence overseas, Russia and China might still work to counter United States interests in order to protect and pursue their own agendas. Stephen Walt observes, “If China is like all previous great powers—including the United States—its definition of ‘vital’ interests will continue to grow as its power increases, and it will try to use its growing muscle

41 Ibid.
to protect an expanding sphere of influence.” The argument fails to recognize that as the United States retreats from key regions and becomes seemingly less supportive of allies and partners, China, Russia, and possibly others will seek to fill the void.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth dismiss the counter-balancing argument, indicating that since the end of the Cold War no major powers have attempted to balance against the United States, either by building military alliances or by attempting to match U.S. military might. Further, the soft counter-balancing cited by Posen is very difficult to distinguish from normal diplomatic competition and the U.S. is both experienced and highly skilled at employing soft counter-balancing leverage. The international legal norms and institutions created under U.S. leadership are tailor-made for use by the United States and its allies and partners.

A final argument is that the American public desires a strategy of Restraint. Proponents of Restraint cite a war-weary populace that is increasingly looking inward to address assorted problems and challenges here at home. According to Charles Kupchan:

> The U.S. public—which should not determine foreign policy, but should inform it—is turning inward; a recent Pew survey found that 46 percent of Americans believe the country ‘should mind its own business’ and 76 percent of Americans want us to ‘concentrate more on our own national problems’ rather than problems far afield, by historical standards very high measures of isolationist sentiment.

After 13 years of war, trillions of dollars spent, and thousands of lives lost, the public is understandably focused on seeking peace and addressing domestic concerns. This response, however, is likely only temporary. Public opinion parallels were seen in 1976 following the Vietnam War. Additionally, polling messages are mixed. Although the public may be frustrated with foreign policy, survey analysts Lindsay and Krauss conclude that “it isn’t ready to abandon internationalism or to embrace unilateralism.” When asked about “the role the U.S. should play in the world,” for instance, 72 percent opted for one of leadership, and 56 percent of those polled believe the “U.S. should remain the sole military superpower.” In 2003, Pew research polls indicated that 72 percent of the American public believed that use of military force in Iraq was “the right decision.” Public opinion moved only gradually in the other direction over several years. More recently, polls show that more than 60 percent of Americans believe the United States should send combat troops to Iraq to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Restraint advocates fail to consider these statistics. Proponents of a grand strategy of Restraint are convinced the United States will be more secure under a less ambitious, less activist foreign policy whereby the U.S. closes its overseas bases, reduces its security commitments, and brings its military forces home. They are mistaken.

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Democracy Promotion in the Post-Cold War Era

Stewart C. Eales

In his first inaugural address, George Washington asserted that the American people were entrusted with the preservation of “the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government.” The character of that “preservation” has evolved overtime, expanding to new heights in recent years with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era, American Presidents seized the opportunity to pursue a “new world order” built on a democratic foundation. Presidents George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama each responded to challenges and circumstances impacting their democracy promotion efforts. Analyses of each president’s approach to democracy promotion illustrates the importance of achieving consistency between values and actions/policies, clarifying the role of military power in democracy promotion, revitalizing the national commitment to American Exceptionalism, and distinguishing between the promotion of liberal values and the nurturing of democratic institutions.

Keywords: Engagement, Enlargement, Exceptionalism, New World Order

During his inaugural speech in January 2009, President Barack Obama identified a wide array of national challenges. Most were somewhat familiar, but one was unique in modern American history: the crisis in confidence—at home and abroad—in America’s role as a world leader.¹ Widespread uncertainty regarding both America’s right and ability to lead had evolved from the assertive and sometimes aggressive promotion of worldwide democracy by recent U.S. administrations, ongoing domestic governance and budgetary challenges, and the War on Terror.

The crisis in credibility that led to this atmosphere of domestic disillusion and international distrust also had a dampening effect on America’s ability to export two of its most valuable resources: democratic values and good governance.² Obama’s concern was valid. Loss of confidence had, and

¹ Unlike his predecessors, President Obama had to speak of core values and national obligations in terms that indicated they had been lost and must be reclaimed. He used similar language with regard to America’s status as a world leader, declaring that America was ready to “lead once more.” Barack Obama, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 2009, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44 (accessed January 13, 2015).

² University of Toronto human rights Professor Michael Ignatieff observed that America, “[once] a model to emulate,” had by 2005 become “an exception to avoid.” Pew Research Center polling data supports this view. Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, America Against the World (New York: Henry Holt, 2006), 29-36; Thomas Carothers, Democracy Policy under
continues to have, significant implications for American power and identity. The “legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them,” along with the evident benefits we derive from them, are the basis of America’s soft power. They have drawn others to share America’s vision, imitate its political and economic systems, and seek its shores. They represent an essential component of America’s strategic culture and national identity—a unifying value and sense of purpose that has framed what Americans believe and how they define proper national behavior.

Throughout his presidency, Obama has sought, with some success, to reestablish America’s image both as a responsible great power and as the legitimate leader of democracies. He must, however, find a way to leverage that renewed influence to effectively promote democracy. Understanding President Obama’s democracy promotion efforts relative to his post-cold war predecessors will help enable his successors to more effectively pursue of democracy promotion of their own. The U.S. needs a calibrated promotion of democracy that advances liberal democratic values, encourages democratic governance, enhances U.S. credibility, and helps rebuild confidence in America as democracy’s champion.

### Democracy

The word democracy describes a wide array of political structures, processes, purposes, and/or principles, either in isolation or in combination. As Colin Gray asserts, “culture as context provides meaning for events,” making democratic policies and underlying values essential elements of America’s strategic culture. Classically, democracy is defined in terms of the will of the people (the source of power) and the common good (outcomes from the use of power). By focusing on the relationships between sources and outcomes, political scientists have tended to emphasize functionalism as an explanatory framework for democracy. The result is a modern definition that features mechanisms for the selection of leaders, competition among candidates for public support, and government restraint due to public accountability. Democracy, however, is more than a set of functional structures and processes. To more fully understand its enactment requires a deeper understanding of the will of the people and the common good. The people of the United States, for example, are bound together by more than just rules and procedures. They are, in part, united by a
concept of the common good characterized by steadfast commitment to inalienable rights, liberty, independence, and the rule-of-law. These truths are held by Americans “to be self-evident.” They are not, however, truths inherent to democracy— which can take many forms (e.g., liberal or social democracies)— but are principles embodied in the political philosophy called liberalism.¹⁰

Combining the elements of process and principle provides a means of effectively differentiating between a full democracy and what has been called a “hollow democracy.” The first manifests both process and principle, while the second displays democratic processes like voting but lacks enactment of democratic principles such as political rights and civil liberties.¹¹ Journalist Fareed Zakaria has characterized states in this latter category as “illiberal democracies,” observing that they actually undermine the credibility of the liberal democracy being promoted by the United States.¹²

Motives for Promotion

The belief that America’s democratic ideals and system of governance make it unique among nations has been a cornerstone of America’s cultural identity since its founding. George Washington asserted that “the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people.”¹³ Washington conveyed the belief that America held a divine torch with the potential to be a blessing to mankind, and the conviction that America had a noble obligation to protect and nurture that flame.

That sense of purpose—with its inherent flavor of responsibility and honor—has shaped America’s national identity, framed its political narrative, and guided its foreign engagement. The image of America as a torch bearer is central to American Exceptionalism, which embodies the conviction that America is unique among nations due to the presumably divine “truths” upon which it was founded and the role those “truths” have played in shaping and guiding its governance system.

America still views itself as a torch bearer. President Ronald Reagan employed a similar image when he spoke of America as “the shining city on a hill,” a description that has since become synonymous with American Exceptionalism.¹⁴ Nearly 225 years after Washington’s inaugural

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address, Obama concluded his own address with a torch-bearing metaphor, challenging Americans to “answer the call of history and carry into an uncertain future that precious light of freedom.”

The Practice of Promotion

For the first hundred years the prevailing definition of democracy promotion among national leaders involved preservation of the flame so that its radiance might be spread. Abraham Lincoln still thought of democracy as an experiment that might fail. He said the Civil War was a test to determine whether America, “or any nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,” could last. The obligation remains to preserve democratic governance and practice democratic values in a manner that would, in Washington’s words, “Win the affections of [the Nation’s] citizens and command the respect of the world.”

The perception of what it meant to defend and nurture freedom and democracy grew with the scope of U.S. power and global engagement. The new role, proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson in his call to build “a world made safe for democracy,” was that of a shield bearer responsible for assuring a global environment in which democracy could survive and thrive. Subsequent presidents embraced that role as they sought to counter threats during World War II and the Cold War by providing “a shield behind which democracy could flourish.” The duty in the Truman Doctrine, however, was to “support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” The goal was to enhance security. The benefits of democracy were treated as a bonus.

At the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion assumed an assertive edge with the new mandate to build a democratic world. The Soviet Union’s collapse and fall of the communist system in Eastern Europe were understood as validation of democracy, prompting active and even vigorous promotion. America’s new role as the sole superpower and leader of the growing community of worldwide democracies was elevated to that of standard bearer.

Each approach to democracy promotion experienced changes in accord with America’s increasing power and reach. As national identity shifted over time, these shifts were reflected in the underlying motives, objectives, and words used to describe actions and their ends. Three approaches surface and can be characterized as follows:

- The torch bearer—obligated by providence to reflect a virtuous system of liberty and justice for others to admire and emulate.

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• The shield bearer—obligated by providence and strength to protect the freedom of others who pursued that virtuous system.
• The standard bearer—obligated by providence and/or enlightened self-interest to champion the spread of political systems and economies that would embrace liberty and the rule of law within a world community of democracies.

The nation did not merely exchange one burden for another during these transitions, but rather added the new to the old. Consequently, Presidents George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush were able to freely mix all three approaches. That, however, was not to be the case for President Barack Obama.

Post-Cold War Promotion of Democracy

Thomas Carothers properly notes that “any administration’s approach to democracy [promotion] is inevitably an amalgam of highly varied policies.”22 The type of action taken and level of effort invested will likely vary from region-to-region and, in some cases, country-to-country. The three identified approaches can be readily applied to all four post-Cold War presidents, each of whom sought to project, protect, or advocate democratic principles and processes.

George H. W. Bush – 1989 to 1993

George H. W. Bush assumed office when the Soviet Union was imploding and Soviet Bloc countries were in a state of transition. He viewed those events as an affirmation of the Founding Fathers’ vision and a vindication of America’s democratic institutions and values.23 His foreign policy message is reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to prepare Americans for a unique role in a new international environment—what Bush initially described as a “new world” and a “new era.”24 He, like Wilson, envisioned a community of nations united by a shared respect for freedom, democracy, and free markets—what he eventually came to call a “New World Order.”25

Bush, seeing the world was at a crossroads, confidently promoted the path toward democracy.26 He approached democracy’s spread with a sense of certainty, asserting that people, given a choice,
would “inevitably” choose freedom and elections. Yet, he still conveyed the sense that history had provided a fleeting opportunity, which must be seized. He challenged Americans to pursue a “common vision of the peaceful world we want to see,” identifying six ways to do so and beginning each with “It is time. . . .” When explaining the basis for the nation’s obligation he bluntly declared “[We] are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom.”

Bush’s foreign policy reflected a desire for partners, an understanding of the need to maintain a sense of perspective as the world’s only superpower, and the intent to actively incorporate all three approaches to democracy promotion as the torch bearer, the shield bearer, and the standard bearer in shaping the new world order. Bush stressed that the post-Cold War era represented an opportunity for the United Nations to fulfill its charter with regard to world peace and prosperity. Highlighting the success of the U.N. in its mandate to drive Iraq from Kuwait, he dedicated a portion of the 1991 National Security Strategy (NSS) and large portions of two U.N. speeches to identifying ways in which the U.N. could, and must, live up to the vision that inspired its founding.

Critics noted that Bush, when he might have established America’s vision of liberal democracy as the new global norm in his 1991 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, made no mention of democracy. Instead, he spoke of sovereignty, rule of law, and human rights (a mix of realist and liberal concepts). Bush appears to have been subordinating a desire to promote the American model of democracy to a need to establish trust among nations unused to a world with the U.S. as the sole superpower. When preeminent power might have tempted Bush to assert U.S. hegemony by defining American democracy as the global benchmark, he opted instead to promote trust and pursue partnership. In truth, Bush did not see promotion of democracy and partnerships as mutually exclusive. He expected NATO to provide the secure environment in which democracy might grow and thrive in Europe. He instituted U.S.-sponsored programs like the Support for East European Democracy, Freedom Support Act, and New Enterprise for the Americas to promote democratization through economic reform and political stability, international connectivity, and growth through developing free market economies.

Bush occasionally sent mixed messages with regard to the promotion of democracy. He initially justified the deployment of U.S. forces to Panama in December 1989, for example, as a response to

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32 George H. W. Bush noted that the world, though recognizing the absolute power of the U.S., was not afraid because it “trusts us with power, and the world is right.” He was clearly sensitive about maintaining that trust. George H. W. Bush, “State of the Union,” January 29, 1991.


the “reckless threats and attacks upon Americans” by forces under Panamanian dictator, General Manuel Noriega. One month later he proudly announced to Congress that democracy had been restored in Panama, mixing cause and effect. On a broader scale, Bush talked about the new world order as a universal event, when in fact his national security strategies reflect a concentration on Europe and Eurasia, with some attention to Asia and South America, and almost none to the Middle East or Africa. Bush vigorously waved the democratic standard in his effort to gather former Soviet states into a new community of democracies, but if he was bearing the democratic torch for Africa, he was certainly not holding it very high.

William J. Clinton – 1993 to 2001

Bill Clinton’s priority during his first months in office was the implementation of a broad-reaching domestic agenda designed to address economic crisis and implement welfare reform. That focus and level of effort came at the expense of foreign policy. Clinton, an internationalist at heart, appears to have been satisfied to carry on Bush’s pursuit of the new world order. He did not publically declare his foreign policy vision until growing criticism and worrisome isolationist trends forced the issue in late summer 1993. At that time, he and his senior foreign policy advisors unveiled a policy of enlargement. The policy, outlined in four speeches between September 21 and 27, 1993, was based on three basic premises:

1. The world is more secure but less stable; Islandization, factionalism, and separatism compete with liberal democracy for preeminence.

2. More nations are embracing democracy and market economics in a manner that “resonates” with America’s core values.


3. Free-market democracies promote prosperity, increase stability, are more reliable partners, and tend to resolve disputes through ways other than war.

Those premises, in turn, shaped an enlargement strategy that called for the U.S. to strengthen the existing community of market democracies, nurture and add new democracies and market economies to that community, protect the community from states opposed to democracy and free markets, and promote democracy and free market economics as part of humanitarian efforts (called the “humanitarian agenda”). The Clinton strategy clearly embraced the roles of torch bearer, shield bearer, and standard bearer.

Clinton balanced his internationalist predisposition with realist policies. He had committed the U.S. to lead the international community, but added the qualification that U.S. national interest would determine the time and place for any active intervention. America would support reform and democracy, foster good governance, and “serve as the fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace,” but it could not solve every problem and nor become the world’s police. This approach required weighing each national security challenge on its own merits in an effort to determine whether or not national interests warranted action.

Enlargement placed considerable emphasis on open markets as the basis of democracy promotion. Clinton’s seven National Security Strategies dedicated extensive text to trade and economic development. He said “open markets and rule-based trade are the best engines we know of for raising living standards, reducing global poverty and environmental destruction, and assuring the free flow of ideas.” Clinton appreciated open markets for the example of prosperity they provided, but valued them most as a force for integration among nations and societies in an increasingly globalized economy. His expectation was that “market democracies,” having been freed from the Soviet threat and a constant requirement to invest in containment, would seek to enlarge their communities.

One of the enlargement strategy’s four elements that did not appear in Clinton’s 1993 address to the U.N. was the “humanitarian agenda.” Part of that agenda involved “working to help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.” In the 2000 NSS, Clinton combined promoting human rights abroad with promoting democracy,

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Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”


Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement”; William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of United Nations.”

Clinton’s humanitarian agenda pre-dates the U.N. convention regarding “responsibility to protect,” under which sovereignty no longer shields a state from foreign interference if the welfare of its people are in doubt. Whether one led to the other or both were a consequence of growing internationalism remains unclear. See “Responsibility to Protect,” April 16, 2014, linked from The United Nations Home Page at [http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml) (accessed January 25, 2015).

identifying the combination as one of his three "central goals/core objectives." The concept sounds innocuous, but the integration of democratic promotion and humanitarian concerns encourages what John Kane calls "the fractured myth of virtuous power" and provides a moral framework that has been used to justify regime change. Clinton used this rational to justify interventions in Serbia and Kosovo. Clinton’s statements do not reflect a belief in either the divine provenance of democracy or its inevitability. He did not hesitate to mention God in public gatherings, but his explanations for why things occurred were more secular and historic. That tendency is reflected in his assertion that "[one] of the most important lessons of the last fifty years is that democracy and free markets are neither inevitable nor irreversible." Such a view, combined with a sense of the moment, likely made him more inclined to actively promote both democracy and free markets.

George W. Bush – 2001 to 2009

An examination of democracy promotion under George W. Bush (hereafter referred to as Bush 43), reveals a clear change in the president’s focus and tone during his second term in office. The aspect of democracy he was promoting underwent a fundamental shift. That shift was likely due to the momentous events of 9/11 and the subsequent initiation of the War on Terror in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq.

Bush 43, during his first years in office, was an active promoter of liberal democratic principles, supporting what he called "the non-negotiable demands of human dignity." His 2002 NSS called for the nation to "champion aspirations for human dignity" by promoting "the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property." In contrast, he viewed democratic systems as being tailored to fit the society they served, saying, "[T]he form that freedom and democracy take in any land will reflect the history, culture, and habits unique to its people." Clearly he viewed the structures and process of democracy as being negotiable.

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55 Ibid.
Bush 43 avoided using the word “democracy” in a promotion context during his early years in office. In his first inaugural address he described the nation’s democratic faith as “an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along.” He took a sharing rather than a promotional approach—that of a torch bearer rather than a standard bearer. More prominent in his speeches were words like “freedom,” “justice,” “liberty,” “peace,” and “free markets.” He supported these principles with money dedicated to programs like the Millennium Challenge Account, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and the U.S.-Sub-Saharan African Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum.

During his early years in office, Bush 43 drew a distinction between promoting human dignity and promoting democratic institutions. His priority was human dignity. In the 2002 NSS, a document with nine sections, the text dedicated to “championing” human dignity appeared in section two. It included a pledge of action: to openly challenge violations, use foreign aid to promote freedom, make freedom and democratic values central to bilateral relationships, and promote freedom of religious expression. In contrast, the text associated with “Building the Infrastructure of Democracy” was section seven and involved development programs designed to enhance health, education and welfare—activities that would improve quality of life but not necessarily advance democratic practices or values.

A significant shift in tone and focus with regard to democracy promotion occurred in 2004. Noting the tendency to tolerate oppressive regimes for the sake of stability, Bush 43 announced in June 2004 that the U.S. would continue to work with any country dedicated to fighting terrorism, but in the long run would “expect a higher standard of reform and democracy” from partners. The contrast between his two inaugural speeches is stark. Where the first referred to passing along America’s democratic faith, the second proclaimed a global policy of dedicated democracy promotion with “the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” U.S. relations with other countries would be tied to their support for human dignity and opposition to oppression. America would not enforce its style of government on the unwilling (process remained negotiable), but it would help others to find their voice (nonnegotiable) and attain their freedom (nonnegotiable). Democracy promotion had morphed to become democracy coercion, particularly for those deemed to be “outlaw regimes.” In short, Bush 43 had set aside the torch and picked up the shield and standard.

The decisions and actions associated with the War on Terror and regime change in Iraq have had a far-reaching effect on democracy promotion by the United States. The torture, degradation, and long-term imprisonment without trial of terror suspects undermined America’s image as the

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57 A review of speeches and press interviews Bush 43 gave during his first thirty days in office reflect virtually no use of the word “democracy.” The few exceptions typically involved shared American ideals rather than promotion abroad. See The University of California/Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project Online Database, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
61 Ibid., 21-23.
64 Ibid.
torch bearer for democratic values like rule-of-law and equal access to justice. Bush 43 pursued many forms of democracy promotion during his presidency—including expanded engagement with Africa—but in the end, people reflecting on America’s role as the leading proponent of democracy will likely only remember his later justification of the war in Iraq as an effort to build a new democracy—a linkage that remains difficult to break.

Barack H. Obama – 2009 to Present

The world that Barack Obama addressed on inauguration day in January 2009, differed from that of his three post-Cold War predecessors. Each of them had assumed office in a time when America was embracing its role as the sole superpower and leader of a rapidly growing community of democratic states. Each had enjoyed a degree of flexibility in their promotion of democratic values and systems, choosing when and how America would bear the torch, shield, and/or standard as democracy’s champion. Their challenge had been to employ the elements of national power in a way that advanced U.S. interests while reinforcing the nation’s image abroad as a partner rather than a hegemon.

Obama took office at a time when America’s post-Cold War hegemony—what some have called America’s “triumphalist moment”—had passed; and with it had gone the assumption that the U.S. would lead the inevitable rise of a world community of market democracies. Many of the values, virtues, and structures that had been the basis for America’s democratic reputation had been called into question in the previous six years. In addition, the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent global recession, along with the rise of China as an economic powerhouse, left some wondering whether establishing market democracies was really the best way to achieve prosperity. Obama’s challenge was not one of choosing how and when to hold up the torch, shield, or standard of democracy, but rather of reestablishing America’s right and ability to bear them all.

His 2009 inaugural address began the process with the words, “[Starting] today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America.” His message focused on reclaiming the things that had made America unique: its values that still represented a light worth following, its reputation as a reliable friend, and the obligations that came with greatness. Within two days the new president issued three executive orders designed to help restore America’s reputation for due process and the rule of law by establishing a prohibition against torture, directing the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention center, and initiating a review of legal procedures for holding and trying suspected terrorists. Progress on the latter two has been slow, but

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Obama succeeded in sending “an unmistakable signal that our actions in defense of liberty will be [as] just as our cause.”

Obama understood the fundamental truth that the honor of bearing the torch of democracy (a prerequisite for being trusted to take up the shield or standard), must be earned. To that end, he highlighted the need for domestic democratic renewal in his 2010 NSS—asserting that America’s right and ability to lead the world and shape events abroad required work on democratic values at home. A section entitled Renewing American Leadership—Building at Home, Shaping Abroad of the NSS stated, “The most effective way . . . to promote our values is to live them. America’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world.”

Significantly, the 2010 NSS spoke routinely of engagement rather than enlargement with respect to international relationships, reflecting in some ways the 1991 example of George Bush who emphasized America as a partner rather than a superpower. Obama sought to reinforce this perspective as he shared his views regarding the promotion of democracy in a September 2009 speech before the U.N. General Assembly. He acknowledged that the U.S. had “too often been selective in its promotion of democracy.” Echoing a view expressed by Bush 43 early in his first term, Obama asserted that nations pursuing democracy must shape it to fit their needs and culture. Structure was again negotiable. He announced that the U.S. was prepared to lead and concluded with a declaration that America was ready to begin a new chapter in international cooperation.

Much has happened since Obama made that declaration. His responses to foreign threats and opportunities during the intervening period have consistently reflected an effort to regain the international community’s trust and the American public’s confidence. His approach to foreign policy has been reminiscent of the balancing acts performed by both Presidents Bush and Clinton: promoting a liberal desire for international norms and structures even as he made decisions based on a realist’s perspective for balancing risk and interest. The result has been a foreign policy that might be characterized as selective engagement. Some examples include:

- Responding to protestors seeking to overthrow the authoritarian Tunisian regime in January 2011 (called the Jasmine Revolution), Obama employed carrots and sticks in a year-long effort to promote a relatively fair and free election. Tunisia is now an Islamic Democratic state with a National Constituent Assembly.

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72 The 2010 NSS spoke of pursuing comprehensive engagement and used the word “engagement” forty two times in sixty pages. The word “enlargement,” pursued by Clinton, never appears in the document. See Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, May 2010.


74 Ibid.


In 2011 the Egyptian people sought to oust President Hosni Mubarak, their ruler for three decades and a long-time U.S. partner. Obama pressed Mubarak to step down in favor of a democratic process and accepted the results of that election, even though it handed power to an Islamist party not friendly to the United States. When the Egyptian Army overthrew the elected government in July 2013, jeopardizing $1.5 billion in U.S. aid, Obama suspended joint exercises and some arms sales but did not cut off aid entirely. He ultimately subordinated democratic values to practical regional security concerns.

Obama wanted to assist Islamic rebels attempting to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2011, particularly after the use of chemical weapons by the regime. However, the most capable rebel forces were affiliated with radical Islamic groups that the U.S. could not support. Obama, with the threat of air strikes and Russian assistance, compelled Assad to hand over Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles, although he has yet to identify a tenable strategy for removing the Syrian dictator.

The U.S. is increasingly engaged in fighting one of the same radical Islamic groups as Assad—the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ISIL’s success in Iraq has created a problem for Obama. A sense of obligation to aid Iraq, a democratic state established by the U.S. remains, but it has been tempered by domestic concerns regarding the possible return of U.S. ground forces to the country. Obama has taken a middle path, seeking to “degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL” through U.S. air strikes and support to partners on the ground. His initial decision to restrict U.S. ground forces to non-combat missions, however, has limited the nation’s ability to clearly assume the mantle of leadership thus far.

Evident in the contrast between his two National Security Strategies, Obama has moved beyond establishing America’s credibility to actively asserting its leadership role. While the 2010 NSS spoke of “renewing” and “building a stronger foundation” for leadership, the 2015 document proclaims in bold text that the U.S. will “lead with purpose,’ ‘lead with strength,’ ‘lead by example,’ ‘lead with capable partners,’ ‘lead with all the instruments of U.S. power,’ and ‘lead with a long term perspective.” Words like “essential” and “indispensable” are used to describe American leadership. The 2015 NSS reflects the U.S. as leading through a combination of independent action, regional partnerships, and support for international organizations. Accordingly, the U.S. will promote three of its four enduring interests—security, stability, and economic prosperity—through
this hybrid approach. From the perspective of democracy promotion, the NSS reserves only one national interest solely for U.S. action: the promotion of values. President Obama has clearly reclaimed the role of torch bearer.

Another important change in the 2015 NSS is Obama’s acknowledgement of American Exceptionalism. Obama was criticized during his first administration for his avoidance of the word “exceptional” when describing America, and on one occasion drew criticism for implying the U.S. was no more exceptional than any other country. Until relatively recently, he seemed to be tacitly agreeing with the political analysts who were asserting the U.S. had entered a “post-exceptionalist era.” That attitude is not, however, conveyed in the 2015 NSS. Obama’s cover letter to that strategy document ends with the acknowledgement that Americans “embrace our exceptional role and responsibilities at a time when our unique contributions and capabilities are needed most.” Obama appears to have reclaimed the duty of bearing the democratic standard as well.

**Recommendations**

To effectively maintain and advance the systematic promotion of democracy as bearers of the torch, shield, and standard, the U.S. needs to set four basic goals: (1) achieve consistency between values and actions/policies, (2) make clear the connection between the military and U.S. promotion of democracy, (3) advance national commitment to exceptionalism, and (4) promote democratic structures while supporting each culture’s unique values and characteristics. To succeed, U.S. presidents first need to demonstrate that core liberal democratic values are a litmus test for policy decisions. Bush 43’s initial pursuit of “human dignity” as a non-negotiable basis for policy decisions exemplifies this practice. His actions following the 9/11 attacks, however, undermined the approach by sacrificing core values in pursuit of security interests. Furthermore, the practice of making foreign policy decisions on a case-by-case basis as Clinton did, suggests the need for a consistent values-based standard. Policy decisions should clearly and consistently identify the role that values play in their administration’s pursuit of national interests.

Second, U.S. presidents need to clarify the role of military power in the promotion of democracy. A risk associated with the prior recommendation is that it can lead to poor decisions regarding the use of military power unless policy defines the military’s role in promoting liberal democratic values. Many post-Cold War foreign policy challenges have involved situations in which U.S. values were infringed, but the appropriateness of military action remained unclear. Assorted global conditions have further complicated the matter by blurring the line between human rights and humanitarian concerns. The U.S. must establish a policy that defines and guides the use of military power when value-related interests are at risk. Doing so will empower military planners and allies while discouraging human rights violations.

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82 Ibid., Cover Letter, 2, 15, 24.
83 Ibid., 3, 19. The fourth section of the NSS is entitled Values.
Third, U.S. presidents need to reassert the mantle of American Exceptionalism. President Obama has declared that America is prepared to embrace its “exceptional role and responsibilities.”

Presidential leadership should build on that assertion by developing and implementing a communications strategy to publicize that America remains an exceptional nation. Consistently emphasizing the linkage between policies and values would support such a message. Presidents should promote American Exceptionalism as the foundation of a national identity that instills in Americans a unique sense of obligation, optimism, and authority—inspiring the nation to use its unrivaled power in pursuit of a better world for all.

Fourth, U.S. presidents need to continue to distinguish between the promotion of liberal values and the nurturing of democratic institutions. Bush 43’s view that democratic values should be non-negotiable, but that democratic systems should be flexible, has great merit. Efforts that focus on countering corruption, encouraging public participation in governance, and investing in initiatives that provide shared prosperity are essential to building societies that can embrace democratic institutions like representative government and open market economics. Nations and their citizens must themselves do the work of connecting democracy to their own set of unifying values. Establishing democratic structures in the hopes of promoting liberal values has too often produced hollow democracies. A clear vision of both the desired end state and the means of achieving it will remain essential.

The four post-Cold War presidents share three things in common with regard to the promotion of democracy: all embraced it as an American responsibility, spoke of it in idealist terms that envisioned a global community of democracies, and pursued it within a realist decision-making process. Systematic application of these four recommendations will enable President Obama and his successors to more effectively bear the torch, shield, and standard of democracy while enhancing the promotion of democracy as the path to a better world.

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87 Ibid.
Public Disclosure Websites and Extremist Threats

Nathan T. Ray

Public disclosure websites (PDWs) constitute a serious security challenge to the United States and other nations. PDW activists are dedicated to exposing sensitive government and commercial information in the belief that they are acting in the public good. As a result, PDWs have revealed previously hard-to-find, strategic and tactical level information that benefits the resiliency and operations of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal groups. To date, no evidence links PDWs to an attack by a violent nonstate group, but the threat exists and is almost certain to grow as Internet access expands globally. Given the high likelihood that unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information will continue, the U.S. Government should adopt stronger controls to safeguard information, including new legislation to address leaking and a review of information sharing policies and practices. Left unchallenged, PDWs imperil the ability of the United States to protect its citizens, work effectively with allies around the world, and counter violent nonstate groups.

Keywords: Internet, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Information Privacy, Information Piracy

As he [Mohammed] called me by name to stand, he said, “Go get me information about those people and do not alarm them about me.”


Dateline April 2011: A group of Libyan fighters, frightened and unsure of their next move, hunkered behind a screen of trees near their hometown of Yefren in the Nafusa Mountains southwest of Tripoli. Nearby, government forces bombarded the town with rockets tipped with high-explosives. If the Libyan fighters attacked, would the rockets be a threat? They needed intelligence. The leader’s cell phone rang. Two Libyan nationals—one in Finland, the other in the United Kingdom—briefed the leader via Skype. The British contact, who had trained on the same rocket launchers during his compulsory military service under the Qaddafi regime, advised that the rockets would overshoot...

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them if they attacked. Moreover, Qaddafi’s soldiers were likely firing the rockets remotely from a distance using an electric cable. Armed with this intelligence, the Libyan fighters successfully assaulted the batteries.\(^2\)

**The Public Disclosure Website Phenomenon**

Communication and information technologies\(^3\) are improving the intelligence gathering capabilities of violent non-state actors—insurgents, terrorists, and crime groups—around the world. These groups use the Internet for propaganda, fundraising, communications, initiating computer network attacks, and intelligence gathering and dissemination.\(^4\) The quality of Internet-based intelligence information is likewise improving. Now, fighters like those in the Nafusa Mountains, can mine the proliferation of government, news, and military-interest websites, gaining immediate tactical advantages and enhancing a group’s resiliency against adversarial intelligence and security efforts. Although some information gained may not be “readily actionable,” it could prove highly valuable as part of a group’s “learn/grow process,” thereby informing analysis of adversarial threats and strategic challenges.\(^5\) For nonstate groups who employ technology effectively, the Internet may function as an adjunct case officer, counterintelligence officer, and intelligence analyst.

Public disclosure websites (PDW) increase the Internet’s utility in this regard. Dedicated to the proposition that “citizens deserve more access to information that the powers that be hold in secret,” sites like WikiLeaks (wikileaks.org) or the Federation of American Scientists’ Secrecy Project (fas.org) encourage exposure of sensitive government and commercial information.\(^6\) As a result, PDWs have harmed “governments and corporations in ways that have much more wide-ranging implications than many other global social movements before them, from economic to security threats.”\(^7\) Most PDW activists do not espouse violence or crime, but by revealing hard-to-find strategic-level information and analysis, they may provide insurgents, terrorists, and criminals with the intelligence they seek. PDWs are, therefore, a security risk that must be included in any analysis concerned with predicting, preparing for, and subverting violent groups and their initiatives. Failure to understand use/potential use of PDWs or other Internet sources could be devastating. In many

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\(^7\) Wong and Brown, “E-Bandits in Global Activism,” 1018.
ways, the Internet is a neutral operational environment for non-state actors, who are themselves vulnerable to online surveillance by authorities, as well as suffering from their own paranoia regarding potential surveillance. But regardless of whether or not the Internet is currently “a force multiplier for terrorist organizations,” greater understanding of non-state intelligence practices is crucial to countering extremists.

Non-state groups clearly recognize the value of open-source information available through PDWs and the Internet. Noted for developing cyber-attack tools, the Muslim Hackers Club, for example, included links on its website to PDWs purporting to disclose U.S. Secret Service code names and radio frequencies. Al-Qa’ida, likewise, has long-recognized the importance of publicly-available information, now made easier and safer to find thanks to the Internet. “Using [openly available information] and without resorting to illegal means,” one operations manual instructs, “it is possible to gather at least 80% of information about the enemy. The one gathering information with this public method is not exposed to any danger whatsoever.”

Another manual advises fighters to employ a “computer specialist” for intelligence collection, who can “enter and download information as required, whether this be images, video, secret documents, statements, or textual reports.”

Because PDWs offer significant intelligence value to insurgents, terrorists, and criminal organizations, they will increasingly supply extremists with critical intelligence benefitting their operations and potentially providing for their long-term survival. As a result, PDW activism constitutes a serious security challenge. The U.S. Government must, therefore, continue strengthening information assurance controls, re-evaluate “need-to-share” mindsets sanctioned in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and recognize that PDWs rely on anonymous leakers and self-described whistleblowers like Edward Snowden for site content.

The Lunev Axiom Re-Validated

Although PDWs are clearly enlarging the pool of operational information and analysis for extremists, the total amount of classified government information continues to grow and vastly outweighs the number of sensitive documents currently available online. In other words, “the [mere] count of leaked [documents] tells us nothing about the significance of a breach.” Yet, the potential sensitivity of exposed information must not be overlooked. Even a single improperly disclosed document could wield tremendous damage to national security, depending, of course, on its content, the timing of its release, and the ability of subversive groups to quickly capitalize on the released information.

In March 2010, for example, the U.S. Department of Defense warned that “some 2,000 pages of documents WikiLeaks released on equipment used by coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan . . .

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15 Ibid., 18.
could be used by foreign intelligence services, terrorist groups and others to identify vulnerabilities, plan attacks, and build new [improvised explosive] devices.” The following year, days before the successful U.S. operation against Osama bin Ladin, WikiLeaks published documents indicating Washington was interested in Abbottabad, almost compromising the raid.

PDWs may already be helping to strengthen the long-term resiliency of nonstate groups against military, law enforcement, and intelligence operations. Even before Snowden’s revelations, “Jihadist technology . . . [was] so sophisticated and secretive” that the National Security Agency (NSA) was unable to monitor their communications, despite using collection methods “specifically designed to uncover terrorist plots.” Now, groups like the Islamic State (ISIS) boast about using “Snowden approved” encryption to protect their communications. Nonstate groups may also employ more secure off-the-shelf electronic devices and digital technologies as they become available. Manufacturers and service providers like Apple, Google, Yahoo, and Facebook have scrambled to protect user information in response to the public outcry over Snowden’s revelations.

Such developments highlight the continuing validity of the Lunev Axiom of intelligence. First coined by U.S. intelligence officer James Bruce to describe the negative impact of Cold War-era press leaks on U.S intelligence and military operations/capabilities, the Lunev Axiom states: “classified information disclosed in the press is the effective equivalent of intelligence gathered through foreign espionage.” Bruce based his observation on a comment from former Soviet military intelligence officer Stanislav Lunev who defected to the United States in 1992. “I was amazed—and Moscow was very appreciative—at how many times I found very sensitive information in American newspapers,” Lunev recalled. “In my view, Americans tend to care more about scooping their competition than about national security, which made my job easier.”

According to Bruce, press leaks that reveal U.S. intelligence techniques/operations provide adversaries with an opportunity to develop denial and deception countermeasures that effectively diminish U.S. intelligence collection efforts and effectiveness while raising the prospect that such intelligence collection will be defeated. As electronic technologies become more sophisticated and readily available worldwide, leaked materials are even more easily disseminated/researched electronically allowing for rapid compilation and comprehensive review. Former NSA and Central

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19 Steven Swinford, “Spy Chief: Facebook is Helping Terrorists; Technology Giants are in Denial Over Their Responsibility, Says New Head of GCHQ,” The Daily Telegraph, November 4, 2014. http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&csi=8109&sr=HLEAD%22Spy%20chief%20Facebook%20is%20helping%20terrorists%22%20and%20date%20is%202014.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 399.
24 Ibid.
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Michael Hayden echoed this concern in the wake of the 2010 WikiLeaks revelations:

If I had gotten this trove on the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, I would have called this priceless. If I'm head of Russian intelligence, I'm getting my best English speakers and saying, "Read every document, I want you to tell me how good are these guys? What are their approaches, their strengths, their weaknesses and blind spots?"  

Nonstate actors almost certainly view sensitive materials published by PDWs as a similar windfall of intelligence resources.

**Intelligence Agencies of the People**

PDWs expose sensitive government and commercial information under the assumption that ordinary citizens deserve greater access to information held in secret by “the powers that be.” The most extreme activists believe that “Information does not just want to be free; it longs to be free. Information expands to fill the available storage space.” Virtually all PDWs actively encourage and abet leaking or self-described whistleblowing, as well as declassification of U.S. Government materials through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Activists promote the use of encryption and Internet anonymizing programs (e.g., The Onion Router or Tor), that enable secure Internet browsing and allow users to “to create regions free from the coercive force of the outer state.” More practically, these tools allow leakers and whistleblowers to divulge sensitive information anonymously and communicate securely with activists.

Although PDWs are rooted in twentieth century activist journalism and Vietnam-era disclosures (e.g., The Pentagon Papers and Philip Agee’s disclosures of CIA operations), PDWs are distinguished from their antecedents in several ways. First, as “the intelligence agency of the people,” many engage in Internet-based sousveillance—or the “observation from below of more powerful organizations and people.” This form of inverse surveillance is practiced by informal networks of citizens seeking to curb perceived excesses by the state. By using cell phones to gather and post video of police and government activities, these groups and individuals alter the public/Internet discourse regarding individual events and the larger issues of which they may be a

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26 Wong and Brown, E-Bandits in Global Activism,” 1018.
30 Beckett, WikiLeaks, 120.
part. The WikiLeaks disclosures in 2010 were perhaps “the most controversial and publicized sousveillance” effort to date—33—at least until Snowden’s revelations.

Second, PDWs are technologically poised to exploit information from unauthorized (e.g., “leaks”) and authorized (e.g., posted online) sources. Such a posture increases the potential “scale and scope” of PDW-enabled disclosures and ensures that improperly disclosed materials will proliferate rapidly over the Internet.34 Most PDWs encourage whistleblowing and leaking by enabling secure “drop boxes” where individuals can anonymously and securely submit sensitive materials,35 and by providing free software that protects Internet users from online surveillance. WikiLeaks, for example, pioneered the use of Skype (which scrambles transmissions), Pretty Good Privacy, (a free encryption program), and the Tor browser, (which anonymizes Internet usage by routing activity through a network of approximately 2,000 volunteer computer servers worldwide).36 Similarly, a rival site, GlobaLeaks (globaleaks.org), sponsors Tor-based software to create a peer-to-peer “leak amplification network.”37

Third, PDWs are an artifact of the Web 2.0 philosophy and culture. As with other Web 2.0 entities (e.g., jihadist websites), PDW users and supporters participate in a virtual community, helping to produce and shape website content, rather than just passively consuming information.38 This interactive characteristic fosters relationships among online activists. The shadowy hacktivist collective Anonymous, for example, is bound together by shared beliefs regarding online free speech and information freedom.39 The Web 2.0 ethos also makes Snowden’s leaks a part of the PDW phenomenon. Justifying his actions as sousveillance, Snowden improperly disclosed sensitive U.S. documents. He used the same encryption and anonymizing tools and techniques that PDWs promote, and received legal support from WikiLeaks (at least initially with ongoing publication and distribution of leaked information continuing online).40

Finally, PDWs are creating a new “complex media ecology” through relationships with traditional media.41 Because the sheer volume of leaked materials on sites like WikiLeaks limits the public’s ability to interpret available information, PDWs rely on the gatekeeping and interpretative functions of traditional media to make their disclosures meaningful. In the absence of media interpretation, activist efforts to stoke indignation leading to political reform are rendered mute.42 In 2010, for example, muted public response to large releases of U.S. military/diplomatic documents prompted WikiLeaks to seek assistance from The New York Times, The Guardian, and Der Spiegel to decipher the exposed content (U.S. military and diplomatic acronyms, classification information, 

33 Rainie and Wellman, Networked, 240.
35 Rainie and Wellman, Networked, 241.
and other arcana) and shape it into more accessible stories (with names redacted).\textsuperscript{43} PDWs have also forged relationships with traditional media outlets to overcome funding challenges. Most sites rely heavily on donations to provide for operation expenses and to diffuse the possible impact of litigation.\textsuperscript{44}

For their part, traditional media outlets have embraced PDWs because PDWs have “dramatically increased the ease with which reporters, editors, and publishers can evade laws or regulations pertaining to the publication of classified information.”\textsuperscript{45} Access to leaked information has multiple benefits for established media: providing increased circulation, audience attention, advertising commitments, profits, and cutting edge status. By supplying reporters with both information and sensationalism, PDWs have effectively revitalized the “campaigning reputations” of many well established media outlets, elevated their status for “high-quality journalism” that PDWs lack, and reminded readers “they are still key players in the political game.”\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{Secret Desktop Archives}

PDWs are digital libraries that provide searchable access to open-endedly archived information. The content of many PDWs grows continually. In 2011, for example, WikiLeaks received sensitive documents “about thirty times a day.”\textsuperscript{47} Site content is available indefinitely on the Internet, whether through PDW mirror sites or programs like the “Wayback Machine” (archive.org), which digitally store Internet content.\textsuperscript{48} Indeed, many PDWs (including WikiLeaks), use mirror sites to operate despite limited funds and government efforts to shut down or block access to them.\textsuperscript{49} These measures help ensure that sensitive information published by a PDW is and will be available to any user for the foreseeable future.

The digital nature of PDWs therefore benefits nonstate groups in several ways. PDWs provide easy access to sensitive information; PDWs help solve information storage and retrieval issues that have traditionally plagued nonstate groups seeking to preserve intelligence information; and PDWs facilitate compartmentalization functions like intelligence gathering and record-keeping. By enabling nonstate groups to preserve these capabilities in case of compromise, valuable information is less likely to be misplaced or captured. As recollected by former Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) operative Brendan Hughes:

In 1987, I came across a dump, a bundle of intelligence reports that had been lying there from 1974, and what had happened was the intelligence officer whose stuff it was was killed and no one knew where he had his stuff hidden. That happens in a guerrilla organisation (sic)—a lot of the intelligence is lost like that because you do not have a central control where you can gather and hold intelligence. So, a lot of it is done by word of mouth . . . by memory. A lot of it has gone . . . it’s not a great system.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 18-19.
\textsuperscript{44} Bolt, “The Leak Before the Storm,” 48-49.
\textsuperscript{45} Sagar, Secrets and Leaks, 178.
\textsuperscript{46} Bolt, “The Leak Before the Storm,” 48.
\textsuperscript{47} Brenner, America the Vulnerable, 170.
\textsuperscript{49} Rainie and Wellman, Networked, 241.
\textsuperscript{50} Gaetano Joe Ilardi, “IRA Operational Intelligence: The Heartbeat of the War,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 21, no. 2 (June 2010): 335.
PDWs, in addition to “cloud storage” options, help solve such conundrums. The number of PDWs, however, may challenge the ability of extremists to monitor them. Virtually all PDW activists provide support to those who leak or whistleblower, but they are not uniform in their views regarding unauthorized disclosures. Differences of opinion among PDW activists have led to the creation of multiple sites and have shaped the way site owners release and analyze leaked materials/declassified documents. As a result, the PDW community is dominated by four major types of sites: disruptive, government transparency, media-enabled, and independent.

Disruptive Sites

Disruptive sites are the most visible and notorious PDWs. Their activists (e.g., Julian Assange, WikiLeaks’ founder and chief spokesperson) are willing to expose all types of sensitive information, regardless of proprietary or intellectual property controls, under the auspices of serving the greater public good.54 Disruptive PDWs include WikiLeaks—the most prominent PDW to date—and Cryptome (cryptome.org)—a less-well known competitor that has been active since the 1990s and is probably the oldest PDW in operation.52 The WikiLeaks revelations in 2010 and the resulting publicity spawned a range of lesser known, and as yet less effectual, copycat sites like BalkanLeaks (balkanleaks.eu), OpenLeaks (openleaks.org), and GlobaLeaks, which seeks to help “anyone... easily set up and maintain an anonymous whistleblowing platform.”53

In addition to the tens of thousands of U.S. military and diplomatic documents revealed by WikiLeaks in 2010, disruptive PDWs have improperly disclosed a range of sensitive government materials. Cryptome, for example, has published “the names of 2,619 CIA sources, 276 British intelligence agents, 600 Japanese intelligence agents,” as well as imagery of sensitive U.S. Government sites.54 Some disruptive PDWs appear to specialize in certain types of disclosures as with the relatively new site Cryptocomb (cryptocomb.org) which maintains exclusive focus on unmasking alleged CIA officers and covert facilities.55

Government Transparency Sites

Numerous PDWs are dedicated to promoting transparency for the U.S. government. Such sites take a more pragmatic approach to secrecy in government and the private sector than do more extremist disruptive sites.56 Stephen Aftergood, Director of the Federation of American Scientists’

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51 Carafano, Wiki at War, 202-203.
53 Ibid., 115-116, 121; Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets, 229, 318-319; GlobaLeaks Home Page, www.globaleaks.org (accessed November 22, 2014). Other disruptive PDWs noted by Beckett and Greenberg include: BalkiLeaks, BritiLeaks, BrusselsLeaks, CorporateLeaks, CrowdLeaks, EnviroLeaks, FrenchLeaks, GlobaLeaks, JumboLeaks (a campus watchdog at Tufts University), Indoleaks, IrishLeaks, IsraeliLeaks, JamiiForums, JumboLeaks, KHEaks, LeakyMails, Localeaks, MapleLeaks, MurdochLeaks, OfficeLeaks, PornWikiLeaks, PinoyLeaks, PirateLeaks, QuebecLeaks, RuLeaks, ScienceLeaks, ThaiLeaks, TradeLeaks, and UniLeaks. Some sites may no longer be operating.
54 Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets, 100-101.
Secrecy Project, for example, seeks to “challenge unwarranted secrecy and to promote reform of national security information policy and practice,” but “also believes that some information should be classified.” Aftergood envisions use of the Secrecy Project to strike a “balance between what government should keep classified and what the American public should be able to see.” Likewise, many government transparency activists, such as Daniel Ellsberg (who maintains his own personal website at ellsberg.net), have been engaged in ongoing watchdog efforts for decades and do not share the same zeal as Assange and his cohorts.

The efforts of government transparency sites potentially benefit nonstate actors in several ways. A number are at the forefront of FOIA efforts to declassify government documents, providing both insight about the FOIA process and updates about newly declassified documents, whistleblowing, and leaked information—occasionally several times per week. Some sites also serve as clearinghouses for whistleblowing and whistleblowers, including links to resources to enable the filing of complaints. In addition, some government transparency sites link to or repost leaked information and provide, as does the Secrecy Project, insightful analyses regarding security and intelligence issues.

Media-Enabled Sites

In the wake of the 2010 WikiLeaks revelations, a handful of traditional media outlets (including The Wall Street Journal) created their own leaker sites (e.g., the now defunct Safehouse), apparently using the same anonymizing and encryption tools that PDWs employ. Doing so allows traditional outlets more leeway to evaluate leaked information and directly shape any subsequent story related to its release. Until the Snowden revelations in 2013, however, only one of these sites, Al Jazeera’s “Transparency Unit,” participated in a noteworthy and large-scale disclosure of sensitive materials. In January 2011, the Transparency Unit released approximately 1,700 files consisting of diplomatic correspondence, memos, e-mails, minutes of private meetings, strategy papers, and PowerPoint slides related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process from 1999-2010. The leak potentially had greater political impact than the WikiLeaks revelations, though it received far less play in established American media outlets.

Independent Sites and Blogs

An untold number of individuals with varying political agendas are routinely linking to, reposting, and blogging about sensitive and declassified information available on the Internet. Some individuals reach wide audiences, like security expert Bruce Schneier (schneier.com) who publishes the popular “Crypto-Gram” monthly e-mail newsletter. Independent sites also may directly receive
leaked information, as occurred in the case of former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) linguist Shamai Leibowitz, convicted in May 2010 of passing classified materials to a blogger.\(^6^6\)

**The Heartbeat of the War**

PDWs may disclose information that has strategic and tactical benefits for nonstate groups, including efforts to protect communications, undertake surveillance, and target individuals. Violent nonstate actors using PDW supplied information almost certainly have created, and will continue to create, new security challenges for the United States and other countries. Nonstate groups collect intelligence because “chance and uncertainty are anathema” to them. PDWs supply these groups with insights that, when combined with other intelligence, help them to exert more “predictability and control” over operations and their environment.\(^6^7\) In turn, nonstate groups can better mitigate “unforeseen circumstances” and craft more effective operations and internal processes to increase their chances for success.\(^6^8\) As Provisional Irish Republican Army operative Brendan Hughes once remarked, “[W]ithout intelligence forget about it . . . Intelligence is the heartbeat of the war.”\(^6^9\)

**Strategic-Level Benefits**

Nonstate groups are likely to combine sensitive information disclosed by PDWs with data gleaned from government publications, declassified documents, scholarly works, media stories, legal cases, and a group’s own experiences to generate exploitable and decisive insights regarding U.S. and Western military and intelligence capabilities. Document translation is no longer the barrier it once was. With the trend toward digital translation applications and increasing language group interconnectivity, most armed groups can probably easily translate documents and accompanying media stories. Translation assistance may also be received by those foreign students and native-born individuals in the United States and the West who have joined armed groups and/or participate in Internet-based propaganda efforts.\(^7^0\) Moreover, armed groups—like the Libyan fighters in the opening vignette—may be able to tap growing Internet access to “crowd source” intelligence needs, such as translation, compilation, and analysis of leaked information, using members of diaspora populations and ideological supporters outside war zones.\(^7^1\)

This potential intelligence capability may provide an armed group with a more comprehensive assessment of adversarial threats, including the capabilities of U.S. and Western military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies, intelligence gaps, and governmental tensions that hamper responses. At the same time, PDW collections of leaked documents (e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq War materials published by WikiLeaks), have lasting relevancy as documentary resources that help inform a group’s strategic-level thinking and decision making. Such information may become more valuable to nonstate groups in an era of retrenchment for the U.S. and other major western

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\(^6^8\) Ilardi, “IRA Operational Intelligence,” 347.

\(^6^9\) Ibid., 331.


\(^7^1\) Pollock, “People Power 2.0,” 63-71.
governments. Conventional warfare could soon become a more attractive and viable option for nonstate groups as it has in previous periods of retrenchment and retraction. In the years since 1944, insurgents pursued a conventional strategy in 32 percent of insurgencies since 1944 (or fifty of 156 campaigns). The collapse of Cold War-era power blocs in the 1990s, for example, encouraged 48 percent of rebel groups to use conventional warfare over guerrilla tactics, more than at any other time before or since. Extremists may indirectly benefit from PDW-based revelations that have a chilling effect on U.S. and Western information-sharing and intelligence collection efforts. PDWs are changing the information landscape in ways that require re-evaluation of best-practices with regard to intelligence gathering, dissemination, storage, and access. In the United States, the issue is best exemplified by the tension between “need to know” and “need to share” national security practices. Both Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden were able to leak large amounts of sensitive information, in part, due to the current “need-to-share” paradigm among U.S. intelligence and security agencies. In response to Congressional criticism regarding information hoarding and failure to “connect the dots” following the 9/11 attacks, U.S. intelligence and security organizations reversed the venerable counterintelligence principle of “need-to-know” in order to “share information broadly across bureaucratic lines and prepare analysis for the widest possible dissemination in order to prevent intelligence stovepiping.” As a result, Manning and Snowden had access to sensitive information unrelated to their primary responsibilities. The fallout from Manning’s and Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures has increased the likelihood that foreign intelligence services “may wish to distance themselves from mutually beneficial cooperative partnerships . . . with the U.S. government,” potentially hampering efforts to collect intelligence and quickly respond to armed groups. Germany and the United Kingdom, for example, have already scaled back their intelligence relationships with the United States due to these PDW-related leaks. At a more tactical level, the leaks have probably further complicated the already-nuanced process of U.S. information-gathering and intelligence-collection from human sources. Foreign diplomats and government officials “will think twice about sharing frank thoughts with their U.S. counterparts if they think what they say will be online tomorrow.” Current and future human intelligence sources—particularly those at risk to harm if exposed—will, likewise, need constant reassurance that the information they provide “won’t endanger them in the next tranche of leaked information.”

Communications Security

Snowden’s disclosures signaled to nonstate groups that PDWs are a potential goldmine of information regarding U.S. intelligence collection. Armed groups seek to protect communications against adversarial collection to ensure operational success and maintain internal cohesion—

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73 Ibid.
74 The source of the WikiLeaks disclosures.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 55-56.
79 Ibid., 53-55.
increasing a group’s chances of long-term survival. Al-Qa’ida operational doctrine warns fighters that the:

biggest thing that destroys organizations is the issue of communications (wire, wireless, direct, indirect). Therefore, one must pay attention to this problem and plan for this, keeping up with technological developments related to the means of communication.80

PDWs, like the one compiling and explaining the technical collection tools and programs exposed by Snowden (Bruce Schneier’s personal website), contribute instrumentally to these efforts.81 Former NSA officials indicate ISIS has exploited Snowden’s disclosures—including a leaked NSA report detailing how it electronically surveilled former bin Ladin confidant Hassan Ghul prior to his 2012 death—to learn “what types of communication to avoid or how to make them more secure.”82 The U.S. should increase its efforts to do the same.

Targeting Individuals

PDWs are potentially a significant source of identity information that could be used to harm U.S. and Western military, diplomatic, and intelligence personnel. Cryptocomb’s efforts to profile alleged CIA personnel are especially problematic. Site sponsors have compiled extensive dossiers on some individuals, including photographs, addresses, maps and street-level views of residences, past job titles, information about family members, and other personal details.83 Though no evidence exists that Cryptocomb actively supports violent groups, the site nonetheless presents the type of intelligence that extremists use to plan assassinations. Al-Qa’ida operational doctrine specifies that to pinpoint a target, groups must collect:

A. Personal information: his name, age, his photograph, his home address, his car (the make, color, license plate number, model), his daily routine . . . his weekly routine, where he spends his vacations . . .

C. Information about the house and its site (the exact address, the part of town, the block where the house is, the house or the building itself, the floor, the apartment, the room).84

Extremists may not yet have used Cryptocomb’s (or any other PDW’s) information to attack an official, but this risk is not without precedent. In 1975, Greek terrorists assassinated Richard Welch, the CIA Station Chief in Athens, Greece, after the Greek press published both his name (initially exposed in Counter Spy, a left-wing U.S. magazine) and address.85 Should extremists wish to target

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80 Cigar, Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency, 123.
83 Cryptocomb Home Page.
84 Cigar, Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency, 142-143.
the individuals on Cryptocomb, the site provides helpful information for that as well. Sadly, these individuals, whether accurately identified or not, likely remain at risk for harassment or violence because Cryptocomb’s information cannot be wholly expunged from the Internet, even were the site to remove its dossiers.

Similarly, extremists might identify spies and informants within a group by gleaning clues from leaked documents. After the WikiLeaks 2010 revelations, for example, a Taliban spokesman warned, “We will investigate through our own secret service whether the people mentioned [in Afghanistan-related documents] are really spies working for the U.S. If they are U.S. spies, then we know how to punish them.” Subsequently, the group claimed to have uncovered and executed a spy in Kandahar on the basis of information provided by WikiLeaks, although this claim has been disputed.

Whether other armed groups have undertaken similar investigations and reprisals remains unclear.

Adjunct Surveillance

Sensitive government information disclosed by PDWs also potentially benefits extremist operational planning, particularly during the initial stages. Armed groups are increasingly using the Internet to gather open-source intelligence on targets. The Internet provides a cyberspace equivalent for discreet surveillance and a forum in which to communicate findings. Easily-searched PDW collections of leaked and declassified government documents, maps and images of sensitive sites (including satellite imagery, and other materials) provide extremists with potentially operational seed material. In December 2010, WikiLeaks, for example, made a significant disclosure in this regard after publishing a classified U.S. State Department “list of worldwide critical infrastructure,” which included hydroelectric sites, pharmaceutical plants, and undersea cable locations. Some sites were probably already known, but publication of the list provided greater insight into U.S. strategic concerns, as well as potentially identifying locations that may not have previously attracted attention.

Recommendations

The volume of sensitive information for homeland security purposes continues to increase and more and more government data are stored electronically. Two high-profile leaks of sensitive U.S. government information in three years suggest that additional unauthorized disclosures are probable. Facilitated by innovations in encryption and anonymizing software, energized activists utilizing PDW information may very “well make the first half of the twenty-first century the age of the whistleblower.” Unfortunately, not all whistleblowers have the best interests of the United States at heart, and even those who do may mistakenly disclose information with devastating consequences. Although uniformly implementing stronger information controls to mitigate leaks will be a challenge, initiatives are underway. Further options that warrant attention include:

89 Brenner, America the Vulnerable, 174.
90 Carafano, Wiki at War, 202.
91 Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets, 316; Swinford, “Spy Chief.”
92 Carafano, Wiki at War, 202.
93 See James B. Bruce and W. George Jameson, Fixing Leaks: Assessing the Department of Defense’s Approach to Preventing and Deterring Unauthorized Disclosures (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2013). Bruce and
• **Seeking comprehensive legislation regarding leaks.** A recent RAND study notes that U.S. legislators and officials are now more open to reforming U.S. statues regarding information leaks and espionage.\(^94\) Accordingly, U.S. national security agencies should work with Congress and the White House to craft “new provisions distinct from the espionage laws” for those who engage in unauthorized disclosures. “Carefully tailored” civil sanctions should also be levied regarding the publication of classified information “with gross negligence or reckless disregard” for national security.\(^95\)

• **Emphasizing “need for mission” over “need to share.”** Government personnel should have access to all mission-specific information—but no more. Chelsea Manning, for example, should have been able to access only Iraq-related State Department documents, not the entire database. Likewise, access to sensitive information should be rescinded, as appropriate, once personnel move to a new account or mission.

• **Encryption enhancement.** U.S. Government computer systems, including unclassified systems, should employ multiple layers of encryption to protect data.\(^96\) If improperly removed, materials would be unreadable without decryption, thus delaying, if not completely neutralizing, the potential impact of a leak.

• **Increasing technology utilization and personnel activation.** U.S. Government agencies should leverage all computer technologies and enhance personnel education about data leaks, flagging suspicious computer-related activities, and investigating leaks as they occur. Tools are available and can be readily adapted for incorporation into new systems (e.g., the Joint Information Environment) before these systems are fielded.\(^97\)

As Internet access expands and improperly disclosed materials become more readily available via PDWs, the likelihood that such information will be used for extremist ends increases. From the Nafusa Mountains to Washington, D.C., electronic sharing of information has not only changed the way people communicate, but the way they think about, utilize, and share information. Public disclosure websites amplify information sharing beyond measure, calling forth the need for governments to change the way they think about, utilize, and share information. To survive the cutting edge, the United States must develop a comprehensive, systematic approach to information as a tactical and strategic commodity and to the threat posed by public disclosure websites and their descendants.

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Jameson provide an unclassified review and further recommendations for the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding the implementation of its anti-leak efforts enacted in the wake of Manning’s and Snowden’s leaks.

\(^94\) Ibid., 34.
\(^95\) Ibid.
\(^96\) Ibid., 33.
\(^97\) Ibid., 33-34.
The Ideological and Political Power of the Islamic State

David M. Kobs

On June 29, 2014, with the release of “This Is the Promise of Allah,” Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, spokesman of the Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham (ISIS), announced an Islamic Caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Caliph of all Muslims, and changed the name ISIS to the Islamic State. That summer, Iraq’s army collapsed. The insurgent army of ISIS advanced into Mosul and central Iraq, virtually erasing four divisions of Iraqi troops and massacring at least 750 prisoners. In less than 90 days, ISIS had succeeded in accumulating the largest treasury of any terrorist group, controlling a population of 5,000,000 in an area of Iraq and Syria equal in size to Jordan, and demonstrating the capability to place an army of 20,000 to 30,000 in the field. Public outcry from regional and western nations continues to call for military intervention by means of bombing or, if necessary, “boots on the ground.” Yet, military intervention cannot be successful absent a larger campaign to address both the root causes that prompted the rise of ISIS and the underlying sources of power that sustain it.

That larger campaign must begin with an assessment of the unique combination of ideology and political power at the core of ISIS. Applying Michael Mann’s framework for evaluating the relative power of states along military, economic, political, and ideological dimensions provides a more comprehensive understanding of ISIS and its uses of power to control a population. Mann’s

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This paper uses the abbreviation ISIS when referring to the Islamic State to maintain consistency with the most commonly used academic and journalistic practices. The Arabic name “Dawlat Islamia fi al-Iraq wa as-Sham” can be translated as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The organization shortened its name to the Islamic State on June 29, 2014. Other common abbreviations include IS, ISIL, or “Daesh” (Arabic). See also Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani, “This Is the Promise of Allah - the Proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate,” http://myreader.toile-libre.org/uploads/My_53b039f00cb03.pdf (accessed October 25, 2014).


For an example of this model applied to the al-Qaeda network see: David M. Kobs, “Terrorist Support of the State: The Al-Qaeda Network and Failed States” (master’s thesis, University of Texas, 2005).
definition of states as “multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power” allows for a wider application of his ideas to non-traditional states and groups of nonstate actors. Mann’s key measures for defining state power include how extensive it is (i.e., ability to control from a distance), how intensive (levels of individual commitment), authoritative (conscious obedience), diffuse (spontaneous obedience), despotic (leader forces activity) and infrastructural (ability of the state to penetrate society). Within Mann’s structure, ISIS is best understood as a power network in contention with other networks for control of a population in both physical and virtual space. The success of ISIS in controlling physical territory results directly from its greater relative strength in both spaces as compared to the other networks in contention (e.g., Syria, Iraq, Kurds, other Syrian resistance groups, al-Qaeda, and the U.S. led coalition).

ISIS adheres to a belief in a perfect Islamic “golden age” that blends the political and religious spheres under a Caliph, thereby increasing the importance of ideological power. This ideology reinforces political power to control three separate populations: (1) true believers who form the central cadre of ISIS members, (2) subject populations who live in ISIS controlled territory and are thus forced to comply with ISIS dictates (although they may not be actively supportive of ISIS), and (3) ISIS sympathizers who are inclined to support the Caliphate from within their dispersed resident communities.

ISIS draws most of its power from its ideology. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself Caliph which, if legitimate, would accord him both religious and civil power over Muslims worldwide. As a lineal descendent of al-Qaeda, ISIS uses much of al-Qaeda’s theology to justify its actions. Islamic scholars characterize this doctrine as either takfiri or khuwariji. ISIS supporters consider their interpretation of Islam as the only true one, declaring that any Muslim who does not agree is an apostate or heretic. Heretics must be converted or killed. Ideology of this ilk makes tolerance and reason difficult. Those who resist, counter, debate or reject the perfect theology of ISIS are considered apostate regardless of religious credentials. The belief system is complete and closed.

ISIS competes against other radical Islamic and terrorist organizations for supporters throughout the global community. Since its earliest incarnation as al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS has prioritized allotting resources to its media wing in order to build domestic and international support.

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7 Michael Mann, The Sources of State Power: Volume II – The Rise of Classes and Nation-states, 1760-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 6-59. Mann uses eight descriptors to characterize state power: distributive vs. collective, extensive vs. intensive, authoritative vs. diffused, and despotic vs. infrastructural. Distributive power is zero sum while collective power can be strengthened by two parties working together against a third. Extensive power is the state’s ability to control activities over long distances. Intensive power is the level of commitment individuals have to their work. Authoritative power is conscious obedience to directed commands and diffused power is unconscious and spontaneous obedience; these may coexist but one will dominate. Despotic power is the ability of the leader to force obedience. Infrastructural power refers to the state’s ability to logistically implement decisions throughout its territory. ISIS has strong despotic, authoritative, and distributive tendencies; extensive and intensive power are weak among the general populace but strong among core members.

9 ISIS evolved over time from Abu Mussab al Zarqawi’s Jamaat al Tawheed wa al Jihad (Group for Monotheism and Jihad) formed in Jordan in 1999. Zarqawi moved his organization to Iraq following the 2003 U.S. invasion, petitioned to join al-Qaeda, and the group became Tansim Qadaat al Jihad fi Balad al Rafa’dayn (Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers or Al Qaeda in Iraq). The group renamed itself Dowlat Islamia fi Balad al Rafa’dayn (The Islamic State in the Land of the Two Rivers or The Islamic State of Iraq) in 2006. Despite years of operations on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border and active participation in the Syrian civil war since 2012, it did not add Syria to its title – Dowlat Islamia fi al-Iraq wa as-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) until 2013. The final name change to Dowlat Islamia (Islamic State) occurred in 2014.


11 Al-Adnani, “This Is the Promise of Allah,” 9-10.
They easily transmit ideological doctrine through social and physical networks\textsuperscript{12} across the global community, thus wooing recruits, garnering supporters, and reinforcing the true believers. While a handful of jihadist groups have pledged fealty to ISIS, mainstream al-Qaeda branches remain loyal to the al-Qaeda hierarchy.\textsuperscript{13} As al-Baghdadi indicated in his call for doctors and engineers to migrate to the Islamic State and join the fight,\textsuperscript{14} attracting foreigners is a top priority for ISIS. Maintaining expatriate support is also crucial. Key expectations of expatriate supporters include: financing the cause, acting unilaterally in “lone wolf” operations, and creating loyalist groups in their homelands.

Though ideologically strong, ISIS is not invincible. Political power is the weakest element of ISIS’ authority. Although the organization appears to be more interested in governing its territory than were earlier groups (e.g., the Taliban), governance, per se, is not its strength. In the absence of true political power, ISIS relies extensively on force and the threat of force to coerce adherence and obedience.\textsuperscript{15} ISIS has been reasonably successful, however, in responding to a political need among a sizeable population segment: the Sunni populations severely repressed in Iraq and Syria. Seizing this opportunity helps ISIS to construct transactional alliances, further strengthening its political influence with former Baathists, other rebel groups, criminal networks, and oppressed Sunni tribesmen.

ISIS adroitly ties ideology to political power by declaring that the only true source of law is Divine. Because, as Sayyid Qutub declared, people “should not decide any affair on their own, but must refer to God’s injunctions concerning it and follow them,”\textsuperscript{16} ISIS depends upon a religious ideology that dictates all aspects of public and personal life. That ideology is transferred politically to ISIS as the (self-declared) Divine authority on Earth. ISIS, then, is responsible for enforcing God’s injunctions. In “This is the Promise of Allah,” ISIS makes clear the connection between religious ideology and political power, stating that because ISIS performs political functions—appointing governors and judges, making tax collections, and implementing a legal system—ISIS therefore constitutes the Caliphate.\textsuperscript{18} Thus ISIS has established a system in which ISIS members voluntarily obey political expectations and enforce prescribed directives on the subject population under the auspices of the perceived unity of Allah and ISIS. Although the rule is frequently brutal, political services are provided within well-defined rules. The success with which ISIS has blended ideological and political authority has accorded ISIS the ability to act with strong intensive, extensive, and diffused power. ISIS members and supporters follow guidance from the central authority over long distances, are personally devoted to the cause, and act spontaneously in accordance with prescribed guidelines. For the most part, however, the subject populations under ISIS are not ideologically motivated. Those subjected to ISIS’ rule by virtue of geography generally obey (to the extent they must) out of fear. This generates low infrastructural power so ISIS finds implementing decisions difficult except in areas where increased presence forces compliance.

\textsuperscript{13} Khalil, “Caliphate Question”
\textsuperscript{15} Itani, “State Building,” 5-6.
\textsuperscript{18} Al-Adnani, “This Is the Promise of Allah,” 4-5.
In comparison, the governments of Iraq and Syria have extremely low ratings in all dimensions of power within the space controlled by ISIS. Years of persecution have resulted in Iraq and Syria projecting power primarily via authoritative and despotic means. Actions do not occur without the presence of state security forces. Kurdish regions of both states, however, have strong social power based on their homogeneous populations and long tradition of resisting government authority and social pressure. The Kurds—ranking high on both intensive and diffused power—are individually committed to defending their region and therefore act independently to protect it. Historically speaking, although Kurdish forces have suffered defeats, they have not acquiesced nor have they suffered a complete rout as that which befell Iraqi forces; Kurdish will to resist remains steadfast.

ISIS, then, cannot be defeated solely on military terms. The limited success of military operations to date serves as a case-in-point. In June 2014, the U.S. and its allies launched Operation Inherent Resolve as part of an overarching strategy to combat ISIS. The campaign targets ISIS in Iraq and Syria while simultaneously increasing military assistance to the Iraqi Military and Kurdish Peshmerga. As a result, the front line forces of the Iraqi Army and Kurdish defense forces have been bolstered, but no amount of bombing short of complete annihilation can defeat an ideology.

The primary focus of the anti-ISIS coalition, then, must be countering the political and ideological tenants that seemingly empower ISIS. The military elements of national power, meanwhile, can help buy time for political reform and ideological change. Importantly, non-Muslim states, including the U.S. must avoid any overt appearance or actual entry into the ideological debate. Arguments that counter the takfiri message will only resonate with true believers and followers if those arguments are advanced by Muslim scholars and spiritual leaders. Spiritual authorities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt may be best positioned to successfully engage ISIS in the ideological sphere. Senior religious leaders have started to publish anti-ISIS messages in an effort to counter the takfiri monologue. Two of the most important are a fatwa by Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mufti which states “extremism, radicalism and terrorism do not belong to Islam in any way,”\(^\text{19}\) and an open letter to al-Baghdadi signed by over 100 religious scholars that systematically debunks the theology and actions of ISIS point by point.\(^\text{20}\) Although such arguments are unlikely to sway core members of ISIS, they are likely to impact global fund raising and recruiting efforts by diverting some ISIS supporters away from the cause. Arab states need to create or strengthen existing counter radicalization programs, to include education (to counter blind adherence to takfiri ideologies) and rehabilitation programs for former fighters. Fighters who feel they must choose between victory and death are likely to remain on the battlefield. Those with perceived options may choose a different path. Rehabilitation programs can facilitate both reconciliation and reintegration into civil society.

Additionally, institutions must be built to counter ISIS’ strength in the political arena. Creating and sustaining such institutions in Syria is impossible at this time due to the ongoing civil war, but is more feasible in Iraq. Iraqi political reforms which stress inclusiveness rather than Shi’a supremacy are essential to addressing Sunni grievances. Unless Iraq’s government provides for greater political inclusion, Sunni resistance and general unrest and disorder will continue. Similar inclusive changes are warranted in the nations from which ISIS draws foreign fighters. Lack of opportunity combined with social exclusion are powerful forces driving individuals towards radicalism and potential violence.

Without significant political reforms, a military victory over ISIS would be transitory at best. New groups will continue to surface as long as the overall situation remains unchanged. ISIS and


similar groups must be defeated by advancing strong arguments that counter their ideology and by much greater socio-political inclusion for young Muslims. The struggle will be won online—not on the ground, by nurturing hearts and minds—not bombing weapons stockpiles, through proactive leadership by Islamic leaders capable of impacting Muslim people worldwide—not high power military force delivered by Western agents in the deserts of Iraq and Syria.
Negotiating with Terrorists: The Way Forward

Craig Simonsgaard

The United States policy of not negotiating with terrorists fails to serve American security interests. By refusing to negotiate, the U.S. effectively seals the fate of both hostage(s) and terrorist(s), prevents all possibility of finding a diplomatic solution, denies the U.S. an opportunity to gather information via negotiation, and, in essence, serves to justify terrorist executions for both terrorists and their supporters. Denying even the possibility of negotiation not only serves terrorist ends by making their actions appear all the more just in the face of U.S. absolutism, but it also unnecessarily and severely limits U.S. options. In short, the U.S. should end its absolutist no-negotiation policy and be open to negotiating with terrorists when doing so would benefit U.S. interests.

The no-negotiation policy exists for a variety of understandable reasons. Perhaps the most common and compelling rationale mirrors that advanced by Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) in the context of the Sergeant Bergdahl trade. Cruz emphasized that the reason the U.S. does not negotiate with terrorists is “because once you start doing it, every other terrorist has an incentive to capture more soldiers.”1 Supporters of the no-negotiation policy further fear that negotiating with terrorists can lead to concessions that, although seemingly small to U.S. negotiators, will encourage terrorists to believe that they are being effective and should therefore press-on to gain future concessions.2 Because terrorists do not pose an existential threat to U.S. national security, they warrant neither the respect nor the commitment of resources necessary for negotiation. Acknowledging even the possibility of negotiation is abhorrent, therefore, because it could yield unexpected rewards for terrorist behavior, suggest that the terrorist and terrorist demands are attention worthy, and imply that the terrorist situation is a credible threat to the continued existence of the United States. These fears constitute the three most common arguments in support of the no-negotiation policy. Neumann summed the policy nicely when stating:

Democracies must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. Negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermine actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Talks can destabilize the

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negotiating governments’ political system, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent.\(^3\)

Elocution and passion aside, each of these arguments misses the point.

Under certain circumstances, negotiating with violent non-state actors is appropriate even when it could be construed as rewarding terrorist behavior. The release of U.S. POWs, for example, requires negotiation\(^4\) and is worthy of the effort. In addition, not all actions that may appear “rewarding” do, in fact, carry rewards. U.S. Soldiers, for example, understand the potential consequence of being captured by Taliban or Al-Qaeda forces (likely beheading) and go to great lengths to avoid that scenario.\(^5\) As Harris notes: “the Islamic State . . . lately seems to be far more interested in butchering Americans than in taking money to set them free.”\(^6\) Senator Cruz’s argument, therefore, that negotiating for a U.S. POW would only incentivize terrorist hostage taking is incorrect. If terrorists could capture more U.S. forces they would—regardless of whether or not they could negotiate a concession or settlement of some kind. No reward is necessary to encourage soldier capture, just as no reward is possible to force terrorist organizations to play by democratic rules.\(^7\) Terrorist groups of the 21st century represent a serious threat to the long term social, political, and economic stability of governments and communities across the globe. Many terrorist organizations are credible adversaries with whom a measure of dialogue can, at worst, be informative. Successful negotiation does not require shared democratic values. The United States, for example, has negotiated formally and informally with the Soviets, the Cubans, and the North Vietnamese; none of them were playing by democratic rules and all of them used force (or the threat of force) in an effort to gain political advantage.

The lethality, size, international reach, information operations, and economic consequences of modern terrorist organizations are substantial. Thus, concern over granting legitimacy to terrorist groups is misplaced: They already have real power and are causing real problems for legitimate governments. An organization that can orchestrate killing approximately 3,000 people in one morning, for example, is an organization with sufficient agency that labels of “legitimate” are irrelevant. Terrorists have become players on the international scene and can no longer be ignored and diplomatically dismissed. \textit{Terrorist groups may be of significant size}. Shining Path, a left-wing group in Peru that reached its high water mark in the 1990’s, for example, reportedly had 10,000 full-time fighters and between 50,000 and 100,000 supporters.\(^8\) \textit{Terrorist groups inflict significant casualties}. World-wide casualty rates per attack have increased over 500 percent during the past 40 years. In the late 60s/early 70s the average number of victims (killed and wounded) by international terrorism was 2.08 per attack. Early in the 2000s, that rate had increased to 10.89 victims per attack.\(^9\) The impact on the United States in 2001 was proportionally even greater. In the 1970’s, 17 percent of attacks resulted in U.S. fatalities but by the 1990s, that rate increased to 25 percent.\(^10\) \textit{Activities by terrorists groups can have devastating economic repercussions}. One


\(^5\) Observation based on the author’s experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most Soldiers do not believe they will be treated in accord with international law and go to great lengths to protect themselves from capture.


\(^7\) Neumann, “Negotiating With Terrorists,” 6.


estimate, for example, put the costs associated with the 9/11 Twin Towers attacks at $3.3 trillion.\textsuperscript{11} Regardless of the perceived “legitimacy” of terrorist organizations, they nevertheless must be addressed.

Terrorism that does not pose an existential threat to the United States is still terrorism whether or not it succeeds in meeting terrorist objectives or causing real national harm.\textsuperscript{12} The perception of terrorism as a grave and global problem permeates American culture and heavily influences both domestic and international policy and strategy. The threat, in other words, even if not entirely existential, is real nevertheless. According to Jackson:

One of the important consequences of the 11 September 2001 attacks was a rapid transformation in the security priorities of many Western states and international organizations. In a relatively short space of time, terrorism emerged as arguably the single most important security issue; its elevation up the list of priorities quickly engendered an impressive array of new anti-terrorism laws, agencies, doctrines, strategies, programmes, initiatives, and measures. The terrorism threat is now a major focus of policy-making attention and commands enormous intellectual and material investment from the security establishment, the emergency services, industry and commerce, the academy and the media.\textsuperscript{13}

Real threats have real costs. The western world struggles with the expenses associated with fighting terrorism. In 2012, the U.S. committed approximately $17.2 billion in classified funds to be spent by the intelligence community defending against terrorism\textsuperscript{14} while the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spent $47.4 billion. Although not every dollar went to counter-terrorist programs, DHS nevertheless exists as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks.\textsuperscript{15} Even if terrorism is not regularly successful,\textsuperscript{16} it would still be cheaper in the long run to avoid conflict. Avoiding conflict is nearly impossible without some avenue for negotiation.

The benefits of ending the U.S. no-negotiation policy far outweigh the largely fallacious reasons for maintaining the hardline. First, reversing the policy would allow the U.S. government to pursue a diplomatic solution without having to violate its own no-negotiation policy. When news broke of the Sergeant Bergdahl trade, for example, the media was filled with rhetoric chastising the administration for “violating its own rules” without regard for the value of executing that deal. A more flexible policy would foster more strategic consistency and allow political leaders to pursue the most appropriate options in each particular circumstance. The second reason is that negotiation can benefit the U.S. when further conflict is likely and possibly inevitable. Even if negotiations fail, the U.S. might gain valuable intelligence about adversaries through the negotiation process. Negotiation based intelligence gathering not only includes gaining organizational information like personal connections and chain of command, but also generates a better understanding of the true interests of terrorist leaders who may say one thing to constituents but have different personal or organizational objectives.\textsuperscript{17} Knowing as much as possible about an adversary is


\textsuperscript{16} Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” 42-78.

essential. Negotiation can be helpful in that regard. Third, when appropriate, offering to negotiate could show U.S. commitment to problem solving. Even if terrorist leaders reject an offer to talk, the very act of negotiation willingness by U.S. authorities could signal to terrorist supporters that their leaders prefer violence over negotiation. In short, a willingness to negotiate could potentially lead to the start or widening of a rift between terrorist leaders and followers.

Recognizing the “high costs” of giving concessions to terrorists may seem like encouraging future attacks, Fisher, Ury, and Patton suggest that:

through communication it may be possible to convince terrorists (and possible future terrorists) that they will not receive a ransom [or whatever concession they are trying to achieve]. It may also be possible to learn of some legitimate interests they have and to work out an arrangement in which neither side gives in.

More convincing is their simple, almost obvious, point that “In general, the better the communication, the better your chance to exert influence.” The no-negotiation policy curtails in significant ways the opportunity for the U.S. to display leadership while exerting influence.

Clearly, negotiation is not a cure-all avenue for dealing with terrorism. With or without negotiation, the way ahead will be fraught with difficulties and hard choices. Although communication will never overcome “insurmountable differences,” “without open channels of communication, opportunities to explore common interests may be missed.” When dealing with well organized, violent, nonstate actors, the U.S. should remove its own gag, trust its own leadership, and add the possibility of negotiation to its arsenal.

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19 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 38.
21 Ibid., 163.
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